To be helped to anticipate consequences is always a gain, and such being the help that abstract concepts give us, it is obvious that their use is fulfilled only when we get back again into concrete particulars by their means, bearing the consequences in our minds, and enriching our notion of the original objects therewithal.
Without abstract concepts to handle our perceptual particulars by, we are like men hopping3 on one foot. Using concepts along with the particulars, we become bipedal. We throw our concept forward, get a foothold on the consequence, hitch5 our line to this, and draw our percept up, travelling thus with a hop4, skip and jump over the surface of life at a vastly rapider rate than if we merely waded7 through the thickness of the particulars as accident rained them down upon our heads. Animals have to do this, but men raise their heads higher and breathe freely in the upper conceptual air.
The enormous esteem8 professed9 by all philosophers for the conceptual form of consciousness is easy to understand. From Plato’s time downwards10 it has been held to be our sole avenue to essential truth. Concepts are universal, changeless, pure; their relations are eternal; they are spiritual, while the concrete particulars which they enable us to handle are corrupted11 by the flesh. They are precious in themselves, then, apart from their original use, and confer new dignity upon our life.
One can find no fault with this way of feeling about concepts so long as their original function does not get swallowed up in the admiration12 and lost. That function is of course to enlarge mentally our momentary13 experiences by ADDING to them the consequences conceived; but unfortunately, that function is not only too often forgotten by philosophers in their reasonings, but is often converted into its exact opposite, and made a means of diminishing the original experience by DENYING (implicitly or explicitly) all its features save the one specially14 abstracted to conceive it by.
This itself is a highly abstract way of stating my complaint, and it needs to be redeemed15 from obscurity by showing instances of what is meant. Some beliefs very dear to my own heart have been conceived in this viciously abstract way by critics. One is the ‘will to believe,’ so called; another is the indeterminism of certain futures16; a third is the notion that truth may vary with the standpoint of the man who holds it. I believe that the perverse17 abuse of the abstracting function has led critics to employ false arguments against these doctrines20, and often has led their readers to false conclusions. I should like to try to save the situation, if possible, by a few counter-critical remarks.
Let me give the name of ‘vicious abstractionism’ to a way of using concepts which may be thus described: We conceive a concrete situation by singling out some salient or important feature in it, and classing it under that; then, instead of adding to its previous characters all the positive consequences which the new way of conceiving it may bring, we proceed to use our concept privatively; reducing the originally rich phenomenon to the naked suggestions of that name abstractly taken, treating it as a case of ‘nothing but’ that concept, and acting18 as if all the other characters from out of which the concept is abstracted were expunged21. 59 Abstraction, functioning in this way, becomes a means of arrest far more than a means of advance in thought. It mutilates things; it creates difficulties and finds impossibilities; and more than half the trouble that metaphysicians and logicians give themselves over the paradoxes23 and dialectic puzzles of the universe may, I am convinced, be traced to this relatively24 simple source. THE VICIOUSLY PRIVATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF ABSTRACT CHARACTERS AND CLASS NAMES is, I am persuaded, one of the great original sins of the rationalistic mind.
To proceed immediately to concrete examples, cast a glance at the belief in ‘free will,’ demolished25 with such specious26 persuasiveness27 recently by the skilful28 hand of Professor Fullerton. 60 When a common man says that his will is free, what does he mean? He means that there are situations of bifurcation inside of his life in which two futures seem to him equally possible, for both have their roots equally planted in his present and his past. Either, if realized, will grow out of his previous motives29, character and circumstances, and will continue uninterruptedly the pulsations of his personal life. But sometimes both at once are incompatible30 with physical nature, and then it seems to the naive31 observer as if he made a choice between them NOW, and that the question of which future is to be, instead of having been decided32 at the foundation of the world, were decided afresh at every passing moment in I which fact seems livingly to grow, and possibility seems, in turning itself towards one act, to exclude all others.
