187. Apart from the value of such assertions as "there is a categorical imperative28 in us," one can always ask: What does such an assertion indicate about him who makes it? There are systems of morals which are meant to justify29 their author in the eyes of other people; other systems of morals are meant to tranquilize him, and make him self-satisfied; with other systems he wants to crucify and humble30 himself, with others he wishes to take revenge, with others to conceal31 himself, with others to glorify32 himself and gave superiority and distinction,—this system of morals helps its author to forget, that system makes him, or something of him, forgotten, many a moralist would like to exercise power and creative arbitrariness over mankind, many another, perhaps, Kant especially, gives us to understand by his morals that "what is estimable in me, is that I know how to obey—and with you it SHALL not be otherwise than with me!" In short, systems of morals are only a SIGN-LANGUAGE OF THE EMOTIONS.
188. In contrast to laisser-aller, every system of morals is a sort of tyranny against "nature" and also against "reason", that is, however, no objection, unless one should again decree by some system of morals, that all kinds of tyranny and unreasonableness33 are unlawful What is essential and invaluable34 in every system of morals, is that it is a long constraint35. In order to understand Stoicism, or Port Royal, or Puritanism, one should remember the constraint under which every language has attained36 to strength and freedom—the metrical constraint, the tyranny of rhyme and rhythm. How much trouble have the poets and orators38 of every nation given themselves!—not excepting some of the prose writers of today, in whose ear dwells an inexorable conscientiousness—"for the sake of a folly39," as utilitarian40 bunglers say, and thereby deem themselves wise—"from submission41 to arbitrary laws," as the anarchists42 say, and thereby fancy themselves "free," even free-spirited. The singular fact remains44, however, that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance45, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law, and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is "nature" and "natural"—and not laisser-aller! Every artist knows how different from the state of letting himself go, is his "most natural" condition, the free arranging, locating, disposing, and constructing in the moments of "inspiration"—and how strictly46 and delicately he then obeys a thousand laws, which, by their very rigidness47 and precision, defy all formulation by means of ideas (even the most stable idea has, in comparison therewith, something floating, manifold, and ambiguous in it). The essential thing "in heaven and in earth" is, apparently48 (to repeat it once more), that there should be long OBEDIENCE49 in the same direction, there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living; for instance, virtue50, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality—anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish, or divine. The long bondage51 of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline which the thinker imposed on himself to think in accordance with the rules of a church or a court, or conformable to Aristotelian premises52, the persistent53 spiritual will to interpret everything that happened according to a Christian54 scheme, and in every occurrence to rediscover and justify the Christian God:—all this violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadfulness, and unreasonableness, has proved itself the disciplinary means whereby the European spirit has attained its strength, its remorseless curiosity and subtle mobility55; granted also that much irrecoverable strength and spirit had to be stifled56, suffocated57, and spoilt in the process (for here, as everywhere, "nature" shows herself as she is, in all her extravagant58 and INDIFFERENT magnificence, which is shocking, but nevertheless noble). That for centuries European thinkers only thought in order to prove something—nowadays, on the contrary, we are suspicious of every thinker who "wishes to prove something"—that it was always settled beforehand what WAS TO BE the result of their strictest thinking, as it was perhaps in the Asiatic astrology of former times, or as it is still at the present day in the innocent, Christian-moral explanation of immediate59 personal events "for the glory of God," or "for the good of the soul":—this tyranny, this arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has EDUCATED the spirit; slavery, both in the coarser and the finer sense, is apparently an indispensable means even of spiritual education and discipline. One may look at every system of morals in this light: it is "nature" therein which teaches to hate the laisser-aller, the too great freedom, and implants60 the need for limited horizons, for immediate duties—it teaches the NARROWING OF PERSPECTIVES, and thus, in a certain sense, that stupidity is a condition of life and development. "Thou must obey some one, and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt61 come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself"—this seems to me to be the moral imperative of nature, which is certainly neither "categorical," as old Kant wished (consequently the "otherwise"), nor does it address itself to the individual (what does nature care for the individual!), but to nations, races, ages, and ranks; above all, however, to the animal "man" generally, to MANKIND.
189. Industrious62 races find it a great hardship to be idle: it was a master stroke of ENGLISH instinct to hallow and begloom Sunday to such an extent that the Englishman unconsciously hankers for his week—and work-day again:—as a kind of cleverly devised, cleverly intercalated FAST, such as is also frequently found in the ancient world (although, as is appropriate in southern nations, not precisely with respect to work). Many kinds of fasts are necessary; and wherever powerful influences and habits prevail, legislators have to see that intercalary days are appointed, on which such impulses are fettered63, and learn to hunger anew. Viewed from a higher standpoint, whole generations and epochs, when they show themselves infected with any moral fanaticism64, seem like those intercalated periods of restraint and fasting, during which an impulse learns to humble and submit itself—at the same time also to PURIFY and SHARPEN itself; certain philosophical65 sects66 likewise admit of a similar interpretation67 (for instance, the Stoa, in the midst of Hellenic culture, with the atmosphere rank and overcharged with Aphrodisiacal odours).—Here also is a hint for the explanation of the paradox68, why it was precisely in the most Christian period of European history, and in general only under the pressure of Christian sentiments, that the sexual impulse sublimated69 into love (amour-passion).
