‘Where our ideas [do] not copy definitely their object, what does agreement with that object mean? . . . Pragmatism asks its usual question. “Grant an idea or belief to be true,” it says, “what concrete difference will its being true make in any one’s actual life? What experiences [may] be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? How will the truth be realized? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?” The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: TRUE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CAN ASSIMILATE, VALIDATE1, CORROBORATE2, AND VERIFY. FALSE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CANNOT. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that therefore is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as.
‘The truth of an idea is not a stagnant3 property inherent in it. Truth HAPPENS to an idea. It BECOMES true, is MADE true by events. Its verity4 IS in fact an event, a process, the process namely of its verifying itself, its veriFICATION. Its validity is the process of its validATION5. 1
‘To agree in the widest sense with a reality can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed. Better either intellectually or practically . . . . Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings6, that doesn’t entangle7 our progress in frustrations8, that FITS, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality’s whole setting, will agree sufficiently9 to meet the requirement. It will be true of that reality.
‘THE TRUE, to put it very briefly10, IS ONLY THE EXPEDIENT11 IN THE WAY OF OUR THINKING, JUST AS THE RIGHT IS ONLY THE EXPEDIENT IN THE WAY OF OUR BEHAVING. Expedient in almost any fashion, and expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course; for what meets expediently12 all the experience in sight won’t necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of BOILING OVER, and making us correct our present formulas.’
This account of truth, following upon the similar ones given by Messrs. Dewey and Schiller, has occasioned the liveliest discussion. Few critics have defended it, most of them have scouted13 it. It seems evident that the subject is a hard one to understand, under its apparent simplicity14; and evident also, I think, that the definitive15 settlement of it will mark a turning-point in the history of epistemology, and consequently in that of general philosophy. In order to make my own thought more accessible to those who hereafter may have to study the question, I have collected in the volume that follows all the work of my pen that bears directly on the truth-question. My first statement was in 1884, in the article that begins the present volume. The other papers follow in the order of their publication. Two or three appear now for the first time.
One of the accusations16 which I oftenest have had to meet is that of making the truth of our religious beliefs consist in their ‘feeling good’ to us, and in nothing else. I regret to have given some excuse for this charge, by the unguarded language in which, in the book Pragmatism, I spoke17 of the truth of the belief of certain philosophers in the absolute. Explaining why I do not believe in the absolute myself (p. 78), yet finding that it may secure ‘moral holidays’ to those who need them, and is true in so far forth18 (if to gain moral holidays be a good), 2 I offered this as a conciliatory olive-branch to my enemies. But they, as is only too common with such offerings, trampled19 the gift under foot and turned and rent the giver. I had counted too much on their good will — oh for the rarity of Christian20 charity under the sun! Oh for the rarity of ordinary secular21 intelligence also! I had supposed it to be matter of common observation that, of two competing views of the universe which in all other respects are equal, but of which the first denies some vital human need while the second satisfies it, the second will be favored by sane22 men for the simple reason that it makes the world seem more rational. To choose the first view under such circumstances would be an ascetic23 act, an act of philosophic24 self-denial of which no normal human being would be guilty. Using the pragmatic test of the meaning of concepts, I had shown the concept of the absolute to MEAN nothing but the holiday giver, the banisher of cosmic fear. One’s objective deliverance, when one says ‘the absolute exists,’ amounted, on my showing, just to this, that ‘some justification25 of a feeling of security in presence of the universe,’ exists, and that systematically26 to refuse to cultivate a feeling of security would be to do violence to a tendency in one’s emotional life which might well be respected as prophetic.
Apparently27 my absolutist critics fail to see the workings of their own minds in any such picture, so all that I can do is to apologize, and take my offering back. The absolute is true in NO way then, and least of all, by the verdict of the critics, in the way which I assigned!
My treatment of ‘God,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘design’ was similar. Reducing, by the pragmatic test, the meaning of each of these concepts to its positive experienceable operation, I showed them all to mean the same thing, viz., the presence of ‘promise’ in the world. ‘God or no God?’ means ‘promise or no promise?’ It seems to me that the alternative is objective enough, being a question as to whether the cosmos28 has one character or another, even though our own provisional answer be made on subjective29 grounds. Nevertheless christian and non-christian critics alike accuse me of summoning people to say ‘God exists,’ EVEN WHEN HE DOESN’T EXIST, because forsooth in my philosophy the ‘truth’ of the saying doesn’t really mean that he exists in any shape whatever, but only that to say so feels good.
