16 As regards the actions of most of the combatants in the hideous5 world-wide war now raging it is possible sincerely to take and defend either of the opposite views concerning their actions. The causes of any such great and terrible contest almost always lie far back in the past, and the seeming immediate6 cause is usually itself in major part merely an effect of many preceding causes. The assassination9 of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne was partly or largely due to the existence of political and often murderous secret societies in Servia which the Servian government did not suppress; and it did not suppress them because the “bondage” of the men and women of the Servian race in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria was such a source of ever-present irritation11 to the Servians that their own government was powerless to restrain them. Strong arguments can be advanced on both the Austrian and the Servian sides as regards this initial cause of the present world-wide war.
Again, when once the war was started between Austria and Servia, it can well be argued that it was impossible for Russia not to take part. Had she not done so, she would have forfeited12 her claims to the leadership of the smaller Slav peoples; and the leading Russian liberals enthusiastically support the Russian government in this matter, asserting that Russia’s triumph in this17 particular struggle means a check to militarism, a stride toward greater freedom, and an advance in justice toward the Pole, the Jew, the Finn, and the people of the Caucasus.
When Russia took part it may well be argued that it was impossible for Germany not to come to the defense13 of Austria, and that disaster would surely have attended her arms had she not followed the course she actually did follow as regards her opponents on her western frontier. As for her wonderful efficiency—her equipment, the foresight14 and decision of her General Staff, her instantaneous action, her indomitable persistence—there can be nothing but the praise and admiration15 due a stern, virile16, and masterful people, a people entitled to hearty17 respect for their patriotism18 and far-seeing self-devotion.
Yet again, it is utterly19 impossible to see how France could have acted otherwise than as she did act. She had done nothing to provoke the crisis, even although it be admitted that in the end she was certain to side with Russia. War was not declared by her, but against her, and she could not have escaped it save by having pursued in the past, and by willingness to pursue in the future, a course which would have left her as helpless as Luxembourg—and Luxembourg’s fate shows that helplessness does not offer the smallest guarantee of peace.
18 When once Belgium was invaded, every circumstance of national honor and interest forced England to act precisely20 as she did act. She could not have held up her head among nations had she acted otherwise. In particular, she is entitled to the praise of all true lovers of peace, for it is only by action such as she took that neutrality treaties and treaties guaranteeing the rights of small powers will ever be given any value. The actions of Sir Edward Grey as he guided Britain’s foreign policy showed adherence22 to lofty standards of right combined with firmness of courage under great strain. The British position, and incidentally the German position, are tersely23 stated in the following extract from the report of Sir Edward Goschen, who at the outset of the war was British ambassador in Berlin. The report, in speaking of the interview between the ambassador and the German imperial chancellor25, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, says:
The chancellor [spoke] about twenty minutes. He said the step taken by Great Britain was terrible to a degree. Just for a word, “neutrality,” a word which in war time had been so often disregarded, just for a scrap26 of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation. What we had done was unthinkable. It was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants.
19 I protested strongly against this statement, and said that in the same way as he wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life or death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter’s neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of life or death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium’s neutrality if attacked. A solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in England’s engagement in the future?
There is one nation, however, as to which there is no room for difference of opinion, whether we consider her wrongs or the justice of her actions. It seems to me impossible that any man can fail to feel the deepest sympathy with a nation which is absolutely guiltless of any wrong-doing, which has given proof of high valor27, and yet which has suffered terribly, and which, if there is any meaning in the words “right” and “wrong,” has suffered wrongfully. Belgium is not in the smallest degree responsible for any of the conditions that during the last half century have been at work to impress a certain fatalistic stamp upon those actions of Austria, Russia, Germany, and France which have rendered this war inevitable28. No European nation has had anything whatever to fear from Belgium. There was not the smallest danger of her making any aggressive movement, not even the slightest aggressive20 movement, against any one of her neighbors. Her population was mainly industrial and was absorbed in peaceful business. Her people were thrifty29, hard-working, highly civilized30, and in no way aggressive. She owed her national existence to the desire to create an absolutely neutral state. Her neutrality had been solemnly guaranteed by the great powers, including Germany as well as England and France.
