The opposite verdicts passed upon his work by his contemporaries bear witness to the extraordinary mingling11 of defects and merits in his mental character. Here are a few, juxtaposed:—
“A philosophic12 saw-mill.”—“The most capacious and powerful thinker of all time.
“The Arry’ of philosophy.”—“Aristotle and his master were not more beyond the pygmies who preceded them than he is beyond Aristotle.”
“Herbert Spencer’s chromo-philosophy.”—“No other man that has walked the earth has so wrought13 and written himself into the life of the world.”
“The touch of his mind takes the living flavor out of everything.”—“He is as much above and beyond all the other great philosophers who have ever lived as the telegraph is beyond the carrier-pigeon, or the railway beyond the sedan chair.”
“He has merely combined facts which we knew before into a huge fantastic contradictory system, which hides its nakedness and emptiness partly under the veil of an imposing14 terminology15, and partly in the primeval fog.”—“His contributions are of a depth, profundity16, and magnitude which have no parallel in the history of mind. Taking but one — and one only — of his transcendent reaches of thought — namely, that referring to the positive sense of the Unknown as the basis of religion — it may unhesitatingly be affirmed that the analysis and synthesis by which he advances to the almost supernal17 grasp of this mighty18 truth give a sense of power and reach verging19 on the preternatural.”
Can the two thick volumes of autobiography20 which Mr. Spencer leaves behind him explain such discrepant21 appreciations22? Can we find revealed in them the higher synthesis which reconciles the contradictions? Partly they do explain, I think, and even justify23, both kinds of judgment24 upon their author. But I confess that in the last resort I still feel baffled. In Spencer, as in every concrete individual, there is a uniqueness that defies all formulation. We can feel the touch of it and recognize its taste, so to speak, relishing25 or disliking, as the case may be, but we can give no ultimate account of it, and we have in the end simply to admire the Creator.
Mr. Spencer’s task, the unification of all knowledge into an articulate system, was more ambitious than anything attempted since St. Thomas or Descartes. Most thinkers have confined themselves either to generalities or to details, but Spencer addressed himself to everything. He dealt in logical, metaphysical, and ethical26 first principles, in cosmogony and geology, in physics, and chemistry after a fashion, in biology, psychology27, sociology, politics, and aesthetics28. Hardly any subject can be named which has not at least been touched on in some one of his many volumes. His erudition was prodigious29. His civic30 conscience and his social courage both were admirable. His life was pure. He was devoted31 to truth and usefulness, and his character was wholly free from envy and malice32 (though not from contempt), and from the perverse33 egoisms that so often go with greatness.
Surely, any one hearing this veracious34 enumeration35 would think that Spencer must have been a rich and exuberant36 human being. Such wide curiosities must have gone with the widest sympathies, and such a powerful harmony of character, whether it were a congenital gift, or were acquired by spiritual wrestling and eating bread with tears, must in any case have been a glorious spectacle for the beholder37. Since Goethe, no such ideal human being can have been visible, walking our poor earth.
Yet when we turn to the “Autobiography,” the self-confession which we find is this: An old-maidish personage, inhabiting boarding-houses, equable and lukewarm in all his tastes and passions, having no desultory38 curiosity, showing little interest in either books or people. A petty fault-finder and stickler39 for trifles, devoid40 in youth of any wide designs on life, fond only of the more mechanical side of things, yet drifting as it were involuntarily into the possession of a world-formula which by dint41 of his extraordinary pertinacity42 he proceeded to apply to so many special cases that it made him a philosopher in spite of himself. He appears as modest enough, but with a curious vanity in some of his deficiencies — his lack of desultory interests, for example, and his nonconformity to reigning43 customs. He gives a queer sense of having no emotional perspective, as if small things and large were on the same plane of vision, and equally commanded his attention. In spite of his professed44 dislike of monotony, one feels an awfully45 monotonous46 quality in him; and in spite of the fact that invalidism47 condemned48 him to avoid thinking, and to saunter and potter through large parts of every day, one finds no twilight49 region in his mind, and no capacity for dreaminess or passivity. All parts of it are filled with the same noonday glare, like a dry desert where every grain of sand shows singly, and there are no mysteries or shadows.
“Look on this picture and on that,” and answer how they can be compatible.
For one thing, Mr. Spencer certainly writes himself down too much. He complains of a poor memory, of an idle disposition50, of a general dislike for reading. Doubtless there have been more gifted men in all these respects. But when Spencer once buckled51 to a particular task, his memory, his industry, and his reading went beyond those of the most gifted. He had excessive sensibility to stimulation52 by a challenge, and he had pre?minent pertinacity. When the notion of his philosophic system once grasped him, it seemed to possess itself of every effective fibre of his being. No faculty53 in him was left unemployed54 — nor, on the other hand, was anything that his philosophy could contain left unstated. Roughly speaking, the task and the man absorbed each other without residuum.