190. There is something in the morality of Plato which does not really belong to Plato, but which only appears in his philosophy, one might say, in spite of him: namely, Socratism, for which he himself was too noble. "No one desires to injure himself, hence all evil is done unwittingly. The evil man inflicts70 injury on himself; he would not do so, however, if he knew that evil is evil. The evil man, therefore, is only evil through error; if one free him from error one will necessarily make him—good."—This mode of reasoning savours of the POPULACE, who perceive only the unpleasant consequences of evil-doing, and practically judge that "it is STUPID to do wrong"; while they accept "good" as identical with "useful and pleasant," without further thought. As regards every system of utilitarianism, one may at once assume that it has the same origin, and follow the scent71: one will seldom err21.—Plato did all he could to interpret something refined and noble into the tenets of his teacher, and above all to interpret himself into them—he, the most daring of all interpreters, who lifted the entire Socrates out of the street, as a popular theme and song, to exhibit him in endless and impossible modifications—namely, in all his own disguises and multiplicities. In jest, and in Homeric language as well, what is the Platonic72 Socrates, if not—[Greek words inserted here.]
191. The old theological problem of "Faith" and "Knowledge," or more plainly, of instinct and reason—the question whether, in respect to the valuation of things, instinct deserves more authority than rationality, which wants to appreciate and act according to motives73, according to a "Why," that is to say, in conformity74 to purpose and utility—it is always the old moral problem that first appeared in the person of Socrates, and had divided men's minds long before Christianity. Socrates himself, following, of course, the taste of his talent—that of a surpassing dialectician—took first the side of reason; and, in fact, what did he do all his life but laugh at the awkward incapacity of the noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and could never give satisfactory answers concerning the motives of their actions? In the end, however, though silently and secretly, he laughed also at himself: with his finer conscience and introspection, he found in himself the same difficulty and incapacity. "But why"—he said to himself—"should one on that account separate oneself from the instincts! One must set them right, and the reason ALSO—one must follow the instincts, but at the same time persuade the reason to support them with good arguments." This was the real FALSENESS of that great and mysterious ironist; he brought his conscience up to the point that he was satisfied with a kind of self-outwitting: in fact, he perceived the irrationality75 in the moral judgment76.—Plato, more innocent in such matters, and without the craftiness77 of the plebeian78, wished to prove to himself, at the expenditure79 of all his strength—the greatest strength a philosopher had ever expended—that reason and instinct lead spontaneously to one goal, to the good, to "God"; and since Plato, all theologians and philosophers have followed the same path—which means that in matters of morality, instinct (or as Christians80 call it, "Faith," or as I call it, "the herd81") has hitherto triumphed. Unless one should make an exception in the case of Descartes, the father of rationalism (and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution), who recognized only the authority of reason: but reason is only a tool, and Descartes was superficial.
192. Whoever has followed the history of a single science, finds in its development a clue to the understanding of the oldest and commonest processes of all "knowledge and cognizance": there, as here, the premature82 hypotheses, the fictions, the good stupid will to "belief," and the lack of distrust and patience are first developed—our senses learn late, and never learn completely, to be subtle, reliable, and cautious organs of knowledge. Our eyes find it easier on a given occasion to produce a picture already often produced, than to seize upon the divergence83 and novelty of an impression: the latter requires more force, more "morality." It is difficult and painful for the ear to listen to anything new; we hear strange music badly. When we hear another language spoken, we involuntarily attempt to form the sounds into words with which we are more familiar and conversant—it was thus, for example, that the Germans modified the spoken word ARCUBALISTA into ARMBRUST (cross-bow). Our senses are also hostile and averse84 to the new; and generally, even in the "simplest" processes of sensation, the emotions DOMINATE—such as fear, love, hatred85, and the passive emotion of indolence.—As little as a reader nowadays reads all the single words (not to speak of syllables) of a page—he rather takes about five out of every twenty words at random86, and "guesses" the probably appropriate sense to them—just as little do we see a tree correctly and completely in respect to its leaves, branches, colour, and shape; we find it so much easier to fancy the chance of a tree. Even in the midst of the most remarkable87 experiences, we still do just the same; we fabricate the greater part of the experience, and can hardly be made to contemplate89 any event, EXCEPT as "inventors" thereof. All this goes to prove that from our fundamental nature and from remote ages we have been—ACCUSTOMED TO LYING. Or, to express it more politely and hypocritically, in short, more pleasantly—one is much more of an artist than one is aware of.—In an animated90 conversation, I often see the face of the person with whom I am speaking so clearly and sharply defined before me, according to the thought he expresses, or which I believe to be evoked91 in his mind, that the degree of distinctness far exceeds the STRENGTH of my visual faculty92—the delicacy93 of the play of the muscles and of the expression of the eyes MUST therefore be imagined by me. Probably the person put on quite a different expression, or none at all.
193. Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit: but also contrariwise. What we experience in dreams, provided we experience it often, pertains94 at last just as much to the general belongings95 of our soul as anything "actually" experienced; by virtue thereof we are richer or poorer, we have a requirement more or less, and finally, in broad daylight, and even in the brightest moments of our waking life, we are ruled to some extent by the nature of our dreams. Supposing that someone has often flown in his dreams, and that at last, as soon as he dreams, he is conscious of the power and art of flying as his privilege and his peculiarly enviable happiness; such a person, who believes that on the slightest impulse, he can actualize all sorts of curves and angles, who knows the sensation of a certain divine levity96, an "upwards97" without effort or constraint, a "downwards98" without descending99 or lowering—without TROUBLE!—how could the man with such dream-experiences and dream-habits fail to find "happiness" differently coloured and defined, even in his waking hours! How could he fail—to long DIFFERENTLY for happiness? "Flight," such as is described by poets, must, when compared with his own "flying," be far too earthly, muscular, violent, far too "troublesome" for him.