Suddenly, and out of a clear sky, her territory was invaded by an overwhelming German army. According to the newspaper reports, it was admitted in the Reichstag by German members that this act was “wrongful.” Of course, if there is any meaning to the words “right” and “wrong” in international matters, the act was wrong. The men who shape German policy take the ground that in matters of vital national moment there are no such things as abstract right and wrong, and that when a great nation is struggling for its existence it can no more consider the rights of neutral powers than it can consider the rights of its own citizens as these rights are construed31 in times of peace, and that everything must bend before the supreme32 law of national self-preservation33. Whatever we may think of the morality of this plea, it is certain that almost all great nations have in time past again and again acted in accordance with it.21 England’s conduct toward Denmark in the Napoleonic wars, and the conduct of both England and France toward us during those same wars, admit only of this species of justification34; and with less excuse the same is true of our conduct toward Spain in Florida nearly a century ago. Nevertheless we had hoped by the action taken at The Hague to mark an advance in international morality in such matters. The action taken by Germany toward Belgium, and the failure by the United States in any way to protest against such action, shows that there has been no advance. I wish to point out just what was done, and to emphasize Belgium’s absolute innocence35 and the horrible suffering and disaster that have overwhelmed her in spite of such innocence. And I wish to do this so that we as a nation may learn aright the lessons taught by the dreadful Belgian tragedy.
Germany’s attack on Belgium was not due to any sudden impulse. It had been carefully planned for a score of years, on the assumption that the treaty of neutrality was, as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg observed, nothing but “paper,” and that the question of breaking or keeping it was to be considered solely36 from the standpoint of Germany’s interest. The German railways up to the Belgian border are for the most part military roads, which have been double-tracked with22 a view to precisely the overwhelming attack that has just been delivered into and through Belgium. The great German military text-books, such as that of Bernhardi, in discussing and studying possible German campaigns against Russia and France, have treated advances through Belgium or Switzerland exactly as they have treated possible advances through German territory, it being assumed by the writers and by all for whom they wrote that no efficient rulers or military men would for a second consider a neutrality treaty or any other kind of treaty if it became to the self-interest of a party to break it. It must be remembered that the German system in no way limits its disregard of conventions to disregard of neutrality treaties. For example, in General von Bernhardi’s book, in speaking of naval37 warfare38, he lays down the following rule: “Sometimes in peace even, if there is no other means of defending one’s self against a superior force, it will be advisable to attack the enemy by torpedo39 and submarine boats, and to inflict41 upon him unexpected losses.... War upon the enemy’s trade must also be conducted as ruthlessly as possible, since only then, in addition to the material damage inflicted42 upon the enemy, the necessary terror is spread among the merchant marine40, which is even more important than the capture of actual prizes. A certain amount of23 terrorism must be practised on the sea, making peaceful tradesmen stay in safe harbors.”
Belgium has felt the full effect of the practical application of these principles, and Germany has profited by them exactly as her statesmen and soldiers believed she would profit. They have believed that the material gain of trampling43 on Belgium would more than offset44 any material opposition45 which the act would arouse, and they treat with the utter and contemptuous derision which it deserves the mere8 pacificist clamor against wrong which is unaccompanied by the intention and effort to redress3 wrong by force.
The Belgians, when invaded, valiantly46 defended themselves. They acted precisely as Andreas Hofer and his Tyrolese, and Koerner and the leaders of the North German Tugendbund acted in their day; and their fate has been the fate of Andreas Hofer, who was shot after his capture, and of Koerner, who was shot in battle. They fought valiantly, and they were overcome. They were then stamped under foot. Probably it is physically48 impossible for our people, living softly and at ease, to visualize49 to themselves the dreadful woe50 that has come upon the people of Belgium, and especially upon the poor people. Let each man think of his neighbors—of the carpenter, the station agent, the day-laborer, the farmer, the grocer—who are round about him,24 and think of these men deprived of their all, their homes destroyed, their sons dead or prisoners, their wives and children half starved, overcome with fatigue51 and horror, stumbling their way to some city of refuge, and when they have reached it, finding air-ships wrecking52 the houses with bombs and destroying women and children. The King shared the toil53 and danger of the fighting men; the Queen and her children suffered as other mothers and children suffered.