Most of the pragmatist and anti-pragmatist warfare30 is over what the word ‘truth’ shall be held to signify, and not over any of the facts embodied31 in truth-situations; for both pragmatists and anti-pragmatists believe in existent objects, just as they believe in our ideas of them. The difference is that when the pragmatists speak of truth, they mean exclusively some thing about the ideas, namely their workableness; whereas when anti-pragmatists speak of truth they seem most often to mean something about the objects. Since the pragmatist, if he agrees that an idea is ‘really’ true, also agrees to whatever it says about its object; and since most anti-pragmatists have already come round to agreeing that, if the object exists, the idea that it does so is workable; there would seem so little left to fight about that I might well be asked why instead of reprinting my share in so much verbal wrangling32, I do not show my sense of ‘values’ by burning it all up.
I understand the question and I will give my answer. I am interested in another doctrine33 in philosophy to which I give the name of radical34 empiricism, and it seems to me that the establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail. Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate35, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion.
The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn36 from experience. [Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate.]
The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.
The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended37 universe needs, in short, no extraneous38 trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated39 or continuous structure.
The great obstacle to radical empiricism in the contemporary mind is the rooted rationalist belief that experience as immediately given is all disjunction and no conjunction, and that to make one world out of this separateness, a higher unifying40 agency must be there. In the prevalent idealism this agency is represented as the absolute all-witness which ‘relates’ things together by throwing ‘categories’ over them like a net. The most peculiar41 and unique, perhaps, of all these categories is supposed to be the truth-relation, which connects parts of reality in pairs, making of one of them a knower, and of the other a thing known, yet which is itself contentless experientially, neither describable, explicable, nor reduceable to lower terms, and denotable only by uttering the name ‘truth.’
The pragmatist view, on the contrary, of the truth-relation is that it has a definite content, and that everything in it is experienceable. Its whole nature can be told in positive terms. The ‘workableness’ which ideas must have, in order to be true, means particular workings, physical or intellectual, actual or possible, which they may set up from next to next inside of concrete experience. Were this pragmatic contention42 admitted, one great point in the victory of radical empiricism would also be scored, for the relation between an object and the idea that truly knows it, is held by rationalists to be nothing of this describable sort, but to stand outside of all possible temporal experience; and on the relation, so interpreted, rationalism is wonted to make its last most obdurate43 rally.
Now the anti-pragmatist contentions44 which I try to meet in this volume can be so easily used by rationalists as weapons of resistance, not only to pragmatism but to radical empiricism also (for if the truth-relation were transcendent, others might be so too), that I feel strongly the strategical importance of having them definitely met and got out of the way. What our critics most persistently45 keep saying is that though workings go with truth, yet they do not constitute it. It is numerically additional to them, prior to them, explanatory OF them, and in no wise to be explained BY them, we are incessantly46 told. The first point for our enemies to establish, therefore, is that SOMETHING numerically additional and prior to the workings is involved in the truth of an idea. Since the OBJECT is additional, and usually prior, most rationalists plead IT, and boldly accuse us of denying it. This leaves on the bystanders the impression — since we cannot reasonably deny the existence of the object — that our account of truth breaks down, and that our critics have driven us from the field. Altho in various places in this volume I try to refute the slanderous47 charge that we deny real existence, I will say here again, for the sake of emphasis, that the existence of the object, whenever the idea asserts it ‘truly,’ is the only reason, in innumerable cases, why the idea does work successfully, if it work at all; and that it seems an abuse of language, to say the least, to transfer the word ‘truth’ from the idea to the object’s existence, when the falsehood of ideas that won’t work is explained by that existence as well as the truth of those that will.
I find this abuse prevailing48 among my most accomplished49 adversaries50. But once establish the proper verbal custom, let the word ‘truth’ represent a property of the idea, cease to make it something mysteriously connected with the object known, and the path opens fair and wide, as I believe, to the discussion of radical empiricism on its merits. The truth of an idea will then mean only its workings, or that in it which by ordinary psychological laws sets up those workings; it will mean neither the idea’s object, nor anything ‘saltatory’ inside the idea, that terms drawn from experience cannot describe.
