Chapter 17 Sensation.

After inner perception, outer perception! The next three chapters will treat of the processes by which we cognize all times the present world of space and the material things which it contains. And first, of the process called Sensation.
Sensation and Perception Distinguished¹.

The words Sensation and Perception do not carry very definitely discriminated² meanings in popular speech, and in psychology³ also their meanings run into each other. Both of them name processes in which we cognize an objective world; both (under normal conditions) need the stimulation⁴ of incoming nerves ere they can occur; Perception always involves Sensation as a portion of itself; and Sensation in turn never takes place in adult life without Perception also being there. They are therefore names for different cognitive⁵ functions, not for different sorts of mental fact. The nearer the object cognized comes to being a simple quality like 'hot,' 'cold,' 'red,' 'noise,' 'pain,' aprehended irrelatively to other things, the more the state mind approaches pure sensation. The fuller of relations an object is, on the contrary; the more it is something eased, located, measured, compared, assigned to a function, etc., etc.; the more unreservedly do we call the state mind a perception, and the relatively⁶ smaller is the part it which sensation plays.

Sensation, then, so long as we take the analytic⁷ point of view, differs from Perception only in the extreme simplicity⁸ of its object or content. 1 Its function is that of mere⁹ acquaintance with a fact. Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge about 2 a fact; and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication. But in both sensation and perception we perceive the fact as an immediately present outboard reality, and this makes them differ from 'thought' and 'conception,' whose objects do not appear present in this immediate¹⁰ physical way. From the physio- logical point of view both sensations and perception differ from 'thoughts' (in the narrower sense of the word) in the fact that nerve-currents coming in from the periphery¹² are involved in their production. In perception these nerve-currents arouse voluminous associative or reproductive processes in the cortex; but when sensation occurs alone, or with a minimum of perception, the accompanying reproductive processes are at a minimum too.

I shall in this chapter discuss some general questions more especially relative to Sensation. In a later chapter perception will take its turn. I shall entirely¹³ pass by the classification and natural history of our special I sensations, such matters finding their proper place, and being sufficiently¹⁴ well treated, in all the physiological¹⁵ books. 3
The Cognitive Function of Sensation

A pure sensation is an abstraction; and when we adults talk of our 'sensations' we mean one of two things: either certain objects, namely simple qualities or attributes like hard, hot, pain; or else those of our thoughts in which acquaintance with these objects is least combined with knowledge about the relations of them to other things. As we can only think or talk about the relations of objects with which we have acquaintance already, we are forced to postulate¹⁷ a function in our thought whereby we first become aware of the bare immediate natures by which our several objects are distinguished. This function is sensation. And just as logicians always point out the distinction between substantive¹⁸ terms of discourse¹⁹ and relations found to obtain between them, so psychologists, as a rule, are ready to admit this function, of the vision of the terms or matters meant, as something distinct from the knowledge about them and of their relations inter²⁰ se. Thought with the former function is sensational²¹, with the latter, intellectual. Our earliest thoughts are almost exclusively sensational. They merely give us a set of thats, or its, of subjects of discourse, with their relations not brought out. The first time we see light, in Condillac's phrase we are it rather rather than see it. But all our later optical knowledge is about what this experience gives. And though we were struck blind from that first moment, our scholarship in the subject would lack no essential feature so long as our memory remained. In training-institutions for the blind they teach the pupils as much about light as in ordinary schools. Reflection, refraction, the spectrum²², the ether-theory, etc., are all studied. But the best taught born-blind pupil of such an establishment yet lacks a knowledge which the least instructed seeing baby has. They can never show him what light is in its 'first intention'; and the loss of that sensible knowledge no book-learning can replace. All this is so obvious that we usually find sensation I postulated²³ as an element of experience, even by those philosophers who are least inclined to make much of its importance, or to pay respect to the knowledge which it brings. 4

But the trouble is that most, if not all, of those who admit it, admit it as a fractional part of the thought, in the old-fashioned atomistic sense which we have so often criticised.

Take the pain called toothache for example. Again and again we feel it and greet it as the same real item in the universe. We must therefore, it is supposed, have a distinct pocket for it in our mind into which it and nothing else will fit. This pocket, when filled, is the sensation of toothache; and must be either filled or half-filled whenever and under whatever form toothache is present to our thought, and whether much or little of the rest of the mind be filled at the same time. Thereupon of course comes up the paradox²⁴ and mystery: If the knowledge of toothache be pent up in this separate mental pocket, how can it be known cum alio or brought into one view with anything else? This pocket knows nothing else; no other part of the mind knows toothache. The knowing of toothache cum alio must be a miracle. And the miracle must have an Agent. And the Agent must be a Subject or Ego²⁵ 'out of time,' -- and all the rest of it, as we saw in Chapter X. And then begins the well-worn round of recrimination between the sensationalists and the spiritualists, from which we are saved by our determination from the outset to accept the psychological point of view, and to admit knowledge whether of simple toothaches or of philosophic²⁶ systems as ultimate fact. There are realities and there are 'states of mind,' and the latter know the former; and it is just as wonderful for a state of mind to be a 'sensation' and know simple pain as for it to be a thought and know a system of related things. 5 But there is no reason to suppose that when different states of mind know different things about the same toothache, they do so by virtue²⁷ of their all containing faintly or vividly²⁸ the original pain. Quite the reverse. The by-gone sensation of my gout was painful, as Reid somewhere says; the thought of the same gout as bygone is pleasant, and in no respect resembles the earlier mental state.

Sensations, then, first make us acquainted with innumerable things, and then are replaced by thoughts which know the same things in altogether other ways. And Locke's main doctrine³⁰ remains³¹ eternally true, however hazy³² some of his language may have been, that

"though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may be compared one with another, and so a multitnde of relations; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about, those simple ideas 6 either of sensation or reflection, which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. . . . The simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which, the mind whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot³³; nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry³⁴ into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas." 7

The nature and hidden causes of ideas will never be unravelled³⁵ till the next between the brain and consciousness is cleared up. All we can say now is that sensations are first things in the way of consciousness. Before perceptions can come, sensations must have come; but sensations come, no psychic³⁶ fact need have existed, a current is enough. If the nerve-current be not given, nothing else will take its place. To quote the good Locke again:

"It is not in the power of the most exalted³⁷ wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thoughts, to invent or frame one new simple idea [i.e. sensation] 8 in the mind . . . I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected³⁸ his palate, or frame the idea of a scent³⁹ he had never smelt⁴⁰; and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colors, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds." 9

The brain is so made that all currents in it run one way. Consciousness of some sort goes with all the currents, but it is only when new currents are entering that it has the sensational tang. And it is only then that consciousness directly encounters (to use a word of Mr. Bradley's) a reality outside itself.

The difference between such encounter and all conceptual knowledge is very great. A blind man may know all about the sky's blueness, and I may know all about your toothache, conceptually; tracing their causes from primeval chaos⁴¹, and their consequences to the crack of doom⁴². But so long as he has not felt the blueness, nor I the toothache, our knowledge, wide as it is, of these realities, will be hollow and inadequate⁴³. Somebody must feel blueness, somebody must have toothache, to make human knowledge of these matters real. Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off in sensations would be like bridges without piers⁴⁴. Systems about fact must plunge⁴⁵ themselves into sensation as bridges plunge their piers into the rock. Sensations are the stable rock, the terminus a quo and the teminus ad quem of thought. To find such termini is our aim with all our theories -- to conceive first when and where a certain sensation maybe had, and then to have it. Finding it stops discussion. Failure to find it kills the false conceit⁴⁶ of knowledge. Only when you deduce a possible sensation for me from your theory, and give it to me when and where the theory requires, do I begin to be sure that your thought has anything to do with truth.

Pure sensations can only be realized in the earliest days of life. They are all but impossible to adults with memories and stores of associations acquired. Prior to all impressions on sense-organs the brain is plunged⁴⁷ in deep sleep and consciousness is practically non-existent. Even the first weeks after birth are passed in almost unbroken sleep by human infants. It takes a strong message from the sense-organs to break this slumber⁴⁸. In a new-born brain this gives rise to an absolutely pure sensation. But the experience leaves its 'unimaginable touch' on the matter of the convolutions, and the next impression which a sense-organs transmits produces a cerebral⁴⁹ reaction in which the awakened⁵⁰ vestige⁵² of the last impression plays its part. Another sort of feeling and a higher grade of cognition are the consequence; and the complication goes on increasing till the end of life, no two successive impressions falling on an identical brain, and no two successive thoughts being exactly the same. (See above, p. 230 ff.)

The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the Universe. And the Universe which he latter comes to know is nothing but an amplification⁵³ and an implication of that first simple germ which, by accretion⁵⁴ on the one hand and intussusception on the other, has grown so big and complex and articulate that its first estate is unrememberable. In his dumb awakening⁵⁵ to the consciousness of something there, a mere this as yet (or something for which even the term this would perhaps be too discriminative⁵⁶, and the intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by the bare interjection 'lo!' ), the infant encounters an object in which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all the 'categories of the understanding' are contained. It has objectivity, unity⁵⁷, substantiality, causality, in the full sense in which any later object or system of objects has these things. Here the young knower meets and greets his world; and the miracle of knowledge bursts forth⁵⁸, as Voltaire says, as much in the infant's lowest sensation as in the highest achievement of a Newton's brain. The physiological condition of this first sensible experience is probably nerve-currents coming in from many peripheral⁵⁹ organs at once. Later, the one confused Fact which these currents cause to appear is perceived to be many facts, and to contain man qualities. 10 For as the currents vary, and the brain-paths are moulded by them, other thoughts with other 'objects' come, and the 'same thing' which was apprehended⁶⁰ as a present this soon figures as a past that, about which many unsuspected things have come to light. The principles of this development have been laid down already in Chapters XII and XIII, and nothing more need here be added to that account.

"THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE."

To the reader who is tired of so much Erkenntnisstheorie I can only say that I am so myself, but that it is indispensable, in the actual state of opinions about Sensation, to try to clear up just what the word means. Locke's pupils seek to do the impossible with sensations, and against them we must once again insist that sensations 'clustered together' cannot build up our more intellectual states of mind. Plato's earlier pupils used to admit Sensation's existence, grudgingly⁶¹, but they trampled⁶² it in the dust as something corporeal⁶³, non-cognitive, and vile⁶⁴. 11 His latest followers⁶⁵ seem to seek to crowd it out of existence altogether. The only reals for the neo-Hegelian writers appear to be relations, relations without terms, or whose terms are speciously⁶⁶ such and really consist in knots, or gnarls relations finer still in infinitum.

"Exclude from what we have considered real all qualities constituted by relation, we find that none are left." "Abstract the many relations from the one thing and there is nothing. . . . Without relations it would not exist at all." 12 "The single feeling is nothing real." "On the recognition of relations as constituting the nature of ideas, rests the possibility of any tenable theory of their reality."

Such quotations⁶⁷ as these from the late T. H. Green 13 would be matters of curiosity rather than of importance, were it not that sensationalist writers themselves believe in a so-called 'Relativity of Knowledge,' which, if they only understood it, they would see to be identical with Professor Green's doctrine. They tell us that the relation of sensations to each other is something belonging to their essence, and that no one of them has an absolute content:

"That, e.g., black can only be felt in contrast to white, or at least in distinction from a paler or a deeper black; similarly a tone or a sound only in alternation with others or with silence; and in like manner a smell, a taste, a touch, only, so to speak, in statu nascendi, whilst, when, the stimulus⁶⁸ continues, all sensation disappears. This all seems at first sight to be splendidly consistent both with itself and with the facts. But looked at more closely, it is seen that neither is the case." 14

The two leading facts from which the doctrine of universal relativity derives⁷⁰ its wide-spread credit are these:

1) The psychological fact that so much of our actual knowledge is of the relations of things -- even our simplest sensations in adult life are habitually⁷¹ referred to classes as we take them in; and

2) The physiological fact that our senses and brain must have periods of change and repose⁷², else we cease to feel and think.

Neither of these facts proves anything about the presence or non-presence to our mind of absolute qualities with which we become sensibly acquainted. Surely not the psychological fact; for our inveterate⁷³ love of relating and comparing things does not alter the intrinsic qualities or nature of the things compared, or undo⁷⁴ their absolute givenness. And surely not the physiological fact; for the length of time during which we can feel or attend to a quality is altogether irrelevant⁷⁵ to the intrinsic constitution of the quality felt. The time, moreover, is long enough in many instances, as sufferers from neuralgia know. 15 And the doctrine of relativity, not proved by these facts, is flatly disproved by other facts even more patent. So far are we from not knowing (in the words of Professor Bain) "any one thing by itself, but only the difference between it and another thing," that if this were true the whole edifice⁷⁷ of our knowledge would collapse⁷⁸. If all we felt were the difference between the C and D, or c and d, on the musical scale, that being the same in the of notes, the pairs themselves would be the same, an language could get along without substantives⁷⁹. But Professor Bain does not mean seriously what he says, and spend no more time on this vague and popular form of doctrine. 16 The facts which seem to hover⁸⁰ before the minds of its champions are those which are best described under the head of a physiological law.
The Law of Contrast.

I will first enumerate⁸¹ the main facts which fall under this law, and then remark upon what seems to me their significance for psychology. 17

[Nowhere are the phenomena⁸² of contrast better exhibited, and their laws more open to accurate study, than in connection with the sense of sight. Here both kinds -- simultaneous and successive -- can easily be observed, for they are of constant occurrence. Ordinarily they remain unnoticed, in accordance with the general law of economy which causes us to select for conscious notice only such elements of our object as will serve us for æsthetic or practical utility, and to neglect the rest; just as we ignore the double images, the mouches volantes, etc., which exist for everyone, but which are not discriminated without careful attention. But by attention we may easily discover the general facts involved in contrast. We find that in general the color and brightness of one object always apparently⁸³ affect the color and brightness of any other object seen simultaneously⁸⁴ with it or immediately after.

In the first place, if we look for a moment at any surface and then turn our eyes elsewhere, the complementary color and opposite degree of brightness to that of the first surface tend to mingle⁸⁶ themselves with the color and the brightness of the second. This is successive contrast. It finds its explanation in the fatigue⁸⁷ of the organ of sight, causing it to respond to any particular stimulus less and less readily the longer such stimulus continues to act. This is shown clearly in the very marked changes which occur in case of continued fixation of one particular point of any field. The field darkens slowly, becomes more and more indistinct, and finally, if one is practised enough in holding the eye perfectly⁸⁸ steady, slight differences in shade and color may entirely disappear. If we now turn aside the eyes, a negative after-image of the field just fixated at once forms, and mingles⁸⁹ its sensations with those which may happen to come from anything else looked at. This influence is distinctly evident only when the first surface has been 'fixated' without movement of the eyes. It is, however, none the less present at all times, even when the eye wanders from point to point, causing each sensation to be modified more or less by that just previously⁹⁰ experienced. On this account successive contrast is almost sure to be present in cases of simultaneous contract, and to complicate⁹¹ the phenomena.

A visual image is modified not only by other sensations just previously experienced, but also by all those experiences simultaneously with it, and especially by such as proceed from contiguous portions of the retina. This is the phenomenon of simultaneous contrast. In this, as in successive contrast, both brightness and hue⁹² are involved. A bright object appears still brighter when its surroundings are darker than itself, and darker when they are brighter than itself. Two colors side by side are apparently changed by the admixture, with each, of the complement⁸⁵ of the other. And lastly, a gray surface near a colored one is tinged⁹⁴ with the complement of the latter. 19

The phenomena of simultaneous contrast in sight are so complicated by other attendant phenomena that it is difficult to isolate⁹⁵ them and observe them in their purity. Yet is evidently of the greatest importance to do so, if one could conduct his investigations⁹⁶ accurately⁹⁷. Neglect of this principle has led to many mistakes being made in counting for the facts observed. As we have seen, if the eye is allowed to wander here and there about the field as ordinarily does, successive contrast results and allowance must be made for its presence. It can be avoided only by successfully fixating with the well-rested eye a point of one field, and by then observing the changes which occur in is field when the contrasting field is placed by its side. Such a course will insure pure simultaneous contrast. But even thus it lasts in its purity for a moment only. It reaches its maximum of effect immediately after the introduction of the contrasting field, and then, if the fixation is continued, it begins to weaken rapidly and soon disappears; thus undergoing changes similar to those observed when any field whatever is fixated steadily⁹⁹ and the retina becomes fatigued¹⁰⁰ by unchanging stimuli¹⁰¹. If one continues still further to fixate the same point, the color and brightness one field tend to spread themselves over and mingle with the color and brightness of the neighboring fields, thus substituting 'simultaneous induction¹⁰²' for simultaneous contrast.

Not only must we recognize and eliminate the effects of successive contrast, of temporal changes due to fixation, and of simultaneous induction, in analysing the phenomena of simultaneous contrast, but we must also take into account various other influences which modify its effects. Under favorable circumstances the contrast-effects are very striking, and did they always occur as strongly they could not fail attract the attention. But they are not always clearly apparent, owing to various disturbing causes which form no exception to the laws of contrast, but which have a modifying effect on its phenomena. When, for instance, the ground observed has many distinguishable features -- a course grain, rough surface, intricate pattern, etc. -- the contrast effect appears weaker. This does not imply that the acts of contrast are absent, but merely that the resulting sensations are overpowered by the many other stronger sensations which entirely occupy the attention. On such a ground a faint negative after-image -- undoubtedly¹⁰³ due to retinal modifications¹⁰⁵ -- may become invisible; and even weak objective differences in color may become imperceptible. For example, a faint spot or grease-stain on woollen cloth, easily seen at a distance, when the fibres are not distinguishable, disappears when closer examination reveals the intricate nature of the surface.

Another frequent cause of the apparent absence of contrast is the presence of narrow dark intermediate fields, such as are formed by bordering a field with black lines, or by the shaded contours of objects. When such fields interfere¹⁰⁶ with the contrast, it is because black and white can absorb much color without themselves becoming clearly colored; and because such lines separate other fields too far for them to distinctly influence one another. Even weak objective differences in color may be made imperceptible by such means.

A third case where contrast does not clearly appear is where the color of the contrasting fields is too weak or too intense, or where there is much difference in brightness between the two fields. In the latter case, as can easily be shown, it is the contrast of brightness which interferes¹⁰⁷ with the color contrast and makes it imperceptible. For this reason contrast shows best between fields of about equal brightness. But the intensity¹⁰⁸ of the color must not be too great, for then its very darkness necessitates¹⁰⁹ a dark contrasting field which is too absorbent of induced color to allow the contrast to appear strongly. The case is similar if the fields are too light.

To obtain the best contrast-effects, therefore, the contrasting fields should be near together, should not be separated by shadows or black lines, should be of homogeneous texture¹¹¹, and should be about equal brightness and medium intensity of color. Such conditions do not often occur naturally, the disturbing influences being present in case of almost all ordinary objects thus making the effects of contrast far less evident. To eliminate these disturbances¹¹² and to produce the condition most favorable for the appearance of good contrast-effects, various experiments have been devised, which will be explained in comparing the rival theories of explanation.