194. The difference among men does not manifest itself only in the difference of their lists of desirable things—in their regarding different good things as worth striving for, and being disagreed as to the greater or less value, the order of rank, of the commonly recognized desirable things:—it manifests itself much more in what they regard as actually HAVING and POSSESSING a desirable thing. As regards a woman, for instance, the control over her body and her sexual gratification serves as an amply sufficient sign of ownership and possession to the more modest man; another with a more suspicious and ambitious thirst for possession, sees the "questionableness," the mere13 apparentness of such ownership, and wishes to have finer tests in order to know especially whether the woman not only gives herself to him, but also gives up for his sake what she has or would like to have—only THEN does he look upon her as "possessed100." A third, however, has not even here got to the limit of his distrust and his desire for possession: he asks himself whether the woman, when she gives up everything for him, does not perhaps do so for a phantom101 of him; he wishes first to be thoroughly, indeed, profoundly well known; in order to be loved at all he ventures to let himself be found out. Only then does he feel the beloved one fully102 in his possession, when she no longer deceives herself about him, when she loves him just as much for the sake of his devilry and concealed103 insatiability, as for his goodness, patience, and spirituality. One man would like to possess a nation, and he finds all the higher arts of Cagliostro and Catalina suitable for his purpose. Another, with a more refined thirst for possession, says to himself: "One may not deceive where one desires to possess"—he is irritated and impatient at the idea that a mask of him should rule in the hearts of the people: "I must, therefore, MAKE myself known, and first of all learn to know myself!" Among helpful and charitable people, one almost always finds the awkward craftiness which first gets up suitably him who has to be helped, as though, for instance, he should "merit" help, seek just THEIR help, and would show himself deeply grateful, attached, and subservient104 to them for all help. With these conceits105, they take control of the needy106 as a property, just as in general they are charitable and helpful out of a desire for property. One finds them jealous when they are crossed or forestalled107 in their charity. Parents involuntarily make something like themselves out of their children—they call that "education"; no mother doubts at the bottom of her heart that the child she has borne is thereby her property, no father hesitates about his right to HIS OWN ideas and notions of worth. Indeed, in former times fathers deemed it right to use their discretion108 concerning the life or death of the newly born (as among the ancient Germans). And like the father, so also do the teacher, the class, the priest, and the prince still see in every new individual an unobjectionable opportunity for a new possession. The consequence is...
195. The Jews—a people "born for slavery," as Tacitus and the whole ancient world say of them; "the chosen people among the nations," as they themselves say and believe—the Jews performed the miracle of the inversion109 of valuations, by means of which life on earth obtained a new and dangerous charm for a couple of millenniums. Their prophets fused into one the expressions "rich," "godless," "wicked," "violent," "sensual," and for the first time coined the word "world" as a term of reproach. In this inversion of valuations (in which is also included the use of the word "poor" as synonymous with "saint" and "friend") the significance of the Jewish people is to be found; it is with THEM that the SLAVE-INSURRECTION IN MORALS commences.
196. It is to be INFERRED that there are countless110 dark bodies near the sun—such as we shall never see. Among ourselves, this is an allegory; and the psychologist of morals reads the whole star-writing merely as an allegorical and symbolic111 language in which much may be unexpressed.
197. The beast of prey112 and the man of prey (for instance, Caesar Borgia) are fundamentally misunderstood, "nature" is misunderstood, so long as one seeks a "morbidness113" in the constitution of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growths, or even an innate114 "hell" in them—as almost all moralists have done hitherto. Does it not seem that there is a hatred of the virgin115 forest and of the tropics among moralists? And that the "tropical man" must be discredited116 at all costs, whether as disease and deterioration117 of mankind, or as his own hell and self-torture? And why? In favour of the "temperate118 zones"? In favour of the temperate men? The "moral"? The mediocre119?—This for the chapter: "Morals as Timidity."
198. All the systems of morals which address themselves with a view to their "happiness," as it is called—what else are they but suggestions for behaviour adapted to the degree of DANGER from themselves in which the individuals live; recipes for their passions, their good and bad propensities120, insofar as such have the Will to Power and would like to play the master; small and great expediencies and elaborations, permeated121 with the musty odour of old family medicines and old-wife wisdom; all of them grotesque122 and absurd in their form—because they address themselves to "all," because they generalize where generalization123 is not authorized124; all of them speaking unconditionally125, and taking themselves unconditionally; all of them flavoured not merely with one grain of salt, but rather endurable only, and sometimes even seductive, when they are over-spiced and begin to smell dangerously, especially of "the other world." That is all of little value when estimated intellectually, and is far from being "science," much less "wisdom"; but, repeated once more, and three times repeated, it is expediency126, expediency, expediency, mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity—whether it be the indifference127 and statuesque coldness towards the heated folly of the emotions, which the Stoics128 advised and fostered; or the no-more-laughing and no-more-weeping of Spinoza, the destruction of the emotions by their analysis and vivisection, which he recommended so naively129; or the lowering of the emotions to an innocent mean at which they may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals; or even morality as the enjoyment130 of the emotions in a voluntary attenuation131 and spiritualization by the symbolism of art, perhaps as music, or as love of God, and of mankind for God's sake—for in religion the passions are once more enfranchised132, provided that...; or, finally, even the complaisant133 and wanton surrender to the emotions, as has been taught by Hafis and Goethe, the bold letting-go of the reins134, the spiritual and corporeal135 licentia morum in the exceptional cases of wise old codgers and drunkards, with whom it "no longer has much danger."—This also for the chapter: "Morals as Timidity."
