I NOW turn to consider the contribution of a temper and a doctrine1, very different both from the saint's and from the sceptic's.
The genuine revolutionary lives wholly for the revolution, as the genuine saint lives wholly for his God. Like the saint, the sincere revolutionary is inspired by generous feeling for his fellow men. He is possessed2, obsessed3, by the spirit of comradeship, in fact by what Christians5 claim to be the truly Christian4 spirit, the spirit of active love. To regard the revolutionary as possessed by hate, as many affect to do, is to miss the truth completely. Can there ever have been a more contemptible6 spectacle in the sordid7 history of human affairs than the concerted effort of a wealthy and parasitic8 class to discredit9 the revolutionaries by misrepresenting their righteous indignation as mere10 hate and envy? By their fruits ye shall know them. The fruits of the revolutionary are life-long courageous11 efforts to defend the oppressed.
I have mainly in mind the sincere kind of Marxian revolutionary, because he is the effective champion of revolution in our day. But much that I shall say about the behaviour, as distinct from the theories, of revolutionaries applies to any kind of genuine revolutionary, whether Marxian or Anarchist12 or what not. Even among professed13 advocates of Fascism there are almost certainly many whom I should regard as genuine though terribly misguided revolutionaries. Much that I shall say is true of them also.
The word genuine, of course, is necessary. The sham15 revolutionary is often a very plausible16 imitation. It is worth noting that there are two kinds of sham revolutionaries. First, there are some, certainly, in whom the ruling motive17 is no longer (if it ever was) love or comradeship but simply envy and hate. These glory in hate, and thereby18 do much harm to the cause. In this they are similar to some sham saints who are more concerned for the damnation of sinners than for the salvation19 of the elect. Hate can be a disinterested20 passion, in the sense that a man can sacrifice everything, even his life, for sheer hate. It follows that hate can also be a prodigious21 source of energy. Some sincere revolutionaries therefore deliberately22 cultivate it in themselves and others. I believe that this is a short-sighted policy, for in the long run hate poisons the spirit of the individual and of the revolution.
The other kind of sham revolutionary is much the commoner kind. These are the self-seekers, conscious or unconscious, who masquerade as revolutionaries, hoping to secure private advancement25 or prestige by an appearance of revolutionary zeal26. The sham revolutionary of this commoner kind tries to give the impression that he is living wholly for the revolution while he is in fact assiduously avoiding all serious risks. Most of these people do, no doubt, want a revolution, or at least they think they do; but they do not want it whole-heartedly. Some do not really want it at all. They merely want to make profit out of the idea of it, either by talking impressively about it, or by gaining power and prestige through the control of some revolutionary organization, or by actually drawing pay from revolutionary funds. In the sham revolutionary of this type, self-interest and self-respect feed upon the possibility of an ever-unfulfilled revolution. Naturally he is reluctant to set in motion any great change which might destroy his comfortable position. In fact he is a conservative in revolutionary clothing. The genuine revolutionary not only desires the revolution more than anything else; conscious that he would sacrifice himself for it, he is ready to sacrifice others if they stand in the way. The sham revolutionary, on the other hand, though he will sacrifice others, will not when it comes to the point sacrifice himself. Both the genuine revolutionary and the genuine saint habitually27 and heroically transcend28 the urge of self-regard; their shams29 do not.
But between the genuine saint and the genuine revolutionary there is a great gulf30, which appears! not only in their professions but in their behaviour. The saint is chiefly concerned with individuals and their personal relations with one another. The revolutionary is interested in groups and their mutual31 repercussions32.
This statement may perhaps seem untrue. The saint himself, of course, is concerned not only with the individual but with masses of individuals. And the revolutionary, the genuine revolutionary, is in a sense concerned primarily not with abstract groups or classes but with the well-being33 of the individuals that compose them. His controlling motive is a passionate34 will to relieve hosts of individuals from tyranny and frustration35. It is because he so vividly36 realizes this tyranny, and the day-by-day frustration of John Smith and Joan Brown, that he devotes himself to revolution.
All the same, it is true and important that, while the saint's main interest is in individuals, the revolutionary's is in groups. For the texture37 of the saint's behaviour is made up largely of acts directed toward the strengthening of individuality in particular individuals, while the revolutionary's behaviour is mainly composed of acts directed toward strengthening group-consciousness in masses of individuals, or toward controlling in one manner or another the thought and action of groups. In fact the saint is more interested in, individuality and the revolutionary in sociality.
This preponderant interest in sociality sometimes leads revolutionaries to disparage38 individuality and hypostatize society. They realize vividly that the individual mind is an expression of its social environment. And in spite of their fundamental concern for the individual's fulfilment they tend to subordinate him to the large pattern of social relationships. And though their source of inspiration is the will to free the oppressed individual, they seek meanwhile to discipline him for the revolution. The Party members regard themselves as consecrated39 to the task of spreading a gospel not only of service but of self-abnegation, and moreover of obedience40 to revolutionary authority. They insist that the individual cannot fulfil himself save as an instrument of society, or a channel for social forces. Idiosyncrasy and eccentricity41 they tend to condemn42. Its expression in culture they are apt to regard as mere "escapism."
In times of desperate social crisis this attitude may be justified43. But the fact that revolutionaries incline emotionally in this direction makes it likely that they will too readily conform to revolutionary orthodoxy, and too readily insist on conformity44 in others.
The genuine saint is not in danger of succumbing45 to herd-mindedness, or of imposing46 herd-mindedness on others. He is too self-conscious either to desire to bay with the pack or to seek to be the mouthpiece and leader of the pack. The saint, of course, regards community as the supreme47 human value; but the community that he applauds is essentially48 a community of self-aware and other-aware individuals. His particular danger, avoided, of course, by the best of his kind, is not herd-mindedness but a kind of individualism, not selfish individualism, but the individualism which inclines to over-estimate the worth of private moral intuitions. With the revolutionary the reverse is the case. He is impressed by social forces and mass movements of opinion. He distrusts private intuitions and all eccentricity. He has an admirably clear consciousness of the form of existing society, and of its rottenness compared with the society that he desires; but in comparison with the saint he seems to be only superficially self-conscious, and therefore only superficially other-conscious. He may, of course, be intensely, but is not penetratingly conscious of himself; and consequently he cannot be penetratingly conscious of others.
This statement may seem unjustified. The revolutionary, I may be told, is more, not less, penetratingly self-conscious than the saint; since he is more clearly aware of the way in which motives49 are determined50 by unconscious influences, such as the pressure of the economic environment. The saint, according to the revolutionary, is the supreme self-deceiver.
This view is surely mistaken. The revolutionary has, of course, a certain kind of knowledge of himself. He has the normal acquaintance with himself as needing food, success, comradeship, and so on. But beyond this his knowledge of himself is a scientific, abstract, theoretical, indirect kind of knowledge. It is not derived51 from meticulous52 self-scrutiny, as the saint's is, but from scientific and sociological theories.
In saying this I do not intend to condemn scientific knowledge. Physiology53, psychology54, anthropology55, sociology have an important part to play in clarifying self-knowledge. But they are only aids. Self-knowledge must be founded on minute observation of one's actual experience and motives.