There are two theories -- the psychological and the physiological -- which attempt to explain the phenomena of contrast

Of these the psychological one was the first to gain prominence¹¹⁴. Its most notable advocate has been Helmholtz. It explains contrast as a DECEPTION¹¹⁵ OF JUDGMENT¹¹⁶. In ordinary life our sensations have interest for us only so far as they give us practical knowledge. Our chief concern is to recognize objects, and we have no occasion to estimate exactly their absolute brightness and color. Hence we gain no facility in so doing, but neglect the constant changes in their shade, and are very uncertain as to the exact degree of their brightness or tone of their color. When objects are near one another "we are inclined to consider those differences which are clearly and surely perceived as greater than those which appear uncertain in perception or which must be judged by aid of memory," 20 just as we see a medium sized man taller than he really is when he stands beside a short man. Such deceptions¹¹⁷ are more easily possible in the judgment of small differences than of large ones; also where there is but one element of difference instead of many. In a large number of cases of contrast, in all of which a whitish spot is surrounded on all sides by a colored surface -- Meyer's experiment, the mirror experiment, colored shadows, etc., soon to be described -- the contrast is produced, according to Helmholtz, by the fact that "a colored illumination or a transparent¹¹⁸ colored covering appears to be spread out over the field, and observation does not show directly that it fails on the white spot." 21 We therefore believe that we see the latter through the former color. Now

"Colors have their greatest importance for us in so far as they are properties of bodies and can serve as signs for the recognition of bodies. . . . We have become accustomed, in forming a judgment in regard to the colors of bodies, to eliminate the varying brightness and color of the illumination. We have sufficient opportunity to investigate the same colors of objects in full sunshine, in the blue light of the clear sky, in the weak white light of a cloudy day, in the reddish-yellow light of the sinking sun or of the candle. Moreover the colored reflections of surrounding objects are involved. Since we see the same colored objects under these varying illuminations, we learn to form a correct conception of the color of the object in spite of the difference in illumination, i.e. to judge how such an object would appear in white illumination; and since only the constant color of the object interests us, we do not become conscious of the particular sensations on which our judgment rests. So also we are at no loss, when we see an object through a colored covering, to distinguish what belongs to the color of the covering and what to the object. In the experiments mentioned we do the same also where the covering over the object is not at all colored, because of the deception into which we fall, and in consequence of which we ascribe to the body a false color, the color complementary to the colored portion of the covering." 22

We think that we see the complementary color through the colored covering, -- for these two colors together would give the sensation of white which is actually experienced. If, however, in any way the white spot is recognized as an independent object, or if it is compared with another object known to be white, our judgment is no longer deceived and the contrast does not appear.

"As soon as the contrasting field is recognized as an independent body which lies above the colored ground, or even through an adequate tracing of its outlines is seen to be a separate field, the contrast disappears. Since, then, the judgment of the spatial¹¹⁹ position, the material independence, of the object in question is decisive for the determination of its color, it follows that the contrast-color arises not through an act of sensation but through an act of judgment. 23

In short, the apparent change in color or brightness through contrast is due to no change in excitation of the organ, to no change in sensation; but in consequence of a false judgment the unchanged sensation is wrongly interpreted, and thus leads to a changed perception of the brightness or color.

In opposition¹²⁰ to this theory has been developed on which attempts to explain all cases of contrast as depending purely¹²¹ on physiological action of the terminal apparatus¹²² of vision. Hearing is the most prominent supporter of this view. By great originality¹²³ in devising experiments and by insisting on rigid¹²⁴ care in conducting them, he has been able to detect the faults in the psychological theory and to practically establish the validity of his own. Every visual sensation, he maintains, is correlated to a physical process in the nervous apparatus. Contrast is occasioned, not by a false idea resulting from unconscious conclusions, but by the fact that the excitation of any portion of the retina -- and the consequent sensation depends -- not only on its own illumination, but on that of the rest of the retina as well.

"If this psycho-physical process is aroused, as usually happens, by light-rays impinging on the retina, its nature depends not only on the nature of these rays, but also on the constitution of the entire nervous apparatus which is connected with the organ of vision, and on the state in which it finds itself." 24

When a limited portion of the retina is aroused by external stimuli, the rest of the retina, and especially the immediately contiguous parts, tends to react also, and in such a way as to produce therefrom the sensation of the opposite degree of brightness and the complementary color to that of the directly-excited portion. When a gray spot is seen alone, and again when it appears colored through contrast, the objective light from the spot is in both cases the same. Helmholtz maintains that the neural⁷⁶ process and the corresponding sensation also remain unchanged, but are differently interpreted; Hering, that the neural process and the sensation are themselves changed, and that the 'interpretation¹²⁵' is the direct conscious correlate of the altered retinal conditions. According to the one, the contrast is psychological in its origin; according to the other, it is purely physiological. In the cases cited above where the contrast-color is no longer apparent -- on a ground with many distinguishable features, on a field whose borders are traced with black lines, etc., -- the psychological theory, as we have seen, attributes this to the fact that under these circumstances we judge the smaller patch of color to be an independent object on the surface, and are no longer deceived in judging it to be something over which the color of the ground is drawn¹²⁶. The physiological theory, on the other hand, maintains that the contrast-effect is still produced, but that the conditions are such that the slight changes in color and brightness which it occasions become imperceptible.

The two theories, stated thus broadly, may seem equally plausible¹²⁷. Hering, however, has conclusively¹²⁹ proved, by experiments with after-images, that the process on one part of the retina does modify that on neighboring portions, under conditions where deception of judgment is impossible. 25 A careful examination of the facts of contrast will show that its phenomena must be due to this cause. In all the cases which one may investigate it will be seen that the upholders of the psychological theory have failed to conduct their experiments with sufficient care. They have not excluded successive contrast, have overlooked the changes due to fixation, and have failed to properly account for the various modifying influences which have been mentioned above. We can easily establish this if we examine the most striking experiments in simultaneous contrast.

Of these one of the best known and most easily arranged is that known as Meyer's experiment. A scrap¹³⁰ of gray paper placed on a colored background, and both are covered a sheet of transparent white paper. The gray spot then assumes a contrast-color, complementary to that of the background, which shines with a whitish tinge⁹³ through the paper which covers it. Helmholtz explains the phenomena thus:

"If the background is green, the covering-paper itself appears to be a greenish color. If now the substance of the paper extends without apparent interruption over the gray which lies under it, we think that glimmering¹³¹ through the greenish paper, and such an object be rose-red, in order to give white light. If, however, the grey spot has its limits so fixed¹³² that it appears to be an independent continuity with the greenish portion of the surface it as a gray object which lies on this surface." 26

The contrast-color may thus be made to disappear by placing in black the outlines of the gray scrap, or by placing above the tissue paper another gray scrap of the same degree of brightness, and comparing together the two grays. On neither of them does the contrast-color now appear. Hering 27 shows clearly that this interpretation is incorrect, and that the disturbing factors are to be otherwise explained. In the first place, the experiment can be so arranged that we could not possibly be deceived into believing that we see the gray through a colored medium. Out of a sheet of gray paper cut strips 5 mm. wide in such a way that there will be alternately an empty space and a bar of gray, both of the same width, the bars being held together by the uncut edges of the gray sheet (thus presenting an appearance like a gridiron). Lay this on a colored back-ground -- e.g. green -- cover both with transparent paper, and above all put a black frame which covers all the edges, having visible only the bars, which are now alternately green and gray. The gray bars appear strongly colored by contrast, although, since they occupy as much space as the green bars, we are not deceived into believing that we see the former through a green medium. The same is true if we weave together into a basket pattern narrow strips of green and gray and cover them with the transparent paper.

Why, then, if it is a true sensation due to physiological causes, and not an error of judgment, which causes the contrast, does the color disappear when the outlines of the gray scrap are traced, enabling us to recognize it as an independent object? In the first place, it does not necessarily do so, as will easily be seen if the experiment is tried. The contrast-color often remains distinctly visible in spite of the black outlines. In the second place, there are many adequate reasons why the effect should be modified. Simultaneous contrast is always strongest at the border-line of the two fields; but a narrow black field now separates the two, and itself by contrast strengthens the whiteness of both original fields, which were already little saturated¹³³ in color; and on black and on white, contrast colors show only under the most favorable circumstances. Even weak objective differences in color may be made to disappear by such tracing of outlines, as can be seen if we place on a gray background a scrap of faintly-colored paper, cover it with transparent paper and trace its outlines. Thus we see that it is not the recognition of the contrasting field as an independent object which interferes with its color, but rather a number of entirely explicable physiological disturbances.

The same may be proved in the case of holding above the tissue paper a second gray scrap and comparing it with that underneath¹³⁴. To avoid the disturbances caused by using papers of different brightness, the second scrap should be made exactly like the first by covering the same gray with the same tissue paper, and carefully cutting a piece about 10 mm. square out of both together. To thoroughly¹³⁵ guard against successive contrast, which so easily complicates¹³⁶ the phenomena, we must carefully prevent all previous excitation of the retina by colored light. This may be done by arranging thus: Place the sheet of tissue paper on a glass pane¹³⁷, which rests on four supports; under the paper put the first gray scrap. By means of a wire, fasten the second gray scrap 2 or 3 cm. above the glass plate. Both scraps¹³⁸ appear exactly alike, except at the edges. Gaze now at both scraps, with eyes not exactly accommodated, so that they appear near one another, with a very narrow space between. Shove now a colored field (green) underneath the glass plate, and the contrast appears a once on both scraps. If it appears less clearly on the upper scrap, it is because of its bright and dark edges, its inequalities, its grain, etc. When the accommodation is exact, there is no essential change, although then on the upper scrap the bright edge on the side toward the light, and the dark edge on the shadow side, disturb somewhat. By continued fixation the contrast becomes weaker and finally yields to simultaneous induction, causing the scraps to become indistinguishable from the ground. Remove the green field and both scraps become green, by successive induction. If the eye moves about freely these last-named phenomena do not appear, but the contrast continues indefinitely and becomes stronger. When Helmholtz found that the contrast on the lower scrap disappeared, it was evidently because he then really held the eye fixed. This experiment may be disturbed by holding the upper scrap wrongly and by the differences in brightness of its edges, or by other inequalities, but not by that recognizing of it as an independent body lying above the colored ground, on which the psychological explanation rests.

In like manner the claims of the psychological explanation can be shown to be inadequate in other cases of contrast Of frequent use are revolving¹³⁹ disks, which are especially efficient in showing good contrast-phenomena, because all inequalities of the ground disappear and leave a perfectly homogeneous surface. On a white disk are arranged colored sectors¹⁴⁰, which are interrupted midway by narrow black fields in such a way that when the disk is revolved¹⁴¹ the white becomes mixed with the color and the black, forming a colored disk of weak saturation¹⁴² on which appears a gray ring. The latter is colored by contrast with the field that surrounds. Helmholtz explain the fact thus:

"The difference of the compared colors appears greater than it really is either because this difference, when it is the only existing one and draws the attention to itself alone, makes a stronger impression than when it is one among many, or because the different colors of surface are conceived as alterations¹⁴³ of the one ground-color of the surface such as might arise through shadows falling on it, through colored reflexes, or through shadows falling on it, through colored reflexes, or through mixture with colored paint or dust. In truth, to produce an objectively gray spot on a green surface, a reddish coloring would be necessary." 28

This explanation is easily proved false by painting the disk with narrow green and gray concentric rings, and giving each a different saturation. The contrast appears through there is no ground-color, and no longer a single difference, but many. The facts which Helmholtz brings forward in support of his theory are also easily turned against him. He asserts that if the color of the ground is too intense, or if the gray ring is bordered by black circles, the contrast becomes weaker; that no contrast appears on a white scrap held over the colored field; and that the gray ring when compared with such scrap looses its contrast-color either wholly or in part. Hering points out the inaccuracy of all the claims. Under favorable conditions it is impossible to make the contrast dissappear by means of balck enclosing lines, although they naturally form a disturbing element; increase in the saturation of the field, if disturbance¹¹³ through increasing brightness-contrast is to be avoided, demands a darker grey field, on which contrast-color are less easily perceived; and careful use of the white scrap leads to entirely different results. The contrast-color does appear upon it when it is first placed above the colored field; but if it is carefully fixated, the contrast-color diminishes very rapidly both on it and on the ring, from causes already explained. To secure accurate observation, a complication through successive contrast should be avoided thus: first arrange the white scrap, then interpose a gray screen between it and the disk, rest the eye, set the wheel in motion, fixate the scrap, and then have the screen re- moved. The contrast at once appears clearly, and its disappearance¹⁴⁴ through continued fixation can be accurately watched.

Brief mention of a few other cases of contrast must suffice. The so-called mirror experiment consists of placing at an angle of 45 [degree] a green (or otherwise colored) pane of glass, forming an angle with two white surfaces, one horizontal and the other vertical¹⁴⁵. On each white surface is a blackspot. The one on the horizontal surface is seen through the glass and appears dark green, the other is reflection from the surface of the glass to the eye, and appears by contrast red. The experiment may be so arranged that we are not aware of the presence of the green glass, but think that we are looking directly at a surface with green and red spots upon it; in such a case there is no deception of judgment caused by making allowance for the colored medium through which we think that we see the spot, and therefore the psychological explanation does not apply. On excluding successive contrast by fixation the contrast soon disappears as in all similar experiments. 29

Colored shadows have long been thought to afford a convincing proof of the fact that simultaneous contrast is psychological in its origin. They are formed whenever an opaque¹⁴⁶ object is illuminated¹⁴⁷ from two separate sides by lights of different colors. When the light from one source is white, its shadow is of the color of the other light, and the second shadow is of a color complementary to that of the field illuminated by both lights. If now we take a tube, blackened inside, and through it look at the colored shadow, none of the surrounding field being visible, and then have the colored light removed, the shadow still appears colored, although 'the circumstances which caused it have disappeared.' This is regarded by the psychologists as conclusive¹²⁸ evidence that the color is due to deception of judgment. It can, however, easily be shown that the persistence¹⁴⁸ of the color seen through the tube is due to fatigue of the retina through the prevailing¹⁴⁹ light, and that when the colored light is removed the color slowly disappears as the equilibrium¹⁵⁰ of the retina becomes gradually restored. When successive contrast is carefully guarded against, the simultaneous contrast, whether seen directly or through the tube, never lasts for an instant on removal of the colored field. The physiological explanation applies throughout to all the phenomena presented by colored shadows. 30

If we have a small field whose illumination remains constant, surrounded by a large field of changing brightness, an increase or decrease in brightness of the latter results in a corresponding apparent decrease or increase respectively in the brightness of the former, while the large field seems to be unchanged. Exner says:

"This illusion of sense shows that we are inclined to regard as constant the dominant¹⁵¹ brightness in our field of vision, and hence to refer the changing difference between this and the brightness of a limited field to a change in brightness of the latter."

The result, however, can be shown to depend not on illusion, but on actual retinal changes, which alter the sensation experienced. The irritability¹⁵² of those portions of the retina lighted by the large field becomes much reduced in consequence of fatigue, so that the increase in brightness becomes much less apparent than it would be without this diminution¹⁵³ in irritability. The small field, however, shows the change by a change in the contrast-effect induced upon it by the surrounding parts of the retina. 31

The above cases show clearly that physiological processes, and not deception of judgment, are responsible for contrast of color. To say this, however, is not to maintain that our perception of a color is never in any degree modified by our judgment of what the particular colored thing before us may be. We have unquestionable illusions of color due to wrong inferences as to what object is before us. Thus Vou Kriest 32 speaks of wandering through evergreen¹⁵⁴ forests covered with snow, and thinking that through the interstices of the boughs¹⁵⁵ he saw the deep blue of pine-clad mountains, covered with snow and lighted by brilliant sunshine; whereas what he really saw was the white snow on trees near by, lying in shadow]. 34

Such a mistake as this is undoubtedly of psychological origin. It is a wrong classification of the appearances, due to the arousal of intricate processes of association, amongst which is the suggestion of a different hue from that really before the eyes. In the ensuing chapters such illusions as this will be treated of in considerable detail. But it is a mistake to interpret the simpler cases of contrast in the light of such illusions as these. These illusions can be rectified¹⁵⁶ in an instant, and we then wonder how they could have been. They come from insufficient¹⁵⁷ attention, or from the fact that the impression which we get is a sign of more than one possible object, and can be interpreted in either way. In none of these points do they resemble simple color-contrast, which unquestionably is a phenomena of sensation immediately aroused.

I have dwelt upon the facts of color-contrast at such great length because they form so good a text to comment on in my struggle against the view that sensations are immutable¹⁵⁸ psychic things which coexist with higher mental functions. Both sensationalists and intellectualists agree that such sensations exist. They fuse, say the pure sensationalists, and make the higher mental function; they are combined by activity of the Thinking Principle, say the intellectualists. I myself have contended that they do not exist in or alongside of the higher mental function when that exists. The things which arouse them exist; and the higher mental function also knows these same things. But just as its knowledge of the things supersedes¹⁵⁹ and displaces their knowledge, so it supersedes and displaces them, when it comes, being as much as they are a direct resultant of whatever momentary¹⁶⁰ brain-conditions may obtain. The psychological theory of contrast, on the other hand, holds the sensations still to exist in themselves unchanged before the mind, whilst the relating activity of the latter deals with them freely and settles to its own satisfaction what each shall be, in view of what the others also are. Wundt says expressly that the Law of Relativity is "not a law of sensation but a law of Apperception" and the word Apperception connotes with him a higher intellectual spontaneity. 35 This way of taking things belongs with the philosophy that looks at the data of sense as something earthborn and servile, and the 'relating of them together' as something spiritual and free. Lo! the spirit can even change the intrinsic quality of the sensible facts themselves if by so doing it can relate them better to each other! But (apart from the difficulty of seeing how changing the sensations should relate them better) is it not manifest that the relations are part of the 'content' of consciousness, part of the 'object,' just as much as the sensations are? Why ascribe the former exclusively to the knower and the latter to the known? The knower is in every case a unique pulse of thought corresponding to a unique reaction of the brain upon its conditions. All that the facts of contrast show us is that the same real thing may give us quite different sensations when the conditions alter, and that we must therefore be careful which one to select as the thing's truest representative.

