2. "HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception8? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness9? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay10, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of THEIR own—in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry11 world, in this turmoil12 of delusion13 and cupidity14, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed15 God, in the 'Thing-in-itself—THERE must be their source, and nowhere else!"—This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this "belief" of theirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," for something that is in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES17 OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest18 of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow19, "DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM." For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly21, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below—"frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence22, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely23 in their being insidiously24 related, knotted, and crocheted25 to these evil and apparently26 opposed things—perhaps even in being essentially27 identical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous "Perhapses"! For that investigation28 one must await the advent29 of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations30, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent—philosophers of the dangerous "Perhaps" in every sense of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear.
3. Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read between their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of conscious thinking must be counted among the instinctive31 functions, and it is so even in the case of philosophical32 thinking; one has here to learn anew, as one learned anew about heredity and "innateness33." As little as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is "being-conscious" OPPOSED to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic16 and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological35 demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of life For example, that the certain is worth more than the uncertain, that illusion is less valuable than "truth" such valuations, in spite of their regulative importance for US, might notwithstanding be only superficial valuations, special kinds of niaiserie, such as may be necessary for the maintenance of beings such as ourselves. Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the "measure of things."
4. The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic36 judgments38 a priori belong), are the most indispensable to us, that without a recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely39 IMAGINED world of the absolute and immutable40, without a constant counterfeiting41 of the world by means of numbers, man could not live—that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation42 of life. TO RECOGNISE UNTRUTH AS A CONDITION OF LIFE; that is certainly to impugn43 the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby44 alone placed itself beyond good and evil.
5. That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are—how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are,—but that there is not enough honest dealing45 with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous46 outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained47 through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute48 defenders49, also, of their prejudices, which they dub20 "truths,"—and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe50, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices51 us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his "categorical imperative53"—makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical54 preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask—in fact, the "love of HIS wisdom," to translate the term fairly and squarely—in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should dare to cast a glance on that invincible55 maiden56, that Pallas Athene:—how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse57 betray!
6. It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of—namely, the confession58 of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: "What morality do they (or does he) aim at?" Accordingly, I do not believe that an "impulse to knowledge" is the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have here acted as INSPIRING GENII (or as demons59 and cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate60 LORD over all the other impulses. For every impulse is imperious, and as SUCH, attempts to philosophize. To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the case of really scientific men, it may be otherwise—"better," if you will; there there may really be such a thing as an "impulse to knowledge," some kind of small, independent clock-work, which, when well wound up, works away industriously61 to that end, WITHOUT the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part therein. The actual "interests" of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another direction—in the family, perhaps, or in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost indifferent at what point of research his little machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist62, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not CHARACTERISED by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal63; and above all, his morality furnishes a decided64 and decisive testimony65 as to WHO HE IS,—that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature stand to each other.
7. How malicious66 philosophers can be! I know of nothing more stinging than the joke Epicurus took the liberty of making on Plato and the Platonists; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its original sense, and on the face of it, the word signifies "Flatterers of Dionysius"—consequently, tyrants67' accessories and lick-spittles; besides this, however, it is as much as to say, "They are all ACTORS, there is nothing genuine about them" (for Dionysiokolax was a popular name for an actor). And the latter is really the malignant68 reproach that Epicurus cast upon Plato: he was annoyed by the grandiose69 manner, the mise en scene style of which Plato and his scholars were masters—of which Epicurus was not a master! He, the old school-teacher of Samos, who sat concealed in his little garden at Athens, and wrote three hundred books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of Plato, who knows! Greece took a hundred years to find out who the garden-god Epicurus really was. Did she ever find out?
8. There is a point in every philosophy at which the "conviction" of the philosopher appears on the scene; or, to put it in the words of an ancient mystery:
Adventavit asinus, Pulcher et fortissimus.