Compare this type of mind with such an opposite type as Ruskin’s, or even as J. S. Mill’s, or Huxley’s, and you realize its peculiarity56. Behind the work of those others was a background of overflowing57 mental temptations. The men loom58 larger than all their publications, and leave an impression of unexpressed potentialities. Spencer tossed all his inexpressibilities into the Unknowable, and gladly turned his back on them forever. His books seem to have expressed all that there was to express in his character.
He is very frank about this himself. No Sturm und Drang Periode, no problematic stage of thought, where the burden of the much-to-be-straightened exceeds the powers of straightening.
When George Eliot uttered surprise at seeing no lines on his forehead, his reply was:—“I suppose it is because I am never puzzled.”—“It has never been my way,” he continues, “to set before myself a problem and puzzle out an answer. The conclusions at which I have from time to time arrived, have not been arrived at as solutions of questions raised; but have been arrived at unawares — each as the ultimate outcome of a body of thought which slowly grew from a germ. Some direct observation, or some fact met with in reading, would dwell with me; apparently59 because I had a sense of its significance. . . . A week afterwards, possibly, the matter would be remembered; and with further thought about it, might occur a recognition of some wider application: new instances being aggregated60 with those already noted61. Again, after an interval,” etc., etc. “And thus, little by little, in unobtrusive ways, without conscious intention or appreciable62 effort, there would grow up a coherent and organized theory” (vol. i, page 464).
A sort of mill, this, wound up to grind in a certain way, and irresponsive otherwise.
“To apply day after day merely with the general idea of acquiring information, or of increasing ability, was not in me.” “Anything like passive receptivity is foreign to my nature; and there results an unusually small tendency to be affected63 by others’ thoughts. It seems as though the fabric64 of my conclusions had in all cases to be developed from within. Material which could be taken in and organized so as to form part of a coherent structure, there was always a readiness to receive. But ideas and sentiments of alien kinds, or unorganizable kinds, were, if not rejected, yet accepted with indifference65, and soon dropped away.” “It has always been out of the question for me to go on reading a book the fundamental principles of which I entirely66 dissent67 from. I take it for granted that if the fundamental principles are wrong the rest cannot be right; and thereupon cease reading — being, I suspect, rather glad of an excuse for doing so.” “Systematic68 books of a political or ethical kind, written from points of view quite unlike my own, were either not consulted at all, or else they were glanced at and thereafter disregarded” (vol. i, pages 215, 277, 289, 350).
There is pride rather than compunction in these confessions69. Spencer’s mind was so narrowly systematized, that he was at last almost incapable70 of believing in the reality of alien ways of feeling. The invariable arrogance71 of his replies to criticisms shows his absolute self-confidence. Every opinion in the world had to be articulately right or articulately wrong — so proved by some principle or other of his infallible system.
He confesses freely his own inflexibility72 and censoriousness. His account of his father makes one believe in the fatality73 of heredity. Born of old nonconformist stock, the elder Spencer was a man of absolute punctuality. Always he would step out of his way to kick a stone off the pavement lest somebody should trip over it. If he saw boys quarrelling he stopped to expostulate; and he never could pass a man who was ill-treating a horse without trying to make him behave better. He would never take off his hat to any one, no matter of what rank, nor could he be induced to address any one as “Esquire” or as “Reverend.” He would never put on any sign of mourning, even for father and mother; and he adhered to one style of coat and hat throughout all changes of fashion. Improvement was his watchword always and everywhere. Whatever he wrote had to be endlessly corrected, and his love of detail led all his life to his neglecting large ends in his care for small ones. A good heart, but a pedantic75 conscience, and a sort of energetically mechanical intelligence.
Of himself Herbert Spencer says: “No one will deny that I am much given to criticism. Along with exposition of my own views there has always gone a pointing out of defects in those of others. And if this is a trait in my writing, still more is it a trait in my conversation. The tendency to fault-finding is dominant76 — disagreeably dominant. The indicating of errors in thought and speech made by those around has all through life been an incurable77 habit — a habit for which I have often reproached myself, but to no purpose.”
The “Autobiography” abounds78 in illustrations of the habit. For instance:—
“Of late I have observed sundry79 cases in which, having found the right, people deliberately desert it for the wrong. . . . A generation ago salt-cellars were made of convenient shapes — either ellipses80 or elongated81 parallelograms: the advantage being that the salt-spoon, placed lengthwise, remained in its place. But for some time past, fashion has dictated82 circular salt-cellars, on the edges of which the salt-spoon will not remain without skilful83 balancing: it falls on the cloth. In my boyhood a jug84 was made of a form at once convenient and graceful85. . . . Now, however, the almost universal form of jug in use is a frustum of a cone86 with a miniature spout87. It combines all possible defects. When anything like full, it is impossible to pour out a small quantity without part of the liquid trickling88 down beneath the spout; and a larger quantity cannot be poured out without exceeding the limits of the spout and running over on each side of it. If the jug is half empty, the tilting89 must be continued a long time before any liquid comes; and then, when it does come, it comes with a rush; because its surface has now become so large that a small inclination90 delivers a great deal. To all which add that the shape is as ugly a one as can well be hit upon. Still more extraordinary is the folly91 of a change made in another utensil92 of daily use”— and Spencer goes on to find fault with the cylindrical93 form of candle extinguisher, proving by a description of its shape that “it squashes the wick into the melted composition, the result being that when, next day, the extinguisher is taken off, the wick, imbedded in the solidified94 composition, cannot be lighted without difficulty” (vol. ii, page 238).