There are many other facts beside the phenomena of contrast which prove that when two objects act together on us the sensation which either would give alone becomes a different sensation. A certain amount of skin dipped in hot water gives the perception of a certain heat. More skin immersed makes the heat much more intense, although of course the water's heat is the same. A certain extent as well as intensity, in the quantity of the stimulus is requisite¹⁶¹ for any quality to be felt. Fick and Wunderli could not distinguish heat from touch when both were applied¹⁶² through a hole in a card, and so confined to a small part of the skin. Similarly there is a chromatic¹⁶³ minimum of size in objects. The image they cast on the retina must needs have a certain extent, or it will give no sensation of color at all. Inversely¹⁶⁴, more intensity in the outward impression may make the subjective¹⁶⁵ object more extensive. This happens, as will be shown in Chapter XIX, when the illumination is increased: The whole room expands and dwindles¹⁶⁶ according as we raise or lower the gas-jet. It is not easy to explain any of these results as illusions of judgment due to the inference of a wrong objective cause for the sensation which we get. No more is this easy in the case of Weber's observation that a thaler laid on the skin of the forehead feels heavier when cold than when warm; or of Szabadfödi's observation that small wooden disks when heated to 122° Fahrenheit¹⁶⁷ often feel heavier than those which are larger but not thus warmed; 36 or of Hall's observation that a heavy point moving over the skin seems to go faster than a lighter¹⁶⁸ one moving at the same rate of speed. 37

Bleuler and Lehmann some years ago called attention to a strange idiosyncrasy found in some persons, and consisting in the fact that impressions on the eye, skin, etc., were accompanied by distinct sensations of sound. 38 Colored hearing is the name sometimes given to the phenomenon, which has now been repeatedly described. Quite lately the Viennese artist Urbantschitsch has proved that these cases are only extreme examples of a very general law, and that all our sense-organs influence each other's sensations. 39 The hue of patches of color so distant as not to be recognized was immediately, in U.'s patients, perceived when a tuning-fork was sounded close to the ear. Sometimes, on the contrary, the field was darkened by the sound. The acuity¹⁶⁹ of vision was increased, so that letters too far off to be read could be read when the tuning-fork was heard. Urbantschitsch, varying his experiments, found that their results were mutual¹⁷⁰, and that sounds which were on the limits of audibility became audible when lights of various colors were exhibited to the eye. Smell, taste, touch, sense of temperature, etc., were all found to fluctuate when lights were seen and sounds were heard. Individuals varied¹⁷¹ much in the degree and kind of effect produced, but almost every one experimented on seems to have been in some way affected. The phenomena remind one somewhat of the 'dynamogenic' effects of sensations upon the strength of muscular contraction¹⁷² observed by M. Féré, and later to be described. The most familiar examples of them seem to be the increase of pain by noise or light, and the increase of nausea¹⁷³ by all concomitant sensations. Persons suffering in any way instinctively¹⁷⁴ seek stillness and darkness.

Probably every one will agree that the best way of formulating¹⁷⁶ all such facts is physiological: it must be that the cerebral process of the first sensation is reinforced or otherwise altered by the other current which comes in. No one, surely, will prefer a psychological explanation here. Well, it seems to me that all cases of mental reaction to a plurality of stimuli must be like these cases, and that the physiological formulation is everywhere the simplest and the best When simultaneous red and green light make us see yellow, when three notes of the scale make us hear a chord, it is not because the sensations of red and of green and of each of the three notes enter the mind as such, and there 'combine' or 'are combined by its relating activity' into the yellow and the chord, it is because the larger sum of light-waves and of air-waves arouses new cortical processes, to which the yellow and the chord directly correspond. Even when the sensible qualities of things enter into the objects of our highest thinking, it is surely the same. Their several sensations do not continue to exist there tucked away. They are replaced by the higher thought which although a different psychic unit from them, knows the same sensible qualities which they know.

The principles laid down in Chapter VI seem then to be corroborated¹⁷⁷ in this new connection. You cannot build up one thought or one sensation out of many; and only direct experiment can inform us of what we shall perceive when we get many stimuli at once.
The 'Eccentric Projection¹⁷⁸' of Sensations.

We often hear the opinion expressed that all our sensations at first appear to us as subjective or internal, and are afterwards and by a special act on our part 'extradited' or 'projected' so as to appear located in an outer world. Thus we read in Professor Ladd's valuable work that

"Sensations . . . are psychical¹⁷⁹ states whose place -- so far as they can be said to have one -- is the mind. The transference of these sensations from mere mental states to physical processes located in the periphery of the body, or to qualities of things projected in space external to the body, is a mental act. It may rather be said to be a mental achievement [cf. Cudworth, above, as to knowledge being conquering], for it is an act which in its perfection results from a long and intricate process of development. . . . Two noteworthy stages, or 'epoch-making' achievements in the process of elaborating the presentations of sense, require a special consideration. These are 'localization', or the transference of the composite sensations from mere states of the mind to processes or conditions recognized as taking place at more or less definitely fixed points or areas of the body; and 'eccentric projection I (sometimes called 'eccentric perception') or the giving to these sensations an objective existence (in the fullest sense of the word I objective') as qualities of objects situated¹⁸⁰ within a field of space and in contact with, or more or less remotely distant from, the body." 41

It seems to me that there is not a vestige of evidence for this view. It hangs together with the opinion that our sensations are originally devoid¹⁸¹ of all spatial content, 42 an opinion which I confess that I am wholly at a loss to understand. As I look at my bookshelf opposite I cannot frame to myself an idea, however imaginary, of any feeling which I could ever possibly have got from it except the feeling of the same big extended sort of outward fact which I now perceive. So far is it from being true that our first way of feeling things is the feeling of them as subjective or mental, that the exact opposite seems rather to be the truth. Our earliest, most instinctive¹⁷⁵, least developed kind of consciousness is the objective kind; and only as reflection becomes developed do we become aware of an inner world at all. Then indeed we enrich it more and more, even to the point of becoming idealists, with the spoils of the outer world which at first was the only world we knew. But subjective consciousness, aware of itself as subjective, does not at first exist. Even an attack of pain is surely felt at first objectively as something in space which prompts to motor reaction, and to the very end it is located, not in the mind, but in some bodily part.

"A sensation which should not awaken⁵¹ an impulse to move, nor any tendency to produce an outward effect, would manifestly be useless to a living creature. On the principles of evolution such a sensation could never be developed. Therefore every sensation originally refers to something external and independent of the sentient¹⁸² creature. Rhizopods (according to Engelmann's observations) retract¹⁸³ their pseudopodia whenever these touch foreign bodies, even if these foreign bodies are the pseudopodia of other individuals of their own species, whilst the mutual contact of their own pseudopodia is followed by no such contraction. These low animals can therefore already feel an outer world -- even in the absence of innate¹⁸⁴ ideas of causality, and probably without any clear consciousness of space. In truth the conviction that something exists outside of ourselves does not come from thought. It comes from sensation; it rests on the same ground as our conviction of our own existence. . . . If we consider the behavior of new-born animals, we never find them betraying that they are first of all conscious of their sensations as purely subjective excitements. We far more readily incline to explain the astonishing certainty with which they make use of their sensations (and which is an effect of adaptation and inheritance) as the result of an inborn¹⁸⁵ intuition of the outer world. . . . Instead of starting from an original pure subjectivity¹⁸⁶ of sensation, and seeking how this could possibly have acquired an objective signification, we must, on the contrary, begin by the possession of objectivity by the sensation and then show how for reflective consciousness the latter becomes interpreted as an effect of the object, how in short the original immediate objectivity becomes changed into a remote one." 43

Another confusion, much more common than the denial of all objective character to sensations, is the assumption that they are all originally located inside the body and are projected outward by a secondary act. This secondary judgment is always false, according to M. Taine, so far as the place of the sensation itself goes. But it happens to hit a real object which is at the point towards which the sensation is projected; so we may call its result, according to this author, a veridical hallucination. 44 The word Sensation, to begin with, is constantly, in psychological literature, used as if it meant one and the same thing with the physical impression either in the terminal organs or in the centres, which is its antecedent condition, and this notwithstanding that by sensation we mean a mental, not a physical, fact. But those who expressly mean by it a mental fact still leave to it a physical place, still think of it as objectively inhabiting the very neural tracts¹⁸⁷ which occasion its appearance when they are excited; and then (going a step farther) they think that it must place itself where they place it, or be subjectively¹⁸⁸ sensible of that place as its habitat in the first instance, and afterwards have to be moved so as to appear elsewhere.

All this seems highly confused and unintelligible¹⁸⁹. Consciousness, as we saw in an earlier chapter (p. 214) cannot properly be said to inhabit any place. It has dynamic relations with the brain, and cognitive relations with everything and anything. From the one point of view we may say that a sensation is in the same place with the brain (if we like), just as from the other point of view we may say that it is in the same place with whatever quality it may be cognizing. But the supposition that a sensation primitively¹⁹⁰ feels either itself or its object to be in the same place with the brain is absolutely groundless, and neither a priori probability nor facts from experience can be adduced to show that such a deliverance forms any part of the original cognitive function of our sensibility.

Where, then, do we feel the objects of our original sensations to be?

Certainly a child newly born in Boston, who gets a sensation from the candle-flame which lights the bedroom, or from his diaper-pin, does not feel either of these objects to be situated in longitude¹⁹² 72° W. and latitude¹⁹³ 41° N. He does not feel them to be in the third story of the house. He does not even feel them in any distinct manner to be to the right or the left of any of the other sensations which he may be getting from other objects in the room at the same time. He does not, in short, know anything about their space-relations to anything else in the world. The flame fills its own place, the pain fills its own place; but as yet these places are neither identified with, nor discriminated from, any other places. That comes later. For the places thus first sensibly known are elements of the child's space-world which remain with him all his life; and by memory and later experience he learns a vast number of things about those places which at first he did not know. But to the end of time certain places of the world remain defined for him as the places where those sensations were; and his only possible answer to the question where anything is will be to say 'there,' and to name some sensation or other like those first ones, which shall identify the spot. Space means but the aggregate¹⁹⁴ of all our possible sensations. There is no duplicate space known aliunde, or created by an 'epoch-making achievement' into which our sensations, originally spaceless, are dropped. They bring space and all its places to our intellect, and do not derive⁶⁹ it thence.

By his body, then, the child later means simply that place where the pain from the pin, and a lot of other sensations like it, were or are felt. It is no more true to say that he locates that pain in his body, than to say that he locates his body in that pain. Both are true: that pain is part of what he means by the word body. Just so by the outer world the child means nothing more than that place where the candle-flame and a lot of other sensations like it are felt. He no more locates the candle in the outer world than he locates the outer world in the candle. Once again, he does both; for the candle is part of what he means by 'outer world.'

This (it seems to me) will be admitted, and will (I trust) be made still more plausible in the chapter on the Perception of Space. But the later developments of this perception are so complicated that these simple principles get easily overlooked. One of the complications comes from the fact that things move, and that the original object which we feel them to be splits into two parts, one of which remains as their whereabouts and the other goes of as their quality or nature. We then contrast where they were with where they are. If we do not move, the sensation of where they were remains unchanged; but we ourselves presently move, so that that also changes; and I where they were' becomes no longer the actual sensation which it was originally, but a sensation which we merely conceive as possible. Gradually the system of these possible sensations, takes more and more the place of the actual sensations. 'Up' and 'down' become 'subjective' notions; east and west grow more 'correct' than 'right' and 'left' etc.; and things get at last more 'truly' located by their relation to certain ideal fixed co-ordinates than by their relation either to our bodies or to those objects by which their place was originally defined. Now this revision of our original localizations is a complex affair; and contains some facts which may very naturally come to be described as translocations whereby sensations get shoved farther of than they originally appeared.

Few things indeed are more striking than the changeable distance which the objects of many of our sensations may be made to assume. A fly's humming may be taken for a distant steam-whistle; or the fly itself, seen out of focus, may for a moment give us the illusion of a distant bird. The same things seem much nearer or much farther, according as we look at them through one end or another, of an opera-glass. Our whole optical education indeed is largely taken up with assigning their proper distances to the objects of our retinal sensations. An infant will grasp at the moon; later, it is said, he projects that sensation to a distance which he knows to be beyond his reach. In the much quoted case of the 'young gentleman who was born blind,' and who was 'couched' for the cataract¹⁹⁵ by Mr. Chesselden, it is reported of the patient that "when he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment about distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he expressed it) as what 'he felt did his skin." And other patients born blind, but relieved by surgical¹⁹⁶ op- eration, have been described as bringing their hand close to their eyes to feel for the objects which they at first saw, and only gradually stretching out their hand when they found that no contact occurred. Many have concluded from these facts that our earliest visual objects must seem in immediate contact with our eyes.

But tactile¹⁹⁷ objects also may be affected with a like ambiguity¹⁹⁸ of situation.

If one of the hairs of our head be pulled, we are pretty accurately sensible of the direction of the pulling by the movements imparted to the head. 45 But the feeling of the pull is localized, not in that part of the hair's length which the fingers hold, but in the scalp itself. This seems connected with the fact that our hair hardly serves at all as a tactile organ. In creatures with vibrisse, however, and in those quadrupeds whose whiskers are tactile organs, it can hardly be doubted that the feeling is projected out of the root into the shaft¹⁹⁹ of the hair itself. We ourselves have an approach to this when the beard as a whole, or the hair as a whole, is touched. We perceive the contact at some distance from the skin.

When fixed and hard appendages²⁰⁰ of the body, like the teeth and nails, are touched, we feel the contact where it objectively is, and not deeper in, where the nerve-terminations lie. If, however, the tooth is loose, we feel two contacts, spatially²⁰¹ separated, one at its root, one at its top.

From this case to that of a hard body not organically connected with the surface, but only accidentally in contact with it, the transition is immediate. With the point of a cane²⁰² we can trace letters in the air or on a wall just as with the finger-tip; and in so doing feel the size and shape of the path described by the cane's tip just as immediately as, without a cane, we should feel the path described by the tip of our finger. Similarly the draughtsman's immediate perception seems to be of the point of his pencil, the surgeon's of the end of his knife, the duellist's of the tip of his rapier as it plunges²⁰³ through his enemy's skin. When on the middle of a vibrating ladder, we feel not only our feet on the round, but the ladder's feet against the ground far below. If we shake a locked iron gate we feel the middle, on which our hands rest, move, but we equally feel the stability of the ends where the hinges and the lock are, and we seem to feel all three at once. 46 And yet the place where the contact is received is in all these cases the skin, whose sensations accordingly are sometimes interpreted as objects on the surface, and at other times as objects a long distance off.

We shall learn in the chapter on Space that our feelings of our own movement are principally due to the sensibility of our rotating joints²⁰⁵. Sometimes by fixing the attention, say on our elbow-joint²⁰⁴, we can feel the movement in the joint itself; but we always are simultaneously conscious of the path which during the movement our finger-tips describe through the air, and yet these same finger-tips themselves are in no way physically²⁰⁶ modified by the motion. A blow on our ulnar nerve behind the elbow is felt both there and in the fingers. Refrigeration of the elbow produces pain in the fingers. Electric currents passed through nerve-trunks, whether of cutaneous or of more special sensibility (such as the optic nerve), give rise to sensations which are vaguely²⁰⁷ localized beyond the nerve-tracts traversed. Persons whose legs or arms have been amputated are, as is well known, apt to preserve an illusory feeling of the lost hand or foot being there. Even when they do not have this feeling constantly, it may be occasionally brought back. This sometimes is the result of exciting electrically the nerve-trunks buried in the stump²⁰⁸.

"I recently faradized," says Dr. Mitchell, "a case of disarticulated shoulder without warning my patient of the possible result. For two year she had altogether ceased to feel the limb. As the current affected the brachial plexus of nerves he suddenly cried aloud, 'Oh the hand, -- the hand!' and attempted to seize the missing member. The phantom²⁰⁹ I had conjured²¹⁰ up swiftly disappeared, but no spirit could have more amazed the man, so real did it seem." 47

Now the apparent position of the lost extremity²¹¹ varies. Often the foot seems on the ground, or follows the position of the artificial foot, where one is used. Sometimes where the arm is lost the elbow will seem bent¹¹⁰, and the hand in a fixed position on the breast. Sometimes, again, the position is non-natural, and the hand will seem to bud straight out of the shoulder, or the foot to be on the same level with the knee of the remaining leg. Sometimes, again, the position is vague; and sometimes it is ambiguous, as in another patient of Dr. Weir²¹² Mitchell's who

"lost his leg at the age of eleven, and remembers that the foot by degrees approached, and at last reached the knee. When he began to wear an artificial leg it reassumed in time its old position, and he is never at present aware of the leg as shortened, unless for some time he talks and thinks of the stump, and of the missing leg, when . . . the direction of attention to the part causes a feeling of discomfort²¹³, and the subjective sensation of active and unpleasant movement of the toes. With these feelings returns at once the delusion²¹⁴ of the foot as being placed at the knee."

All these facts, and others like them, can easily be described as if our sensations might be induced by circumstances to migrate from their original locality near the brain or near the surface of the body, and to appear farther off; and (under current circumstances) to return again after having migrated. But a little analysis of what happens shows us that this description is inaccurate²¹⁵.

The objectivity with which each of our sensations originally comes to m, the roomy and spatial character which is a primitive¹⁹¹ part of its content, is not in the first instance relative to any other sensation. The first time we open our eyes we get an optical object which is a place, but which is not yet placed in relation to any other object, nor identified with any place otherwise known. It is a place with which so far we are only acquainted. When later we know that this same place is in 'front' of us, that only means that we have learned something about it, namely, that it is congruent with that other place, called 'front,' which is given us by certain sensations of the arm and hand or of the head and body. But at the first moment of our optical experience, even though we already had an acquaintance with our head, hand, and body, we could not possibly know anything about their relations to this new seen object. It could not be immediately located in respect of them. How its place agrees with the places which their feelings yield is a matter of which only later experience can inform us; and in the next chapter we shall see with some detail how later experience does this by means of discrimination, association, selection, and other constantly working functions of the mind. When, therefore, the baby grasps at the moon, that does not mean that what he sees fails to give him the sensation which lie afterwards knows as distance; it means only that he has not learned at what tactile or manual distance things which appear at that visual distances are. 48 And when a person just operated for cataract gropes close to his face for far-off objects, that only means the same thing. All the ordinary optical signs of differing distances are absent from the poor creature's sensation anyhow. His vision is monocular (only one eye being operated at a time); the lens is gone, and everything is out of focus; he feels photophobia, lachrymation, and other painful resident sensations of the eyeball itself, whose place he has long since learned to know in tactile terms; what wonder, then, that the first tactile reaction which the new sensations provoke should be one associated with the tactile situation of the organ itself? And as for his assertions about the matter, what wonder, again, if, as Prof. Paul Janet says, they are still expressed in the tactile language which is the only one he knows. "To be touched means for him to receive an impression without first making a movement." His eye gets such an impression now; so he can only say that the objects are touching²¹⁶ it.'

