The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion8, and avoidance by other people, if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably9 express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly10, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite11 for its protection.
In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify12 the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate14 object, necessarily and therefore legitimately15 causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts16 a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions17 of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion20 and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity22 from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere13, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit — namely, fraud or treachery, and force.
Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction23 of society: accordingly, it was once held to be the duty of governments, in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix prices, and regulate the processes of manufacture. But it is now recognized, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly24 free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions25 on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in question affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely27 because they do not really produce the results which it is desired to produce by them. As the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine: as for example, what amount of public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary28 precautions, or arrangements to protect work-people employed in dangerous occupations, should be enforced on employers. Such questions involve considerations of liberty, only in so far as leaving people to themselves is always better, caeteris paribus, than controlling them: but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle undeniable. On the other hand, there are questions relating to interference with trade which are essentially29 questions of liberty; such as the Maine Law, already touched upon; the prohibition30 of the importation of opium31 into China; the restriction26 of the sale of poisons; all cases, in short, where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These interferences are objectionable, not as infringements33 on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.
One of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it. If poisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission of murder, it would be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale. They may, however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes, and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in the other. Again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained35 to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back without any real infringement32 of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief37, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive38 which may prompt him to incur39 the risk: in this case, therefore, (unless he is a child, or delirious40, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible41 with the full use of the reflecting faculty,) he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it. Similar considerations, applied42 to such a question as the sale of poisons, may enable us to decide which among the possible modes of regulation are or are not contrary to principle. Such a precaution, for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive43 of its dangerous character, may be enforced without violation44 of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities. But to require in all cases the certificate of a medical practitioner45, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to obtain the article for legitimate uses. The only mode apparent to me, in which difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this means, without any infringement, worth taking into account, upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes, consists in providing what, in the apt language of Bentham, is called “preappointed evidence.” This provision is familiar to every one in the case of contracts. It is usual and right that the law, when a contract is entered into, should require as the condition of its enforcing performance, that certain formalities should be observed, such as signatures, attestation46 of witnesses, and the like, in order that in case of subsequent dispute, there may be evidence to prove that the contract was really entered into, and that there was nothing in the circumstances to render it legally invalid47: the effect being, to throw great obstacles in the way of fictitious48 contracts, or contracts made in circumstances which, if known, would destroy their validity. Precautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime. The seller, for example, might be required to enter in a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received. When there was no medical prescription50, the presence of some third person might be required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in case there should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been applied to criminal purposes. Such regulations would in general be no material impediment to obtaining the article, but a very considerable one to making an improper51 use of it without detection.
The right inherent in society, to ward34 off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim4, that purely52 self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled53 with in the way of prevention or punishment. Drunkennesses, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative54 interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. So, again, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except when it constitutes a breach55 of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory56 labor57, if no other means are available.
Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted58, but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences against others, may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency60; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only connected indirectly61 with our subject, the objection to publicity62 being equally strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable64, nor supposed to be so.
There is another question to which an answer must be found, consistent with the principles which have been laid down. In cases of personal conduct supposed to be blameable, but which respect for liberty precludes65 society from preventing or punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; what the agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate66? This question is not free from difficulty. The case of a person who solicits67 another to do an act, is not strictly68 a case of self-regarding conduct. To give advice or offer inducements to any one, is a social act, and may therefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed amenable69 to social control. But a little reflection corrects the first impression, by showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. If people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as seems best to themselves at their own peril70, they must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions. Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. The question is doubtful, only when the instigator71 derives72 a personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence, or pecuniary73 gain, to promote what society and the State consider to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new element of complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes of persons with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal, and whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction74 of it. Ought this to be interfered75 with, or not? Fornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling76; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house? The case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are arguments on both sides. On the side of toleration it may be said, that the fact of following anything as an occupation, and living or profiting by the practice of it, cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible; that the act should either be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited; that if the principles which we have hitherto defended are true, society has no business, as society, to decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the individual; that it cannot go beyond dissuasion77, and that one person should be as free to persuade, as another to dissuade78. In opposition18 to this it may be contended, that although the public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively79 deciding, for purposes of repression80 or punishment, that such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they are fully59 justified81 in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or not is at least a disputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting82 wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested83, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial84 — who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate85 their inclinations86 for interested purposes of their own. Thus (it may be said) though the statutes87 respecting unlawful games are utterly88 indefensible — though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each other’s houses, or in any place of meeting established by their own subscriptions89, and open only to the members and their visitors — yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted. It is true that the prohibition is never effectual, and that whatever amount of tyrannical power is given to the police, gamblinghouses can always be maintained under other pretences90; but they may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy91 and mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them; and more than this society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force in these arguments. I will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary, when the principal is (and must be) allowed to go free; of fining or imprisoning92 the procurer, but not the fornicator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the gambler. Still less ought the common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous93 grounds. Almost every article which is bought and sold may be used in excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no argument can be founded on this, in favor, for instance, of the Maine Law; because the class of dealers94 in strong drinks, though interested in their abuse, are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate use. The interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance95 is a real evil, and justifies96 the State in imposing97 restrictions and requiring guarantees, which but for that justification98 would be infringements of legitimate liberty.