9. You desire to LIVE "according to Nature"? Oh, you noble Stoics71, what fraud of words! Imagine to yourselves a being like Nature, boundlessly72 extravagant73, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves INDIFFERENCE74 as a power—how COULD you live in accordance with such indifference? To live—is not that just endeavouring to be otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? And granted that your imperative, "living according to Nature," means actually the same as "living according to life"—how could you do DIFFERENTLY? Why should you make a principle out of what you yourselves are, and must be? In reality, however, it is quite otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with rapture75 the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride you wish to dictate76 your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist that it shall be Nature "according to the Stoa," and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal glorification77 and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently78, and with such hypnotic rigidity79 to see Nature FALSELY, that is to say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise—and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness80 gives you the Bedlamite hope that BECAUSE you are able to tyrannize over yourselves—Stoicism is self-tyranny—Nature will also allow herself to be tyrannized over: is not the Stoic70 a PART of Nature?... But this is an old and everlasting81 story: what happened in old times with the Stoics still happens today, as soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual Will to Power, the will to "creation of the world," the will to the causa prima.
10. The eagerness and subtlety82, I should even say craftiness83, with which the problem of "the real and the apparent world" is dealt with at present throughout Europe, furnishes food for thought and attention; and he who hears only a "Will to Truth" in the background, and nothing else, cannot certainly boast of the sharpest ears. In rare and isolated84 cases, it may really have happened that such a Will to Truth—a certain extravagant and adventurous85 pluck, a metaphysician's ambition of the forlorn hope—has participated therein: that which in the end always prefers a handful of "certainty" to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities; there may even be puritanical86 fanatics87 of conscience, who prefer to put their last trust in a sure nothing, rather than in an uncertain something. But that is Nihilism, and the sign of a despairing, mortally wearied soul, notwithstanding the courageous88 bearing such a virtue89 may display. It seems, however, to be otherwise with stronger and livelier thinkers who are still eager for life. In that they side AGAINST appearance, and speak superciliously90 of "perspective," in that they rank the credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility of the ocular evidence that "the earth stands still," and thus, apparently, allowing with complacency their securest possession to escape (for what does one at present believe in more firmly than in one's body?),—who knows if they are not really trying to win back something which was formerly91 an even securer possession, something of the old domain92 of the faith of former times, perhaps the "immortal93 soul," perhaps "the old God," in short, ideas by which they could live better, that is to say, more vigorously and more joyously94, than by "modern ideas"? There is DISTRUST of these modern ideas in this mode of looking at things, a disbelief in all that has been constructed yesterday and today; there is perhaps some slight admixture of satiety95 and scorn, which can no longer endure the BRIC-A-BRAC of ideas of the most varied96 origin, such as so-called Positivism at present throws on the market; a disgust of the more refined taste at the village-fair motleyness and patchiness of all these reality-philosophasters, in whom there is nothing either new or true, except this motleyness. Therein it seems to me that we should agree with those skeptical97 anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of the present day; their instinct, which repels98 them from MODERN reality, is unrefuted... what do their retrograde by-paths concern us! The main thing about them is NOT that they wish to go "back," but that they wish to get AWAY therefrom. A little MORE strength, swing, courage, and artistic99 power, and they would be OFF—and not back!
11. It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently100 the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he said: "This is the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." Let us only understand this "could be"! He was proud of having DISCOVERED a new faculty101 in man, the faculty of synthetic judgment37 a priori. Granting that he deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his pride, and on the eager rivalry102 of the younger generation to discover if possible something—at all events "new faculties103"—of which to be still prouder!—But let us reflect for a moment—it is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judgments a priori POSSIBLE?" Kant asks himself—and what is really his answer? "BY MEANS OF A MEANS (faculty)"—but unfortunately not in five words, but so circumstantially, imposingly104, and with such display of German profundity105 and verbal flourishes, that one altogether loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation106 reached its climax107 when Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man—for at that time Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling108 in the "Politics of hard fact." Then came the honeymoon109 of German philosophy. All the young theologians of the Tubingen institution went immediately into the groves—all seeking for "faculties." And what did they not find—in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between "finding" and "inventing"! Above all a faculty for the "transcendental"; Schelling christened it, intellectual intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings111 of the naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to the whole of this exuberant112 and eccentric movement (which was really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so boldly, in hoary113 and senile conceptions), than to take it seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, however—the world grew older, and the dream vanished. A time came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost—old Kant. "By means of a means (faculty)"—he had said, or at least meant to say. But, is that—an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium114 induce sleep? "By means of a means (faculty)," namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere,
Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva,
Cujus est natura sensus assoupire.