He who takes things at their face-value here may indeed be deceived. He may far too often mistake his private ignorance of what is predetermined for a real indetermination of what is to be. Yet, however imaginary it may be, his picture of the situation offers no appearance of breach34 between the past and future. A train is the same train, its passengers are the same passengers, its momentum35 is the same momentum, no matter which way the switch which fixes its direction is placed. For the indeterminist there is at all times enough past for all the different futures in sight, and more besides, to find their reasons in it, and whichever future comes will slide out of that past as easily as the train slides by the switch. The world, in short, is just as CONTINUOUS WITH ITSELF for the believers in free will as for the rigorous determinists, only the latter are unable to believe in points of bifurcation as spots of really indifferent equilibrium36 or as containing shunts which there — and there only, NOT BEFORE— direct existing motions without altering their amount.
Were there such spots of indifference37, the rigorous determinists think, the future and the past would be separated absolutely, for, ABSTRACTLY TAKEN, THE WORD ‘INDIFFERENT’ SUGGESTS DISCONNECTION SOLELY38. Whatever is indifferent is in so far forth39 unrelated and detached. Take the term thus strictly40, and you see, they tell us, that if any spot of indifference is found upon the broad highway between the past and the future, then no connection of any sort whatever, no continuous momentum, no identical passenger, no common aim or agent, can be found on both sides of the shunt or switch which there is moved. The place is an impassable chasm41.
Mr. Fullerton writes — the italics are mine — as follows:—
‘In so far as my action is free, what I have been, what I am, what I have always done or striven to do, what I most earnestly wish or resolve to do at the present moment — these things can have NO MORE TO DO WITH ITS FUTURE REALIZATION42 THAN IF THEY HAD NO EXISTENCE. . . . The possibility is a hideous43 one; and surely even the most ardent44 free-willist will, when he contemplates45 it frankly46, excuse me for hoping that if I am free I am at least not very free, and that I may reasonably expect to find SOME degree of consistency47 in my life and actions. . . . Suppose that I have given a dollar to a blind beggar. Can I, if it is really an act of free-will, be properly said to have given the money? Was it given because I was a man of tender heart, etc., etc.? . . . What has all this to do with acts of free-will? If they are free, they must not be conditioned by antecedent circumstances of any sort, by the misery48 of the beggar, by the pity in the heart of the passer-by. They must be causeless, not determined33. They must drop from a clear sky out of the void, for just in so far as they can be accounted for, they are not free.’ 61
Heaven forbid that I should get entangled49 here in a controversy50 about the rights and wrongs of the free-will question at large, for I am only trying to illustrate51 vicious abstractionism by the conduct of some of the doctrine19’s assailants. The moments of bifurcation, as the indeterminist seems to himself to experience them, are moments both of re-direction and of continuation. But because in the ‘either — or’ of the re-direction we hesitate, the determinist abstracts this little element of discontinuity from the superabundant continuities of the experience, and cancels in its behalf all the connective characters with which the latter is filled. Choice, for him, means henceforward DISconnection pure and simple, something undetermined in advance IN ANY RESPECT WHATEVER, and a life of choices must be a raving52 chaos53, at no two moments of which could we be treated as one and the same man. If Nero were ‘free’ at. the moment of ordering his mother’s murder, Mr. McTaggart 62 assures us that no one would have the right at any other moment to call him a bad man, for he would then be an absolutely other Nero.
A polemic54 author ought not merely to destroy his victim. He ought to try a bit to make him feel his error — perhaps not enough to convert him, but enough to give him a bad conscience and to weaken the energy of his defence. These violent caricatures of men’s beliefs arouse only contempt for the incapacity of their authors to see the situations out of which the problems grow. To treat the negative character of one abstracted element as annulling55 all the positive features with which it coexists, is no way to change any actual indeterminist’s way of looking on the matter, tho it may make the gallery applaud.
Turn now to some criticisms of the ‘will to believe,’ as another example of the vicious way in which abstraction is currently employed. The right to believe in things for the truth of which complete objective proof is yet lacking is defended by those who apprehend56 certain human situations in their concreteness. In those situations the mind has alternatives before it so vast that the full evidence for either branch is missing, and yet so significant that simply to wait for proof, and to doubt while waiting, might often in practical respects be the same thing as weighing down the negative side. Is life worth while at all? Is there any general meaning in all this cosmic weather? Is anything being permanently57 bought by all this suffering? Is there perhaps a transmundane experience in Being, something corresponding to a ‘fourth dimension,’ which, if we had access to it, might patch up some of this world’s zerrissenheit and make things look more rational than they at first appear? Is there a superhuman consciousness of which our minds are parts, and from which inspiration and help may come? Such are the questions in which the right to take sides practically for yes or no is affirmed by some of us, while others hold that this is methodologically inadmissible, and summon us to die professing58 ignorance and proclaiming the duty of every one to refuse to believe.
