If, then, the exercise of the faculty of sight is actual seeing, that of the auditory faculty, hearing, and, in general that of the faculty of sense-perception, perceiving; and if there are some perceptions common to the senses, such as figure, magnitude, motion, &c., while there are others, as colour, sound, taste, peculiar5 [each to its own sense]; and further, if all creatures, when the eyes are closed in sleep, are unable to see, and the analogous6 statement is true of the other senses, so that manifestly we perceive nothing when asleep; we may conclude that it is not by sense-perception we perceive a dream.
But neither is it by opinion that we do so. For [in dreams] we not only assert, e.g. that some object approaching is a man or a horse [which would be an exercise of opinion], but that the object is white or beautiful, points on which opinion without sense-perception asserts nothing either truly or falsely. It is, however, a fact that the soul makes such assertions in sleep. We seem to see equally well that the approaching figure is a man, and that it is white. [In dreams], too, we think something else, over and above the dream presentation, just as we do in waking moments when we perceive something; for we often also reason about that which we perceive. So, too, in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than the mere7 phantasms immediately before our minds. This would be manifest to any one who should attend and try, immediately on arising from sleep, to remember [his dreaming experience]. There are cases of persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according to the mnemonic rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which they envisage8 into its mnemonic position. Hence it is plain that not every ‘phantasm’ in sleep is a mere dream-image, and that the further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the faculty of opinion.
So much at least is plain on all these points, viz. that the faculty by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected9 by disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in sleep. So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the facts of the case perfectly10 well, the sun, nevertheless, appears to them to be only a foot wide. Now, whether the presentative faculty of the soul be identical with, or different from, the faculty of sense-perception, in either case the illusion does not occur without our actually seeing or [otherwise] perceiving something. Even to see wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one who sees or hears something real, though not exactly what he supposes. But we have assumed that in sleep one neither sees, nor hears, nor exercises any sense whatever. Perhaps we may regard it as true that the dreamer sees nothing, yet as false that his faculty of sense-perception is unaffected, the fact being that the sense of seeing and the other senses may possibly be then in a certain way affected, while each of these affections, as duly as when he is awake, gives its impulse in a certain manner to his [primary] faculty of sense, though not in precisely11 the same manner as when he is awake. Sometimes, too, opinion says [to dreamers] just as to those who are awake, that the object seen is an illusion; at other times it is inhibited12, and becomes a mere follower13 of the phantasm.
It is plain therefore that this affection, which we name ‘dreaming’, is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence, but yet is not an affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense. If it were the latter it would be possible [when asleep] to hear and see in the simple sense.
How then, and in what manner, it takes place, is what we have to examine. Let us assume, what is indeed clear enough, that the affection [of dreaming] pertains to sense-perception as surely as sleep itself does. For sleep does not pertain2 to one organ in animals and dreaming to another; both pertain to the same organ.
But since we have, in our work On the Soul, treated of presentation, and the faculty of presentation is identical with that of sense-perception, though the essential notion of a faculty of presentation is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since presentation is the movement set up by a sensory14 faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in sleep-whether simply or in some particular way-is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception, but belongs to this faculty qua presentative.
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1 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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2 pertain | |
v.(to)附属,从属;关于;有关;适合,相称 | |
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3 pertains | |
关于( pertain的第三人称单数 ); 有关; 存在; 适用 | |
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4 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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5 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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6 analogous | |
adj.相似的;类似的 | |
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7 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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8 envisage | |
v.想象,设想,展望,正视 | |
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9 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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10 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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11 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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12 inhibited | |
a.拘谨的,拘束的 | |
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13 follower | |
n.跟随者;随员;门徒;信徒 | |
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14 sensory | |
adj.知觉的,感觉的,知觉器官的 | |
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