FIRST PART. PRIVATE RIGHT.

The System of those Laws Which Require No External Promulgation¹.
CHAPTER I.
Of the Mode of Having Anything External as One’s Own.
1. The Meaning of “Mine” in Right (Meum Juris).

Anything is “Mine” by right, or is rightfully mine, when I am so connected with it, that if any other person should make use of it without my consent, he would do me a lesion or injury. The subjective² condition of the use of anything is possession of it.

An external thing, however as such could only be mine, if I may assume it to be possible that I can be wronged by the use which another might make of it when it is not actually in my possession. Hence it would be a contradiction to have anything external as one’s own, were not the conception of possession capable of two different meanings, as sensible possession that is perceivable by the senses, and rational possession that is perceivable only by the intellect. By the former is to be understood a physical possession, and by the latter, a purely³ juridical possession of the same object.

The description of an object as “external to me” may signify either that it is merely “different and distinct from me as a subject,” or that it is also “a thing placed outside of me, and to be found elsewhere in space or time.” Taken in the first sense, the term possession signifies rational possession; and, in the second sense, it must mean empirical possession. A rational or intelligible⁵ possession, if such be possible, is possession viewed apart from physical holding or detention⁶ (detentio).
2. Juridical Postulate⁷ of the Practical Reason.

It is possible to have any external object of my will as mine. In other words, a maxim⁸ to this effect — were it to become law — that any object on which the will can be exerted must remain objectively in itself without an owner, as res nullius, is contrary to the principle of right.

For an object of any act of my will, is something that it would be physically⁹ within my power to use. Now, suppose there were things that by right should absolutely not be in our power, or, in other words, that it would be wrong or inconsistent with the freedom of all, according to universal law, to make use of them. On this supposition, freedom would so far be depriving itself of the use of its voluntary activity, in thus putting useable objects out of all possibility of use. In practical relations, this would be to annihilate¹⁰ them, by making them res nullius, notwithstanding the fact act acts of will in relation to such things would formally harmonize, in the actual use of them, with the external freedom of all according to universal laws. Now the pure practical reason lays down only formal laws as principles to regulate the exercise of the will; and therefore abstracts from the matter of the act of will, as regards the other qualities of the object, which is considered only in so far as it is an object of the activity of the will. Hence the practical reason cannot contain, in reference to such an object, an absolute prohibition¹³ of its use, because this would involve a contradiction of external freedom with itself. An object of my free will, however, is one which I have the physical capability¹⁴ of making some use of at will, since its use stands in my power (in potentia). This is to be distinguished¹⁵ from having the object brought under my disposal (in postestatem meam reductum), which supposes not a capability merely, but also a particular act of the free-will. But in order to consider something merely as an object of my will as such, it is sufficient to be conscious that I have it in my power. It is therefore an assumption a priori of the practical reason to regard and treat every object within the range of my free exercise of will as objectively a possible mine or thine.

This postulate may be called “a permissive law” of the practical reason, as giving us a special title which we could not evolve out of the mere⁴ conceptions of right generally. And this title constitutes the right to impose upon all others an obligation, not otherwise laid upon them, to abstain¹⁶ from the use of certain objects of our free choice, because we have already taken them into our possession. Reason wills that this shall be recognised as a valid¹⁷ principle, and it does so as practical reason; and it is enabled by means of this postulate a priori to enlarge its range of activity in practice.
3. Possession and Ownership.

Any one who would assert the right to a thing as his must be in possession of it as an object. Were he not its actual possessor or owner, he could not be wronged or injured by the use which another might make of it without his consent. For, should anything external to him, and in no way connected with him by right, affect this object, it could not affect himself as a subject, nor do him any wrong, unless he stood in a relation of ownership to it.
4. Exposition of the Conception of the External Mine and Thine.

There can only be three external objects of my will in the activity of choice:

(1) A corporeal¹⁸ thing external to me;

(2) The free-will of another in the performance of a particular act (praestatio);

(3) The state of another in relation to myself.

These correspond to the categories of substance, causality, and reciprocity; and they form the practical relations between me and external objects, according to the laws of freedom.

A. I can only call a corporeal thing or an object in space “mine,” when, even although not in physical possession of it, I am able to assert that I am in possession of it in another real nonphysical sense. Thus, I am not entitled to call an apple mine merely because I hold it in my hand or possess it physically; but only when I am entitled to say, “I possess it, although I have laid it out of my hand, and wherever it may lie.” In like manner, I am not entitled to say of the ground, on which I may have laid myself down, that therefore it is mine; but only when I can rightly assert that it still remains¹⁹ in my possession, although I may have left the spot. For any one who, in the former appearances of empirical possession, might wrench²⁰ the apple out of my hand, or drag me away from my resting-place, would, indeed, injure me in respect of the inner “mine” of freedom, but not in respect of the external “mine,” unless I could assert that I was in the possession of the object, even when not actually holding it physically. And if I could not do this, neither could I call the apple or the spot mine.

B. I cannot call the performance of something by the action of the will of another “mine,” if I can only say “it has come into my possession at the same time with a promise” (pactum re initum); but only if I am able to assert “I am in possession of the will of the other, so as to determine him to the performance of a particular act, although the time for the performance of it has not yet come.” In the latter case, the promise belongs to the nature of things actually held as possessed²¹, and as an active obligation I can reckon it mine; and this holds good not only if I have the thing promised — as in the first case — already in my possession, but even although I do not yet possess it in fact. Hence, I must be able to regard myself in thought as independent of that empirical form of possession that is limited by the condition of time and as being, nevertheless, in possession of the object.

C. I cannot call a wife, a child, a domestic, or, generally, any other person “mine” merely because I command them at present as belonging to my household, or because I have them under control, and in my power and possession. But I can call them mine, if, although they may have withdrawn²² themselves from my control and I do not therefore possess them empirically, I can still say “I possess them by my mere will, provided they exist anywhere in space or time; and, consequently, my possession of them is purely juridical.” They belong, in fact, to my possessions, only when and so far as I can assert this as a matter of right.
5. Definition of the Conception of the External Mine and Thine.

Definitions are nominal²⁴ or real. A nominal definition is sufficient merely to distinguish the object defined from all other objects, and it springs out of a complete and definite exposition of its conception. A real definition further suffices for a deduction²⁵ of the conception defined, so as to furnish a knowledge of the reality of the object. The nominal definition of the external “mine” would thus be: “The external mine is anything outside of myself, such that any hindrance²⁶ of my use of it at will would be doing me an injury or wrong as an infringement²⁷ of that freedom of mine which may coexist with the freedom of all others according to a universal law.” The real definition of this conception may be put thus: “The external mine is anything outside of myself, such that any prevention of my use of it would be a wrong, although I may not be in possession of it so as to be actually holding it as an object.” I must be in some kind of possession of an external object, if the object is to be regarded as mine; for, otherwise, anyone interfering²⁸ with this object would not, in doing so, affect me; nor, consequently, would he thereby²⁹ do me any wrong. Hence, according to SS 4, a rational possession (possessio noumenon) must be assumed as possible, if there is to be rightly an external mine and thine. Empirical possession is thus only phenomenal possession or holding (detention) of the object in the sphere of sensible appearance (possessio phenomenon), although the object which I possess is not regarded in this practical relation as itself a phenomenon — according to the exposition of the Transcendental Analytic³⁰ in the Critique of Pure Reason — but as a thing in itself. For in the Critique of Pure Reason the interest of reason turns upon the theoretical knowledge of the nature of things and how far reason can go in such knowledge. But here reason has to deal with the practical determination of the action of the will according to laws of freedom, whether the object is perceivable through the senses or merely thinkable by the pure understanding. And right, as under consideration, is a pure practical conception of the reason in relation to the exercise of the will under laws of freedom.

And, hence, it is not quite correct to speak of “possessing” a right to this or that object, but it should rather be said that an object is possessed in a purely juridical way; for a right is itself the rational possession of an object, and to “possess a possession,” would be an expression without meaning.
6. Deduction of the Conception of a Purely Juridical Possession of an External Object (Possessio Noumenon).

The question, “How is an external mine and thine possible?” resolves itself into this other question: “How is a merely juridical or rational possession possible?” And this second question resolves itself again into a third: “How is a synthetic³¹ proposition in right possible a priori?”

All propositions of right — as juridical propositions — are propositions a priori, for they are practical laws of reason (dictamina rationis). But the juridical proposition a priori respecting empirical possession is analytical³²; for it says nothing more than what follows by the principle of contradiction, from the conception of such possession; namely, that if I am the holder³³ of a thing in the way of being physically connected with it, any one interfering with it without my consent — as, for instance, in wrenching³⁴ an apple out of my hand — affects and detracts from my freedom as that which is internally mine; and consequently the maxim of his action is in direct contradiction to the axiom of right. The proposition expressing the principle of an empirical rightful possession does not therefore go beyond the right of a person in reference to himself.

On the other hand, the proposition expressing the possibility of the possession of a thing external to me, after abstraction of all the conditions of empirical possession in space and time — consequently presenting the assumption of the possibility of a possessio noumenon — goes beyond these limiting conditions; and because this proposition asserts a possession even without physical holding, as necessary to the conception of the external mine and thine, it is synthetical³⁵. And thus it becomes a problem for reason to show how such a proposition, extending its range beyond the conception of empirical possession, is possible a priori.

In this manner, for instance, the act of taking possession of a particular portion of the soil is a mode exercising the private free-will without being an act of usurpation³⁶. The possessor founds upon the innate³⁷ right of common possession of the surface of the earth, and upon the universal will corresponding a priori to it, which allows a private possession of the soil; because what are mere things would be otherwise made in themselves and by a law into unappropriable objects. Thus a first appropriator acquires originally by primary possession a particular portion of the ground; and by right (jure) he resists every other person who would hinder him in the private use of it, although, while the “state of nature” continues, this cannot be done by juridical means (de jure), because a public law does not yet exist.

And although a piece of ground should be regarded as free, or declared to be such, so as to be for the public use of all without distinction, yet it cannot be said that it is thus free by nature and originally so, prior to any juridical act. For there would be a real relation already incorporated in such a piece of ground by the very fact that the possession of it was denied to any particular individual; and as this public freedom of the ground would be a prohibition of it to every particular individual, this presupposes a common possession of it which cannot take effect without a contract. A piece of ground, however, which can only become publicly free by contract, must actually be in the possession of all those associated together, who mutually interdict⁴⁰ or suspend each other, from any particular or private use of it.

This original community of the soil and of the things upon it (communio fundi originaria), is an idea which has objective and practical juridical reality and is entirely⁴² different from the idea of a primitive⁴³ community of things, which is a fiction. For the latter would have had to be founded as a form of society, and must have taken its rise from a contract by which all renounced⁴⁴ the right of private possession, so that by uniting the property owned by each into a whole, it was thus transformed into a common possession. But had such an event taken place, history must have presented some evidence of it. To regard such a procedure as the original mode of taking possession, and to hold that the particular possessions of every individual may and ought to be grounded upon it, is evidently a contradiction.

Possession (possessio) is to be distinguished from habitation as mere residence (sedes); and the act of taking possession of the soil in the intention of acquiring it once for all, is also to be distinguished from settlement or domicile (incolatus), which is a continuous private possession of a place that is dependent on the presence of the individual upon it. We have not here to deal with the question of domiciliary settlement, as that is a secondary juridical act which may follow upon possession, or may not occur at all; for as such it could not involve an original possession, but only a secondary possession derived⁴⁶ from the consent of others.

Simple physical possession, or holding of the soil, involves already certain relations of right to the thing, although it is certainly not sufficient to enable me to regard it as mine. Relative to others, so far as they know, it appears as a first possession in harmony with the law of external freedom; and, at the same time, it is embraced in the universal original possession which contains a priori the fundamental principle of the possibility of a private possession. Hence to disturb the first occupier or holder of a portion of the soil in his use of it is a lesion or wrong done to him. The first taking of possession has therefore a title of right (titulus possessionis) in its favour, which is simply the principle of the original common possession; and the saying that “It is well for those who are in possession” (beati possidentes), when one is not bound to authenticate⁴⁸ his possession, is a principle of natural right that establishes the juridical act of taking possession, as a ground of acquisition upon which every first possessor may found.

It has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that in theoretical principles a priori, an intuitional perception a priori must be supplied in connection with any given conception; and, consequently, were it a question of a purely theoretical principle, something would have to be added to the conception of the possession of an object to make it real. But in respect of the practical principle under consideration, the procedure is just the converse⁴⁹ of the theoretical process; so that all the conditions of perception which form the foundation of empirical possession must be abstracted or taken away in order to extend the range of the juridical conception beyond the empirical sphere, and in order to be able to apply the postulate, that every external object of the free activity of my will, so far as I have it in my power, although not in the possession of it, may be reckoned as juridically mine.

The possibility of such a possession, with consequent deduction of the conception of a nonempirical possession, is founded upon the juridical postulate of the practical reason, that “It is a juridical duty so to act towards others that what is external and useable may come into the possession or become the property of some one.” And this postulate is conjoined with the exposition of the conception that what is externally one’s own is founded upon a possession, that is not physical. The possibility of such a possession, thus conceived, cannot, however, be proved or comprehended in itself, because it is a rational conception for which no empirical perception can be furnished; but it follows as an immediate⁵⁰ consequence from the postulate that has been enunciated⁵¹. For, if it is necessary to act according to that juridical principle, the rational or intelligible condition of a purely juridical possession must also be possible. It need astonish no one, then, that the theoretical aspect of the principles of the external mine and thine is lost from view in the rational sphere of pure intelligence and presents no extension of knowledge; for the conception of freedom upon which they rest does not admit of any theoretical deduction of its possibility, and it can only be inferred from the practical law of reason, called the categorical imperative⁵², viewed as a fact.
7. Application of the Principle of the Possibility of an External Mine and Thine to Objects of Experience.

The conception of a purely juridical possession is not an empirical conception dependent on conditions of space and time, and yet it has practical reality. As such it must be applicable to objects of experience, the knowledge of which is independent of the conditions of space and time. The rational process by which the conception of right is brought into relation to such objects so as to constitute a possible external mine and thine, is as follows. The conception of right, being contained merely in reason, cannot be immediately applied⁵³ to objects of experience, so as to give the conception of an empirical possession, but must be applied directly to the mediating⁵⁴ conception, in the understanding, of possession in general; so that, instead of physical holding (detentio) as an empirical representation of possession, the formal conception or thought of having, abstracted from all conditions of space and time, is conceived by the mind, and only as implying that an object is in my power and at my disposal (in potestate mea positum esse). In this relation, the term external does not signify existence in another place than where I am, nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment in which I have the offer of a thing: it signifies only an object different from or other than myself. Now the practical reason by its law of right wills, that I shall think the mine and thine in application to objects, not according to sensible conditions, but apart from these and from the possession they indicate; because they refer to determinations of the activity of the will that are in accordance with the laws of freedom. For it is only a conception of the understanding that can be brought under the rational conception of right. I may therefore say that I possess a field, although it is in quite a different place from that on which I actually find myself. For the question here is not concerning an intellectual relation to the object, but I have the thing practically in my power and at my disposal, which is a conception of possession realized by the understanding and independent of relations of space; and it is mine, because my will, in determining itself to any particular use of it, is not in conflict with the law of external freedom. Now it is just in abstraction from physical possession of the object of my free-will in the sphere of sense, that the practical reason wills that a rational possession of it shall be thought, according to intellectual conceptions which are not empirical, but contain a priori the conditions of rational possession. Hence it is in this fact, that we found the ground of the validity of such a rational conception of possession possessio noumenon) as a principle of a universally valid legislation. For such a legislation is implied and contained in the expression, “This external object is mine,” because an obligation is thereby imposed upon all others in respect of it, who would otherwise not have been obliged to abstain from the use of this object.

The mode, then, of having something external to myself as mine, consists in a specially⁵⁵ juridical connection of the will of the subject with that object, independently of the empirical relations to it in space and in time, and in accordance with the conception of a rational possession. A particular spot on the earth is not externally mine because I occupy it with my body; for the question here discussed refers only to my external freedom, and consequently it affects only the possession of myself, which is not a thing external to me, and therefore only involves an internal right. But if I continue to be in possession of the spot, although I have taken myself away from it and gone to another place, only under that condition is my external right concerned in connection with it. And to make the continuous possession of this spot by my person a condition of having it as mine, must either be to assert that it is not possible at all to have anything external as one’s own, which is contrary to the postulate in SS 2, or to require, in order that this external possession may be possible, that I shall be in two places at the same time. But this amounts to saying that I must be in a place and also not in it, which is contradictory⁵⁶ and absurd.

This position may be applied to the case in which I have accepted a promise; for my having and possession in respect of what has been promised become established on the ground of external right. This right is not to be annulled⁵⁷ by the fact that the promiser having said at one time, “This thing shall be yours,” again at a subsequent time says, “My will now is that the thing shall not be yours.” In such relations of rational right, the conditions hold just the same as if the promiser had, without any interval⁵⁹ of time between them, made the two declarations of his will, “This shall be yours,” and also “This shall not be yours”; which manifestly contradicts itself.

The same thing holds, in like manner, of the conception of the juridical possession of a person as belonging to the Having of a subject, whether it be a wife, a child, or a servant. The relations of right involved in a household, and the reciprocal possession of all its members, are not annulled by the capability of separating from each other in space; because it is by juridical relations that they are connected, and the external mine and thine, as in the former cases, rests entirely upon the assumption of the possibility of a purely rational possession, without the accompaniment of physical detention or holding of the object.

Reason is forced to a critique of its juridically practical function in special reference to the conception of the external mine and thine, by the antinomy of the propositions enunciated regarding the possibility of such a form of possession. For these give rise to an inevitable⁶⁰ dialectic, in which a thesis and an antithesis⁶¹ set up equal claims to the validity of two conflicting conditions. Reason is thus compelled, in its practical function in relation to right — as it was in its theoretical function — to make a distinction between possession as a phenomenal appearance presented to the senses, and that possession which is rational and thinkable only by the understanding.

Thesis. — The thesis, in this case, is: “It is possible to have something external as mine, although I am not in possession of it.”

Antithesis. — The antithesis is: “It is not possible to have anything external as mine, if I am not in possession of it.”

Solution. — The solution is: “Both Propositions are true”; the former when I mean empirical possession (possessio phaenomenon), the latter when I understand by the same term, a purely rational possession (possessio noumenon).

But the possibility of a rational possession, and consequently of an external mine and thine, cannot be comprehended by direct insight, but must be deduced from the practical reason. And in this relation it is specially noteworthy that the practical reason without intuitional perceptions, and even without requiring such an element a priori, can extend its range by the mere elimination⁶³ of empirical conditions, as justified⁶⁴ by the law of freedom, and can thus establish synthetical propositions a priori. The proof of this in the practical connection, as will be shown afterwards, can be adduced in an analytical manner.
8. To Have Anything External as One’s Own is only Possible in a Juridical or Civil State of Society under the Regulation of a Public Legislative⁶⁵ Power.

If, by word or deed, I declare my will that some external thing shall be mine, I make a declaration that every other person is obliged to abstain from the use of this object of my exercise of will; and this imposes an obligation which no one would be under, without such a juridical act on my part. But the assumption of this act at the same time involves the admission that I am obliged reciprocally to observe a similar abstention towards every other in respect of what is externally theirs; for the obligation in question arises from a universal rule regulating the external juridical relations. Hence I am not obliged to let alone what another person declares to be externally his, unless every other person likewise secures me by a guarantee that he will act in relation to what is mine, upon the same principle. This guarantee of reciprocal and mutual³⁹ abstention from what belongs to others does not require a special juridical act for its establishment, but is already involved in the conception of an external obligation of right, on account of the universality and consequently the reciprocity of the obligatoriness arising from a universal Rule. Now a single will, in relation to an external and consequently contingent⁶⁶ possession, cannot serve as a compulsory⁶⁷ law for all, because that would be to do violence to the freedom which is in accordance with universal laws. Therefore it is only a will that binds⁶⁸ every one, and as such a common, collective, and authoritative⁷⁰ will, that can furnish a guarantee of security to all. But the state of men under a universal, external, and public legislation, conjoined with authority and power, is called the civil state. There can therefore be an external mine and thine only in the civil state of society.

Consequence. — It follows, as a corollary, that, if it is juridically possible to have an external object as one’s own, the individual subject of possession must be allowed to compel or constrain⁷¹ every person with whom a dispute as to the mine or thine of such a possession may arise, to enter along with himself into the relations of a civil constitution.
9. There May, However, Be an External Mine and Thine Found as a Fact in the State of Nature, but it is only Provisory.

Natural right in the state of a civil constitution means the forms of right which may be deduced from principles a priori as the conditions of such a constitution. It is therefore not to be infringed⁷² by the statutory laws of such a constitution; and accordingly the juridical principle remains in force, that, “Whoever proceeds upon a maxim by which it becomes impossible for me to have an object of the exercise of my will as mine, does me a lesion or injury.” For a civil constitution is only the juridical condition under which every one has what is his own merely secured to him, as distinguished from its being specially assigned and determined⁷³ to him. All guarantee, therefore, assumes that everyone to whom a thing is secured is already in possession of it as his own. Hence, prior to the civil constitution — or apart from it — an external mine and thine must be assumed as possible, and along with it a right to compel everyone with whom we could come into any kind of intercourse⁷⁴ to enter with us into a constitution in which what is mine or thine can be secured. There may thus be a possession in expectation or in preparation for such a state of security, as can only be established on the law of the common will; and as it is therefore in accordance with the possibility of such a state, it constitutes a provisory or temporary juridical possession; whereas that possession which is found in reality in the civil state of society will be a peremptory⁷⁵ or guaranteed possession. Prior to entering into this state, for which he is naturally prepared, the individual rightfully resists those who will not adapt themselves to it, and who would disturb him in his provisory possession; because, if the will of all except himself were imposing⁷⁶ upon him an obligation to withdraw from a certain possession, it would still be only a one-sided or unilateral will, and consequently it would have just as little legal title — which can be properly based only on the universalized will — to contest a claim of right as he would have to assert it. Yet he has the advantage on his side, of being in accord with the conditions requisite⁷⁸ to the introduction and institution of a civil form of society. In a word, the mode in which anything external may be held as one’s own in the state of nature, is just physical possession with a presumption⁷⁹ of right thus far in its favour, that by union of the wills of all in a public legislation it will be made juridical; and in this expectation it holds comparatively, as a kind of potential juridical possession.

This prerogative⁸⁰ of right, as arising from the fact of empirical possession, is in accordance with the formula: “It is well for those who are in possession” (Beati possidentes). It does not consist in the fact that, because the possessor has the presumption of being a rightful man, it is unnecessary for him to bring forward proof that he possesses a certain thing rightfully, for this position applies only to a case of disputed right. But it is because it accords with the postulate of the practical reason, that everyone is invested with the faculty⁸¹ of having as his own any external object upon which he has exerted his will; and, consequently, all actual possession is a state whose rightfulness is established upon that postulate by an anterior⁸² act of will. And such an act, if there be no prior possession of the same object by another opposed to it, does, therefore, provisionally justify⁸³ and entitle me, according to the law of external freedom, to restrain anyone who refuses to enter with me into a state of public legal freedom from all pretension⁸⁴ to the use of such an object. For such a procedure is requisite, in conformity⁸⁵ with the postulate of reason, in order to subject to my proper use a thing which would otherwise be practically annihilated⁸⁶, as regards all proper use of it.
CHAPTER II.
The Mode of Acquiring Anything External.
10. The General Principle of External Acquisition.

I acquire a thing when I act (efficio) so that it becomes mine. An external thing is originally mine when it is mine even without the intervention⁸⁷ of a juridical act. An acquisition is original and primary when it is not derived from what another had already made his own.

There is nothing external that is as such originally mine; but anything external may be originally acquired when it is an object that no other person has yet made his. A state in which the mine and thine are in common cannot be conceived as having been at any time original. Such a state of things would have to be acquired by an external juridical act, although there may be an original and common possession of an external object. Even if we think hypothetically of a state in which the mine and thine would be originally in common as a communio mei et tui originaria, it would still have to be distinguished from a primeval communion (communio primaeva) with things in common, sometimes supposed to be founded in the first period of the relations of right among men, and which could not be regarded as based upon principles like the former, but only upon history. Even under that condition the historic communio, as a supposed primeval community, would always have to be viewed as acquired and derivative⁸⁸ (communio derivativa).

The principle of external acquisition, then, may be expressed thus: “Whatever I bring under my power according to the law of external freedom, of which as an object of my free activity of will I have the capability of making use according to the postulate of the practical reason, and which I will to become mine in conformity with the idea of a possible united common will, is mine.”

