We have now finished the physiological1 preliminaries of our subject and must in the remaining chapters study the mental states themselves whose cerebral3 conditions and concomitants we have been considering hitherto. Beyond the brain, however, there is an outer world to which the brain-states themselves 'correspond.' And it will be well, ere we advance farther, to say a word about the relation of the mind to this larger sphere of physical fact.
Psychology4 is a Natural Science.
That is, the mind which the psychologist studies is the mind of distinct individuals inhabiting definite portions of a real space and of a real time. With any other sort of mind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. 'Mind,' in his mouth, is only a class name for minds. Fortunate will it be if his more modest inquiry6 result in any generalizations7 which the philosopher devoted8 to absolute Intelligence as such can use.
To the psychologist, then, the minds he studies are objects, in a world of other objects. Even when he introspectively analyzes9 his own mind, and tells what he finds there, he talks about it in an objective way. He says, for instance, that under certain circumstances the color gray appears to him green, and calls the appearance an illusion. This implies that he compares two objects, a real color seen under conditions, and a mental perception which he believes to represent it, and that he declares the relation between them to be of a certain kind. In making this critical judgment10, the psychologist stands as much outside of the perception which he criticises as he does of the color. Both are his objects. And if this is true of him when he reflects on his own conscious states, how much truer is it when he treats of those of others! In German philosophy since Kant the word Erkenntnisstheorie, criticism of the faculty12 of knowledge, plays a great part. Now the psychologist necessarily becomes such an Erkenntnisstheoretiker. But the knowledge he theorizes about is not the bare function of knowledge which Kant criticises - he does not inquire into the possibility of knowledge überhaupt. He assumes it to be possible, he does not doubt its presence in himself at the moment he speaks. The knowledge he criticises is the knowledge of particular men about the particular things that surround them. This he may, upon occasion, in the light of his own unquestioned knowledge, pronounce true or false, and trace the reasons by which it has become one or the other.
It is highly important that this natural-science point of view should be understood at the outset. Otherwise more may be demanded of the psychologist than he ought to be expected to perform.
A diagram will exhibit more emphatically what the assumptions of Psychology must be:
| 1 The Psychologist |
2 The Thought Studied |
3 The Thought's Object |
4 The Psycholo- gist's Reality |
These four squares contain the irreducible data of psychology. No. 1, the psychologist, believes Nos. 2, 3, and 4, which together form his total object, to be realities, and reports them and their mutual13 relations as truly as he can without troubling himself with the puzzle of how he can report them at all. About such ultimate puzzles he in the main need trouble himself no more than the geometer, the chemist, or the botanist14 do, who make precisely15 the same assumptions as he.1
Of certain fallacies to which the psychologist is exposed by reason of his peculiar16 point of view - that of being a reporter of subjective17 as well as of objective facts, we must presently speak. But not until we have considered the methods he uses for ascertaining18 what the facts in question are.
The Methods of Investigation19.
Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always. The word introspection need hardly be defined - it means, of course, the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover. Every one agrees that we there discover states of consciousness. So far as I know, the existence of such states has never been doubted by any critic, however sceptical in other respects he may have been. That we have cogitations of some sort is the inconcussum in a world most of whose other facts have at some time tottered20 in the breath of philosophic21 doubt. All people unhesitatingly believe that they feel themselves thinking, and that they distinguish the mental state as an inward activity or passion, from all the objects with which it may cognitively22 deal. I regard this belief as the most fundamental of all the postulates24 of Psychology, and shall discard all curious inquiries25 about its certainty as too metaphysical for the scope of this book.