199. Inasmuch as in all ages, as long as mankind has existed, there have also been human herds136 (family alliances, communities, tribes, peoples, states, churches), and always a great number who obey in proportion to the small number who command—in view, therefore, of the fact that obedience has been most practiced and fostered among mankind hitherto, one may reasonably suppose that, generally speaking, the need thereof is now innate in every one, as a kind of FORMAL CONSCIENCE which gives the command "Thou shalt unconditionally do something, unconditionally refrain from something", in short, "Thou shalt". This need tries to satisfy itself and to fill its form with a content, according to its strength, impatience137, and eagerness, it at once seizes as an omnivorous138 appetite with little selection, and accepts whatever is shouted into its ear by all sorts of commanders—parents, teachers, laws, class prejudices, or public opinion. The extraordinary limitation of human development, the hesitation139, protractedness, frequent retrogression, and turning thereof, is attributable to the fact that the herd-instinct of obedience is transmitted best, and at the cost of the art of command. If one imagine this instinct increasing to its greatest extent, commanders and independent individuals will finally be lacking altogether, or they will suffer inwardly from a bad conscience, and will have to impose a deception140 on themselves in the first place in order to be able to command just as if they also were only obeying. This condition of things actually exists in Europe at present—I call it the moral hypocrisy141 of the commanding class. They know no other way of protecting themselves from their bad conscience than by playing the role of executors of older and higher orders (of predecessors142, of the constitution, of justice, of the law, or of God himself), or they even justify themselves by maxims143 from the current opinions of the herd, as "first servants of their people," or "instruments of the public weal". On the other hand, the gregarious144 European man nowadays assumes an air as if he were the only kind of man that is allowable, he glorifies145 his qualities, such as public spirit, kindness, deference146, industry, temperance, modesty147, indulgence, sympathy, by virtue of which he is gentle, endurable, and useful to the herd, as the peculiarly human virtues148. In cases, however, where it is believed that the leader and bell-wether cannot be dispensed149 with, attempt after attempt is made nowadays to replace commanders by the summing together of clever gregarious men all representative constitutions, for example, are of this origin. In spite of all, what a blessing150, what a deliverance from a weight becoming unendurable, is the appearance of an absolute ruler for these gregarious Europeans—of this fact the effect of the appearance of Napoleon was the last great proof the history of the influence of Napoleon is almost the history of the higher happiness to which the entire century has attained in its worthiest151 individuals and periods.
200. The man of an age of dissolution which mixes the races with one another, who has the inheritance of a diversified152 descent in his body—that is to say, contrary, and often not only contrary, instincts and standards of value, which struggle with one another and are seldom at peace—such a man of late culture and broken lights, will, on an average, be a weak man. His fundamental desire is that the war which is IN HIM should come to an end; happiness appears to him in the character of a soothing153 medicine and mode of thought (for instance, Epicurean or Christian); it is above all things the happiness of repose154, of undisturbedness, of repletion155, of final unity—it is the "Sabbath of Sabbaths," to use the expression of the holy rhetorician, St. Augustine, who was himself such a man.—Should, however, the contrariety and conflict in such natures operate as an ADDITIONAL incentive156 and stimulus157 to life—and if, on the other hand, in addition to their powerful and irreconcilable158 instincts, they have also inherited and indoctrinated into them a proper mastery and subtlety159 for carrying on the conflict with themselves (that is to say, the faculty of self-control and self-deception), there then arise those marvelously incomprehensible and inexplicable160 beings, those enigmatical men, predestined for conquering and circumventing161 others, the finest examples of which are Alcibiades and Caesar (with whom I should like to associate the FIRST of Europeans according to my taste, the Hohenstaufen, Frederick the Second), and among artists, perhaps Leonardo da Vinci. They appear precisely in the same periods when that weaker type, with its longing1 for repose, comes to the front; the two types are complementary to each other, and spring from the same causes.