One word more, ere I end this preface. A distinction is sometimes made between Dewey, Schiller and myself, as if I, in supposing the object’s existence, made a concession51 to popular prejudice which they, as more radical pragmatists, refuse to make. As I myself understand these authors, we all three absolutely agree in admitting the transcendency of the object (provided it be an experienceable object) to the subject, in the truth-relation. Dewey in particular has insisted almost ad nauseam that the whole meaning of our cognitive52 states and processes lies in the way they intervene in the control and revaluation of independent existences or facts. His account of knowledge is not only absurd, but meaningless, unless independent existences be there of which our ideas take account, and for the transformation53 of which they work. But because he and Schiller refuse to discuss objects and relations ‘transcendent’ in the sense of being ALTOGETHER TRANS-EXPERIENTIAL, their critics pounce54 on sentences in their writings to that effect to show that they deny the existence WITHIN THE REALM OF EXPERIENCE of objects external to the ideas that declare their presence there. 3
It seems incredible that educated and apparently sincere critics should so fail to catch their adversary’s point of view.
What misleads so many of them is possibly also the fact that the universes of discourse55 of Schiller, Dewey, and myself are panoramas57 of different extent, and that what the one postulates58 explicitly59 the other provisionally leaves only in a state of implication, while the reader thereupon considers it to be denied. Schiller’s universe is the smallest, being essentially60 a psychological one. He starts with but one sort of thing, truth-claims, but is led ultimately to the independent objective facts which they assert, inasmuch as the most successfully validated61 of all claims is that such facts are there. My universe is more essentially epistemological. I start with two things, the objective facts and the claims, and indicate which claims, the facts being there, will work successfully as the latter’s substitutes and which will not. I call the former claims true. Dewey’s panorama56, if I understand this colleague, is the widest of the three, but I refrain from giving my own account of its complexity62. Suffice it that he holds as firmly as I do to objects independent of our judgments63. If I am wrong in saying this, he must correct me. I decline in this matter to be corrected at second hand.
I have not pretended in the following pages to consider all the critics of my account of truth, such as Messrs. Taylor, Lovejoy, Gardiner, Bakewell, Creighton, Hibben, Parodi, Salter, Carus, Lalande, Mentre, McTaggart, G. E. Moore, Ladd and others, especially not Professor Schinz, who has published under the title of Anti-pragmatisme an amusing sociological romance. Some of these critics seem to me to labor64 under an inability almost pathetic, to understand the thesis which they seek to refute. I imagine that most of their difficulties have been answered by anticipation65 elsewhere in this volume, and I am sure that my readers will thank me for not adding more repetition to the fearful amount that is already there.
95 IRVING ST., CAMBRIDGE (MASS.), August, 1909.
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1
validate
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| vt.（法律）使有效，使生效 | |
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corroborate
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| v.支持，证实，确定 | |
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stagnant
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| adj.不流动的，停滞的，不景气的 | |
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verity
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| n.真实性 | |
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validation
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| n.确认 | |
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belongings
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| n.私人物品，私人财物 | |
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entangle
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| vt.缠住，套住；卷入，连累 | |
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frustrations
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| 挫折( frustration的名词复数 )； 失败； 挫败； 失意 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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expediently
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| adv.方便地，得当地，便利地 | |
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scouted
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| 寻找，侦察( scout的过去式和过去分词 )； 物色（优秀运动员、演员、音乐家等） | |
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simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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definitive
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| adj.确切的，权威性的；最后的，决定性的 | |
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accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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trampled
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| 踩( trample的过去式和过去分词 )； 践踏； 无视； 侵犯 | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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secular
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| n.牧师，凡人；adj.世俗的，现世的，不朽的 | |
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sane
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| adj.心智健全的，神志清醒的，明智的，稳健的 | |
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ascetic
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| adj.禁欲的；严肃的 | |
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philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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cosmos
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| n.宇宙；秩序，和谐 | |
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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wrangling
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| v.争吵，争论，口角( wrangle的现在分词 ) | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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extraneous
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| adj.体外的；外来的；外部的 | |
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concatenated
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| v.把 （一系列事件、事情等）联系起来( concatenate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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unifying
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| 使联合( unify的现在分词 )； 使相同； 使一致； 统一 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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obdurate
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| adj.固执的，顽固的 | |
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contentions
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| n.竞争( contention的名词复数 )；争夺；争论；论点 | |
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persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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slanderous
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| adj.诽谤的，中伤的 | |
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prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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cognitive
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| adj.认知的，认识的，有感知的 | |
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transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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pounce
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| n.猛扑；v.猛扑，突然袭击，欣然同意 | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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panorama
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| n.全景，全景画，全景摄影，全景照片[装置] | |
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panoramas
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| 全景画( panorama的名词复数 )； 全景照片； 一连串景象或事 | |
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postulates
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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explicitly
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| ad.明确地，显然地 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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validated
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| v.证实( validate的过去式和过去分词 )；确证；使生效；使有法律效力 | |
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complexity
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| n.复杂(性)，复杂的事物 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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