The remorseless explicitness96, the punctuation97, everything, make these specimens of public fault-finding with what probably was the equipment of Mr. Spencer’s latest boarding-house, sound like passages from “The Man versus98 the State.” Another example:—
“Playing billiards99 became ‘my custom always of the afternoon.’ Those who confess to billiard-playing commonly make some kind of an excuse. . . . It suffices to me that I like billiards, and the attainment100 of the pleasure given I regard as a sufficient motive101. I have for a long time deliberately set my face against that asceticism102 which makes it an offence to do a thing for the pleasure of doing it; and have habitually103 contended that, so long as no injury is inflicted104 on others, nor any ulterior injury on self, and so long as the various duties of life have been discharged, the pursuit of pleasure for its own sake is perfectly105 legitimate106 and requires no apology. The opposite view is nothing else than a remote sequence of the old devil worship of the barbarian107, who sought to please his god by inflicting108 pains upon himself, and believed his god would be angry if he made himself happy” (vol. ii, page 263).
The tone of pedantic rectitude in these passages is characteristic. Every smallest thing is either right or wrong, and if wrong, can be articulately proved so by reasoning. Life grows too dry and literal, and loses all a?rial perspective at such a rate; and the effect is the more displeasing109 when the matters in dispute have a rich variety of aspects, and when the aspect from which Mr. Spencer deduces his conclusions is manifestly partial.
For instance, in his art-criticisms. Spencer in his youth did much drawing, both mechanical and artistic110. Volume one contains a photo-print of a very creditable bust111 which he modelled of his uncle. He had a musical ear, and practiced singing. He paid attention to style, and was not wholly insensible to poetry. Yet in all his dealings with the art-products of mankind he manifests the same curious dryness and mechanical literality of judgment — a dryness increased by pride in his non-conformity. He would, for example, rather give a large sum than read to the end of Homer’s Iliad — the ceaseless repetition of battles, speeches, and epithets112 like well-greaved Greeks, horse-breaking Trojans; the tedious enumeration of details of dresses, arms, and chariots; such absurdities113 as giving the genealogy114 of a horse while in the midst of a battle; and the appeals to savage115 and brutal116 passions, having soon made the poem intolerable to him (vol. i, page 300). Turner’s paintings he finds untrue, in that the earth-region is habitually as bright in tone as the air-region. Moreover, Turner scatters117 his detail too evenly. In Greek statues the hair is falsely treated. Renaissance118 painting, even the best, is spoiled by unreal illumination, and non-rendering of reflected light in the shadows. Venetian gothic sins by meaningless ornamentation. St. Mark’s Church may be precious archaeologically119, but is not aesthetically120 precious. Of Wagner’s music he admires nothing but the skilful specialization of the instruments in the orchestra.
The fault-finding in all these cases rests on observation, true as far as it goes; but the total absence of genial121 relations with the entirety of the phenomenon discussed, the clutching at some paltry122 mechanical aspect of it that lends itself to reasoned proof by a plus b, and the practical denial of everything that only appeals to vaguer sentiment, show a mind so oddly limited to ratiocinative and explicit95 processes, and so wedded123 to the superficial and flagrantly insufficient124, that one begins to wonder whether in the philosophic and scientific spheres the same mind can have wrought out results of extraordinary value.
Both “yes” and “no” are here the answer. Every one who writes books or articles knows how he must flounder until he hits upon the proper opening. Once the right beginning found, everything follows easily and in due order. If a man, however narrow, strikes even by accident, into one of these fertile openings, and pertinaciously125 follows the lead, he is almost sure to meet truth on his path. Some thoughts act almost like mechanical centres of crystallization; facts cluster of themselves about them. Such a thought was that of the gradual growth of all things, by natural processes, out of natural antecedents. Until the middle of the nineteenth century no one had grasped it wholesale126; and the thinker who did so earliest was bound to make discoveries just in proportion to the exclusiveness of his interest in the principle. He who had the keenest eye for instances and illustrations, and was least divertible by casual side-curiosity, would score the quickest triumph.
To Spencer is certainly due the immense credit of having been the first to see in evolution an absolutely universal principle. If any one else had grasped its universality, it failed at any rate to grasp him as it grasped Spencer. For Spencer it instantly became “the guiding conception running through and connecting all the concrete sciences” (vol. ii, page 196). Here at last was “an object at once large and distinct enough” to overcome his “constitutional idleness.” “With an important and definite end to achieve, I could work” (vol. i, page 215). He became, in short, the victim of a vivid obsession127, and for the first time in his life seems to have grown genuinely ambitious. Every item of his experience, small or great, every idea in his mental storehouse, had now to be considered with reference to its bearing on the new universal principle. On pages 194–199 of volume two he gives an interesting summary of the way in which all his previous and subsequent ideas moved into harmonious128 co?rdination and subordination, when once he had this universal key to insight. Applying it wholesale as he did, innumerable truths unobserved till then had to fall into his gamebag. And his peculiar55 trick, a priggish infirmity in daily intercourse129, of treating every smallest thing by abstract law, was here a merit. Add his sleuth-hound scent130 for what he was after, and his untiring pertinacity, to his priority in perceiving the one great truth and you fully6 justify the popular estimate of him as one of the world’s geniuses, in spite of the fact that the “temperament131” of genius, so called, seems to have been so lacking in him.