"All his language, borrowed from touch, but applied to the objects of his sight, make us think that he perceives differently from ourselves, whereas, at bottom, it is only his different way of talking about the same experience. 49

The other cases of translocation of our sensations are equally easily interpreted without supposing any 'projection' from a centre at which they are originally perceived. Unfortunately the details are intricate; and what I say now can only be made fully⁹⁸ clear when we come to the next chapter. We shall then see that we are constantly selecting certain of our sensations as realities and degrading others to the status of signs of these. When we get one of the signs we think of the reality signified; and the strange thing is that then the reality (which need not be itself a sensation at all at the time, but only an idea) is so interesting that it acquires an hallucinatory strength, which may even eclipse that of the relatively uninteresting sign and entirely divert our attention from the latter. Thus the sensations to which our joints give rise when they rotate are signs of what, through a large number of other sensations, tactile and optical, we have come to know as the movement of the whole limb. This movement of the whole limb is what we think of when the joint's nerves are excited in that way; and its place is so much more important than the joint's place that our sense of the latter is taken up, so to speak, into our perception of the former, and the sensation of the movement seems to diffuse²¹⁷ itself into our very fingers and toes. But by abstracting our attention from the suggestion of the entire extremity we can perfectly well perceive the same sensation as if it were concentrated in one spot. We can identify it with a differently located tactile and visual image of 'the joint' itself.

Just so when we feel the tip of our cane against the ground. The peculiar²¹⁸ sort of movement of the hand (impossible in one direction, but free in every other) which we experience when the tip touches 'the ground,' is a sign to us of the visual and tactile object which we already know under that name. We think of 'the ground' as being there and giving us the sensation of this kind of movement. The sensation, we say, comes from the ground. The ground's place seems to be its place; although at the same time, and for very similar practical reasons, we think of another optical and tactile object, 'the hand' namely, and consider that its place also must be the place of our sensation. In other words, we take an object or sensible content A, and confounding it with another object otherwise known, B, or with two objects otherwise known, B and C, we identify its place with their places. But in all this there is no 'projecting' (such as the extradition-philosophers talk of) of A out of an original place; no primitive location which it first occupied, away from these other sensations, has to be contradicted; no natural ' centre,' from which it is expelled, exists. That would imply that A aboriginally came to us in definite local relations with other sensations, for to be out of B and C is to be in local relation with them as much as to be in them is so. But it was no more out of B and C than it was in them when it first came to us. It simply had nothing to do with them. To say that we feel a sensation's seat to be 'in the brain' or 'against the eye' or 'under the skin' is to say as much about it and to deal with it in as non-primitive a way as to say that it is a mile off. These are all secondary perceptions, ways of defining the sensation's seat per aliud. They involve numberless associations, identifications, and imaginations, and admit a great deal of vacillation²¹⁹ and uncertainty²²⁰ in the result. 50

I conclude, then, that there is no truth in the 'eccentric projection' theory. It is due to the confused assumption that the bodily processes which cause a sensation must also be its seat. 51 But sensations have no seat in this sense. They become seats for each other, as fast as experience associates them together; but that violates no primitive seat possessed²²¹ by any one of them. And though our sensations cannot then so analyze²²² and talk of themselves, yet at their very first appearance quite as much as at any later date are they cognizant of all those qualities which we end by extracting and conceiving under the names of objectivity, exteriority²²³, and extent. It is surely subjectivity and inferiority which are the notions latest acquired by the human mind. 52

1 Some persons will say that we never have a really simple object or content. My definition of sensation does not require the simplicity to be absolutely, but only relatively, extreme. It is worth while in passing, however, to warn the reader against a couple of inferences that are often made. One is that because we gradually learn to analyze so many qualities we ought to conclude that there are no really indecomposable feelings in the mind. The other is that because the processes that produce our sensations are multiple, the sensations regarded as subjective facts must also be compound. To take an example, to a child the taste of lemonade comes at first as a simple quality. He later learns both that many stimuli and many nerves are involved in the exhibition of this taste to his wind, and he also learns to perceive separately the sourness, the coolness, the sweet, the lemon aroma²²⁴, etc., and the several degrees of strength of each and all of these things, -- the experience falling into a large number of aspects, each of which is abstracted, classed, named, etc., and all of which appear to be the elementary sensations into which the original 'lemonade flavor' is decomposed²²⁵. It is argued from this that the latter never was the simple thing which it seemed. I have already criticised this sort of reasoning in ChapterVI(see pp.17ff.). The mind of the child enjoying the simple lemonade flavor and that of the same child grown up and analysing it are in two entirely different conditions. Subjectively considered, the two states of mind are two altogether distinct sorts of fact. The later mental state says 'this is the same flavor (or fluid) which that earlier state perceived as simple, but that does not make the two states themselves identical. It is nothing but a case of learning more and more about the same topics of discourse or things. -- Many of these topics, however, must be confessed to resist all analysis, the various colors for example. He who sees blue and yellow 'in' a certain green means merely that when green is confronted with these other colors he sees relations of similarity. He who sees abstract 'color' in it means merely that he sees a similarity between it and all the other objects known as colors. (Similarity itself cannot ultimately be accounted for by an identical abstract element buried in all the similars, as has been already shown, p. 492 ff.) He who sees abstract paleness, intensity, purity, in the green means other similarities still. These are all outward determinations of that special green, knowledges about it, züallige Anischten, as Herbart would say, not elements of its composition. Compare the article by Meinong in the Vierteliahrschrift für wiss. Phil., xii. 324.

2 See above, p. 221

3 Those who wish a fuller treatment than Martin's Human Body affords may be recommended to Bernstein's 'Five Senses of Man,' in the International Scientific Series, or to Ladd's or Wundt's Physiological Psychology. The completest compendium²²⁶ is L. Hermann's Handbuch der Physiologie, Vol. III.

4 "The sensations which we postulate, as the signs or occasions of our perceptions" (A. Seth: Scottish Philosophy, p. 89). "Their existence is supposed only because, without them, it would be impossible to account for the complex phenomena which are directly present in consciousness" (J. Dewey: Psychology, p. 34). Even as great an enemy of Sensation as T. H. Green has to allow it a sort of hypothetical existence under protest. "Perception presupposes feeling" (Contemp. Review, vol. xxxi. p. 747). Cf. also sail passages as those in his Prolegomena to Ethics²²⁷, §§ 48, 49. -- Physiologically²²⁸, the sensory²²⁹ and the reproductive or associative processes may wax and wane²³⁰ independently of each other. Where the part directly due to stimulation of the sense-organ preponderates²³¹, the thought has a sensational character, and differs from other thoughts in the sensational direction. Those thoughts which lie farthest in that direction we call sensations, for practical convenience, just as we call conceptions those which lie nearer the opposite extreme. But we no more have conceptions pure than we have pure sensations. Our most rarefied intellectual states involve some bodily sensibility, just as our dullest feelings have some intellectual scope. Common-sense and common psychology express this by saying that the mental state is composed of distinct fractional parts, one of which Is sensation, the other conception. We, however, who believe every mental state to be an integral thing (p. 276) cannot talk thus, but must speak of the degree of sensational or intellectual character, or function, of the mental state. Professor Hering puts, as usual, his finger better upon the truth than any one else. Writing of visual perception, he says: "It is inadmissible in the present state of our knowledge to assert that first and last the same retinal picture arouses exactly the same pure sensation, but that this sensation, in consequence of practice and experience, is differently interpreted the last time, and elaborated into a different perception the first. For the only real data are, on the one hand, the physical picture on the retina, -- and that is both times the same; and, on the other hand, the resultant state of consciousness (ausgelöste Empfindungscomplex) -- and that is both times distinct. Of any third thing, namely, a pure sensation thrust between the retinal and the mental pictures, we know nothing. We can then, if we wish to avoid all hypothesis, only say that the nervous apparatus reacts upon the same stimulus differently the last time from the first, and that in consequence the consciouss is different too." (Hermann's Hdbch., iii. i. 567-8.)

5 Yet even writers like Prof. Bain will deny, in the most gratuitous²³² way, that sensations know anything. "It is evident that the most restricted form of sensation does not contain an element edge. The mere state of mind called the sensation of scarlet²³³ is edge, although a necessary preparation for it." 'Is not know about scarlet' is all that Professor Bain can rightfully say.

6By simple ideas of sensation Locke merely means sensations.

7 Essay c. H. U., bk. ii. ch. xxiii. § 29; ch. xxv. § 9.

9 Op. cit. Bk. Ii ch. ii § 2.

10 "So far is it from being true that we necessarily have as many feelings in consciousness at one time as there are isles²³⁴ to the sense then played upon, that it is a fundamental law of pure sensation that each momentarily state of the organism yields but one feeling, however numerous may be Its parts and its exposures. . . . To this original Unity of consciousness it makes no difference that the tributaries²³⁵ to the single feeling are beyond the organism instead of within it, in an outside object with several sensible properties, instead of in the living body with its several sensitive functions. . . . The unity therefore is riot made by 'association' of several components²³⁶; but the plurality is formed by dissociation of unsuspected varieties within the unity; the substantive thing being no product of synthesis, but the residuum of differentiation²³⁷." (J. Martineau: A Study of Religion (1888), p.192-4.) Compare also F. H. Bradley, Logic¹¹, book i. chap. ii.

11 Such passages as the following abound²³⁸ in anti-sensationalist literature:

"Sense is a kind of dull, confused, and stupid perception obtruded²³⁹ upon the soul from without, whereby it perceives the alterations and motions within its own body, and takes cognizance of individual bodies existing round about it, but does not clearly comprehend what they are nor penetrate²⁴⁰ into the nature of them, it being intended by nature, as Plotinus speaks, not so properly for knowledge as for the use of the body. For the soul suffering under that which it perceives by way of passion cannot master or conquer it, that is to say, know or understand it. For so Anaxigoras in Aristotle very fairly expresses the nature of knowledge and intellection under the notion of Conquering. Wherefore it is necessary, since the mind understands all things, that it should be free from mixture and passion, for this end, as Anaxagorias speaks, that it may be able to know and master and conquer its objects, that is to say, to conquer and understand them. In like manner Pieus, in his book of Sense and Memory, makes to suffer and to be, conquered: one, also to know and to conquer; for which reason he concludes that that which suffers doth not know. . . . Sense that suffers from external objects lies as it were prostrate²⁴¹ under them, and is overcome by them . . . Sense therefore is a certain kind of drowsy²⁴² and somnolent²⁴³ perception of that passive part of the soul which is as it were asleep and acts concretely with it. . . . It is an energy arising from the body and a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended together with it. The perceptions of which compound, or of the soul as it were half asleep and half awake, are confused, indistinct, turbid²⁴⁴, and encumbered²⁴⁵ cogitations very different from the energies of the noetical part, . . . which are free, clear, serene²⁴⁶, satisfactory, and awakened cogitations. That is to say, knowledges" Etc., etc., etc. (R. Cudworth: Treatise²⁴⁷ concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, bk iii. chap. ii.) Similarly Malbranche: "THÉODORE. -- Oh, oh, Ariste! God knows pain, pleasure and the rest. But he does not feel these things. He knows pain, since he knows what that modification¹⁰⁴ of the soul is in which pain consists. He knows it because he alone causes it in us (as I shall presently prove), and he knows what he does. In a word, he knows it because his knowledge has no bounds. But he does not feel it, for if so he would be unhappy. To know pain, then, is not to feel it. ARISTE. -- That is true. But to feel it is to know it, is it not? THÉODORE. -- No indeed, since God does not feel it in the least, and yet he knows it perfectly. But in order not to quibble about terms, if you will have it that to feel pain is to know it, agree a that it is not to know it clearly, that it is not to know it by light an by evidence -- in a word, that it is not to know its nature; in other words speak exactly, it is not to know it at all. To feel pain, for example, is to feel ourselves unhappy without well knowing either what we are or is this modality of our being which makes us unhappy. . . . Impose silence on your senses, your imagination, and your passions, and you will hear the pure voice of inner truth, the clear and evident replies of our common master. Never confound the evidence which results from the comparison of ideas with the liveliness of the sensations which touch and thrill you. The livelier our sensations and feelings (sentiments) are, the more darkness do they shed. The more terrible or agreeable are our phantoms²⁴⁸, and they body and reality they appear to have, the more dangerous are they an to lead us astray." (Entretiens sur la Métaphysique, 3me Entretien ad init.) Malebranche's Theodore prudently²⁴⁹ does not try to explain God's 'infinite felicity' is compatible with his not feeling joy.

12 Green: Prolegomena, §§ 20, 28.

13 Introd. to Hume, §§ 146, 188. It is hard to tell just what this apostolic human being but strenuously²⁵⁰ feeble writer means by relation. Sometimes it seems to stand for system of related fact. The ubiquity of the 'psychologist's fallacy' (see p. 196) in his pages, his incessant²⁵¹ leaning on the confusion between the thing known, the thought that knows it, and the farther things known about that thing and about that thought by later and additional thoughts, make it impossible to clear up his meaning. Compare, however, utterances²⁵² in the text such others as these: "The waking of Self-consciousness from the sleep of sense is an absolute new beginning, and nothing can come within the 'crystal sphere' of intelligence except as it is determined²⁵³ by intelligence. What sense is to sense is nothing for thought. What sense is to thought, it is as determined by thought. There can, therefore, be no 'reality' in sensation to which the world of thought can be referred." (Edward Caird's Philosophy of Kant, 1st ed. pp. 393-4.) "When," says Green again, "feeling a pain or pleasure of heat to be connected with the action of approaching the fire, am I not receiving a relation of which one constituent²⁵⁴, at any rate, is a simple sensation? The true answer is No." "Perception, in its simplest form . . . -- perception as the first sight or touch of an object in which is seen or touched is recognized -- neither is nor contains sensation. ( Contemp. Rev²⁹., xxxi. pp. 746, 750.) "Mere sensation is in truth a phrase that represents no reality." "Mere feeling, then, as a matter unformed by thought, has no place in the world of facts, in the cosmos²⁵⁵ of possible experience." (Proglegomena to Ethics, §§ 46, 50.) -- I have expressed myself a little more fully on this subject in mind, x. 27 ff.

14 Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i. Pp. 7,8. Hobbes's phrase, sentire semper idem et non sentire ad idem recidunt, is generally treated as the original statement of the relativity doctrine. J. S. Mill ( Examn. of Hamilton, p. 6) and Bain (Senses and Intellect. p. 321; Emotions and Will, pp. 550, 570-2; Logic, i. p. 2; Body and Mind, p. 81) are subscribers to this doctrine also J. S. Mill's analysis, J. S. Mill's edition, ii. 11, 12.

15 We can steadily hear a note for half an hour. The difference between the senses are marked. Smell and taste seem soon to get fatigued.

16 In the popular mind it is mixed up with that entirely different doctrine of the 'Relativity of Knowledge' preached by Hamilton and Spencer. This doctrine says that our knowledge is relative to us, and is not of the object as the latter is in itself. It has nothing to do with the question which we have been discussing, of whether our objects of knowledge contain absolute terms or consist altogether of relations.

17 What follows in brackets, as far as p. 27, is from the pen of my friend and pupil Mr. E. B. Delabarre.

19 These phenomena have close analogues²⁵⁶ in the phenomena of contrast presented by the temperature-sense (see W. Preyer²⁵⁷ in Archiv f. d. ges Phys., Bd. xxv. p. 79 ff.). Successive contrast here is shown in the fact that a warm sensation appears warmer if a cold one has just previously been experienced; and a cold one colder, if the preceding one was warm. If a finger which has been plunged in hot water, and another which has been in cold water, be both immersed in lukewarm water, the same water appears cold to the former finger and warm to the latter. In simultaneous contrast, a sensation of warmth on any part of the skin tends to induce the sensation of cold in its immediate neighborhood; and vice²⁵⁸ versá. This may be seen if we press with the palm on two metal surfaces of about inch and a half square and three-fourths inch apart; the skin between them appears distinctly warmer. So also a small object of exactly the temperature of the palm appears warm if a cold object, and cold if a warm object, touch the skin near it.

[20 ]Helmholtz, Physiolog. Optik, p. 392.

21 Loc. cit. p. 407.

22 Loc. cit. p. 408.

23 Loc. cit. p. 406.

24 E. Hering, in Hermann's Handbuch d. Physiologie, iii. 1, p. 565.

25 Hering: 'Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne.' -- Of these experiments the following (found on p. 24 ff.) may be cited as a typical one: "From dark gray paper cut two strips 3-4 cm. long and ½ cm. wide, and lay them on a background of which one half is white and the other half deep black, in such a way that one strip lies on each side of the border-line and parallel to it, and at least 1 cm. distant from it. Fixate ½ to 1 minute a point on the border-line between the strips. One strip appears much brighter than the other. Close and cover the eyes, and the negative after-image appears . . . The difference in brightness of the strips in the after-image is in general much greater than it appeared in direct vision. . . . This difference in brightness of the strips by no means always increases and decreases with the difference in brightness of the two halves of tile background. . . . phase occurs in which the difference in brightness of the two halves the background entirely disappears, and yet both after-images of the strips are still very clear, one of them brighter and one darker than the back ground, which is equally bright on both halves. Here can no longer be any question of contrast-effect, because the conditio sine qua non of contrast, namely, the differing brightness of the ground, is no longer present. This proves that the different brightness of the after-images of the strips must have its ground in a different state of excitation of the corresponding portions of the retina, and from this follows further that both these portions of the retina were differently stimulated²⁵⁹ during the origin observation; for the different after-effect demands here a different effect. . . . In the original arrangement, the objectively similar strips appeared of different brightness, because both corresponding portions retina were truly differently excited."

26 Helmholtz, Physiolog. Optik, p. 407.

27 In Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. XLI. S. 1 ff.

28 Helmholtz, loc. cit. p. 412.

29 See Hering: Archiv. f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. XLI. S. 358 ff.

30 Hering: Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. XL. B. 172 ff.; Delabarre: American Journal of Psychology, ii. 636.

31 Hering: Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. XLI. S. 91 ff.

32 Die Gesichtsempfindungen u. ihre Analyse, p. 128.

34 Mr. Delabarre's contribution ends here.

35 Physiol. Psych., i. 351, 458-60. The full inanity²⁶⁰ of the law of relativity is best to be seen in Wundt's treatment, where the great 'allgemeiner Gesetz der Beziehung,' invoked²⁶¹ to account for Weber's law as well as for the phenomena of contrast and many other matters, can only be defined as a tendency to feel all things in relation to each other! Bless its little soul! But why does it change the things so, when it thus feels them in relation?

36 Ladd: Physiol. Psych., p. 348.

37 Mind, x. 567.

38 Zwangsmässige Lichtempfindung durch Schall (Leipzig, 1881).

39 Ptlüger's Archiv, XLII. 154.

41 Physiological Psychology, 385, 387. See also such passages as that in Bain: The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 364-6.

42 Especially must we avoid all attempts, whether avowed²⁶² or concealed²⁶³, to account for the spatial qualities of the presentations of sense by merely describing the qualities of the simple sensations and the modes of their combination. It is position and extension in space which constitutes the very peculiarity²⁶⁴ of the objects as no longer mere sensations or affections of the mind. As sensations, they are neither out of ourselves nor possessed of the qualities indicated by the word spread-out." (Ladd, op. cit. p. 391.)