Nor do I intend to condemn the revolutionary. It is no more his function to be deeply conscious of individuality than it is the function of the saint to be an effective politician. Each of them, of course, if he is to be true to his own calling, must to some extent share in the others' special aptitude56. The saint must think socially. The revolutionary, on his side, must at least have intense consciousness of certain important but simple aspects of individuality which in the less fortunate classes are grossly frustrated58.
Moreover there is, of course, an important identity in the emotional experience of the saint and the revolutionary. Both feel warmly toward the average individual. Not princes, politicians, intellectuals, great ecclesiastics60, or great revolutionary leaders do they cherish, but Everyman.
This democratic feeling may be combined, in both saints and revolutionaries, with an aristocratic sense that some individuals are much more developed, more awakened62, than others, and more valuable to society. Some, indeed, rise much further than others beyond the merely animal mentality63. They are capable of much more precise, subtle and comprehensive awareness64, and of much more integrated conduct. But this recognition of the different natural ranks of men is always subordinate. It is a sense of the differences of attainment66 of the members of one family. Always there is a tacit assumption that even the weakest of the brethren or of the comrades is potentially equal to the leader, the eldest68 brother.
In the pure aristocrat61, on the other hand, whether the social or the intellectual aristocrat, the sense of difference is such that average individuals are regarded as an inferior species. Saints and revolutionaries both reject this cult23 of the superior person, and find in the experience of common men and women, united in practical comradeship, the great source of inspiration and enlightenment. In their view the life of aristocrats69, social or intellectual, is artificial and false. Divorced from the community life of the masses, it develops an exaggerated cult of refinement70 and of the separate individual. For my part, though I see little value in a social aristocracy, I am convinced that an intellectual, or rather cultural, aristocracy is necessary for the healthy life of a society; but its members must regard themselves as specialists in a particular form of social service, not as superior persons.
Though saints and revolutionaries agree in rejecting the aristocratic view, beyond this point their convictions diverge71. The saint must specialize in consciousness of individuality-in-community, and the technique of raising individuality to a higher calibre in himself and others. The revolutionary's source of inspiration and strength is his simpler but no less passionately72 generous awareness of the frustration of individuality in the masses. This awareness he has to use as a source of energy for a life devoted73 to changing the social order.
There may be, there probably are, times in the history of a community when nothing whatever should be allowed to stand in the way of revolution. There may be other times when nothing is more important than a direct improving of personal relationship. To-day the need for revolution and the need for better personal relationship are complementary, and must be pursued together. To-day we cannot be saved by saints alone, nor by revolutionaries alone. Saints and revolutionaries must co-operate. Also they must acquire something of one another's nature. Saints must to some extent become revolutionaries, and revolutionaries saints.
When I was considering saints, I said that the true saint's absolute moral principle was respect for individuality and right personal relationship. Kindliness74 and trustworthiness are for him the supreme virtues75. It would be untrue to say that the saint will never, and the revolutionary will sometimes, desert this principle. No doubt many true saints may sometimes in emergency use or countenance77 violence. No doubt also they may sometimes deceive, namely when they see no other way of preventing greater evil. But the saint, even if his devotion to non-violence and to truthfulness78 is not absolute, uses violence and deceit only in the most desperate emergency, and with an agony of horror and shame; whereas the revolutionary can use them with equanimity79. If it seems to him that violence or deceit is necessary for the advancement of the cause, he will use it without hesitation80, sometimes even with relish81.
Both revolutionary and saint can be fired with righteous indignation. But whereas the revolutionary hates the enemies of the revolution, and may even glory in doing so, the saint strives never to hate human beings, and regards hate as the very spirit of evil. The saint's danger is that he may allow great harm to be done to one set of individuals because of his overwhelming revulsion from using violence or deceit against another set. The revolutionary's danger is that through lack of this extreme repugnance82 he may sometimes practise or applaud violence or deceit in order to gain immediate83 advantage for the cause, when as a matter of fact this advantage is outweighed84 by a greater hurt in the future, namely damage to the tradition of kindliness and reasonableness.
So far as mere private interest is concerned the true revolutionary, of course, will never use violence or deceit, for he knows very well that these practices are socially harmful. But in the view of the typical sincere revolutionary an occasional act of violence or of deceit is abundantly justified if it is needed for helping85 the cause in a tight place. Information damaging to the cause must be suppressed. False information favourable86 to the cause may be propagated. Traitors87 must be shot. And of course the revolution itself may have to be achieved by fighting in the streets. Even torture, presumably, might in some circumstances seem to the revolutionary a necessary and therefore permissible88 means of serving the revolution. For, after all, many who can snap their fingers at death are cowed by torture.
Now even the condemnation89 of torture, I suggest, should be qualified90. There may, for all I know, be circumstances in which a man ought to be subjected to some degree of physical or mental pain "for his soul's good", or to save others from great disaster. I find it exceedingly difficult to imagine any such circumstances, but I recognize the abstract possibility that they may occur. The charge, however, against some revolutionaries is not that they refrain from an absolute condemnation of torture, but that sometimes they too readily condone91 brutality92 when it is committed for the revolution. The only adequate reply to Fascist94 ruthlessness, we are sometimes told, is ruthlessness for the revolution. This attitude suggests a dangerous coarseness of feeling. And, indeed, that the consciousness of some revolutionaries is in some important respects obtuse95 is evident from their startling failure to comprehend the pacifist's position.
In the matter of intellectual honesty also some revolutionaries are very unperceptive. The trouble is not merely that while insisting on free speech for revolutionaries they demand restrictions96 upon Fascist agitators97. It is at least arguable that in times of grave crisis those who advocate the overthrow98 of the State and vilify99 the community's most sacred values should be restrained. But it is disturbing that some revolutionaries seem as ready as their opponents to suppress or distort the truth for the sake of some quite trivial gain for the cause.
The revolutionary, in fact, since he is less self-conscious than the saint, is less vividly aware of what the saint would call the "spiritual" damage done by the use of violence and deceit. He does not so clearly realize that these are very dangerous drugs, perhaps necessary at times, but always seriously poisonous, and moreover habit-forming. Their harmfulness, the saint believes, is two-fold. In the man on whom they are used they produce distrust and hate. In the user they breed not only an addiction100 but guilty suspicion and a protective shell of callousness101. Further, rather perversely102, they produce hate against the maltreated individual.
The controlling emotional inclination104 of the saint is toward that aspect of human life which in our day is easily ridiculed105 with the label "spiritual uplift". That of the revolutionary is in the main toward "de-bunking". Naturally the one thing that the revolutionary does not want to de-bunk is revolution and the social ideal which he hopes to attain65 by revolution. These are for him just as sacred as righteousness for the saint. But the general texture of his behaviour is one of indefatigable106 de-bunking. He is out to expose the pretensions107 of the employers, of the politicians, including right-wing Labour politicians, of the churches, of Liberal Idealism, of capitalist democracy, of philosophy, of intellectual detachment, of "art for art's sake", of bourgeois108 culture in general.
The psychological roots of this passion for de-bunking are probably very complex. But whatever its causes in individual experience, the common source of iconoclasm in all revolutionaries is the sense of the prodigious injustice109 of contemporary human society, and of the discrepancy110 between the much advertized ideals and the shady achievements of our time. The Churches promised us eternal life if we would practise Christian love. They themselves did not practise as they preached. The Liberal idealists promised us the gradual evolution of a better society if only we would give capitalist individualism a fair chance. Injustice increases. Prosperity wanes111, and security too.