A Question of Nomenclature. We ought to have some general term by which to designate all states of consciousness merely as such, and apart from their particular quality or cognitive23 function. Unfortunately most of the terms in use have grave objections. 'Mental state,' 'state of consciousness,' 'conscious modification27,' are cumbrous and have no kindred verbs. The same is true of 'subjective condition.' 'Feeling' has the verb 'to feel,' both active and neuter, and such derivatives28 as 'feelingly,' 'felt,' 'feltness,' etc., which make it extremely convenient. But on the other hand it has specific meanings as well as its generic29 one, sometimes standing30 for pleasure and pain, and being sometimes a synonym31 of 'sensation' as opposed to thought; whereas we wish a term to cover sensation and thought indifferently. Moreover, 'feeling' has acquired in the hearts of platonizing thinkers a very opprobrious32 set of implications; and since one of the greatest obstacles to mutual understanding in philosophy is the use of words eulogistically and disparagingly33, impartial34 terms ought always, if possible, to be preferred. The word psychosis has been proposed by Mr. Huxley. It has the advantage of being correlative to neurosis (the name applied35 by the same author to the corresponding nerve-process), and is moreover technical and devoid36 of partial implications. But it has no verb or other grammatical form allied37 to it. The expressions 'affection of the soul,' 'modification of the ego38,' are clumsy, like 'state of consciousness,' and they implicitly39 assert theories which it is not well to embody40 in terminology41 before they have been openly discussed and approved. 'Idea' is a good vague neutral word, and was by Locke employed in the broadest generic way; but notwithstanding his authority it has not domesticated42 itself in the language so as to cover bodily sensations. It has no opprobrious connotation such as 'feeling' has, and it immediately suggests the omnipresence of cognition (or reference to an object other than the mental state itself), which we shall soon see to be of the mental life's essence. But can the expression 'thought of a toothache' ever suggest to the reader the actual present pain itself? It is hardly possible; and we thus seem about to be forced back on some pair of terms like Hume's 'impression and idea,' or Hamilton's 'presentation and representation,' or the ordinary 'feeling and thought,' if we wish to cover the whole ground.
In this quandary44 we can make no definitive45 choice, but must, according to the convenience of the context, use sometimes one, sometimes another of the synonyms46 that have been mentioned. My own partiality is for either FEELING or THOUGHT. I shall probably often use both words in a wider sense than usual, and alternately startle two classes of readers by their unusual sound; but if the connection makes it clear that mental states at large, irrespective of their kind, are meant, this will do no harm, and may even do some good.2
The inaccuracy of introspective observation has been made a subject of debate. It is important to gain some fixed47 ideas on this point before we proceed.
The commonest spiritualistic opinion is that the Soul or Subject of the mental life is a metaphysical entity48, inaccessible49 to direct knowledge, and that the various mental states and operations of which we reflectively become aware are objects of an inner sense which does not lay hold of the real agent in itself, any more than sight or hearing gives us direct knowledge of matter in itself. From this point of view introspection is, of course, incompetent50 to lay hold of anything more than the Soul's phenomena51. But even then the question remains52, How well can it know the phenomena themselves?
Some authors take high ground here and claim for it a sort of infallibility. Thus Ueberweg:
"When a mental image, as such, is the object of my apprehension53, there is no meaning in seeking to distinguish its existence in my consciousness (in me) from its existence out of my consciousness (in itself); for the object apprehended54 is, in this case, one which does not even exist, as the objects of external perception do, in itself outside of my consciousness. It exists only within me."3
And Brentano:
"The phenomena inwardly apprehended are true in themselves. As they appear - of this the evidence with which they are apprehended is a warrant - so they are in reality. Who, then, can deny that in this a great superiority of Psychology over the physical sciences comes to light?"
And again:
"No one can doubt whether the psychic55 condition he apprehends56 in himself be, and be so, as he apprehends it. Whoever should doubt this would have reached that finished doubt which destroys itself in destroying every fixed point from which to make an attack upon knowledge."4
Others have gone to the opposite extreme, and maintained that we can have no introspective cognition of our own minds at all. A deliverance of Auguste Comte to this effect has been so often quoted as to be almost classical; and some reference to it seems therefore indispensable here.
Philosophers, says Comte,5 have
"in these latter days imagined themselves able to distinguish, by a very singular subtlety57, two sorts of observation of equal importance, one external, the other internal, the latter being solely58 destined59 for the study of intellectual phenomena. . . . I limit myself to pointing out the principal consideration which proves clearly that this pretended direct contemplation of the mind by itself is a pure illusion. . . . It is in fact evident that, by an invincible60 neccessity, [sic] the human mind can observe directly all phenomena except its own proper states. For by whom shall the observation of these be made? It is conceivable that a man might observe himself with respect to the passions that animate61 him, for the anatomical organs of passion are distinct from those whose function is observation. Though we have all made such observations on ourselves, they can never have much scientific value, and the best mode of knowing the passions will always be that of observing them from without; for every strong state of passion . . . is necessarily incompatible62 with the state of observation. But, as for observing in the same way intellectual phenomena at the time of their actual presence, that is a manifest impossibility. The thinker cannot divide himself into two, of whom one reasons whilst the other observes him reason. The organ observed and the organ observing being, in this case, identical, how could observation take place? This pretended psychological method is then radically63 null and void. On the one hand, they advise you to isolate64 yourself, as far as possible, from every external sensation, especially every intellectual work, - for if you were to busy yourself even with the simplest calculation, what would become of internal observation? - on the other hand, after having with the utmost care attained65 this state of intellectual slumber67, you must begin to contemplate68 the operations going on in your mind, when nothing there takes place! Our descendants will doubtless see such pretensions69 some day ridiculed70 upon the stage. The results of so strange a procedure harmonize entirely71 with its principle. For all the two thousand years during which metaphysicians have thus cultivated psychology, they are not agreed about one intelligible72 and established proposition. 'Internal observation' gives almost as many divergent results as there are individuals who think they practise it."