In one sense, then, Spencer’s personal narrowness and dryness were not hindering, but helping132 conditions of his achievement. Grant that a vast picture quelconque had to be made before the details could be made perfect, and a greater richness and receptivity of mind would have resulted in hesitation133. The quality would have been better in spots, but the extensiveness would have suffered.
Spencer is thus the philosopher of vastness. Misprised by many specialists, who carp at his technical imperfections, he has nevertheless enlarged the imagination, and set free the speculative134 mind of countless135 doctors, engineers, and lawyers, of many physicists136 and chemists, and of thoughtful laymen137 generally. He is the philosopher whom those who have no other philosopher can appreciate. To be able to say this of any man is great praise, and gives the “yes” answer to my recent question.
Can the “no” answer be as unhesitatingly uttered? I think so, if one makes the qualitative138 aspect of Spencer’s work undo139 its quantitative140 aspect. The luke-warm equable temperament, the narrowness of sympathy and passion, the fondness for mechanical forms of thought, the imperfect receptivity and lack of interest in facts as such, dissevered from their possible connection with a theory; nay141, the very vividness itself, the keenness of scent and the pertinacity; these all are qualities which may easily make for second-rateness, and for contentment with a cheap and loosely woven achievement. As Mr. Spencer’s “First Principles” is the book which more than any other has spread his popular reputation, I had perhaps better explain what I mean by criticising some of its peculiarities142.
I read this book as a youth when it was still appearing in numbers, and was carried away with enthusiasm by the intellectual perspectives which it seemed to open. When a maturer companion, Mr. Charles S. Peirce, attacked it in my presence, I felt spiritually wounded, as by the defacement of a sacred image or picture, though I could not verbally defend it against his criticisms.
Later I have used it often as a text-book with students, and the total outcome of my dealings with it is an exceedingly unfavorable verdict. Apart from the great truth which it enforces, that everything has evolved somehow, and apart from the inevitable143 stimulating144 effect of any such universal picture, I regard its teachings as almost a museum of blundering reasoning. Let me try to indicate briefly145 my grounds for such an opinion.
I pass by the section on the Unknowable, because this part of Mr. Spencer’s philosophy has won fewer friends than any other. It consists chiefly of a rehash of Mansel’s rehash of Hamilton’s “Philosophy of the Conditioned,” and has hardly raised its head since John Mill so effectively demolished146 it. If criticism of our human intellectual constitution is needed, it can be got out of Bradley today better than out of Spencer. The latter’s way of reconciling science and religion is, moreover, too absurdly na?f. Find, he says, a fundamental abstract truth on which they can agree, and that will reconcile them. Such a truth, he thinks, is that there is a mystery. The trouble is that it is over just such common truths that quarrels begin. Did the fact that both believed in the existence of the Pope reconcile Luther and Ignatius Loyola? Did it reconcile the South and the North that both agreed that there were slaves? Religion claims that the “mystery” is interpretable by human reason; “Science,” speaking through Spencer, insists that it is not. The admission of the mystery is the very signal for the quarrel. Moreover, for nine hundred and ninety-nine men out of a thousand the sense of mystery is the sense of more-to-be-known, not the sense of a More, not to be known.
But pass the Unknowable by, and turn to Spencer’s famous law of Evolution.
“Science” works with several types of “law.” The most frequent and useful type is that of the “elementary law,”— that of the composition of forces, that of gravitation, of refraction, and the like. Such laws declare no concrete facts to exist, and make no prophecy as to any actual future. They limit themselves to saying that if a certain character be found in any fact, another character will co-exist with it or follow it. The usefulness of these laws is proportionate to the extent to which the characters they treat of pervade147 the world, and to the accuracy with which they are definable.
Statistical148 laws form another type, and positively149 declare something about the world of actuality. Although they tell us nothing of the elements of things, either abstract or concrete, they affirm that the resultant of their actions drifts preponderantly in a particular direction. Population tends toward cities; the working classes tend to grow discontented; the available energy of the universe is running down — such laws prophesy150 the real future en gros, but they never help us to predict any particular detail of it.