201. As long as the utility which determines moral estimates is only gregarious utility, as long as the preservation162 of the community is only kept in view, and the immoral163 is sought precisely and exclusively in what seems dangerous to the maintenance of the community, there can be no "morality of love to one's neighbour." Granted even that there is already a little constant exercise of consideration, sympathy, fairness, gentleness, and mutual164 assistance, granted that even in this condition of society all those instincts are already active which are latterly distinguished165 by honourable166 names as "virtues," and eventually almost coincide with the conception "morality": in that period they do not as yet belong to the domain of moral valuations—they are still ULTRA-MORAL. A sympathetic action, for instance, is neither called good nor bad, moral nor immoral, in the best period of the Romans; and should it be praised, a sort of resentful disdain167 is compatible with this praise, even at the best, directly the sympathetic action is compared with one which contributes to the welfare of the whole, to the RES PUBLICA. After all, "love to our neighbour" is always a secondary matter, partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our FEAR OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. After the fabric88 of society seems on the whole established and secured against external dangers, it is this fear of our neighbour which again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. Certain strong and dangerous instincts, such as the love of enterprise, foolhardiness, revengefulness, astuteness168, rapacity169, and love of power, which up till then had not only to be honoured from the point of view of general utility—under other names, of course, than those here given—but had to be fostered and cultivated (because they were perpetually required in the common danger against the common enemies), are now felt in their dangerousness to be doubly strong—when the outlets170 for them are lacking—and are gradually branded as immoral and given over to calumny171. The contrary instincts and inclinations172 now attain37 to moral honour, the gregarious instinct gradually draws its conclusions. How much or how little dangerousness to the community or to equality is contained in an opinion, a condition, an emotion, a disposition173, or an endowment—that is now the moral perspective, here again fear is the mother of morals. It is by the loftiest and strongest instincts, when they break out passionately174 and carry the individual far above and beyond the average, and the low level of the gregarious conscience, that the self-reliance of the community is destroyed, its belief in itself, its backbone175, as it were, breaks, consequently these very instincts will be most branded and defamed. The lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogent176 reason, are felt to be dangers, everything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called EVIL, the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition, the MEDIOCRITY of desires, attains177 to moral distinction and honour. Finally, under very peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for training the feelings to severity and rigour, and now every form of severity, even in justice, begins to disturb the conscience, a lofty and rigorous nobleness and self-responsibility almost offends, and awakens178 distrust, "the lamb," and still more "the sheep," wins respect. There is a point of diseased mellowness179 and effeminacy in the history of society, at which society itself takes the part of him who injures it, the part of the CRIMINAL, and does so, in fact, seriously and honestly. To punish, appears to it to be somehow unfair—it is certain that the idea of "punishment" and "the obligation to punish" are then painful and alarming to people. "Is it not sufficient if the criminal be rendered HARMLESS? Why should we still punish? Punishment itself is terrible!"—with these questions gregarious morality, the morality of fear, draws its ultimate conclusion. If one could at all do away with danger, the cause of fear, one would have done away with this morality at the same time, it would no longer be necessary, it WOULD NOT CONSIDER ITSELF any longer necessary!—Whoever examines the conscience of the present-day European, will always elicit180 the same imperative from its thousand moral folds and hidden recesses181, the imperative of the timidity of the herd "we wish that some time or other there may be NOTHING MORE TO FEAR!" Some time or other—the will and the way THERETO is nowadays called "progress" all over Europe.
202. Let us at once say again what we have already said a hundred times, for people's ears nowadays are unwilling182 to hear such truths—OUR truths. We know well enough how offensive it sounds when any one plainly, and without metaphor183, counts man among the animals, but it will be accounted to us almost a CRIME, that it is precisely in respect to men of "modern ideas" that we have constantly applied184 the terms "herd," "herd-instincts," and such like expressions. What avail is it? We cannot do otherwise, for it is precisely here that our new insight is. We have found that in all the principal moral judgments185, Europe has become unanimous, including likewise the countries where European influence prevails in Europe people evidently KNOW what Socrates thought he did not know, and what the famous serpent of old once promised to teach—they "know" today what is good and evil. It must then sound hard and be distasteful to the ear, when we always insist that that which here thinks it knows, that which here glorifies itself with praise and blame, and calls itself good, is the instinct of the herding186 human animal, the instinct which has come and is ever coming more and more to the front, to preponderance and supremacy187 over other instincts, according to the increasing physiological188 approximation and resemblance of which it is the symptom. MORALITY IN EUROPE AT PRESENT IS HERDING-ANIMAL MORALITY, and therefore, as we understand the matter, only one kind of human morality, beside which, before which, and after which many other moralities, and above all HIGHER moralities, are or should be possible. Against such a "possibility," against such a "should be," however, this morality defends itself with all its strength, it says obstinately189 and inexorably "I am morality itself and nothing else is morality!" Indeed, with the help of a religion which has humoured and flattered the sublimest190 desires of the herding-animal, things have reached such a point that we always find a more visible expression of this morality even in political and social arrangements: the DEMOCRATIC movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement. That its TEMPO191, however, is much too slow and sleepy for the more impatient ones, for those who are sick and distracted by the herding-instinct, is indicated by the increasingly furious howling, and always less disguised teeth-gnashing of the anarchist43 dogs, who are now roving through the highways of European culture. Apparently in opposition192 to the peacefully industrious democrats193 and Revolution-ideologues, and still more so to the awkward philosophasters and fraternity-visionaries who call themselves Socialists194 and want a "free society," those are really at one with them all in their thorough and instinctive196 hostility197 to every form of society other than that of the AUTONOMOUS198 herd (to the extent even of repudiating199 the notions "master" and "servant"—ni dieu ni maitre, says a socialist195 formula); at one in their tenacious200 opposition to every special claim, every special right and privilege (this means ultimately opposition to EVERY right, for when all are equal, no one needs "rights" any longer); at one in their distrust of punitive201 justice (as though it were a violation202 of the weak, unfair to the NECESSARY consequences of all former society); but equally at one in their religion of sympathy, in their compassion203 for all that feels, lives, and suffers (down to the very animals, up even to "God"—the extravagance of "sympathy for God" belongs to a democratic age); altogether at one in the cry and impatience of their sympathy, in their deadly hatred of suffering generally, in their almost feminine incapacity for witnessing it or ALLOWING it; at one in their involuntary beglooming and heart-softening, under the spell of which Europe seems to be threatened with a new Buddhism204; at one in their belief in the morality of MUTUAL sympathy, as though it were morality in itself, the climax205, the ATTAINED climax of mankind, the sole hope of the future, the consolation206 of the present, the great discharge from all the obligations of the past; altogether at one in their belief in the community as the DELIVERER, in the herd, and therefore in "themselves."