Comte hardly could have known anything of the English, and nothing of the German, empirical psychology. The 'results' which he had in mind when writing were probably scholastic73 ones, such as principles of internal activity, the faculties74, the ego, the liberum arbitrium indifferentioe, etc. John Mill, in replying to him,6 says:
"It might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact may be studied through the medium of memory, not at the very moment of our perceiving it, but the moment after: and this is really the mode in which our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. We reflect on what we have been doing when the act is past, but when its impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these ways, we could not have acquired the knowledge which nobody denies us to have, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have affirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We know of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or by memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not (like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe."
Where now does the truth lie? Our quotation75 from Mill is obviously the one which expresses the most of practical truth about the matter. Even the writers who insist upon the absolute veracity76 of our immediate43 inner apprehension of a conscious state have to contrast with this the fallibility of our memory or observation of it, a moment later. No one has emphasized more sharply than Brentano himself the difference between the immediate feltness of a feeling, and its perception by a subsequent reflective act. But which mode of consciousness of it is that which the psychologist must depend on? If to have feelings or thoughts in their immediacy were enough, babies in the cradle would be psychologists, and infallible ones. But the psychologist must not only have his mental states in their absolute veritableness, he must report them and write about them, name them, classify and compare them and trace their relations to other things. Whilst alive they are their own property; it is only post-mortem that they become his prey77.7 And as in the naming, classing, and know- ing of things in general we are notoriously fallible, why not also here? Comte is quite right in laying stress on the fact that a feeling, to be named, judged, or perceived, must be already past. No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always something else. There are, it is true, cases in which we appear to be naming our present feeling, and so to be experiencing and observing the same inner fact at a single stroke, as when we say 'I feel tired,' 'I am angry,' etc. But these are illusory, and a little attention unmasks the illusion. The present conscious state, when I say 'I feel tired,' is not the direct state of tire; when I say "I feel angry,' it is not the direct state of anger. It is the state of saying-I-feel-tired, of saying-I-feel-angry, - entirely different matters, so different that the fatigue78 and anger apparently79 included in them are considerable modifications80 of the fatigue and anger directly felt in the previous instant. The act of naming them has momentarily detracted from their force.8
The only sound grounds on which the infallible veracity of the introspective judgment might be maintained are empirical. If we had reason to think it has never yet deceived us, we might continue to trust it. This is the ground actually maintained by Herr Mohr.
"The illusions of our senses." says this author," have undermined our belief in the reality of the outer world; but in the sphere of inner observation our confidence is intact, for we have never found ourselves to be in error about the reality of an act of thought or feeling. We have never been misled into thinking we were not in doubt or in anger when these conditions were really states of our consciousness."9
But sound as the reasoning here would be, were the premises81 correct, I fear the latter cannot pass. However it may be with such strong feelings as doubt or anger, about weaker feelings, and about the relations to each other of all feelings, we find ourselves in continual error and uncertainty82 so soon as we are called on to name and class, and not merely to feel. Who can be sure of the exact order of his feelings when they are excessively rapid? Who can be sure, in his sensible perception of a chair, how much comes from the eye and how much is supplied out of the previous knowledge of the mind? Who can compare with precision the quantities of disparate feelings even where the feelings are very much alike. For instance, where an object is felt now against the back and now against the cheek, which feeling is most extensive? Who can be sure that two given feelings are or are not exactly the same? Who can tell which is briefer or longer than the other when both occupy but an instant of time? Who knows, of many actions, for what motive83 they were done, or if for any motive at all? Who can enumerate84 all the distinct ingredients of such a complicated feeling as anger? and who can tell offhand85 whether or no a perception of distance be a compound or a simple state of mind. The whole mind-stuff controversy86 would stop if we could decide conclusively87 by introspection that what seem to us elementary feelings are really elementary and not compound.