Spencer’s law of Evolution is of the statistical variety. It defines what evolution means, and what dissolution means, and asserts that, although both processes are always going on together, there is in the present phase of the world a drift in favor of evolution. In the first edition of “First Principles” an evolutive change in anything was described as the passage of it from a state of indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity151. The existence of a drift in this direction in everything Mr. Spencer proves, both by a survey of facts, and by deducing it from certain laws of the elementary type, which he severally names “the instability of the homogeneous,” “the multiplication152 of effects,” “segregation,” and “equilibration.” The two former insure the heterogeneity, while “segregation” brings about the definiteness and coherence153, and “equilibration” arrests the process, and determines when dissolutive changes shall begin.
The whole panorama154 is resplendent for variety and inclusiveness, and has aroused an admiration155 for philosophy in minds that never admired philosophy before. Like Descartes in earlier days, Spencer aims at a purely156 mechanical explanation of Nature. The knowable universe is nothing but matter and motion, and its history is nothing but the “redistribution” of these entities157. The value of such an explanation for scientific purposes depends altogether on how consistent and exact it is. Every “thing” must be interpreted as a “configuration158,” every “event” as a change of configuration, every predicate ascribed must be of a geometrical sort. Measured by these requirements of mechanics Spencer’s attempt has lamentably159 failed. His terms are vagueness and ambiguity160 incarnate161, and he seems incapable of keeping the mechanical point of view in mind for five pages consecutively162.
“Definite,” for example, is hardly a physical idea at all. Every motion and every arrangement of matter is definitely what it is — a fog or an irregular scrawl163, as much so as a billiard ball or a straight line. Spencer means by definiteness in a thing any character that makes it arrest our attention, and forces us to distinguish it from other things. The word with him has a human, not a physical connotation. Definite things, in his book, finally appear merely as things that men have made separate names for, so that there is hardly a pretence164 of the mechanical view being kept. Of course names increase as human history proceeds, so “definiteness” in things must necessarily more and more evolve.
“Coherent,” again. This has the definite mechanical meaning of resisting separation, of sticking together; but Spencer plays fast and loose with this meaning. Coherence with him sometimes means permanence in time, sometimes such mutual165 dependence166 of parts as is realized in a widely scattered167 system of no fixed168 material configuration; a commercial house, for example, with its “travellers” and ships and cars.
An honestly mechanical reader soon rubs his eyes with bewilderment at the orgy of ambiguity to which he is introduced. Every term in Spencer’s fireworks shimmers169 through a whole spectrum170 of meanings in order to adapt itself to the successive spheres of evolution to which it must apply. “Integration171,” for instance. A definite coherence is an Integration; and examples given of integration are the contraction172 of the solar nebula173, the formation of the earth’s crust, the calcification174 of cartilage, the shortening of the body of crabs175, the loss of his tail by man, the mutual dependence of plants and animals, the growth of powerful states, the tendency of human occupations to go to distinct localities, the dropping of terminal inflexions in English grammar, the formation of general concepts by the mind, the use of machinery176 instead of simple tools, the development of “composition” in the fine arts, etc., etc. It is obvious that no one form of the motion of matter characterizes all these facts. The human ones simply embody177 the more and more successful pursuit of certain ends.
In the second edition of his book, Mr. Spencer supplemented his first formula by a unifying178 addition, meant to be strictly179 mechanical. “Evolution,” he now said, “is the progressive integration of matter and dissipation of motion,” during which both the matter and the motion undergo the previously180 designated kinds of change. But this makes the formula worse instead of better. The “dissipation of motion” part of it is simple vagueness — for what particular motion is “dissipated” when a man or state grows more highly evolved? And the integration of matter belongs only to stellar and geologic181 evolution. Neither heightened specific gravity, nor greater massiveness, which are the only conceivable integrations of matter, is a mark of the more evolved vital, mental, or social things.
It is obvious that the facts of which Spencer here gives so clumsy an account could all have been set down more simply. First there is solar, and then there is geological evolution, processes accurately182 describable as integrations in the mechanical sense, namely, as decrease in bulk, or growth in hardness. Then Life appears; and after that neither integration of matter nor dissipation of motion play any part whatever. The result of life, however, is to fill the world more and more with things displaying organic unity183. By this is meant any arrangement of which one part helps to keep the other parts in existence. Some organic unities184 are material — a sea-urchin, for example, a department store, a civil service, or an ecclesiastical organization. Some are mental, as a “science,” a code of laws, or an educational programme. But whether they be material or mental products, organic unities must accumulate; for every old one tends to conserve185 itself, and if successful new ones arise they also “come to stay.” The human use of Spencer’s adjectives “integrated,” “definite,” “coherent,” here no longer shocks one. We are frankly186 on teleological187 ground, and metaphor188 and vagueness are permissible189.
This tendency of organic unities to accumulate when once they are formed is absolutely all the truth I can distill190 from Spencer’s unwieldy account of evolution. It makes a much less gaudy191 and chromatic192 picture, but what there is of it is exact.
Countless other criticisms swarm193 toward my pen, but I have no heart to express them — it is too sorry an occupation. A word about Spencer’s conception of “Force,” however, insists on being added; for although it is one of his most essential, it is one of his vaguest ideas.