The craving112 to de-bunk is associated with the scientific mentality. The revolutionary is well disposed toward science, for this reason. But his temperament113 is very different from the completely sceptical disillusionment which triumphed after the war of 1914-1918. The genuine revolutionary's ruling passion is essentially a moral passion. Certain conditions of human affairs are in his view wrong. They ought not to be. We ought to get together to put them right. Though theoretically Marxists reject all universal ethical115 principles, in practice they exhort116 us to sacrifice ourselves in a cause which is at bottom the cause of justice and righteousness.
Without attempting to summarize the Marxian philosophy, I shall now very briefly117 discuss certain parts of it which seem to me relevant to the attempt to create a synthesis out of the temper of the saints, the sceptics and the revolutionaries.
From observation of the actual course of history the Marxist infers that the evolution of institutions and ideas is an expression of the impact of the environment on the economic motives of men; that is, on their need for security, food, comfort. These economic motives are not purely118 individualistic, since a man is concerned largely with the needs of his family. And besides economic needs, men have other motives. But according to the Marxian theory these other motives are much less powerful than the economic motives. Also they are so varied119 and individual that in relation to large social changes they cancel out and may be neglected.
In saying that history is "determined" in this way Marxists do not deny that it depends on spontaneous human choices. But human choices turn out to be in practice and in the long run very largely predictable. Men do in practice choose in such manners as to justify120 the theory of economic determinism. Whether they could in any sense behave otherwise is debatable, but in fact they do on the whole behave in this manner. Economic determinism is a true inductive law of the behaviour of masses of men. Being what they are, and wanting what in the main they do want, they cannot but behave in this manner.
The Marxist declares also that even those acts which are not simply expressions of economic motives are none the less very largely determined by economic influences. The desire for fame or power, for instance, must satisfy itself by taking economic factors into account. The economic structure of society determines the direction which the power-lover will pursue.
The Marxist does not deny that personal idiosyncrasies take effect on the course of events. He allows, too, that outstanding individuals may play an important part in history. But he claims that their power is merely to retard121 or side-track or advance the inevitable122 effect of massed economic motives. Outstanding individuals, he says, are most powerful when they are the conscious instruments of social evolution, when they see the direction of social growth, and use their abilities to further it.
Not only institutions but also ideas and valuations must be understood in terms of economic forces. The culture of a society is said to be due to the impact of economic, and particularly technological123, conditions on successive generations of individuals. The form of men's minds, or more correctly the form of their mental behaviour, is said to be determined by their economic environment. Thus the culture of ancient Greece is to be understood as an expression of the economic and technological conditions which produced it. These conditions stimulated124 and set a limit to the possible development of Greek culture in the minds of a property-owning and leisured class. Later on, chivalry125 was an expression of medieval technological development as it effected an owner-class whose power was military and its social structure hierarchical. Puritanism was a system of ideas and values generated in and appropriate to a rising bourgeois class whose power was based on economic individualism. Modern scientific culture could not have appeared till technological development had reached a certain level of complexity126 and power. Modern science was beyond the reach of feudalism, but within the reach of early industrialism. And now science has increased a thousand-fold man's technological power, which in turn has enabled science to advance beyond all expectation by means of immensely complicated and costly128 research and world-wide co-ordination. But to-day, says the Marxist, science is outrageously129 hobbled by the fact that research is directed mainly for private commercial profit. It should be single-mindedly used for the benefit of the community.
Since the dominant130 class of a society has far greater influence than any other class, a culture is to be understood mainly in terms of the economic conditions of the dominant class. Sometimes however the ideas and values of a subject-class may, through special circumstances, play an important part. For instance, during the disintegration131 of the Roman Empire and the birth of feudalism, Christianity, which was produced by the proletariat, was a very important influence in the new culture.
Normally, however, culture is in the main a product of the class which controls the productive forces, though it is not originated by the particular individuals who control those forces. The division of society into exploiters and exploited arose long ago when for the first time the technique of production advanced from the most primitive132 level so far as to enable some men to accumulate a surplus of wealth beyond that which was required for the bare needs of life. The Marxist summarizes the observed course of history since those days by saying that class after class has risen to power and in turn been overthrown133 by a class rising from beneath it. At any given stage of social development the ruling class is that which controls the economic structure of the society. So long as the structure is favourable to the full and free activity of the society's technique of production, the structure is stable. But technological development continues, and sooner or later the established social order becomes inadequate134. It fails to allow full scope to the increasing productive forces. The ruling class tries to maintain the old order against the rising power of a new productive class which has come into being as the wielders of the new productive forces. The strain increases, till at last the new class gains power, and founds a new social order and a new culture adapted to the mental needs of the new society.
Thus the movement of social change, according to the Marxist, is "dialectical". Fundamentally, and apart from complicating135 accidents, it is like the movement of thought from a "thesis" to an "antithesis136", and on to a "synthesis" which unites the truths of "thesis" and "antithesis" in a new conception. But the dialectic of society is a dialectic not primarily of ideas but .of objective conditions.
So long as a culture expresses and serves the trend of social development, it retains its vitality137 and flexibility138. But; when the economic system which generated it ceases to be adequate to the developing powers of the society, the established culture, which is the mental instrument of the established dominant class, begins to grow rigid139, formalistic, remote from the actual circumstances of the life of the society. Thus, when the old feudal127 aristocracy lost its power to the rising bourgeois class, medieval culture withered140. In the clash of the two classes there emerged a new society and a new culture. This new, bourgeois culture included, of course, much of the old culture, but it was moulded by the mental needs of the bourgeoisie. In its early days, when it stood for democracy against feudalism, it was vital and flexible. It founded science. It conceived the right of every individual to a full life, to education, to freedom of expression, to a voice in the government. These principles were convenient to a class fighting for power. When the bourgeoisie had obtained control, its ideals were largely accepted, at least in theory, by both political parties. And so long as capitalism141 was flourishing the ruling class could permit the workers to acquire a number of social benefits in the name of liberal idealism.
But in our day, when the capitalist system is insecure, and the power of the ruling class is everywhere threatened, our rulers are compelled by circumstances to belie24 their liberal principles. There is a tendency to reverse the process of social amelioration, and to tighten142 up social discipline. Moreover, says the Marxist, the bourgeoisie is faced with the unpleasant fact that in one great segment of the world, namely Russia, a new, non-capitalist order has been firmly established, By every method of propaganda and strong government, therefore, our rulers will seek to prevent the masses from going "bolshevik",
The plight143 of capitalism in our day is the supreme example of the way in which an outworn economic system frustrates144 and actually reverses the proper development of the productive forces, Our individualistic economic system depends on the mass-production of goods by machinery145 on an ever-increasing scale, and their sale in ever-expanding markets, But by restricting wages for the sake of profits it prevents an adequate rise of purchasing power among its own workers, To keep pace with increasing production it must rely on increasing foreign markets, To secure and regularize those markets, and prevent competitors from seizing them, it is forced into imperialistic146 annexation147 of territory.
By selling machinery to "backward" countries, and lending them money at interest, it gradually equips these countries to satisfy their own demand for goods, thus depriving itself of its own foreign markets, Not only so, but as industrialism spreads, rival industrial powers enter the competition for markets and empires. Wars between rival empires and would-be-empires become inevitable. Meanwhile with the failure of foreign markets the social structure of the highly industrialized countries is more and more strained. Wages fall. Unemployment increases. The standard of living declines. Social services are crippled. Discontent breeds disorder148, which has to be repressed with ever-increasing harshness.