43 A. Riehl: Der Philosophischer Kriticismus, Bd. ii. Theil ii. p. 64.

44 On Intelligence, part ii. bk. ii. chap. ii. §§ vii, viii. Compare such statements as these: "The consequence is that when a sensation has for Its usual condition the presence of an object more or less distant from our bodies, and experience has once made us acquainted with this distance, we shall situate our sensation at this distance. -- This, in fact, is the case with sensations of hearing and sight. The peripheral extremity of the acoustic²⁶⁵ nerve is in the deep-seated chamber²⁶⁶ of the car. That of the optic nerve is in the most inner recess²⁶⁷ of the eye. But still, in our present state, we never situate our sensations of sound or color in these places, but without us, and often at a considerable distance from us. . . . All our sensations of color are thus projected out of our body, and clothe more or less distant objects, furniture, walls, houses, trees, the sky, and the rest. This is why, when we afterwards reflect on them, we cease to attribute them to ourselves; they are alienated²⁶⁸ and detached from us, so far as to appear different from us. Projected from the nervous surface in which we localize the majority of the others, the tie which connected them to the others and to ourselves is undone²⁶⁹. . . . Thus, all our sensations are wrongly situated, and the red color is no more extended on the arm-chair than the sensation of tingling²⁷⁰ is situated at my fingers' ends. They are all situated in the sensory centres of the encephalon; all appear situated elsewhere, and a common law allots²⁷¹ to each of them its apparent situation." (Vol. ii. pp. 47-53.) -- Similarly Schopenhauer: "I will now show the same by the sense of sight. The immediate datum²⁷² is here limited to the sensation of the retina which, it is true, admits of considerable diversity, but at bottom reverts²⁷³ to the impression of light and dark with their shades, and that of colors. This sensation is through and through subjective, that is, inside of the organism and under the skin." (Schopenhauer: Satz vom Grunde, p. 58.) This philosopher then enumerates²⁷⁴ seriatim what the Intellect does to make the originally subjective sensation objective: 1) it turns it bottom side up; 2) it reduces its doubleness to singleness; 3) it changes its flatness to solidity; and 4) it projects it to a distance from the eye. Again: "Sensations are what we call the impressions on our senses, in so far as they come to our consciousness as states of our own body, especially of our nervous apparatus; we call them perceptions when we form out of them the representation of outer objects." (Helmholtz: Tonempfindungen, 1870, p. 101.) -- Once more: "Sensation is always accomplished²⁷⁵ in the psychic centres, but it manifests itself at the excited part of the periphery. In other words, one is conscious of the phenomenon in the nervous centres. . . . but one perceives it in the peripheric organs. This phenomenon depends on the experience of the sensations themselves, in which there is a reflection of the subjective phenomenon and a tendency on the part of perception to return as it were to the external cause which has roused tile mental state because the latter is connected with the former." (Sergi: Psychologie Physiologique (Paris, 1888), p. 189.) -- The clearest and best passage I know is in Liebmann: Der Objective Anblick (1869), pp. 67-72, but it is unfortunately too long to quote.

45 This is proved by Weber's device of causing the head to be firmly pressed against a support by another person, whereupon the direction of traction¹⁶ ceases to be perceived.

46 Lotze: Med. Psych., 428-433; Lipps: Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, 582.

47 Injuries to Nerves (Philadelphia, 1872), p. 350 ff.

48 In reality it probably means only a restless movement of desire, which he might make even after he had become aware of his impotence to touch the object.

49 Revue Philosophique, vii. p. 1 ff., an admirable critical article, in the course of which M. Janet gives a bibliography²⁷⁶ of the cases in question. See also Dunan: ibid. xxv. 165-7. They are also discussed and similarly Interpreted by T. K. Abbot: Sight and Touch (1864), chapter x.

50 The intermediary and shortened locations of the lost band and foot in the amputation²⁷⁷ cases also show this. It is easy to see why the phantom foot might continue to follow the position of the artificial one. But I confess that I cannot explain its half way-positions.

51 It is from this confused assumption that the time-honored riddle²⁷⁸ comes, of how, with an upside-down picture on the retina, we can see things right-side up. Our consciousness is naively²⁷⁹ supposed to inhabit the picture and to feel the picture's position as related to other objects of space. But the truth is that the picture is non-existent either as a habitat or as anything else, for immediate consciousness. Our notion of it is an enormously late conception. The outer object is given immediately with all those qualities which later are named and determined in relation to other sensations. The 'bottom' of this object is where we see what by touch we afterwards know as our feet, the 'top' is the place in which we see what we know as other people's heads, etc., etc. Berkeley long ago made this matter perfectly clear (see his Essay towards a new Theory of Vision, 93-98, 113-118).

52 For full justification²⁸⁰ the reader must see the next chapter. He may object, against the summary account given now, that in a babe's immediate field of vision the various things which appear are located relatively to each other from the outset. I admit that if discriminated, they would appear so located. But they are parts of the content of one sensation, not sensations separately experienced, such as the text is concerned with. The fully developed 'world,' in which all our sensations ultimately find location, is nothing but an imaginary object framed after the pattern of the field of vision, by the addition and continuation of one sensation upon another in an orderly and systematic²⁸¹ way. In corroboration²⁸² of my text I must refer to pp. 57-60 of Riehl's book quoted above on page 32, and to Uphues: Wahrnehmung und Empfiudung (1888), especially the Einleitung and pp. 51-61.

1 Prof. Jastrow has ascertained²⁸³ by statistical²⁸⁴ inquiry²⁸⁵ among the blind that if their blindness have occurred before a period embraced between the fifth and seventh years the visual centres seem to decay, and visual dreams and images are gradually outgrown²⁸⁶. If sight is lost after the seventh year, visual imagination seems to survive through life. See Prof. J.'s interesting article on the Dreams of the Blind, in the New Princeton Review for January 1888.

1 distinguished   

adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的

参考例句：

• Elephants are distinguished from other animals by their long noses.大象以其长长的鼻子显示出与其他动物的不同。
• A banquet was given in honor of the distinguished guests.宴会是为了向贵宾们致敬而举行的。

2 discriminated   

分别，辨别，区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 )； 歧视，有差别地对待

参考例句：

• His great size discriminated him from his followers. 他的宽广身材使他不同于他的部下。
• Should be a person that has second liver virus discriminated against? 一个患有乙肝病毒的人是不是就应该被人歧视？

3 psychology   

n.心理，心理学，心理状态

参考例句：

• She has a background in child psychology.她受过儿童心理学的教育。
• He studied philosophy and psychology at Cambridge.他在剑桥大学学习哲学和心理学。

4 stimulation   

n.刺激，激励，鼓舞

参考例句：

• The playgroup provides plenty of stimulation for the children.幼儿游戏组给孩子很多启发。
• You don't get any intellectual stimulation in this job.你不能从这份工作中获得任何智力启发。

5 cognitive   

adj.认知的，认识的，有感知的

参考例句：

• As children grow older,their cognitive processes become sharper.孩子们越长越大，他们的认知过程变得更为敏锐。
• The cognitive psychologist is like the tinker who wants to know how a clock works.认知心理学者倒很像一个需要通晓钟表如何运转的钟表修理匠。

6 relatively   

adv.比较...地，相对地

参考例句：

• The rabbit is a relatively recent introduction in Australia.兔子是相对较新引入澳大利亚的物种。
• The operation was relatively painless.手术相对来说不痛。

7 analytic   

adj.分析的，用分析方法的

参考例句：

• The boy has an analytic mind. 这男孩有分析的头脑。
• Latin is a synthetic language,while English is analytic.拉丁文是一种综合性语言，而英语是一种分析性语言。

8 simplicity   

n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯

参考例句：

• She dressed with elegant simplicity.她穿着朴素高雅。
• The beauty of this plan is its simplicity.简明扼要是这个计划的一大特点。

9 mere   

adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过

参考例句：

• That is a mere repetition of what you said before.那不过是重复了你以前讲的话。
• It's a mere waste of time waiting any longer.再等下去纯粹是浪费时间。

10 immediate   

adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的

参考例句：

• His immediate neighbours felt it their duty to call.他的近邻认为他们有责任去拜访。
• We declared ourselves for the immediate convocation of the meeting.我们主张立即召开这个会议。

11 logic   

n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性

参考例句：

• What sort of logic is that?这是什么逻辑？
• I don't follow the logic of your argument.我不明白你的论点逻辑性何在。

12 periphery   

n.(圆体的)外面；周围

参考例句：

• Geographically, the UK is on the periphery of Europe.从地理位置上讲，英国处于欧洲边缘。
• The periphery of the retina is very sensitive to motion.视网膜的外围对运动非常敏感。

13 entirely   

ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The fire was entirely caused by their neglect of duty. 那场火灾完全是由于他们失职而引起的。
• His life was entirely given up to the educational work. 他的一生统统献给了教育工作。

14 sufficiently   

adv.足够地，充分地

参考例句：

• It turned out he had not insured the house sufficiently.原来他没有给房屋投足保险。
• The new policy was sufficiently elastic to accommodate both views.新政策充分灵活地适用两种观点。

15 physiological   

adj.生理学的，生理学上的

参考例句：

• He bought a physiological book.他买了一本生理学方面的书。
• Every individual has a physiological requirement for each nutrient.每个人对每种营养成分都有一种生理上的需要。

16 traction   

n.牵引；附着摩擦力

参考例句：

• I'll show you how the traction is applied.我会让你看如何做这种牵引。
• She's injured her back and is in traction for a month.她背部受伤，正在作一个月的牵引治疗。

17 postulate   

n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定

参考例句：

• Let's postulate that she is a cook.我们假定她是一位厨师。
• Freud postulated that we all have a death instinct as well as a life instinct.弗洛伊德曾假定我们所有人都有生存本能和死亡本能。

18 substantive   

adj.表示实在的；本质的、实质性的；独立的；n.实词，实名词；独立存在的实体

参考例句：

• They plan to meet again in Rome very soon to begin substantive negotiations.他们计划不久在罗马再次会晤以开始实质性的谈判。
• A president needs substantive advice,but he also requires emotional succor. 一个总统需要实质性的建议，但也需要感情上的支持。

19 discourse   

n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述

参考例句：

• We'll discourse on the subject tonight.我们今晚要谈论这个问题。
• He fell into discourse with the customers who were drinking at the counter.他和站在柜台旁的酒客谈了起来。

20 inter   

v.埋葬

参考例句：

• They interred their dear comrade in the arms.他们埋葬了他们亲爱的战友。
• The man who died in that accident has been interred.在那次事故中死的那个人已经被埋葬了。

21 sensational   

adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的

参考例句：

• Papers of this kind are full of sensational news reports.这类报纸满是耸人听闻的新闻报道。
• Their performance was sensational.他们的演出妙极了。

22 spectrum   

n.谱，光谱，频谱；范围，幅度，系列

参考例句：

• This is a kind of atomic spectrum.这是一种原子光谱。
• We have known much of the constitution of the solar spectrum.关于太阳光谱的构成，我们已了解不少。

23 postulated   

v.假定，假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• They postulated a 500-year lifespan for a plastic container. 他们假定塑料容器的寿命为500年。
• Freud postulated that we all have a death instinct as well as a life instinct. 弗洛伊德曾假定我们所有人都有生存本能和死亡本能。 来自辞典例句

24 paradox   

n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法；自相矛盾的人(物)

参考例句：

• The story contains many levels of paradox.这个故事存在多重悖论。
• The paradox is that Japan does need serious education reform.矛盾的地方是日本确实需要教育改革。

25 ego   

n.自我，自己，自尊

参考例句：

• He is absolute ego in all thing.在所有的事情上他都绝对自我。
• She has been on an ego trip since she sang on television.她上电视台唱过歌之后就一直自吹自擂。

26 philosophic   

adj.哲学的，贤明的

参考例句：

• It was a most philosophic and jesuitical motorman.这是个十分善辩且狡猾的司机。
• The Irish are a philosophic as well as a practical race.爱尔兰人是既重实际又善于思想的民族。

27 virtue   

n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力

参考例句：

• He was considered to be a paragon of virtue.他被认为是品德尽善尽美的典范。
• You need to decorate your mind with virtue.你应该用德行美化心灵。

28 vividly   

adv.清楚地，鲜明地，生动地

参考例句：

• The speaker pictured the suffering of the poor vividly.演讲者很生动地描述了穷人的生活。
• The characters in the book are vividly presented.这本书里的人物写得栩栩如生。

29 rev   

v.发动机旋转，加快速度

参考例句：

• It's his job to rev up the audience before the show starts.他要负责在表演开始前鼓动观众的热情。
• Don't rev the engine so hard.别让发动机转得太快。

30 doctrine   

n.教义；主义；学说

参考例句：

• He was impelled to proclaim his doctrine.他不得不宣扬他的教义。
• The council met to consider changes to doctrine.宗教议会开会考虑更改教义。

31 remains   

n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹

参考例句：

• He ate the remains of food hungrily.他狼吞虎咽地吃剩余的食物。
• The remains of the meal were fed to the dog.残羹剩饭喂狗了。

32 hazy   

adj.有薄雾的，朦胧的；不肯定的，模糊的

参考例句：

• We couldn't see far because it was so hazy.雾气蒙蒙妨碍了我们的视线。
• I have a hazy memory of those early years.对那些早先的岁月我有着朦胧的记忆。

33 jot   

n.少量；vi.草草记下；vt.匆匆写下

参考例句：

• I'll jot down their address before I forget it.我得赶快把他们的地址写下来，免得忘了。
• There is not a jot of evidence to say it does them any good.没有丝毫的证据显示这对他们有任何好处。

34 pry   

vi.窥(刺)探，打听；vt.撬动(开，起)

参考例句：

• He's always ready to pry into other people's business.他总爱探听别人的事。
• We use an iron bar to pry open the box.我们用铁棍撬开箱子。

35 unravelled   

解开，拆散，散开( unravel的过去式和过去分词 )； 阐明； 澄清； 弄清楚

参考例句：

• I unravelled the string and wound it into a ball. 我把绳子解开并绕成一个球。
• The legal tangle was never really unravelled. 这起法律纠葛从来没有真正解决。

36 psychic   

n.对超自然力敏感的人；adj.有超自然力的

参考例句：

• Some people are said to have psychic powers.据说有些人有通灵的能力。
• She claims to be psychic and to be able to foretell the future.她自称有特异功能，能预知未来。

37 exalted   

adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的

参考例句：

• Their loveliness and holiness in accordance with their exalted station.他们的美丽和圣洁也与他们的崇高地位相称。
• He received respect because he was a person of exalted rank.他因为是个地位崇高的人而受到尊敬。

38 affected   

adj.不自然的，假装的

参考例句：

• She showed an affected interest in our subject.她假装对我们的课题感到兴趣。
• His manners are affected.他的态度不自然。

39 scent   

n.气味，香味，香水，线索，嗅觉；v.嗅，发觉

参考例句：

• The air was filled with the scent of lilac.空气中弥漫着丁香花的芬芳。
• The flowers give off a heady scent at night.这些花晚上散发出醉人的芳香。

40 smelt   

v.熔解，熔炼；n.银白鱼，胡瓜鱼

参考例句：

• Tin is a comparatively easy metal to smelt.锡是比较容易熔化的金属。
• Darby was looking for a way to improve iron when he hit upon the idea of smelting it with coke instead of charcoal.达比一直在寻找改善铁质的方法，他猛然想到可以不用木炭熔炼，而改用焦炭。

41 chaos   

n.混乱，无秩序

参考例句：

• After the failure of electricity supply the city was in chaos.停电后，城市一片混乱。
• The typhoon left chaos behind it.台风后一片混乱。

42 doom   

n.厄运，劫数；v.注定，命定

参考例句：

• The report on our economic situation is full of doom and gloom.这份关于我们经济状况的报告充满了令人绝望和沮丧的调子。
• The dictator met his doom after ten years of rule.独裁者统治了十年终于完蛋了。

43 inadequate   

adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的

参考例句：

• The supply is inadequate to meet the demand.供不应求。
• She was inadequate to the demands that were made on her.她还无力满足对她提出的各项要求。

44 piers   

n.水上平台( pier的名词复数 )；（常设有娱乐场所的）突堤；柱子；墙墩

参考例句：

• Most road bridges have piers rising out of the vally. 很多公路桥的桥墩是从河谷里建造起来的。 来自辞典例句
• At these piers coasters and landing-craft would be able to discharge at all states of tide. 沿岸航行的海船和登陆艇，不论潮汐如何涨落，都能在这种码头上卸载。 来自辞典例句

45 plunge   

v.跳入，(使)投入，(使)陷入；猛冲

参考例句：

• Test pool's water temperature before you plunge in.在你跳入之前你应该测试水温。
• That would plunge them in the broil of the two countries.那将会使他们陷入这两国的争斗之中。

46 conceit   

n.自负，自高自大

参考例句：

• As conceit makes one lag behind,so modesty helps one make progress.骄傲使人落后，谦虚使人进步。
• She seems to be eaten up with her own conceit.她仿佛已经被骄傲冲昏了头脑。

47 plunged   

v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降

参考例句：

• The train derailed and plunged into the river. 火车脱轨栽进了河里。
• She lost her balance and plunged 100 feet to her death. 她没有站稳，从100英尺的高处跌下摔死了。

48 slumber   

n.睡眠，沉睡状态

参考例句：

• All the people in the hotels were wrapped in deep slumber.住在各旅馆里的人都已进入梦乡。
• Don't wake him from his slumber because he needs the rest.不要把他从睡眠中唤醒，因为他需要休息。

49 cerebral   

adj.脑的，大脑的；有智力的，理智型的

参考例句：

• Your left cerebral hemisphere controls the right-hand side of your body.你的左半脑控制身体的右半身。
• He is a precise,methodical,cerebral man who carefully chooses his words.他是一个一丝不苟、有条理和理智的人，措辞谨慎。

50 awakened   

v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到

参考例句：

• She awakened to the sound of birds singing. 她醒来听到鸟的叫声。
• The public has been awakened to the full horror of the situation. 公众完全意识到了这一状况的可怕程度。 来自《简明英汉词典》

51 awaken   

vi.醒，觉醒；vt.唤醒，使觉醒，唤起，激起

参考例句：

• Old people awaken early in the morning.老年人早晨醒得早。
• Please awaken me at six.请于六点叫醒我。

52 vestige   

n.痕迹，遗迹，残余

参考例句：

• Some upright stones in wild places are the vestige of ancient religions.荒原上一些直立的石块是古老宗教的遗迹。
• Every vestige has been swept away.一切痕迹都被一扫而光。

53 amplification   

n.扩大，发挥

参考例句：

• The voice of despair may be weak and need amplification.绝望的呼声可能很微弱，需要扩大。
• Some of them require further amplification.其中有些内容需进一步详细阐明。

54 accretion   

n.自然的增长，增加物

参考例句：

• Every culture is an accretion.每一种文化都是长期积淀的结果。
• An accretion of sediment at the mouth of the river caused serious flooding.河口堆积物的增加导致河水严重泛滥。

55 awakening   

n.觉醒，醒悟 adj.觉醒中的；唤醒的

参考例句：

• the awakening of interest in the environment 对环境产生的兴趣
• People are gradually awakening to their rights. 人们正逐渐意识到自己的权利。