The practical elements (momenta attendenda) constitutive of the process of original acquisition are:

    Prehension or seizure⁸⁹ of an object which belongs to no one; for, if it belonged already to some one, the act would conflict with the freedom of others, that is, according to universal laws. This is the taking possession of an object of my free activity of will in space and time; the possession, therefore, into which I thus put myself is sensible or physical possession (possessio phenomenon);

    Declaration of the possession of this object by formal designation and the act of my freewill in interdicting⁹⁰ every other person from using it as his;

    Appropriation⁹¹, as the act, in idea, of an externally legislative common will, by which all and each are obliged to respect and act in conformity with my act of will.

The validity of the last element in the process of acquisition, as that on which the conclusion that “the external object is mine” rests, is what makes the possession valid as a purely rational and juridical possession (possessio noumenon). It is founded upon the fact that, as all these acts are juridical, they consequently proceed from the practical reason, and therefore, in the question as to what is right, abstraction may be made of the empirical conditions involved, and the conclusion, “the external object is mine,” thus becomes a correct inference from the external fact of sensible possession to the internal right of rational possession.

The original primary acquisition of an external object of the action of the will, is called occupancy. It can only take place in reference to substances or corporeal things. Now when this occupation of an external object does take place, the act presupposes, as a condition of such empirical possession, its priority in time before the act of any other who may also be willing to enter upon occupation of it. Hence the legal maxim: “qui prior tempore, potior jure.” Such occupation as original or primary is, further, the effect only of a single or unilateral will; for were a bilateral⁹² or twofold will requisite for it, it would be derived from a contract of two or more persons with each other, and consequently it would be based upon what another or others had already made their own. It is not easy to see how such an act of free-will as this would be could really form a foundation for every one having his own. However, the first acquisition of a thing is on that account not quite exactly the same as the original acquisition of it. For the acquisition of a public juridical state by union of the wills of all in a universal legislation would be such an original acquisition, seeing that no other of the kind could precede it, and yet it would be derived from the particular wills of all the individuals, and consequently become all-sided or omnilateral; for a properly primary acquisition can only proceed from an individual or unilateral or unilateral will.
DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE EXTERNAL MINE AND THINE.

    In respect of the matter of object of acquisition, I acquire either a corporeal thing (substance), or the performance of something by another (causality), or this other as a person in respect of his state, so far as I have a right to dispose of the same (in a relation of reciprocity with him).

    In respect of the form or mode of acquisition, it is either a real right (jus reale), or a personal right (jus personale), or a real-personal right (jus realiter personale), to the possession although not to the use, of another person as if he were a thing.

    In respect of the ground of right or the title (titulus) of acquisition — which, properly, is not a particular member of the division of rights, but rather a constituent⁹³ element of the mode of exercising them — anything external is acquired by a certain free exercise of will that is either unilateral, as the act of a single will (facto), or bilateral, as the act of two wills (pacto), or omnilateral, as the act of all the wills of a community together (lege).

SECTION I.
Principles of Real Right.
11. What is a Real Right?

The usual definition of real right, or “right in a thing” (jus reale, jus in re), is that “it is a right as against every possessor of it.” This is a correct nominal definition. But what is it that entitles me to claim an external object from any one who may appear as its possessor, and to compel him, per vindicationem, to put me again, in place of himself, into possession of it? Is this external juridical relation of my will a kind of immediate relation to an external thing? If so, whoever might think of his right as referring not immediately to persons but to things would have to represent it, although only in an obscure way, somewhat thus. A right on one side has always a duty corresponding to it on the other, so that an external thing, although away from the hands of its first possessor, continues to be still connected with him by a continuing obligation; and thus it refuses to fall under the claim of any other possessor, because it is already bound to another. In this way my right, viewed as a kind of good genius accompanying a thing and preserving it from all external attack, would refer an alien possessor always to me! It is, however, absurd to think of an obligation of persons towards things, and conversely; although it may be allowed in any particular case to represent the juridical relation by a sensible image of this kind, and to express it in this way.

The real definition would run thus: “Right in a thing is a right to the private use of a thing, of which I am in possession — original or derivative — in common with all others.” For this is the one condition under which it is alone possible that I can exclude every others possessor from the private use of the thing (jus contra quemlibet hujus rei possessorem). For, except by presupposing such a common collective possession, it cannot be conceived how, when I am not in actual possession of a thing, I could be injured or wronged by others who are in possession of it and use it. By an individual act of my own will I cannot oblige any other person to abstain from the use of a thing in respect of which he would otherwise be under no obligation; and, accordingly, such an obligation can only arise from the collective will of all united in a relation of common possession. Otherwise, I would have to think of a right in a thing, as if the thing has an obligation towards me, and as if the right as against every possessor of it had to be derived from this obligation in the thing, which is an absurd way of representing the subject.

Further, by the term real right (jus reale) is meant not only the right in a thing (jus in re), but also the constitutive principle of all the laws which relate to the real mine and thine. It is, however, evident that a man entirely alone upon the earth could properly neither have nor acquire any external thing as his own; because, between him as a person and all external things as material objects, there could be no relations of obligation. There is therefore, literally⁹⁵, no direct right in a thing, but only that right is to be properly called “real” which belongs to any one as constituted against a person, who is in common possession of things with all others in the civil state of society.
12. The First Acquisition of a Thing can only be that of the Soil.

By the soil is understood all habitable Land. In relation to everything that is moveable upon it, it is to be regarded as a substance, and the mode of the existence of the moveables is viewed as an inherence in it. And just as, in the theoretical acceptance, accidents cannot exist apart from their substances, so, in the practical relation, moveables upon the soil cannot be regarded as belonging to any one unless he is supposed to have been previously⁹⁶ in juridical possession of the soil, so that it is thus considered to be his.

For, let it be supposed that the soil belongs to no one. Then I would be entitled to remove every moveable thing found upon it from its place, even to total loss of it, in order to occupy that place, without infringing⁹⁷ thereby on the freedom of any other; there being, by the hypothesis, no possessor of it at all. But everything that can be destroyed, such as a tree, a house, and such like — as regards its matter at least — is moveable; and if we call a thing which cannot be moved without destruction of its form an immoveable, the mine and thine in it is not understood as applying to its substance, but to that which is adherent⁹⁸ to it and which does not essentially⁹⁹ constitute the thing itself.
13. Every Part of the Soil may be Originally Acquired; and the Principle of the Possibility of such Acquisition is the Original Community of the Soil Generally.

The first clause of this proposition is founded upon the postulate of the practical reason (SS 2); the second is established by the following proof.

All men are originally and before any juridical act of will in rightful possession of the soil; that is, they have a right to be wherever nature or chance has placed them without their will. Possession (possessio), which is to be distinguished from residential¹⁰⁰ settlement (sedes) as a voluntary, acquired, and permanent possession, becomes common possession, on account of the connection with each other of all the places on the surface of the earth as a globe. For, had the surface of the earth been an infinite plain, men could have been so dispersed¹⁰¹ upon it that they might not have come into any necessary communion with each other, and a state of social community would not have been a necessary consequence of their existence upon the earth. Now that possession proper to all men upon the earth, which is prior to all their particular juridical acts, constitutes an original possession in common (communio possessionis originaria). The conception of such an original, common possession of things is not derived from experience, nor is it dependent on conditions of time, as is the case with the imaginary and indemonstrable fiction of a primaeval community of possession in actual history. Hence it is a practical conception of reason, involving in itself the only principle according to which men may use the place they happen to occupy on the surface of the earth, in accordance with laws of right.
14. The Juridical Act of this Original Acquisition is Occupancy.

The act of taking possession (apprehensio), being at its beginning the physical appropriation of a corporeal thing in space (possessionis physicae), can accord with the law of the external freedom of all, under no other condition than that of its priority in respect of time. In this relation it must have the characteristic of a first act in the way of taking possession, as a free exercise of will. The activity of will, however, as determining that the thing — in this case a definite separate place on the surface of the earth — shall be mine, being an act of appropriation, cannot be otherwise in the case of original acquisition than individual or unilateral (voluntas unilateralis s. propria). Now, occupancy is the acquisition of an external object by an individual act of will. The original acquisition of such an object as a limited portion of the soil can therefore only be accomplished¹⁰² by an act of occupation.

The possibility of this mode of acquisition cannot be intuitively apprehended¹⁰³ by pure reason in any way, nor established by its principles, but is an immediate consequence from the postulate of the practical reason. The will as practical reason, however, cannot justify external acquisition otherwise than only in so far as it is itself included in an absolutely authoritative will, with which it is united by implication; or, in other words, only in so far as it is contained within a union of the wills of all who come into practical relation with each other. For an individual, unilateral will — and the same applies to a dual³⁸ or other particular willcannot impose on all an obligation which is contingent in itself. This requires an omnilateral or universal will, which is not contingent, but a priori, and which is therefore necessarily united and legislative. Only in accordance with such a principle can there be agreement of the active free-will of each individual with the freedom of all, and consequently rights in general, or even the possibility of an external mine and thine.
15. It is Only within a Civil Constitution that Anything can be Acquired Peremptorily¹⁰⁴, whereas in the State of Nature Acquisition can only be Provisory.

A civil constitution is objectively necessary as a duty, although subjectively¹⁰⁵ its reality is contingent. Hence, there is connected with it a real natural law of right, to which all external acquisition is subjected.

The empirical title of acquisition has been shown to be constituted by the taking physical possession (apprehensio physica) as founded upon an original community of right in all to the soil. And because a possession in the phenomenal sphere of sense can only be subordinated to that possession which is in accordance with rational conceptions of right, there must correspond to this physical act of possession a rational mode of taking possession by elimination of all the empirical conditions in space and time. This rational form of possession establishes the proposition that “whatever I bring under my power in accordance with laws of external freedom, and will that it shall be mine, becomes mine.”

The rational title of acquisition can therefore only lie originally in the idea of the will of all united implicitly¹⁰⁶, or necessarily to be united, which is here tacitly assumed as an indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non). For by a single will there cannot be imposed upon others an obligation by which they would not have been otherwise bound. But the fact formed by wills actually and universally united in a legislation constitutes the civil state of society. Hence, it is only in conformity with the idea of a civil state of society, or in reference to it and its realization¹⁰⁷, that anything external can be acquired. Before such a state is realized, and in anticipation¹⁰⁸ of it, acquisition, which would otherwise be derived, is consequently only provisory. The acquisition which is peremptory finds place only in the civil state.

Nevertheless, such provisory acquisition is real acquisition. For, according to the postulate of the juridically practical reason, the possibility of acquisition in whatever state men may happen to be living beside one another, and therefore in the state of nature as well, is a principle of private right. And in accordance with this principle, every one is justified or entitled to exercise that compulsion by which it alone becomes possible to pass out of the state of nature and to enter into that state of civil society which alone can make all acquisition peremptory.

It is a question as to how far the right of taking possession of the soil extends. The answer is, So far as the capability of having it under one’s power extends; that is, just as far as he who wills to appropriate it can defend it, as if the soil were to say: “If you cannot protect me, neither can you command me.” In this way the controversy¹⁰⁹ about what constitutes a free or closed sea must be decided¹¹⁰. Thus, within the range of a cannon¹¹¹-shot no one has a right to intrude¹¹² on the coast of a country that already belongs to a certain state, in order to fish or gather amber¹¹³ on the shore, or such like. Further, the question is put, “Is cultivation¹¹⁴ of the soil, by building, agriculture, drainage, etc., necessary in order to its acquisition?” No. For, as these processes as forms of specification¹¹⁵ are only accidents, they do not constitute objects of immediate possession and can only belong to the subject in so far as the substance of them has been already recognized as his. When it is a question of the first acquisition of a thing, the cultivation or modification¹¹⁶ of it by labour forms nothing more than an external sign of the fact that it has been taken into possession, and this can be indicated by many other signs that cost less trouble. Again: “May any one be hindered in the act of taking possession, so that neither one nor other of two competitors shall acquire the right of priority, and the soil in consequence may remain for all time free as belonging to no one?” Not at all. Such a hindrance cannot be allowed to take place, because the second of the two, in order to be enabled to do this, would himself have to be upon some neighbouring soil, where he also, in this manner, could be hindered from being, and such absolute hindering would involve a contradiction. It would, however, be quite consistent with the right of occupation, in the case of a certain intervening piece of the soil, to let it lie unused as a neutral ground for the separation of two neighbouring states; but under such a condition, that ground would actually belong to them both in common, and would not be without an owner (res nullius), just because it would be used by both in order to form a separation between them. Again: “May one have a thing as his, on a soil of which no one has appropriated any part as his own?” Yes. In Mongolia, for example, any one may let lie whatever baggage he has, or bring back the horse that has run away from him into his possession as his own, because the whole soil belongs to the people generally, and the use of it accordingly belongs to every individual. But that any one can have a moveable thing on the soil of another as his own is only possible by contract. Finally, there is the question: “May one of two neighbouring nations or tribes resist another when attempting to impose upon them a certain mode of using a particular soil; as, for instance, a tribe of hunters making such an attempt in relation to a pastoral people, or the latter to agriculturists and such like?” Certainly. For the mode in which such peoples or tribes may settle themselves upon the surface of the earth, provided they keep within their own boundaries, is a matter of mere pleasure and choice on their own part (res merae facultatis).

As a further question, it may be asked whether, when neither nature nor chance, but merely our own will, brings us into the neighbourhood of a people that gives no promise of a prospect¹¹⁷ of entering into civil union with us, we are to be considered entitled in any case to proceed with force in the intention of founding such a union, and bringing into a juridical state such men as the savage¹¹⁸ American Indians, the Hottentots,and the New Hollanders; or — and the case is not much better — whether we may establish colonies by deceptive¹¹⁹ purchase, and so become owners of their soil, and, in general, without regard to their first possession, make use at will of our superiority in relation to them? Further, may it not be held that Nature herself, as abhorring¹²⁰ a vacuum, seems to demand such a procedure, and that large regions in other continents, that are now magnificently peopled, would otherwise have remained unpossessed by civilized¹²¹ inhabitants and might have for ever remained thus, so that the end of creation would have so far been frustrated¹²²? It is almost unnecessary to answer; for it is easy to see through all this flimsy veil of injustice¹²³, which just amounts to the Jesuitism of making a good end justify any means. This mode of acquiring the soil is, therefore, to be repudiated¹²⁴.

The indefiniteness of external acquirable objects in respect of their quantity, as well as their quality, makes the problem of the sole primary external acquisition of them one of the most difficult to solve. There must, however, be some one first acquisition of an external object; for every Acquisition cannot be derivative. Hence, the problem is not to be given up as insoluble or in itself as impossible. If it is solved by reference to the original contract, unless this contract is extended so as to include the whole human race, acquisition under it would still remain but provisional.
16. Exposition of the Conception of a Primary Acquisition of the Soil.

All men are originally in a common collective possession of the soil of the whole earth (communio fundi originaria), and they have naturally each a will to use it (lex justi). But on account of the opposition¹²⁵ of the free will of one to that of the other in the sphere of action, which is inevitable by nature, all use of the soil would be prevented did not every will contain at the same time a law for the regulation of the relation of all wills in action, according to which a particular possession can be determined to every one upon the common soil. This is the juridical law (lex juridica). But the distributive law of the mine and thine, as applicable to each individual on the soil, according to the axiom of external freedom, cannot proceed otherwise than from a primarily united will a prioriwhich does not presuppose any juridical act as requisite for this union. This Law can only take form in the civil state (lex justitiae distributivae); as it is in this state alone that the united common will determines what is right, what is rightful, and what is the constitution of Right. In reference to this state, however — and prior to its establishment and in view of it — it is provisorily a duty for every one to proceed according to the law of external acquisition; and accordingly it is a juridical procedure on the part of the will to lay every one under obligation to recognise the act of possessing and appropriating, although it be only unilaterally. Hence a provisory acquisition of the soil, with all its juridical consequences, is possible in the state of nature.

Such an acquisition, however, requires and also obtains the favour of a permissive law (lex permissiva), in respect of the determination of the limits of juridically possible possession. For it precedes the juridical state, and as merely introductory to it is not yet peremptory; and this favour does not extend farther than the date of the consent of the other co-operators in the establishment of the civil state. But if they are opposed to entering into the civil state, as long as this opposition lasts it carries all the effect of a guaranteed juridical acquisition with it, because the advance from the state of nature to the civil state is founded upon a duty.
17. Deduction of the Conception of the Original Primary Acquisition.

We have found the title of acquisition in a universal original community of the soil, under the conditions of an external acquisition in space; and the mode of acquisition is contained in the empirical fact of taking possession (apprehensio), conjoined with the will to have an external object as one’s own. It is further necessary to unfold, from the principles of the pure juridically practical reason involved in the conception, the juridical acquisition proper of an object — that is, the external mine and thine that follows from the two previous conditions, as rational possession (possessio noumenon).

The juridical conception of the external mine and thine, so far as it involves the category of substance, cannot by “that which is external to me” mean merely “in a place other than that in which I am”; for it is a rational conception. As under the conceptions of the reason only intellectual conceptions can be embraced, the expression in question can only signify “something that is different and distinct from me” according to the idea of a non-empirical possession through, as it were, a continuous activity in taking possession of an external object; and it involves only the notion of having something in my power, which indicates the connection of an object with myself, as a subjective condition of the possibility of making use of it. This forms a purely intellectual conception of the understanding. Now we can leave out or abstract from the sensible conditions of possession, as relations of a person to objects which have no obligation. This process of elimination just gives the rational relation of a person to persons; and it is such that he can bind⁶⁹ them all by an obligation in reference to the use of things through his act of will, so far as it is conformable to the axiom of freedom, the postulate of right, and the universal legislation of the common will, conceived as united a priori. This is therefore the rational intelligible possession of things as by pure right, although they are objects of sense.

It is evident that the first modification, limitation, or transformation¹²⁶ generally, of a portion of the soil cannot of itself furnish a title to its acquisition, since possession of an accident does not form a ground for legal possession of the substance. Rather, conversely, the inference as to the mine and thine must be drawn²³ from ownership of the substance according to the rule: Accessarium sequitur suum principale. Hence one who has spent labour on a piece of ground that was not already his own, has lost his effort and work to the former owner. This position is so evident of itself that the old opinion to the opposite effect, that is still spread far and wide, can hardly be ascribed to any other than the prevailing¹²⁷ illusion which unconsciously leads to the personification of things; and, then, as if they could be bound under an obligation by the labour bestowed¹²⁸ upon them to be at the service of the person who does the labour, to regard them as his by immediate right. Otherwise it is probable that the natural question — already discussed — would not have been passed over with so light a tread, namely: “How is a right in a thing possible?” For, right as against every possible possessor of a thing means only the claim of a particular will to the use of an object so far as it may be included in the all-comprehending universal will, and can be thought as in harmony with its law.

As regards bodies situated¹²⁹ upon a piece of ground which is already mine, if they otherwise belong to no other person, they belong to me without my requiring any particular juridical act for the purpose of this acquisition; they are mine not facto, but lege. For they may be regarded as accidents inhering in the substance of the soil, and they are thus mine jure rei meae. To this category also belongs everything which is so connected with anything of mine that it cannot be separated from what is mine without altering it substantially. Examples of this are gilding¹³⁰ on an object, mixture of a material belonging to me with other things, alluvial¹³¹ deposit, or even alteration¹³² of the adjoining bed of a stream or river in my favour so as to produce an increase of my land, etc. By the same principles, the question must also be decided as to whether the acquirable soil may extend farther than the existing land, so as even to include part of the bed of the sea, with the right to fish on my own shores, to gather amber and such like. So far as I have the mechanical capability from my own site, as the place I occupy, to secure my soil from the attack of others — and, therefore, as far as cannon can carry from the shore — all is included in my possession, and the sea is thus far closed (mare clausum). But as there is no site for occupation upon the wide sea itself, possible possession cannot be extended so far, and the open sea is free (mare liberum). But in the case of men, or things that belong to them, becoming stranded¹³³ on the shore, since the fact is not voluntary, it cannot be regarded by the owner of the shore as giving him a right of acquisition. For shipwreck¹³⁴ is not an act of will, nor is its result a lesion to him; and things which may have come thus upon his soil, as still belonging to some one, are not to be treated as being without an owner or res nullius. On the other hand, a river, so far as possession of the bank reaches, may be originally acquired, like any other piece of ground, under the above restrictions¹³⁵, by one who is in possession of both its banks.
PROPERTY.

An external object, which in respect of its substance can be claimed by some one as his own, is called the property (dominium) of that person to whom all the rights in it as a thing belong — like the accidents inhering in a substance — and which, therefore, he as the proprietor¹³⁶ (dominus) can dispose of at will (jus disponendi de re sua). But from this it follows at once that such an object can only be a corporeal thing towards which there is no direct personal obligation. Hence a man may be his own master (sui juris) but not the proprietor of himself (sui dominus), so as to be able to dispose of himself at will, to say nothing of the possibility of such a relation to other men; because he is responsible to humanity in his own person. This point, however, as belonging to the right of humanity as such, rather than to that of individual men, would not be discussed at its proper place here, but is only mentioned incidentally for the better elucidation¹³⁷ of what has just been said. It may be further observed that there may be two full proprietors¹³⁸ of one and the same thing, without there being a mine and thine in common, but only in so far as they are common possessors of what belongs only to one of them as his own. In such a case the whole possession, without the use of the thing, belongs to one only of the co-proprietors (condomini); while to the others belongs all the use of the thing along with its possession. The former as the direct proprietor (dominus directus), therefore, restricts the latter as the proprietor in use (dominus utilis) to the condition of a certain continuous performance, with reference to the thing itself, without limiting him in the use of it.
SECTION II.
Principles of Personal Right.
18. Nature and Acquisition of Personal Right.

The possession of the active free-will of another person, as the power to determine it by my will to a certain action, according to laws of freedom, is a form of right relating to the external mine and thine, as affected¹³⁹ by the causality of another. It is possible to have several such rights in reference to the same person or to different persons. The principle of the system of laws, according to which I can be in such possession, is that of personal right, and there is only one such principle.

The acquisition of a personal right can never be primary or arbitrary; for such a mode of acquiring it would not be in accordance with the principle of the harmony of the freedom of my will with the freedom of every other, and it would therefore be wrong. Nor can such a right be acquired by means of any unjust act of another (facto injusti alterius), as being itself contrary to right; for if such a wrong as it implies were perpetrated on me, and I could demand satisfaction from the other, in accordance with right, yet in such a case I would only be entitled to maintain undiminished what was mine, and not to acquire anything more than what I formerly¹⁴⁰ had.

Acquisition by means of the action of another, to which I determine his will according to laws of right, is therefore always derived from what that other has as his own. This derivation, as a juridical act, cannot be effected by a mere negative relinquishment¹⁴¹ or renunciation of what is his (per derelictionem aut renunciationem); because such a negative act would only amount to a cessation of his right, and not to the acquirement of a right on the part of another. It is therefore only by positive transference (translatio), or conveyance¹⁴², that a personal right can be acquired; and this is only possible by means of a common will, through which objects come into the power of one or other, so that as one renounces¹⁴³ a particular thing which he holds under the common right, the same object when accepted by another, in consequence of a positive act of will, becomes his. Such transference of the property of one to another is termed its alienation¹⁴⁴. The act of the united wills of two persons, by which what belonged to one passes to the other, constitutes contract.
19. Acquisition by Contract.

In every contract there are four juridical acts of will involved; two of them being preparatory acts, and two of them constitutive acts. The two preparatory acts, as forms of treating in the transaction, are offer (oblatio) and approval (approbatio); the two constitutive acts, as the forms of concluding the transaction, are promise (promissum) and acceptance (acceptatio). For an offer cannot constitute a promise before it can be judged that the thing offered (oblatum) is something that is agreeable to the party to whom it is offered, and this much is shown by the first two declarations; but by them alone there is nothing as yet acquired.

Further, it is neither by the particular will of the promiser nor that of the acceptor that the property of the former passes over to the latter. This is effected only by the combined or united wills of both, and consequently so far only as the will of both is declared at the same time or simultaneously¹⁴⁵. Now, such simultaneousness is impossible by empirical acts of declaration, which can only follow each other in time and are never actually simultaneous. For if I have promised, and another person is now merely willing to accept, during the interval before actual acceptance, however short it may be, I may retract¹⁴⁶ my offer, because I am thus far still free; and, on the other side, the acceptor, for the same reason, may likewise hold himself not to be bound, up till the moment of acceptance, by his counter-declaration following upon the promise. The external formalities or solemnities (solemnia) on the conclusion of a contractsuch as shaking hands or breaking a straw (stipula) laid hold of by two persons — and all the various modes of confirming the declarations on either side, prove in fact the embarrassment¹⁴⁷ of the contracting parties as to how and in what way they may represent declarations, which are always successive, as existing simultaneously at the same moment; and these forms fail to do this. They are, by their very nature, acts necessarily following each other in time, so that when the one act is, the other either is not yet or is no longer.