Mr. Sully, in his work on Illusions, has a chapter on those of Introspection from which we might now quote. But, since the rest of this volume will be little more than a collection of illustrations of the difficulty of discovering by direct introspection exactly what our feelings and their relations are, we need not anticipate our own future details, but just state our general conclusion that introspection is difficult and fallible; and that the difficulty is simply that of all observation of whatever kind. Something is before us; we do our best to tell what it is, but in spite of our good will we may go astray, and give a description more applicable to some other sort of thing. The only safeguard is in the final consensus88 of our farther knowledge about the thing in question, later views correcting earlier ones, until at last the harmony of a consistent system is reached. Such a system, gradually worked out, is the best guarantee the psychologist can give for the soundness of any particular psychologic observation which he may report. Such a system we ourselves must strive, as far as may be, to attain66.
The English writers on psychology, and the school of Herbart in Germany, have in the main contented89 themselves with such results as the immediate introspection of single individuals gave, and shown what a body of doctrine90 they may make. The works of Locke, Hume, Reid, Hartley, Stewart Brown, the Mills, will always be classics in this line; and in Professor Brain's Treatises91 we have probably the last word of what this method taken mainly by itself can do - the last monument of the youth of our science, still untechnical and generally intelligible, like the Chemistry of Lavoisier, or Anatomy92 before the microscope was used.
The Experimental Method. But psychology is passing into a less simple phase. Within a few years what one may call a microscopic93 psychology has arisen in Germany, carried on by experimental methods, asking of course every moment for introspective data, but eliminating their uncertainty by operating on a large scale and taking statistical94 means. This method taxes patience to the utmost, and could hardly have arisen in a country whose natives could be bored. Such Germans as Weber, Fechner, Vierordt, and Wundt obviously cannot; and their success has brought into the field an array of younger experimental psychologists, bent95 on studying the elements of the mental life, dissecting96 them out from the gross results in which they are embedded97, and as far as possible reducing them to quantitative98 scales. The simple and open method of attack having done what it can, the method of patience, starving out, and harassing99 to death is tried; the Mind must submit to a regular siege, in which minute advantages gained night and day by the forces that hem2 her in must sum themselves up at last into her overthrow100. There is little of the grand style about these new prism, pendulum101, and chronograph-philosophers. They mean business, not chivalry102. What generous divination103, and that superiority in virtue104 which was thought by Cicero to give a man the best insight into nature, have failed to do, their spying and scraping, their deadly tenacity105 and almost diabolic cunning, will doubtless some day bring about.
No general description of the methods of experimental psychology would be instructive to one unfamiliar106 with the instances of their application, so we will waste no words upon the attempt. The principal fields of experimentation107 so far have been: 1) the connection of conscious states with their physical conditions, including the whole of brain-physiology108, and the recent minutely cultivated physiology of the sense-organs, together with what is technically109 known as 'psycho-physics,' or the laws of correlation110 between sensations and the outward stimuli111 by which they are aroused; 2) the analysis of space-perception into its sensational112 elements; 3) the measurement of the duration of the simplest mental processes; 4) that of the accuracy of reproduction in the memory of sensible experiences and of intervals113 of space and time; 5) that of the manner in which simple mental states influence each other, call each other up, or inhibit114 each other's reproduction; 6) that of the number of facts which consciousness can simultaneously115 discern; finally, 7) that of the elementary laws of oblivescence and retention116. It must be said that in some of these fields the results have as yet borne little theoretic fruit commensurate with the great labor117 expended118 in their acquisition. But facts are facts, and if we only get enough of them they are sure to combine. New ground will from year to year be broken, and theoretic results will grow. Meanwhile the experimental method has quite changed the face of the science so far as the latter is a record of mere26 work done.