56 discriminative   

有判别力

参考例句：

• The measures are non-discriminative and not targeted at Mexican citizens. 有关措施并非针对墨西哥公民，没有歧视性。
• The Discriminative Common Vector (DCV) successfully overcomes this problem for FLDA. 近年来针对此问题提出了不同的解决方法，其中基于共同鉴别矢量(DCV)的方法成功克服了已有各种方法存在的缺点，有较好的数值稳定性和较低的计算复杂度。

57 unity   

n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调

参考例句：

• When we speak of unity,we do not mean unprincipled peace.所谓团结，并非一团和气。
• We must strengthen our unity in the face of powerful enemies.大敌当前，我们必须加强团结。

58 forth   

adv.向前；向外，往外

参考例句：

• The wind moved the trees gently back and forth.风吹得树轻轻地来回摇晃。
• He gave forth a series of works in rapid succession.他很快连续发表了一系列的作品。

59 peripheral   

adj.周边的，外围的

参考例句：

• We dealt with the peripheral aspects of a cost reduction program.我们谈到了降低成本计划的一些外围问题。
• The hotel provides the clerk the service and the peripheral traveling consultation.旅舍提供票务服务和周边旅游咨询。

60 apprehended   

逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解

参考例句：

• She apprehended the complicated law very quickly. 她很快理解了复杂的法律。
• The police apprehended the criminal. 警察逮捕了罪犯。

61 grudgingly   

参考例句：

• He grudgingly acknowledged having made a mistake. 他勉强承认他做错了。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Their parents unwillingly [grudgingly] consented to the marriage. 他们的父母无可奈何地应允了这门亲事。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

62 trampled   

踩( trample的过去式和过去分词 )； 践踏； 无视； 侵犯

参考例句：

• He gripped his brother's arm lest he be trampled by the mob. 他紧抓着他兄弟的胳膊，怕他让暴民踩着。
• People were trampled underfoot in the rush for the exit. 有人在拼命涌向出口时被踩在脚下。

63 corporeal   

adj.肉体的，身体的；物质的

参考例句：

• The body is the corporeal habitation of the soul.身体为灵魂之有形寓所。
• He is very religious;corporeal world has little interest for him.他虔信宗教，对物质上的享受不感兴趣。

64 vile   

adj.卑鄙的，可耻的，邪恶的；坏透的

参考例句：

• Who could have carried out such a vile attack?会是谁发起这么卑鄙的攻击呢？
• Her talk was full of vile curses.她的话里充满着恶毒的咒骂。

65 followers   

追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件

参考例句：

• the followers of Mahatma Gandhi 圣雄甘地的拥护者
• The reformer soon gathered a band of followers round him. 改革者很快就获得一群追随者支持他。

66 speciously   

adv.似是而非地；外观好看地，像是真实地

参考例句：

67 quotations   

n.引用( quotation的名词复数 )；[商业]行情（报告）；（货物或股票的）市价；时价

参考例句：

• The insurance company requires three quotations for repairs to the car. 保险公司要修理这辆汽车的三家修理厂的报价单。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• These quotations cannot readily be traced to their sources. 这些引语很难查出出自何处。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

68 stimulus   

n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物

参考例句：

• Regard each failure as a stimulus to further efforts.把每次失利看成对进一步努力的激励。
• Light is a stimulus to growth in plants.光是促进植物生长的一个因素。

69 derive   

v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自

参考例句：

• We derive our sustenance from the land.我们从土地获取食物。
• We shall derive much benefit from reading good novels.我们将从优秀小说中获得很大好处。

70 derives   

v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取

参考例句：

• English derives in the main from the common Germanic stock. 英语主要源于日耳曼语系。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He derives his income from freelance work. 他以自由职业获取收入。 来自《简明英汉词典》

71 habitually   

ad.习惯地，通常地

参考例句：

• The pain of the disease caused him habitually to furrow his brow. 病痛使他习惯性地紧皱眉头。
• Habitually obedient to John, I came up to his chair. 我已经习惯于服从约翰，我来到他的椅子跟前。

72 repose   

v.(使)休息；n.安息

参考例句：

• Don't disturb her repose.不要打扰她休息。
• Her mouth seemed always to be smiling,even in repose.她的嘴角似乎总是挂着微笑，即使在睡眠时也是这样。

73 inveterate   

adj.积习已深的，根深蒂固的

参考例句：

• Hitler was not only an avid reader but also an inveterate underliner.希特勒不仅酷爱读书，还有写写划划的习惯。
• It is hard for an inveterate smoker to give up tobacco.要一位有多年烟瘾的烟民戒烟是困难的。

74 undo   

vt.解开，松开；取消，撤销

参考例句：

• His pride will undo him some day.他的傲慢总有一天会毁了他。
• I managed secretly to undo a corner of the parcel.我悄悄地设法解开了包裹的一角。

75 irrelevant   

adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的

参考例句：

• That is completely irrelevant to the subject under discussion.这跟讨论的主题完全不相关。
• A question about arithmetic is irrelevant in a music lesson.在音乐课上，一个数学的问题是风马牛不相及的。

76 neural   

adj.神经的，神经系统的

参考例句：

• The neural network can preferably solve the non- linear problem.利用神经网络建模可以较好地解决非线性问题。
• The information transmission in neural system depends on neurotransmitters.信息传递的神经途径有赖于神经递质。

77 edifice   

n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室)

参考例句：

• The American consulate was a magnificent edifice in the centre of Bordeaux.美国领事馆是位于波尔多市中心的一座宏伟的大厦。
• There is a huge Victorian edifice in the area.该地区有一幢维多利亚式的庞大建筑物。

78 collapse   

vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷

参考例句：

• The country's economy is on the verge of collapse.国家的经济已到了崩溃的边缘。
• The engineer made a complete diagnosis of the bridge's collapse.工程师对桥的倒塌做了一次彻底的调查分析。

79 substantives   

n.作名词用的词或词组（substantive的复数形式）

参考例句：

80 hover   

vi.翱翔，盘旋；徘徊；彷徨，犹豫

参考例句：

• You don't hover round the table.你不要围着桌子走来走去。
• A plane is hover on our house.有一架飞机在我们的房子上盘旋。

81 enumerate   

v.列举，计算，枚举，数

参考例句：

• The heroic deeds of the people's soldiers are too numerous to enumerate.人民子弟兵的英雄事迹举不胜举。
• Its applications are too varied to enumerate.它的用途不胜枚举。

82 phenomena   

n.现象

参考例句：

• Ade couldn't relate the phenomena with any theory he knew.艾德无法用他所知道的任何理论来解释这种现象。
• The object of these experiments was to find the connection,if any,between the two phenomena.这些实验的目的就是探索这两种现象之间的联系，如果存在着任何联系的话。

83 apparently   

adv.显然地；表面上，似乎

参考例句：

• An apparently blind alley leads suddenly into an open space.山穷水尽，豁然开朗。
• He was apparently much surprised at the news.他对那个消息显然感到十分惊异。

84 simultaneously   

adv.同时发生地，同时进行地

参考例句：

• The radar beam can track a number of targets almost simultaneously.雷达波几乎可以同时追着多个目标。
• The Windows allow a computer user to execute multiple programs simultaneously.Windows允许计算机用户同时运行多个程序。

85 complement   

n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足

参考例句：

• The two suggestions complement each other.这两条建议相互补充。
• They oppose each other also complement each other.它们相辅相成。

86 mingle   

vt.使混合，使相混；vi.混合起来；相交往

参考例句：

• If we mingle with the crowd,we should not be noticed.如果我们混在人群中，就不会被注意到。
• Oil will not mingle with water.油和水不相融。

87 fatigue   

n.疲劳，劳累

参考例句：

• The old lady can't bear the fatigue of a long journey.这位老妇人不能忍受长途旅行的疲劳。
• I have got over my weakness and fatigue.我已从虚弱和疲劳中恢复过来了。

88 perfectly   

adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The witnesses were each perfectly certain of what they said.证人们个个对自己所说的话十分肯定。
• Everything that we're doing is all perfectly above board.我们做的每件事情都是光明正大的。

89 mingles   

混合，混入( mingle的第三人称单数 )； 混进，与…交往[联系]

参考例句：

• He rarely mingles with persons of his own rank in society. 他几乎不与和他身份相同的人交往。
• The distant rumbling of the guns mingles with our marching song. 枪的深邃长声与我们行进歌混合。

90 previously   

adv.以前，先前（地）

参考例句：

• The bicycle tyre blew out at a previously damaged point.自行车胎在以前损坏过的地方又爆开了。
• Let me digress for a moment and explain what had happened previously.让我岔开一会儿，解释原先发生了什么。

91 complicate   

vt.使复杂化，使混乱，使难懂

参考例句：

• There is no need to complicate matters.没有必要使问题复杂化。
• These events will greatly complicate the situation.这些事件将使局势变得极其复杂。

92 hue   

n.色度；色调；样子

参考例句：

• The diamond shone with every hue under the sun.金刚石在阳光下放出五颜六色的光芒。
• The same hue will look different in different light.同一颜色在不同的光线下看起来会有所不同。

93 tinge   

vt.(较淡)着色于，染色；使带有…气息；n.淡淡色彩，些微的气息

参考例句：

• The maple leaves are tinge with autumn red.枫叶染上了秋天的红色。
• There was a tinge of sadness in her voice.她声音中流露出一丝忧伤。

94 tinged   

v.（使）发丁丁声( ting的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• memories tinged with sadness 略带悲伤的往事
• white petals tinged with blue 略带蓝色的白花瓣

95 isolate   

vt.使孤立，隔离

参考例句：

• Do not isolate yourself from others.不要把自己孤立起来。
• We should never isolate ourselves from the masses.我们永远不能脱离群众。

96 investigations   

（正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究

参考例句：

• His investigations were intensive and thorough but revealed nothing. 他进行了深入彻底的调查，但没有发现什么。
• He often sent them out to make investigations. 他常常派他们出去作调查。

97 accurately   

adv.准确地，精确地

参考例句：

• It is hard to hit the ball accurately.准确地击中球很难。
• Now scientists can forecast the weather accurately.现在科学家们能准确地预报天气。

98 fully   

adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地

参考例句：

• The doctor asked me to breathe in,then to breathe out fully.医生让我先吸气，然后全部呼出。
• They soon became fully integrated into the local community.他们很快就完全融入了当地人的圈子。

99 steadily   

adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地

参考例句：

• The scope of man's use of natural resources will steadily grow.人类利用自然资源的广度将日益扩大。
• Our educational reform was steadily led onto the correct path.我们的教学改革慢慢上轨道了。

100 fatigued   

adj. 疲乏的

参考例句：

• The exercises fatigued her. 操练使她感到很疲乏。
• The President smiled, with fatigued tolerance for a minor person's naivety. 总统笑了笑，疲惫地表现出对一个下级人员的天真想法的宽容。

101 stimuli   

n.刺激（物）

参考例句：

• It is necessary to curtail or alter normally coexisting stimuli.必需消除或改变正常时并存的刺激。
• My sweat glands also respond to emotional stimuli.我的汗腺对情绪刺激也能产生反应。

102 induction   

n.感应，感应现象

参考例句：

• His induction as a teacher was a turning point in his life.他就任教师工作是他一生的转折点。
• The magnetic signals are sensed by induction coils.磁信号由感应线圈所检测。

103 undoubtedly   

adv.确实地，无疑地

参考例句：

• It is undoubtedly she who has said that.这话明明是她说的。
• He is undoubtedly the pride of China.毫无疑问他是中国的骄傲。

104 modification   

n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻

参考例句：

• The law,in its present form,is unjust;it needs modification.现行的法律是不公正的，它需要修改。
• The design requires considerable modification.这个设计需要作大的修改。

105 modifications   

n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变

参考例句：

• The engine was pulled apart for modifications and then reassembled. 发动机被拆开改型，然后再组装起来。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The original plan had undergone fairly extensive modifications. 原计划已经作了相当大的修改。 来自《简明英汉词典》

106 interfere   

v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰

参考例句：

• If we interfere, it may do more harm than good.如果我们干预的话，可能弊多利少。
• When others interfere in the affair,it always makes troubles. 别人一卷入这一事件，棘手的事情就来了。

107 interferes   

vi. 妨碍，冲突，干涉

参考例句：

• The noise interferes with my work. 这噪音妨碍我的工作。
• That interferes with my plan. 那干扰了我的计划。

108 intensity   

n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度

参考例句：

• I didn't realize the intensity of people's feelings on this issue.我没有意识到这一问题能引起群情激奋。
• The strike is growing in intensity.罢工日益加剧。

109 necessitates   

使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• The increase in population necessitates a greater food supply. 人口的增加需要更多食物供应。
• Your proposal necessitates borrowing money. 你的提议使借款成为必要。

110 bent   

n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的

参考例句：

• He was fully bent upon the project.他一心扑在这项计划上。
• We bent over backward to help them.我们尽了最大努力帮助他们。

111 texture   

n.(织物)质地；(材料)构造；结构；肌理

参考例句：

• We could feel the smooth texture of silk.我们能感觉出丝绸的光滑质地。
• Her skin has a fine texture.她的皮肤细腻。

112 disturbances   

n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍

参考例句：

• The government has set up a commission of inquiry into the disturbances at the prison. 政府成立了一个委员会来调查监狱骚乱事件。
• Extra police were called in to quell the disturbances. 已调集了增援警力来平定骚乱。

113 disturbance   

n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调

参考例句：

• He is suffering an emotional disturbance.他的情绪受到了困扰。
• You can work in here without any disturbance.在这儿你可不受任何干扰地工作。

114 prominence   

n.突出；显著；杰出；重要

参考例句：

• He came to prominence during the World Cup in Italy.他在意大利的世界杯赛中声名鹊起。
• This young fashion designer is rising to prominence.这位年轻的时装设计师的声望越来越高。

115 deception   

n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计

参考例句：

• He admitted conspiring to obtain property by deception.他承认曾与人合谋骗取财产。
• He was jailed for two years for fraud and deception.他因为诈骗和欺诈入狱服刑两年。

116 judgment   

n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见

参考例句：

• The chairman flatters himself on his judgment of people.主席自认为他审视人比别人高明。
• He's a man of excellent judgment.他眼力过人。

117 deceptions   

欺骗( deception的名词复数 )； 骗术，诡计

参考例句：

• Nobody saw through Mary's deceptions. 无人看透玛丽的诡计。
• There was for him only one trustworthy road through deceptions and mirages. 对他来说只有一条可靠的路能避开幻想和错觉。

118 transparent   

adj.明显的，无疑的；透明的

参考例句：

• The water is so transparent that we can see the fishes swimming.水清澈透明，可以看到鱼儿游来游去。
• The window glass is transparent.窗玻璃是透明的。

119 spatial   

adj.空间的，占据空间的

参考例句：

• This part of brain judges the spatial relationship between objects.大脑的这部分判断物体间的空间关系。
• They said that time is the feeling of spatial displacement.他们说时间是空间位移的感觉。

120 opposition   

n.反对，敌对

参考例句：

• The party leader is facing opposition in his own backyard.该党领袖在自己的党內遇到了反对。
• The police tried to break down the prisoner's opposition.警察设法制住了那个囚犯的反抗。

121 purely   

adv.纯粹地，完全地

参考例句：

• I helped him purely and simply out of friendship.我帮他纯粹是出于友情。
• This disproves the theory that children are purely imitative.这证明认为儿童只会单纯地模仿的理论是站不住脚的。

122 apparatus   

n.装置，器械；器具，设备

参考例句：

• The school's audio apparatus includes films and records.学校的视听设备包括放映机和录音机。
• They had a very refined apparatus.他们有一套非常精良的设备。

123 originality   

n.创造力，独创性；新颖

参考例句：

• The name of the game in pop music is originality.流行音乐的本质是独创性。
• He displayed an originality amounting almost to genius.他显示出近乎天才的创造性。

124 rigid   

adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的

参考例句：

• She became as rigid as adamant.她变得如顽石般的固执。
• The examination was so rigid that nearly all aspirants were ruled out.考试很严，几乎所有的考生都被淘汰了。

125 interpretation   

n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理

参考例句：

• His statement admits of one interpretation only.他的话只有一种解释。
• Analysis and interpretation is a very personal thing.分析与说明是个很主观的事情。

126 drawn   

v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的

参考例句：

• All the characters in the story are drawn from life.故事中的所有人物都取材于生活。
• Her gaze was drawn irresistibly to the scene outside.她的目光禁不住被外面的风景所吸引。

127 plausible   

adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的

参考例句：

• His story sounded plausible.他说的那番话似乎是真实的。
• Her story sounded perfectly plausible.她的说辞听起来言之有理。

128 conclusive   

adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的

参考例句：

• They produced some fairly conclusive evidence.他们提供了一些相当确凿的证据。
• Franklin did not believe that the French tests were conclusive.富兰克林不相信这个法国人的实验是结论性的。

129 conclusively   

adv.令人信服地，确凿地

参考例句：

• All this proves conclusively that she couldn't have known the truth. 这一切无可置疑地证明她不可能知道真相。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• From the facts,he was able to determine conclusively that the death was not a suicide. 根据这些事实他断定这起死亡事件并非自杀。 来自《简明英汉词典》

130 scrap   

n.碎片；废料；v.废弃，报废

参考例句：

• A man comes round regularly collecting scrap.有个男人定时来收废品。
• Sell that car for scrap.把那辆汽车当残品卖了吧。

131 glimmering   

n.微光，隐约的一瞥adj.薄弱地发光的v.发闪光，发微光( glimmer的现在分词 )

参考例句：

• I got some glimmering of what he was driving at. 他这么说是什么意思，我有点明白了。 来自辞典例句
• Now that darkness was falling, only their silhouettes were outlined against the faintly glimmering sky. 这时节两山只剩余一抹深黑，赖天空微明为画出一个轮廓。 来自汉英文学 - 散文英译

132 fixed   

adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的

参考例句：

• Have you two fixed on a date for the wedding yet?你们俩选定婚期了吗？
• Once the aim is fixed,we should not change it arbitrarily.目标一旦确定，我们就不应该随意改变。

133 saturated   

a.饱和的，充满的

参考例句：

• The continuous rain had saturated the soil. 连绵不断的雨把土地淋了个透。
• a saturated solution of sodium chloride 氯化钠饱和溶液

134 underneath   

adj.在...下面，在...底下；adv.在下面

参考例句：

• Working underneath the car is always a messy job.在汽车底下工作是件脏活。
• She wore a coat with a dress underneath.她穿着一件大衣，里面套着一条连衣裙。

135 thoroughly   

adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地

参考例句：

• The soil must be thoroughly turned over before planting.一定要先把土地深翻一遍再下种。
• The soldiers have been thoroughly instructed in the care of their weapons.士兵们都系统地接受过保护武器的训练。

136 complicates   

使复杂化( complicate的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• What complicates the issue is the burden of history. 历史的重负使问题复杂化了。
• Russia as a great and ambitious power gravely complicates the situation. 俄国作为一个强大而有野心的国家，使得局势异常复杂。

