* One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not, therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who makes the rational end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he joins with this the necessary knowledge which, as it aims at action, must not be spun6 out into the most subtile threads of metaphysic, unless a legal duty is in question; in which case meum and tuum must be accurately7 determined8 in the balance of justice, on the principle of equality of action and action, which requires something like mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere ethical9 duty. For in this case the question is not only to know what it is a duty to do (a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have can be easily decided), but the chief point is the inner principle of the will namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the man who joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that he is a practical philosopher.
Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every feeling) a motive10 of action. For what sort of notion can we form of the mighty11 power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to overcome the vice12-breeding inclinations13, if Virtue14 is to borrow her "arms from the armoury of metaphysics," which is a matter of speculation15 that only few men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out with fragments of metaphysics, becomes ridiculous. But it is not, therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics the first principles of ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty, otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a certain feeling which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral, may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone in every case made your maxim16 the universal law, how could this law be consistent with itself?" But if it were merely feeling that made it our duty to take this principle as a criterion, then this would not be dictated17 by reason, but only adopted instinctively18 and therefore blindly.
But in fact, whatever men imagine, no moral principle is based on any feeling, but such a principle is really nothing else than an obscurely conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's reasoning faculty19; as the teacher will easily find who tries to catechize his pupils in the Socratic method about the imperative20 of duty and its application to the moral judgement of his actions. The mode of stating it need not be always metaphysical, and the language need not necessarily be scholastic21, unless the pupil is to be trained to be a philosopher. But the thought must go back to the elements of metaphysics, without which we cannot expect any certainty or purity, or even motive power in ethics.
If we deviate22 from this principle and begin from pathological, or purely23 sensitive, or even moral feeling (from what is subjectively24 practical instead of what is objective), that is, from the matter of the will, the end, not from its form that is the law, in order from thence to determine duties; then, certainly, there are no metaphysical elements of ethics, for feeling by whatever it may be excited is always physical. But then ethical teaching, whether in schools, or lecture-rooms, etc., is corrupted25 in its source. For it is not a matter of indifference26 by what motives27 or means one is led to a good purpose (the obedience28 to duty). However disgusting, then, metaphysics may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly, or even brilliantly, about the doctrine of duty, it is, nevertheless, an indispensable duty for those who oppose it to go back to its principles even in ethics, and to begin by going to school on its benches.
We may fairly wonder how, after all previous explanations of the principles of duty, so far as it is derived29 from pure reason, it was still possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of happiness; in such a way, however, that a certain moral happiness not resting on empirical causes was ultimately arrived at, a self-contradictory nonentity30. In fact, when the thinking man has conquered the temptations to vice, and is conscious of having done his (often hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction which may well be called happiness, in which virtue is her own reward. Now, says the eudaemonist, this delight, this happiness, is the real motive of his acting31 virtuously32. The notion of duty, says he, does not immediately determine his will; it is only by means of the happiness in prospect33 that he is moved to his duty. Now, on the other hand, since he can promise himself this reward of virtue only from the consciousness of having done his duty, it is clear that the latter must have preceded: that is, he must feel himself bound to do his duty before he thinks, and without thinking, that happiness will be the consequence of obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a circle in his assignment of cause and effect. He can only hope to be happy if he is conscious of his obedience to duty: and he can only be moved to obedience to duty if he foresees that he will thereby34 become happy. But in this reasoning there is also a contradiction. For, on the one side, he must obey his duty, without asking what effect this will have on his happiness, consequently, from a moral principle; on the other side, he can only recognize something as his duty when he can reckon on happiness which will accrue35 to him thereby, and consequently on a pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the former.
I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as I believe, to the simplest expressions the distinction between pathological and moral pleasure. The pleasure, namely, which must precede the obedience to the law in order that one may act according to the law is pathological, and the process follows the physical order of nature; that which must be preceded by the law in order that it may be felt is in the moral order. If this distinction is not observed; if eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is adopted as the principle instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom of the inner legislation), the consequence is the euthanasia (quiet death) of all morality.
The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those who are accustomed only to physiological36 explanations will not admit into their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws dictatorially37 proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves irresistibly38 forced by it. Dissatisfied at not being able to explain what lies wholly beyond that sphere, namely, freedom of the elective will, elevating as is this privilege, that man has of being capable of such an idea. They are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative39 reason, which feels its power so strongly in the fields, just as if they were allies leagued in defence of the omnipotence40 of theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist that idea; and thus they are at present, and perhaps for a long time to come, though ultimately in vain, to attack the moral concept of freedom and if possible render it doubtful.
Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics
Ethics in ancient times signified moral philosophy (philosophia moral is) generally, which was also called the doctrine of duties. Subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part of moral philosophy, namely, to the doctrine of duties which are not subject to external laws (for which in German the name Tugendlehre was found suitable). Thus the system of general deontology is divided into that of jurisprudence (jurisprudentia), which is capable of external laws, and of ethics, which is not thus capable, and we may let this division stand.
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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spun
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| v.纺，杜撰，急转身 | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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scholastic
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| adj.学校的，学院的，学术上的 | |
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deviate
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| v.(from)背离，偏离 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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subjectively
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| 主观地； 臆 | |
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corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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nonentity
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| n.无足轻重的人 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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virtuously
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| 合乎道德地，善良地 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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accrue
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| v.(利息等)增大，增多 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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dictatorially
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| adv.独裁地，自大地 | |
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irresistibly
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| adv.无法抵抗地，不能自持地；极为诱惑人地 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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omnipotence
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| n.全能，万能，无限威力 | |
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