The dominant class, nurtured149 in the old system, lacks both the imagination and the courage to conceive and execute the necessary heroic measures of social reconstruction150. And the established culture, once vital and fertile, degenerates152 into a system of rigid and out-worn mental habits. In particular its exponents153 tend either to hark back to the archaic154 values of the militant155 tribe and the heroic tribal156 leader or to indulge in sheer "escapism". Either they more or less frankly157 express the ideas which are suited to an increasingly militarized state, or they conceive seductive dreams to distract the mind from the distressing158 reality.
The present condition of the world may be summarized thus. By increasing the productive forces a thousandfold, modern science has immensely accelerated and intensified159 the process of social evolution. The discrepancy between the world's actual production and its potentiality of production is Unprecedented160. Further, owing to the vast increase in the means of communication, the world has become a single economic field. The dialectical process which formerly161 occurred in isolated162 societies is now being enacted163 on a worldwide scale.
According to the orthodox Marxist this distressing state of the world must lead, through ever-increasing economic disorder and ever more desperate capitalist wars, to social revolution in one state after another, Until the workers of the world have completely destroyed the capitalist class and inaugurated a dictatorship of the proletariat. This will be the prelude164 to a worldwide classless communistic society.
I believe that there is much truth in this account of the changes of institutions and ideas. How far the movement is strictly165 dialectical may be doubted. There is of course a loose sense in which it must be so. Every change may be regarded as due to the fact that an initial situation; had generated within itself a conflicting tendency, which subsequently produced a new synthesis. But the Marxian theory implies more than this. It claims that history necessarily moves in alternating phases of stability and crises. I have neither the knowledge nor the aptitude to judge this claim, and it is not relevant to my theme. I merely remark in passing that the dialectical principle, so long as it is not interpreted in a rigid, doctrinaire166 manner, does seem to cast light on certain movements of history. But there is a danger that devotion to the principle may lead to distortion of the facts of past social change and to rash prophesies167 about the future. For instance, it seems doubtful whether the world-revolution will occur precisely168 in the manner prophesied169 by Marxists. In the highly organized industrial state an orthodox proletarian revolution is becoming less and less possible. The change is more likely to come through the sheer rotting away and collapse170 of capitalism, and the re-organization of society under the guidance of the highly skilled technicians, stimulated, no doubt, by proletarian pressure; unless, of course, general war comes, and an epidemic171 of revolutions.
Human nature is a very much more complex and subtle thing than the Marxist supposes. Human history is much more chancy, and much more dependent on the idiosyncrasies of prominent individuals and the sentimentality of the masses. But although I cannot altogether trust the Marxist's prophecies, I recognize that he has seized upon one of the most important sociological principles. Indeed there is a broad sense in which economic determinism is the all-sufficient principle for the understanding of social and cultural change. All ideas spring directly or indirectly172 from the interaction of individual minds and their environment. Even if some ideas spring not from the economic aspect of experience but from some other aspect, such as the purely aesthetic173 or the abstractly intellectual or the religious, they will have little chance of survival, of general acceptance, unless they happen to be in harmony with the prevailing174 economically-determined mental climate of the society and period. The idea of Christian brotherhood175, for instance, would never have "caught on" in the ancient world if it had not suited the mental needs of an economically oppressed class, amongst whom circumstances were already forcing individuals to feel communally176 in the face of common hardship.
Nevertheless, to regard Christianity solely177 as an expression of economic determinism would be to ignore its essential nature. It was at bottom an apprehension178, on the part of Jesus and his followers179, of individuality and community as the supreme ends of social action. Economic circumstances set the stage for this new vision, but they were not the whole cause of it. They directed attention to a certain value which hosts of human beings had experienced throughout the ages, but which had not hitherto been clearly apprehended180 and abstracted from experience. Nor had it been compellingly expressed as a supreme principle of conduct. Thus, though economic determinism affords a true account of cultural changes, its account is external. It does not go to the root of the matter. Economic circumstances control the movement of attention in the individual and in large masses of individuals. They do not create any fundamental values. They incline men to attend more to one set of values than to another. Such values as they do in a manner "create", for instance the value of secure employment or of coal-mines or of money, are derivative181.
This qualification of the principle of economic determinism, if true, is very important. It means that, at any rate in exceptional circumstances, other motives than economic motives may playa crucial part in determining the course of history. No doubt the circumstances which call forth182 these other motives are, in the broadest sense, economic circumstances. Thus the principle of economic determinism is in a sense preserved. But we must allow for the possibility that, just as during the rise of Christianity economic circumstances evoked183 a will for genuine community, so on other occasions also the distinctively184 human motives may playa crucial part. Moreover there may come a time, perhaps in a very remote future, when utopian economic circumstances may deprive the economic motives of their urgency, and enable purely cultural motives to become the main determinants of history.
Economic determinism, I should say, is an invaluable185 key, but not the master-key to all the locks of history. Bertrand Russell has pointed186 out that when individuals or communities have a fair degree of economic security they will gladly sacrifice economic interest to the sheer will for power; and that the power-lust of outstanding individuals and of whole communities has often been the crucial influence in determining the course of events.
There is one very obtrusive187 and important factor in the modern world which, I believe, cannot be wholly explained in terms of economic influences, namely Fascism. According to the Marxist, Fascism is simply the extreme development of the reactionary188 tendency of capitalism. The whole Fascist movement is a machiavellian189 device on the part of the capitalist class to marshal the people in defence of the capitalist national state against the gathering190 forces of revolution. It is particularly dangerous because it side-tracks an immense drive of genuine revolutionary zeal and draws it off into channels convenient to the capitalist class. But though in its early stage it is stimulated and used by capitalism, later it becomes a power in itself, and finally it controls individualistic capitalism very thoroughly191 in the interest of the totalitarian state.
I believe that, though this theory is true so far as it goes, and very important, it is not the whole truth about Fascism. Besides its root in capitalism Fascism has other roots. One of its sources, as I have already suggested, is the emotional revulsion from love and reason, which is spreading over the world in protest against the failure of Christianity and science to create a better world. It springs also, as Marxists themselves admit, from a genuine, even if largely perverted192, revolutionary zeal. And further, as Marxists fail to recognize, it draws strength from a deep and widespread yearning193 for spiritual regeneration, no doubt equally perverted. Fascism as an institution is, of course, largely a capitalist device; but Fascism as a disposition194 in the hearts of men and women is in part revolutionary and religious. Marxists deny that any motive deserving the adjective "spiritual" can ever be a causal factor in history. In this respect I believe they are profoundly mistaken. All normal human beings are at least feebly and intermittently195, and some are strongly and constantly, moved by the disinterested desire to conform to some ideal of conduct, conceived as intrinsically better, more righteous, than the life of impulse and self-seeking. The tragedy is that this desire is sometimes most potent67 when it is most misguided. To omit this motive from the interpretation196 of history, or to account for it wholly in terms of economic influences is almost as perverse103 as to ignore the economic.