Over all his special laws of evolution there reigns194 an absolutely general law, that of the “persistence of force.” By this Spencer sometimes means the phenomenal law of conservation of energy, sometimes the metaphysical principle that the quantity of existence is unalterable, sometimes the logical principle that nothing can happen without a reason, sometimes the practical postulate74 that in the absence of any assignable difference you must call a thing the same. This law is one vast vagueness, of which I can give no clear account; but of his special vaguenesses “mental force” and “social force” are good examples.
These manifestations195 of the universal force, he says, are due to vital force, and this latter is due to physical force, both being proportionate to the amount of physical force which is “transformed” into them. But what on earth is “social force”? Sometimes he identifies it with “social activity” (showing the latter to be proportionate to the amount of food eaten), sometimes with the work done by human beings and their steam-engines, and shows it to be due ultimately to the sun’s heat. It would never occur to a reader of his pages that a social force proper might be anything that acted as a stimulus196 of social change — a leader, for example, a discovery, a book, a new idea, or a national insult; and that the greatest of “forces” of this kind need embody no more “physical force” than the smallest. The measure of greatness here is the effect produced on the environment, not a quantity antecedently absorbed from physical nature. Mr. Spencer himself is a great social force; but he ate no more than an average man, and his body, if cremated197, would disengage no more energy. The effects he exerts are of no nature of releases — his words pull triggers in certain kinds of brain.
The fundamental distinction in mechanics between forces of push-and-pull and forces of release is one of which Mr. Spencer, in his earlier years, made no use whatever. Only in his sixth edition did he show that it had seriously arrested his attention. In biology, psychology, and sociology the forces concerned are almost exclusively forces of release. Spencer’s account of social forces is neither good sociology nor good mechanics. His feeble grasp of the conception of force vitiates, in fact, all his work.
But the task of a carper is repugnant. The “Essays,” “Biology,” “Psychology,” “Sociology,” and “Ethics” are all better than “First Principles,” and contain numerous and admirable bits of penetrating198 work of detail. My impression is that, of the systematic treaties, the “Psychology” will rank as the most original. Spencer broke new ground here in insisting that, since mind and its environment have evolved together, they must be studied together. He gave to the study of mind in isolation199 a definitive200 quietus, and that certainly is a great thing to have achieved. To be sure he overdid201 the matter, as usual, and left no room for any mental structure at all, except that which passively resulted from the storage of impressions received from the outer world in the order of their frequency by fathers and transmitted to their sons. The belief that whatever is acquired by sires is inherited by sons, and the ignoring of purely inner variations, are weak points; but to have brought in the environment as vital was a master stroke.
I may say that Spencer’s controversy202 over use-inheritance with Weismann, entered into after he was sixty, seems to me in point of quality better than any other part of his work. It is genuine labor203 over a puzzle, genuine research.
Spencer’s “Ethics” is a most vital and original piece of attitude-taking in the world of ideals. His politico-ethical activity in general breathes the purest English spirit liberty, and his attacks on over-administration and criticisms on the inferiority of great centralized systems are worthy204 to be the textbooks of individualists the world over. I confess that it is with this part of his work, in spite of its hardness and inflexibility of tone, that I personally sympathize most.
Looking back on Mr. Spencer as a whole, as this admirably truth-telling “Autobiography” reveals him, he is a figure unique for quaint205 consistency206. He never varied207 from that inimitable blend of small and vast mindedness, of liberality and crabbedness, which was his personal note, and which defies our formulating208 power. If an abstract logical concept could come to life, its life would be like Spencer’s — the same definiteness of exclusion209 and inclusion, the same bloodlessness of temperament, the same narrowness of intent and vastness of extent, the same power of applying itself to numberless instances. But he was no abstract idea; he was a man vigorously devoted to truth and justice as he saw them, who had deep insights, and who finished, under terrible frustrations210 from bad health, a piece of work that taken for all in all, is extraordinary. A human life is greater than all its possible appraisers, assessors, and critics. In comparison with the fact of Spencer’s actual living, such critical characterization of it as I have been at all these pains to produce seems a rather unimportant as well as a decidedly graceless thing.