A further question is, whether the State while it permits, should nevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the means of drunkenness more costly99, or add to the difficulty of procuring100 them, by limiting the number of the places of sale. On this as on most other practical questions, many distinctions require to be made. To tax stimulants101 for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable102 only if that were justifiable. Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented103 price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending104 their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own judgment. These considerations may seem at first sight to condemn63 the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation105 for purposes of revenue. But it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal106 purposes is absolutely inevitable107; that in most countries it is necessary that a considerable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State, therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be prohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. It is hence the duty of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the consumers can best spare; and a fortiori, to select in preference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively108 injurious. Taxation, therefore, of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of.
The question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less exclusive privilege, must be answered differently, according to the purposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient109. All places of public resort require the restraint of a police, and places of this kind peculiarly, because offences against society are especially apt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to confine the power of selling these commodities (at least for consumption on the spot) to persons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for public surveillance, and to withdraw the license112 if breaches113 of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance114 or incapacity of the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous115 for concocting116 and preparing offences against the law. Any further restriction I do not conceive to be, in principle, justifiable. The limitation in number, for instance, of beer and spirit-houses, for the express purpose of rendering117 them more difficult of access, and diminishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by whom the facility would be abused, but is suited only to a state of society in which the laboring118 classes are avowedly119 treated as children or savages120, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not the principle on which the laboring classes are professedly governed in any free country; and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted121 to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it has been definitively122 proved that they can only be governed as children. The bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity123 of supposing that such efforts have been made in any case which needs be considered here. It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal124, government, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy as a moral education.
It was pointed21 out in an early part of this Essay, that the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the individual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual125 agreement such things as regard them jointly127, and regard no persons but themselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as the will of all the persons implicated128 remains129 unaltered; but since that will may change, it is often necessary, even in things in which they alone are concerned, that they should enter into engagements with one another; and when they do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be kept. Yet in the laws probably, of every country, this general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are not held to engagements which violate the rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an engagement, that it is injurious to themselves. In this and most other civilized130 countries, for example, an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for not interfering131, unless for the sake of others, with a person’s voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates132 his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption134 in its favor, that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate135 his freedom. These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous136 in this peculiar110 case, are evidently of far wider application; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the necessities of life, which continually require, not indeed that we should resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this and the other limitation of it. The principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves, requires that those who have become bound to one another, in things which concern no third party, should be able to release one another from the engagement: and even without such voluntary release, there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money’s worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retractation. Baron137 Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the excellent Essay from which I have already quoted, states it as his conviction, that engagements which involve personal relations or services, should never be legally binding138 beyond a limited duration of time; and that the most important of these engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity139 that its objects are frustrated140 unless the feelings of both the parties are in harmony with it, should require nothing more than the declared will of either party to dissolve it. This subject is too important, and too complicated, to be discussed in a parenthesis141, and I touch on it only so far as is necessary for purposes of illustration. If the conciseness142 and generality of Baron Humboldt’s dissertation143 had not obliged him in this instance to content himself with enunciating his conclusion without discussing the premises144, he would doubtless have recognized that the question cannot be decided145 on grounds so simple as those to which he confines himself. When a person, either by express promise or by conduct, has encouraged another to rely upon his continuing to act in a certain way — to build expectations and calculations, and stake any part of his plan of life upon that supposition, a new series of moral obligations arises on his part towards that person, which may possibly be overruled, but can not be ignored. And again, if the relation between two contracting parties has been followed by consequences to others; if it has placed third parties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case of marriage, has even called third parties into existence, obligations arise on the part of both the contracting parties towards those third persons, the fulfilment of which, or at all events, the mode of fulfilment, must be greatly affected146 by the continuance or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the contract. It does not follow, nor can I admit, that these obligations extend to requiring the fulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the reluctant party; but they are a necessary element in the question; and even if, as Von Humboldt maintains, they ought to make no difference in the legal freedom of the parties to release themselves from the engagement (and I also hold that they ought not to make much difference), they necessarily make a great difference in the moral freedom. A person is bound to take all these circumstances into account, before resolving on a step which may affect such important interests of others; and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests, he is morally responsible for the wrong. I have made these obvious remarks for the better illustration of the general principle of liberty, and not because they are at all needed on the particular question, which, on the contrary, is usually discussed as if the interest of children was everything, and that of grown persons nothing.
