The oldest device for the protection of war-ships against torpedoes5—whether fired by torpedo4-boats or submarines—is the net. Our older battle-ships, as everyone will remember, were fitted with a complete set of steel nets on both sides, and with long booms for hanging them out. These booms, when not in use, were lashed6 diagonally along the ship’s sides, like great stitches, and gave the typical vessels7 of the British Fleet a peculiar9 and decidedly smart appearance. Very smart, too, was the quickness and precision with which the order ‘Out torpedo nets!’ was executed; but—long before 1914—everyone was perfectly10 aware that the nets were practically as much out of date as masts and sails.96 They were so heavy, and hung so low in the water, that no ship could man?uvre in them, and even for a fleet at anchor they had ceased to be a trustworthy defence; for the Whitehead torpedo was now fitted with cutters which could shear11 a way through the steel meshes12.
Nets of the old type, therefore, have played no part in the present War—unless we are to believe the Turkish account of the sinking of the Ocean in the Dardanelles, according to which the nets were out, and were not only useless as a protection, but dragged down some of our men when they might otherwise have escaped by swimming. But, because one type of net is obsolete, the British Navy has seen no reason to reject all nets as impracticable. It is not beyond imagination to conceive a net so light and large of mesh13, that it will diminish by no more than one knot the speed of the ship which carries it, and will yet catch and deflect14 a torpedo in the act of passing through it. For it must be remembered that the real problem is not how to stop a torpedo in its full 30-knot career, but how to prevent it from striking the ship with its head at an angle not too fine for the detonator to be fired. A turn of the helm, or the mere15 wave from the cut-water of a fast ship, has often sent a torpedo running harmlessly away along the quarter. The net of the future may be found equally successful in catching16 the fish by its whiskers and turning it forward along the bow, where the same wave will drive it outwards17 from the ship’s course.
The second familiar means of defence was the gun. Here again there was a temptation to despair. The secondary armament of any battle-ship or cruiser was fairly certain to make short work of a torpedo-boat, or of a submarine visible upon the surface. But no living97 gunner had ever fired at the periscope18 of a submarine—a mark only two feet, at most, out of the water, and only four inches in diameter. To see such an object at, say, 1,000 yards, was difficult; to hit it might well seem impossible. Yet 1,000 yards was but one-tenth of the possible range at which a modern submarine might fire its torpedo.
Nevertheless the use of the gun was not discarded; and two important discoveries were made in consequence. The first of these was that gunfire may be distant, wild, or even unaimed, and yet have an excellent effect. The existence of a submarine is so precarious—its chance of surviving a single direct hit is so slight—that the mere sound of a gun will almost always be enough to make it submerge completely—unless it can engage the enemy, with superior gun-power, at a range of its own choosing. When Captain Weddigen had already hit the Aboukir, the Hogue, and the Cressy, and all three were sinking, the sound of the Cressy’s guns was enough to cause his disappearance19, though it is very improbable that the shooting was really dangerous; for the listing of the ship was rapid, and according to eye-witnesses, the gallant20 gunners were soon firing in the air. Since then, the same thing has been repeatedly observed; and some brilliant successes by our patrol-boats and trawlers have shown that the U-boat has every right to be nervous when it hears even a 6-pounder talking English.
The other discovery is a much more recent one. As soon as it was once recognised that a torpedo is just as innocuous when deflected21, as when stopped or evaded22, the idea was sure to strike the handiest gunners in the world that they might use their weapons to disturb the98 straightforwardness23 of the fish’s onset24. Even thirty knots is nothing to the velocity25 of a modern shell, and without hoping for a direct hit on an object from six to twenty-two feet under water, it was thought possible to give a twist to the torpedo’s nose sufficient to make a potential hit into a miss or a glancing shot. This feat26 was actually performed by the gunners of the Justitia, who, with splendid coolness, shot at torpedoes as sportsmen used to shoot at oncoming tigers, and succeeded in killing27 or diverting several, only to fall at last before the rush of numbers.
‘She had gone full speed for the enemy, and rammed28 him.’
