§133. By common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in our language, is common-wealth, and most properly expresses such a society of men, which community or city in English does not; for there may be subordinate communities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion from common-wealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity9, I crave10 leave to use the word common-wealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king James the first; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body dislike, I consent with him to change it for a better.
Chapter XI.
Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.
§134. THE great end of men’s entering into society, being the enjoyment11 of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths13 is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation14 of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent*, and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience15, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts16: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever17, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting18 pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted19, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the supreme.
(*The lawful20 power of making laws to command whole politic21 societies of men, belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate22 of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived23 at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere24 tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation25 hath not made so. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10. Of this point therefore we are to note, that sith men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly26 without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man’s commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking27 the same after by the like universal agreement.
Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.)
§135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals28, though it be the supreme power in every common-wealth; yet,
First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint29 power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the common-wealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never* have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish30 the subjects. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn31 closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed32 to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid33 against it.
(*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a natural inclination34, whereby all men desire sociable35 life and fellowship; the other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching36 the manner of their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a commonweal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated37, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained38 for external order and regiment39 amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate40, rebellious41, and averse42 from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance44 unto the common good, for which societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
§136. Secondly45,* The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense46 justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated47 standing43 laws, and known authorized48 judges: for the law of nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents49. To avoid these inconveniences, which disorder50 men’s properties in the state of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty51, as it was in the state of nature.
(*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by, which rules are two, the law of God, and the law of nature; so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature, and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture52, otherwise they are ill made. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect. 9.
To constrain53 men to any thing inconvenient54 doth seem unreasonable55. Ibid. l. i. sect. 10.)
§137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate’s hand to execute his unlimited56 will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed57 themselves, and armed him, to make a prey58 of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will, who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever form the common-wealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates59 and undetermined resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant60 and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify61 their actions: for all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted62, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.
§138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity63 for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are theirs, that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth12, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting64 assembly always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies65, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man’s property is not at all secure, tho’ there be good and equitable66 laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.
§139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have before shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property, without their own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial67 discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole common-wealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither the serjeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon68, or stand in a breach69, where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn70 him to death for deserting his post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot71 of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it.
§140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy72 taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby73 invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts74 the end of government: for what property have I in that, which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?
§141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the common-wealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.
§142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every common-wealth, in all forms of government.
First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied75 in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.
Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.
Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people have.
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sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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oligarchy
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| n.寡头政治 | |
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monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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reverted
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| 恢复( revert的过去式和过去分词 )； 重提； 回到…上； 归还 | |
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ambiguity
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| n.模棱两可；意义不明确 | |
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crave
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| vt.渴望得到，迫切需要，恳求，请求 | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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commonwealths
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| n.共和国( commonwealth的名词复数 )；联邦；团体；协会 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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enacts
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的第三人称单数 ) | |
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whatsoever
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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enacted
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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potentate
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| n.统治者；君主 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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utterly
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revoking
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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impoverish
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| vt.使穷困，使贫困 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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sociable
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touching
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animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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ordained
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| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的过去式和过去分词 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
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regiment
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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rebellious
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| adj.造反的，反抗的，难控制的 | |
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averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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promulgated
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| v.宣扬（某事物）( promulgate的过去式和过去分词 )；传播；公布；颁布（法令、新法律等） | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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delinquents
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| n.（尤指青少年）有过失的人，违法的人( delinquent的名词复数 ) | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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scripture
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| n.经文，圣书，手稿；Scripture:(常用复数)《圣经》，《圣经》中的一段 | |
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constrain
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| vt.限制，约束；克制，抑制 | |
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inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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unreasonable
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| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
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unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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disarmed
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| v.裁军( disarm的过去式和过去分词 )；使息怒 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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exorbitant
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| adj.过分的；过度的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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monarchies
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| n. 君主政体, 君主国, 君主政治 | |
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equitable
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| adj.公平的；公正的 | |
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martial
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| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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68
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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69
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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70
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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71
jot
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| n.少量；vi.草草记下；vt.匆匆写下 | |
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72
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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73
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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74
subverts
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| v.颠覆，破坏（政治制度、宗教信仰等）( subvert的第三人称单数 )；使（某人）道德败坏或不忠 | |
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75
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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