I have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognized general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld147, as well as withheld where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, in the modern European world, the sentiment of liberty is the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is altogether misplaced. A person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another under the pretext148 that the affairs of another are his own affairs. The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially111 regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant149 control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost entirely150 disregarded in the case of the family relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness, more important than all the others taken together. The almost despotic power of husbands over wives needs not be enlarged upon here, because nothing more is needed for the complete removal of the evil, than that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in the same manner, as all other persons; and because, on this subject, the defenders151 of established injustice152 do not avail themselves of the plea of liberty, but stand forth133 openly as the champions of power. It is in the case of children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the State of its duties. One would almost think that a man’s children were supposed to be literally153, and not metaphorically154, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over them; more jealous than of almost any interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of mankind value liberty than power. Consider, for example, the case of education. Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to be the father’s duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis155! It still remains unrecognized, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent.
Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an end to the difficulties about what the State should teach, and how it should teach, which now convert the subject into a mere156 battle-field for sects157 and parties, causing the time and labor which should have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quarrelling about education. If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping158 to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections which are urged with reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to the State’s taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a totally different thing. That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch159, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus160, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence161. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task; then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint126-stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking162 great works of industry does not exist in the country. But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified163 to provide education under government auspices164, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense.
The instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations, extending to all children, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed165 at which every child must be examined, to ascertain36 if he (or she) is able to read. If a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his labor, and the child might be put to school at his expense. Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more, retention166, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. Beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency167 might claim a certificate. To prevent the State from exercising through these arrangements, an improper influence over opinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination (beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as languages and their use) should, even in the higher class of examinations, be confined to facts and positive science exclusively. The examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics, should not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. Under this system, the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed truths, than they are at present; they would be brought up either churchmen or dissenters168 as they now are, the State merely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools where they were taught other things. All attempts by the State to bias169 the conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify170 that a person possesses the knowledge requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth attending to. A student of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand an examination both in Locke and in Kant, whichever of the two he takes up with, or even if with neither: and there is no reasonable objection to examining an atheist171 in the evidences of Christianity, provided he is not required to profess19 a belief in them. The examinations, however, in the higher branches of knowledge should, I conceive, be entirely voluntary. It would be giving too dangerous a power to governments, were they allowed to exclude any one from professions, even from the profession of teacher, for alleged172 deficiency of qualifications: and I think, with Wilhelm von Humboldt, that degrees, or other public certificates of scientific or professional acquirements, should be given to all who present themselves for examination, and stand the test; but that such certificates should confer no advantage over competitors, other than the weight which may be attached to their testimony173 by public opinion.
It is not in the matter of education only that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognized, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the latter also. The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility — to bestow174 a life which may be either a curse or a blessing175 — unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed176 will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. And in a country either over-peopled or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labor by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labor. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State: and whether such laws be expedient177 or not (a question mainly dependent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations178 of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the State to prohibit a mischievous179 act — an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation180, and social stigma181, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of the individual, in things which concern only himself, would repel182 the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life, or lives, of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently183 within reach to be in any way affected by their actions. When we compare the strange respect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to any one.
I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. These are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty: the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination.
The objections to government interference, when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds.
The first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government. Speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This principle condemns184 the interferences, once so common, of the legislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes of industry. But this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists185, and is not particularly related to the principles of this Essay.