The comparative method, finally, supplements the intro- spective and experimental methods. This method presupposes a normal psychology of introspection to be established in its main features. But where the origin of these features, or their dependence119 upon one another, is in question, it is of the utmost importance to trace the phenomenon considered through all its possible variations of type and combination. So it has come to pass that instincts of animals are ransacked120 to throw light on our own; and that the reasoning faculties of bees and ants, the minds of savages121, infants, madmen, idiots, the deaf and blind, criminals, and eccentrics, are all invoked123 in support of this or that special theory about some part of our own mental life. The history of sciences, moral and political institutions, and languages, as types of mental product, are pressed into the same service. Messrs. Darwin and Galton have set the example of circulars of questions sent out by the hundred to those supposed able to reply. The custom has spread, and it will be well for us in the next generation if such circulars be not ranked among the common pests of life. Meanwhile information grows, and results emerge. There are great sources of error in the comparative method. The interpretation124 of the 'psychoses' of animals, savages, and infants is necessarily wild work, in which the personal equation of the investigator125 has things very much its own way. A savage122 will be reported to have no moral or religious feeling if his actions shock the observer unduly126. A child will be assumed without self-consciousness because he talks of himself in the third person, etc., etc. No rules can be laid down in advance. Comparative observations, to be definite, must usually be made to test some pre-existing hypothesis; and the only thing then is to use as much sagacity as you possess, and to be as candid127 as you can.
The Sources of Error in Psychology.
The first of them arises from the Misleading Influence of Speech. Language was originally made by men who were not psychologists, and most men to-day employ almost exclusively the vocabulary of outward things. The cardinal128 passions of our life, anger, love, fear, hate, hope, and the most comprehensive divisions of our intellectual activity, to remember, expect, think, know, dream, with the broadest genera of aesthetic129 feeling, joy, sorrow, pleasure, pain, are the only facts of a subjective order which this vocabulary deigns130 to note by special words. The elementary qualities of sensation, bright, loud, red, blue, hot, cold, are, it is true, susceptible131 of being used in both an objective and a subjective sense. They stand for outer qualities and for the feelings which these arouse. But the objective sense is the original sense; and still to-day we have to describe a large number of sensations by the name of the object from which they have most frequently been got. An orange color, an odor of violets, a cheesy taste, a thunderous sound, a fiery132 smart, etc., will recall what I mean. This absence of a special vocabulary for subjective facts hinders the study of all but the very coarsest of them. Empiricist writers are very fond of emphasizing one great set of delusions133 which language inflicts134 on the mind. Whenever we have made a word, they say, to denote a certain group of phenomena, we are prone135 to suppose a substantive136 entity existing beyond the phenomena, of which the word shall be the name. But the lack of a word quite as often leads to the directly opposite error. We are then prone to suppose that no entity can be there; and so we come to overlook phenomena whose existence would be patent to us all, had we only grown up to hear it familiarly recognized in speech.10 It is hard to focus our attention on the nameless, and so there results a certain vacuousness137 in the descriptive parts of most psychologies138.
But a worse defect than vacuousness comes from the dependence of psychology on common speech. Naming our thought by its own objects, we almost all of us assume that as the objects are, so the thought must be. The thought of several distinct things can only consist of several distinct bits of thought, or 'ideas;' that of an abstract or universal object can only be an abstract or universal idea. As each object may come and go, be forgotten and then thought of again, it is held that the thought of it has a precisely similar independence, self-identity, and mobility139. The thought of the object's recurrent identity is regarded as the identity of its recurrent thought; and the perceptions of multiplicity, of coexistence, of succession, are severally conceived to be brought about only through a multiplicity, a coexistence, a succession, of perceptions. The continuous flow of the mental stream is sacrificed, and in its place an atomism, a brickbat plan of construction, is preached, for the existence of which no good introspective grounds can be brought forward, and out of which presently grow all sorts of paradoxes140 and contradictions, the heritage of woe141 of students of the mind.
These words are meant to impeach142 the entire English psychology derived143 from Locke and Hume, and the entire German psychology derived from Herbart, so far as they both treat 'ideas' as separate subjective entities144 that come and go. Examples will soon make the matter clearer. Meanwhile our psychologic insight is vitiated by still other snares145.
'The Psychologist's Fallacy.' The great snare146 of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call this the 'psychologist's fallacy' par5 excellence147. For some of the mischief148, here too, language is to blame. The psychologist, as we remarked above (p. 183), stands outside of the mental state he speaks of. Both itself and its object are objects for him. Now when it is a cognitive state (percept, thought, concept, etc.), he ordinarily has no other way of naming it than as the thought, percept, etc., of that object. He himself, meanwhile, knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily led to suppose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in the same way in which he knows it, although this is often very far from being the case.11 The most fictitious149 puzzles have been introduced into our science by this means. The so-called question of presentative or representative perception, of whether an object is present to the thought that thinks it by a counterfeit150 image of itself, or directly and without any intervening image at all; the question of nominalism and conceptualism, of the shape in which things are present when only a general notion of them is before the mind; are comparatively easy questions when once the psychologist's fallacy is eliminated from their treatment, - as we shall ere long see (in Chapter XII).