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specimens
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| n.样品( specimen的名词复数 )；范例；（化验的）抽样；某种类型的人 | |
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diversified
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| adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域 | |
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arabesque
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| n.阿拉伯式花饰；adj.阿拉伯式图案的 | |
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4
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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5
personalities
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| n. 诽谤，（对某人容貌、性格等所进行的）人身攻击； 人身攻击；人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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6
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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7
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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8
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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9
feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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11
mingling
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| adj.混合的 | |
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12
philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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13
wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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14
imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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15
terminology
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| n.术语；专有名词 | |
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16
profundity
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| n.渊博；深奥，深刻 | |
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17
supernal
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| adj.天堂的，天上的；崇高的 | |
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18
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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19
verging
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| 接近，逼近（verge的现在分词形式） | |
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20
autobiography
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| n.自传 | |
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21
discrepant
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| 差异的 | |
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22
appreciations
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| n.欣赏( appreciation的名词复数 )；感激；评定；（尤指土地或财产的）增值 | |
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23
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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24
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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25
relishing
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| v.欣赏( relish的现在分词 )；从…获得乐趣；渴望 | |
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26
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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27
psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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28
aesthetics
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| n.(尤指艺术方面之)美学，审美学 | |
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29
prodigious
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| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
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30
civic
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| adj.城市的，都市的，市民的，公民的 | |
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31
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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32
malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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33
perverse
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| adj.刚愎的；坚持错误的，行为反常的 | |
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34
veracious
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| adj.诚实可靠的 | |
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35
enumeration
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| n.计数，列举；细目；详表；点查 | |
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36
exuberant
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| adj.充满活力的；（植物）繁茂的 | |
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37
beholder
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| n.观看者，旁观者 | |
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38
desultory
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| adj.散漫的，无方法的 | |
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39
stickler
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| n.坚持细节之人 | |
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40
devoid
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| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
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41
dint
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| n.由于，靠；凹坑 | |
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42
pertinacity
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| n.执拗，顽固 | |
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43
reigning
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| adj.统治的，起支配作用的 | |
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44
professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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45
awfully
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| adv.可怕地，非常地，极端地 | |
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46
monotonous
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| adj.单调的，一成不变的，使人厌倦的 | |
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47
invalidism
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| 病弱，病身； 伤残 | |
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48
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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49
twilight
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| n.暮光，黄昏；暮年，晚期，衰落时期 | |
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50
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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51
buckled
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| a. 有带扣的 | |
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52
stimulation
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| n.刺激，激励，鼓舞 | |
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53
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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54
unemployed
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| adj.失业的，没有工作的；未动用的，闲置的 | |
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55
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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56
peculiarity
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| n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖 | |
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57
overflowing
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| n. 溢出物,溢流 adj. 充沛的，充满的 动词overflow的现在分词形式 | |
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58
loom
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| n.织布机，织机；v.隐现，(危险、忧虑等)迫近 | |
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59
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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60
aggregated
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| a.聚合的，合计的 | |
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61
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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62
appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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63
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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64
fabric
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| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
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65
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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66
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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67
dissent
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| n./v.不同意，持异议 | |
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68
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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69
confessions
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| n.承认( confession的名词复数 )；自首；声明；（向神父的）忏悔 | |
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70
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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71
arrogance
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| n.傲慢，自大 | |
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72
inflexibility
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| n.不屈性，顽固，不变性；不可弯曲；非挠性；刚性 | |
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73
fatality
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| n.不幸，灾祸，天命 | |
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74
postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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75
pedantic
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| adj.卖弄学问的；迂腐的 | |
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76
dominant
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|
| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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77
incurable
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| adj.不能医治的，不能矫正的，无救的；n.不治的病人，无救的人 | |
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78
abounds
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| v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的第三人称单数 ) | |
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79
sundry
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| adj.各式各样的，种种的 | |
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80
ellipses
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|
| n.椭园，省略号；椭圆( ellipse的名词复数 )；（语法结构上的）省略( ellipsis的名词复数 ) | |
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81
elongated
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|
| v.延长，加长( elongate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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82
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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83
skilful
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|
| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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84
jug
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| n.(有柄，小口，可盛水等的)大壶，罐，盂 | |
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85
graceful
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|
| adj.优美的，优雅的；得体的 | |
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86
cone
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| n.圆锥体，圆锥形东西，球果 | |
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87
spout
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| v.喷出，涌出；滔滔不绝地讲；n.喷管；水柱 | |
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88
trickling
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| n.油画底色含油太多而成泡沫状突起v.滴( trickle的现在分词 )；淌；使)慢慢走；缓慢移动 | |
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89
tilting
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| 倾斜，倾卸 | |
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90
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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91
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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92
utensil
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| n.器皿，用具 | |
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93
cylindrical
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| adj.圆筒形的 | |
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94
solidified
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| （使）成为固体，（使）变硬，（使）变得坚固( solidify的过去式和过去分词 )； 使团结一致； 充实，巩固； 具体化 | |
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95
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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96
explicitness
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97
punctuation
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| n.标点符号，标点法 | |
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98
versus
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| prep.以…为对手，对；与…相比之下 | |
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99
billiards
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| n.台球 | |
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100
attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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101
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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102
asceticism
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| n.禁欲主义 | |
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103
habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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104
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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105
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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106
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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107
barbarian