The second objection is more nearly allied186 to our subject. In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education — a mode of strengthening their active faculties187, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is a principal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations. These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. It belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming188 them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns — habituating them to act from public or semipublic motives189, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating190 them from one another. Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved, as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties. The management of purely local business by the localities, and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this Essay as belonging to individuality of development, and diversity of modes of action. Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied191 experiments, and endless diversity of experience. What the State can usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others, instead of tolerating no experiments but its own.
The third, and most cogent192 reason for restricting the interference of government, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government, causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused193, and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government. If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became departments of the central administration; if the employes of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name. And the evil would be greater, the more efficiently194 and scientifically the administrative195 machinery196 was constructed — the more skilful197 the arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it. In England it has of late been proposed that all the members of the civil service of government should be selected by competitive examination, to obtain for those employments the most intelligent and instructed persons procurable198; and much has been said and written for and against this proposal. One of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents is that the occupation of a permanent official servant of the State does not hold out sufficient prospects199 of emolument200 and importance to attract the highest talents, which will always be able to find a more inviting201 career in the professions, or in the service of companies and other public bodies. One would not have been surprised if this argument had been used by the friends of the proposition, as an answer to its principal difficulty. Coming from the opponents it is strange enough. What is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed system. If indeed all the high talent of the country could be drawn202 into the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness. If every part of the business of society which required organized concert, or large and comprehensive views, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative203, would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the able and aspiring204 for personal advancement205. To be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. Under this regime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticize or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy206 condition of the Russian empire, as is shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of observation. The Czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic207 body: he can send any one of them to Siberia, but he cannot govern without them, or against their will. On every decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining from carrying it into effect. In countries of more advanced civilization and of a more insurrectionary spirit the public, accustomed to expect everything to be done for them by the State, or at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from the State not only leave to do it, but even how it is to be done, naturally hold the State responsible for all evil which befalls them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience, they rise against the government and make what is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate authority from the nation, vaults208 into the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking their place.
A very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to transact49 their own business. In France, a large part of the people having been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least the rank of noncommissioned officers, there are in every popular insurrection several persons competent to take the lead, and improvise209 some tolerable plan of action. What the French are in military affairs, the Americans are in every kind of civil business; let them be left without a government, every body of Americans is able to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence, order and decision. This is what every free people ought to be: and a people capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins210 of the central administration. No bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do or undergo anything that they do not like. But where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse211 can be done at all. The constitution of such countries is an organization of the experience and practical ability of the nation, into a disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest; and the more perfect that organization is in itself, the more successful in drawing to itself and educating for itself the persons of greatest capacity from all ranks of the community, the more complete is the bondage212 of all, the members of the bureaucracy included. For the governors are as much the slaves of their organization and discipline, as the governed are of the governors. A Chinese mandarin213 is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator. An individual Jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement214 the slave of his order though the order itself exists for the collective power and importance of its members.
It is not, also, to be forgotten, that the absorption of all the principal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body itself. Banded together as they are — working a system which, like all systems, necessarily proceeds in a great measure by fixed rules — the official body are under the constant temptation of sinking into indolent routine, or, if they now and then desert that mill-horse round, of rushing into some half-examined crudity215 which has struck the fancy of some leading member of the corps216: and the sole check to these closely allied, though seemingly opposite, tendencies, the only stimulus which can keep the ability of the body itself up to a high standard, is liability to the watchful217 criticism of equal ability outside the body. It is indispensable, therefore, that the means should exist, independently of the government, of forming such ability, and furnishing it with the opportunities and experience necessary for a correct judgment of great practical affairs. If we would possess permanently218 a skilful and efficient body of functionaries219 — above all, a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements; if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate220 into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross221 all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind.
To determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom and advancement begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society, under its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being222, to secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity, is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government. It is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in which many and various considerations must be kept in view, and no absolute rule can be laid down. But I believe that the practical principle in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in view, the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination223 of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion224 of it from the centre. Thus, in municipal administration, there would be, as in the New England States, a very minute division among separate officers, chosen by the localities, of all business which is not better left to the persons directly interested; but besides this, there would be, in each department of local affairs, a central superintendence, forming a branch of the general government. The organ of this superintendence would concentrate, as in a focus, the variety of information and experience derived225 from the conduct of that branch of public business in all the localities, from everything analogous which is done in foreign countries, and from the general principles of political science. This central organ should have a right to know all that is done, and its special duty should be that of making the knowledge acquired in one place available for others. Emancipated226 from the petty prejudices and narrow views of a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive sphere of observation, its advice would naturally carry much authority; but its actual power, as a permanent institution, should, I conceive, be limited to compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance. In all things not provided for by general rules, those officers should be left to their own judgment, under responsibility to their constituents227. For the violation of rules, they should be responsible to law, and the rules themselves should be laid down by the legislature; the central administrative authority only watching over their execution, and if they were not properly carried into effect, appealing, according to the nature of the case, to the tribunal to enforce the law, or to the constituencies to dismiss the functionaries who had not executed it according to its spirit. Such, in its general conception, is the central superintendence which the Poor Law Board is intended to exercise over the administrators228 of the Poor Rate throughout the country. Whatever powers the Board exercises beyond this limit, were right and necessary in that peculiar case, for the cure of rooted habits of mal-administration in matters deeply affecting not the localities merely, but the whole community; since no locality has a moral right to make itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism229, necessarily overflowing230 into other localities, and impairing231 the moral and physical condition of the whole laboring community. The powers of administrative coercion232 and subordinate legislation possessed233 by the Poor Law Board (but which, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very scantily234 exercised by them), though perfectly justifiable in a case of a first-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in the superintendence of interests purely local. But a central organ of information and instruction for all the localities, would be equally valuable in all departments of administration. A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede235, but aids and stimulates236, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of informing, advising, and upon occasion denouncing, it makes them work in fetters237 or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them. The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones238 the interests of their mental expansion and elevation239, to a little more of administrative skill or that semblance240 of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State, which dwarfs241 its men, in order that they may be more docile242 instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished243; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly244, it has preferred to banish245.
The End
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4 maxim | |
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6 doctrine | |
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7 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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8 persuasion | |
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9 justifiably | |
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10 secondly | |
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11 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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12 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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13 interfere | |
v.(in)干涉,干预;(with)妨碍,打扰 | |
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14 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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15 legitimately | |
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16 intercepts | |
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18 opposition | |
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19 profess | |
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20 exertion | |
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21 pointed | |
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22 immunity | |
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23 jurisdiction | |
n.司法权,审判权,管辖权,控制权 | |
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24 perfectly | |
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25 restrictions | |
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26 restriction | |
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27 solely | |
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28 sanitary | |
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29 essentially | |
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30 prohibition | |
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31 opium | |
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32 infringement | |
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33 infringements | |
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34 ward | |
n.守卫,监护,病房,行政区,由监护人或法院保护的人(尤指儿童);vt.守护,躲开 | |
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35 ascertained | |
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36 ascertain | |
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37 mischief | |
n.损害,伤害,危害;恶作剧,捣蛋,胡闹 | |
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38 motive | |
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39 incur | |
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40 delirious | |
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41 incompatible | |
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42 applied | |
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43 expressive | |
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44 violation | |
n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯 | |
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45 practitioner | |
n.实践者,从事者;(医生或律师等)开业者 | |
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46 attestation | |
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47 invalid | |
n.病人,伤残人;adj.有病的,伤残的;无效的 | |
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48 fictitious | |
adj.虚构的,假设的;空头的 | |
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49 transact | |
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50 prescription | |
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51 improper | |
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52 purely | |
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53 meddled | |
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54 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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55 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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56 compulsory | |
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57 labor | |
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58 interdicted | |