Unquestionably what has been done in Belgium has been done in accordance with what the Germans sincerely believe to be the course of conduct necessitated54 by Germany’s struggle for life. But Germany’s need to struggle for her life does not make it any easier for the Belgians to suffer death. The Germans are in Belgium from no fault of the Belgians but purely55 because the Germans deemed it to their vital interest to violate Belgium’s rights. Therefore the ultimate responsibility for what has occurred at Louvain and what has occurred and is occurring in Brussels rests upon Germany and in no way upon Belgium. The invasion could have been averted56 by no action of Belgium that was consistent with her honor and self-respect. The Belgians would have been less than men had they not defended themselves and their country. For this, and for this only, they are suffering, somewhat as my25 own German ancestors suffered when Turenne ravaged57 the Palatinate, somewhat as my Irish ancestors suffered in the struggles that attended the conquests and reconquests of Ireland in the days of Cromwell and William. The suffering is by no means as great, but it is very great, and it is altogether too nearly akin24 to what occurred in the seventeenth century for us of the twentieth century to feel overmuch pleased with the amount of advance that has been made. It is neither necessary nor at the present time possible to sift58 from the charges, countercharges, and denials the exact facts as to the acts alleged59 to have been committed in various places. The prime fact as regards Belgium is that Belgium was an entirely60 peaceful and genuinely neutral power which had been guilty of no offence whatever. What has befallen her is due to the further fact that a great, highly civilized military power deemed that its own vital interests rendered imperative61 the infliction62 of this suffering on an inoffensive although valiant47 and patriotic63 little nation.
I admire and respect the German people. I am proud of the German blood in my veins64. But the sympathy and support of the American people should go out unreservedly to Belgium, and we should learn the lesson taught by Belgium’s fall. What has occurred to Belgium is precisely what would occur under similar conditions to us, unless26 we were able to show that the action would be dangerous.
The rights and wrongs of these cases where nations violate the rules of morality in order to meet their own supposed needs can be precisely determined65 only when all the facts are known and when men’s blood is cool. Nevertheless, it is imperative, in the interest of civilization, to create international conditions which shall neither require nor permit such action in the future. Moreover, we should understand clearly just what these actions are and just what lessons we of the United States should learn from them so far as our own future is concerned.
There are several such lessons. One is how complicated instead of how simple it is to decide what course we ought to follow as regards any given action supposed to be in the interest of peace. Of course I am speaking of the thing and not the name when I speak of peace. The ultrapacificists are capable of taking any position, yet I suppose that few among them now hold that there was value in the “peace” which was obtained by the concert of European powers when they prevented interference with Turkey while the Turks butchered some hundreds of thousands of Armenian men, women, and children. In the same way I do not suppose that even the ultrapacificists really feel that “peace”27 is triumphant66 in Belgium at the present moment. President Wilson has been much applauded by all the professional pacificists because he has announced that our desire for peace must make us secure it for ourselves by a neutrality so strict as to forbid our even whispering a protest against wrong-doing, lest such whispers might cause disturbance67 to our ease and well-being68. We pay the penalty of this action—or, rather, supine inaction—on behalf of peace for ourselves, by forfeiting69 our right to do anything on behalf of peace for the Belgians in the present. We can maintain our neutrality only by refusal to do anything to aid unoffending weak powers which are dragged into the gulf70 of bloodshed and misery71 through no fault of their own. It is a grim comment on the professional pacificist theories as hitherto developed that, according to their view, our duty to preserve peace for ourselves necessarily means the abandonment of all effective effort to secure peace for other unoffending nations which through no fault of their own are trampled72 down by war.