It is only the philosophical¹⁴⁹ transcendental deduction of the conception of acquisition by contract that can remove all these difficulties. In a juridical external relation, my taking possession of the free-will of another, as the cause that determined it to a certain act, is conceived at first empirically by means of the declaration and counter-declaration of the free-will of each of us in time, as the sensible conditions of taking possession; and the two juridical acts must necessarily be regarded as following one another in time. But because this relation, viewed as juridical, is purely rational in itself, the will as a law-giving faculty of reason represents this possession as intelligible or rational (possessio noumenon), in accordance with conceptions of freedom and under abstraction of those empirical conditions. And now, the two acts of promise and acceptance are not regarded as following one another in time, but, in the manner of a pactum re initum, as proceeding¹⁵⁰ from a common will, which is expressed by the term “at the same time,” or “simultaneous,” and the object promised (promissum) is represented, under elimination of empirical conditions, as acquired according to the law of the pure practical reason.

That this is the true and only possible deduction of the idea of acquisition by contract is sufficiently¹⁵¹ attested¹⁵² by the laborious¹⁵³ yet always futile¹⁵⁴ striving of writers on jurisprudence such as Moses Mendelssohn in his Jerusalem — to adduce a proof of its rational possibility. The question is put thus: “Why ought I to keep my Promise?” For it is assumed as understood by all that I ought to do so. It is, however, absolutely impossible to give any further proof of the categorical imperative implied; just as it is impossible for the geometrician to prove by rational syllogisms that in order to construct a triangle I must take three lines — so far an analytical proposition — of which three lines any two together must be greater than the third — a synthetical proposition, and like the former a priori. It is a postulate of the pure reason that we ought to abstract from all the sensible conditions of space and time in reference to the conception of right; and the theory of the possibility of such abstraction from these conditions, without taking away the reality of the possession, just constitutes the transcendental deduction of the conception of acquisition by contract. It is quite akin¹¹ to what was presented under the last title, as the theory of acquisition by occupation of the external object.
20. What is Acquired by Contract.

But what is that, designated as external, which I acquire by contract? As it is only the causality of the active will of another, in respect of the performance of something promised to me, I do not immediately acquire thereby an external thing, but an act of the will in question, whereby a thing is brought under my power so that I make it mine. By the contract, therefore, I acquire the promise of another, as distinguished from the thing promised; and yet something is thereby added to my having and possession. I have become the richer in possession (locupletior) by the acquisition of an active obligation that I can bring to bear upon the freedom and capability of another. This my right, however, is only a personal right, valid only to the effect of acting¹⁴⁸ upon a particular physical person and specially upon the causality of his will, so that he shall perform something for me. It is not a real right upon that moral person, which is identified with the idea of the united will of all viewed a priori, and through which alone I can acquire a right valid against every possessor of the thing. For, it is in this that all right in a thing consists.

The transfer or transmission of what is mine to another by contract, takes place according to the law of continuity (lex continui). Possession of the object is not interrupted for a moment during this act; for, otherwise, I would acquire an object in this state as a thing that had no possessor, and it would thus be acquired originally, which is contrary to the idea of a contract. This continuity, however, implies that it is not the particular will of either the promiser or the acceptor, but their united will in common, that transfers what is mine to another. And hence it is not accomplished in such a manner that the promiser first relinquishes¹⁵⁶ (derelinquit) his possession for the benefit of another, or renounces his right (renunciat), and thereupon the other at the same time enters upon it; or conversely. The transfer (translatio) is therefore an act in which the object belongs for a moment at the same time to both, just as in the parabolic path of a projectile¹⁵⁷ the object on reaching its highest point may be regarded for a moment as at the same time both rising and falling, and as thus passing in fact from the ascending¹⁵⁸ to the falling motion.
21. Acceptance and Delivery.

A thing is not acquired in a case of contract by the acceptance (acceptatio) of the promise, but only by the delivery (traditio) of the object promised. For all promise is relative to performance; and if what was promised is a thing, the performance cannot be executed otherwise than by an act whereby the acceptor is put by the promiser into possession of the thing; and this is delivery. Before the delivery and the reception of the thing, the performance of the act required has not yet taken place; the thing has not yet passed from the one person to the other and, consequently, has not been acquired by that other. Hence the right arising from a contract is only a personal right; and it only becomes a real right by delivery.

A contract upon which delivery immediately follows (pactum re initum) excludes any interval of time between its conclusion and its execution; and as such it requires no further particular act in the future by which one person may transfer to another what is his. But if there is a time — definite or indefinite — agreed upon between them for the delivery, the question then arises whether the thing has already before that time become the acceptor’s by the contract, so that his right is a right in the thing; or whether a further special contract regarding the delivery alone must be entered upon, so that the right that is acquired by mere acceptance is only a personal right, and thus it does not become a right in the thing until delivery? That the relation must be determined according to the latter alternative will be clear from what follows.

Suppose I conclude a contract about a thing that I wish to acquire — such as a horse — and that I take it immediately into my stable, or otherwise into my possession; then it is mine (vi pacti re initi), and my right is a right in the thing. But if I leave it in the hands of the seller without arranging with him specially in whose physical possession or holding (detentio) this thing shall be before my taking possession of it (apprehensio), and consequently, before the actual change of possession, the horse is not yet mine; and the right which I acquire is only a right against a particular personnamely, the seller of the horse — to be put into possession of the object (poscendi traditionem) as the subjective condition of any use of it at my will. My right is thus only a personal right to demand from the seller the performance of his promise (praestatio) to put me into possession of the thing. Now, if the contract does not contain the condition of delivery at the same time — as a pactum re initum — and consequently an interval of time intervenes between the conclusion of the contract and the taking possession of the object of acquisition, I cannot obtain possession of it during this interval otherwise than by exercising the particular juridical activity called a possessory act (actum possessorium), which constitutes a special contract. This act consists in my saying, “I will send to fetch the horse,” to which the seller has to agree. For it is not self-evident or universally reasonable that any one will take a thing destined¹⁵⁹ for the use of another into his charge at his own risk. On the contrary, a special contract is necessary for this arrangement, according to which the alienator¹⁶⁰ of a thing continues to be its owner during a certain definite time, and must bear the risk of whatever may happen to it; while the acquirer can only be regarded by the seller as the owner when he has delayed to enter into possession beyond the date at which he agreed to take delivery. Prior to the possessory act, therefore, all that is acquired by the contract is only a personal right; and the acceptor can acquire an external thing only by delivery.
SECTION III.
Principles of Personal Right that is Real in Kind. (Jus Realiter Personale).
22. Nature of Personal Right of a Real Kind.

Personal right of a real kind is the right to the possession of an external object as a thing, and to the use of it as a person. The mine and thine embraced under this right relate specially to the family and household; and the relations involved are those of free beings in reciprocal real interaction with each other. Through their relations and influence as persons upon one another, in accordance with the principle of external freedom as the cause of it, they form a society composed as a whole of members standing¹² in community with each other as persons; and this constitutes the household. The mode in which this social status is acquired by individuals, and the functions which prevail within it, proceed neither by arbitrary individual action (facto), nor by mere contract (pacto), but by law (lege). And this law as being not only a right, but also as constituting possession in reference to a person, is a right rising above all mere real and personal right. It must, in fact, form the right of humanity in our own person; and, as such, it has as its consequence a natural permissive law, by the favour of which such acquisition becomes possible to us.
23. What is acquired in the household.

The acquisition that is founded upon this law is, as regards its objects, threefold. The man acquires a wife; the husband and wife acquire children, constituting a family; and the family acquire domestics. All these objects, while acquirable, are inalienable; and the right of possession in these objects is the most strictly¹⁶¹ personal of all rights.
The Rights of the Family as a Domestic Society
Title I. Conjugal¹⁶² Right. (Husband and Wife)
24. The Natural Basis of Marriage.

The domestic relations are founded on marriage, and marriage is founded upon the natural reciprocity or intercommunity (commercium) of the sexes.2 This natural union of the sexes proceeds according to the mere animal nature (vaga libido¹⁶³, venus vulgivaga, fornicatio), or according to the law. The latter is marriage (matrimonium), which is the union of two persons of different sex for life-long reciprocal possession of their sexual faculties¹⁶⁴. The end of producing and educating children may be regarded as always the end of nature in implanting mutual desire and inclination¹⁶⁵ in the sexes; but it is not necessary for the rightfulness of marriage that those who marry should set this before themselves as the end of their union, otherwise the marriage would be dissolved of itself when the production of children ceased.

2Commercium sexuale est usus membrorum et facultatum sexualium alterius. This “usus” is either natural, by which human beings may reproduce their own kind, or unnatural¹⁶⁶, which, again, refers either to a person of the same sex or to an animal of another species than man. These transgressions¹⁶⁷ of all law, as crimina carnis contra naturam, are even “not to be named”; and, as wrongs against all humanity in the person, they cannot be saved, by any limitation or exception whatever, from entire reprobation¹⁶⁸.

And even assuming that enjoyment¹⁶⁹ in the reciprocal use of the sexual endowments is an end of marriage, yet the contract of marriage is not on that account a matter of arbitrary will, but is a contract necessary in its nature by the law of humanity. In other words, if a man and a woman have the will to enter on reciprocal enjoyment in accordance with their sexual nature, they must necessarily marry each other; and this necessity is in accordance with the juridical laws of pure reason.
25. The Rational Right of Marriage.

For, this natural commercium — as a usus membrorum sexualium alterius — is an enjoyment for which the one person is given up to the other. In this relation the human individual makes himself a res, which is contrary to the right of humanity in his own person. This, however, is only possible under the one condition, that as the one person is acquired by the other as a res, that same person also equally acquires the other reciprocally, and thus regains¹⁷¹ and reestablishes the rational personality. The acquisition of a part of the human organism being, on account of its unity⁴¹, at the same time the acquisition of the whole person, it follows that the surrender and acceptation of, or by, one sex in relation to the other, is not only permissible¹⁷² under the condition of marriage, but is further only really possible under that condition. But the personal right thus acquired is, at the same time, real in kind; and this characteristic of it is established by the fact that if one of the married persons run away or enter into the possession of another, the other is entitled, at any time, and incontestably, to bring such a one back to the former relation, as if that person were a thing.
26. Monogamy and Equality in Marriage.

For the same reasons, the relation of the married persons to each other is a relation of equality as regards the mutual possession of their persons, as well as of their goods. Consequently marriage is only truly realized in monogamy; for in the relation of polygamy the person who is given away on the one side, gains only a part of the one to whom that person is given up, and therefore becomes a mere res. But in respect of their goods, they have severally the right to renounce⁴⁵ the use of any part of them, although only by a special contract.

From the principle thus stated, it also follows that concubinage is as little capable of being brought under a contract of right as the hiring of a person on any one occasion, in the way of a pactum fornicationis. For, as regards such a contract as this latter relation would imply, it must be admitted by all that any one who might enter into it could not be legally held to the fulfillment of their promise if they wished to resile from it. And as regards the former, a contract of concubinage would also fall as a pactum turpe; because as a contract of the hire (locatio, conductio), of a part for the use of another, on account of the inseparable unity of the members of a person, any one entering into such a contract would be actually surrendering as a res to the arbitrary will of another. Hence any party may annul⁵⁸ a contract like this if entered into with any other, at any time and at pleasure; and that other would have no ground, in the circumstances, to complain of a lesion of his right. The same holds likewise of a morganatic or “left-hand” marriage, contracted in order to turn the inequality in the social status of the two parties to advantage in the way of establishing the social supremacy¹⁷³ of the one over the other; for, in fact, such a relation is not really different from concubinage, according to the principles of natural right, and therefore does not constitute a real marriage. Hence the question may be raised as to whether it is not contrary to the equality of married persons when the law says in any way of the husband in relation to the wife, “he shall be thy master,” so that he is represented as the one who commands, and she is the one who obeys. This, however, cannot be regarded as contrary to the natural equality of a human pair, if such legal supremacy is based only upon the natural superiority of the faculties of the husband compared with the wife, in the effectuation of the common interest of the household, and if the right to command is based merely upon this fact. For this right may thus be deduced from the very duty of unity and equality in relation to the end involved.
27. Fulfillment of the Contract of Marriage.

The contract of marriage is completed only by conjugal cohabitation. A contract of two persons of different sex, with the secret understanding either to abstain from conjugal cohabitation or with the consciousness on either side of incapacity for it, is a simulated contract; it does not constitute a marriage, and it may be dissolved by either of the parties at will. But if the incapacity only arises after marriage, the right of the contract is not annulled or diminished by a contingency¹⁷⁴ that cannot be legally blamed.

The acquisition of a spouse¹⁷⁵, either as a husband or as a wife, is therefore not constituted facto — that is, by cohabitation — without a preceding contract; nor even pacto — by a mere contract of marriage, without subsequent cohabitation; but only lege, that is, as a juridical consequence of the obligation that is formed by two persons entering into a sexual union solely¹⁷⁶ on the basis of a reciprocal possession of each other, which possession at the same time is only effected in reality by the reciprocal usus facultatum sexualium alterius.
Title II. Parental¹⁷⁷ Right. (Parent and Child).
28. The Relation of Parent and Child.

From the duty of man towards himself — that is, towards the humanity in his own person there thus arises a personal right on the part of the members of the opposite sexes, as persons, to acquire one another really and reciprocally by marriage. In like manner, from the fact of procreation in the union thus constituted, there follows the duty of preserving and rearing children as the products of this union. Accordingly, children, as persons, have, at the same time, an original congenital right — distinguished from mere hereditary¹⁷⁸ right — to be reared by the care of their parents till they are capable of maintaining themselves; and this provision becomes immediately theirs by law, without any particular juridical act being required to determine it.

For what is thus produced is a person, and it is impossible to think of a being endowed with personal freedom as produced merely by a physical process. And hence, in the practical relation, it is quite a correct and even a necessary idea to regard the act of generation as a process by which a person is brought without his consent into the world and placed in it by the responsible free will of others. This act, therefore, attaches an obligation to the parents to make their children — as far as their power goes — contented¹⁷⁹ with the condition thus acquired. Hence parents cannot regard their child as, in a manner, a thing of their own making; for a being endowed with freedom cannot be so regarded. Nor, consequently, have they a right to destroy it as if it were their own property, or even to leave it to chance; because they have brought a being into the world who becomes in fact a citizen of the world, and they have placed that being in a state which they cannot be left to treat with indifference¹⁸⁰, even according to the natural conceptions of right.

We cannot even conceive how it is possible that God can create free beings; for it appears as if all their future actions, being predetermined by that first act, would be contained in the chain of natural necessity, and that, therefore, they could not be free. But as men we are free in fact, as is proved by the categorical imperative in the moral and practical relation as an authoritative decision of reason; yet reason cannot make the possibility of such a relation of cause to effect conceivable from the theoretical point of view, because they are both suprasensible. All that can be demanded of reason under these conditions would merely be to prove that there is no contradiction involved in the conception of a creation of free beings; and this may be done by showing that contradiction only arises when, along with the category of causality, the condition of time is transferred to the relation of suprasensible things. This condition, as implying that the cause of an effect must precede the effect as its reason, is inevitable in thinking the relation of objects of sense to one another; and if this conception of causality were to have objective reality given to it in the theoretical bearing, it would also have to be referred to the suprasensible sphere. But the contradiction vanishes when the pure category, apart from any sensible conditions, is applied from the moral and practical point of view, and consequently as in a non-sensible relation to the conception of creation.

The philosophical jurist will not regard this investigation¹⁸¹, when thus carried back even to the ultimate principles of the transcendental philosophy, as an unnecessary subtlety¹⁸² in a metaphysic of morals, or as losing itself in aimless obscurity, when he takes into consideration the difficulty of doing justice in this inquiry¹⁸³ to the ultimate relations of the principles of right.
29. The Rights of the Parent.

From the duty thus indicated, there further necessarily arises the right of the parents to the management and training of the child, so long as it is itself incapable¹⁸⁴ of making proper use of its body as an organism, and of its mind as an understanding. This involves its nourishment¹⁸⁵ and the care of its education. This includes, in general, the function of forming and developing it practically, that it may be able in the future to maintain and advance itself, and also its moral culture and development, the guilt¹⁸⁶ of neglecting it falling upon the parents. All this training is to be continued till the child reaches the period of emancipation¹⁸⁷ (emancipatio), as the age of practicable self-support. The parents then virtually renounce the parental right to command, as well as all claim to repayment¹⁸⁸ for their previous care and trouble; for which care and trouble, after the process of education is complete, they can only appeal to the children, by way of any claim, on the ground of the obligation of gratitude¹⁸⁹ as a duty of virtue¹⁹⁰.

From the fact of personality in the children, it further follows that they can never be regarded as the property of the parents, but only as belonging to them by way of being in their possession, like other things that are held apart from the possession of all others and that can be brought back even against the will of the subjects. Hence the right of the parents is not a purely real right, and it is not alienable (jus personalissimum). But neither is it a merely personal right; it is a personal right of a real kind, that is, a personal right that is constituted and exercised after the manner of a real right.

It is therefore evident that the title of a personal right of a real kind must necessarily be added, in the science of right, to the titles of real right and personal right, the division of rights into these two being not complete. For, if the right of the parents to the children were treated as if it were merely a real right to a part of what belongs to their house, they could not found only upon the duty of the children to return to them in claiming them when they run away, but they would be then entitled to seize them and impound them like things or runaway¹⁹¹ cattle.
TITLE III. Household Right. (Master and Servant)
30. Relation and Right of the Master of a Household.

The children of the house, who, along with the parents, constitute a family, attain¹⁹² majority, and become masters of themselves (majorennes, sui juris), even without a contract of release from their previous state of dependence¹⁹³, by their actually attaining¹⁹⁴ to the capability of self-maintenance. This attainment¹⁹⁵ arises, on the one hand, as a state of natural majority, with the advance of years in the general course of nature; and, on the other hand, it takes form, as a state in accordance with their own natural condition. They thus acquire the right of being their own masters, without the interposition of any special juridical act, and therefore merely by law (lege); and they owe their parents nothing by way of legal debt for their education, just as the parents, on their side, are now released from their obligations to the children in the same way. Parents and children thus gain or regain¹⁷⁰ their natural freedom; and the domestic society, which was necessary according to the law of right, is thus naturally dissolved.

Both parties, however, may resolve to continue the household, but under another mode of obligation. It may assume the form of a relation between the bead¹⁹⁶ of the house, as its master, and the other members as domestic servants, male or female; and the connection between them in this new regulated domestic economy (societas herilis) may be determined by contract. The master of the house, actually or virtually, enters into contract with the children, now become major and masters of themselves; or, if there be no children in the family, with other free persons constituting the membership of the household; and thus there is established domestic relationship not founded on social equality, but such that one commands as master, and another obeys as servant (imperantis et subjecti domestici).

The domestics or servants may then be regarded by the master of the household as thus far his. As regards the form or mode of his possession of them, they belong to him as if by a real right; for if any of them run away, he is entitled to bring them again under his power by a unilateral act of his will. But as regards the matter of his right, or the use he is entitled to make of such persons as his domestics, he is not entitled to conduct himself towards them as if he was their proprietor or owner (dominus servi); because they are only subjected to his power by contract, and by a contract under certain definite restrictions. For a contract by which the one party renounced his whole freedom for the advantage of the other, ceasing thereby to be a person and consequently having no duty even to observe a contract, is self contradictory, and is therefore of itself null and void. The question as to the right of property in relation to one who has lost his legal personality by a crime does not concern us here.

This contract, then, of the master of a household with his domestics, cannot be of such a nature that the use of them could ever rightly become an abuse of them; and the judgement as to what constitutes use or abuse in such circumstances the is not left merely to the master, but is also competent to the servants, who ought never to be held in bondage¹⁹⁷ or bodily servitude as slaves or serfs. Such a contract cannot, therefore, be concluded for life, but in all cases only for a definite period, within which one party may intimate to the other a termination of their connection. Children, however, including even the children of one who has become enslaved owing to a crime, are always free. For every man is born free, because he has at birth as yet broken no law; and even the cost of his education till his maturity¹⁹⁸ cannot be reckoned as a debt which he is bound to pay. Even a slave, if it were in his power, would be bound to educate his children without being entitled to count and reckon with them for the cost; and in view of his own incapacity for discharging this function, the possessor of a slave, therefore, enters upon the obligation which he has rendered the slave himself unable to fulfil.

Here, again, as under the first two titles, it is clear that there is a personal right of a real kind, in the relation of the master of a house to his domestics. For he can legally demand them as belonging to what is externally his, from any other possessor of them; and he is entitled to fetch them back to his house, even before the reasons that may have led them to run away, and their particular right in the circumstances, have been juridically investigated.
SYSTEMATIC¹⁹⁹ DIVISION OF ALL THE RIGHTS CAPABLE OF BEING ACQUIRED BY CONTRACT.
31. Division of Contracts: Juridical Conceptions of Money and a Book.

It is reasonable to demand that a metaphysical science of right shall completely and definitely determine the members of a logical division of its conceptions a priori, and thus establish them in a genuine system. All empirical division, on the other hand, is merely fragmentary partition, and it leaves us in uncertainty²⁰⁰ as to whether there may not be more members still required to complete the whole sphere of the divided conception. A division that is made according to a principle a priori may be called, in contrast to all empirical partitions, a dogmatic division.

Every contract, regarded in itself objectively, consists of two juridical acts: the promise and its acceptance. Acquisition by the latter, unless it be a pactum re initum which requires delivery, is not a part, but the juridically necessary consequence of the contract. Considered again subjectively, or as to whether the acquisition, which ought to happen as a necessary consequence according to reason, will also follow, in fact, as a physical consequence, it is evident that I have no security or guarantee that this will happen by the mere acceptance of a promise. There is, therefore, something externally required connected with the mode of the contract, in reference to the certainty of acquisition by it; and this can only be some element completing and determining the means necessary to the attainment of acquisition as realizing the purpose of the contract. And in his connection and behoof, three persons are required to intervene — the promiser, the acceptor, and the cautioner or surety. The importance of the cautioner is evident; but by his intervention and his special contract with the promiser, the acceptor gains nothing in respect of the object but the means of compulsion that enable him to obtain what is his own.

According to these rational principles of logical division, there are properly only three pure and simple modes of contract. There are, however, innumerable mixed and empirical modes, adding statutory and conventional forms to the principles of mine and thine that are in accordance with rational laws. But they lie outside of the circle of the metaphysical science of right, whose rational modes of contract can alone be indicated here.

All contracts are founded upon a purpose of acquisition, and are either:

    Gratuitous²⁰¹ contracts, with unilateral acquisition; or

    Onerous²⁰² contracts, with reciprocal acquisition; or

    Cautionary contracts, with no acquisition, but only guarantee of what has been already acquired. These contracts may be gratuitous on the one side, and yet, at the same time, onerous on the other.

    The gratuitous contracts (pacta gratuita) are:
        Depositation (depositum), involving the preservation²⁰³ of some valuable deposited in trust;
        Commodate (commodatum) a loan of the use of a thing;
        Donation (donatio), a free gift.

    The onerous contracts are contracts either of permutation or of hiring.

        Contracts of permutation or reciprocal exchange (permutatio late sic dicta):
            Barter²⁰⁴, or strictly real exchange (permutatio stricte sic dicta). Goods exchanged for goods.
            Purchase and sale (emptio venditio). Goods exchanged for money.
            Loan (mutuum). Loan of a fungible under condition of its being returned in kind: corn for corn, or money for money.

        Contracts of letting and hiring (locatio conductio):
            Letting of a thing on hire to another person who is to make use of it (locatio rei). If the thing can only be restored in specie, it may be the subject of an onerous contract combining the consideration of interest with it (pactum usurarium).
            Letting of work on hire (locatio operae). Consent to the use of my powers by another for a certain price (merces). The worker under this contract is a hired servant (mercenarius).
            Mandate²⁰⁵ (mandatum). The contract of mandate is an engagement to perform or execute a certain business in place and in name of another person. If the action is merely done in the place of another, but not, at the same time, in his name, it is performance without commission (gestio negotii); but if it is rightfully performed in name of the other, it constitutes mandate, which as a contract of procuration is an onerous contract (mandatum onerosum).

    The cautionary contracts (cautiones) are:
        Pledge (pignus). Caution by a moveable deposited as security.
        Suretyship (fidejussio). Caution for the fulfillment of the promise of another.
        Personal security (praestatio obsidis). Guarantee of personal performance.