The modern desire for regeneration began as a popular revulsion from ethical scepticism and cynical197 individualism, and indeed from the whole materialistic198 attitude which for so long had dominated Europe, and was a main factor in post-war disillusion114. This revulsion was at bottom a desperate longing200 to have something to live for, something super-individual and even super-social, which could be the supreme object of devotion, and could raise the tension of the individual's whole life. This longing was muddle201-headed and easily turned to evil account, but it was and is at bottom sincere. At bottom it is the desire for right living, for the awakened life.
Excessive faith in economic determinism, I suggest, blinds the Marxist to an essentially religious motive both in Fascism and in Communism itself. Both movements have a root in a genuinely moral, an essentially spiritual, protest against individualism as a way of life, against what the Christian calls "worldliness". Both insist on a life of consecrated service of the community. While Communism takes the community at its face-value, Fascism exalts202 it to a pseudo-mystical status. Although in this respect Communism is right and Fascism tragically203 wrong, the need which both attempt to satisfy is at bottom a spiritual need, though Marxists refuse to recognize it as such. It is a need for something not merely super-individual but genuinely universal that can inspire devotion. It is a need that in our day has been desperately204 frustrated, partly by the vogue205 of mechanistic metaphysics, partly by the failure of the churches to give a moral lead.
Having said something to the credit of Fascism I must repeat that this spiritual source in it is utterly206 poisoned and wasted. Fascism inculcates the primitive herd-mentality. It discourages, nay207 destroys, individuality. It suppresses criticism and all free expression. In place of reason and love it glorifies208 superstitious209 dogma and brutal93 might. It glorifies war. It prostitutes science for research into the means of murder. It is essentially opposed to the spirit of science, which is cosmopolitan210, demands free access to facts, free criticism, and the collaboration211 of mutually respecting individuals.
The sources of Fascism, then, are not wholly economic. But let there be no mistake about the importance of economic determinism. In the case of Fascism it is economic determinism, working through the minds of a declining bourgeois oligarchy212 that has tapped and directed and perverted the reviving spiritual energy. Moreover the whole of contemporary culture must certainly be regarded in the light of economic determinism, namely as mainly a product of the industrial revolution and the circumstances of the bourgeois class. And because the circumstances of this class have greatly changed since its early days, we find in its culture two different strains, namely Liberalism and Fascism, the products of its rise and of its decline. How many young "executives", conscious of their own efficiency and public spirit, and impatient with the muddle and lethargy and palaver213 and sheer corruption214 around them, are to-day looking enviously215 toward the new Germany? Although in all sincerity216 they profess14 horror at Nazi217 brutality and superstition218, and praise the fundamental rightness of democracy, their imagination is kindled219 by the thought of a great people disciplined, devoted, capable of speedy and resolute220 action, and full of hope. Who can blame them? But this feeling, if it is not balanced by a passion for the spirit of democracy, leads straight to Fascism.
The Marxist is opposed both to Liberal Democracy and to Fascism. He is opposed to Fascism because it denies his fundamental values. Liberalism he rejects for two reasons. First, since in the end it leads to a desperate defence of capitalism by the bourgeois oligarchy, though logically it is opposed to Fascism it must in practice lead to Fascism, whether veiled or frank; since in the end it produces a situation in which the bourgeois oligarchy is forced into an increasingly ruthless defence of capitalism. Second, though it appears to be founded on the fundamental values which the Marxist himself accepts, it states them in such a manner as to falsify them.
Liberalism is based on the intrinsic value of the human individual, but it does not sufficiently221 stress the necessity that society shall have the means of restraining powerful individuals who seek self-aggrandisement at its expense. The theory assumes that if every individual seeks his own economic interest in the open market the upshot will be the greatest possible happiness for all. This could only be true if all individuals had equal bargaining power, which they have not. Under laissez faire the inequality of bargaining power has led inevitably222 to grave social injustice. From the Marxian point of view, liberal democracy, as preached and practised by the privileged class, seems fundamentally insincere. Its doctrine of individualism is no more than an excuse for gross self-seeking on the part of a class composed of powerful individuals.
The Marxist’s intellectual reasons for denying the self-completeness and importance of the individual are derived from Hegel’s view of the individual as something less real than society, because less self-complete. In Hegel’s view the individual mind is a mere excerpt223 from the "social mind", from the culture of his society. There is nothing in him that is not socially conditioned. His every act, thought and desire are what they are in virtue76 of the social whole of which he is a particular expression. The whole texture of his mind, for instance, is linguistic224, and therefore socially determined. His most sacred loyalties225 and his most peculiar226 whimsies227 are one and all products of social influences focused in him.
Both Marxists and Fascists228 disparage the individual, but at bottom there is an important difference between their attitudes. The Fascist, following Hegel, tends to regard the State or the race as a super-individual entity59. The Marxist, more influenced by analytical229 science, refrains from what he regards as a mystical hypostatization of society. But Marxists tend to overlook the individualistic aspect of their theory, and to deny individuality almost as ruthlessly as Fascists.
The denial of the importance of the individual is at once the strength and the weakness of Marxism. It is its strength because it impels230 the individual to live for something more than himself, more even than other individuals to whom he is attached, namely for the ideal of comradeship and for the creating of a world in which comradeship shall be the ruling principle. This is the very essence of Christian brotherhood. The Early Christians experienced community in small groups of individuals living in personal contact and living in devotion to a universal ideal. The same spirit animates231 the revolutionary cell or society at its best. And in both cases the exaltation of concrete community is an expression of the mutual helpfulness and loyalty232 which is natural to an oppressed class, and much more difficult for the individuals of a commercial oligarchy.
But this emotional experience of concrete community and of the universal rightness of comradeship, which is the root both of Christianity and of revolutionary zeal, is very different from the denial of the worth and the reality of the individual, and the exaltation of the abstract State, or the abstract world-state, or world-wide communistic social organization. This is the dangerous and perverted element in some expressions of Marxism. The emotional experience of community is of course opposed to individualism, to the cherishing of one individual, namely oneself, at the expense of others. But it is equally opposed to the subjection of all individuals to the abstract form of organization. For essentially the experience of community is the experience of mutual awareness, mutual respect, mutual service and mutual mental enrichment. In the cult of the group and the disparagement233 of the individual there are grave dangers.
In the first place, though the old view of the individual as a self-complete spiritual substance and initiator of acts must, I think, be rejected, and though the new emphasis on the part played by the environment is wholesome234, we must beware of an extravagant235 swing of the pendulum236. Though the individual's behaviour is through and through determined by the social environment, it is also determined by his own nature. And though his own nature at any moment is determined by his past environments and by his biological inheritance, and so by the selective force of ancestral environments, there must at every stage be something (however caused) capable of responding to the environment. No doubt it is a long journey from the unicellular ancestor to Shakespeare, and the whole route is partly determined by environmental influences. But at every stage there must be something capable of behaving, of actively237 responding to those influences. Moreover, whatever the causes which brought John Smith into being, once he is in being, he is what he is, namely an actual living biological organism with characteristic potentialities of behaviour, physical and mental.
