I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions12 are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book. This book, assuming that thoughts and feelings exist and are vehicles of knowledge, thereupon contends that psychology when she has ascertained13 the empirical correlation14 of the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite conditions of the brain, can go no farther -- can go no farther, that is, as a, natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical. All attempts to explain our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities15 (whether the latter be named 'Soul,' 'Transcendental Ego,' 'Ideas,' or 'Elementary Units of Consciousness') are metaphysical. This book consequently rejects both the associationist and the spiritualist theories; and in this strictly16 positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel tempted17 to claim originality18. Of course this point of view is anything but ultimate. Men must keep thinking; and the data assumed by psychology, just like those assumed by physics and the other natural sciences, must some time be overhauled19. The effort to overhaul20 them clearly and thoroughly21 is metaphysics; but metaphysics can only perform her task well when distinctly conscious of its great extent. Metaphysics fragmentary, irresponsible, and half-awake, and unconscious that she is metaphysical, spoils two good things when she injects herself into a natural science. And it seems to me that the theories both of a spiritual agent and of associated 'ideas' are, as they figure in the psychology-books, just such metaphysics as this. Even if their results be true, it would be as well to keep them, as thus presented, out of psychology as it is to keep the results of idealism out of physics.
I have therefore treated our passing thoughts as integers, and regarded the mere22 laws of their coexistence with brain-states as the ultimate laws for our science. The reader will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. It is mainly a mess of descriptive details, running out into queries23 which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope successfully to deal with. That will perhaps be centuries hence; and meanwhile the best mark of health that a science can show is this unfinished-seeming front.
The completion of the book has been so slow that several chapters have been published successively in Mind, the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the Popular Science Monthly, and Scribner's Magazine. Acknowledgment is made in the proper places.
The bibliography24, I regret to say, is quite unsystematic. I have habitually25 given my authority for special experimental facts; but beyond that I have aimed mainly to cite books that would probably be actually used by the ordinary American college-student in his collateral26 reading. The bibliography in W. Volkmann von Volkmar's Lehrbuch der Psychologie (1875) is so complete, up to its date, that there is no need of an inferior duplicate. And for more recent references, Sully's Outlines, Dewey's Psychology, and Baldwin's Handbook of Psychology may be advantageously used.
Finally, where one owes to so many, it seems absurd to single out particular creditors27; yet I cannot resist the temptation at the end of my first literary venture to record my gratitude28 for the inspiration I have got from the writings of J. S. Mill, Lotze, Renouvier, Hodgson, and Wundt, and from the intellectual companionship (to name only five names) of Chauncey Wright and Charles Peirce in old times, and more recently of Stanley Hall, James Putnam, and Josiah Royce.
Harvard University, August 1890.
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1 treatise | |
n.专著;(专题)论文 | |
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2 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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3 exclusion | |
n.拒绝,排除,排斥,远足,远途旅行 | |
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4 aesthetic | |
adj.美学的,审美的,有美感 | |
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5 judgments | |
判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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6 sanguine | |
adj.充满希望的,乐观的,血红色的 | |
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7 judiciously | |
adv.明断地,明智而审慎地 | |
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8 awaken | |
vi.醒,觉醒;vt.唤醒,使觉醒,唤起,激起 | |
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9 abridgment | |
n.删节,节本 | |
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10 spatial | |
adj.空间的,占据空间的 | |
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11 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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12 deductions | |
扣除( deduction的名词复数 ); 结论; 扣除的量; 推演 | |
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13 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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14 correlation | |
n.相互关系,相关,关连 | |
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15 entities | |
实体对像; 实体,独立存在体,实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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16 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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17 tempted | |
v.怂恿(某人)干不正当的事;冒…的险(tempt的过去分词) | |
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18 originality | |
n.创造力,独创性;新颖 | |
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19 overhauled | |
v.彻底检查( overhaul的过去式和过去分词 );大修;赶上;超越 | |
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20 overhaul | |
v./n.大修,仔细检查 | |
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21 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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22 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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23 queries | |
n.问题( query的名词复数 );疑问;询问;问号v.质疑,对…表示疑问( query的第三人称单数 );询问 | |
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24 bibliography | |
n.参考书目;(有关某一专题的)书目 | |
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25 habitually | |
ad.习惯地,通常地 | |
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26 collateral | |
adj.平行的;旁系的;n.担保品 | |
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27 creditors | |
n.债权人,债主( creditor的名词复数 ) | |
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28 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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