137 pane   

n.窗格玻璃，长方块

参考例句：

• He broke this pane of glass.他打破了这块窗玻璃。
• Their breath bloomed the frosty pane.他们呼出的水气，在冰冷的窗玻璃上形成一层雾。

138 scraps   

油渣

参考例句：

• Don't litter up the floor with scraps of paper. 不要在地板上乱扔纸屑。
• A patchwork quilt is a good way of using up scraps of material. 做杂拼花布棉被是利用零碎布料的好办法。

139 revolving   

adj.旋转的，轮转式的；循环的v.（使）旋转( revolve的现在分词 )；细想

参考例句：

• The theatre has a revolving stage. 剧院有一个旋转舞台。
• The company became a revolving-door workplace. 这家公司成了工作的中转站。

140 sectors   

n.部门( sector的名词复数 )；领域；防御地区；扇形

参考例句：

• Berlin was divided into four sectors after the war. 战后柏林分成了4 个区。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Industry and agriculture are the two important sectors of the national economy. 工业和农业是国民经济的两个重要部门。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

141 revolved   

v.（使）旋转( revolve的过去式和过去分词 )；细想

参考例句：

• The fan revolved slowly. 电扇缓慢地转动着。
• The wheel revolved on its centre. 轮子绕中心转动。 来自《简明英汉词典》

142 saturation   

n.饱和(状态)；浸透

参考例句：

• The company's sales are now close to saturation in many western countries.这家公司的产品销售量在许多西方国家已接近饱和。
• Road traffic has reached saturation point.公路交通已达到饱和点。

143 alterations   

n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变

参考例句：

• Any alterations should be written in neatly to the left side. 改动部分应书写清晰，插在正文的左侧。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Gene mutations are alterations in the DNA code. 基因突变是指DNA 密码的改变。 来自《简明英汉词典》

144 disappearance   

n.消失，消散，失踪

参考例句：

• He was hard put to it to explain her disappearance.他难以说明她为什么不见了。
• Her disappearance gave rise to the wildest rumours.她失踪一事引起了各种流言蜚语。

145 vertical   

adj.垂直的，顶点的，纵向的；n.垂直物，垂直的位置

参考例句：

• The northern side of the mountain is almost vertical.这座山的北坡几乎是垂直的。
• Vertical air motions are not measured by this system.垂直气流的运动不用这种系统来测量。

146 opaque   

adj.不透光的；不反光的，不传导的；晦涩的

参考例句：

• The windows are of opaque glass.这些窗户装着不透明玻璃。
• Their intentions remained opaque.他们的意图仍然令人费解。

147 illuminated   

adj.被照明的；受启迪的

参考例句：

• Floodlights illuminated the stadium. 泛光灯照亮了体育场。
• the illuminated city at night 夜幕中万家灯火的城市

148 persistence   

n.坚持，持续，存留

参考例句：

• The persistence of a cough in his daughter puzzled him.他女儿持续的咳嗽把他难住了。
• He achieved success through dogged persistence.他靠着坚持不懈取得了成功。

149 prevailing   

adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的

参考例句：

• She wears a fashionable hair style prevailing in the city.她的发型是这个城市流行的款式。
• This reflects attitudes and values prevailing in society.这反映了社会上盛行的态度和价值观。

150 equilibrium   

n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静

参考例句：

• Change in the world around us disturbs our inner equilibrium.我们周围世界的变化扰乱了我们内心的平静。
• This is best expressed in the form of an equilibrium constant.这最好用平衡常数的形式来表示。

151 dominant   

adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因

参考例句：

• The British were formerly dominant in India.英国人从前统治印度。
• She was a dominant figure in the French film industry.她在法国电影界是个举足轻重的人物。

152 irritability   

n.易怒

参考例句：

• It was the almost furtive restlessness and irritability that had possessed him. 那是一种一直纠缠着他的隐秘的不安和烦恼。
• All organisms have irritability while alive. 所有生物体活着时都有应激性。

153 diminution   

n.减少；变小

参考例句：

• They hope for a small diminution in taxes.他们希望捐税能稍有减少。
• He experienced no diminution of his physical strength.他并未感觉体力衰落。

154 evergreen   

n.常青树；adj.四季常青的

参考例句：

• Some trees are evergreen;they are called evergreen.有的树是常青的，被叫做常青树。
• There is a small evergreen shrub on the hillside.山腰上有一小块常绿灌木丛。

155 boughs   

大树枝( bough的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• The green boughs glittered with all their pearls of dew. 绿枝上闪烁着露珠的光彩。
• A breeze sighed in the higher boughs. 微风在高高的树枝上叹息着。

156 rectified   

[医]矫正的，调整的

参考例句：

• I am hopeful this misunderstanding will be rectified very quickly. 我相信这个误会将很快得到纠正。
• That mistake could have been rectified within 28 days. 那个错误原本可以在28天内得以纠正。

157 insufficient   

adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的

参考例句：

• There was insufficient evidence to convict him.没有足够证据给他定罪。
• In their day scientific knowledge was insufficient to settle the matter.在他们的时代，科学知识还不能足以解决这些问题。

158 immutable   

adj.不可改变的，永恒的

参考例句：

• Nothing in the world is immutable.世界没有一成不变的东西。
• They free our minds from considering our world as fixed and immutable.它们改变着人们将世界看作是永恒不变的观点。

159 supersedes   

取代，接替( supersede的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• The new supersedes the old. 新陈代谢。
• No sooner do you buy a computer than they bring out a new one which supersedes it. 你买电脑后不久他们就会推出新产品取代它。

160 momentary   

adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的

参考例句：

• We are in momentary expectation of the arrival of you.我们无时无刻不在盼望你的到来。
• I caught a momentary glimpse of them.我瞥了他们一眼。

161 requisite   

adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品

参考例句：

• He hasn't got the requisite qualifications for the job.他不具备这工作所需的资格。
• Food and air are requisite for life.食物和空气是生命的必需品。

162 applied   

adj.应用的；v.应用，适用

参考例句：

• She plans to take a course in applied linguistics.她打算学习应用语言学课程。
• This cream is best applied to the face at night.这种乳霜最好晚上擦脸用。

163 chromatic   

adj.色彩的，颜色的

参考例句：

• The removal of the chromatic aberration is then of primary importance.这时消除色差具有头等重要性。
• In lampblack many kitchens easy to present the chromatic aberration.油烟较多的厨房中易出现色差。

164 inversely   

adj.相反的

参考例句：

• Pressure varies directly with temperature and inversely with volume. 压力随温度成正比例变化，与容积成反比例变化。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The amount of force needed is inversely proportional to the rigidity of the material. 需要的力度与材料的硬度成反比。 来自《简明英汉词典》

165 subjective   

a.主观(上)的，个人的

参考例句：

• The way they interpreted their past was highly subjective. 他们解释其过去的方式太主观。
• A literary critic should not be too subjective in his approach. 文学评论家的看法不应太主观。

166 dwindles   

v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• Her husband grows rich in crime, her significance dwindles. 她的丈夫罪恶累累，她的形象也受到损害。 来自辞典例句
• The voice died away and ceased, as an insect's tiny trumpet dwindles swiftly into silence. 这声音逐渐消失，就象昆虫的小喇叭嘎然而止。 来自辞典例句

167 Fahrenheit   

n./adj.华氏温度；华氏温度计(的)

参考例句：

• He was asked for the boiling point of water in Fahrenheit.他被问到水的沸点是华氏多少度。
• The thermometer reads 80 degrees Fahrenheit.寒暑表指出华氏80度。

168 lighter   

n.打火机，点火器；驳船；v.用驳船运送；light的比较级

参考例句：

• The portrait was touched up so as to make it lighter.这张画经过润色，色调明朗了一些。
• The lighter works off the car battery.引燃器利用汽车蓄电池打火。

169 acuity   

n.敏锐，（疾病的）剧烈

参考例句：

• We work on improving visual acuity.我们致力于提高视觉的敏锐度。
• The nurse may also measure visual acuity.护士还可以检查视敏度。

170 mutual   

adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的

参考例句：

• We must pull together for mutual interest.我们必须为相互的利益而通力合作。
• Mutual interests tied us together.相互的利害关系把我们联系在一起。

171 varied   

adj.多样的，多变化的

参考例句：

• The forms of art are many and varied.艺术的形式是多种多样的。
• The hotel has a varied programme of nightly entertainment.宾馆有各种晚间娱乐活动。

172 contraction   

n.缩略词，缩写式，害病

参考例句：

• The contraction of this muscle raises the lower arm.肌肉的收缩使前臂抬起。
• The forces of expansion are balanced by forces of contraction.扩张力和收缩力相互平衡。

173 nausea   

n.作呕，恶心；极端的憎恶(或厌恶)

参考例句：

• Early pregnancy is often accompanied by nausea.怀孕期常有恶心的现象。
• He experienced nausea after eating octopus.吃了章鱼后他感到恶心。

174 instinctively   

adv.本能地

参考例句：

• As he leaned towards her she instinctively recoiled. 他向她靠近，她本能地往后缩。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He knew instinctively where he would find her. 他本能地知道在哪儿能找到她。 来自《简明英汉词典》

175 instinctive   

adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的

参考例句：

• He tried to conceal his instinctive revulsion at the idea.他试图饰盖自己对这一想法本能的厌恶。
• Animals have an instinctive fear of fire.动物本能地怕火。

176 formulating   

v.构想出( formulate的现在分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示

参考例句：

• At present, the Chinese government is formulating nationwide regulations on the control of such chemicals. 目前，中国政府正在制定全国性的易制毒化学品管理条例。 来自汉英非文学 - 白皮书
• Because of this, the U.S. has taken further steps in formulating the \"Magellan\" programme. 为此，美国又进一步制定了“麦哲伦”计划。 来自百科语句

177 corroborated   

v.证实，支持（某种说法、信仰、理论等）( corroborate的过去式 )

参考例句：

• The evidence was corroborated by two independent witnesses. 此证据由两名独立证人提供。
• Experiments have corroborated her predictions. 实验证实了她的预言。 来自《简明英汉词典》

178 projection   

n.发射，计划，突出部分

参考例句：

• Projection takes place with a minimum of awareness or conscious control.投射在最少的知觉或意识控制下发生。
• The projection of increases in number of house-holds is correct.对户数增加的推算是正确的。

179 psychical   

adj.有关特异功能现象的；有关特异功能官能的；灵魂的；心灵的

参考例句：

• Conclusion: The Liuhe-lottery does harm to people, s psychical health and should be for bidden. 结论：“六合彩”赌博有害人们心理卫生，应予以严禁。 来自互联网

180 situated   

adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的

参考例句：

• The village is situated at the margin of a forest.村子位于森林的边缘。
• She is awkwardly situated.她的处境困难。

181 devoid   

adj.全无的，缺乏的

参考例句：

• He is completely devoid of humour.他十分缺乏幽默。
• The house is totally devoid of furniture.这所房子里什么家具都没有。

182 sentient   

adj.有知觉的，知悉的；adv.有感觉能力地

参考例句：

• The living knew themselves just sentient puppets on God's stage.生还者认识到，他们不过是上帝的舞台上有知觉的木偶而已。
• It teaches us to love all sentient beings equally.它教导我们应该平等爱护一切众生。

183 retract   

vt.缩回，撤回收回，取消

参考例句：

• The criminals should stop on the precipice, retract from the wrong path and not go any further.犯罪分子应当迷途知返，悬崖勒马，不要在错误的道路上继续走下去。
• I don't want to speak rashly now and later have to retract my statements.我不想现在说些轻率的话，然后又要收回自己说过的话。

184 innate   

adj.天生的，固有的，天赋的

参考例句：

• You obviously have an innate talent for music.你显然有天生的音乐才能。
• Correct ideas are not innate in the mind.人的正确思想不是自己头脑中固有的。

185 inborn   

adj.天生的，生来的，先天的

参考例句：

• He is a man with an inborn love of joke.他是一个生来就喜欢开玩笑的人。
• He had an inborn talent for languages.他有语言天分。

186 subjectivity   

n.主观性（主观主义）

参考例句：

• In studying a problem,we must shun subjectivity.研究问题，忌带主观性。
• 'Cause there's a certain amount of subjectivity involved in recreating a face.因为在重建面部的过程中融入了太多的主观因素？

187 tracts   

大片土地( tract的名词复数 )； 地带； （体内的）道； （尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的）短文

参考例句：

• vast tracts of forest 大片大片的森林
• There are tracts of desert in Australia. 澳大利亚有大片沙漠。

188 subjectively   

主观地； 臆

参考例句：

• Subjectively, the demand of interest is the desire of human being. 荀子所说的对利的需要从主观上说就是人的欲望。
• A sound also has an amplitude, a property subjectively heard as loudness. 声音有振幅，振幅的主观感觉是声音的大小。

189 unintelligible   

adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的

参考例句：

• If a computer is given unintelligible data, it returns unintelligible results.如果计算机得到的是难以理解的数据，它给出的也将是难以理解的结果。
• The terms were unintelligible to ordinary folk.这些术语一般人是不懂的。

190 primitively   

最初地，自学而成地

参考例句：

• Result: The histological structure of anencephalus differentiates primitively and grows very slowly. 结果：无脑儿食管的组织学结构较正常胎儿分化较低，发育迟缓。
• Another primitively for horse's hoof Dutch. 另一个原始属为马蹄荷属。

191 primitive   

adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物

参考例句：

• It is a primitive instinct to flee a place of danger.逃离危险的地方是一种原始本能。
• His book describes the march of the civilization of a primitive society.他的著作描述了一个原始社会的开化过程。

192 longitude   

n.经线，经度

参考例句：

• The city is at longitude 21°east.这个城市位于东经21度。
• He noted the latitude and longitude,then made a mark on the admiralty chart.他记下纬度和经度，然后在航海图上做了个标记。

193 latitude   

n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区

参考例句：

• The latitude of the island is 20 degrees south.该岛的纬度是南纬20度。
• The two cities are at approximately the same latitude.这两个城市差不多位于同一纬度上。

194 aggregate   

adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合

参考例句：

• The football team had a low goal aggregate last season.这支足球队上个赛季的进球总数很少。
• The money collected will aggregate a thousand dollars.进帐总额将达一千美元。

195 cataract   

n.大瀑布，奔流，洪水，白内障

参考例句：

• He is an elderly gentleman who had had a cataract operation.他是一位曾经动过白内障手术的老人。
• The way is blocked by the tall cataract.高悬的大瀑布挡住了去路。

196 surgical   

adj.外科的，外科医生的，手术上的

参考例句：

• He performs the surgical operations at the Red Cross Hospital.他在红十字会医院做外科手术。
• All surgical instruments must be sterilised before use.所有的外科手术器械在使用之前，必须消毒。

197 tactile   

adj.触觉的，有触觉的，能触知的

参考例句：

• Norris is an expert in the tactile and the tangible.诺里斯创作最精到之处便是，他描绘的人物使人看得见摸得着。
• Tactile communication uses touch rather than sight or hearing.触觉交流，是用触摸感觉，而不是用看或听来感觉。

198 ambiguity   

n.模棱两可；意义不明确

参考例句：

• The telegram was misunderstood because of its ambiguity.由于电文意义不明确而造成了误解。
• Her answer was above all ambiguity.她的回答毫不含糊。

199 shaft   

n.(工具的)柄，杆状物

参考例句：

• He was wounded by a shaft.他被箭击中受伤。
• This is the shaft of a steam engine.这是一个蒸汽机主轴。

200 appendages   

n.附属物( appendage的名词复数 )；依附的人；附属器官；附属肢体（如臂、腿、尾等）

参考例句：

• The 11th segment carries a pair of segmented appendages, the cerci. 第十一节有一对分节的附肢，即尾须。 来自辞典例句
• Paired appendages, with one on each side of the body, are common in many animals. 很多动物身上有成对的附肢，一侧一个，这是很普遍的现象。 来自辞典例句

201 spatially   

空间地，存在于空间地

参考例句：

• A well-defined array of stable fringes results and the field is spatially coherent. 结果得到一组完全确定的稳定条纹，而光场是空间相干的。
• The units are collaged together by a serial tectonic spatially and temporally. 这些构造单元是由构造原因，依一定的时空序列拼贴在一起的。

202 cane   

n.手杖，细长的茎，藤条；v.以杖击，以藤编制的

参考例句：

• This sugar cane is quite a sweet and juicy.这甘蔗既甜又多汁。
• English schoolmasters used to cane the boys as a punishment.英国小学老师过去常用教鞭打男学生作为惩罚。

203 plunges   

n.跳进，投入vt.使投入，使插入，使陷入vi.投入，跳进，陷入v.颠簸( plunge的第三人称单数 )；暴跌；骤降；突降

参考例句：

• Even before he plunges into his program, he has his audience in his pocket. 他的节目甚至还没有出场，就已控制住了观众。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• 'Monseigneur, he precipitated himself over the hill-side, head first, as a person plunges into the river.' “大人，他头冲下跳下山坡去了，像往河里跳一样。” 来自英汉文学 - 双城记

204 joint   

adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合

参考例句：

• I had a bad fall,which put my shoulder out of joint.我重重地摔了一跤，肩膀脫臼了。
• We wrote a letter in joint names.我们联名写了封信。

205 joints   

接头( joint的名词复数 )； 关节； 公共场所（尤指价格低廉的饮食和娱乐场所） （非正式）； 一块烤肉 （英式英语）

参考例句：

• Expansion joints of various kinds are fitted on gas mains. 各种各样的伸缩接头被安装在煤气的总管道上了。
• Expansion joints of various kinds are fitted on steam pipes. 各种各样的伸缩接头被安装在蒸气管道上了。

206 physically   

adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律

参考例句：

• He was out of sorts physically,as well as disordered mentally.他浑身不舒服，心绪也很乱。
• Every time I think about it I feel physically sick.一想起那件事我就感到极恶心。

207 vaguely   

adv.含糊地，暖昧地

参考例句：

• He had talked vaguely of going to work abroad.他含糊其词地说了到国外工作的事。
• He looked vaguely before him with unseeing eyes.他迷迷糊糊的望着前面，对一切都视而不见。

208 stump   

n.残株，烟蒂，讲演台；v.砍断，蹒跚而走

参考例句：

• He went on the stump in his home state.他到故乡所在的州去发表演说。
• He used the stump as a table.他把树桩用作桌子。

209 phantom   

n.幻影，虚位，幽灵；adj.错觉的，幻影的，幽灵的

参考例句：

• I found myself staring at her as if she were a phantom.我发现自己瞪大眼睛看着她，好像她是一个幽灵。
• He is only a phantom of a king.他只是有名无实的国王。

210 conjured   

用魔术变出( conjure的过去式和过去分词 )； 祈求，恳求； 变戏法； （变魔术般地） 使…出现

参考例句：

• He conjured them with his dying breath to look after his children. 他临终时恳求他们照顾他的孩子。
• His very funny joke soon conjured my anger away. 他讲了个十分有趣的笑话，使得我的怒气顿消。