The danger of Marxism is that, though it starts with a protest against tyranny, its emphasis on the social aspect of individuality may lead it to subject the individual to a tyranny not of class but of the community as a whole. In this connection it is interesting to note the difference between the Marxist and the Liberal ideas of liberty. For the Liberal, liberty consists simply of freedom from social constraint238. Rightly Marxists have pointed out that liberty should mean something more than this. For, if this is all that liberty is, the most free of all individuals is the "jungle child"; but he, if he survives, grows up an imbecile. Liberty, then, must rather be conceived as the opportunity for free and full exercise of capacity. And since man is essentially social, this involves complex social relations, for stimulus239 and discipline and full development. What is opposed to liberty, says the Marxist, is not social relations as such but the bad social relations imposed by an unsound and unjust social system. This is true and important. But liberty involves more than fertile social relations and the absence of oligarchical240 tyranny. Even a thoroughly democratic society, if it had an exaggerated respect for social discipline, might seriously frustrate57 the development of its individual members, and reduce itself to mental sterility241.
The second grave danger in the disparagement of individuality is that it encourages herd-mindedness, and condemns242 originality243 of thought and feeling. In all ages the sole instrument of progress has been the original mind, the individual who is to a greater or less degree different from the average individual just because he is more sensitive than others, either to the ever-changing pressure of the environment or to the more obscure or delicate features of human nature itself; or again because he is more capable of heroic self-transcendence.
The denial of the importance of the individual leads the revolutionary to reject individual experience whenever it diverges244 from the body of doctrine which he has already accepted as the authentic245 expression of the developing life of his society, namely Marxism; or Fascism, if his revolutionary zeal has been side-tracked in that direction. He tends to subordinate his individual intelligence and conscience to an orthodox ideology246, and to the will of "the Party". This is true although revolutionaries are often in disagreement as to the right interpretation of their sacred texts.
Further, the disparagement of individuality, since it leads to neglect of all experiences other than those that are possible to average human beings, disposes revolutionaries to ignore or misinterpret all the subtler or more refined kinds of experience, including those of the artists, intellectuals, and adepts247 in personal sensibility, and of course those of the saints. He therefore tends to accept a theory of the universe which leaves out of account or explains away all evidence derived from these sources. His strength lies in his rejection248 of old-fashioned idealism, the arguments for which are mainly verbalistic; and in his firm grip on the facts of common experience. His weakness lies in his obsession249 with the physical and with the commonplace.
The Marxist, of course, would strongly protest against this criticism, and would point to the fact that artists of all sorts fulfil an important and respected function in the U.S.S.R. True, but artistic250 expression under the Soviets251 has been subordinated to the exigences of social propaganda.
The reader may protest that in an age of crisis, when the supreme and urgent need is for radical252 social change, this neglect of the more developed capacities of our nature does not matter. When the house is on fire we need not poets but firemen. There is some force in the argument, but the analogy is not accurate. Unless the revolution can become clearly conscious that its motive is at bottom a spiritual motive, it will certainly, as soon as its initial enthusiasm wanes, degenerate151 into a mundane253 tyranny. There is danger, for instance, that under the influence of Marxism art, instead of being the main instrument for the exercise and development of human sensibility, might degenerate into a mere expression of social cohesion254 and of such values as fall within the range of average minds.
The Marxian revolutionary claims to adopt a scientific attitude to all intellectual matters.
He accepts scientific positivism, the typical scientist's denial of the possibility of metaphysics. In his view, metaphysical problems, even if not actually meaningless, cannot be solved by human intellect. No theory is to be accepted without the support of positive scientific evidence. And no metaphysical theory can be adequately supported by scientific evidence. This positivistic tendency is sound, so long as it does not become a dogmatic denial of the very possibility of metaphysics, or a cult of the physical and a contempt for all that is most developed in man.
Though the Marxian claims that he rejects all metaphysics, he is apt to accept unwittingly a certain type of metaphysical theory, namely materialism255. He claims that his materialism, far from being metaphysical, is simply a scientific generalization256 from experience. But in practice he is apt to pass on to make far-reaching metaphysical generalizations257 about the universe.
Though the genuine Marxist is by conscious profession a materialist199, subconsciously258, as I have said, he seems to me to be moved by a spiritual impulse, the worship of comradeship. And even his theory t though it is professedly a materialistic theory, is elastic259, and capable of accommodating all that the saint has any right to demand. The Marxian's materialism is not the old-fashioned crude materialism. He calls it "dialectical", not "mechanical" materialism. Mechanical materialism affirms that everything, including mental phenomena260, can be accounted for in terms of physical mechanism261. Dialectical materialism denies this. It is materialistic only in the sense that it is not idealistic. It rejects the view that all reality is essentially mental, and that matter is an illusion; but it does not affirm that mechanical principles can explain everything. By "matter" it means simply whatever is objectively real. Matter, of course, is observed to behave physically262; but it is also observed to behave mentally. Dialectical Materialism recognizes different spheres or levels of reality, each of which is to be described scientifically in terms of its own special set of laws.
Marx, of course, derived his dialectical principle from Hegel. But he turned Hegel's philosophy inside out. According to Hegel, reality is essentially mental and logical, and its development is dialectical. According to Marx, the dialectical relationship is not in the first instance a movement of ideas but a characteristic of the objective world. And to emphasize the fact that the objective world is not "idea", Marx said that it was "matter". Mind merely reflects the dialectical process of "matter".
But "matter", according to Marx, is not fully263 described or describable by physical science. Each of the sciences, physics, biology, psychology, sociology, describes some special aspect of matter. And each develops laws of its own, in relation to its special data. The laws of one science cannot be described simply in terms of sciences lower in the hierarchy264. All that can be said is that the sciences can be arranged in a certain order, corresponding to the complexity of their subject matter, and that there is a systematic265 relationship between the laws of all the different sciences. This relationship is dialectical. I find it difficult to form a really clear idea of Dialectical Materialism, but so far as I can grasp it, it is to be understood as follows. Matter in certain physical and chemical conditions may generate within itself a conflict from which arise new qualities and a new kind of behaviour. These novel characters are a necessary outcome of the nature of matter; but for their adequate description special laws must be devised. Thus, within the physical sphere, an .increase of "quantity" (we are told) may produce a new "quality", as when a rise of temperature turns ice into water. Similarly out of a conflict on the physical plane there may emerge a new kind of behaviour, namely biological behaviour, which again is a necessary but unpredictable outcome of the nature of matter. And this biological behaviour in certain conditions may generate another kind of necessary consequence, namely mental behaviour. And out of the clash of individual minds arises yet another necessary manifestation266 of the potentiality of matter, namely society, the special nature of which is studied by sociology. I do not feel at all sure that I understand the principle correctly. But if I do, then at each superior level a new kind of whole emerges, fully analysable into lower-level parts; yet its own organic form, and therefore, its behaviour as a whole, is novel, and must be described by a new set of laws.
Dialectical Materialism seems to me a very valuable principle. Indeed, if it is interpreted in a liberal, and perhaps heretical, manner, it can provide the ground plan of a comprehensive and satisfying philosophy. But unless I have seriously misunderstood it, it is open to a grave charge of ambiguity267. It is said to be distinguished268 from Mechanical Materialism by its recognition that real novelty occurs in the dialectical process by which the "higher" levels of reality are manifested. The "higher", it is insisted, cannot be explained in terms of the lower. But this contention269 is the main tenet of those who believe in the theory of "Emergence270." According to this theory, in certain very complex physical configurations271 a new mode of behaviour, namely biological behaviour, "emerges" from the physical. This biological behaviour, it is said, is not logically reducible to the laws of physics, since it is purposive, and physics has no room for purpose. There seem therefore to be two possible interpretations272 of the Marxian theory of Dialectical Materialism. If the occurrence of novelty is to be taken seriously, the theory seems to become identical with the Emergence theory, at least in this fundamental respect. Yet Marxists emphatically reject the Emergence theory, reviling273 it as "mystical". If on the other hand the occurrence of novelty is not taken seriously, then Dialectical Materialism becomes identical with Mechanical Materialism, which also is explicitly274 rejected by Marxists.