A third weapon of the war-ship was the ram29; and the use of this, being an offensive-defensive30 method, was the best of all, as we shall see presently. It was, from the beginning, present to the mind of every naval31 man, for A. 1 (our very first submarine) was lost, with all hands, in May, 1904, by being accidentally rammed in the act of submerging. It happened, too, that the first attack made by a submarine against British war-ships in the present War was beaten by this method. On August 9, 1914, a squadron of our light cruisers sighted the periscope of a German U-boat, which had succeeded in approaching to within short range of them. In the account of the affair published at the time, we were informed that H.M.S. Birmingham had sunk the submarine by a direct hit on the periscope, and that this was the only shot fired. Some time afterwards, the truth became known—the Birmingham had to her credit, not an impossible feat of gunnery, but a brilliant piece of seamanship. She had gone full speed for the enemy, and rammed him. Her captain was not led to do this by inspiration or desperation, but by a scientific knowledge of the elements in the problem. Without99
stopping to think afresh, he knew that a submarine takes a certain time to dive to a safe depth, and that his own ship, at 27 knots, would cover a good 900 yards of sea in one minute. When his eye measured the distance of that periscope, he saw that—given straight steering—the result was a mathematical certainty.
The new methods introduced during the War are also three in number. Of one—the use of dazzle-painting—we have already heard. It is, of course, a purely32 defensive measure, intended to deceive the eye at the periscope by misrepresenting the ship’s size, distance, and course. Another deceptive33 device is the phantom34 ship or dummy35. A vessel8 of comparatively small size and value is covered more or less completely with a superstructure of light wood-work, with sham36 funnels37, turrets38 and big guns, so that she has all the appearance of a battle-cruiser or Dreadnought. The U-boat may run after her, or run from her, according to his feeling at the moment; but, in either case, he will be wasting his time and laying up disappointment for himself. In May, 1915, during the Gallipoli campaign, the Germans spent a certain amount of time and trouble in torpedoing39 a ship which they supposed to be H.M.S. Agamemnon, and in their illustrated40 propaganda sheets they give a picture of that ship as one of the victims of the irresistible41 U-boats. For a short time the story was believed inside Constantinople, and Mr. Lewis Einstein, of the American Embassy there, relates in his diary that this success, coming (as it appeared to do) immediately after the sinking of the Triumph and Majestic43, was almost more than he could bear. Fortunately for his peace of mind, he soon discovered the truth. The supposed Agamemnon was a dummy, and lay for some time near the entrance of102 the Dardanelles, with her false turrets and sham guns, exposed to the view of friends and foes44 on the two shores. Very possibly this dummy received a shot which might otherwise have been successfully directed against a genuine battle-ship, and the deception45 was thus really useful. The German cunning is expended46 in a very different direction. Its object is often to deceive their own people as to what has actually been lost, not to avert47 a possible loss at our hands. Thus when the super-submarine Bremen was sunk on her outward voyage for America, one dummy Bremen after another was ostentatiously brought home to a German port, as if returning from a successful Atlantic passage. A more flagrant instance still was the statement that, among the German losses in the Battle of Jutland, was the sinking of the Pommern, a small and obsolete battle-ship of 13,000 tons, built in 1905. The British Admiralty, who knew that that older Pommern had been sunk in the Baltic by Commander Max Horton, nearly a year before, had no difficulty in identifying the Pommern lost at Jutland with a new Dreadnought of the largest type, commissioned since her predecessor’s destruction and christened by her name—either then or at the moment when it became necessary to put a good face on their disasters in the battle. It is to be hoped that this state of things may continue on both sides. The Germans are welcome to our phantom ships, if we thereby48 save our real ones; while, if we can sink their real ones, we may well be content to hear them given imaginary names. The two Services have different ideas of what is a useful dummy.
The newest method of preserving ships from the torpedo is a purely constructional device, and very little103 can be said of it here. But we have been allowed to know this much—the Marlborough was torpedoed49 at Jutland, but returned to the line of battle within nine minutes, fought for three hours, and eventually came home under her own steam, defeating a submarine attack on the way. We are not told how this very satisfactory result is attained50 in the construction of a Dreadnought of 25,000 tons, capable of full battle-ship speed. It cannot be by the mere addition of the bulging51 compartments52 known as ‘blisters,’ for in the older cruisers in which these were tried they were found to cause too great a sacrifice of speed. The result, however, is there; and there can be no doubt that as the number of unsinkable ships increases, the activity of the U-boat will be very greatly discouraged.