This list of all modes in which the property of one person may be transferred or conveyed to another includes conceptions of certain objects or instruments required for such transference (translatio). These appear to be entirely empirical, and it may therefore seem questionable²⁰⁶ whether they are entitled to a place in a metaphysical science of right. For, in such a science, the divisions must be made according to principles a priori; and hence the matter of the juridical relation, which may be conventional, ought to be left out of account, and only its form should be taken into consideration.

Such conceptions may be illustrated²⁰⁷ by taking the instance of money, in contradistinction from all other exchangeable things as wares²⁰⁸ and merchandise; or by the case of a book. And considering these as illustrative examples in this connection, it will be shown that the conception of money as the greatest and most useable of all the means of human intercommunication through things, in the way of purchase and sale in commerce, as well as that of books as the greatest means of carrying on the interchange of thought, resolve themselves into relations that are purely intellectual and rational. And hence it will be made evident that such conceptions do not really detract from the purity of the given scheme of pure rational contracts, by empirical admixture.
Illustration of Relations of Contract by the Conceptions of Money and a Book
I. What is Money?

Money is a thing which can only be made use of, by being alienated²⁰⁹ or exchanged. This is a good nominal definition, as given by Achenwall; and it is sufficient to distinguish objects of the will of this kind from all other objects. But it gives us no information regarding the rational possibility of such a thing as money is. Yet we see thus much by the definition: (1) that the alienation in this mode of human intercommunication and exchange is not viewed as a gift, but is intended as a mode of reciprocal acquisition by an onerous contract; and (2) that it is regarded as a mere means of carrying on commerce, universally adopted by the people, but having no value as such of itself, in contrast to other things as mercantile goods or wares which have a particular value in relation to special wants existing among the people. It therefore represents all exchangeable things.

A bushel of corn has the greatest direct value as a means of satisfying human wants. Cattle may be fed by it; and these again are subservient²¹⁰ to our nourishment and locomotion²¹¹, and they even labour in our stead. Thus, by means of corn, men are multiplied and supported, who not only act again in reproducing such natural products, but also by other artificial products they can come to the relief of all our proper wants. Thus are men enabled to build dwellings²¹², to prepare clothing, and to supply all the ingenious comforts and enjoyments²¹³ which make up the products of industry. On the other hand, the value of money is only indirect. It cannot be itself enjoyed, nor be used directly for enjoyment; it is, however, a means towards this, and of all outward things it is of the highest utility.

We may found a real definition of money provisionally upon these considerations. It may thus be defined as the universal means of carrying on the industry of men in exchanging intercommunications with each other. Hence national wealth, in so far as it can be acquired by means of money, is properly only the sum of the industry or applied labour with which men pay each other, and which is represented by the money in circulation among the people.

The thing which is to be called money must, therefore, have cost as much industry to produce it, or even to put it into the hands of others, as may be equivalent to the industry or labour required for the acquisition of the goods or wares or merchandise, as natural or artificial products, for which it is exchanged. For if it were easier to procure²¹⁴ the material which is called money than the goods that are required, there would be more money in the market than goods to be sold; and because the seller would then have to expend²¹⁵ more labour upon his goods than the buyer on the equivalent, the money coming in to him more rapidly, the labour applied to the preparation of goods and industry generally, with the industrial productivity which is the source of the public wealth, would at the same time dwindle²¹⁶ and be cut down. Hence bank notes and assignations are not to be regarded as money, although they may take its place by way of representing it for a time; because it costs almost no labour to prepare them, and their value is based merely upon the opinion prevailing as to the further continuance of the previous possibility of changing them into ready money. But on its being in any way found out that there is not ready money in sufficient quantity for easy and safe conversion²¹⁷ of such notes or assignations, the opinion gives way, and a fall in their value becomes inevitable. Thus the industrial labour of those who work the gold and silver mines in Peru and Mexicoespecially on account of the frequent failures in the application of fruitless efforts to discover new veins²¹⁸ of these precious metals — is probably even greater than what is expended²¹⁹ in the manufacture of goods in Europe. Hence such mining labour, as unrewarded in the circumstances, would be abandoned of itself, and the countries mentioned would in consequence soon sink into poverty, did not the industry of Europe, stimulated²²⁰ in turn by these very metals, proportionally expand at the same time so as constantly to keep up the zeal²²¹ of the miners in their work by the articles of luxury thereby offered to them. It is thus that the concurrence²²² of industry with industry, and of labour with labour, is always maintained.

But how is it possible that what at the beginning constituted only goods or wares, at length became money? This has happened wherever a sovereign as great and powerful consumer of a particular substance, which he at first used merely for the adornment²²³ and decoration of his servants and court, has enforced the tribute of his subjects in this kind of material. Thus it may have been gold, or silver, or copper²²⁴, or a species of beautiful shells called cowries, or even a sort of mat called makutes, as in Congo; or ingots of iron, as in Senegal; or Negro slaves, as on the Guinea Coast. When the ruler of the country demanded such things as imposts, those whose labour had to be put in motion to procure them were also paid by means of them, according to certain regulations of commerce then established, as in a market or exchange. As it appears to me, it is only thus that a particular species of goods came to be made a legal means of carrying on the industrial labour of the subjects in their commerce with each other, and thereby forming the medium of the national wealth. And thus it practically became money.

The rational conception of money, under which the empirical conception is embraced, is therefore that of a thing which, in the course of the public permutation or exchange of possessions (permutatio publica), determines the price of all the other things that form products or goods — under which term even the sciences are included, in so far as they are not taught gratis²²⁵ to others. The quantity of it among a people constitutes their wealth (opulentia). For price (pretium) is the public judgement about the value of a thing, in relation to the proportionate abundance of what forms the universal representative means in circulation for carrying on the reciprocal interchange of the products of industry or labour.3 The precious metals, when they are not merely weighed but also stamped or provided with a sign indicating how much they are worth, form legal money, and are called coin.

3Hence where commerce is extensive neither gold nor copper is specially used as money, but only as constituting wares; because there is too little of the first and too much of the second for them to be easily brought into circulation, so as at once to have the former in such small pieces as are necessary in payment for particular goods and not to have the latter in great quantity in case of the smallest acquisitions. Hence silver — more or less alloyed with copper — is taken as the proper material of money and the measure of the calculation of all prices in the great commercial intercommunications of the world; and the other metals — and still more non-metalic substancescan only take its place in the case of a people of limited commerce.

According to Adam Smith: “Money has become, in all civilized nations, the universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold or exchanged for one another.” This definition expands the empirical conception of money to the rational idea of it, by taking regard only to the implied form of the reciprocal performances in the onerous contracts, and thus abstracting from their matter. It is thus conformable to the conception of right in the permutation and exchange of the mine and thine generally (commutatio late sic dicta). The definition, therefore, accords with the representation in the above synopsis²²⁶ of a dogmatic division of contracts a priori, and consequently with the metaphysical principle of right in general.
II. What is a Book?

A book is a writing which contains a discourse²²⁷ addressed by some one to the public, through visible signs of speech. It is a matter of indifference to the present considerations whether it is written by a pen or imprinted²²⁸ by types, and on few or many pages. He who speaks to the public in his own name is the author. He who addresses the writing to the public in the name of the author is the publisher. When a publisher does this with the permission or authority of the author, the act is in accordance with right, and he is the rightful publisher; but if this is done without such permission or authority, the act is contrary to right, and the publisher is a counterfeiter²³⁰ or unlawful publisher. The whole of a set of copies of the original document is called an edition.
The Unauthorized Publishing of Books is Contrary to the Principles of Right, and is Rightly Prohibited.

A writing is not an immediate direct presentation of a conception, as is the case, for instance, with an engraving²³³ that exhibits a portrait, or a bust²³⁴ or cast by a sculptor²³⁵. It is a discourse addressed in a particular form to the public; and the author may be said to speak publicly by means of his publisher. The publisher, again, speaks by the aid of the printer as his workman (operarius), yet not in his own name, for otherwise he would be the author, but in the name of the author; and he is only entitled to do so in virtue of a mandate given him to that effect by the author. Now the unauthorized printer and publisher speaks by an assumed authority in his publication; in the name indeed of the author, but without a mandate to that effect (gerit se mandatarium absque mandato). Consequently such an unauthorized publication is a wrong committed upon the authorized²³² and only lawful²³¹ publisher, as it amounts to a pilfering²³⁶ of the profits which the latter was entitled and able to draw from the use of his proper right (furtum usus). Unauthorized printing and publication of books is, therefore, forbidden — as an act of counterfeit²²⁹ and piracyon the ground of right.

There seems, however, to be an impression that there is a sort of common right to print and publish books; but the slightest reflection must convince any one that this would be a great injustice. The reason of it is found simply in the fact that a book, regarded from one point of view, is an external product of mechanical art (opus mechanicum), that can be imitated by any one who may be in rightful possession of a copy; and it is therefore his by a real right.

But, from another point of view, a book is not merely an external thing, but is a discourse of the publisher to the public, and he is only entitled to do this publicly under the mandate of the author (praestatio operae); and this constitutes a personal right. The error underlying²³⁷ the impression referred to, therefore, arises from an interchange and confusion of these two kinds of right in relation to books.
Confusion of Personal Right and Real Right.

The confusion of personal right with real right may be likewise shown by reference to a difference of view in connection with another contract, falling under the head of contracts of hiring (B II. I), namely, the contract of lease (jus incolatus). The question is raised as to whether a proprietor when he has sold a house or a piece of ground held on lease, before the expiry of the period of lease, was bound to add the condition of the continuance of the lease to the contract of purchase; or whether it should be held that “purchase breaks hire,” of course under reservation of a period of warning determined by the nature of the subject in use. In the former view, a house or farm would be regarded as having a burden lying upon it, constituting a real right acquired in it by the lessee²³⁸; and this might well enough be carried out by a clause merely indorsing or ingrossing the contract of lease in the deed of sale. But as it would no longer then be a simple lease; another contract would properly be required to be conjoined, a matter which few lessors would be disposed to grant. The proposition, then, that “Purchase breaks hire” holds in principle; for the full right in a thing as a property overbears all personal right, which is inconsistent with it. But there remains a right of action to the lessee, on the ground of a personal right for indemnification on account of any loss arising from breaking of the contract.
EPISODICAL SECTION.
The Ideal Acquisition of External Objects of the Will.
32. The Nature and Modes of Ideal Acquisition.

I call that mode of acquisition ideal which involves no causality in time, and which is founded upon a mere idea of pure reason. It is nevertheless actual, and not merely imaginary acquisition: and it is not called real only because the act of acquisition is not empirical. This character of the act arises from the peculiarity²³⁹ that the person acquiring acquires from another who either is not yet, and who can only be regarded as a possible being, or who is just ceasing to be, or who no longer is. Hence such a mode of attaining to possession is to be regarded as a mere practical idea of reason.

There are three modes of ideal acquisition:

I. Acquisition by usucapion;
II. Acquisition by inheritance or succession;
III. Acquisition by undying merit (meritum immortale), or the claim by right to a good name at death.

These three modes of acquisition can, as a matter of fact, only have effect in a public juridical state of existence, but they are not founded merely upon the civil constitution or upon arbitrary statutes²⁴¹; they are already contained a priori in the conception of the state of nature, and are thus necessarily conceivable prior to their empirical manifestation²⁴². The laws regarding them in the civil constitution ought to be regulated by that rational conception.
33. I. Acquisition by Usucapion. (Acquisitio per Usucapionem).

I may acquire the property of another merely by long possession and use of it (usucapio). Such property is not acquired, because I may legitimately²⁴⁴ presume that his consent is given to this effect (per consensum praesumptum); nor because I can assume that, as he does not oppose my acquisition of it, he has relinquished²⁴⁵ or abandoned it as his (rem derelictam). But I acquire it thus because, even if there were any one actually raising a claim to this property as its true owner, I may exclude him on the ground of my long possession of it, ignore his previous existence, and proceed as if he existed during the time of my possession as a mere abstraction, although I may have been subsequently apprized of his reality as well as of his claim. This mode of acquisition is not quite correctly designated acquisition by prescription²⁴⁶ (per praescriptionem); for the exclusion²⁴⁷ of all other claimants is to be regarded as only the consequence of the usucapion; and the process of acquisition must have gone before the right of exclusion. The rational possibility of such a mode of acquisition has now to be proved.

Any one who does not exercise a continuous possessory activity (actus possessorius) in relation to a thing as his is regarded with good right as one who does not at all exist as its possessor. For he cannot complain of lesion so long as he does not qualify himself with a title as its possessor. And even if he should afterwards lay claim to the thing when another has already taken possession of it, he only says he was once on a time owner of it, but not that he is so still, or that his possession has continued without interruption as a juridical fact. It can, therefore, only be a juridical process of possession, that has been maintained without interruption and is proveable by documentary fact, that any one can secure for himself what is his own after ceasing for a long time to make use of it.

For, suppose that the neglect to exercise this possessory activity had not the effect of enabling another to found upon his hitherto lawful, undisputed and bona fide possession, and irrefragable right to continue in its possession so that he may regard the thing that is thus in his possession as acquired by him. Then no acquisition would ever become peremptory and secured, but all acquisition would only be provisory and temporary. This is evident on the ground that there are no historical records available to carry the investigation of a title back to the first possessor and his act of acquisition. The presumption upon which acquisition by usucapion is founded is, therefore, not merely its conformity to right as allowed and just, but also the presumption of its being right (praesumtio juris et de jure), and its being assumed to be in accordance with compulsory laws (suppositio legalis). Anyone who has neglected to embody²⁴⁸ his possessory act in a documentary title has lost his claim to the right of being possessor for the time; and the length of the period of his neglecting to do so — which need not necessarily be particularly defined — can be referred to only as establishing the certainty of this neglect. And it would contradict the postulate of the juridically practical reason to maintain that one hitherto unknown as a possessor, and whose possessory activity has at least been interrupted, whether by or without fault of his own, could always at any time re-acquire a property; for this would be to make all ownership uncertain (dominia rerum incerta facere).

But if he is a member of the commonwealth²⁴⁹ or civil union, the state may maintain his possession for him vicariously, although it may be interrupted as private possession; and in that case the actual possessor will not be able to prove a title of acquisition even from a first occupation, nor to found upon a title of usucapion. But, in the state of nature, usucapion is universally a rightful ground of holding, not properly as a juridical mode of requiring a thing, but as a ground for maintaining oneself in possession of it where there are no juridical acts. A release from juridical claims is commonly also called acquisition. The prescriptive title of the older possessor, therefore, belongs to the sphere of natural right (est juris naturae).
34. II. Acquisition by Inheritance. (Acquisitio haereditatis).

Inheritance is constituted by the transfer (translatio) of the property or goods of one who is dying to a survivor²⁵⁰, through the consent of the will of both. The acquisition of the heir who takes the estate (haeredis instituti) and the relinquishment of the testator who leaves it, being the acts that constitute the exchange of the mine and thine, take place in the same moment of time — in articulo mortisand just when the testator ceases to be. There is therefore no special act of transfer (translatio) in the empirical sense; for that would involve two successive acts, by which the one would first divest²⁵¹ himself of his possession, and the other would thereupon enter into it. Inheritance as constituted by a simultaneous double act is, therefore, an ideal mode of acquisition. Inheritance is inconceivable in the state of nature without a testamentary disposition²⁵² (dispositio ultimae voluntatis); and the question arises as to whether this mode of acquisition is to be regarded as a contract of succession, or a unilateral act instituting an heir by a will (testamentum). The determination of this question depends on the further question, whether and how, in the very same moment in which one individual ceases to be, there can be a transition of his property to another person. Hence the problem, as to how a mode of acquisition by inheritance is possible, must be investigated independently of the various possible forms in which it is practically carried out, and which can have place only in a commonwealth.

“It is possible to acquire by being instituted or appointed heir in a testamentary disposition.” For the testator Caius promises and declares in his last will to Titius, who knows nothing of this promise, to transfer to him his estate in case of death, but thus continuing as long as he lives sole owner of it. Now by a mere unilateral act of will, nothing can in fact be transmitted to another person, as in addition to the promise of the one party there is required acceptance (acceptatio) on the part of the other, and a simultaneous bilateral act of will (voluntas simultanea) which, however, is here awanting. So long as Caius lives, Titius cannot expressly accept in order to enter on acquisition, because Caius has only promised in case of death; otherwise the property would be for a moment at least in common possession, which is not the will of the testator. However, Titius acquires tacitly a special right to the inheritance as a real right. This is constituted by the sole and exclusive right to accept the estate (jus in re jacente), which is therefore called at that point of time a haereditas jacens. Now as every man — because he must always gain and never lose by itnecessarily, although tacitly, accepts such a right, and as Titius after the death of Caius is in this position, he may acquire the succession as heir by acceptance of the promise. And the estate is not in the meantime entirely without an owner (res nullius), but is only in abeyance²⁵³ or vacant (vacua); because he has exclusively the right of choice as to whether he will actually make the estate bequeathed to him his own or not.

Hence testaments²⁵⁴ are valid according to mere natural right (sunt juris naturae). This assertion however, is to be understood in the sense that they are capable and worthy⁶² of being introduced and sanctioned in the civil state, whenever it is instituted. For it is only the common will in the civil state that maintains the possession of the inheritance or succession, while it hangs between acceptance or rejection²⁵⁵ and specially belongs to no particular individual.
35. III. The Continuing Right of a Good Name after Death. (Bona fama Defuncti).

It would be absurd to think that a dead person could possess anything after his death, when he no longer exists in the eye of the law, if the matter in question were a mere thing. But a good name is a congenital and external, although merely ideal, possession, which attaches inseparably to the individual as a person. Now we can and must abstract here from all consideration as to whether the persons cease to be after death or still continue as such to exist; because, in considering their juridical relation to others, we regard persons merely according to their humanity and as rational beings (homo noumenon). Hence any attempt to bring the reputation or good name of a person into evil and false repute after death, is always questionable, even although a well-founded charge may be allowed — for to that extent the brocard “De mortuis nil⁷⁷ nisi bene”4 is wrong. Yet to spread charges against one who is absent and cannot defend himself, shows at least a want of magnanimity.

4[Let nothing be said of the dead but what is favourable²⁵⁶.]

By a blameless life and a death that worthily²⁵⁷ ends it, nothing ends it, it is admitted that a man may acquire a (negatively) good reputation constituting something that is his own, even when he no longer exists in the world of sense as a visible person (homo phaenomenon). It is further held that his survivors²⁵⁸ and successorswhether relatives or strangers — are entitled to defend his good name as a matter of right, on the ground that unproved accusations²⁶⁰ subject them all to the danger of similar treatment after death. Now that a man when dead can yet acquire such a right is a peculiar²⁴⁰ and, nevertheless, an undeniable manifestation in fact, of the a priori law-giving reason thus extending its law of command or prohibition beyond the limits of the present life. If some one then spreads a charge regarding a dead person that would have dishonoured²⁶² him when living, or even made him despicable, any one who can adduce a proof that this accusation²⁵⁹ is intentionally²⁶³ false and untrue may publicly declare him who thus brings the dead person into ill repute to be a calumniator²⁶⁴, and affix²⁶⁵ dishonour²⁶¹ to him in turn. This would not be allowable unless it were legitimate²⁴³ to assume that the dead person was injured by the accusation, although he is dead, and that a certain just satisfaction was done to him by an apology, although he no longer sensibly exists. A title to act the part the vindicator²⁶⁶ of the dead person does not require to be established; for every one necessarily claims this of himself, not merely as a duty of virtue regarded ethically²⁶⁷, but as a right belonging to him in virtue of his humanity. Nor does the vindicator require to show any special personal damage, accruing²⁶⁸ to him as a friend or relative, from a stain on the character of the deceased, to justify him in proceeding to censure²⁶⁹ it. That such a form of ideal acquisition, and even a right in an individual after death against survivors, is thus actually founded, cannot, therefore, be disputed, although the possibility of such a right is not capable of logical deduction.

There is no ground for drawing visionary inferences from what has just been stated, to the presentiment²⁷⁰ of a future life and invisible relations to departed souls. For the considerations connected with this right turn on nothing more than the purely moral and juridical relation which subsists²⁷¹ among men, even in the present life, as rational beings. Abstraction is, however, made from all that belongs physically to their existence in space and time; that is, men are considered logically apart from these physical concomitants of their nature, not as to their state when actually deprived of them, but only in so far as being spirits they are in a condition that might realize the injury done them by calumniators. Any one who may falsely say something against me a hundred years hence injures me even now. For in the pure juridical relation, which is entirely rational and surprasensible, abstraction is made from the physical conditions of time, and the calumniator is as culpable²⁷² as if he had committed the offence in my lifetime; only this will not be tried by a criminal process, but he will only be punished with that loss of honour he would have caused to another, and this is inflicted²⁷³ upon him by public opinion according to the lex talionis. Even a plagiarism²⁷⁴ from a dead author, although it does not tarnish²⁷⁵ the honour of the deceased, but only deprives him of a part of his property, is yet properly regarded as a lesion of his human right.
CHAPTER III.
Acquisition Conditioned by the Sentence of a Public Judicatory.
36. How and What Acquisition is Subjectively Conditioned by the Principle of a Public Court.

Natural right, understood simply as that right which is not statutory, and which is knowable purely a priori, by every man’s reason, will include distributive justice as well as commutative justice. It is manifest that the latter, as constituting the justice that is valid between persons in their reciprocal relations of intercourse with one another, must belong to natural right. But this holds also of distributive justice, in so far as it can be known a priori; and decisions or sentences regarding it must be regulated by the law of natural right.

The moral person who presides in the sphere of justice and administers it is called the Court of justice, and, as engaged in the process of official duty, the judicatory; the sentence delivered in a case, is the judgement (judicium). All this is to be here viewed a priori, according to the rational conditions of right, without taking into consideration how such a constitution is to be actually established or organized, for which particular statutes, and consequently empirical principles, are requisite.

The question, then, in this connection, is not merely “What is right in itself?” in the sense in which every man must determine it by the judgement of reason; but “What is right as applied to this case?” that is, “What is right and just as viewed by a court?” The rational and the judicial²⁷⁶ points of view are therefore to be distinguished; and there are four cases in which the two forms of judgement have a different and opposite issue. And yet they may co-exist with each other, because they are delivered from two different, yet respectively true, points of view: the one from regard to private right, the other from the idea of public right. They are: I. The contract of donation (pactum donationis); II. The contract of loan (commodatum); III. The action of real revindication (vindicatio); and IV. Guarantee by oath (juramentum).

It is a common error on the part of the jurist to fall here into the fallacy of begging the question by a tacit assumption (vitium subreptionis). This is done by assuming as objective and absolute the juridical principle which a public court of justice is entitled and even bound to adopt in its own behoof, and only from the subjective purpose of qualifying itself to decide and judge upon all the rights pertaining²⁷⁷ to individuals. It is therefore of no small importance to make this specific difference intelligible, and to draw attention to it.
37. I. The Contract of Donation. (Pactum Donationis).

The contract of donation signifies the gratuitous alienation (gratis) of a thing or right that is mine. It involves a relation between me as the donor²⁷⁸ (donans), and another person as the donatory (donatarius), in accordance with the principle of private right, by which what is mine is transferred to the latter, on his acceptance of it, as a gift (donum). However, it is not to be presumed that I have voluntarily bound myself thereby so as to be compelled to keep my promise, and that I have thus given away my freedom gratuitously²⁷⁹, and, as it were, to that extent thrown myself away. Nemo suum jactare praesumitur. But this is what would happen, under such circumstances, according to the principle of right in the civil state; for in this sphere the donatory can compel me, under certain conditions, to perform my promise. If, then, the case comes before a court, according to the conditions of public right, it must either be presumed that the donor has consented to such compulsion, or the court would give no regard, in the sentence, to the consideration as to whether he intended to reserve the right to resile from his promise or not; but would only refer to what is certain, namely, the condition of the promise and the acceptance of the donatory. Although the promiser, therefore, thought — as may easily be supposed — that he could not be bound by his promise in any case, if he “rued” it before it was actually carried out, yet the court assumes that he ought expressly to have reserved this condition if such was his mind; and if he did not make such an express reservation, it will be held that he can be compelled to implement²⁸⁰ his promise. And this principle is assumed by the court, because the administration of justice would otherwise be endlessly impeded²⁸¹, or even made entirely impossible.
38. II. The Contract of Loan. (Commodatum).