I say nothing of the personal inconsistency of some of these critics, whose printed works furnish exquisite59 illustrations of the will to believe, in spite of their denunciations of it as a phrase and as a recommended thing. Mr. McTaggart, whom I will once more take as an example, is sure that ‘reality is rational and righteous’ and ‘destined sub specie temporis to become perfectly60 good’; and his calling this belief a result of necessary logic22 has surely never deceived any reader as to its real genesis in the gifted author’s mind. Mankind is made on too uniform a pattern for any of us to escape successfully from acts of faith. We have a lively vision of what a certain view of the universe would mean for us. We kindle62 or we shudder63 at the thought, and our feeling runs through our whole logical nature and animates64 its workings. It CAN’T be that, we feel; it MUST be this. It must be what it OUGHT to be, and OUGHT to be this; and then we seek for every reason, good or bad, to make this which so deeply ought to be, seem objectively the probable thing. We show the arguments against it to be insufficient65, so that it MAY be true; we represent its appeal to be to our whole nature’s loyalty66 and not to any emaciated67 faculty68 of syllogistic69 proof. We reinforce it by remembering the enlargement of our world by music, by thinking of the promises of sunsets and the impulses from vernal woods. And the essence of the whole experience, when the individual swept through it says finally ‘I believe,’ is the intense concreteness of his vision, the individuality of the hypothesis before him, and the complexity70 of the various concrete motives and perceptions that issue in his final state.
But see now how the abstractionist treats this rich and intricate vision that a certain state of things must be true. He accuses the believer of reasoning by the following syllogism71:—
All good desires must be fulfilled; The desire to believe this proposition is a good desire;
Ergo, this proposition must be believed.
He substitutes this abstraction for the concrete state of mind of the believer, pins the naked absurdity72 of it upon him, and easily proves that any one who defends him must be the greatest fool on earth. As if any real believer ever thought in this preposterous73 way, or as if any defender74 of the legitimacy75 of men’s concrete ways of concluding ever used the abstract and general premise76, ‘All desires must be fulfilled’! Nevertheless, Mr. McTaggart solemnly and laboriously77 refutes the syllogism in sections 47 to 57 of the above-cited book. He shows that there is no fixed78 link in the dictionary between the abstract concepts ‘desire,’ ‘goodness’ and ‘reality’; and he ignores all the links which in the single concrete case the believer feels and perceives to be there! He adds:—
‘When the reality of a thing is uncertain, the argument encourages us to suppose that our approval of a thing can determine its reality. And when this unhallowed link has once been established, retribution overtakes us. For when the reality of the thing is independently certain, we [then] have to admit that the reality of the thing should determine our approval of that thing. I find it difficult to imagine a more degraded position.’
One here feels tempted79 to quote ironically Hegel’s famous equation of the real with the rational to his english disciple80, who ends his chapter with the heroic words:—
‘For those who do not pray, there remains81 the resolve that, so far as their strength may permit, neither the pains of death nor the pains of life shall drive them to any comfort in that which they hold to be false, or drive them from any comfort [discomfort?] in that which they hold to be true.’
How can so ingenious-minded a writer fail to see how far over the heads of the enemy all his arrows pass? When Mr. McTaggart himself believes that the universe is run by the dialectic energy of the absolute idea, his insistent82 desire to have a world of that sort is felt by him to be no chance example of desire in general, but an altogether peculiar83 insight-giving passion to which, in this if in no other instance, he would be stupid not to yield. He obeys its concrete singularity, not the bare abstract feature in it of being a ‘desire.’ His situation is as particular as that of an actress who resolves that it is best for her to marry and leave the stage, of a priest who becomes secular84, of a politician who abandons public life. What sensible man would seek to refute the concrete decisions of such persons by tracing them to abstract premises85, such as that ‘all actresses must marry,’ ‘all clergymen must be laymen,’ ‘all politicians should resign their posts’? Yet this type of refutation, absolutely unavailing though it be for purposes of conversion86, is spread by Mr. McTaggart through many pages of his book. For the aboundingness of our real reasons he substitutes one narrow point. For men’s real probabilities he gives a skeletonized abstraction which no man was ever tempted to believe.