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| n.野蛮人；adj.野蛮(人)的；未开化的 | |
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108
inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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109
displeasing
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| 不愉快的，令人发火的 | |
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110
artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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111
bust
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| vt.打破；vi.爆裂；n.半身像；胸部 | |
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112
epithets
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| n.（表示性质、特征等的）词语( epithet的名词复数 ) | |
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113
absurdities
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| n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 )；荒谬；谬论；荒谬的行为 | |
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114
genealogy
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| n.家系，宗谱 | |
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115
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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116
brutal
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| adj.残忍的，野蛮的，不讲理的 | |
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117
scatters
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| v.（使）散开， （使）分散，驱散( scatter的第三人称单数 )；撒 | |
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118
renaissance
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| n.复活，复兴，文艺复兴 | |
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119
archaeologically
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| archaeology（考古学）的变形 | |
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120
aesthetically
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| adv.美地，艺术地 | |
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121
genial
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| adj.亲切的，和蔼的，愉快的，脾气好的 | |
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122
paltry
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| adj.无价值的，微不足道的 | |
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123
wedded
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| adj.正式结婚的；渴望…的，执著于…的v.嫁，娶，（与…）结婚( wed的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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124
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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125
pertinaciously
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| adv.坚持地；固执地；坚决地；执拗地 | |
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126
wholesale
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| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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127
obsession
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| n.困扰，无法摆脱的思想(或情感) | |
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128
harmonious
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| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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129
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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130
scent
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| n.气味，香味，香水，线索，嗅觉；v.嗅，发觉 | |
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131
temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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132
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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133
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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134
speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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135
countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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136
physicists
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| 物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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137
laymen
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| 门外汉，外行人( layman的名词复数 )； 普通教徒（有别于神职人员） | |
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138
qualitative
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| adj.性质上的，质的，定性的 | |
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139
undo
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| vt.解开，松开；取消，撤销 | |
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140
quantitative
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| adj.数量的，定量的 | |
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141
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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142
peculiarities
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| n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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143
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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144
stimulating
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| adj.有启发性的，能激发人思考的 | |
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145
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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146
demolished
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| v.摧毁( demolish的过去式和过去分词 )；推翻；拆毁（尤指大建筑物）；吃光 | |
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147
pervade
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| v.弥漫，遍及，充满，渗透，漫延 | |
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148
statistical
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| adj.统计的，统计学的 | |
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149
positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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150
prophesy
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| v.预言；预示 | |
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151
heterogeneity
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| n.异质性；多相性 | |
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152
multiplication
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| n.增加，增多，倍增；增殖，繁殖；乘法 | |
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153
coherence
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| n.紧凑；连贯；一致性 | |
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154
panorama
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| n.全景，全景画，全景摄影，全景照片[装置] | |
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155
admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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156
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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157
entities
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| 实体对像； 实体，独立存在体，实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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158
configuration
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| n.结构，布局，形态，(计算机)配置 | |
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159
lamentably
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| adv.哀伤地，拙劣地 | |
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160
ambiguity
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| n.模棱两可；意义不明确 | |
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161
incarnate
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| adj.化身的，人体化的，肉色的 | |
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consecutively
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| adv.连续地 | |
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163
scrawl
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| vt.潦草地书写；n.潦草的笔记，涂写 | |
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pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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165
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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166
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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169
shimmers
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| n.闪闪发光，发微光( shimmer的名词复数 )v.闪闪发光，发微光( shimmer的第三人称单数 ) | |
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170
spectrum
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| n.谱，光谱，频谱；范围，幅度，系列 | |
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171
integration
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| n.一体化，联合，结合 | |
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172
contraction
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| n.缩略词，缩写式，害病 | |
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173
nebula
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| n.星云，喷雾剂 | |
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174
calcification
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| n.钙化 | |
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175
crabs
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| n.蟹( crab的名词复数 )；阴虱寄生病；蟹肉v.捕蟹( crab的第三人称单数 ) | |
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176
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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177
embody
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| vt.具体表达，使具体化；包含，收录 | |
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178
unifying
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| 使联合( unify的现在分词 )； 使相同； 使一致； 统一 | |
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179
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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180
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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181
geologic
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| adj.地质的 | |
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182
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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183
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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184
unities
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| n.统一体( unity的名词复数 )；（艺术等） 完整；（文学、戏剧） （情节、时间和地点的）统一性；团结一致 | |
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185
conserve
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| vt.保存，保护，节约，节省，守恒，不灭 | |
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186
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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187
teleological
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| adj.目的论的 | |
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188
metaphor
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| n.隐喻，暗喻 | |
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189
permissible
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| adj.可允许的，许可的 | |
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190
distill
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| vt.蒸馏，用蒸馏法提取，吸取，提炼 | |
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191
gaudy
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| adj.华而不实的；俗丽的 | |
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192
chromatic
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| adj.色彩的，颜色的 | |
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193
swarm
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| n.(昆虫)等一大群；vi.成群飞舞；蜂拥而入 | |
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194
reigns
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| n.君主的统治( reign的名词复数 )；君主统治时期；任期；当政期 | |
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195
manifestations
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| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
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196
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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197
cremated
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| v.火葬，火化（尸体）( cremate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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198
penetrating
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| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
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199
isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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200
definitive
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| adj.确切的，权威性的；最后的，决定性的 | |
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201
overdid
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| v.做得过分( overdo的过去式 )；太夸张；把…煮得太久；（工作等）过度 | |
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202
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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203
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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204
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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205
quaint
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| adj.古雅的，离奇有趣的，奇怪的 | |
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206
consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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207
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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208
formulating
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| v.构想出( formulate的现在分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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209
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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210
frustrations
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| 挫折( frustration的名词复数 )； 失败； 挫败； 失意 | |
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