I am not concerned to discover which is the true view of Dialectical Materialism. I am concerned merely to say in the most general way what it is in Marxism that seems to me of real importance for anyone who, like myself, is attempting to form a reasonable and helpful world-view, and what seems to me mistaken..
In Marxian metaphysics (if I may use the word without offence to Marxists) two principles seem to be of very great value. The first is the principle of objectivity, according to which the form which mind assumes is to be understood by reference to the impact of the environment. Mind does not spin webs of idea out of its own intrinsic nature.
The second valuable principle is the dialectical principle itself, when it is taken seriously. Science must postulate275 a hierarchy of spheres of natural laws, dialectically related.
But if this principle is true, we must beware of dogmatically rejecting ideas merely because from the common-sense point of view they are unintelligible276 or incredible. We must recognize, as Marx himself recognized, that the common sense of one phase of culture may need to be stretched to the breaking point if it is to give rise to the common sense of a more developed phase. For instance we must beware of regarding the mysterious modern theories of space-time with the same unimaginative contempt as was formerly directed against, for example, Galileo's views. Of course we must take all recent advances of science as merely provisional half-truths, and we must be very suspicious of any metaphysical theories based on them. But at the same time we must recognize them as growing points of thought, and try to be sensitive to their mind-stretching power.
Further, if we accept the Dialectical principle, we must recognize its destructive effect on old-fashioned naturalism. We must recognize, for instance, that it makes room for much that would formerly have been regarded as "supernatural". In particular, even though it does not sanction orthodox religious doctrines277, it can quite well accommodate the conclusions which I suggested about the testimony278 of the saints.
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1
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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obsessed
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| adj.心神不宁的,鬼迷心窍的,沉迷的 | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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sordid
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| adj.肮脏的，不干净的，卑鄙的，暗淡的 | |
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parasitic
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| adj.寄生的 | |
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discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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courageous
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| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
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anarchist
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| n.无政府主义者 | |
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professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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sham
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| n./adj.假冒(的)，虚伪(的) | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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prodigious
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| adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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cult
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| n.异教，邪教；时尚，狂热的崇拜 | |
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belie
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| v.掩饰，证明为假 | |
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advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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transcend
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| vt.超出，超越(理性等)的范围 | |
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shams
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| 假象( sham的名词复数 )； 假货； 虚假的行为（或感情、言语等）； 假装…的人 | |
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gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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repercussions
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| n.后果，反响( repercussion的名词复数 )；余波 | |
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well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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frustration
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| n.挫折，失败，失效，落空 | |
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vividly
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| adv.清楚地，鲜明地，生动地 | |
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texture
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| n.(织物)质地；(材料)构造；结构；肌理 | |
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disparage
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| v.贬抑，轻蔑 | |
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consecrated
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| adj.神圣的，被视为神圣的v.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的过去式和过去分词 )；奉献 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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eccentricity
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| n.古怪，反常，怪癖 | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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succumbing
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| 不再抵抗（诱惑、疾病、攻击等）( succumb的现在分词 )； 屈从； 被压垮； 死 | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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meticulous
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| adj.极其仔细的，一丝不苟的 | |
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physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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anthropology
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| n.人类学 | |
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aptitude
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| n.(学习方面的)才能，资质，天资 | |
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frustrate
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| v.使失望；使沮丧；使厌烦 | |
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frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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entity
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| n.实体，独立存在体，实际存在物 | |
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ecclesiastics
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| n.神职者，教会，牧师( ecclesiastic的名词复数 ) | |
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61
aristocrat
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| n.贵族，有贵族气派的人，上层人物 | |
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62
awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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63
mentality
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| n.心理，思想，脑力 | |
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64
awareness
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| n.意识，觉悟，懂事，明智 | |
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65
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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66
attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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67
potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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68
eldest
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| adj.最年长的，最年老的 | |
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69
aristocrats
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| n.贵族( aristocrat的名词复数 ) | |
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70
refinement
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| n.文雅；高尚；精美；精制；精炼 | |
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71
diverge
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| v.分叉，分歧，离题，使...岔开，使转向 | |
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72
passionately
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| ad.热烈地，激烈地 | |
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73
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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74
kindliness
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| n.厚道，亲切，友好的行为 | |
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75
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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76
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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77
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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78
truthfulness
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| n. 符合实际 | |
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79
equanimity
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| n.沉着，镇定 | |
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80
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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81
relish
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| n.滋味，享受，爱好，调味品；vt.加调味料，享受，品味；vi.有滋味 | |
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82
repugnance
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| n.嫌恶 | |
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83
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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84
outweighed
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| v.在重量上超过( outweigh的过去式和过去分词 )；在重要性或价值方面超过 | |
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85
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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86
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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87
traitors
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| 卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 )； 叛徒； 背叛者； 背信弃义的人 | |
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88
permissible
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| adj.可允许的，许可的 | |
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89
condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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90
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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91
condone
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| v.宽恕；原谅 | |
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92
brutality
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| n.野蛮的行为，残忍，野蛮 | |
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93
brutal
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| adj.残忍的，野蛮的，不讲理的 | |
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94
fascist
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| adj.法西斯主义的；法西斯党的；n.法西斯主义者，法西斯分子 | |
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95
obtuse
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| adj.钝的；愚钝的 | |
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96
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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97
agitators
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| n.（尤指政治变革的）鼓动者( agitator的名词复数 )；煽动者；搅拌器；搅拌机 | |
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98
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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99
vilify
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| v.诽谤，中伤 | |
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100
addiction
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| n.上瘾入迷，嗜好 | |
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101
callousness
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102
perversely
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| adv. 倔强地 | |
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103
perverse
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| adj.刚愎的；坚持错误的，行为反常的 | |
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104
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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105
ridiculed
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| v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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106
indefatigable
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| adj.不知疲倦的，不屈不挠的 | |
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107
pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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108
bourgeois
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| adj./n.追求物质享受的(人)；中产阶级分子 | |
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109
injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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110
discrepancy
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| n.不同；不符；差异；矛盾 | |
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111
wanes
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| v.衰落( wane的第三人称单数 )；（月）亏；变小；变暗淡 | |
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112
craving
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| n.渴望,热望 | |
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113
temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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114
disillusion
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| vt.使不再抱幻想，使理想破灭 | |
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115
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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116
exhort
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| v.规劝，告诫 | |
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117
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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118
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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119
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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120
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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121
retard
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| n.阻止，延迟；vt.妨碍，延迟，使减速 | |
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122
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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123
technological
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| adj.技术的；工艺的 | |
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124
stimulated
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| a.刺激的 | |
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125
chivalry
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| n.骑士气概，侠义；（男人）对女人彬彬有礼，献殷勤 | |
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126
complexity
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| n.复杂(性)，复杂的事物 | |
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127
feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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128
costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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129
outrageously
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| 凶残地； 肆无忌惮地； 令人不能容忍地； 不寻常地 | |
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130
dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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131
disintegration
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| n.分散，解体 | |
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132
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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133
overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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134
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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135
complicating
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| 使复杂化( complicate的现在分词 ) | |
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136
antithesis
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| n.对立；相对 | |
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137
vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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138
flexibility
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| n.柔韧性，弹性，（光的）折射性，灵活性 | |
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139
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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140
withered
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| adj. 枯萎的，干瘪的，（人身体的部分器官）因病萎缩的或未发育良好的 动词wither的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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141
capitalism
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| n.资本主义 | |
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142
tighten
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| v.(使)变紧；(使)绷紧 | |
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143
plight
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| n.困境，境况，誓约，艰难；vt.宣誓，保证，约定 | |
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144
frustrates
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| v.使不成功( frustrate的第三人称单数 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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145