The abstraction in my next example is less simple, but is quite as flimsy as a weapon of attack. Empiricists think that truth in general is distilled87 from single men’s beliefs; and the so-called pragmatists ‘go them one better’ by trying to define what it consists in when it comes. It consists, I have elsewhere said, in such a working on the part of the beliefs as may bring the man into satisfactory relations with objects to which these latter point. The working is of course a concrete working in the actual experience of human beings, among their ideas, feelings, perceptions, beliefs and acts, as well as among the physical things of their environment, and the relations must be understood as being possible as well as actual. In the chapter on truth of my book Pragmatism I have taken pains to defend energetically this view. Strange indeed have been the misconceptions of it by its enemies, and many have these latter been. Among the most formidable-sounding onslaughts on the attempt to introduce some concreteness into our notion of what the truth of an idea may mean, is one that has been raised in many quarters to the effect that to make truth grow in any way out of human opinion is but to reproduce that protagorean doctrine that the individual man is ‘the measure of all things,’ which Plato in his immortal88 dialogue, the Thaeatetus, is unanimously said to have laid away so comfortably in its grave two thousand years ago. The two cleverest brandishers of this objection to make truth concrete, Professors Rickert and Munsterberg, write in German, 63 and ‘relativismus’ is the name they give to the heresy89 which they endeavor to uproot90.
The first step in their campaign against ‘relativismus’ is entirely91 in the air. They accuse relativists — and we pragmatists are typical relativists — of being debarred by their self-adopted principles, not only from the privilege which rationalist philosophers enjoy, of believing that these principles of their own are truth impersonal92 and absolute, but even of framing the abstract notion of such a truth, in the pragmatic sense, of an ideal opinion in which all men might agree, and which no man should ever wish to change. Both charges fall wide of their mark. I myself, as a pragmatist, believe in my own account of truth as firmly as any rationalist can possibly believe in his. And I believe in it for the very reason that I have the idea of truth which my learned adversaries93 contend that no pragmatist can frame. I expect, namely, that the more fully61 men discuss and test my account, the more they will agree that it fits, and the less will they desire a change. I may of course be premature94 in this confidence, and the glory of being truth final and absolute may fall upon some later revision and correction of my scheme, which later will then be judged untrue in just the measure in which it departs from that finally satisfactory formulation. To admit, as we pragmatists do, that we are liable to correction (even tho we may not expect it) involves the use on our part of an ideal standard. Rationalists themselves are, as individuals, sometimes sceptical enough to admit the abstract possibility of their own present opinions being corrigible and revisable to some degree, so the fact that the mere6 NOTION of an absolute standard should seem to them so important a thing to claim for themselves and to deny to us is not easy to explain. If, along with the notion of the standard, they could also claim its exclusive warrant for their own fulminations now, it would be important to them indeed. But absolutists like Rickert freely admit the sterility95 of the notion, even in their own hands. Truth is what we OUGHT to believe, they say, even tho no man ever did or shall believe it, and even tho we have no way of getting at it save by the usual empirical processes of testing our opinions by one another and by facts. Pragmatically, then, this part of the dispute is idle. No relativist who ever actually walked the earth 64 has denied the regulative character in his own thinking of the notion of absolute truth. What is challenged by relativists is the pretence96 on any one’s part to have found for certain at any given moment what the shape of that truth is. Since the better absolutists agree in this, admitting that the proposition ‘There is absolute truth’ is the only absolute truth of which we can be sure, 65 further debate is practically unimportant, so we may pass to their next charge.
It is in this charge that the vicious abstractionism becomes most apparent. The antipragmatist, in postulating97 absolute truth, refuses to give any account of what the words may mean. For him they form a self-explanatory term. The pragmatist, on the contrary, articulately defines their meaning. Truth absolute, he says, means an ideal set of formulations towards which all opinions may in the long run of experience be expected to converge98. In this definition of absolute truth he not only postulates100 that there is a tendency to such convergence of opinions, to such ultimate consensus101, but he postulates the other factors of his definition equally, borrowing them by anticipation102 from the true conclusions expected to be reached. He postulates the existence of opinions, he postulates the experience that will sift103 them, and the consistency which that experience will show. He justifies104 himself in these assumptions by saying that they are not postulates in the strict sense but simple inductions105 from the past extended to the future by analogy; and he insists that human opinion has already reached a pretty stable equilibrium regarding them, and that if its future development fails to alter them, the definition itself, with all its terms included, will be part of the very absolute truth which it defines. The hypothesis will, in short, have worked successfully all round the circle and proved self-corroborative, and the circle will be closed.