In the contract of commodate-loan (commodatum) I give some one the gratuitous use of something that is mine. If it is a thing that is given on loan, the contracting parties agree that the borrower will restore the very same thing to the power of the lender, But the receiver of the loan (commodatarius) cannot, at the same time, assume that the owner of the thing lent (commodans) will take upon himself all risk (casus) of any possible loss of it, or of its useful quality, that may arise from having given it into the possession of the receiver. For it is not to be understood of itself that the owner, besides the use of the thing, which he has granted to the receiver, and the detriment²⁸² that is inseparable from such use, also gives a guarantee or warrandice against all damage that may arise from such use. On the contrary, a special accessory contract would have to be entered into for this purpose. The only question, then, that can be raised is this: “Is it incumbent²⁸³ on the lender or the borrower to add expressly the condition of undertaking²⁸⁴ the risk that may accrue²⁸⁵ to the thing lent; or, if this is not done, which of the parties is to be presumed to have consented and agreed to guarantee the property of the lender, up to restoration of the very same thing or its equivalent?” Certainly not the lender; because it cannot be presumed that he has gratuitously agreed to give more than the mere use of the thing, so that he cannot be supposed to have also undertaken the risk of loss of his property. But this may be assumed on the side of the borrower; because he thereby undertakes and performs nothing more than what is implied in the contract.

For example, I enter a house, when overtaken by a shower of rain, and ask the loan of a cloak. But through accidental contact with colouring matter, it becomes entirely spoiled while in my possession; or on entering another house, I lay it aside and it is stolen. Under such circumstances, everybody would think it absurd for me to assert that I had no further concern with the cloak but to return it as it was, or, in the latter case, only to mention the fact of the theft; and that, in any case, anything more required would be but an act of courtesy in expressing sympathy with the owner on account of his loss, seeing he can claim nothing on the ground of right. It would be otherwise, however, if, on asking the use of an article, I discharged myself beforehand from all responsibility, in case of its coming to grief while in my hands, on the ground of my being poor and unable to compensate²⁸⁶ any incidental loss. No one could find such a condition superfluous²⁸⁷ or ludicrous, unless the borrower were, in fact, known to be a well-to-do and well-disposed man; because in such a case it would almost be an insult not to act on the presumption of generous compensation for any loss sustained.

Now by the very nature of this contract, the possible damage (casus) which the thing lent may undergo cannot be exactly determined in any agreement. Commodate is therefore an uncertain contract (pactum incertum), because the consent can only be so far presumed. The judgement, in any case, deciding upon whom the incidence of any loss must fall, cannot therefore be determined from the conditions of the contract in itself, but only by the principle of the court before which it comes, and which can only consider what is certain in the contract; and the only thing certain is always the fact as to the possession of the thing as property. Hence the judgement passed in the state of nature will be different from that given by a court of justice in the civil state. The judgement from the standpoint of natural right will be determined by regard to the inner rational quality of the thing, and will run thus: “Loss arising from damage accruing to a thing lent falls upon the borrower” (casum sentit commodatarius); whereas the sentence of a court of justice in the civil state will run thus: “The loss falls upon the lender” (casum sentit dominus). The latter judgement turns out differently from the former as the sentence of the mere sound reason, because a public judge cannot found upon presumptions²⁸⁸ as to what either party may have thought; and thus the one who has not obtained release from all loss in the thing, by a special accessory contract, must bear the loss. Hence the difference between the judgement as the court must deliver it and the form in which each individual is entitled to hold it for himself, by his private reason, is a matter of importance, and is not to be overlooked in the consideration of juridical judgements.
39. III. The Revindication of what has been Lost. (Vindicatio).

It is clear from what has been already said that a thing of mine which continues to exist remains mine, although I may not be in continuous occupation of it; and that it does not cease to be mine without a juridical act of dereliction or alienation. Further, it is evident that a right in this thing (jus reale) belongs in consequence to me (jus personale), against every holder of it, and not merely against some particular person. But the question now arises as to whether this right must be regarded by every other person as a continuous right of property per se, if I have not in any way renounced it, although the thing is in the possession of another.

A thing may be lost (res amissa) and thus come into other hands in an honourable²⁸⁹ bona fide way as a supposed “find”; or it may come to me by formal transfer on the part of one who is in possession of it, and who professes²⁹⁰ to be its owner, although he is not so. Taking the latter case, the question arises whether, since I cannot acquire a thing from one who is not its owner (a non domino), I am excluded by the fact from all right in the thing itself, and have merely a personal right against a wrongful possessor? This is manifestly so, if the acquisition is judged purely according to its inner justifying²⁹¹ grounds and viewed according to the state of nature, and not according to the convenience of a court of justice.

For everything alienable must be capable of being acquired by anyone. The rightfulness of acquisition, however, rests entirely upon the form in accordance with which what is in possession of another, is transferred to me and accepted by me. In other words, rightful acquisition depends upon the formality of the juridical act of commutation or interchange between the possessor of the thing and the acquirer of it, without its being required to ask how the former came by it; because this would itself be an injury, on the ground that: Quilibet praesumitur bonus. Now suppose it turned out that the said possessor was not the real owner, I cannot admit that the real owner is entitled to hold me directly responsible, or so entitled with regard to any one who might be holding the thing. For I have myself taken nothing away from him, when, for example, I bought his horse according to the law (titulo empti venditi) when it was offered for sale in the public market. The title of acquisition is therefore unimpeachable²⁹² on my side; and as buyer I am not bound, nor even have I the right, to investigate the title of the seller; for this process of investigation would have to go on in an ascending series ad infinitum. Hence on such grounds I ought to be regarded, in virtue of a regular and formal purchase, as not merely the putative²⁹³, but the real owner of the horse.

But against this position, there immediately start up the following juridical principles. Any acquisition derived from one who is not the owner of the thing in question is null and void. I cannot derive⁴⁷ from another anything more than what he himself rightfully has; and although as regards the form of the acquisition the modus acquirendi — I may proceed in accordance with all the conditions of right when I deal in a stolen horse exposed for sale in the market, yet a real title warranting the acquisition was awanting; for the horse was not really the property of the seller in question. However I may be a bona fide possessor of a thing under such conditions, I am still only a putative owner, and the real owner has the right of vindication⁹⁴ against me (rem suam vindicandi).

Now, it may be again asked, what is right and just in itself regarding the acquisition of external things among men in their intercourse with one another — viewed in the state of nature according to the principles of commutative justice? And it must be admitted in this connection that whoever has a purpose of acquiring anything must regard it as absolutely necessary to investigate whether the thing which he wishes to acquire does not already belong to another person. For although he may carefully observe the formal conditions required for appropriating what may belong to the property of another, as in buying a horse according to the usual terms in a market, yet he can, at the most, acquire only a personal right in relation to a thing (jus ad rem) so long as it is still unknown to him whether another than the seller may not be the real owner. Hence, if some other person were to come forward and prove by documentary evidence a prior right of property in the thing, nothing would remain for the putative new owner but the advantage which he has drawn as a bona fide possessor of it up to that moment. Now it is frequently impossible to discover the absolutely first original owner of a thing in the series of putative owners, who derive their right from one another. Hence no mere exchange of external things, however well it may agree with the formal conditions of commutative justice, can ever guarantee an absolutely certain acquisition.

Here, however, the juridically law-giving reason comes in again with the principle of distributive justice; and it adopts as a criterion of the rightfulness of possession, not what is in itself in reference to the private will of each individual in the state of nature, but only the consideration of how it would be adjudged by a court of justice in a civil state, constituted by the united will of all. In this connection, fulfillment of the formal conditions of acquisition, that in themselves only establish a personal right, is postulated²⁹⁴ as sufficient; and they stand as an equivalent for the material conditions which properly establish the derivation of property from a prior putative owner, to the extent of making what is in itself only a personal right, valid before a court, as a real right. Thus the horse which I bought when exposed for sale in the public market, under conditions regulated by the municipal law, becomes my property if all the conditions of purchase and sale have been exactly observed in the transaction; but always under the reservation that the real owner continues to have the right of a claim against the seller, on the ground of his prior unalienated possession. My otherwise personal right is thus transmuted²⁹⁵ into a real right, according to which I may take and vindicate²⁹⁶ the object as mine wherever I may find it, without being responsible for the way in which the Seller had come into possession of it.

It is therefore only in behoof of the requirements of juridical decision in a court (in favorem justitae distributivae) that the right in respect of a thing is regarded, not as personal, which it is in itself, but as real, because it can thus be most easily and certainly adjudged; and it is thus accepted and dealt with according to a pure principle a priori. Upon this principle, various statutory laws come to be founded which specially aim at laying down the conditions under which alone a mode of acquisition shall be legitimate, so that the judge may be able to assign every one his own as easily and certainly as possible. Thus, in the brocard, “Purchase breaks hire,” what by the nature of the subject is a real right — namely the hire — is taken to hold as a merely personal right; and, conversely, as in the case referred to above, what is in itself merely a personal right is held to be valid as a real right. And this is done only when the question arises as to the principles by which a court of justice in the civil state is to be guided, in order to proceed with all possible safety in delivering judgement on the rights of individuals.
40. IV. Acquisition of Security by the Taking of an Oath. (Cautio Juratoria).

Only one ground can be assigned on which it could be held that men are bound in the juridical relation to believe and to confess that there are gods, or that there is a God. It is that they may be able to swear an oath; and that thus by the fear of an all-seeing Supreme²⁹⁷ Power, whose revenge they must solemnly invoke²⁹⁸ upon themselves in case their utterance²⁹⁹ should be false, they may be constrained³⁰⁰ to be truthful³⁰¹ in statement and faithful in promising³⁰². It is not morality but merely blind superstition³⁰³ that is reckoned upon in this process; for it is evident it implies that no certainty is to be expected from a mere solemn declaration in matters of right before a court, although the duty of truthfulness³⁰⁴ must have always appeared self-evident to all, in a matter which concerns the holiest that can be among men — namely, the right of man. Hence recourse has been had to a motive³⁰⁵ founded on mere myths and fables³⁰⁶ as imaginary guarantees. Thus among the Rejangs, a heathen people in Sumatra, it is the customaccording to the testimony³⁰⁷ of Marsden — to swear by the bones of their dead relatives, although they have no belief in a life after death. In like manner the negroes of Guinea swear by their fetish, a bird’s feather, which they imprecate under the belief that it will break their neck. And so in other cases. The belief underlying these oaths is that an invisible power — whether it has understanding or notby its very nature possesses magical power that can be put into action by such invocations. Such a belief — which is commonly called religion, but which ought to be called superstition — is, however, indispensable for the administration of justice; because, without referring to it, a court of justice would not have adequate means to ascertain³⁰⁸ facts otherwise kept secret, and to determine rights. A law making an oath obligatory³⁰⁹ is therefore only given in behoof of the judicial authority.

But then the question arises as to what the obligation could be founded upon that would bind any one in a court of justice to accept the oath of another person as a right and valid proof of the truth of his statements which are to put an end to all dispute. In other words, what obliges me juridically to believe that another person when taking an oath has any religion at all, so that I should subordinate or entrust³¹⁰ my right to his oath? And, on like grounds, conversely, can I be bound at all to take an oath? It is evident that both these questions point to what is in itself morally wrong.

But in relation to a court of justice — and generally in the civil state — if it be assumed there are no other means of getting to the truth in certain cases than by an oath, it must be adopted. In regard to religion, under the supposition that every one has it, it may be utilized³¹¹ as a necessary means (in causu necessitatis), in behoof of the legitimate procedure of a court of justice. The court uses this form of spiritual compulsion (tortura spiritualis) as an available means, in conformity with the superstitious³¹² propensity³¹³ of mankind, for the ascertainment³¹⁴ of what is concealed³¹⁵; and therefore holds itself justified in so doing. The legislative power, however, is fundamentally wrong in assigning this authority to the judicial power, because even in the civil state any compulsion with regard to the taking of oaths is contrary to the inalienable freedom of man.

Official oaths, which are usually promissory, being taken on entering upon an office, to the effect that the individual has sincere intention to administer his functions dutifully, might well be changed into assertory oaths, to be taken at the end of a year or more of actual administration, the official swearing to the faithfulness of his discharge of duty during that time. This would bring the conscience more into action than the promissory oath, which always gives room for the internal pretext³¹⁶ that, with the best intention, the difficulties that arose during the administration of the official function were not foreseen. And, further, violations³¹⁷ of duty, under the prospect of their being summed up by future censors³¹⁸, would give rise to more anxiety as to censure than when they are merely represented, one after the other, and forgotten.

As regards an oath taken concerning a matter of belief (de credulitate), it is evident that no such oath can be demanded by a court. 1. For, first, it contains in itself a contradiction. Such belief, as intermediate between opinion and knowledge, is a thing on which one might venture to lay a wager³¹⁹ but not to swear an oath. 2. And, second, the judge who imposes an oath of belief, in order to ascertain anything pertinent³²⁰ to his own purpose or even to the common good, commits a great offence against the conscientiousness³²¹ of the party taking such an oath. This he does in regard both to the levity³²² of mind, which he thereby helps to engender³²³, and to the stings of conscience which a man must feel who to-day regards a subject from a certain point of view, but who will very probably to-morrow find it quite improbable from another point of view. Any one, therefore, who is compelled to take such an oath, is subjected to an injury.
Transition from the Mine and Thine in the State of Nature to the Mine and Thine in the Juridical State Generally.
41. Public Justice as Related to the Natural and the Civil State.

The juridical state is that relation of men to one another which contains the conditions under which it is alone possible for every one to obtain the right that is his due. The formal principle of the possibility of actually participating in such right, viewed in accordance with the idea of a universally legislative will, is public justice. Public justice may be considered in relation either to the possibility, or actuality, or necessity of the possession of objects — regarded as the matter of the activity of the will — according to laws. It may thus be divided into protective justice (justitia testatrix), commutative justice (justitia commutativa), and distributive justice (justitia distributiva), in the first mode of justice, the law declares merely what relation is internally right in respect of form (lex justi); in the second, it declares what is likewise externally in accord with a law in respect of the object, and what possession is rightful (lex juridica); and in the third, it declares what is right, and what is just, and to what extent, by the judgement of a court in any particular case coming under the given law. In this latter relation, the public court is called the justice of the country; and the question whether there actually is or is not such an administration of public justice may be regarded as the most important of all juridical interests.

The non-juridical state is that condition of society in which there is no distributive justice. It is commonly called the natural state (status naturalis), or the state of nature. It is not the social state, as Achenwall puts it, for this may be in itself an artificial state (status artificialis), that is to be contradistinguished from the “natural” state. The opposite of the state of nature is the civil state (status civilis) as the condition of a society standing under a distributive justice. In the state of nature, there may even be juridical forms of society such as marriage, parental authority, the household, and such like. For none of these, however, does any law a priori lay it down as an incumbent obligation: “Thou shalt enter into this state.” But it may be said of the juridical state that: “All men who may even involuntarily come into relations of right with one another ought to enter into this state.”

The natural or non-juridical social state may be viewed as the sphere of private right, and the civil state may be specially regarded as the sphere of public right. The latter state contains no more and no other duties of men towards each other than what may be conceived in connection with the former state; the matter of private right is, in short, the very same in both. The laws of the civil state, therefore, only turn upon the juridical form of the coexistence of men under a common constitution; and, in this respect, these laws must necessarily be regarded and conceived as public laws.

The civil union (unio civilis) cannot, in the strict sense, be properly called a society; for there is no sociality in common between the ruler (imperans) and the subject (subditus) under a civil constitution. They are not co-ordinated as associates in a society with each other, but the one is subordinated to the other. Those who may be co-ordinated with one another must consider themselves as mutually equal, in so far as they stand under common laws. The civil union may therefore be regarded not so much as being, but rather as making a society.
42. The Postulate of Public Right.

From the conditions of private right in the natural state, there arises the postulate of public right. It may be thus expressed: “In the relation of unavoidable coexistence with others, thou shalt pass from the state of nature into a juridical union constituted under the condition of a distributive justice.” The principle of this postulate may be unfolded analytically³²⁴ from the conception of right in the external relation, contradistinguished from mere might as violence.

No one is under obligation to abstain from interfering with the possession of others, unless they give him a reciprocal guarantee for the observance of a similar abstention from interference with his possession. Nor does he require to wait for proof by experience of the need of this guarantee, in view of the antagonistic³²⁵ disposition of others. He is therefore under no obligation to wait till he acquires practical prudence¹⁵⁵ at his own cost; for he can perceive in himself evidence of the natural inclination of men to play the master over others, and to disregard the claims of the right of others, when they feel themselves their superiors by might or fraud. And thus it is not necessary to wait for the melancholy³²⁶ experience of actual hostility³²⁷; the individual is from the first entitled to exercise a rightful compulsion towards those who already threaten him by their very nature. Quilibet praesumitur malus, donec securitatem dederit oppositi.

So long as the intention to live and continue in this state of externally lawless freedom prevails, men may be said to do no wrong or injustice at all to one another, even when they wage war against each other. For what seems competent as good for the one is equally valid for the other, as if it were so by mutual agreement. Uti partes de jure suo disponunt, ita jus est. But generally they must be considered as being in the highest state of wrong, as being and willing to be in a condition which is not juridical, and in which, therefore, no one can be secured against violence, in the possession of his own.

The distinction between what is only formally and what is also materially wrong, and unjust, finds frequent application in the science of right. An enemy who, on occupying a besieged³²⁸ fortress³²⁹, instead of honourably³³⁰ fulfilling the conditions of a capitulation, maltreats the garrison³³¹ on marching out, or otherwise violates the agreement, cannot complain of injury or wrong if on another occasion the same treatment is inflicted upon themselves. But, in fact, all such actions fundamentally involve the commission of wrong and injustice, in the highest degree; because they take all validity away from the conception of right, and give up everything, as it were by law itself, to savage violence, and thus overthrow³³² the rights of men generally.

1 promulgation   

n.颁布

参考例句：

• The new law comes into force from the day of its promulgation. 新法律自公布之日起生效。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Article 118 These Regulations shall come into effect from the day of their promulgation. 第一百一十八条本条例自公布之日起实施。 来自经济法规部分

2 subjective   

a.主观(上)的，个人的

参考例句：

• The way they interpreted their past was highly subjective. 他们解释其过去的方式太主观。
• A literary critic should not be too subjective in his approach. 文学评论家的看法不应太主观。

3 purely   

adv.纯粹地，完全地

参考例句：

• I helped him purely and simply out of friendship.我帮他纯粹是出于友情。
• This disproves the theory that children are purely imitative.这证明认为儿童只会单纯地模仿的理论是站不住脚的。

4 mere   

adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过

参考例句：

• That is a mere repetition of what you said before.那不过是重复了你以前讲的话。
• It's a mere waste of time waiting any longer.再等下去纯粹是浪费时间。

5 intelligible   

adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的

参考例句：

• This report would be intelligible only to an expert in computing.只有计算机运算专家才能看懂这份报告。
• His argument was barely intelligible.他的论点不易理解。

6 detention   

n.滞留，停留；拘留，扣留；(教育)留下

参考例句：

• He was kept in detention by the police.他被警察扣留了。
• He was in detention in connection with the bribery affair.他因与贿赂事件有牵连而被拘留了。

7 postulate   

n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定

参考例句：

• Let's postulate that she is a cook.我们假定她是一位厨师。
• Freud postulated that we all have a death instinct as well as a life instinct.弗洛伊德曾假定我们所有人都有生存本能和死亡本能。

8 maxim   

n.格言，箴言

参考例句：

• Please lay the maxim to your heart.请把此格言记在心里。
• "Waste not,want not" is her favourite maxim.“不浪费则不匮乏”是她喜爱的格言。

9 physically   

adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律

参考例句：

• He was out of sorts physically,as well as disordered mentally.他浑身不舒服，心绪也很乱。
• Every time I think about it I feel physically sick.一想起那件事我就感到极恶心。

10 annihilate   

v.使无效；毁灭；取消

参考例句：

• Archer crumpled up the yellow sheet as if the gesture could annihilate the news it contained.阿切尔把这张黄纸揉皱，好象用这个动作就会抹掉里面的消息似的。
• We should bear in mind that we have to annihilate the enemy.我们要把歼敌的重任时刻记在心上。

11 akin   

adj.同族的，类似的

参考例句：

• She painted flowers and birds pictures akin to those of earlier feminine painters.她画一些同早期女画家类似的花鸟画。
• Listening to his life story is akin to reading a good adventure novel.听他的人生故事犹如阅读一本精彩的冒险小说。

12 standing   

n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的

参考例句：

• After the earthquake only a few houses were left standing.地震过后只有几幢房屋还立着。
• They're standing out against any change in the law.他们坚决反对对法律做任何修改。

13 prohibition   

n.禁止；禁令，禁律

参考例句：

• The prohibition against drunken driving will save many lives.禁止酒后开车将会减少许多死亡事故。
• They voted in favour of the prohibition of smoking in public areas.他们投票赞成禁止在公共场所吸烟。

14 capability   

n.能力；才能；(pl)可发展的能力或特性等

参考例句：

• She has the capability to become a very fine actress.她有潜力成为杰出演员。
• Organizing a whole department is beyond his capability.组织整个部门是他能力以外的事。

15 distinguished   

adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的

参考例句：

• Elephants are distinguished from other animals by their long noses.大象以其长长的鼻子显示出与其他动物的不同。
• A banquet was given in honor of the distinguished guests.宴会是为了向贵宾们致敬而举行的。

16 abstain   

v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免

参考例句：

• His doctor ordered him to abstain from beer and wine.他的医生嘱咐他戒酒。
• Three Conservative MPs abstained in the vote.三位保守党下院议员投了弃权票。

17 valid   

adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的

参考例句：

• His claim to own the house is valid.他主张对此屋的所有权有效。
• Do you have valid reasons for your absence?你的缺席有正当理由吗？

18 corporeal   

adj.肉体的，身体的；物质的

参考例句：

• The body is the corporeal habitation of the soul.身体为灵魂之有形寓所。
• He is very religious;corporeal world has little interest for him.他虔信宗教，对物质上的享受不感兴趣。

19 remains   

n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹

参考例句：

• He ate the remains of food hungrily.他狼吞虎咽地吃剩余的食物。
• The remains of the meal were fed to the dog.残羹剩饭喂狗了。

20 wrench   

v.猛拧；挣脱；使扭伤；n.扳手；痛苦，难受

参考例句：

• He gave a wrench to his ankle when he jumped down.他跳下去的时候扭伤了足踝。
• It was a wrench to leave the old home.离开这个老家非常痛苦。

21 possessed   

adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的

参考例句：

• He flew out of the room like a man possessed.他像着了魔似地猛然冲出房门。
• He behaved like someone possessed.他行为举止像是魔怔了。

22 withdrawn   

vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出

参考例句：

• Our force has been withdrawn from the danger area.我们的军队已从危险地区撤出。
• All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.一切外国军队都应撤回本国去。

23 drawn   

v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的

参考例句：

• All the characters in the story are drawn from life.故事中的所有人物都取材于生活。
• Her gaze was drawn irresistibly to the scene outside.她的目光禁不住被外面的风景所吸引。

24 nominal   

adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的

参考例句：

• The king was only the nominal head of the state. 国王只是这个国家名义上的元首。
• The charge of the box lunch was nominal.午餐盒饭收费很少。

25 deduction   

n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎

参考例句：

• No deduction in pay is made for absence due to illness.因病请假不扣工资。
• His deduction led him to the correct conclusion.他的推断使他得出正确的结论。

26 hindrance   

n.妨碍，障碍

参考例句：

• Now they can construct tunnel systems without hindrance.现在他们可以顺利地建造隧道系统了。
• The heavy baggage was a great hindrance to me.那件行李成了我的大累赘。

27 infringement   

n.违反；侵权

参考例句：

• Infringement of this regulation would automatically rule you out of the championship.违背这一规则会被自动取消参加锦标赛的资格。
• The committee ruled that the US ban constituted an infringement of free trade.委员会裁定美国的禁令对自由贸易构成了侵犯

28 interfering   

adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词

参考例句：

• He's an interfering old busybody! 他老爱管闲事！
• I wish my mother would stop interfering and let me make my own decisions. 我希望我母亲不再干预，让我自己拿主意。

29 thereby   

adv.因此，从而

参考例句：

• I have never been to that city,,ereby I don't know much about it.我从未去过那座城市，因此对它不怎么熟悉。
• He became a British citizen,thereby gaining the right to vote.他成了英国公民，因而得到了投票权。

30 analytic   

adj.分析的，用分析方法的

参考例句：

• The boy has an analytic mind. 这男孩有分析的头脑。
• Latin is a synthetic language,while English is analytic.拉丁文是一种综合性语言，而英语是一种分析性语言。

31 synthetic   

adj.合成的，人工的；综合的；n.人工制品

参考例句：

• We felt the salesman's synthetic friendliness.我们感觉到那位销售员的虚情假意。
• It's a synthetic diamond.这是人造钻石。