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59 fully | |
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60 decency | |
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61 indirectly | |
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62 publicity | |
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63 condemn | |
vt.谴责,指责;宣判(罪犯),判刑 | |
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64 condemnable | |
adj.该罚的,该受责备的 | |
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65 precludes | |
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66 instigate | |
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67 solicits | |
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68 strictly | |
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69 amenable | |
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70 peril | |
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71 instigator | |
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72 derives | |
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73 pecuniary | |
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74 counteraction | |
反对的行动,抵抗,反动 | |
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75 interfered | |
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76 gambling | |
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77 dissuasion | |
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78 dissuade | |
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79 authoritatively | |
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80 repression | |
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81 justified | |
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82 acting | |
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83 disinterested | |
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84 impartial | |
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85 stimulate | |
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88 utterly | |
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90 pretences | |
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91 secrecy | |
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92 imprisoning | |
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93 analogous | |
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95 intemperance | |
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96 justifies | |
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98 justification | |
n.正当的理由;辩解的理由 | |
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99 costly | |
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102 justifiable | |
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103 Augmented | |
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105 taxation | |
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106 fiscal | |
adj.财政的,会计的,国库的,国库岁入的 | |
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107 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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108 positively | |
adv.明确地,断然,坚决地;实在,确实 | |
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109 subservient | |
adj.卑屈的,阿谀的 | |
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110 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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111 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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112 license | |
n.执照,许可证,特许;v.许可,特许 | |
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113 breaches | |
破坏( breach的名词复数 ); 破裂; 缺口; 违背 | |
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114 connivance | |
n.纵容;默许 | |
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115 rendezvous | |
n.约会,约会地点,汇合点;vi.汇合,集合;vt.使汇合,使在汇合地点相遇 | |
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116 concocting | |
v.将(尤指通常不相配合的)成分混合成某物( concoct的现在分词 );调制;编造;捏造 | |
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117 rendering | |
n.表现,描写 | |
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118 laboring | |
n.劳动,操劳v.努力争取(for)( labor的现在分词 );苦干;详细分析;(指引擎)缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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119 avowedly | |
adv.公然地 | |
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120 savages | |
未开化的人,野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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121 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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122 definitively | |
adv.决定性地,最后地 | |
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123 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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124 paternal | |
adj.父亲的,像父亲的,父系的,父方的 | |
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125 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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126 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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127 jointly | |
ad.联合地,共同地 | |
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128 implicated | |
adj.密切关联的;牵涉其中的 | |
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129 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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130 civilized | |
a.有教养的,文雅的 | |
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131 interfering | |
adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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132 abdicates | |
放弃(职责、权力等)( abdicate的第三人称单数 ); 退位,逊位 | |
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133 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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134 presumption | |
n.推测,可能性,冒昧,放肆,[法律]推定 | |
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135 alienate | |
vt.使疏远,离间;转让(财产等) | |
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136 conspicuous | |
adj.明眼的,惹人注目的;炫耀的,摆阔气的 | |
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137 baron | |
n.男爵;(商业界等)巨头,大王 | |
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138 binding | |
有约束力的,有效的,应遵守的 | |
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139 peculiarity | |
n.独特性,特色;特殊的东西;怪癖 | |
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140 frustrated | |
adj.挫败的,失意的,泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 );挫败;使受挫折;令人沮丧 | |
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141 parenthesis | |
n.圆括号,插入语,插曲,间歇,停歇 | |
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142 conciseness | |
n.简洁,简短 | |
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143 dissertation | |
n.(博士学位)论文,学术演讲,专题论文 | |
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144 premises | |
n.建筑物,房屋 | |
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145 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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146 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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147 withheld | |
withhold过去式及过去分词 | |
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148 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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149 vigilant | |
adj.警觉的,警戒的,警惕的 | |
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150 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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151 defenders | |
n.防御者( defender的名词复数 );守卫者;保护者;辩护者 | |
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152 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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153 literally | |
adv.照字面意义,逐字地;确实 | |
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154 metaphorically | |
adv. 用比喻地 | |
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155 gratis | |
adj.免费的 | |
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156 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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157 sects | |
n.宗派,教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
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158 helping | |
n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的,辅助的 | |
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159 monarch | |
n.帝王,君主,最高统治者 | |
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160 stimulus | |
n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物 | |
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161 excellence | |
