Ethics3, however, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start from the ends which the man may propose to himself, and hence give directions as to the maxims4 he should adopt, that is, as to his duty; for that would be to take empirical principles of maxims, and these could not give any notion of duty; since this, the categorical ought, has its root in pure reason alone. Indeed, if the maxims were to be adopted in accordance with those ends (which are all selfish), we could not properly speak of the notion of duty at all. Hence in ethics the notion of duty must lead to ends, and must on moral principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to the ends which we ought to propose to ourselves.
Setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in itself a duty, and how such an end is possible, it is here only necessary to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue5, and why it is so called.
To every duty corresponds a right of action (facultas moral is generatim), but all duties do not imply a corresponding right (facultas juridica) of another to compel any one, but only the duties called legal duties. Similarly to all ethical6 obligation corresponds the notion of virtue, but it does not follow that all ethical duties are duties of virtue. Those, in fact, are not so which do not concern so much a certain end (matter, object of the elective will), but merely that which is formal in the moral determination of the will (e.g., that the dutiful action must also be done from duty). It is only an end which is also duty that can be called a duty of virtue. Hence there are several of the latter kind (and thus there are distinct virtues7); on the contrary, there is only one duty of the former kind, but it is one which is valid8 for all actions (only one virtuous9 disposition).
The duty of virtue is essentially10 distinguished11 from the duty of justice in this respect; that it is morally possible to be externally compelled to the latter, whereas the former rests on free self-constraint only. For finite holy beings (which cannot even be tempted12 to the violation13 of duty) there is no doctrine14 of virtue, but only moral philosophy, the latter being an autonomy of practical reason, whereas the former is also an autocracy15 of it. That is, it includes a consciousness- not indeed immediately perceived, but rightly concluded, from the moral categorical imperative- of the power to become master of one's inclinations16 which resist the law; so that human morality in its highest stage can yet be nothing more than virtue; even if it were quite pure (perfectly free from the influence of a spring foreign to duty), a state which is poetically17 personified under the name of the wise man (as an ideal to which one should continually approximate).
Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed18 merely as habit, and (as it is expressed in the prize essay of Cochius) as a long custom acquired by practice of morally good actions. For, if this is not an effect of well-resolved and firm principles ever more and more purified, then, like any other mechanical arrangement brought about by technical practical reason, it is neither armed for all circumstances nor adequately secured against the change that may be wrought19 by new allurements20.
REMARK
To virtue = + a is opposed as its logical contradictory21 (contradictorie oppositum) the negative lack of virtue (moral weakness) = o; but vice22 = a is its contrary (contrarie s. realiter oppositum); and it is not merely a needless question but an offensive one to ask whether great crimes do not perhaps demand more strength of mind than great virtues. For by strength of mind we understand the strength of purpose of a man, as a being endowed with freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of himself (in his senses) and therefore in a healthy condition of mind. But great crimes are paroxysms, the very sight of which makes the man of healthy mind shudder23. The question would therefore be something like this: whether a man in a fit of madness can have more physical strength than if he is in his senses; and we may admit this without on that account ascribing to him more strength of mind, if by mind we understand the vital principle of man in the free use of his powers. For since those crimes have their ground merely in the power of the inclinations that weaken reason, which does not prove strength of mind, this question would be nearly the same as the question whether a man in a fit of illness can show more strength than in a healthy condition; and this may be directly denied, since the want of health, which consists in the proper balance of all the bodily forces of the man, is a weakness in the system of these forces, by which system alone we can estimate absolute health.
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1
maxim
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n.格言,箴言 | |
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2
determined
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adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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3
ethics
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n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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4
maxims
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n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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5
virtue
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n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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6
ethical
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adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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7
virtues
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美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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8
valid
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adj.有确实根据的;有效的;正当的,合法的 | |
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9
virtuous
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adj.有品德的,善良的,贞洁的,有效力的 | |
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10
essentially
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adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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11
distinguished
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adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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12
tempted
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v.怂恿(某人)干不正当的事;冒…的险(tempt的过去分词) | |
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13
violation
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n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯 | |
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14
doctrine
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n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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15
autocracy
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n.独裁政治,独裁政府 | |
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16
inclinations
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倾向( inclination的名词复数 ); 倾斜; 爱好; 斜坡 | |
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17
poetically
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adv.有诗意地,用韵文 | |
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18
esteemed
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adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 );敬重;认为;以为 | |
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19
wrought
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v.引起;以…原料制作;运转;adj.制造的 | |
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20
allurements
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n.诱惑( allurement的名词复数 );吸引;诱惑物;有诱惑力的事物 | |
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21
contradictory
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adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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22
vice
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n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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23
shudder
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v.战粟,震动,剧烈地摇晃;n.战粟,抖动 | |
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