32 analytical   

adj.分析的；用分析法的

参考例句：

• I have an analytical approach to every survey.对每项调查我都采用分析方法。
• As a result,analytical data obtained by analysts were often in disagreement.结果各个分析家所得的分析数据常常不一致。

33 holder   

n.持有者，占有者；(台，架等)支持物

参考例句：

• The holder of the office of chairman is reponsible for arranging meetings.担任主席职位的人负责安排会议。
• That runner is the holder of the world record for the hundred-yard dash.那位运动员是一百码赛跑世界纪录的保持者。

34 wrenching   

n.修截苗根，苗木铲根（铲根时苗木不起土或部分起土）v.（猛力地）扭( wrench的现在分词 )；扭伤；使感到痛苦；使悲痛

参考例句：

• China has been through a wrenching series of changes and experiments. 中国经历了一系列艰苦的变革和试验。 来自辞典例句
• A cold gust swept across her exposed breast, wrenching her back to reality. 一股寒气打击她的敞开的胸膛，把她从梦幻的境地中带了回来。 来自汉英文学 - 家（1-26） - 家（1-26）

35 synthetical   

adj.综合的，合成的

参考例句：

• Studying the value of science is a new and synthetical study. 科学价值的向度研究是一个崭新的综合性跨学科领域研究。 来自互联网
• Among them, sea-island structure flexibilizer had good synthetical properties. 相比较而言，端环氧基聚氨酯醚海岛结构增韧剂的综合性能较好。 来自互联网

36 usurpation   

n.篡位；霸占

参考例句：

• The struggle during this transitional stage is to oppose Chiang Kai-shek's usurpation of the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance.过渡阶段的斗争，就是反对蒋介石篡夺抗战胜利果实的斗争。
• This is an unjustified usurpation of my authority.你是在非法纂夺我的权力。

37 innate   

adj.天生的，固有的，天赋的

参考例句：

• You obviously have an innate talent for music.你显然有天生的音乐才能。
• Correct ideas are not innate in the mind.人的正确思想不是自己头脑中固有的。

38 dual   

adj.双的；二重的，二元的

参考例句：

• The people's Republic of China does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national.中华人民共和国不承认中国公民具有双重国籍。
• He has dual role as composer and conductor.他兼作曲家及指挥的双重身分。

39 mutual   

adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的

参考例句：

• We must pull together for mutual interest.我们必须为相互的利益而通力合作。
• Mutual interests tied us together.相互的利害关系把我们联系在一起。

40 interdict   

v.限制；禁止；n.正式禁止；禁令

参考例句：

• Troops could be ferried in to interdict drug shipments.可以把军队渡运过来阻截毒品的装运。
• Interdict could also be sought for the protection of public interests.禁令也可以用于保护公共利益。

41 unity   

n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调

参考例句：

• When we speak of unity,we do not mean unprincipled peace.所谓团结，并非一团和气。
• We must strengthen our unity in the face of powerful enemies.大敌当前，我们必须加强团结。

42 entirely   

ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The fire was entirely caused by their neglect of duty. 那场火灾完全是由于他们失职而引起的。
• His life was entirely given up to the educational work. 他的一生统统献给了教育工作。

43 primitive   

adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物

参考例句：

• It is a primitive instinct to flee a place of danger.逃离危险的地方是一种原始本能。
• His book describes the march of the civilization of a primitive society.他的著作描述了一个原始社会的开化过程。

44 renounced   

v.声明放弃( renounce的过去式和过去分词 )；宣布放弃；宣布与…决裂；宣布摒弃

参考例句：

• We have renounced the use of force to settle our disputes. 我们已再次宣布放弃使用武力来解决争端。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Andrew renounced his claim to the property. 安德鲁放弃了财产的所有权。 来自《简明英汉词典》

45 renounce   

v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系

参考例句：

• She decided to renounce the world and enter a convent.她决定弃绝尘世去当修女。
• It was painful for him to renounce his son.宣布与儿子脱离关系对他来说是很痛苦的。

46 derived   

vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取

参考例句：

• Many English words are derived from Latin and Greek. 英语很多词源出于拉丁文和希腊文。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He derived his enthusiasm for literature from his father. 他对文学的爱好是受他父亲的影响。 来自《简明英汉词典》

47 derive   

v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自

参考例句：

• We derive our sustenance from the land.我们从土地获取食物。
• We shall derive much benefit from reading good novels.我们将从优秀小说中获得很大好处。

48 authenticate   

vt.证明…为真，鉴定

参考例句：

• We would have to authenticate your relationship with the boy.我们必须证实一下您和那个孩子的关系。
• An expert was needed to authenticate the original Van Gogh painting from his imitation.这幅画是凡·高的真迹还是赝品,需由专家来鉴定。

49 converse   

vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反

参考例句：

• He can converse in three languages.他可以用3种语言谈话。
• I wanted to appear friendly and approachable but I think I gave the converse impression.我想显得友好、平易近人些,却发觉给人的印象恰恰相反。

50 immediate   

adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的

参考例句：

• His immediate neighbours felt it their duty to call.他的近邻认为他们有责任去拜访。
• We declared ourselves for the immediate convocation of the meeting.我们主张立即召开这个会议。

51 enunciated   

v.（清晰地）发音( enunciate的过去式和过去分词 )；确切地说明

参考例句：

• She enunciated each word slowly and carefully. 她每个字都念得又慢又仔细。
• His voice, cold and perfectly enunciated, switched them like a birch branch. 他的话口气冰冷，一字一板，有如给了他们劈面一鞭。 来自辞典例句

52 imperative   

n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的

参考例句：

• He always speaks in an imperative tone of voice.他老是用命令的口吻讲话。
• The events of the past few days make it imperative for her to act.过去这几天发生的事迫使她不得不立即行动。

53 applied   

adj.应用的；v.应用，适用

参考例句：

• She plans to take a course in applied linguistics.她打算学习应用语言学课程。
• This cream is best applied to the face at night.这种乳霜最好晚上擦脸用。

54 mediating   

调停，调解，斡旋( mediate的现在分词 )； 居间促成； 影响…的发生； 使…可能发生

参考例句：

• So many factors are mediating. 如此众多的因素在起作用。
• The contrast in mediating noted in the sitting room. 客厅中注重了调和中的对比。

55 specially   

adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地

参考例句：

• They are specially packaged so that they stack easily.它们经过特别包装以便于堆放。
• The machine was designed specially for demolishing old buildings.这种机器是专为拆毁旧楼房而设计的。

56 contradictory   

adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立

参考例句：

• The argument is internally contradictory.论据本身自相矛盾。
• What he said was self-contradictory.他讲话前后不符。

57 annulled   

v.宣告无效( annul的过去式和过去分词 )；取消；使消失；抹去

参考例句：

• Their marriage was annulled after just six months. 他们的婚姻仅过半年就宣告取消。
• Many laws made by the former regime have been annulled. 前政权制定的许多法律被宣布无效。 来自《简明英汉词典》

58 annul   

v.宣告…无效，取消，废止

参考例句：

• They have the power to alter or annul inappropriate decisions of their own standing committees.他们有权改变或者撤销本级人民代表大会常务委员会不适当的决定。
• The courts later found grounds to annul the results,after the king urged them to sort out the "mess".在国王敦促法庭收拾烂摊子后，法庭随后宣布废除选举结果。

59 interval   

n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息

参考例句：

• The interval between the two trees measures 40 feet.这两棵树的间隔是40英尺。
• There was a long interval before he anwsered the telephone.隔了好久他才回了电话。

60 inevitable   

adj.不可避免的，必然发生的

参考例句：

• Mary was wearing her inevitable large hat.玛丽戴着她总是戴的那顶大帽子。
• The defeat had inevitable consequences for British policy.战败对英国政策不可避免地产生了影响。

61 antithesis   

n.对立；相对

参考例句：

• The style of his speech was in complete antithesis to mine.他和我的讲话方式完全相反。
• His creation was an antithesis to academic dogmatism of the time.他的创作与当时学院派的教条相对立。

62 worthy   

adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的

参考例句：

• I did not esteem him to be worthy of trust.我认为他不值得信赖。
• There occurred nothing that was worthy to be mentioned.没有值得一提的事发生。

63 elimination   

n.排除，消除，消灭

参考例句：

• Their elimination from the competition was a great surprise.他们在比赛中遭到淘汰是个很大的意外。
• I was eliminated from the 400 metres in the semi-finals.我在400米半决赛中被淘汰。

64 justified   

a.正当的，有理的

参考例句：

• She felt fully justified in asking for her money back. 她认为有充分的理由要求退款。
• The prisoner has certainly justified his claims by his actions. 那个囚犯确实已用自己的行动表明他的要求是正当的。

65 legislative   

n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的

参考例句：

• Congress is the legislative branch of the U.S. government.国会是美国政府的立法部门。
• Today's hearing was just the first step in the legislative process.今天的听证会只是展开立法程序的第一步。

66 contingent   

adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队

参考例句：

• The contingent marched in the direction of the Western Hills.队伍朝西山的方向前进。
• Whether or not we arrive on time is contingent on the weather.我们是否按时到达要视天气情况而定。

67 compulsory   

n.强制的，必修的；规定的，义务的

参考例句：

• Is English a compulsory subject?英语是必修课吗？
• Compulsory schooling ends at sixteen.义务教育至16岁为止。

68 binds   

v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 )；装订；捆绑；（用长布条）缠绕

参考例句：

• Frost binds the soil. 霜使土壤凝结。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Stones and cement binds strongly. 石头和水泥凝固得很牢。 来自《简明英汉词典》

69 bind   

vt.捆，包扎；装订；约束；使凝固；vi.变硬

参考例句：

• I will let the waiter bind up the parcel for you.我让服务生帮你把包裹包起来。
• He wants a shirt that does not bind him.他要一件不使他觉得过紧的衬衫。

70 authoritative   

adj.有权威的，可相信的；命令式的；官方的

参考例句：

• David speaks in an authoritative tone.大卫以命令的口吻说话。
• Her smile was warm but authoritative.她的笑容很和蔼，同时又透着威严。

71 constrain   

vt.限制，约束；克制，抑制

参考例句：

• She tried to constrain herself from a cough in class.上课时她竭力忍住不咳嗽。
• The study will examine the factors which constrain local economic growth.这项研究将考查抑制当地经济发展的因素。

72 infringed   

v.违反（规章等）( infringe的过去式和过去分词 )；侵犯（某人的权利）；侵害（某人的自由、权益等）

参考例句：

• Wherever the troops went, they never infringed on the people's interests. 大军过处，秋毫无犯。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• He was arrested on a charge of having infringed the Election Law. 他因被指控触犯选举法而被拘捕。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

73 determined   

adj.坚定的；有决心的

参考例句：

• I have determined on going to Tibet after graduation.我已决定毕业后去西藏。
• He determined to view the rooms behind the office.他决定查看一下办公室后面的房间。

74 intercourse   

n.性交；交流，交往，交际

参考例句：

• The magazine becomes a cultural medium of intercourse between the two peoples.该杂志成为两民族间文化交流的媒介。
• There was close intercourse between them.他们过往很密。

75 peremptory   

adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的

参考例句：

• The officer issued peremptory commands.军官发出了不容许辩驳的命令。
• There was a peremptory note in his voice.他说话的声音里有一种不容置辩的口气。

76 imposing   

adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的

参考例句：

• The fortress is an imposing building.这座城堡是一座宏伟的建筑。
• He has lost his imposing appearance.他已失去堂堂仪表。

77 nil   

n.无，全无，零

参考例句：

• My knowledge of the subject is practically nil.我在这方面的知识几乎等于零。
• Their legal rights are virtually nil.他们实际上毫无法律权利。

78 requisite   

adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品

参考例句：

• He hasn't got the requisite qualifications for the job.他不具备这工作所需的资格。
• Food and air are requisite for life.食物和空气是生命的必需品。

79 presumption   

n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定

参考例句：

• Please pardon my presumption in writing to you.请原谅我很冒昧地写信给你。
• I don't think that's a false presumption.我认为那并不是错误的推测。

80 prerogative   

n.特权

参考例句：

• It is within his prerogative to do so.他是有权这样做的。
• Making such decisions is not the sole prerogative of managers.作这类决定并不是管理者的专有特权。

81 faculty   

n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员

参考例句：

• He has a great faculty for learning foreign languages.他有学习外语的天赋。
• He has the faculty of saying the right thing at the right time.他有在恰当的时候说恰当的话的才智。

82 anterior   

adj.较早的；在前的

参考例句：

• We've already finished the work anterior to the schedule.我们已经提前完成了工作。
• The anterior part of a fish contains the head and gills.鱼的前部包括头和鳃。

83 justify   

vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护

参考例句：

• He tried to justify his absence with lame excuses.他想用站不住脚的借口为自己的缺席辩解。
• Can you justify your rude behavior to me?你能向我证明你的粗野行为是有道理的吗？

84 pretension   

n.要求；自命，自称；自负

参考例句：

• I make no pretension to skill as an artist,but I enjoy painting.我并不自命有画家的技巧，但我喜欢绘画。
• His action is a satire on his boastful pretension.他的行动是对他自我卖弄的一个讽刺。

85 conformity   

n.一致，遵从，顺从

参考例句：

• Was his action in conformity with the law?他的行动是否合法？
• The plan was made in conformity with his views.计划仍按他的意见制定。

86 annihilated   

v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃

参考例句：

• Our soldiers annihilated a force of three hundred enemy troops. 我军战士消灭了300名敌军。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• We annihilated the enemy. 我们歼灭了敌人。 来自《简明英汉词典》

87 intervention   

n.介入，干涉，干预

参考例句：

• The government's intervention in this dispute will not help.政府对这场争论的干预不会起作用。
• Many people felt he would be hostile to the idea of foreign intervention.许多人觉得他会反对外来干预。

88 derivative   

n.派(衍)生物；adj.非独创性的，模仿他人的

参考例句：

• His paintings are really quite derivative.他的画实在没有创意。
• Derivative works are far more complicated.派生作品更加复杂。

89 seizure   

n.没收；占有；抵押

参考例句：

• The seizure of contraband is made by customs.那些走私品是被海关没收的。
• The courts ordered the seizure of all her property.法院下令查封她所有的财产。

90 interdicting   

v.禁止（行动）( interdict的现在分词 )；禁用；限制

参考例句：

91 appropriation   

n.拨款，批准支出

参考例句：

• Our government made an appropriation for the project.我们的政府为那个工程拨出一笔款项。
• The council could note an annual appropriation for this service.议会可以为这项服务表决给他一笔常年经费。

92 bilateral   

adj.双方的，两边的，两侧的

参考例句：

• They have been negotiating a bilateral trade deal.他们一直在商谈一项双边贸易协定。
• There was a wide gap between the views of the two statesmen on the bilateral cooperation.对双方合作的问题，两位政治家各自所持的看法差距甚大。

93 constituent   

n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的

参考例句：

• Sugar is the main constituent of candy.食糖是糖果的主要成分。
• Fibre is a natural constituent of a healthy diet.纤维是健康饮食的天然组成部分。

94 vindication   

n.洗冤，证实

参考例句：

• There is much to be said in vindication of his claim.有很多理由可以提出来为他的要求作辩护。
• The result was a vindication of all our efforts.这一结果表明我们的一切努力是必要的。

95 literally   

adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实

参考例句：

• He translated the passage literally.他逐字逐句地翻译这段文字。
• Sometimes she would not sit down till she was literally faint.有时候，她不走到真正要昏厥了，决不肯坐下来。

96 previously   

adv.以前，先前（地）

参考例句：

• The bicycle tyre blew out at a previously damaged point.自行车胎在以前损坏过的地方又爆开了。
• Let me digress for a moment and explain what had happened previously.让我岔开一会儿，解释原先发生了什么。

97 infringing   

v.违反（规章等）( infringe的现在分词 )；侵犯（某人的权利）；侵害（某人的自由、权益等）

参考例句：

• The material can be copied without infringing copyright. 这份材料可以复制，不会侵犯版权。
• The media is accused of infringing on people's privacy. 人们指责媒体侵犯了大家的隐私。 来自《简明英汉词典》

98 adherent   

n.信徒，追随者，拥护者

参考例句：

• He was most liberal where money would bring him a powerful or necessary political adherent.在金钱能够收买一个干练的或者必需的政治拥护者的地方，他是最不惜花钱的。
• He's a pious adherent of Buddhism.他是一位虔诚的佛教徒。

99 essentially   

adv.本质上，实质上，基本上

参考例句：

• Really great men are essentially modest.真正的伟人大都很谦虚。
• She is an essentially selfish person.她本质上是个自私自利的人。

100 residential   

adj.提供住宿的；居住的；住宅的

参考例句：

• The mayor inspected the residential section of the city.市长视察了该市的住宅区。
• The residential blocks were integrated with the rest of the college.住宿区与学院其他部分结合在了一起。

101 dispersed   

adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的

参考例句：

• The clouds dispersed themselves. 云散了。
• After school the children dispersed to their homes. 放学后，孩子们四散回家了。

102 accomplished   

adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的

参考例句：

• Thanks to your help,we accomplished the task ahead of schedule.亏得你们帮忙,我们才提前完成了任务。
• Removal of excess heat is accomplished by means of a radiator.通过散热器完成多余热量的排出。

103 apprehended   

逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解

参考例句：

• She apprehended the complicated law very quickly. 她很快理解了复杂的法律。
• The police apprehended the criminal. 警察逮捕了罪犯。

104 peremptorily   

adv.紧急地，不容分说地，专横地

参考例句：

• She peremptorily rejected the request. 她断然拒绝了请求。
• Their propaganda was peremptorily switched to an anti-Western line. 他们的宣传断然地转而持反对西方的路线。 来自辞典例句

105 subjectively   

主观地； 臆

参考例句：

• Subjectively, the demand of interest is the desire of human being. 荀子所说的对利的需要从主观上说就是人的欲望。
• A sound also has an amplitude, a property subjectively heard as loudness. 声音有振幅，振幅的主观感觉是声音的大小。

106 implicitly   

adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地

参考例句：

• Many verbs and many words of other kinds are implicitly causal. 许多动词和许多其他类词都蕴涵着因果关系。
• I can trust Mr. Somerville implicitly, I suppose? 我想，我可以毫无保留地信任萨莫维尔先生吧？

107 realization   

n.实现；认识到，深刻了解

参考例句：

• We shall gladly lend every effort in our power toward its realization.我们将乐意为它的实现而竭尽全力。
• He came to the realization that he would never make a good teacher.他逐渐认识到自己永远不会成为好老师。

108 anticipation   

n.预期，预料，期望

参考例句：

• We waited at the station in anticipation of her arrival.我们在车站等着，期待她的到来。
• The animals grew restless as if in anticipation of an earthquake.各种动物都变得焦躁不安，像是感到了地震即将发生。

109 controversy   

n.争论，辩论，争吵

参考例句：

• That is a fact beyond controversy.那是一个无可争论的事实。
• We ran the risk of becoming the butt of every controversy.我们要冒使自己在所有的纷争中都成为众矢之的的风险。

110 decided   

adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的

参考例句：

• This gave them a decided advantage over their opponents.这使他们比对手具有明显的优势。
• There is a decided difference between British and Chinese way of greeting.英国人和中国人打招呼的方式有很明显的区别。

111 cannon   

n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮

参考例句：

• The soldiers fired the cannon.士兵们开炮。
• The cannon thundered in the hills.大炮在山间轰鸣。

112 intrude   

vi.闯入；侵入；打扰，侵扰

参考例句：

• I do not want to intrude if you are busy.如果你忙我就不打扰你了。
• I don't want to intrude on your meeting.我不想打扰你们的会议。

113 amber   

n.琥珀；琥珀色；adj.琥珀制的

参考例句：

• Would you like an amber necklace for your birthday?你过生日想要一条琥珀项链吗？
• This is a piece of little amber stones.这是一块小小的琥珀化石。

114 cultivation   

n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成

参考例句：

• The cultivation in good taste is our main objective.培养高雅情趣是我们的主要目标。
• The land is not fertile enough to repay cultivation.这块土地不够肥沃，不值得耕种。

115 specification   

n.详述；[常pl.]规格，说明书，规范

参考例句：

• I want to know his specification of details.我想知道他对细节的详述。
• Examination confirmed that the quality of the products was up to specification.经检查，产品质量合格。

116 modification   

n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻

参考例句：

• The law,in its present form,is unjust;it needs modification.现行的法律是不公正的，它需要修改。
• The design requires considerable modification.这个设计需要作大的修改。

117 prospect   

n.前景，前途；景色，视野

参考例句：

• This state of things holds out a cheerful prospect.事态呈现出可喜的前景。
• The prospect became more evident.前景变得更加明朗了。

118 savage   

adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人

参考例句：

• The poor man received a savage beating from the thugs.那可怜的人遭到暴徒的痛打。
• He has a savage temper.他脾气粗暴。

119 deceptive   

adj.骗人的，造成假象的，靠不住的

参考例句：

• His appearance was deceptive.他的外表带有欺骗性。
• The storyline is deceptively simple.故事情节看似简单，其实不然。

120 abhorring   

v.憎恶( abhor的现在分词 )；（厌恶地）回避；拒绝；淘汰

参考例句：

• He is a very upright man, abhorring evil as a deadly foe. 他具有正义感，一向嫉恶如仇。 来自互联网

121 civilized   

a.有教养的，文雅的

参考例句：

• Racism is abhorrent to a civilized society. 文明社会憎恶种族主义。
• rising crime in our so-called civilized societies 在我们所谓文明社会中日益增多的犯罪行为

122 frustrated   

adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧

参考例句：

• It's very easy to get frustrated in this job. 这个工作很容易令人懊恼。
• The bad weather frustrated all our hopes of going out. 恶劣的天气破坏了我们出行的愿望。 来自《简明英汉词典》

123 injustice   

n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利

参考例句：

• They complained of injustice in the way they had been treated.他们抱怨受到不公平的对待。
• All his life he has been struggling against injustice.他一生都在与不公正现象作斗争。

124 repudiated   

v.（正式地）否认( repudiate的过去式和过去分词 )；拒绝接受；拒绝与…往来；拒不履行（法律义务）

参考例句：

• All slanders and libels should be repudiated. 一切诬蔑不实之词，应予推倒。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• The Prime Minister has repudiated racist remarks made by a member of the Conservative Party. 首相已经驳斥了一个保守党成员的种族主义言论。 来自辞典例句

125 opposition   

n.反对，敌对

参考例句：

• The party leader is facing opposition in his own backyard.该党领袖在自己的党內遇到了反对。
• The police tried to break down the prisoner's opposition.警察设法制住了那个囚犯的反抗。

126 transformation   

n.变化；改造；转变

参考例句：

• Going to college brought about a dramatic transformation in her outlook.上大学使她的观念发生了巨大的变化。
• He was struggling to make the transformation from single man to responsible husband.他正在努力使自己由单身汉变为可靠的丈夫。

127 prevailing   

adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的

参考例句：

• She wears a fashionable hair style prevailing in the city.她的发型是这个城市流行的款式。
• This reflects attitudes and values prevailing in society.这反映了社会上盛行的态度和价值观。

128 bestowed   

赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• It was a title bestowed upon him by the king. 那是国王赐给他的头衔。
• He considered himself unworthy of the honour they had bestowed on him. 他认为自己不配得到大家赋予他的荣誉。

129 situated   

adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的

参考例句：

• The village is situated at the margin of a forest.村子位于森林的边缘。
• She is awkwardly situated.她的处境困难。

130 gilding   

n.贴金箔，镀金

参考例句：

• The dress is perfect. Don't add anything to it at all. It would just be gilding the lily. 这条裙子已经很完美了，别再作任何修饰了，那只会画蛇添足。
• The gilding is extremely lavish. 这层镀金极为奢华。

131 alluvial   

adj.冲积的；淤积的

参考例句：

• Alluvial soils usually grow the best crops.淤积土壤通常能长出最好的庄稼。
• A usually triangular alluvial deposit at the mouth of a river.三角洲河口常见的三角形沉淀淤积地带。

132 alteration   

n.变更，改变；蚀变

参考例句：

• The shirt needs alteration.这件衬衣需要改一改。
• He easily perceived there was an alteration in my countenance.他立刻看出我的脸色和往常有些不同。

133 stranded   

a.搁浅的，进退两难的

参考例句：

• He was stranded in a strange city without money. 他流落在一个陌生的城市里， 身无分文，一筹莫展。
• I was stranded in the strange town without money or friends. 我困在那陌生的城市，既没有钱，又没有朋友。

134 shipwreck   

n.船舶失事，海难

参考例句：

• He walked away from the shipwreck.他船难中平安地脱险了。
• The shipwreck was a harrowing experience.那次船难是一个惨痛的经历。