203. We, who hold a different belief—we, who regard the democratic movement, not only as a degenerating207 form of political organization, but as equivalent to a degenerating, a waning208 type of man, as involving his mediocrising and depreciation209: where have WE to fix our hopes? In NEW PHILOSOPHERS—there is no other alternative: in minds strong and original enough to initiate210 opposite estimates of value, to transvalue and invert211 "eternal valuations"; in forerunners212, in men of the future, who in the present shall fix the constraints213 and fasten the knots which will compel millenniums to take NEW paths. To teach man the future of humanity as his WILL, as depending on human will, and to make preparation for vast hazardous214 enterprises and collective attempts in rearing and educating, in order thereby to put an end to the frightful215 rule of folly and chance which has hitherto gone by the name of "history" (the folly of the "greatest number" is only its last form)—for that purpose a new type of philosopher and commander will some time or other be needed, at the very idea of which everything that has existed in the way of occult, terrible, and benevolent216 beings might look pale and dwarfed217. The image of such leaders hovers218 before OUR eyes:—is it lawful for me to say it aloud, ye free spirits? The conditions which one would partly have to create and partly utilize219 for their genesis; the presumptive methods and tests by virtue of which a soul should grow up to such an elevation220 and power as to feel a CONSTRAINT to these tasks; a transvaluation of values, under the new pressure and hammer of which a conscience should be steeled and a heart transformed into brass221, so as to bear the weight of such responsibility; and on the other hand the necessity for such leaders, the dreadful danger that they might be lacking, or miscarry and degenerate:—these are OUR real anxieties and glooms, ye know it well, ye free spirits! these are the heavy distant thoughts and storms which sweep across the heaven of OUR life. There are few pains so grievous as to have seen, divined, or experienced how an exceptional man has missed his way and deteriorated222; but he who has the rare eye for the universal danger of "man" himself DETERIORATING223, he who like us has recognized the extraordinary fortuitousness which has hitherto played its game in respect to the future of mankind—a game in which neither the hand, nor even a "finger of God" has participated!—he who divines the fate that is hidden under the idiotic224 unwariness and blind confidence of "modern ideas," and still more under the whole of Christo-European morality—suffers from an anguish225 with which no other is to be compared. He sees at a glance all that could still BE MADE OUT OF MAN through a favourable226 accumulation and augmentation of human powers and arrangements; he knows with all the knowledge of his conviction how unexhausted man still is for the greatest possibilities, and how often in the past the type man has stood in presence of mysterious decisions and new paths:—he knows still better from his painfulest recollections on what wretched obstacles promising227 developments of the highest rank have hitherto usually gone to pieces, broken down, sunk, and become contemptible228. The UNIVERSAL DEGENERACY OF MANKIND to the level of the "man of the future"—as idealized by the socialistic fools and shallow-pates—this degeneracy and dwarfing229 of man to an absolutely gregarious animal (or as they call it, to a man of "free society"), this brutalizing of man into a pigmy with equal rights and claims, is undoubtedly230 POSSIBLE! He who has thought out this possibility to its ultimate conclusion knows ANOTHER loathing231 unknown to the rest of mankind—and perhaps also a new MISSION!
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
longing
|
|
| n.（for）渴望 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
incarnate
|
|
| adj.化身的，人体化的，肉色的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
thereby
|
|
| adv.因此，从而 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
presumptuous
|
|
| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
avow
|
|
| v.承认，公开宣称 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
domain
|
|
| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
recurring
|
|
| adj.往复的，再次发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
pedantic
|
|
| adj.卖弄学问的；迂腐的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
pretentious
|
|
| adj.自命不凡的，自负的，炫耀的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
insignificant
|
|
| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
precisely
|
|
| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
epitome
|
|
| n.典型，梗概 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
prevailing
|
|
| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
motive
|
|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
lawful
|
|
| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
analyzing
|
|
| v.分析；分析( analyze的现在分词 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析n.分析 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
worthy
|
|
| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
purport
|
|
| n.意义，要旨，大要；v.意味著，做为...要旨，要领是... | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
ethics
|
|
| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
err
|
|
| vi.犯错误，出差错 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
sentimental
|
|
| adj.多愁善感的，感伤的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
pessimist
|
|
| n.悲观者；悲观主义者；厌世 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
flute
|
|
| n.长笛；v.吹笛 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
repudiator
|
|
| n.批判者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
27
assents
|
|
| 同意，赞同( assent的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
28
imperative
|
|
| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
justify
|
|
| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
humble
|
|
| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
conceal
|
|
| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
glorify
|
|
| vt.颂扬，赞美，使增光，美化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
unreasonableness
|
|
| 无理性； 横逆 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
invaluable
|
|
| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
constraint
|
|
| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
attained
|
|
| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
attain
|
|
| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
orators
|
|
| n.演说者，演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
folly
|
|
| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
utilitarian
|
|
| adj.实用的，功利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
submission
|
|
| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
anarchists
|
|
| 无政府主义者( anarchist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
anarchist
|
|
| n.无政府主义者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
elegance
|
|
| n.优雅；优美，雅致；精致，巧妙 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
strictly
|
|
| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
rigidness
|
|
| n.坚硬，劲直 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
48
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
obedience
|
|