n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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162 undertaking | |
n.保证,许诺,事业 | |
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163 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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164 auspices | |
n.资助,赞助 | |
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165 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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166 retention | |
n.保留,保持,保持力,记忆力 | |
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167 proficiency | |
n.精通,熟练,精练 | |
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168 dissenters | |
n.持异议者,持不同意见者( dissenter的名词复数 ) | |
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169 bias | |
n.偏见,偏心,偏袒;vt.使有偏见 | |
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170 certify | |
vt.证明,证实;发证书(或执照)给 | |
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171 atheist | |
n.无神论者 | |
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172 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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173 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
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174 bestow | |
v.把…赠与,把…授予;花费 | |
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175 blessing | |
n.祈神赐福;祷告;祝福,祝愿 | |
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176 bestowed | |
赠给,授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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177 expedient | |
adj.有用的,有利的;n.紧急的办法,权宜之计 | |
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178 violations | |
违反( violation的名词复数 ); 冒犯; 违反(行为、事例); 强奸 | |
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179 mischievous | |
adj.调皮的,恶作剧的,有害的,伤人的 | |
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180 reprobation | |
n.斥责 | |
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181 stigma | |
n.耻辱,污名;(花的)柱头 | |
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182 repel | |
v.击退,抵制,拒绝,排斥 | |
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183 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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184 condemns | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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185 economists | |
n.经济学家,经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
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186 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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187 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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188 accustoming | |
v.(使)习惯于( accustom的现在分词 ) | |
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189 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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190 isolating | |
adj.孤立的,绝缘的v.使隔离( isolate的现在分词 );将…剔出(以便看清和单独处理);使(某物质、细胞等)分离;使离析 | |
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191 varied | |
adj.多样的,多变化的 | |
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192 cogent | |
adj.强有力的,有说服力的 | |
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193 diffused | |
散布的,普及的,扩散的 | |
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194 efficiently | |
adv.高效率地,有能力地 | |
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195 administrative | |
adj.行政的,管理的 | |
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196 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
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197 skilful | |
(=skillful)adj.灵巧的,熟练的 | |
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198 procurable | |
adj.可得到的,得手的 | |
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199 prospects | |
n.希望,前途(恒为复数) | |
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200 emolument | |
n.报酬,薪水 | |
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201 inviting | |
adj.诱人的,引人注目的 | |
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202 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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203 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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204 aspiring | |
adj.有志气的;有抱负的;高耸的v.渴望;追求 | |
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205 advancement | |
n.前进,促进,提升 | |
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206 melancholy | |
n.忧郁,愁思;adj.令人感伤(沮丧)的,忧郁的 | |
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207 bureaucratic | |
adj.官僚的,繁文缛节的 | |
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208 vaults | |
n.拱顶( vault的名词复数 );地下室;撑物跳高;墓穴 | |
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209 improvise | |
v.即兴创作;临时准备,临时凑成 | |
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210 reins | |
感情,激情; 缰( rein的名词复数 ); 控制手段; 掌管; (成人带着幼儿走路以防其走失时用的)保护带 | |
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211 adverse | |
adj.不利的;有害的;敌对的,不友好的 | |
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212 bondage | |
n.奴役,束缚 | |
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213 Mandarin | |
n.中国官话,国语,满清官吏;adj.华丽辞藻的 | |
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214 abasement | |
n.滥用 | |
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215 crudity | |
n.粗糙,生硬;adj.粗略的 | |
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216 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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217 watchful | |
adj.注意的,警惕的 | |
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218 permanently | |
adv.永恒地,永久地,固定不变地 | |
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219 functionaries | |
n.公职人员,官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
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220 degenerate | |
v.退步,堕落;adj.退步的,堕落的;n.堕落者 | |
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221 engross | |
v.使全神贯注 | |
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222 well-being | |
n.安康,安乐,幸福 | |
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223 dissemination | |
传播,宣传,传染(病毒) | |
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224 diffusion | |
n.流布;普及;散漫 | |
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225 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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226 emancipated | |
adj.被解放的,不受约束的v.解放某人(尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚)( emancipate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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227 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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228 administrators | |
n.管理者( administrator的名词复数 );有管理(或行政)才能的人;(由遗嘱检验法庭指定的)遗产管理人;奉派暂管主教教区的牧师 | |
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229 pauperism | |
n.有被救济的资格,贫困 | |
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230 overflowing | |
n. 溢出物,溢流 adj. 充沛的,充满的 动词overflow的现在分词形式 | |
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231 impairing | |
v.损害,削弱( impair的现在分词 ) | |
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232 coercion | |
n.强制,高压统治 | |
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233 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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234 scantily | |
adv.缺乏地;不充足地;吝啬地;狭窄地 | |
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235 impede | |
v.妨碍,阻碍,阻止 | |
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236 stimulates | |
v.刺激( stimulate的第三人称单数 );激励;使兴奋;起兴奋作用,起刺激作用,起促进作用 | |
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237 fetters | |
n.脚镣( fetter的名词复数 );束缚v.给…上脚镣,束缚( fetter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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238 postpones | |
v.延期,推迟( postpone的第三人称单数 ) | |
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239 elevation | |
n.高度;海拔;高地;上升;提高 | |
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240 semblance | |
n.外貌,外表 | |
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241 dwarfs | |
n.侏儒,矮子(dwarf的复数形式)vt.(使)显得矮小(dwarf的第三人称单数形式) | |
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242 docile | |
adj.驯服的,易控制的,容易教的 | |
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243 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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244 smoothly | |
adv.平滑地,顺利地,流利地,流畅地 | |
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245 banish | |
vt.放逐,驱逐;消除,排除 | |
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