135 restrictions   

约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则）

参考例句：

• I found the restrictions irksome. 我对那些限制感到很烦。
• a snaggle of restrictions 杂乱无章的种种限制

136 proprietor   

n.所有人；业主；经营者

参考例句：

• The proprietor was an old acquaintance of his.业主是他的一位旧相识。
• The proprietor of the corner grocery was a strange thing in my life.拐角杂货店店主是我生活中的一个怪物。

137 elucidation   

n.说明，阐明

参考例句：

• The advertising copy is the elucidation text,which must be written according to the formula of AIDA. 文案是说明文，应基本遵照AIDA公式来写作。 来自互联网
• Fourth, a worm hole, elucidation space-time can stretch, compression, rent, also is deduced time-travel this idea. 第四，有了虫洞，就说明时空可以被拉伸、压缩、撕裂，也就推导出了时空旅行这个想法。 来自互联网

138 proprietors   

n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• These little proprietors of businesses are lords indeed on their own ground. 这些小业主们，在他们自己的行当中，就是真正的至高无上的统治者。 来自英汉文学 - 嘉莉妹妹
• Many proprietors try to furnish their hotels with antiques. 许多经营者都想用古董装饰他们的酒店。 来自辞典例句

139 affected   

adj.不自然的，假装的

参考例句：

• She showed an affected interest in our subject.她假装对我们的课题感到兴趣。
• His manners are affected.他的态度不自然。

140 formerly   

adv.从前，以前

参考例句：

• We now enjoy these comforts of which formerly we had only heard.我们现在享受到了过去只是听说过的那些舒适条件。
• This boat was formerly used on the rivers of China.这船从前航行在中国内河里。

141 relinquishment   

n.放弃；撤回；停止

参考例句：

• One kind of love is called relinquishment. 有一种爱叫做放手。
• Our curriculum trains for the relinquishment of judgment as the necessary condition of salvation. 我们的课程则训练我们把放弃判断作为得救的必需条件。

142 conveyance   

n.(不动产等的)转让，让与；转让证书；传送；运送；表达；（正）运输工具

参考例句：

• Bicycles have become the most popular conveyance for Chinese people.自行车已成为中国人最流行的代步工具。
• Its another,older,usage is a synonym for conveyance.它的另一个更古老的习惯用法是作为财产转让的同义词使用。

143 renounces   

v.声明放弃( renounce的第三人称单数 )；宣布放弃；宣布与…决裂；宣布摒弃

参考例句：

• Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores. 日本放弃对福尔摩沙（台湾）及澎湖的一切权利，主张（名称）及所有权。 来自互联网
• He renounces Christianity, temporarily straining his relationship with his parents. 他放弃了基督教信仰，从而与父母的关系暂时变得紧张。 来自互联网

144 alienation   

n.疏远；离间；异化

参考例句：

• The new policy resulted in the alienation of many voters.新政策导致许多选民疏远了。
• As almost every conceivable contact between human beings gets automated,the alienation index goes up.随着人与人之间几乎一切能想到的接触方式的自动化，感情疏远指数在不断上升。

145 simultaneously   

adv.同时发生地，同时进行地

参考例句：

• The radar beam can track a number of targets almost simultaneously.雷达波几乎可以同时追着多个目标。
• The Windows allow a computer user to execute multiple programs simultaneously.Windows允许计算机用户同时运行多个程序。

146 retract   

vt.缩回，撤回收回，取消

参考例句：

• The criminals should stop on the precipice, retract from the wrong path and not go any further.犯罪分子应当迷途知返，悬崖勒马，不要在错误的道路上继续走下去。
• I don't want to speak rashly now and later have to retract my statements.我不想现在说些轻率的话，然后又要收回自己说过的话。

147 embarrassment   

n.尴尬；使人为难的人(事物)；障碍；窘迫

参考例句：

• She could have died away with embarrassment.她窘迫得要死。
• Coughing at a concert can be a real embarrassment.在音乐会上咳嗽真会使人难堪。

148 acting   

n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的

参考例句：

• Ignore her,she's just acting.别理她，她只是假装的。
• During the seventies,her acting career was in eclipse.在七十年代，她的表演生涯黯然失色。

149 philosophical   

adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的

参考例句：

• The teacher couldn't answer the philosophical problem.老师不能解答这个哲学问题。
• She is very philosophical about her bad luck.她对自己的不幸看得很开。

150 proceeding   

n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报

参考例句：

• This train is now proceeding from Paris to London.这次列车从巴黎开往伦敦。
• The work is proceeding briskly.工作很有生气地进展着。

151 sufficiently   

adv.足够地，充分地

参考例句：

• It turned out he had not insured the house sufficiently.原来他没有给房屋投足保险。
• The new policy was sufficiently elastic to accommodate both views.新政策充分灵活地适用两种观点。

152 attested   

adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓

参考例句：

• The handwriting expert attested to the genuineness of the signature. 笔迹专家作证该签名无讹。 来自《现代英汉综合大词典》
• Witnesses attested his account. 几名证人都证实了他的陈述是真实的。 来自《简明英汉词典》

153 laborious   

adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅

参考例句：

• They had the laborious task of cutting down the huge tree.他们接受了伐大树的艰苦工作。
• Ants and bees are laborious insects.蚂蚁与蜜蜂是勤劳的昆虫。

154 futile   

adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的

参考例句：

• They were killed,to the last man,in a futile attack.因为进攻失败，他们全部被杀，无一幸免。
• Their efforts to revive him were futile.他们对他抢救无效。

155 prudence   

n.谨慎，精明，节俭

参考例句：

• A lack of prudence may lead to financial problems.不够谨慎可能会导致财政上出现问题。
• The happy impute all their success to prudence or merit.幸运者都把他们的成功归因于谨慎或功德。

156 relinquishes   

交出，让给( relinquish的第三人称单数 )； 放弃

参考例句：

• She relinquishes him to a partner more appropriate. 结果是，她抛弃了他，找了个年龄相当的伴侣。

157 projectile   

n.投射物，发射体；adj.向前开进的；推进的；抛掷的

参考例句：

• The vertical and horizontal motions of a projectile can be treated independently.抛射体的竖直方向和水平方向的运动能够分开来处理。
• Have you altered the plans of the projectile as the telegram suggests?你已经按照电报的要求修改炮弹图样了吗?

158 ascending   

adj.上升的，向上的

参考例句：

• Now draw or trace ten dinosaurs in ascending order of size.现在按照体型由小到大的顺序画出或是临摹出10只恐龙。

159 destined   

adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的

参考例句：

• It was destined that they would marry.他们结婚是缘分。
• The shipment is destined for America.这批货物将运往美国。

160 alienator   

n.转让人，让渡人

参考例句：

• However,such gains do not arise in the other Contracting State they shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident.但是，如果这种收益不是发生于缔约国另一方，应仅在转让者为居民的缔约国征税。
• He is a alienator in this matter.他是转让人。

161 strictly   

adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地

参考例句：

• His doctor is dieting him strictly.他的医生严格规定他的饮食。
• The guests were seated strictly in order of precedence.客人严格按照地位高低就座。

162 conjugal   

adj.婚姻的，婚姻性的

参考例句：

• Conjugal visits are banned,so marriages break down.配偶访问是禁止的，罪犯的婚姻也因此破裂。
• Conjugal fate is something delicate.缘分，其实是一种微妙的东西。

163 libido   

n.本能的冲动

参考例句：

• Lack of sleep is a major factor in loss of libido.睡眠不足是导致性欲丧失的一个主要因素。
• Ginseng can increase energy and libido,which can help solve intimacy problems.人参可以增加活力和性欲，从而帮助解决亲密关系的问题。

164 faculties   

n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院

参考例句：

• Although he's ninety, his mental faculties remain unimpaired. 他虽年届九旬，但头脑仍然清晰。
• All your faculties have come into play in your work. 在你的工作中，你的全部才能已起到了作用。 来自《简明英汉词典》

165 inclination   

n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好

参考例句：

• She greeted us with a slight inclination of the head.她微微点头向我们致意。
• I did not feel the slightest inclination to hurry.我没有丝毫着急的意思。

166 unnatural   

adj.不自然的；反常的

参考例句：

• Did her behaviour seem unnatural in any way?她有任何反常表现吗？
• She has an unnatural smile on her face.她脸上挂着做作的微笑。

167 transgressions   

n.违反，违法，罪过( transgression的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• Many marine transgressions occur across coastal plains. 许多海运是横越滨海平原。 来自辞典例句
• For I know my transgressions, and my sin always before me. 因为我知道我的过犯，我的罪常在我面前。 来自互联网

168 reprobation   

n.斥责

参考例句：

• Nearly everyone had something to say in reprobation of the views suggested by Owen. 几乎每个人都说几句话来表示反对欧文的见解。 来自辞典例句

169 enjoyment   

n.乐趣；享有；享用

参考例句：

• Your company adds to the enjoyment of our visit. 有您的陪同，我们这次访问更加愉快了。
• After each joke the old man cackled his enjoyment.每逢讲完一个笑话，这老人就呵呵笑着表示他的高兴。

170 regain   

vt.重新获得，收复，恢复

参考例句：

• He is making a bid to regain his World No.1 ranking.他正为重登世界排名第一位而努力。
• The government is desperate to regain credibility with the public.政府急于重新获取公众的信任。

171 regains   

复得( regain的第三人称单数 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地

参考例句：

• It will take a lot of repair work before the theatre regains its former splendour. 要想剧院重拾昔日的辉煌，必须进行大规模整修。
• He lays down the book and regains the consciousness. 他惊悸初定，掩卷细思。

172 permissible   

adj.可允许的，许可的

参考例句：

• Is smoking permissible in the theatre?在剧院里允许吸烟吗？
• Delay is not permissible,even for a single day.不得延误，即使一日亦不可。

173 supremacy   

n.至上；至高权力

参考例句：

• No one could challenge her supremacy in gymnastics.她是最优秀的体操运动员，无人能胜过她。
• Theoretically,she holds supremacy as the head of the state.从理论上说，她作为国家的最高元首拥有至高无上的权力。

174 contingency   

n.意外事件，可能性

参考例句：

• We should be prepared for any contingency.我们应该对任何应急情况有所准备。
• A fire in our warehouse was a contingency that we had not expected.库房的一场大火是我们始料未及的。

175 spouse   

n.配偶(指夫或妻)

参考例句：

• Her spouse will come to see her on Sunday.她的丈夫星期天要来看她。
• What is the best way to keep your spouse happy in the marriage?在婚姻中保持配偶幸福的最好方法是什么？

176 solely   

adv.仅仅，唯一地

参考例句：

• Success should not be measured solely by educational achievement.成功与否不应只用学业成绩来衡量。
• The town depends almost solely on the tourist trade.这座城市几乎完全靠旅游业维持。

177 parental   

adj.父母的；父的；母的

参考例句：

• He encourages parental involvement in the running of school.他鼓励学生家长参与学校的管理。
• Children always revolt against parental disciplines.孩子们总是反抗父母的管束。

178 hereditary   

adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的

参考例句：

• The Queen of England is a hereditary ruler.英国女王是世袭的统治者。
• In men,hair loss is hereditary.男性脱发属于遗传。

179 contented   

adj.满意的，安心的，知足的

参考例句：

• He won't be contented until he's upset everyone in the office.不把办公室里的每个人弄得心烦意乱他就不会满足。
• The people are making a good living and are contented,each in his station.人民安居乐业。

180 indifference   

n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎

参考例句：

• I was disappointed by his indifference more than somewhat.他的漠不关心使我很失望。
• He feigned indifference to criticism of his work.他假装毫不在意别人批评他的作品。

181 investigation   

n.调查，调查研究

参考例句：

• In an investigation,a new fact became known, which told against him.在调查中新发现了一件对他不利的事实。
• He drew the conclusion by building on his own investigation.他根据自己的调查研究作出结论。

182 subtlety   

n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别

参考例句：

• He has shown enormous strength,great intelligence and great subtlety.他表现出充沛的精力、极大的智慧和高度的灵活性。
• The subtlety of his remarks was unnoticed by most of his audience.大多数听众都没有觉察到他讲话的微妙之处。

183 inquiry   

n.打听，询问，调查，查问

参考例句：

• Many parents have been pressing for an inquiry into the problem.许多家长迫切要求调查这个问题。
• The field of inquiry has narrowed down to five persons.调查的范围已经缩小到只剩5个人了。

184 incapable   

adj.无能力的，不能做某事的

参考例句：

• He would be incapable of committing such a cruel deed.他不会做出这么残忍的事。
• Computers are incapable of creative thought.计算机不会创造性地思维。

185 nourishment   

n.食物，营养品；营养情况

参考例句：

• Lack of proper nourishment reduces their power to resist disease.营养不良降低了他们抵抗疾病的能力。
• He ventured that plants draw part of their nourishment from the air.他大胆提出植物从空气中吸收部分养分的观点。

186 guilt   

n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责

参考例句：

• She tried to cover up her guilt by lying.她企图用谎言掩饰自己的罪行。
• Don't lay a guilt trip on your child about schoolwork.别因为功课责备孩子而使他觉得很内疚。

187 emancipation   

n.（从束缚、支配下）解放

参考例句：

• We must arouse them to fight for their own emancipation. 我们必须唤起他们为其自身的解放而斗争。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• They rejoiced over their own emancipation. 他们为自己的解放感到欢欣鼓舞。 来自《简明英汉词典》

188 repayment   

n.偿还，偿还款；报酬

参考例句：

• I am entitled to a repayment for the damaged goods.我有权利索取货物损坏赔偿金。
• The tax authorities have been harrying her for repayment.税务局一直在催她补交税款。

189 gratitude   

adj.感激，感谢

参考例句：

• I have expressed the depth of my gratitude to him.我向他表示了深切的谢意。
• She could not help her tears of gratitude rolling down her face.她感激的泪珠禁不住沿着面颊流了下来。

190 virtue   

n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力

参考例句：

• He was considered to be a paragon of virtue.他被认为是品德尽善尽美的典范。
• You need to decorate your mind with virtue.你应该用德行美化心灵。

191 runaway   

n.逃走的人，逃亡，亡命者；adj.逃亡的，逃走的

参考例句：

• The police have not found the runaway to date.警察迄今没抓到逃犯。
• He was praised for bringing up the runaway horse.他勒住了脱缰之马受到了表扬。

192 attain   

vt.达到，获得，完成

参考例句：

• I used the scientific method to attain this end. 我用科学的方法来达到这一目的。
• His painstaking to attain his goal in life is praiseworthy. 他为实现人生目标所下的苦功是值得称赞的。

193 dependence   

n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属

参考例句：

• Doctors keep trying to break her dependence of the drug.医生们尽力使她戒除毒瘾。
• He was freed from financial dependence on his parents.他在经济上摆脱了对父母的依赖。

194 attaining   

（通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况）

参考例句：

• Jim is halfway to attaining his pilot's licence. 吉姆就快要拿到飞行员执照了。
• By that time she was attaining to fifty. 那时她已快到五十岁了。

195 attainment   

n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣

参考例句：

• We congratulated her upon her attainment to so great an age.我们祝贺她高寿。
• The attainment of the success is not easy.成功的取得并不容易。

196 bead   

n.念珠；(pl.)珠子项链；水珠

参考例句：

• She accidentally swallowed a glass bead.她不小心吞下了一颗玻璃珠。
• She has a beautiful glass bead and a bracelet in the box.盒子里有一颗美丽的玻璃珠和手镯。

197 bondage   

n.奴役，束缚

参考例句：

• Masters sometimes allowed their slaves to buy their way out of bondage.奴隶主们有时允许奴隶为自己赎身。
• They aim to deliver the people who are in bondage to superstitious belief.他们的目的在于解脱那些受迷信束缚的人。

198 maturity   

n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期

参考例句：

• These plants ought to reach maturity after five years.这些植物五年后就该长成了。
• This is the period at which the body attains maturity.这是身体发育成熟的时期。

199 systematic   

adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的

参考例句：

• The way he works isn't very systematic.他的工作不是很有条理。
• The teacher made a systematic work of teaching.这个教师进行系统的教学工作。

200 uncertainty   

n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物

参考例句：

• Her comments will add to the uncertainty of the situation.她的批评将会使局势更加不稳定。
• After six weeks of uncertainty,the strain was beginning to take its toll.6个星期的忐忑不安后，压力开始产生影响了。

201 gratuitous   

adj.无偿的，免费的；无缘无故的，不必要的

参考例句：

• His criticism is quite gratuitous.他的批评完全没有根据。
• There's too much crime and gratuitous violence on TV.电视里充斥着犯罪和无端的暴力。

202 onerous   

adj.繁重的

参考例句：

• My household duties were not particularly onerous.我的家务活并不繁重。
• This obligation sometimes proves onerous.这一义务有时被证明是艰巨的。

203 preservation   

n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持

参考例句：

• The police are responsible for the preservation of law and order.警察负责维持法律与秩序。
• The picture is in an excellent state of preservation.这幅画保存得极为完好。

204 barter   

n.物物交换，以货易货，实物交易

参考例句：

• Chickens,goats and rabbits were offered for barter at the bazaar.在集市上，鸡、山羊和兔子被摆出来作物物交换之用。
• They have arranged food imports on a barter basis.他们以易货贸易的方式安排食品进口。

205 mandate   

n.托管地；命令，指示

参考例句：

• The President had a clear mandate to end the war.总统得到明确的授权结束那场战争。
• The General Election gave him no such mandate.大选并未授予他这种权力。

206 questionable   

adj.可疑的，有问题的

参考例句：

• There are still a few questionable points in the case.这个案件还有几个疑点。
• Your argument is based on a set of questionable assumptions.你的论证建立在一套有问题的假设上。

207 illustrated   

adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词

参考例句：

• His lecture was illustrated with slides taken during the expedition. 他在讲演中使用了探险时拍摄到的幻灯片。
• The manufacturing Methods: Will be illustrated in the next chapter. 制作方法将在下一章说明。

208 wares   

n. 货物, 商品

参考例句：

• They sold their wares at half-price. 他们的货品是半价出售的。
• The peddler was crying up his wares. 小贩极力夸耀自己的货物。

209 alienated   

adj.感到孤独的，不合群的v.使疏远( alienate的过去式和过去分词 )；使不友好；转让；让渡（财产等）

参考例句：

• His comments have alienated a lot of young voters. 他的言论使许多年轻选民离他而去。
• The Prime Minister's policy alienated many of her followers. 首相的政策使很多拥护她的人疏远了她。 来自《简明英汉词典》

210 subservient   

adj.卑屈的，阿谀的

参考例句：

• He was subservient and servile.他低声下气、卑躬屈膝。
• It was horrible to have to be affable and subservient.不得不强作欢颜卖弄风骚，真是太可怕了。

211 locomotion   

n.运动，移动

参考例句：

• By land,air or sea,birds are masters of locomotion.无论是通过陆地，飞越空中还是穿过海洋，鸟应算是运动能手了。
• Food sources also elicit oriented locomotion and recognition behavior patterns in most insects.食物源也引诱大多数昆虫定向迁移和识别行为。

212 dwellings   

n.住处，处所( dwelling的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• The development will consist of 66 dwellings and a number of offices. 新建楼区将由66栋住房和一些办公用房组成。
• The hovels which passed for dwellings are being pulled down. 过去用作住室的陋屋正在被拆除。 来自《简明英汉词典》

213 enjoyments   

愉快( enjoyment的名词复数 )； 令人愉快的事物； 享有； 享受

参考例句：

• He is fond of worldly enjoyments. 他喜爱世俗的享乐。
• The humanities and amenities of life had no attraction for him--its peaceful enjoyments no charm. 对他来说，生活中的人情和乐趣并没有吸引力——生活中的恬静的享受也没有魅力。

214 procure   

vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条

参考例句：

• Can you procure some specimens for me?你能替我弄到一些标本吗？
• I'll try my best to procure you that original French novel.我将尽全力给你搞到那本原版法国小说。

215 expend   

vt.花费，消费，消耗

参考例句：

• Don't expend all your time on such a useless job.不要把时间消耗在这种无用的工作上。
• They expend all their strength in trying to climb out.他们费尽全力想爬出来。

216 dwindle   

v.逐渐变小（或减少）

参考例句：

• The factory's workforce has dwindled from over 4,000 to a few hundred.工厂雇员总数已经从4,000多人减少到几百人。
• He is struggling to come to terms with his dwindling authority.他正努力适应自己权力被削弱这一局面。

217 conversion   

n.转化，转换，转变

参考例句：

• He underwent quite a conversion.他彻底变了。
• Waste conversion is a part of the production process.废物处理是生产过程的一个组成部分。

218 veins   

n.纹理；矿脉( vein的名词复数 )；静脉；叶脉；纹理

参考例句：

• The blood flows from the capillaries back into the veins. 血从毛细血管流回静脉。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• I felt a pleasant glow in all my veins from the wine. 喝过酒后我浑身的血都热烘烘的，感到很舒服。 来自《简明英汉词典》

219 expended   

v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽

参考例句：

• She expended all her efforts on the care of home and children. 她把所有精力都花在料理家务和照顾孩子上。
• The enemy had expended all their ammunition. 敌人已耗尽所有的弹药。 来自《简明英汉词典》

220 stimulated   

a.刺激的

参考例句：

• The exhibition has stimulated interest in her work. 展览增进了人们对她作品的兴趣。
• The award has stimulated her into working still harder. 奖金促使她更加努力地工作。

221 zeal   

n.热心，热情，热忱

参考例句：

• Revolutionary zeal caught them up,and they joined the army.革命热情激励他们，于是他们从军了。
• They worked with great zeal to finish the project.他们热情高涨地工作，以期完成这个项目。

222 concurrence   

n.同意；并发

参考例句：

• There is a concurrence of opinion between them.他们的想法一致。
• The concurrence of their disappearances had to be more than coincidental.他们同时失踪肯定不仅仅是巧合。

223 adornment   

n.装饰；装饰品

参考例句：

• Lucie was busy with the adornment of her room.露西正忙着布置她的房间。
• Cosmetics are used for adornment.化妆品是用来打扮的。

224 copper   

n.铜；铜币；铜器；adj.铜(制)的；(紫)铜色的

参考例句：

• The students are asked to prove the purity of copper.要求学生们检验铜的纯度。
• Copper is a good medium for the conduction of heat and electricity.铜是热和电的良导体。

225 gratis   

adj.免费的

参考例句：

• David gives the first consultation gratis.戴维免费提供初次咨询。
• The service was gratis to graduates.这项服务对毕业生是免费的。

226 synopsis   

n.提要，梗概

参考例句：

• The synopsis of the book is very good.这本书的梗概非常好。
• I heard there wasn't a script.They only had a synopsis.我听说是没有剧本的。他们只有一个大纲。

227 discourse   

n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述

参考例句：

• We'll discourse on the subject tonight.我们今晚要谈论这个问题。
• He fell into discourse with the customers who were drinking at the counter.他和站在柜台旁的酒客谈了起来。

228 imprinted   

v.盖印（imprint的过去式与过去分词形式）

参考例句：

• The terrible scenes were indelibly imprinted on his mind. 那些恐怖场面深深地铭刻在他的心中。
• The scene was imprinted on my mind. 那个场面铭刻在我的心中。 来自《简明英汉词典》

229 counterfeit   

vt.伪造，仿造；adj.伪造的，假冒的

参考例句：

• It is a crime to counterfeit money.伪造货币是犯罪行为。
• The painting looked old but was a recent counterfeit.这幅画看上去年代久远，实际是最近的一幅赝品。

230 counterfeiter   

n.伪造者

参考例句：

• If the illegal gains are very large the counterfeiter shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than seven years and be fined. 对于违法所得数额巨大的，处3年以上7年以下有期徒刑，并处罚金。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Judge: (asking a counterfeiter) Why do you make false money? 法官：（威严地问假币制造者）你为什么制造假币？ 来自互联网

231 lawful   

adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的

参考例句：

• It is not lawful to park in front of a hydrant.在消火栓前停车是不合法的。
• We don't recognised him to be the lawful heir.我们不承认他为合法继承人。

232 authorized   

a.委任的，许可的

参考例句：

• An administrative order is valid if authorized by a statute.如果一个行政命令得到一个法规的认可那么这个命令就是有效的。

233 engraving   

n.版画；雕刻（作品）；雕刻艺术；镌版术v.在（硬物）上雕刻（字，画等）( engrave的现在分词 )；将某事物深深印在（记忆或头脑中）

参考例句：

• He collected an old engraving of London Bridge. 他收藏了一张古老的伦敦桥版画。 来自辞典例句
• Some writing has the precision of a steel engraving. 有的字体严谨如同钢刻。 来自辞典例句