| n.服从，顺从 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
virtue
|
|
| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
bondage
|
|
| n.奴役，束缚 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
premises
|
|
| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
persistent
|
|
| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
Christian
|
|
| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
mobility
|
|
| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
stifled
|
|
| （使）窒息， （使）窒闷( stifle的过去式和过去分词 )； 镇压，遏制； 堵 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
suffocated
|
|
| （使某人）窒息而死( suffocate的过去式和过去分词 )； （将某人）闷死； 让人感觉闷热； 憋气 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
extravagant
|
|
| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
implants
|
|
| n.（植入身体中的）移植物( implant的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
wilt
|
|
| v.(使)植物凋谢或枯萎；(指人)疲倦，衰弱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
industrious
|
|
| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
fettered
|
|
| v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
fanaticism
|
|
| n.狂热，盲信 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
philosophical
|
|
| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
sects
|
|
| n.宗派，教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
interpretation
|
|
| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
paradox
|
|
| n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法；自相矛盾的人(物) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
sublimated
|
|
| v.（使某物质）升华( sublimate的过去式和过去分词 )；使净化；纯化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
inflicts
|
|
| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
scent
|
|
| n.气味，香味，香水，线索，嗅觉；v.嗅，发觉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
platonic
|
|
| adj.精神的；柏拉图（哲学）的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
conformity
|
|
| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
irrationality
|
|
| n. 不合理，无理性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
craftiness
|
|
| 狡猾，狡诈 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
plebeian
|
|
| adj.粗俗的；平民的；n.平民；庶民 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
expenditure
|
|
| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
Christians
|
|
| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
herd
|
|
| n.兽群，牧群；vt.使集中，把…赶在一起 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
premature
|
|
| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
divergence
|
|
| n.分歧，岔开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
averse
|
|
| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
hatred
|
|
| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
random
|
|
| adj.随机的；任意的；n.偶然的(或随便的)行动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
fabric
|
|
| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
contemplate
|
|
| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
animated
|
|
| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
evoked
|
|
| [医]诱发的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
faculty
|
|
| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
delicacy
|
|
| n.精致，细微，微妙，精良；美味，佳肴 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
pertains
|
|
| 关于( pertain的第三人称单数 )； 有关； 存在； 适用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
belongings
|
|
| n.私人物品，私人财物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
levity
|
|
| n.轻率，轻浮，不稳定，多变 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
upwards
|
|
| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
downwards
|
|
| adj./adv.向下的（地），下行的（地） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
descending
|
|
| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
phantom
|
|
| n.幻影，虚位，幽灵；adj.错觉的，幻影的，幽灵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
concealed
|
|
| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
subservient
|
|
| adj.卑屈的，阿谀的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
conceits
|
|
| 高傲( conceit的名词复数 )； 自以为； 巧妙的词语； 别出心裁的比喻 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
needy
|
|
| adj.贫穷的，贫困的，生活艰苦的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
forestalled
|
|
| v.先发制人，预先阻止( forestall的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
discretion
|
|
| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
inversion
|
|
| n.反向，倒转，倒置 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
countless
|
|
| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
symbolic
|
|
| adj.象征性的，符号的，象征主义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
prey
|
|
| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
morbidness
|
|
| （精神的）病态 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
innate
|
|
| adj.天生的，固有的，天赋的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
virgin
|
|
| n.处女，未婚女子；adj.未经使用的；未经开发的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
discredited
|
|
| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
deterioration
|
|
| n.退化；恶化；变坏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
temperate
|
|
| adj.温和的，温带的，自我克制的，不过分的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
mediocre
|
|
| adj.平常的，普通的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
propensities
|
|
| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
permeated
|
|
| 弥漫( permeate的过去式和过去分词 )； 遍布； 渗入； 渗透 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
grotesque
|
|
| adj.怪诞的，丑陋的；n.怪诞的图案，怪人（物） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
generalization
|
|
| n.普遍性，一般性，概括 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
authorized
|
|
| a.委任的，许可的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
unconditionally
|
|
| adv.无条件地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
expediency
|
|
| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
indifference
|
|
| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
stoics
|
|
| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
naively
|
|
| adv. 天真地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
enjoyment
|
|
| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
attenuation
|
|
| n.变薄；弄细；稀薄化；减少 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
enfranchised
|
|
| v.给予选举权( enfranchise的过去式和过去分词 )；（从奴隶制中）解放 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
complaisant
|
|
| adj.顺从的，讨好的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
reins
|
|
| 感情，激情； 缰( rein的名词复数 )； 控制手段； 掌管； （成人带着幼儿走路以防其走失时用的）保护带 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
corporeal
|
|
| adj.肉体的，身体的；物质的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
herds
|
|
| 兽群( herd的名词复数 )； 牧群； 人群； 群众 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
impatience
|
|
| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
omnivorous
|
|
| adj.杂食的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
hesitation
|
|
| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
deception
|
|
| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
hypocrisy
|
|
| n.伪善，虚伪 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
predecessors
|
|
| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
maxims
|
|
| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
gregarious
|
|
| adj.群居的，喜好群居的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
glorifies
|
|
| 赞美( glorify的第三人称单数 )； 颂扬； 美化； 使光荣 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