The next lesson we should learn is of far more immediate consequence to us than speculations73 about peace in the abstract. Our people should wake up to the fact that it is a poor thing to live in a fool’s paradise. What has occurred in this war ought to bring home to everybody what has of course long been known to all really well-28informed men who were willing to face the truth and not try to dodge74 it. Until some method is devised of putting effective force behind arbitration75 and neutrality treaties neither these treaties nor the vague and elastic76 body of custom which is misleadingly termed international law will have any real effect in any serious crisis between us and any save perhaps one or two of the great powers. The average great military power looks at these matters purely from the standpoint of its own interests. Several months ago, for instance, Japan declared war on Germany. She has paid scrupulous77 regard to our own rights and feelings in the matter. The contention78 that she is acting79 in a spirit of mere disinterested80 altruism81 need not be considered. She believes that she has wrongs to redress and strong national interests to preserve. Nineteen years ago Germany joined with Russia to check Japan’s progress after her victorious82 war with China, and has since then itself built up a German colonial possession on Chinese soil. Doubtless the Japanese have never for one moment forgotten this act of Germany. Doubtless they also regard the presence of a strong European military power in China so near to Korea and Manchuria as a menace to Japan’s national life. With businesslike coolness the soldierly statesmen of Nippon have taken the chance which offered itself of at29 little cost retaliating83 for the injury inflicted upon them in the past and removing an obstacle to their future dominance in eastern Asia. Korea is absolutely Japan’s. To be sure, by treaty it was solemnly covenanted84 that Korea should remain independent. But Korea was itself helpless to enforce the treaty, and it was out of the question to suppose that any other nation with no interest of its own at stake would attempt to do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for themselves. Moreover, the treaty rested on the false assumption that Korea could govern herself well. It had already been shown that she could not in any real sense govern herself at all. Japan could not afford to see Korea in the hands of a great foreign power. She regarded her duty to her children and her children’s children as overriding85 her treaty obligations. Therefore, when Japan thought the right time had come, it calmly tore up the treaty and took Korea, with the polite and businesslike efficiency it had already shown in dealing86 with Russia, and was afterward87 to show in dealing with Germany. The treaty, when tested, proved as utterly worthless as our own recent all-inclusive arbitration treaties—and worthlessness can go no further.
Hysteria does not tend toward edification; and in this country hysteria is unfortunately too often30 the earmark of the ultrapacificist. Surely at this time there is more reason than ever to remember Professor Lounsbury’s remark concerning the “infinite capacity of the human brain to withstand the introduction of knowledge.” The comments of some doubtless well-meaning citizens of our own country upon the lessons taught by this terrible cataclysm88 of war are really inexplicable89 to any man who forgets the truth that Professor Lounsbury thus set forth90. A writer of articles for a newspaper syndicate the other day stated that Germany was being opposed by the rest of the world because it had “inspired fear.” This thesis can, of course, be sustained. But Belgium has inspired no fear. Yet it has suffered infinitely91 more than Germany. Luxembourg inspired no fear. Yet it has been quietly taken possession of by Germany. The writer in question would find it puzzling to point out the particulars in which Belgium and Luxembourg—not to speak of China and Korea—are at this moment better off than Germany. Of course they are worse off; and this because Germany has “inspired fear,” and they have not. Nevertheless, this writer drew the conclusion that “fear” was the only emotion which ought not to be inspired; and he advocated our abandonment of battle-ships and other means of defense, so that we might never inspire “fear” in any one. He forgot that, while31 it is a bad thing to inspire fear, it is a much worse thing to inspire contempt. Another newspaper writer pointed92 out that on the frontier between us and Canada there were no forts, and yet peace obtained; and drew the conclusion that forts and armed forces were inimical to national safety. This worthy93 soul evidently did not know that Luxembourg had no forts or armed forces, and therefore succumbed94 without a protest of any kind. If he does not admire the heroism95 of the Belgians and prefer it to the tame submission96 of the Luxembourgers, then this writer is himself unfit to live as a free man in a free country. The crown of ineptitude97, however, was reached by an editor who announced, in praising the recent all-inclusive peace treaties, that “had their like been in existence between some of the European nations two weeks ago, the world might have been spared the great war.” It is rather hard to deal seriously with such a supposition. At this very moment the utter worthlessness, under great pressure, of even the rational treaties drawn98 to protect Belgium and Luxembourg has been shown. To suppose that under such conditions a bundle of bits of paper representing mere verbiage99, with no guarantee, would count for anything whatever in a serious crisis is to show ourselves unfit to control the destinies of a great, just, and self-respecting people.