234 bust   

vt.打破；vi.爆裂；n.半身像；胸部

参考例句：

• I dropped my camera on the pavement and bust it. 我把照相机掉在人行道上摔坏了。
• She has worked up a lump of clay into a bust.她把一块黏土精心制作成一个半身像。

235 sculptor   

n.雕刻家，雕刻家

参考例句：

• A sculptor forms her material.雕塑家把材料塑造成雕塑品。
• The sculptor rounded the clay into a sphere.那位雕塑家把黏土做成了一个球状。

236 pilfering   

v.偷窃（小东西），小偷( pilfer的现在分词 )；偷窃（一般指小偷小摸）

参考例句：

• He was caught pilfering. 他行窃时被抓个正着。
• Pilfering has stopped entirely since they put Angus in charge of the stores. 自从他们让安格斯掌管商店以来，小偷小摸就杜绝了。 来自《简明英汉词典》

237 underlying   

adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的

参考例句：

• The underlying theme of the novel is very serious.小说隐含的主题是十分严肃的。
• This word has its underlying meaning.这个单词有它潜在的含义。

238 lessee   

n.（房地产的）租户

参考例句：

• The lessor can evict the lessee for failure to pay rent.出租人可驱逐不付租金的承租人。
• The lessee will be asked to fill in a leasing application.租赁人要求填写一张租赁申请。

239 peculiarity   

n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖

参考例句：

• Each country has its own peculiarity.每个国家都有自己的独特之处。
• The peculiarity of this shop is its day and nigth service.这家商店的特点是昼夜服务。

240 peculiar   

adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的

参考例句：

• He walks in a peculiar fashion.他走路的样子很奇特。
• He looked at me with a very peculiar expression.他用一种很奇怪的表情看着我。

241 statutes   

成文法( statute的名词复数 )； 法令； 法规； 章程

参考例句：

• The numerous existing statutes are complicated and poorly coordinated. 目前繁多的法令既十分复杂又缺乏快调。 来自英汉非文学 - 环境法 - 环境法
• Each agency is also restricted by the particular statutes governing its activities. 各个机构的行为也受具体法令限制。 来自英汉非文学 - 环境法 - 环境法

242 manifestation   

n.表现形式；表明；现象

参考例句：

• Her smile is a manifestation of joy.她的微笑是她快乐的表现。
• What we call mass is only another manifestation of energy.我们称之为质量的东西只是能量的另一种表现形态。

243 legitimate   

adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法

参考例句：

• Sickness is a legitimate reason for asking for leave.生病是请假的一个正当的理由。
• That's a perfectly legitimate fear.怀有这种恐惧完全在情理之中。

244 legitimately   

ad.合法地；正当地，合理地

参考例句：

• The radio is legitimately owned by the company. 该电台为这家公司所合法拥有。
• She looked for nothing save what might come legitimately and without the appearance of special favour. 她要的并不是男人们的额外恩赐，而是合法正当地得到的工作。 来自英汉文学 - 嘉莉妹妹

245 relinquished   

交出，让给( relinquish的过去式和过去分词 )； 放弃

参考例句：

• She has relinquished the post to her cousin, Sir Edward. 她把职位让给了表弟爱德华爵士。
• The small dog relinquished his bone to the big dog. 小狗把它的骨头让给那只大狗。

246 prescription   

n.处方，开药；指示，规定

参考例句：

• The physician made a prescription against sea- sickness for him.医生给他开了个治晕船的药方。
• The drug is available on prescription only.这种药只能凭处方购买。

247 exclusion   

n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行

参考例句：

• Don't revise a few topics to the exclusion of all others.不要修改少数论题以致排除所有其他的。
• He plays golf to the exclusion of all other sports.他专打高尔夫球，其他运动一概不参加。

248 embody   

vt.具体表达，使具体化；包含，收录

参考例句：

• The latest locomotives embody many new features. 这些最新的机车具有许多新的特色。
• Hemingway's characters plainly embody his own values and view of life.海明威笔下的角色明确反映出他自己的价值观与人生观。

249 commonwealth   

n.共和国，联邦，共同体

参考例句：

• He is the chairman of the commonwealth of artists.他是艺术家协会的主席。
• Most of the members of the Commonwealth are nonwhite.英联邦的许多成员国不是白人国家。

250 survivor   

n.生存者，残存者，幸存者

参考例句：

• The sole survivor of the crash was an infant.这次撞车的惟一幸存者是一个婴儿。
• There was only one survivor of the plane crash.这次飞机失事中只有一名幸存者。

251 divest   

v.脱去，剥除

参考例句：

• I cannot divest myself of the idea.我无法消除那个念头。
• He attempted to divest himself of all responsibilities for the decision.他力图摆脱掉作出该项决定的一切责任。

252 disposition   

n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署

参考例句：

• He has made a good disposition of his property.他已对财产作了妥善处理。
• He has a cheerful disposition.他性情开朗。

253 abeyance   

n.搁置，缓办，中止，产权未定

参考例句：

• The question is in abeyance until we know more about it.问题暂时搁置，直到我们了解更多有关情况再行研究。
• The law was held in abeyance for well over twenty years.这项法律被搁置了二十多年。

254 testaments   

n.遗嘱( testament的名词复数 )；实际的证明

参考例句：

• The coastline is littered with testaments to the savageness of the waters. 海岸线上充满了海水肆虐过后的杂乱东西。 来自互联网
• A personification of wickedness and ungodliness alluded to in the Old and New Testaments. 彼勒《旧约》和《新约》中邪恶和罪孽的化身。 来自互联网

255 rejection   

n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃

参考例句：

• He decided not to approach her for fear of rejection.他因怕遭拒绝决定不再去找她。
• The rejection plunged her into the dark depths of despair.遭到拒绝使她陷入了绝望的深渊。

256 favourable   

adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的

参考例句：

• The company will lend you money on very favourable terms.这家公司将以非常优惠的条件借钱给你。
• We found that most people are favourable to the idea.我们发现大多数人同意这个意见。

257 worthily   

重要地，可敬地，正当地

参考例句：

• Many daughters have done worthily, But you surpass them all. 29行事有才德的女子很多，惟独你超过众人。
• Then as my gift, which your true love has worthily purchased, take mydaughter. 那么，就作为我的礼物，把我的女儿接受下来吧--这也是你的真实爱情应得的报偿。

258 survivors   

幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• The survivors were adrift in a lifeboat for six days. 幸存者在救生艇上漂流了六天。
• survivors clinging to a raft 紧紧抓住救生筏的幸存者

259 accusation   

n.控告，指责，谴责

参考例句：

• I was furious at his making such an accusation.我对他的这种责备非常气愤。
• She knew that no one would believe her accusation.她知道没人会相信她的指控。

260 accusations   

n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名

参考例句：

• There were accusations of plagiarism. 曾有过关于剽窃的指控。
• He remained unruffled by their accusations. 对于他们的指控他处之泰然。

261 dishonour   

n./vt.拒付（支票、汇票、票据等）；vt.凌辱，使丢脸；n.不名誉，耻辱，不光彩

参考例句：

• There's no dishonour in losing.失败并不是耻辱。
• He would rather die than live in dishonour.他宁死不愿忍辱偷生。

262 dishonoured   

a.不光彩的，不名誉的

参考例句：

• You have dishonoured the name of the school. 你败坏了学校的名声。
• We found that the bank had dishonoured some of our cheques. 我们发现银行拒绝兑现我们的部分支票。

263 intentionally   

ad.故意地，有意地

参考例句：

• I didn't say it intentionally. 我是无心说的。
• The local authority ruled that he had made himself intentionally homeless and was therefore not entitled to be rehoused. 当地政府裁定他是有意居无定所，因此没有资格再获得提供住房。

264 calumniator   

n.中伤者，诽谤者

参考例句：

• Tower is measured by their shadow, and great men by their calumniator. 高塔是按塔影测量的；伟人是以他们的诽谤者衡量的。 来自互联网

265 affix   

n.附件，附录 vt.附贴，盖(章)，签署

参考例句：

• Please affix your signature to the document. 请你在这个文件上签字。
• Complete the form and affix four tokens to its back. 填完该表，在背面贴上4张凭券。

266 vindicator   

n.维护者，辩护者，辩明者

参考例句：

267 ethically   

adv.在伦理上，道德上

参考例句：

• Ethically , we have nothing to be ashamed about . 从伦理上说，我们没有什么好羞愧的。
• Describe the appropriate action to take in an ethically ambiguous situation. 描述适当行为采取在一个道德地模棱两可的情况。

268 accruing   

v.增加( accrue的现在分词 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累

参考例句：

• economic benefits accruing to the country from tourism 旅游业为该国带来的经济效益
• The accruing on a security since the previous coupon date. 指证券自上次付息日以来所累积的利息。 来自互联网

269 censure   

v./n.责备；非难；责难

参考例句：

• You must not censure him until you know the whole story.在弄清全部事实真相前不要谴责他。
• His dishonest behaviour came under severe censure.他的不诚实行为受到了严厉指责。

270 presentiment   

n.预感，预觉

参考例句：

• He had a presentiment of disaster.他预感会有灾难降临。
• I have a presentiment that something bad will happen.我有某种不祥事要发生的预感。

271 subsists   

v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• This plant subsists in water holes only during the rainy season. 这种植物只有雨季在水坑里出现。 来自辞典例句
• The hinge is that the enterprise subsists on suiting the development of data communication. 适应数据通信的发展是通信企业生存的关键。 来自互联网

272 culpable   

adj.有罪的，该受谴责的

参考例句：

• The judge found the man culpable.法官认为那个人有罪。
• Their decision to do nothing makes them culpable.他们不采取任何行动的决定使他们难辞其咎。

273 inflicted   

把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• They inflicted a humiliating defeat on the home team. 他们使主队吃了一场很没面子的败仗。
• Zoya heroically bore the torture that the Fascists inflicted upon her. 卓娅英勇地承受法西斯匪徒加在她身上的酷刑。

274 plagiarism   

n.剽窃，抄袭

参考例句：

• Teachers in America fight to control cheating and plagiarism.美国老师们努力对付欺骗和剽窃的问题。
• Now he's in real trouble.He's accused of plagiarism.现在他是真遇到麻烦了。他被指控剽窃。

275 tarnish   

n.晦暗，污点；vt.使失去光泽；玷污

参考例句：

• The affair could tarnish the reputation of the prime minister.这一事件可能有损首相的名誉。
• Stainless steel products won't tarnish.不锈钢产品不会失去光泽。

276 judicial   

adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的

参考例句：

• He is a man with a judicial mind.他是个公正的人。
• Tom takes judicial proceedings against his father.汤姆对他的父亲正式提出诉讼。

277 pertaining   

与…有关系的，附属…的，为…固有的(to)

参考例句：

• Living conditions are vastly different from those pertaining in their country of origin. 生活条件与他们祖国大不相同。
• The inspector was interested in everything pertaining to the school. 视察员对有关学校的一切都感兴趣。

278 donor   

n.捐献者；赠送人；(组织、器官等的)供体

参考例句：

• In these cases,the recipient usually takes care of the donor afterwards.在这类情况下，接受捐献者以后通常会照顾捐赠者。
• The Doctor transplanted the donor's heart to Mike's chest cavity.医生将捐赠者的心脏移植进麦克的胸腔。

279 gratuitously   

平白

参考例句：

• They rebuild their houses for them gratuitously when they are ruined. 如果他们的房屋要坍了，就会有人替他们重盖，不要工资。 来自互联网
• He insulted us gratuitously. 他在毫无理由的情况下侮辱了我们。 来自互联网

280 implement   

n.(pl.)工具，器具；vt.实行，实施，执行

参考例句：

• Don't undertake a project unless you can implement it.不要承担一项计划，除非你能完成这项计划。
• The best implement for digging a garden is a spade.在花园里挖土的最好工具是铁锹。

281 impeded   

阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• Work on the building was impeded by severe weather. 楼房的施工因天气恶劣而停了下来。
• He was impeded in his work. 他的工作受阻。

282 detriment   

n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源

参考例句：

• Smoking is a detriment to one's health.吸烟危害健康。
• His lack of education is a serious detriment to his career.他的未受教育对他的事业是一种严重的妨碍。

283 incumbent   

adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的

参考例句：

• He defeated the incumbent governor by a large plurality.他以压倒多数票击败了现任州长。
• It is incumbent upon you to warn them.你有责任警告他们。

284 undertaking   

n.保证，许诺，事业

参考例句：

• He gave her an undertaking that he would pay the money back with in a year.他向她做了一年内还钱的保证。
• He is too timid to venture upon an undertaking.他太胆小，不敢从事任何事业。

285 accrue   

v.(利息等)增大，增多

参考例句：

• Ability to think will accrue to you from good habits of study.思考能力将因良好的学习习惯而自然增强。
• Money deposited in banks will accrue to us with interest.钱存在银行，利息自生。

286 compensate   

vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消

参考例句：

• She used her good looks to compensate her lack of intelligence. 她利用她漂亮的外表来弥补智力的不足。
• Nothing can compensate for the loss of one's health. 一个人失去了键康是不可弥补的。

287 superfluous   

adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的

参考例句：

• She fined away superfluous matter in the design. 她删去了这图案中多余的东西。
• That request seemed superfluous when I wrote it.我这样写的时候觉得这个请求似乎是多此一举。

288 presumptions   

n.假定( presumption的名词复数 )；认定；推定；放肆

参考例句：

• Much modern technological advance is based on these presumptions of legal security. 许多现代技术的发展都是基于这些法律安全设想的考虑。 来自互联网
• What visions, what expectations and what presumptions can outsoar that flight? 那一种想象，那一种期望和推测能超越他之上呢？ 来自互联网

289 honourable   

adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的

参考例句：

• I don't think I am worthy of such an honourable title.这样的光荣称号，我可担当不起。
• I hope to find an honourable way of settling difficulties.我希望设法找到一个体面的办法以摆脱困境。

290 professes   

声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉

参考例句：

• She still professes her innocence. 她仍然声称自己无辜。
• He professes himself to be sad but doesn't look it. 他自称感到悲伤，但外表却看不出来。

291 justifying   

证明…有理( justify的现在分词 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护）

参考例句：

• He admitted it without justifying it. 他不加辩解地承认这个想法。
• The fellow-travellers'service usually consisted of justifying all the tergiversations of Soviet intenal and foreign policy. 同路人的服务通常包括对苏联国内外政策中一切互相矛盾之处进行辩护。

292 unimpeachable   

adj.无可指责的；adv.无可怀疑地

参考例句：

• He said all five were men of unimpeachable character.他说这五个都是品格完美无缺的人。
• It is the revenge that nature takes on persons of unimpeachable character.这是自然对人品无瑕的人的报复。

293 putative   

adj.假定的

参考例句：

• There have been many attempts to track down the putative Loch Ness monster.人们为追踪假定存在的尼斯湖水怪做了许多努力。
• He is the putative father of this child.他是这孩子的推定的父亲。

294 postulated   

v.假定，假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• They postulated a 500-year lifespan for a plastic container. 他们假定塑料容器的寿命为500年。
• Freud postulated that we all have a death instinct as well as a life instinct. 弗洛伊德曾假定我们所有人都有生存本能和死亡本能。 来自辞典例句

295 transmuted   

v.使变形，使变质，把…变成…( transmute的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• It was once thought that lead could be transmuted into gold. 有人曾经认为铅可以变成黄金。
• They transmuted the raw materials into finished products. 他们把原料变为成品。 来自《现代英汉综合大词典》

296 vindicate   

v.为…辩护或辩解，辩明；证明…正确

参考例句：

• He tried hard to vindicate his honor.他拼命维护自己的名誉。
• How can you vindicate your behavior to the teacher?你怎样才能向老师证明你的行为是对的呢？

297 supreme   

adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的

参考例句：

• It was the supreme moment in his life.那是他一生中最重要的时刻。
• He handed up the indictment to the supreme court.他把起诉书送交最高法院。

298 invoke   

v.求助于(神、法律)；恳求，乞求

参考例句：

• Let us invoke the blessings of peace.让我们祈求和平之福。
• I hope I'll never have to invoke this clause and lodge a claim with you.我希望我永远不会使用这个条款向你们索赔。

299 utterance   

n.用言语表达，话语，言语

参考例句：

• This utterance of his was greeted with bursts of uproarious laughter.他的讲话引起阵阵哄然大笑。
• My voice cleaves to my throat,and sob chokes my utterance.我的噪子哽咽，泣不成声。

300 constrained   

adj.束缚的,节制的

参考例句：

• The evidence was so compelling that he felt constrained to accept it. 证据是那样的令人折服，他觉得不得不接受。
• I feel constrained to write and ask for your forgiveness. 我不得不写信请你原谅。

301 truthful   

adj.真实的，说实话的，诚实的

参考例句：

• You can count on him for a truthful report of the accident.你放心，他会对事故作出如实的报告的。
• I don't think you are being entirely truthful.我认为你并没全讲真话。

302 promising   

adj.有希望的，有前途的

参考例句：

• The results of the experiments are very promising.实验的结果充满了希望。
• We're trying to bring along one or two promising young swimmers.我们正设法培养出一两名有前途的年轻游泳选手。

303 superstition   

n.迷信，迷信行为

参考例句：

• It's a common superstition that black cats are unlucky.认为黑猫不吉祥是一种很普遍的迷信。
• Superstition results from ignorance.迷信产生于无知。

304 truthfulness   

n. 符合实际

参考例句：

• Among her many virtues are loyalty, courage, and truthfulness. 她有许多的美德，如忠诚、勇敢和诚实。
• I fired a hundred questions concerning the truthfulness of his statement. 我对他发言的真实性提出一连串质问。

305 motive   

n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的

参考例句：

• The police could not find a motive for the murder.警察不能找到谋杀的动机。
• He had some motive in telling this fable.他讲这寓言故事是有用意的。

306 fables   

n.寓言( fable的名词复数 )；神话，传说

参考例句：

• Some of Aesop's Fables are satires. 《伊索寓言》中有一些是讽刺作品。 来自《现代英汉综合大词典》
• Little Mexican boys also breathe the American fables. 墨西哥族的小孩子对美国神话也都耳濡目染。 来自辞典例句

307 testimony   

n.证词；见证，证明

参考例句：

• The testimony given by him is dubious.他所作的证据是可疑的。
• He was called in to bear testimony to what the police officer said.他被传入为警官所说的话作证。

308 ascertain   

vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清

参考例句：

• It's difficult to ascertain the coal deposits.煤储量很难探明。
• We must ascertain the responsibility in light of different situtations.我们必须根据不同情况判定责任。

309 obligatory   

adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的

参考例句：

• It is obligatory for us to obey the laws.我们必须守法。
• It is obligatory on every citizen to safeguard our great motherland.保卫我们伟大的祖国是每一个公民应尽的义务。

310 entrust   

v.信赖，信托，交托

参考例句：

• I couldn't entrust my children to strangers.我不能把孩子交给陌生人照看。
• They can be entrusted to solve major national problems.可以委托他们解决重大国家问题。

311 utilized   

v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• In the19th century waterpower was widely utilized to generate electricity. 在19世纪人们大规模使用水力来发电。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The empty building can be utilized for city storage. 可以利用那栋空建筑物作城市的仓库。 来自《简明英汉词典》

312 superstitious   

adj.迷信的

参考例句：

• They aim to deliver the people who are in bondage to superstitious belief.他们的目的在于解脱那些受迷信束缚的人。
• These superstitious practices should be abolished as soon as possible.这些迷信做法应尽早取消。

313 propensity   

n.倾向；习性

参考例句：

• He has a propensity for drinking too much alcohol.他有酗酒的倾向。
• She hasn't reckoned on his propensity for violence.她不曾料到他有暴力倾向。

314 ascertainment   

n.探查，发现，确认

参考例句：

• Part 1 introduces the ascertainment of key stuff in state-owned commercial banks. 第1部分介绍了国有商业银行核心员工的界定。 来自互联网
• IV The judicial ascertainment and criminal liability of involuntary dangerous crime. 过失危险犯的司法认定及刑事责任。 来自互联网

315 concealed   

a.隐藏的，隐蔽的

参考例句：

• The paintings were concealed beneath a thick layer of plaster. 那些画被隐藏在厚厚的灰泥层下面。
• I think he had a gun concealed about his person. 我认为他当时身上藏有一支枪。

316 pretext   

n.借口，托词

参考例句：

• He used his headache as a pretext for not going to school.他借口头疼而不去上学。
• He didn't attend that meeting under the pretext of sickness.他以生病为借口，没参加那个会议。

317 violations   

违反( violation的名词复数 )； 冒犯； 违反（行为、事例）； 强奸

参考例句：

• This is one of the commonest traffic violations. 这是常见的违反交通规则之例。
• These violations of the code must cease forthwith. 这些违犯法规的行为必须立即停止。

318 censors   

删剪（书籍、电影等中被认为犯忌、违反道德或政治上危险的内容）( censor的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• The censors eviscerated the book to make it inoffensive to the President. 审查员删去了该书的精华以取悦于总统。
• The censors let out not a word. 检察官一字也不发。

319 wager   

n.赌注；vt.押注，打赌

参考例句：

• They laid a wager on the result of the race.他们以竞赛的结果打赌。
• I made a wager that our team would win.我打赌我们的队会赢。

320 pertinent   

adj.恰当的；贴切的；中肯的；有关的；相干的

参考例句：

• The expert made some pertinent comments on the scheme.那专家对规划提出了一些中肯的意见。
• These should guide him to pertinent questions for further study.这些将有助于他进一步研究有关问题。

321 conscientiousness   

责任心

参考例句：

• Conscientiousness is expected of a student. 学生要诚实。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Only has the conscientiousness, diligently works, can make a more splendid result! 只有脚踏实地，努力工作，才能做出更出色的成绩！ 来自互联网

322 levity   

n.轻率，轻浮，不稳定，多变

参考例句：

• His remarks injected a note of levity into the proceedings.他的话将一丝轻率带入了议事过程中。
• At the time,Arnold had disapproved of such levity.那时候的阿诺德对这种轻浮行为很看不惯。

323 engender   

v.产生，引起

参考例句：

• A policy like that tends to engender a sense of acceptance,and the research literature suggests this leads to greater innovation.一个能够使员工产生认同感的政策，研究表明这会走向更伟大的创新。
• The sense of injustice they engender is a threat to economic and political security.它们造成的不公平感是对经济和政治安全的威胁。

324 analytically   

adv.有分析地，解析地

参考例句：

• The final requirement,'significant environmental impact", is analytically more difficult. 最后一个规定“重大的环境影响”，分析起来是比较困难的。 来自英汉非文学 - 环境法 - 环境法
• The overwhelming majority of nonlinear differential equations are not soluble analytically. 绝大多数非线性微分方程是不能用解析方法求解的。

325 antagonistic   

adj.敌对的

参考例句：

• He is always antagonistic towards new ideas.他对新思想总是持反对态度。
• They merely stirred in a nervous and wholly antagonistic way.他们只是神经质地，带着完全敌对情绪地骚动了一下。

326 melancholy   

n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的

参考例句：

• All at once he fell into a state of profound melancholy.他立即陷入无尽的忧思之中。
• He felt melancholy after he failed the exam.这次考试没通过，他感到很郁闷。

327 hostility   

n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争

参考例句：

• There is open hostility between the two leaders.两位领导人表现出公开的敌意。
• His hostility to your plan is well known.他对你的计划所持的敌意是众所周知的。

328 besieged   

包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• Paris was besieged for four months and forced to surrender. 巴黎被围困了四个月后被迫投降。
• The community besieged the newspaper with letters about its recent editorial. 公众纷纷来信对报社新近发表的社论提出诘问，弄得报社应接不暇。

329 fortress   

n.堡垒，防御工事

参考例句：

• They made an attempt on a fortress.他们试图夺取这一要塞。
• The soldier scaled the wall of the fortress by turret.士兵通过塔车攀登上了要塞的城墙。

330 honourably   

adv.可尊敬地，光荣地，体面地

参考例句：

• Will the time never come when we may honourably bury the hatchet? 难道我们永远不可能有个体面地休战的时候吗？ 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The dispute was settled honourably. 争议体面地得到解决。 来自《简明英汉词典》

331 garrison   

n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防

参考例句：

• The troops came to the relief of the besieged garrison.军队来援救被围的守备军。
• The German was moving to stiffen up the garrison in Sicily.德军正在加强西西里守军之力量。

332 overthrow   

v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆

参考例句：

• After the overthrow of the government,the country was in chaos.政府被推翻后，这个国家处于混乱中。
• The overthrow of his plans left him much discouraged.他的计划的失败使得他很气馁。