The anti-pragmatist, however, immediately falls foul106 of the word ‘opinion’ here, abstracts it from the universe of life, and uses it as a bare dictionary-substantive, to deny the rest of the assumptions which it coexists withal. The dictionary says that an opinion is ‘what some one thinks or believes.’ This definition leaves every one’s opinion free to be autogenous, or unrelated either to what any one else may think or to what the truth may be.
Therefore, continue our abstractionists, we must conceive it as essentially107 thus unrelated, so that even were a billion men to sport the same opinion, and only one man to differ, we could admit no collateral108 circumstances which might presumptively make it more probable that he, not they, should be wrong. Truth, they say, follows not the counting of noses, nor is it only another name for a majority vote. It is a relation that antedates109 experience, between our opinions and an independent something which the pragmatist account ignores, a relation which, tho the opinions of individuals should to all eternity110 deny it, would still remain to qualify them as false. To talk of opinions without referring to this independent something, the anti-pragmatist assures us, is to play Hamlet with Hamlet’s part left out.
But when the pragmatist speaks of opinions, does he mean any such insulated and unmotived abstractions as are here supposed? Of course not, he means men’s opinions in the flesh, as they have really formed themselves, opinions surrounded by their causes and the influences they obey and exert, and along with the whole environment of social communication of which they are a part and out of which they take their rise. Moreover the ‘experience’ which the pragmatic definition postulates is the independent something which the anti-pragmatist accuses him of ignoring. Already have men grown unanimous in the opinion that such experience is of an independent reality, the existence of which all opinions must acknowledge, in order to be true. Already do they agree that in the long run it is useless to resist experience’s pressure; that the more of it a man has, the better position he stands in, in respect of truth; that some men, having had more experience, are therefore better authorities than others; that some are also wiser by nature and better able to interpret the experience they have had; that it is one part of such wisdom to compare notes, discuss, and follow the opinion of our betters; and that the more systematically111 and thoroughly112 such comparison and weighing of opinions is pursued, the truer the opinions that survive are likely to be. When the pragmatist talks of opinions, it is opinions as they thus concretely and livingly and interactingly and correlatively exist that he has in mind; and when the anti-pragmatist tries to floor him because the word ‘opinion’ can also be taken abstractly and as if it had no environment, he simply ignores the soil out of which the whole discussion grows. His weapons cut the air and strike no blow. No one gets wounded in the war against caricatures of belief and skeletons of opinion of which the German onslaughts upon ‘relativismus’ consists. Refuse to use the word ‘opinion’ abstractly, keep it in its real environment, and the withers113 of pragmatism remain unwrung. That men do exist who are ‘opinionated,’ in the sense that their opinions are self-willed, is unfortunately a fact that must be admitted, no matter what one’s notion of truth in general may be. But that this fact should make it impossible for truth to form itself authentically114 out of the life of opinion is what no critic has yet proved. Truth may well consist of certain opinions, and does indeed consist of nothing but opinions, tho not every opinion need be true. No pragmatist needs to dogmatize about the consensus of opinion in the future being right — he need only postulate99 that it will probably contain more of truth than any one’s opinion now.
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elasticity
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| n.弹性，伸缩力 | |
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accrue
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| v.(利息等)增大，增多 | |
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hopping
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| n. 跳跃 动词hop的现在分词形式 | |
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hop
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| n.单脚跳，跳跃；vi.单脚跳，跳跃；着手做某事；vt.跳跃，跃过 | |
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hitch
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| v.免费搭(车旅行)；系住；急提；n.故障；急拉 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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waded
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| （从水、泥等）蹚，走过，跋( wade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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downwards
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corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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momentary
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| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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redeemed
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| adj. 可赎回的，可救赎的 动词redeem的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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futures
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| n.期货，期货交易 | |
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perverse
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| adj.刚愎的；坚持错误的，行为反常的 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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expunged
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| v.擦掉( expunge的过去式和过去分词 )；除去；删去；消除 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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paradoxes
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| n.似非而是的隽语，看似矛盾而实际却可能正确的说法( paradox的名词复数 )；用于语言文学中的上述隽语；有矛盾特点的人[事物，情况] | |
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relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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demolished
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specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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persuasiveness
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skilful
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motives
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incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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naive
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| adj.幼稚的，轻信的；天真的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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breach
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momentum
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equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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40
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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41
chasm
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| n.深坑，断层，裂口，大分岐，利害冲突 | |
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42
realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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43
hideous
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| adj.丑陋的，可憎的，可怕的，恐怖的 | |
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ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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45
contemplates
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的第三人称单数 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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46
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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47
consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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48
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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49
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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50
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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51
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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52
raving
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| adj.说胡话的；疯狂的，怒吼的；非常漂亮的；令人醉心[痴心]的v.胡言乱语(rave的现在分词)n.胡话；疯话adv.胡言乱语地；疯狂地 | |
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53
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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54
polemic
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| n.争论，论战 | |
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55
annulling
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| v.宣告无效( annul的现在分词 )；取消；使消失；抹去 | |
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56
apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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57
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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professing
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| 声称( profess的现在分词 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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59
exquisite
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| adj.精美的；敏锐的；剧烈的，感觉强烈的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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62
kindle
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| v.点燃，着火 | |
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63
shudder
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| v.战粟，震动，剧烈地摇晃；n.战粟，抖动 | |
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animates
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| v.使有生气( animate的第三人称单数 )；驱动；使栩栩如生地动作；赋予…以生命 | |
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65
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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emaciated
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| adj.衰弱的，消瘦的 | |
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68
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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syllogistic
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| adj.三段论法的，演绎的，演绎性的 | |
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complexity
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| n.复杂(性)，复杂的事物 | |
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71
syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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72
absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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preposterous
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| adj.荒谬的，可笑的 | |
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defender
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| n.保卫者，拥护者，辩护人 | |
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legitimacy
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| n.合法，正当 | |
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premise
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| n.前提；v.提论，预述 | |
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laboriously
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| adv.艰苦地；费力地；辛勤地；（文体等）佶屈聱牙地 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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disciple
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| n.信徒，门徒，追随者 | |
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81
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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82
insistent
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| adj.迫切的，坚持的 | |
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83
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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84
secular
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| n.牧师，凡人；adj.世俗的，现世的，不朽的 | |
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85
premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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86
conversion
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| n.转化，转换，转变 | |
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87
distilled
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| adj.由蒸馏得来的v.蒸馏( distil的过去式和过去分词 )；从…提取精华 | |
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88
immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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89
heresy
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| n.异端邪说；异教 | |
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90
uproot
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| v.连根拔起，拔除；根除，灭绝；赶出家园，被迫移开 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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92
impersonal
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| adj.无个人感情的，与个人无关的，非人称的 | |
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93
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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94
premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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95
sterility
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| n.不生育，不结果，贫瘠，消毒，无菌 | |
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pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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postulating
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的现在分词 ) | |
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98
converge
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| vi.会合；聚集，集中；(思想、观点等)趋近 | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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100
postulates
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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101
consensus
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| n.(意见等的)一致，一致同意，共识 | |
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102
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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103
sift
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| v.筛撒，纷落，详察 | |
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104
justifies
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| 证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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105
inductions
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| 归纳（法）( induction的名词复数 )； （电或磁的）感应； 就职； 吸入 | |
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106
foul
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| adj.污秽的；邪恶的；v.弄脏；妨害；犯规；n.犯规 | |
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107
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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108
collateral
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| adj.平行的；旁系的；n.担保品 | |
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109
antedates
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| v.（在历史上）比…为早( antedate的第三人称单数 )；先于；早于；（在信、支票等上）填写比实际日期早的日期 | |
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110
eternity
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| n.不朽，来世；永恒，无穷 | |
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111
systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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112
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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113
withers
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| 马肩隆 | |
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114
authentically
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| ad.sincerely真诚地 | |
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