32 These writers wish us to abandon all means of defending ourselves. Some of them advocate our abandoning the building of an efficient fleet. Yet at this moment Great Britain owes it that she is not in worse plight100 than Belgium solely to the fact that with far-sighted wisdom her statesmen have maintained her navy at the highest point of efficiency. At this moment the Japanese are at war with the Germans, and hostilities101 have been taking place in what but twenty years ago was Chinese territory, and what by treaty is unquestionably Chinese territory to-day. China has protested against the Japanese violation102 of Chinese neutrality in their operations against the Germans, but no heed103 has been paid to the protest, for China cannot back the protest by the use of armed force. Moreover, as China is reported to have pointed out to Germany, the latter power had violated Chinese neutrality just as Japan had done.
Very possibly the writers above alluded104 to were sincere in their belief that they were advocating what was patriotic and wise when they urged that the United States make itself utterly defenseless so as to avoid giving an excuse for aggression105. Yet these writers ought to have known that during their own lifetime China has been utterly defenseless and yet has suffered from aggression after aggression. Large portions of its territory are now33 in the possession of Russia, of Japan, of Germany, of France, of England. The great war between Russia and Japan was fought on what was nominally106 Chinese territory. At present, because a few months ago Servian assassins murdered the heir to the Austrian monarchy107, Japan has fought Germany on Chinese territory. Luxembourg has been absolutely powerless and defenseless, has had no soldiers and no forts. It is off the map at this moment. Not only are none of the belligerents108 thinking about its rights, but no neutral is thinking about its rights, and this simply because Luxembourg could not defend itself. It is our duty to be patient with every kind of folly109, but it is hard for a good American, for a man to whom his country is dear and who reveres110 the memories of Washington and Lincoln, to be entirely patient with the kind of folly that advocates reducing this country to the position of China and Luxembourg.
One of the main lessons to learn from this war is embodied111 in the homely112 proverb: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Persistently113 only half of this proverb has been quoted in deriding114 the men who wish to safeguard our national interest and honor. Persistently the effort has been made to insist that those who advocate keeping our country able to defend its rights are merely adopting “the policy of the big stick.” In reality,34 we lay equal emphasis on the fact that it is necessary to speak softly; in other words, that it is necessary to be respectful toward all people and scrupulously115 to refrain from wronging them, while at the same time keeping ourselves in condition to prevent wrong being done to us. If a nation does not in this sense speak softly, then sooner or later the policy of the big stick is certain to result in war. But what befell Luxembourg five months ago, what has befallen China again and again during the past quarter of a century, shows that no amount of speaking softly will save any people which does not carry a big stick.
America should have a coherent policy of action toward foreign powers, and this should primarily be based on the determination never to give offense116 when it can be avoided, always to treat other nations justly and courteously117, and, as long as present conditions exist, to be prepared to defend our own rights ourselves. No other nation will defend them for us. No paper guarantee or treaty will be worth the paper on which it is written if it becomes to the interest of some other power to violate it, unless we have strength, and courage and ability to use that strength, back of the treaty. Every public man, every writer who speaks with wanton offensiveness of a foreign power or of a foreign people, whether he attacks England or France or Germany, whether35 he assails118 the Russians or the Japanese, is doing an injury to the whole American body politic10. We have plenty of shortcomings at home to correct before we start out to criticise119 the shortcomings of others. Now and then it becomes imperatively120 necessary in the interests of humanity, or in our own vital interest, to act in a manner which will cause offense to some other power. This is a lamentable121 necessity; but when the necessity arises we must meet it and act as we are honorably bound to act, no matter what offense is given. We must always weigh well our duties in such a case, and consider the rights of others as well as our own rights, in the interest of the world at large. If after such consideration it is evident that we are bound to act along a certain line of policy, then it is mere weakness to refrain from doing so because offense is thereby122 given. But we must never act wantonly or brutally123, or without regard to the essentials of genuine morality—a morality considering our interests as well as the interests of others, and considering the interests of future generations as well as of the present generation. We must so conduct ourselves that every big nation and every little nation that behaves itself shall never have to think of us with fear, and shall have confidence not only in our justice but in our courtesy. Submission to wrong-doing on our part would be36 mere weakness and would invite and insure disaster. We must not submit to wrong done to our honor or to our vital national interests. But we must be scrupulously careful always to speak with courtesy and self-restraint to others, always to act decently to others, and to give no nation any justification for believing that it has anything to fear from us as long as it behaves with decency124 and uprightness.