But it would be contrary to the principles of war and the genius of our Navy, to rely upon purely defensive measures to defeat the submarine enemy. It is sometimes said that the U-boat campaign took us by surprise. So far as this applies to the legitimate53 use of the submarine against war-ships, the statement is quite untrue. The campaign against merchant shipping54 and non-combatant passengers, waged in defiance55 of all international law and common humanity, did certainly take us by surprise; and it is only to our credit, and the discredit56 of our enemies, that their barbarity was beyond our imagination. But the efforts of the U-boats against our fleet were, as we have shown in a previous chapter, actually less successful than our own attacks upon theirs, and our tacticians were never for a moment at a loss to deal with them. The principles had been thought out long ago. As early as 1907, the distinguished57 admiral who writes over the name ‘Barfleur’104 clearly stated his belief that ‘the untried submarine’ was not likely to prove more effective than the torpedo-boat and destroyer in depriving our Battle Fleet of the control of the sea. ‘Nothing is more to be deprecated,’ he added, ‘than the attempt which has been made to enhance unduly58 its importance, by playing on the credulity of the public. The new instrument of war has no doubt a value, but that it is anything more than an auxiliary59, with limited and special uses, is difficult to believe.’ And he turned back to old and tried principles: ‘The traditional role of the British Navy is not to act on the defensive, but to prepare to attack the force which threatens.’ In September, 1914, when Weddigen’s coup60 showed that the moment had come, ‘Barfleur’ was among the first to attack the new problem tactically—he saw at once that the war-ship’s best defence lies in the offensive power given by her immense superiority in speed and weight. And if the single ship is formidable to the submarine, a squadron is still more so. By its formation, its man?uvres, its pace and its ramming61 power, it reverses the whole situation—the hunter becomes the hunted, and must fly like a wolf from a pack of wolf-hounds, every one more powerful than itself.
There remains62, of course, the question of the best formation for the squadron to adopt. Upon this point there are more opinions than one, and a conversation may be reported in which the merits of line abreast63 and line ahead were set against one another by two naval officers, and both put out of court by a third. The first two were captains commanding ships in two different squadrons. They argued the question between them with great seriousness; but in so cool and abstract a105 manner, that the spectator might be pardoned for suspecting—rightly or wrongly—that they were supporting doctrines64 which were not personal to themselves but derived65 from higher authority—perhaps from their respective admirals, both men of great ability and experience. It was noticeable, too, that the admiral at whose table the disputants were sitting, and who himself commanded yet another squadron, maintained an attitude of neutrality; though it is certain that he and his own officers, several of whom were present, had often discussed the problem, and were probably agreed upon the answer to it.
‘Speed,’ said Captain A, ‘seems to be the key to the solution. It is only in line ahead that speed helps you—in fact gives you something like practical safety. If a torpedo, fired at a column in line ahead, misses the ship it is aimed at, it is very unlikely to be so wide a shot as to hit either the next ahead or next astern—it is a miss directly it crosses the line.’
Captain B remained perfectly grave, but he looked very well content with this argument. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘theoretically; but, in fact, the contrary has happened. In a column of eight ships, in line ahead, the London and the Formidable were the last two. You remember that the torpedo which sank the Formidable was believed to have been meant for the London. And anyhow, speed and stormy weather failed to save the rear ship.’
‘The speed was insufficient,’ replied Captain A, ‘not worth calling speed. When your fleet is in line abreast, columns disposed astern, the theoretical chances of hitting are much greater. Speed is no advantage in such a formation—in fact it may be a positive disadvantage.106 It may actually increase the virtual target. A shot which misses the near ship of a line abreast may still hit one of the others.’
‘Laurence,’ said Captain B, ‘when he fired at the Moltke, considered her, as wing ship of the squadron, to be his only chance.’
‘There was no second line disposed astern,’ replied Captain A; ‘but even so, if his torpedo had just missed, ahead of the Moltke, the next or next but one in the line might have come forward just in time to receive the shot.’
‘That,’ said Captain B, ‘is a mere question of time and distance; and, in anything like ordinary circumstances, you would not get your result. Say the ships are three cables apart, and doing only fifteen knots. The torpedo is going double the speed; but by the time it has run the three cables along the line, the next ship will have gone one and a half cables ahead and be past the danger point.’
‘Your ship may be zigzagging66,’ replied Captain A, ‘and run right into it. Line ahead has the advantage there—in fact, speaking generally, I have the power, which you have not, of immediate42 deployment67 in any direction. I can avoid mines, or turn away from the submarine altogether.’
‘Certainly,’ said Captain B, looking again quite well content, ‘but you would not turn away in any case—you would best defend yourself by attacking the submarine.’
Captain A hesitated a moment. ‘Yes,’ he replied at last, ‘but in line abreast your attack might be positively68 dangerous to yourself. Suppose your columns in line abreast to be zigzagging, as they probably would107 be, and imagine one of your ships to put her helm the wrong way—there would inevitably69 be a collision.’
‘I cannot imagine such a thing,’ said Captain B.
‘I appeal to the Admiral,’ said Captain A.
It seemed an embarrassing thing, for a host and superior officer, to be called upon to give judgment70 between his guests on so serious an argument. But the Admiral was not in the least embarrassed. He did not even express his own opinion, which was thought to favour Captain B. ‘Let me remind you,’ he said, ‘that you have not examined the most important witness in the case—the commander of the submarine. What order is the most dangerous for the submarine to meet? I asked Commander C, one of our best E-boat officers, this question lately, and he replied “Quarter-line, undoubtedly71.”’
He turned to the only landsman present, and reminded him that in a quarter-line, or bow-and-quarter line, the ships are echeloned each upon the quarter of the next ahead instead of directly astern. He added, ‘A will say that this is in his favour, because ships in a quarter-line are really in line ahead, only that each one in turn is a little out of the straight. And B will claim that he wins, because a quarter-line is merely a line abreast in which each ship lags a little more behind the true front. And C will tell us that the only thing which matters is that the quarter-line gives the unhappy submarine less chance of hitting, and more chance of being sunk than either of the other two formations. And thereupon the Court is adjourned72.’
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1
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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obsolete
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| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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torpedoes
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| 鱼雷( torpedo的名词复数 )； 油井爆破筒； 刺客； 掼炮 | |
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6
lashed
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| adj.具睫毛的v.鞭打( lash的过去式和过去分词 )；煽动；紧系；怒斥 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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shear
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| n.修剪，剪下的东西，羊的一岁；vt.剪掉，割，剥夺；vi.修剪，切割，剥夺，穿越 | |
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meshes
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| 网孔( mesh的名词复数 )； 网状物； 陷阱； 困境 | |
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mesh
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| n.网孔，网丝，陷阱；vt.以网捕捉，啮合，匹配；vi.适合； [计算机]网络 | |
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deflect
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| v.(使)偏斜，(使)偏离，(使)转向 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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catching
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| adj.易传染的，有魅力的，迷人的，接住 | |
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outwards
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| adj.外面的，公开的，向外的；adv.向外；n.外形 | |
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periscope
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| n. 潜望镜 | |
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disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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deflected
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| 偏离的 | |
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evaded
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| 逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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straightforwardness
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| n.坦白，率直 | |
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onset
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| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
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velocity
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| n.速度，速率 | |
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feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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rammed
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| v.夯实（土等）( ram的过去式和过去分词 )；猛撞；猛压；反复灌输 | |
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ram
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| (random access memory)随机存取存储器 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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deceptive
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| adj.骗人的，造成假象的，靠不住的 | |
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phantom
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| n.幻影，虚位，幽灵；adj.错觉的，幻影的，幽灵的 | |
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dummy
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| n.假的东西；(哄婴儿的)橡皮奶头 | |
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sham
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| n./adj.假冒(的)，虚伪(的) | |
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funnels
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| 漏斗( funnel的名词复数 )； （轮船，火车等的）烟囱 | |
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turrets
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| （六角）转台( turret的名词复数 )； （战舰和坦克等上的）转动炮塔； （摄影机等上的）镜头转台； （旧时攻城用的）塔车 | |
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torpedoing
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| 用爆破筒爆破 | |
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illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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majestic
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| adj.雄伟的，壮丽的，庄严的，威严的，崇高的 | |
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foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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49
torpedoed
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| 用鱼雷袭击（torpedo的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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50
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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51
bulging
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| 膨胀； 凸出（部）； 打气； 折皱 | |
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compartments
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| n.间隔( compartment的名词复数 )；（列车车厢的）隔间；（家具或设备等的）分隔间；隔层 | |
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53
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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defiance
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| n.挑战，挑衅，蔑视，违抗 | |
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discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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unduly
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| adv.过度地，不适当地 | |
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auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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ramming
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| n.打结炉底v.夯实（土等）( ram的现在分词 )；猛撞；猛压；反复灌输 | |
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62
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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63
abreast
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| adv.并排地；跟上(时代)的步伐，与…并进地 | |
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64
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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65
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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66
zigzagging
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| v.弯弯曲曲地走路，曲折地前进( zigzag的现在分词 )；盘陀 | |
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67
deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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68
positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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69
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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70
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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71
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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72
adjourned
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| （使）休会， （使）休庭( adjourn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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