A. THE MORAL FEELING
This is the susceptibility for pleasure or displeasure, merely from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement of our action with the law of duty. Now, every determination of the elective will proceeds from the idea of the possible action through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it or its effect to the deed; and here the sensitive state (the affection of the internal sense) is either a pathological or a moral feeling. The former is the feeling that precedes the idea of the law, the latter that which may follow it.
Now it cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it; for all consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order that one may become conscious of the necessitation that lies in the notion of duty; but every man (as a moral being) has it originally in himself; the obligation, then, can only extend to the cultivation5 of it and the strengthening of it even by admiration6 of its inscrutable origin; and this is effected by showing how it is just, by the mere4 conception of reason, that it is excited most strongly, in its own purity and apart from every pathological stimulus7; and it is improper8 to call this feeling a moral sense; for the word sense generally means a theoretical power of perception directed to an object; whereas the moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in general) is something merely subjective, which supplies no knowledge. No man is wholly destitute9 of moral feeling, for if he were totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead; and, to speak in the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could no longer produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity would be dissolved (as it were by chemical laws) into mere animality and be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical beings. But we have no special sense for (moral) good and evil any more than for truth, although such expressions are often used; but we have a susceptibility of the free elective will for being moved by pure practical reason and its law; and it is this that we call the moral feeling.
B. OF CONSCIENCE
Similarly, conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally within him. To be bound to have a conscience would be as much as to say to be under a duty to recognize duties. For conscience is practical reason which, in every case of law, holds before a man his duty for acquittal or condemnation10; consequently it does not refer to an object, but only to the subject (affecting the moral feeling by its own act); so that it is an inevitable11 fact, not an obligation and duty. When, therefore, it is said, "This man has no conscience," what is meant is that he pays no heed12 to its dictates13. For if he really had none, he would not take credit to himself for anything done according to duty, nor reproach himself with violation14 of duty, and therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a conscience.
I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only observe what follows from what has just been said, namely, that there is no such thing as an erring16 conscience. No doubt it is possible sometimes to err15 in the objective judgement whether something is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the subjective whether I have compared it with my practical (here judicially17 acting) reason for the purpose of that judgement: for if I erred18 I would not have exercised practical judgement at all, and in that case there is neither truth nor error. Unconscientiousness is not want of conscience, but the propensity19 not to heed its judgement. But when a man is conscious of having acted according to his conscience, then, as far as regards guilt20 or innocence21, nothing more can be required of him, only he is bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is duty or not; but when it comes or has come to action, then conscience speaks involuntarily and inevitably22. To act conscientiously23 can, therefore, not be a duty, since otherwise it would be necessary to have a second conscience, in order to be conscious of the act of the first.
The duty here is only to cultivate our conscience, to quicken our attention to the voice of the internal judge, and to use all means to secure obedience24 to it, and is thus our indirect duty.
C. OF LOVE TO MEN
Love is a matter of feeling, not of will or volition25, and I cannot love because I will to do so, still less because I ought (I cannot be necessitated26 to love); hence there is no such thing as a duty to love. Benevolence27, however (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of action, may be subject to a law of duty. Disinterested28 benevolence is often called (though very improperly29) love; even where the happiness of the other is not concerned, but the complete and free surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another (even a superhuman) being, love is spoken of as being also our duty. But all duty is necessitation or constraint30, although it may be self-constraint according to a law. But what is done from constraint is not done from love.
It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether we love them or not, and this duty loses nothing of its weight, although we must make the sad remark that our species, alas31! is not such as to be found particularly worthy32 of love when we know it more closely. Hatred33 of men, however, is always hateful: even though without any active hostility34 it consists only in complete aversion from mankind (the solitary35 misanthropy). For benevolence still remains36 a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we can show kindness.
To hate vice37 in men is neither duty nor against duty, but a mere feeling of horror of vice, the will having no influence on the feeling nor the feeling on the will. Beneficence is a duty. He who often practises this, and sees his beneficent purpose succeed, comes at last really to love him whom he has benefited. When, therefore, it is said: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," this does not mean, "Thou shalt first of all love, and by means of this love (in the next place) do him good"; but: "Do good to thy neighbour, and this beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit of inclination38 to beneficence)."
The love of complacency (amor complacentiae,) would therefore alone be direct. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the idea of the existence of an object, and to have a duty to this, that is, to be necessitated to find pleasure in a thing, is a contradiction.
D. OF RESPECT
Respect (reverentia) is likewise something merely subjective; a feeling of a peculiar39 kind not a judgement about an object which it would be a duty to effect or to advance. For if considered as duty it could only be conceived as such by means of the respect which we have for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would be as much as to say to be bound in duty to have a duty. When, therefore, it is said: "Man has a duty of self-esteem," this is improperly stated, and we ought rather to say: "The law within him inevitably forces from him respect for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a peculiar kind) is a basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions which may be consistent with his duty to himself." But we cannot say that he has a duty of respect for himself; for he must have respect for the law within himself, in order to be able to conceive duty at all.
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1
subjective
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a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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2
affected
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adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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3
virtue
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n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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4
mere
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adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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5
cultivation
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n.耕作,培养,栽培(法),养成 | |
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6
admiration
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n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
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7
stimulus
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n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物 | |
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8
improper
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adj.不适当的,不合适的,不正确的,不合礼仪的 | |
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9
destitute
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adj.缺乏的;穷困的 | |
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10
condemnation
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n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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11
inevitable
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adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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12
heed
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v.注意,留意;n.注意,留心 | |
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13
dictates
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n.命令,规定,要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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14
violation
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n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯 | |
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15
err
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vi.犯错误,出差错 | |
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16
erring
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做错事的,错误的 | |
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17
judicially
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依法判决地,公平地 | |
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18
erred
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犯错误,做错事( err的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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19
propensity
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n.倾向;习性 | |
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20
guilt
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n.犯罪;内疚;过失,罪责 | |
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21
innocence
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n.无罪;天真;无害 | |
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22
inevitably
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adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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23
conscientiously
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adv.凭良心地;认真地,负责尽职地;老老实实 | |
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24
obedience
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n.服从,顺从 | |
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25
volition
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n.意志;决意 | |
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26
necessitated
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使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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27
benevolence
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n.慈悲,捐助 | |
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28
disinterested
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adj.不关心的,不感兴趣的 | |
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29
improperly
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不正确地,不适当地 | |
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30
constraint
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n.(on)约束,限制;限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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31
alas
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int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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32
worthy
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adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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33
hatred
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n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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34
hostility
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n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
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35
solitary
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adj.孤独的,独立的,荒凉的;n.隐士 | |
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36
remains
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n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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37
vice
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n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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38
inclination
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n.倾斜;点头;弯腰;斜坡;倾度;倾向;爱好 | |
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39
peculiar
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adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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