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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146
imperialistic
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| 帝国主义的，帝制的 | |
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147
annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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148
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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149
nurtured
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| 养育( nurture的过去式和过去分词 )； 培育； 滋长； 助长 | |
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150
reconstruction
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| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
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151
degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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152
degenerates
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| 衰退，堕落，退化( degenerate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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153
exponents
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| n.倡导者( exponent的名词复数 )；说明者；指数；能手 | |
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154
archaic
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| adj.(语言、词汇等)古代的，已不通用的 | |
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155
militant
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| adj.激进的，好斗的；n.激进分子，斗士 | |
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156
tribal
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| adj.部族的，种族的 | |
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157
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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158
distressing
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| a.使人痛苦的 | |
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159
intensified
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| v.（使）增强， （使）加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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160
unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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161
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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162
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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163
enacted
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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164
prelude
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| n.序言，前兆，序曲 | |
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165
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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166
doctrinaire
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| adj.空论的 | |
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167
prophesies
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| v.预告，预言( prophesy的第三人称单数 ) | |
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168
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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169
prophesied
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| v.预告，预言( prophesy的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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170
collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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171
epidemic
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| n.流行病；盛行；adj.流行性的，流传极广的 | |
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172
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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173
aesthetic
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| adj.美学的，审美的，有美感 | |
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174
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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175
brotherhood
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| n.兄弟般的关系，手中情谊 | |
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176
communally
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| adv.共同地 | |
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177
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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178
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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179
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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180
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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181
derivative
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| n.派(衍)生物；adj.非独创性的，模仿他人的 | |
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182
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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183
evoked
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| [医]诱发的 | |
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184
distinctively
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| adv.特殊地，区别地 | |
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185
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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186
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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187
obtrusive
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| adj.显眼的；冒失的 | |
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188
reactionary
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| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
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189
machiavellian
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| adj.权谋的，狡诈的 | |
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190
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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191
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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192
perverted
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| adj.不正当的v.滥用( pervert的过去式和过去分词 )；腐蚀；败坏；使堕落 | |
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193
yearning
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| a.渴望的；向往的；怀念的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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195
intermittently
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| adv.间歇地；断断续续 | |
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196
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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197
cynical
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| adj.(对人性或动机)怀疑的，不信世道向善的 | |
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198
materialistic
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| a.唯物主义的，物质享乐主义的 | |
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199
materialist
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| n. 唯物主义者 | |
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200
longing
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| n.（for）渴望 | |
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201
muddle
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| n.困惑，混浊状态；vt.使混乱，使糊涂，使惊呆；vi.胡乱应付，混乱 | |
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202
exalts
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| 赞扬( exalt的第三人称单数 )； 歌颂； 提升； 提拔 | |
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203
tragically
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| adv. 悲剧地，悲惨地 | |
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204
desperately
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| adv.极度渴望地，绝望地，孤注一掷地 | |
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205
Vogue
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| n.时髦，时尚；adj.流行的 | |
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206
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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207
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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208
glorifies
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| 赞美( glorify的第三人称单数 )； 颂扬； 美化； 使光荣 | |
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209
superstitious
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| adj.迷信的 | |
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210
cosmopolitan
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| adj.世界性的，全世界的，四海为家的，全球的 | |
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211
collaboration
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| n.合作，协作；勾结 | |
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212
oligarchy
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| n.寡头政治 | |
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213
palaver
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| adj.壮丽堂皇的；n.废话，空话 | |
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214
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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215
enviously
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| adv.满怀嫉妒地 | |
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216
sincerity
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| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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217
Nazi
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| n.纳粹分子，adj.纳粹党的，纳粹的 | |
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218
superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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219
kindled
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| （使某物）燃烧，着火( kindle的过去式和过去分词 )； 激起（感情等）； 发亮，放光 | |
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resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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221
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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222
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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223
excerpt
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| n.摘录，选录，节录 | |
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224
linguistic
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| adj.语言的，语言学的 | |
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225
loyalties
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| n.忠诚( loyalty的名词复数 )；忠心；忠于…感情；要忠于…的强烈感情 | |
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226
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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227
whimsies
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| n.怪念头( whimsy的名词复数 )；异想天开；怪脾气；与众不同的幽默感 | |
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228
fascists
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| n.法西斯主义的支持者( fascist的名词复数 ) | |
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229
analytical
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| adj.分析的；用分析法的 | |
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230
impels
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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animates
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| v.使有生气( animate的第三人称单数 )；驱动；使栩栩如生地动作；赋予…以生命 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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233
disparagement
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| n.轻视，轻蔑 | |
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234
wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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235
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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236
pendulum
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| n.摆，钟摆 | |
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actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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238
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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239
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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oligarchical
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| adj.寡头政治的，主张寡头政治的 | |
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sterility
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| n.不生育，不结果，贫瘠，消毒，无菌 | |
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242
condemns
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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243
originality
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| n.创造力，独创性；新颖 | |
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diverges
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| 分开( diverge的第三人称单数 )； 偏离； 分歧； 分道扬镳 | |
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authentic
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| a.真的，真正的；可靠的，可信的，有根据的 | |
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246
ideology
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| n.意识形态，(政治或社会的)思想意识 | |
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247
adepts
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| n.专家，能手( adept的名词复数 ) | |
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248
rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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249
obsession
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| n.困扰，无法摆脱的思想(或情感) | |
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250
artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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251
soviets
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| 苏维埃（Soviet的复数形式） | |
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252
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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253
mundane
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| adj.平凡的；尘世的；宇宙的 | |
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254
cohesion
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| n.团结，凝结力 | |
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255
materialism
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| n.［哲］唯物主义，唯物论；物质至上 | |
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generalization
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| n.普遍性，一般性，概括 | |
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257
generalizations
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| 一般化( generalization的名词复数 )； 普通化； 归纳； 概论 | |
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258
subconsciously
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| ad.下意识地，潜意识地 | |
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259
elastic
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| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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260
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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261
mechanism
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| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
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262
physically
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| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
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263
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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264
hierarchy
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| n.等级制度；统治集团，领导层 | |
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265
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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266
manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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267
ambiguity
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| n.模棱两可；意义不明确 | |
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268
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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269
contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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270
emergence
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| n.浮现，显现，出现，（植物）突出体 | |
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271
configurations
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| n.[化学]结构( configuration的名词复数 )；构造；（计算机的）配置；构形（原子在分子中的相对空间位置） | |
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272
interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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273
reviling
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| v.辱骂，痛斥( revile的现在分词 ) | |
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274
explicitly
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| ad.明确地，显然地 | |
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275
postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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276
unintelligible
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| adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的 | |
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277
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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278
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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