Another variety of the psychologist' fallacy is the assumption that the mental state studied must be conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it. The mental state is aware of itself only from within; it grasps what we call its own content, and nothing more. The psychologist, on the contrary, is aware of it from without, and knows its relations with all sorts of other things. What the thought sees is only its own object; what the psychologist sees is the thought's object, plus the thought itself, plus possibly all the rest of the world. We must be very careful therefore, in discussing a state of mind from the psychologist's point of view, to avoid foisting151 into its own ken11 matters that are only there for ours. We must avoid substituting what we know the consciousness is, for what it is a consciousness of, and counting its outward, and so to speak physical, relations with other facts of the world, in among the objects of which we set it down as aware. Crude as such a confusion of standpoints seems to be when abstractly stated, it is nevertheless a snare into which no psychologist has kept himself at all times from falling, and which forms almost the entire stock-in-trade of certain schools. We cannot be too watchful152 against its subtly corrupting153 influence.
Summary. To sum up the chapter, Psychology assumes that thoughts successively occur, and that they know objects in a world which the psychologist also knows. These thoughts are the subjective data of which he treats, and their relations to their objects, to the brain, and to the rest of the world constitute the subject-matter of psychologic science. Its methods are introspection, experimentation, and comparison. But introspection is no sure guide to truths about our mental states; and in particular the poverty of the psychological vocabu. [sic] lary leads us to drop out certain states from our consideration, and to treat others as if they knew themselves and their objects as the psychologist knows both, which is a disastrous154 fallacy in the science.
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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hem
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| n.贴边，镶边；vt.缝贴边；(in)包围，限制 | |
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cerebral
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| adj.脑的，大脑的；有智力的，理智型的 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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generalizations
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| 一般化( generalization的名词复数 )； 普通化； 归纳； 概论 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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analyzes
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| v.分析( analyze的第三人称单数 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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ken
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| n.视野，知识领域 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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botanist
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| n.植物学家 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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ascertaining
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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tottered
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| v.走得或动得不稳( totter的过去式和过去分词 )；踉跄；蹒跚；摇摇欲坠 | |
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philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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cognitively
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cognitive
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| adj.认知的，认识的，有感知的 | |
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postulates
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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26
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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27
modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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28
derivatives
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| n.衍生性金融商品；派生物，引出物( derivative的名词复数 )；导数 | |
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generic
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| adj.一般的，普通的，共有的 | |
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30
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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31
synonym
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| n.同义词，换喻词 | |
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32
opprobrious
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| adj.可耻的，辱骂的 | |
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33
disparagingly
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| adv.以贬抑的口吻，以轻视的态度 | |
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34
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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35
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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36
devoid
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| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
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37
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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38
ego
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| n.自我，自己，自尊 | |
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39
implicitly
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| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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40
embody
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| vt.具体表达，使具体化；包含，收录 | |
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41
terminology
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| n.术语；专有名词 | |
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42
domesticated
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| adj.喜欢家庭生活的；（指动物）被驯养了的v.驯化( domesticate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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43
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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44
quandary
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| n.困惑，进迟两难之境 | |
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45
definitive
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| adj.确切的，权威性的；最后的，决定性的 | |
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46
synonyms
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| 同义词( synonym的名词复数 ) | |
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47
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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48
entity
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| n.实体，独立存在体，实际存在物 | |
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49
inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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50
incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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51
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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52
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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53
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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55
psychic
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| n.对超自然力敏感的人；adj.有超自然力的 | |
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56
apprehends
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的第三人称单数 )； 理解 | |
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57
subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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58
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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59
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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60
invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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61
animate
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| v.赋于生命，鼓励；adj.有生命的，有生气的 | |
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62
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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63
radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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64
isolate
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| vt.使孤立，隔离 | |
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65
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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66
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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67
slumber
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| n.睡眠，沉睡状态 | |
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68
contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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69
pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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70
ridiculed
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| v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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71
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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72
intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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73
scholastic
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| adj.学校的，学院的，学术上的 | |
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74
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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75
quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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76
veracity
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| n.诚实 | |
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77
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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78