deference
|
|
| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
modesty
|
|
| n.谦逊，虚心，端庄，稳重，羞怯，朴素 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
virtues
|
|
| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
dispensed
|
|
| v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
blessing
|
|
| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
worthiest
|
|
| 应得某事物( worthy的最高级 )； 值得做某事； 可尊敬的； 有（某人或事物）的典型特征 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
diversified
|
|
| adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
153
soothing
|
|
| adj.慰藉的；使人宽心的；镇静的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
154
repose
|
|
| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
155
repletion
|
|
| n.充满，吃饱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
156
incentive
|
|
| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
157
stimulus
|
|
| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
158
irreconcilable
|
|
| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
159
subtlety
|
|
| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
160
inexplicable
|
|
| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
161
circumventing
|
|
| v.设法克服或避免（某事物），回避( circumvent的现在分词 )；绕过，绕行，绕道旅行 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
162
preservation
|
|
| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
163
immoral
|
|
| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
164
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
165
distinguished
|
|
| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
166
honourable
|
|
| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
167
disdain
|
|
| n.鄙视，轻视；v.轻视，鄙视，不屑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
168
astuteness
|
|
| n.敏锐；精明；机敏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
169
rapacity
|
|
| n.贪婪，贪心，劫掠的欲望 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
170
outlets
|
|
| n.出口( outlet的名词复数 )；经销店；插座；廉价经销店 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
171
calumny
|
|
| n.诽谤，污蔑，中伤 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
172
inclinations
|
|
| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
173
disposition
|
|
| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
174
passionately
|
|
| ad.热烈地，激烈地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
175
backbone
|
|
| n.脊骨，脊柱，骨干；刚毅，骨气 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
176
cogent
|
|
| adj.强有力的，有说服力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
177
attains
|
|
| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
178
awakens
|
|
| v.（使）醒( awaken的第三人称单数 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
179
mellowness
|
|
| 成熟； 芳醇； 肥沃； 怡然 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
180
elicit
|
|
| v.引出,抽出,引起 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
181
recesses
|
|
| n.壁凹( recess的名词复数 )；（工作或业务活动的）中止或暂停期间；学校的课间休息；某物内部的凹形空间v.把某物放在墙壁的凹处( recess的第三人称单数 )；将（墙）做成凹形，在（墙）上做壁龛；休息，休会，休庭 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
182
unwilling
|
|
| adj.不情愿的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
183
metaphor
|
|
| n.隐喻，暗喻 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
184
applied
|
|
| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
185
judgments
|
|
| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
186
herding
|
|
| 中畜群 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
187
supremacy
|
|
| n.至上；至高权力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
188
physiological
|
|
| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
189
obstinately
|
|
| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
190
sublimest
|
|
| 伟大的( sublime的最高级 )； 令人赞叹的； 极端的； 不顾后果的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
191
tempo
|
|
| n.(音乐的)速度；节奏，行进速度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
192
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
193
democrats
|
|
| n.民主主义者，民主人士( democrat的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
194
socialists
|
|
| 社会主义者( socialist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
195
socialist
|
|
| n.社会主义者；adj.社会主义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
196
instinctive
|
|
| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
197
hostility
|
|
| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
198
autonomous
|
|
| adj.自治的；独立的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
199
repudiating
|
|
| v.（正式地）否认( repudiate的现在分词 )；拒绝接受；拒绝与…往来；拒不履行（法律义务） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
200
tenacious
|
|
| adj.顽强的，固执的，记忆力强的，粘的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
201
punitive
|
|
| adj.惩罚的，刑罚的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
202
violation
|
|
| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
203
compassion
|
|
| n.同情，怜悯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
204
Buddhism
|
|
| n.佛教（教义） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
205
climax
|
|
| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
206
consolation
|
|
| n.安慰，慰问 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
207
degenerating
|
|
| 衰退，堕落，退化( degenerate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
208
waning
|
|
| adj.（月亮）渐亏的，逐渐减弱或变小的n.月亏v.衰落( wane的现在分词 )；（月）亏；变小；变暗淡 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
209
depreciation
|
|
| n.价值低落，贬值，蔑视，贬低 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
210
initiate
|
|
| vt.开始，创始，发动；启蒙，使入门；引入 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
211
invert
|
|
| vt.使反转，使颠倒，使转化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
212
forerunners
|
|
| n.先驱( forerunner的名词复数 )；开路人；先兆；前兆 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
213
constraints
|
|
| 强制( constraint的名词复数 )； 限制； 约束 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
214
hazardous
|
|
| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
215
frightful
|
|
| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
216
benevolent
|
|
| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
217
dwarfed
|
|
| vt.（使）显得矮小（dwarf的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
218
hovers
|
|
| 鸟( hover的第三人称单数 )； 靠近（某事物）； （人）徘徊； 犹豫 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
219
utilize
|
|
| vt.使用，利用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
220
elevation
|
|
| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
221
brass
|
|
| n.黄铜；黄铜器，铜管乐器 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
222
deteriorated
|
|
| 恶化，变坏( deteriorate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
223
deteriorating
|
|
| 恶化，变坏( deteriorate的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
224
idiotic
|
|
| adj.白痴的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
225
anguish
|
|
| n.(尤指心灵上的)极度痛苦，烦恼 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
226
favourable
|
|
| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
227
promising
|
|
| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
228
contemptible
|
|
| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
229
dwarfing
|
|
| n.矮化病 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
230
undoubtedly
|
|
| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
231
loathing
|
|
| n.厌恶，憎恨v.憎恨，厌恶( loathe的现在分词)；极不喜欢 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |