Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus uniqui
Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.*
* Horace. ["Let the wise man bear the name of fool, and the just of unjust, if he pursue virtue7 herself beyond the proper bounds."]
For otherwise it is absurd to imagine that one could be too wise or too virtuous. The emotion always belongs to the sensibility, no matter by what sort of object it may be excited. The true strength of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to bring its law into practice. That is the state of health in the moral life; on the contrary, the emotion, even when it is excited by the idea of the good, is a momentary8 glitter which leaves exhaustion9 after it. We may apply the term fantastically virtuous to the man who will admit nothing to be indifferent in respect of morality (adiaphora), and who strews10 all his steps with duties, as with traps, and will not allow it to be indifferent whether a man eats fish or flesh, drink beer or wine, when both agree with him; a micrology which, if adopted into the doctrine11 of virtue, would make its rule a tyranny.
Remark
Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the beginning. The former follows from the fact that, objectively considered, it is an ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty constantly to approximate to it. The second is founded subjectively12 on the nature of man which is affected13 by inclinations14, under the influence of which virtue, with its maxims15 adopted once for all, can never settle in a position of rest; but, if it is not rising, inevitably16 falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical, be based on custom (for this belongs to the physical character of the determination of will); but even if the practice of them become a custom, the agent would thereby17 lose the freedom in the choice of his maxims, which freedom is the character of an action done from duty.
On Conscience
The consciousness of an internal tribunal in man (before which "his thoughts accuse or excuse one another") is CONSCIENCE.
Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe18 (reverence combined with fear); and this power which watches over the laws within him is not something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is incorporated in his being. It follows him like his shadow, when he thinks to escape. He may indeed stupefy himself with pleasures and distractions19, but cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he cannot avoid hearing it.
Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity20 in it, that although its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself compelled by his reason to transact21 it as if at the command of another person. For the transaction here is the conduct of a trial (causa) before a tribunal. But that he who is accused by his conscience should be conceived as one and the same person with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial22 court; for then the complainant would always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions, if it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames to itself. Such an idealized person (the authorized23 judge of conscience) must be one who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set up in the inward part of man; at the same time he must also be all-obliging, that is, must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded as his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must at the same time possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and since such a moral being possessing power over all is called GOD, hence conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before God; nay24, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in every moral self-consciousness.
The End
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1
apathy
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n.漠不关心,无动于衷;冷淡 | |
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2
subjective
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a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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3
indifference
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n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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4
distinguished
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adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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5
degenerate
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v.退步,堕落;adj.退步的,堕落的;n.堕落者 | |
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6
virtuous
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adj.有品德的,善良的,贞洁的,有效力的 | |
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7
virtue
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n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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8
momentary
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adj.片刻的,瞬息的;短暂的 | |
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9
exhaustion
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n.耗尽枯竭,疲惫,筋疲力尽,竭尽,详尽无遗的论述 | |
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10
strews
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v.撒在…上( strew的第三人称单数 );散落于;点缀;撒满 | |
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11
doctrine
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n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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12
subjectively
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主观地; 臆 | |
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13
affected
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adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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14
inclinations
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倾向( inclination的名词复数 ); 倾斜; 爱好; 斜坡 | |
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15
maxims
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n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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16
inevitably
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adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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17
thereby
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adv.因此,从而 | |
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18
awe
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n.敬畏,惊惧;vt.使敬畏,使惊惧 | |
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19
distractions
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n.使人分心的事[人]( distraction的名词复数 );娱乐,消遣;心烦意乱;精神错乱 | |
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20
peculiarity
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n.独特性,特色;特殊的东西;怪癖 | |
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21
transact
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v.处理;做交易;谈判 | |
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22
judicial
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adj.司法的,法庭的,审判的,明断的,公正的 | |
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23
authorized
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a.委任的,许可的 | |
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24
nay
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adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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