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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79
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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80
modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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81
premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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82
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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83
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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84
enumerate
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| v.列举，计算，枚举，数 | |
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85
offhand
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| adj.临时，无准备的；随便，马虎的 | |
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86
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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87
conclusively
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| adv.令人信服地，确凿地 | |
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88
consensus
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| n.(意见等的)一致，一致同意，共识 | |
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89
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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90
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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91
treatises
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| n.专题著作，专题论文，专著( treatise的名词复数 ) | |
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92
anatomy
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| n.解剖学，解剖；功能，结构，组织 | |
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93
microscopic
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|
| adj.微小的，细微的，极小的，显微的 | |
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94
statistical
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| adj.统计的，统计学的 | |
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95
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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96
dissecting
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| v.解剖（动物等）( dissect的现在分词 )；仔细分析或研究 | |
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97
embedded
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| a.扎牢的 | |
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98
quantitative
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| adj.数量的，定量的 | |
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99
harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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100
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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101
pendulum
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| n.摆，钟摆 | |
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102
chivalry
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| n.骑士气概，侠义；（男人）对女人彬彬有礼，献殷勤 | |
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103
divination
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| n.占卜，预测 | |
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104
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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105
tenacity
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| n.坚韧 | |
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106
unfamiliar
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| adj.陌生的，不熟悉的 | |
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107
experimentation
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| n.实验，试验，实验法 | |
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108
physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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109
technically
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| adv.专门地，技术上地 | |
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110
correlation
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| n.相互关系，相关，关连 | |
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111
stimuli
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| n.刺激（物） | |
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112
sensational
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| adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的 | |
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113
intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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114
inhibit
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| vt.阻止，妨碍，抑制 | |
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115
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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116
retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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117
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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118
expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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119
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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120
ransacked
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| v.彻底搜查( ransack的过去式和过去分词 )；抢劫，掠夺 | |
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121
savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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122
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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123
invoked
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| v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求 | |
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124
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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125
investigator
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| n.研究者，调查者，审查者 | |
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126
unduly
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| adv.过度地，不适当地 | |
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127
candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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128
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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129
aesthetic
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| adj.美学的，审美的，有美感 | |
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130
deigns
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| v.屈尊，俯就( deign的第三人称单数 ) | |
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131
susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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132
fiery
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| adj.燃烧着的，火红的；暴躁的；激烈的 | |
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133
delusions
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| n.欺骗( delusion的名词复数 )；谬见；错觉；妄想 | |
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134
inflicts
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的第三人称单数 ) | |
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135
prone
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| adj.(to)易于…的，很可能…的；俯卧的 | |
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136
substantive
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| adj.表示实在的；本质的、实质性的；独立的；n.实词，实名词；独立存在的实体 | |
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137
vacuousness
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| n.空虚，无聊，愚蠢 | |
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138
psychologies
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| n.心理学( psychology的名词复数 )；心理特点；心理影响 | |
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139
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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140
paradoxes
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| n.似非而是的隽语，看似矛盾而实际却可能正确的说法( paradox的名词复数 )；用于语言文学中的上述隽语；有矛盾特点的人[事物，情况] | |
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141
woe
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| n.悲哀，苦痛，不幸，困难；int.用来表达悲伤或惊慌 | |
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142
impeach
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| v.弹劾；检举 | |
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143
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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144
entities
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| 实体对像； 实体，独立存在体，实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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145
snares
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| n.陷阱( snare的名词复数 )；圈套；诱人遭受失败（丢脸、损失等）的东西；诱惑物v.用罗网捕捉，诱陷，陷害( snare的第三人称单数 ) | |
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146
snare
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| n.陷阱，诱惑，圈套；（去除息肉或者肿瘤的）勒除器；响弦，小军鼓；vt.以陷阱捕获，诱惑 | |
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147
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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148
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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149
fictitious
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| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
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150
counterfeit
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| vt.伪造，仿造；adj.伪造的，假冒的 | |
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151
foisting
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|
| 强迫接受，把…强加于( foist的现在分词 ) | |
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152
watchful
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| adj.注意的，警惕的 | |
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153
corrupting
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的现在分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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154
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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