211 extremity   

n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度

参考例句：

• I hope you will help them in their extremity.我希望你能帮助在穷途末路的他们。
• What shall we do in this extremity?在这种极其困难的情况下我们该怎么办呢？

212 weir   

n.堰堤，拦河坝

参考例句：

• The discharge from the weir opening should be free.从堰开口处的泻水应畅通。
• Big Weir River,restraining tears,has departed!大堰河，含泪地去了！

213 discomfort   

n.不舒服，不安，难过，困难，不方便

参考例句：

• One has to bear a little discomfort while travelling.旅行中总要忍受一点不便。
• She turned red with discomfort when the teacher spoke.老师讲话时她不好意思地红着脸。

214 delusion   

n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑

参考例句：

• He is under the delusion that he is Napoleon.他患了妄想症，认为自己是拿破仑。
• I was under the delusion that he intended to marry me.我误认为他要娶我。

215 inaccurate   

adj.错误的，不正确的，不准确的

参考例句：

• The book is both inaccurate and exaggerated.这本书不但不准确，而且夸大其词。
• She never knows the right time because her watch is inaccurate.她从来不知道准确的时间因为她的表不准。

216 touching   

adj.动人的，使人感伤的

参考例句：

• It was a touching sight.这是一幅动人的景象。
• His letter was touching.他的信很感人。

217 diffuse   

v.扩散；传播；adj.冗长的；四散的，弥漫的

参考例句：

• Direct light is better for reading than diffuse light.直射光比漫射光更有利于阅读。
• His talk was so diffuse that I missed his point.他的谈话漫无边际，我抓不住他的要点。

218 peculiar   

adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的

参考例句：

• He walks in a peculiar fashion.他走路的样子很奇特。
• He looked at me with a very peculiar expression.他用一种很奇怪的表情看着我。

219 vacillation   

n.动摇；忧柔寡断

参考例句：

• Vacillation is the cause of his failure.优柔寡断是他失败的原因。
• His constant vacillation made him an unfit administrator.他经常优柔寡断，这使他不适合当行政官员。

220 uncertainty   

n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物

参考例句：

• Her comments will add to the uncertainty of the situation.她的批评将会使局势更加不稳定。
• After six weeks of uncertainty,the strain was beginning to take its toll.6个星期的忐忑不安后，压力开始产生影响了。

221 possessed   

adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的

参考例句：

• He flew out of the room like a man possessed.他像着了魔似地猛然冲出房门。
• He behaved like someone possessed.他行为举止像是魔怔了。

222 analyze   

vt.分析，解析 (=analyse)

参考例句：

• We should analyze the cause and effect of this event.我们应该分析这场事变的因果。
• The teacher tried to analyze the cause of our failure.老师设法分析我们失败的原因。

223 exteriority   

n.在外，外在性

参考例句：

224 aroma   

n.香气，芬芳，芳香

参考例句：

• The whole house was filled with the aroma of coffee.满屋子都是咖啡的香味。
• The air was heavy with the aroma of the paddy fields.稻花飘香。

225 decomposed   

已分解的，已腐烂的

参考例句：

• A liquid is decomposed when an electric current passes through it. 当电流通过时，液体就分解。
• Water can be resolved [decomposed] into hydrogen and oxygen. 水可分解为氢和氧。

226 compendium   

n.简要，概略

参考例句：

• The Compendium of Materia Medica has been held in high esteem since it was first published.“本草纲目”问世之后，深受人们的推重。
• The book is a compendium of their poetry,religion and philosophy.这本书是他们诗歌、宗教和哲学的概略。

227 ethics   

n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准

参考例句：

• The ethics of his profession don't permit him to do that.他的职业道德不允许他那样做。
• Personal ethics and professional ethics sometimes conflict.个人道德和职业道德有时会相互抵触。

228 physiologically   

ad.生理上，在生理学上

参考例句：

• Therefore, the liver and gallbladder cannot be completely separated physiologically and pathologically. 因此，肝胆在生理和病理上不能完全分离。
• Therefore, the liver and gallbladder are closely related physiologically and pathologically. 因此，肝胆在生理和病理上紧密联系。

229 sensory   

adj.知觉的，感觉的，知觉器官的

参考例句：

• Human powers of sensory discrimination are limited.人类感官分辨能力有限。
• The sensory system may undergo long-term adaptation in alien environments.感觉系统对陌生的环境可能经过长时期才能适应。

230 wane   

n.衰微，亏缺，变弱；v.变小，亏缺，呈下弦

参考例句：

• The moon is on the wane.月亮渐亏。
• Her enthusiasm for him was beginning to wane.她对他的热情在开始减退。

231 preponderates   

v.超过，胜过( preponderate的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• This reason preponderates over all others. 这个理由较所有其他理由重要。 来自辞典例句

232 gratuitous   

adj.无偿的，免费的；无缘无故的，不必要的

参考例句：

• His criticism is quite gratuitous.他的批评完全没有根据。
• There's too much crime and gratuitous violence on TV.电视里充斥着犯罪和无端的暴力。

233 scarlet   

n.深红色，绯红色，红衣；adj.绯红色的

参考例句：

• The scarlet leaves of the maples contrast well with the dark green of the pines.深红的枫叶和暗绿的松树形成了明显的对比。
• The glowing clouds are growing slowly pale,scarlet,bright red,and then light red.天空的霞光渐渐地淡下去了，深红的颜色变成了绯红，绯红又变为浅红。

234 isles   

岛( isle的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• the geology of the British Isles 不列颠群岛的地质
• The boat left for the isles. 小船驶向那些小岛。

235 tributaries   

n. 支流

参考例句：

• In such areas small tributaries or gullies will not show. 在这些地区，小的支流和冲沟显示不出来。
• These tributaries are subsequent streams which erode strike valley. 这些支流系即为蚀出走向谷的次生河。

236 components   

（机器、设备等的）构成要素，零件，成分； 成分( component的名词复数 )； [物理化学]组分； [数学]分量； （混合物的）组成部分

参考例句：

• the components of a machine 机器部件
• Our chemistry teacher often reduces a compound to its components in lab. 在实验室中化学老师常把化合物分解为各种成分。

237 differentiation   

n.区别，区分

参考例句：

• There can be no differentiation without contrast. 有比较才有差别。
• The operation that is the inverse of differentiation is called integration. 与微分相反的运算叫做积分。

238 abound   

vi.大量存在；(in，with)充满，富于

参考例句：

• Oranges abound here all the year round.这里一年到头都有很多橙子。
• But problems abound in the management of State-owned companies.但是在国有企业的管理中仍然存在不少问题。

239 obtruded   

v.强行向前，强行，强迫( obtrude的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• Music from the next room obtruded upon his thoughts. 隔壁的音乐声打扰了他的思绪。
• Not a leaf stirred; not a sound obtruded upon great Nature's meditation. 树叶儿一动也不动，没有任何声音打扰大自然的酣眠。 来自英汉文学 - 汤姆历险

240 penetrate   

v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解

参考例句：

• Western ideas penetrate slowly through the East.西方观念逐渐传入东方。
• The sunshine could not penetrate where the trees were thickest.阳光不能透入树木最浓密的地方。

241 prostrate   

v.拜倒，平卧，衰竭；adj.拜倒的，平卧的，衰竭的

参考例句：

• She was prostrate on the floor.她俯卧在地板上。
• The Yankees had the South prostrate and they intended to keep It'so.北方佬已经使南方屈服了,他们还打算继续下去。

242 drowsy   

adj.昏昏欲睡的，令人发困的

参考例句：

• Exhaust fumes made him drowsy and brought on a headache.废气把他熏得昏昏沉沉，还引起了头疼。
• I feel drowsy after lunch every day.每天午饭后我就想睡觉。

243 somnolent   

adj.想睡的，催眠的；adv.瞌睡地；昏昏欲睡地；使人瞌睡地

参考例句：

• The noise of the stream had a pleasantly somnolent effect.小河潺潺的流水声有宜人的催眠效果。
• The sedative makes people very somnolent.这种镇静剂会让人瞌睡。

244 turbid   

adj.混浊的，泥水的，浓的

参考例句：

• He found himself content to watch idly the sluggish flow of the turbid stream.他心安理得地懒洋洋地望着混浊的河水缓缓流着。
• The lake's water is turbid.这个湖里的水混浊。

245 encumbered   

v.妨碍，阻碍，拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• The police operation was encumbered by crowds of reporters. 警方的行动被成群的记者所妨碍。
• The narrow quay was encumbered by hundreds of carts. 狭窄的码头被数百辆手推车堵得水泄不通。 来自辞典例句

246 serene   

adj. 安详的，宁静的，平静的

参考例句：

• He has entered the serene autumn of his life.他已进入了美好的中年时期。
• He didn't speak much,he just smiled with that serene smile of his.他话不多，只是脸上露出他招牌式的淡定的微笑。

247 treatise   

n.专著；(专题)论文

参考例句：

• The doctor wrote a treatise on alcoholism.那位医生写了一篇关于酗酒问题的论文。
• This is not a treatise on statistical theory.这不是一篇有关统计理论的论文。

248 phantoms   

n.鬼怪，幽灵( phantom的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• They vanished down the stairs like two phantoms. 他们像两个幽灵似的消失在了楼下。 来自辞典例句
• The horrible night that he had passed had left phantoms behind it. 他刚才度过的恐布之夜留下了种种错觉。 来自辞典例句

249 prudently   

adv. 谨慎地，慎重地

参考例句：

• He prudently pursued his plan. 他谨慎地实行他那计划。
• They had prudently withdrawn as soon as the van had got fairly under way. 他们在蓬车安全上路后立即谨慎地离去了。

250 strenuously   

adv.奋发地，费力地

参考例句：

• The company has strenuously defended its decision to reduce the workforce. 公司竭力为其裁员的决定辩护。
• She denied the accusation with some warmth, ie strenuously, forcefully. 她有些激动，竭力否认这一指责。

251 incessant   

adj.不停的，连续的

参考例句：

• We have had incessant snowfall since yesterday afternoon.从昨天下午开始就持续不断地下雪。
• She is tired of his incessant demands for affection.她厌倦了他对感情的不断索取。

252 utterances   

n.发声( utterance的名词复数 )；说话方式；语调；言论

参考例句：

• John Maynard Keynes used somewhat gnomic utterances in his General Theory. 约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯在其《通论》中用了许多精辟言辞。 来自辞典例句
• Elsewhere, particularly in his more public utterances, Hawthorne speaks very differently. 在别的地方，特别是在比较公开的谈话里，霍桑讲的话则完全不同。 来自辞典例句

253 determined   

adj.坚定的；有决心的

参考例句：

• I have determined on going to Tibet after graduation.我已决定毕业后去西藏。
• He determined to view the rooms behind the office.他决定查看一下办公室后面的房间。

254 constituent   

n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的

参考例句：

• Sugar is the main constituent of candy.食糖是糖果的主要成分。
• Fibre is a natural constituent of a healthy diet.纤维是健康饮食的天然组成部分。

255 cosmos   

n.宇宙；秩序，和谐

参考例句：

• Our world is but a small part of the cosmos.我们的世界仅仅是宇宙的一小部分而已。
• Is there any other intelligent life elsewhere in the cosmos?在宇宙的其他星球上还存在别的有智慧的生物吗？

256 analogues   

相似物( analogue的名词复数 )； 类似物； 类比； 同源词

参考例句：

• A vegetarian gets protein not from meat but from its analogues. 素食者所摄取的蛋白质不是来自肉类而是来自近似肉类的食物。
• Moreover, it tends to foster the human qualities that I admire most-courage and its analogues. 不但如此，它还能培养我最景仰的那些德性-勇敢和诸如此类的东西。

257 preyer   

猛兽，猛禽

参考例句：

258 vice   

n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的

参考例句：

• He guarded himself against vice.他避免染上坏习惯。
• They are sunk in the depth of vice.他们堕入了罪恶的深渊。

259 stimulated   

a.刺激的

参考例句：

• The exhibition has stimulated interest in her work. 展览增进了人们对她作品的兴趣。
• The award has stimulated her into working still harder. 奖金促使她更加努力地工作。

260 inanity   

n.无意义，无聊

参考例句：

• Their statement was a downright inanity.他们的声明是彻头彻尾的废话。
• I laugh all alone at my complete inanity.十分无聊时，我就独自大笑。

261 invoked   

v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求

参考例句：

• It is unlikely that libel laws will be invoked. 不大可能诉诸诽谤法。
• She had invoked the law in her own defence. 她援引法律为自己辩护。 来自《简明英汉词典》

262 avowed   

adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词)

参考例句：

• An aide avowed that the President had known nothing of the deals. 一位助理声明，总统对这些交易一无所知。
• The party's avowed aim was to struggle against capitalist exploitation. 该党公开宣称的宗旨是与资本主义剥削斗争。 来自《简明英汉词典》

263 concealed   

a.隐藏的，隐蔽的

参考例句：

• The paintings were concealed beneath a thick layer of plaster. 那些画被隐藏在厚厚的灰泥层下面。
• I think he had a gun concealed about his person. 我认为他当时身上藏有一支枪。

264 peculiarity   

n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖

参考例句：

• Each country has its own peculiarity.每个国家都有自己的独特之处。
• The peculiarity of this shop is its day and nigth service.这家商店的特点是昼夜服务。

265 acoustic   

adj.听觉的，声音的；(乐器)原声的

参考例句：

• The hall has a fine acoustic.这个大厅的传音效果很好。
• Animals use a whole rang of acoustic, visual,and chemical signals in their systems of communication.动物利用各种各样的听觉、视觉和化学信号来进行交流。

266 chamber   

n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所

参考例句：

• For many,the dentist's surgery remains a torture chamber.对许多人来说，牙医的治疗室一直是间受刑室。
• The chamber was ablaze with light.会议厅里灯火辉煌。

267 recess   

n.短期休息，壁凹（墙上装架子，柜子等凹处）

参考例句：

• The chairman of the meeting announced a ten-minute recess.会议主席宣布休会10分钟。
• Parliament was hastily recalled from recess.休会的议员被匆匆召回开会。

268 alienated   

adj.感到孤独的，不合群的v.使疏远( alienate的过去式和过去分词 )；使不友好；转让；让渡（财产等）

参考例句：

• His comments have alienated a lot of young voters. 他的言论使许多年轻选民离他而去。
• The Prime Minister's policy alienated many of her followers. 首相的政策使很多拥护她的人疏远了她。 来自《简明英汉词典》

269 undone   

a.未做完的，未完成的

参考例句：

• He left nothing undone that needed attention.所有需要注意的事他都注意到了。

270 tingling   

v.有刺痛感( tingle的现在分词 )

参考例句：

• My ears are tingling [humming; ringing; singing]. 我耳鸣。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• My tongue is tingling. 舌头发麻。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

271 allots   

分配，拨给，摊派( allot的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• My days are as happy as those God allots to his saints. 我的日子过得像上帝分配给圣徒的一样快乐。
• In this paper, a combination method that allots multi-objective weights is proposed. 多目标评价中的一个重要因素是考虑目标权系数的选取。

272 datum   

n.资料；数据；已知数

参考例句：

• The author has taught foreigners Chinese manyand gathered rich language and datum.作者长期从事对外汉语教学，积累了丰富的语言资料。
• Every theory,datum,or fact is generated by purpose.任何理论，资料、事实都来自于一定的目的。

273 reverts   

恢复( revert的第三人称单数 )； 重提； 回到…上； 归还

参考例句：

• The mind reverts to the earliest days of colonial history. 我们回想到早期的殖民地历史。
• Macau reverts to Chinese sovereignty at midnight on December19. 澳门主权于十二月十九日零时回归中国。

274 enumerates   

v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• Enumerates the transaction options when sending or receiving a message. 发送或接收消息时，枚举事务处理选项。 来自互联网
• Ming as Researcher enumerates research projects conducted and those in progress. [潘氏研究]举曾经进行﹐及现在进行的研究计划。 来自互联网

275 accomplished   

adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的

参考例句：

• Thanks to your help,we accomplished the task ahead of schedule.亏得你们帮忙,我们才提前完成了任务。
• Removal of excess heat is accomplished by means of a radiator.通过散热器完成多余热量的排出。

276 bibliography   

n.参考书目；(有关某一专题的)书目

参考例句：

• There is a useful bibliography at the end of each chapter.在每一章后附有一份有用的参考书目。
• The production of this bibliography is totally automated.这个目录的编制过程全是自动化的。

277 amputation   

n.截肢

参考例句：

• In ancient India,adultery was punished by amputation of the nose.在古代印度，通奸要受到剖鼻的处罚。
• He lived only hours after the amputation.截肢后，他只活了几个小时。

278 riddle   

n.谜，谜语，粗筛；vt.解谜，给…出谜，筛，检查，鉴定，非难，充满于；vi.出谜

参考例句：

• The riddle couldn't be solved by the child.这个谜语孩子猜不出来。
• Her disappearance is a complete riddle.她的失踪完全是一个谜。

279 naively   

adv. 天真地

参考例句：

• They naively assume things can only get better. 他们天真地以为情况只会变好。
• In short, Knox's proposal was ill conceived and naively made. 总而言之，诺克斯的建议考虑不周，显示幼稚。

280 justification   

n.正当的理由；辩解的理由

参考例句：

• There's no justification for dividing the company into smaller units. 没有理由把公司划分成小单位。
• In the young there is a justification for this feeling. 在年轻人中有这种感觉是有理由的。

281 systematic   

adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的

参考例句：

• The way he works isn't very systematic.他的工作不是很有条理。
• The teacher made a systematic work of teaching.这个教师进行系统的教学工作。

282 corroboration   

n.进一步的证实，进一步的证据

参考例句：

• Without corroboration from forensic tests,it will be difficult to prove that the suspect is guilty. 没有法医化验的确证就很难证明嫌疑犯有罪。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Definitely more independent corroboration is necessary. 有必要更明确地进一步证实。 来自辞典例句

283 ascertained   

v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• The previously unidentified objects have now been definitely ascertained as being satellites. 原来所说的不明飞行物现在已证实是卫星。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• I ascertained that she was dead. 我断定她已经死了。 来自《简明英汉词典》

284 statistical   

adj.统计的，统计学的

参考例句：

• He showed the price fluctuations in a statistical table.他用统计表显示价格的波动。
• They're making detailed statistical analysis.他们正在做具体的统计分析。

285 inquiry   

n.打听，询问，调查，查问

参考例句：

• Many parents have been pressing for an inquiry into the problem.许多家长迫切要求调查这个问题。
• The field of inquiry has narrowed down to five persons.调查的范围已经缩小到只剩5个人了。

286 outgrown   

长[发展] 得超过（某物）的范围( outgrow的过去分词 )； 长[发展]得不能再要（某物）； 长得比…快； 生长速度超过

参考例句：

• She's already outgrown her school uniform. 她已经长得连校服都不能穿了。
• The boy has outgrown his clothes. 这男孩已长得穿不下他的衣服了。