But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high time to replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic judgments a PRIORI possible?" by another question, "Why is belief in such judgments necessary?"—in effect, it is high time that we should understand that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation115 of creatures like ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily—synthetic judgments a priori should not "be possible" at all; we have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as plausible116 belief and ocular evidence belonging to the perspective view of life. And finally, to call to mind the enormous influence which "German philosophy"—I hope you understand its right to inverted117 commas (goosefeet)?—has exercised throughout the whole of Europe, there is no doubt that a certain VIRTUS DORMITIVA had a share in it; thanks to German philosophy, it was a delight to the noble idlers, the virtuous, the mystics, the artiste, the three-fourths Christians118, and the political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote119 to the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed120 from the last century into this, in short—"sensus assoupire."...
12. As regards materialistic121 atomism, it is one of the best-refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to attach serious signification to it, except for convenient everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)—thanks chiefly to the Pole Boscovich: he and the Pole Copernicus have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of ocular evidence. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does NOT stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure122 the belief in the last thing that "stood fast" of the earth—the belief in "substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle-atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless123 war to the knife, against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated124 "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous125 atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the SOUL-ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce126 one of the oldest and most venerated127 hypotheses—as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists128, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements129 of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective130 multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions131 which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust—it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned133 to INVENT—and, who knows? perhaps to DISCOVER the new.
13. Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal134 instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to DISCHARGE its strength—life itself is WILL TO POWER; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent RESULTS thereof. In short, here, as everywhere else, let us beware of SUPERFLUOUS135 teleological136 principles!—one of which is the instinct of self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency). It is thus, in effect, that method ordains137, which must be essentially economy of principles.
14. It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural philosophy is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement (according to us, if I may say so!) and NOT a world-explanation; but in so far as it is based on belief in the senses, it is regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be regarded as more—namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this operates fascinatingly, persuasively138, and CONVINCINGLY upon an age with fundamentally plebeian139 tastes—in fact, it follows instinctively140 the canon of truth of eternal popular sensualism. What is clear, what is "explained"? Only that which can be seen and felt—one must pursue every problem thus far. Obversely, however, the charm of the Platonic141 mode of thought, which was an ARISTOCRATIC mode, consisted precisely in RESISTANCE to obvious sense-evidence—perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger and more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this by means of pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they threw over the motley whirl of the senses—the mob of the senses, as Plato said. In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an ENJOYMENT142 different from that which the physicists143 of today offer us—and likewise the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the physiological workers, with their principle of the "smallest possible effort," and the greatest possible blunder. "Where there is nothing more to see or to grasp, there is also nothing more for men to do"—that is certainly an imperative different from the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be the right imperative for a hardy144, laborious145 race of machinists and bridge-builders of the future, who have nothing but ROUGH work to perform.
15. To study physiology146 with a clear conscience, one must insist on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena147 in the sense of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, if not as heuristic principle. What? And others say even that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, if the conception CAUSA SUI is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is NOT the work of our organs—?
16. There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are "immediate110 certainties"; for instance, "I think," or as the superstition132 of Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as "the thing in itself," without any falsification taking place either on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, however, a hundred times, that "immediate certainty," as well as "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO; we really ought to free ourselves from the misleading significance of words! The people on their part may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the philosopher must say to himself: "When I analyze148 the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego52,' and finally, that it is already determined149 what is to be designated by thinking—that I KNOW what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think,' assumes that I COMPARE my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me."—In place of the "immediate certainty" in which the people may believe in the special case, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented to him, veritable conscience questions of the intellect, to wit: "Whence did I get the notion of 'thinking'? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an 'ego,' and even of an 'ego' as cause, and finally of an 'ego' as cause of thought?" He who ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an appeal to a sort of INTUITIVE perception, like the person who says, "I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, and certain"—will encounter a smile and two notes of interrogation in a philosopher nowadays. "Sir," the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you are not mistaken, but why should it be the truth?"
17. With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse150 fact, which is unwillingly151 recognized by these credulous152 minds—namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a PERVERSION153 of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"—even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION154 of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula—"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently"... It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates—the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall accustom155 ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy156 old "ego" has refined itself).
18. It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more subtle minds. It seems that the hundred-times-refuted theory of the "free will" owes its persistence157 to this charm alone; some one is always appearing who feels himself strong enough to refute it.
19. Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, absolutely and completely known, without deduction158 or addition. But it again and again seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer also only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing—he seems to have adopted a POPULAR PREJUDICE and exaggerated it. Willing seems to me to be above all something COMPLICATED, something that is a unity159 only in name—and it is precisely in a name that popular prejudice lurks160, which has got the mastery over the inadequate161 precautions of philosophers in all ages. So let us for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let us say that in all willing there is firstly a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "AWAY FROM WHICH we go," the sensation of the condition "TOWARDS WHICH we go," the sensation of this "FROM" and "TOWARDS" itself, and then besides, an accompanying muscular sensation, which, even without our putting in motion "arms and legs," commences its action by force of habit, directly we "will" anything. Therefore, just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be recognized as ingredients of the will, so, in the second place, thinking is also to be recognized; in every act of the will there is a ruling thought;—and let us not imagine it possible to sever162 this thought from the "willing," as if the will would then remain over! In the third place, the will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an EMOTION, and in fact the emotion of the command. That which is termed "freedom of the will" is essentially the emotion of supremacy163 in respect to him who must obey: "I am free, 'he' must obey"—this consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional164 judgment that "this and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that obedience165 will be rendered—and whatever else pertains166 to the position of the commander. A man who WILLS commands something within himself which renders obedience, or which he believes renders obedience. But now let us notice what is the strangest thing about the will,—this affair so extremely complex, for which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as in the given circumstances we are at the same time the commanding AND the obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations of constraint167, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term "I": a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the act of willing—to such a degree that he who wills believes firmly that willing SUFFICES for action. Since in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the command—consequently obedience, and therefore action—was to be EXPECTED, the APPEARANCE has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were a NECESSITY OF EFFECT; in a word, he who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success. "Freedom of Will"—that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition168, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order—who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his own will that overcame them. In this way the person exercising volition adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the useful "underwills" or under-souls—indeed, our body is but a social structure composed of many souls—to his feelings of delight as commander. L'EFFET C'EST MOI. what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth169, namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many "souls", on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing-as-such within the sphere of morals—regarded as the doctrine170 of the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life" manifests itself.
20. That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything optional or autonomously171 evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with each other, that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective members of the fauna172 of a Continent—is betrayed in the end by the circumstance: how unfailingly the most diverse philosophers always fill in again a definite fundamental scheme of POSSIBLE philosophies. Under an invisible spell, they always revolve173 once more in the same orbit, however independent of each other they may feel themselves with their critical or systematic174 wills, something within them leads them, something impels175 them in definite order the one after the other—to wit, the innate34 methodology and relationship of their ideas. Their thinking is, in fact, far less a discovery than a re-recognizing, a remembering, a return and a home-coming to a far-off, ancient common-household of the soul, out of which those ideas formerly grew: philosophizing is so far a kind of atavism of the highest order. The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is easily enough explained. In fact, where there is affinity176 of language, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean owing to the unconscious domination and guidance of similar grammatical functions—it cannot but be that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and succession of philosophical systems, just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (where the conception of the subject is least developed) look otherwise "into the world," and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the Indo-Germans and Mussulmans, the spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of PHYSIOLOGICAL valuations and racial conditions.—So much by way of rejecting Locke's superficiality with regard to the origin of ideas.
21. The CAUSA SUI is the best self-contradiction that has yet been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation177 and unnaturalness178; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle179 itself profoundly and frightfully with this very folly180. The desire for "freedom of will" in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve181 God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this CAUSA SUI, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough182 of nothingness. If any one should find out in this manner the crass183 stupidity of the celebrated conception of "free will" and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him to carry his "enlightenment" a step further, and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous184 conception of "free will": I mean "non-free will," which is tantamount to a misuse185 of cause and effect. One should not wrongly MATERIALISE "cause" and "effect," as the natural philosophers do (and whoever like them naturalize in thinking at present), according to the prevailing186 mechanical doltishness187 which makes the cause press and push until it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect" only as pure CONCEPTIONS, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and mutual188 understanding,—NOT for explanation. In "being-in-itself" there is nothing of "casual-connection," of "necessity," or of "psychological non-freedom"; there the effect does NOT follow the cause, there "law" does not obtain. It is WE alone who have devised cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive189, and purpose; and when we interpret and intermix this symbol-world, as "being-in-itself," with things, we act once more as we have always acted—MYTHOLOGICALLY. The "non-free will" is mythology190; in real life it is only a question of STRONG and WEAK wills.—It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in himself, when a thinker, in every "causal-connection" and "psychological necessity," manifests something of compulsion, indigence191, obsequiousness192, oppression, and non-freedom; it is suspicious to have such feelings—the person betrays himself. And in general, if I have observed correctly, the "non-freedom of the will" is regarded as a problem from two entirely193 opposite standpoints, but always in a profoundly PERSONAL manner: some will not give up their "responsibility," their belief in THEMSELVES, the personal right to THEIR merits, at any price (the vain races belong to this class); others on the contrary, do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS, no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are in the habit at present of taking the side of criminals; a sort of socialistic sympathy is their favourite disguise. And as a matter of fact, the fatalism of the weak-willed embellishes194 itself surprisingly when it can pose as "la religion de la souffrance humaine"; that is ITS "good taste."
22. Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist from the mischief195 of putting his finger on bad modes of interpretation, but "Nature's conformity196 to law," of which you physicists talk so proudly, as though—why, it exists only owing to your interpretation and bad "philology197." It is no matter of fact, no "text," but rather just a naively198 humanitarian199 adjustment and perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant concessions200 to the democratic instincts of the modern soul! "Everywhere equality before the law—Nature is not different in that respect, nor better than we": a fine instance of secret motive, in which the vulgar antagonism201 to everything privileged and autocratic—likewise a second and more refined atheism—is once more disguised. "Ni dieu, ni maitre"—that, also, is what you want; and therefore "Cheers for natural law!"—is it not so? But, as has been said, that is interpretation, not text; and somebody might come along, who, with opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of the same "Nature," and with regard to the same phenomena, just the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of the claims of power—an interpreter who should so place the unexceptionalness and unconditionalness of all "Will to Power" before your eyes, that almost every word, and the word "tyranny" itself, would eventually seem unsuitable, or like a weakening and softening202 metaphor—as being too human; and who should, nevertheless, end by asserting the same about this world as you do, namely, that it has a "necessary" and "calculable" course, NOT, however, because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely LACKING, and every power effects its ultimate consequences every moment. Granted that this also is only interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the better.
23. All psychology203 hitherto has run aground on moral prejudices and timidities, it has not dared to launch out into the depths. In so far as it is allowable to recognize in that which has hitherto been written, evidence of that which has hitherto been kept silent, it seems as if nobody had yet harboured the notion of psychology as the Morphology and DEVELOPMENT-DOCTRINE OF THE WILL TO POWER, as I conceive of it. The power of moral prejudices has penetrated204 deeply into the most intellectual world, the world apparently most indifferent and unprejudiced, and has obviously operated in an injurious, obstructive, blinding, and distorting manner. A proper physio-psychology has to contend with unconscious antagonism in the heart of the investigator205, it has "the heart" against it even a doctrine of the reciprocal conditionalness of the "good" and the "bad" impulses, causes (as refined immorality) distress206 and aversion in a still strong and manly207 conscience—still more so, a doctrine of the derivation of all good impulses from bad ones. If, however, a person should regard even the emotions of hatred208, envy, covetousness, and imperiousness as life-conditioning emotions, as factors which must be present, fundamentally and essentially, in the general economy of life (which must, therefore, be further developed if life is to be further developed), he will suffer from such a view of things as from sea-sickness. And yet this hypothesis is far from being the strangest and most painful in this immense and almost new domain of dangerous knowledge, and there are in fact a hundred good reasons why every one should keep away from it who CAN do so! On the other hand, if one has once drifted hither with one's bark, well! very good! now let us set our teeth firmly! let us open our eyes and keep our hand fast on the helm! We sail away right OVER morality, we crush out, we destroy perhaps the remains209 of our own morality by daring to make our voyage thither—but what do WE matter. Never yet did a PROFOUNDER world of insight reveal itself to daring travelers and adventurers, and the psychologist who thus "makes a sacrifice"—it is not the sacrifizio dell' intelletto, on the contrary!—will at least be entitled to demand in return that psychology shall once more be recognized as the queen of the sciences, for whose service and equipment the other sciences exist. For psychology is once more the path to the fundamental problems.
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1
tempt
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| vt.引诱，勾引，吸引，引起…的兴趣 | |
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hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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truthfulness
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| n. 符合实际 | |
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questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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rendezvous
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| n.约会，约会地点，汇合点；vi.汇合，集合；vt.使汇合，使在汇合地点相遇 | |
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propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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covetousness
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nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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paltry
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| adj.无价值的，微不足道的 | |
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turmoil
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| n.骚乱，混乱，动乱 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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cupidity
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| n.贪心，贪财 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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antitheses
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| n.对照，对立的，对比法；对立( antithesis的名词复数 )；对立面；对照；对偶 | |
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wariest
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| 谨慎的，小心翼翼的( wary的最高级 ) | |
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vow
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| n.誓(言)，誓约；v.起誓，立誓 | |
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dub
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| vt.（以某种称号）授予，给...起绰号，复制 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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insidiously
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| 潜在地，隐伏地，阴险地 | |
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crocheted
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| v.用钩针编织( crochet的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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advent
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| n.(重要事件等的)到来，来临 | |
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inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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innateness
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| n.天生，天赋 | |
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innate
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| adj.天生的，固有的，天赋的 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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synthetic
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| adj.合成的，人工的；综合的；n.人工制品 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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counterfeiting
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| n.伪造v.仿制，造假( counterfeit的现在分词 ) | |
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negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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impugn
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| v.指责，对…表示怀疑 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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astute
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| adj.机敏的，精明的 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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entices
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| 诱惑，怂恿( entice的第三人称单数 ) | |
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ego
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| n.自我，自己，自尊 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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maiden
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| n.少女，处女；adj.未婚的，纯洁的，无经验的 | |
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recluse
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| n.隐居者 | |
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confession
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| n.自白，供认，承认 | |
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demons
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| n.恶人( demon的名词复数 )；恶魔；精力过人的人；邪念 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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industriously
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philologist
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| n.语言学者，文献学者 | |
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impersonal
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| adj.无个人感情的，与个人无关的，非人称的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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malicious
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| adj.有恶意的，心怀恶意的 | |
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tyrants
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| 专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 )； 暴君似的人； （古希腊的）僭主； 严酷的事物 | |
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malignant
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| adj.恶性的，致命的；恶意的，恶毒的 | |
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grandiose
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| adj.宏伟的，宏大的，堂皇的，铺张的 | |
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stoic
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| n.坚忍克己之人，禁欲主义者 | |
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stoics
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| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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boundlessly
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| adv.无穷地，无限地 | |
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extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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rapture
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| n.狂喜；全神贯注；着迷；v.使狂喜 | |
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dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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glorification
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| n.赞颂 | |
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persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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rigidity
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| adj.钢性，坚硬 | |
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superciliousness
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| n.高傲，傲慢 | |
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everlasting
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| adj.永恒的，持久的，无止境的 | |
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82
subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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craftiness
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| 狡猾，狡诈 | |
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84
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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adventurous
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| adj.爱冒险的；惊心动魄的，惊险的，刺激的 | |
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86
puritanical
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| adj.极端拘谨的；道德严格的 | |
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87
fanatics
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| 狂热者，入迷者( fanatic的名词复数 ) | |
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88
courageous
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| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
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89
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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90
superciliously
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| adv.高傲地；傲慢地 | |
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91
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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92
domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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93
immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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94
joyously
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| ad.快乐地, 高兴地 | |
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95
satiety
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| n.饱和；(市场的)充分供应 | |
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96
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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97
skeptical
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| adj.怀疑的，多疑的 | |
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98
repels
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| v.击退( repel的第三人称单数 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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99
artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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100
prudently
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| adv. 谨慎地，慎重地 | |
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101
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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102
rivalry
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| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
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103
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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104
imposingly
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105
profundity
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| n.渊博；深奥，深刻 | |
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106
jubilation
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| n.欢庆，喜悦 | |
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107
climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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108
dabbling
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| v.涉猎( dabble的现在分词 )；涉足；浅尝；少量投资 | |
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109
honeymoon
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| n.蜜月（假期）；vi.度蜜月 | |
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110
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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111
longings
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| 渴望，盼望( longing的名词复数 ) | |
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112
exuberant
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| adj.充满活力的；（植物）繁茂的 | |
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113
hoary
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| adj.古老的；鬓发斑白的 | |
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114
opium
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| n.鸦片；adj.鸦片的 | |
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115
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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116
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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117
inverted
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| adj.反向的，倒转的v.使倒置，使反转( invert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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118
Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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119
antidote
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| n.解毒药，解毒剂 | |
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120
overflowed
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| 溢出的 | |
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121
materialistic
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| a.唯物主义的，物质享乐主义的 | |
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122
abjure
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| v.发誓放弃 | |
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123
relentless
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| adj.残酷的，不留情的，无怜悯心的 | |
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124
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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125
portentous
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| adj.不祥的，可怕的，装腔作势的 | |
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126
renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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127
venerated
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| 敬重（某人或某事物），崇敬( venerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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128
naturalists
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| n.博物学家( naturalist的名词复数 )；（文学艺术的）自然主义者 | |
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129
refinements
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| n.（生活）风雅；精炼( refinement的名词复数 )；改良品；细微的改良；优雅或高贵的动作 | |
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130
subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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131
superstitions
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| 迷信，迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 ) | |
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132
superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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133
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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134
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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135
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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136
teleological
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| adj.目的论的 | |
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137
ordains
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| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的第三人称单数 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
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138
persuasively
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| adv.口才好地；令人信服地 | |
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139
plebeian
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| adj.粗俗的；平民的；n.平民；庶民 | |
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140
instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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141
platonic
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| adj.精神的；柏拉图（哲学）的 | |
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142
enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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143
physicists
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| 物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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144
hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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145
laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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146
physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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147
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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148
analyze
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| vt.分析，解析 (=analyse) | |
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149
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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150
terse
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| adj.(说话，文笔)精炼的，简明的 | |
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151
unwillingly
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| adv.不情愿地 | |
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152
credulous
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| adj.轻信的，易信的 | |
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153
perversion
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| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
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154
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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155
accustom
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| vt.使适应，使习惯 | |
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156
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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157
persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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158
deduction
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| n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎 | |
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159
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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160
lurks
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| n.潜在，潜伏；（lurk的复数形式）vi.潜伏，埋伏（lurk的第三人称单数形式） | |
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161
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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162
sever
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| v.切开，割开；断绝，中断 | |
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163
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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164
unconditional
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| adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的 | |
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165
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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166
pertains
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| 关于( pertain的第三人称单数 )； 有关； 存在； 适用 | |
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167
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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168
volition
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| n.意志；决意 | |
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169
commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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170
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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171
autonomously
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| adv. 自律地，自治地 | |
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172
fauna
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| n.(一个地区或时代的)所有动物，动物区系 | |
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173
revolve
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| vi.(使)旋转；循环出现 | |
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174
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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175
impels
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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176
affinity
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| n.亲和力，密切关系 | |
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177
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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178
unnaturalness
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179
entangle
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| vt.缠住，套住；卷入，连累 | |
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180
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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181
absolve
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| v.赦免，解除（责任等） | |
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182
slough
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| v.蜕皮，脱落，抛弃 | |
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183
crass
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| adj.愚钝的，粗糙的；彻底的 | |
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184
monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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185
misuse
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| n.误用，滥用；vt.误用，滥用 | |
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186
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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187
doltishness
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| doltishness' S | |
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188
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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189
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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190
mythology
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| n.神话，神话学，神话集 | |
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191
indigence
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| n.贫穷 | |
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192
obsequiousness
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| 媚骨 | |
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193
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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194
embellishes
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| v.美化( embellish的第三人称单数 )；装饰；修饰；润色 | |
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195
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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196
conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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197
philology
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| n.语言学；语文学 | |
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198
naively
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| adv. 天真地 | |
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199
humanitarian
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| n.人道主义者，博爱者，基督凡人论者 | |
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200
concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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201
antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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202
softening
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| 变软，软化 | |
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203
psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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204
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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205
investigator
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| n.研究者，调查者，审查者 | |
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206
distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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207
manly
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| adj.有男子气概的；adv.男子般地，果断地 | |
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208
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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209
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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