Above all, let us avoid the policy of peace with insult, the policy of unpreparedness to defend our rights, with inability to restrain our representatives from doing wrong to or publicly speaking ill of others. The worst policy for the United States is to combine the unbridled tongue with the unready hand.
We in this country have of course come lamentably125 short of our ideals. Nevertheless, in some ways our ideals have been high, and at times we have measurably realized them. From the beginning we have recognized what is taught in the words of Washington, and again in the great crisis of our national life in the words of Lincoln, that in the past free peoples have generally split and sunk on that great rock of difficulty caused by the fact that a government which recognizes the liberties of the people is not usually strong enough to preserve the liberties of the people against outside aggression. Washington37 and Lincoln believed that ours was a strong people and therefore fit for a strong government. They believed that it was only weak peoples that had to fear strong governments, and that to us it was given to combine freedom and efficiency. They belonged among that line of statesmen and public servants whose existence has been the negation126 of the theory that goodness is always associated with weakness, and that strength always finds its expression in violent wrong-doing. Edward the Confessor represented exactly the type which treats weakness and virtue127 as interchangeable terms. His reign21 was the prime cause of the conquest of England. Godoy, the Spanish statesman, a century ago, by the treaties he entered into and carried out, actually earned the title of “Prince of Peace” instead of merely lecturing about it; and the result of his peacefulness was the loss by Spain of the vast regions which, she then held in our country west of the Mississippi, and finally the overthrow128 of the Spanish national government, the setting up in Madrid of a foreign king by a foreign conqueror129, and a long-drawn and incredibly destructive war. To statesmen of this kind Washington and Lincoln stand in as sharp contrast as they stand on the other side to the great absolutist chiefs such as C?sar, Napoleon, Frederick the Great, and Cromwell. What was true of the personality of Washington38 and Lincoln was true of the policy they sought to impress upon our nation. They were just as hostile to the theory that virtue was to be confounded with weakness as to the theory that strength justified130 wrong-doing. No abundance of the milder virtues131 will save a nation that has lost the virile qualities; and, on the other hand, no admiration of strength must make us deviate132 from the laws of righteousness. The kind of “peace” advocated by the ultrapacificists of 1776 would have meant that we never would have had a country; the kind of “peace” advocated by the ultrapacificists in the early ’60’s would have meant the absolute destruction of the country. It would have been criminal weakness for Washington not to have fought for the independence of this country, and for Lincoln not to have fought for the preservation of the union; just as in an infinitely smaller degree it would have been criminal weakness for us if we had permitted wrong-doing in Cuba to go on forever unchecked, or if we had failed to insist on the building of the Panama Canal in exactly the fashion that we did insist; and, above all, if we had failed to build up our navy as during the last twenty years it has been built up. No alliance, no treaty, and no easy good-will of other nations will save us if we are not true to ourselves; and, on the other hand, if we wantonly give offense to39 others, if we excite hatred133 and fear, then some day we will pay a heavy penalty.
The most important lesson, therefore, for us to learn from Belgium’s fate is that, as things in the world now are, we must in any great crisis trust for our national safety to our ability and willingness to defend ourselves by our own trained strength and courage. We must not wrong others; and for our own safety we must trust, not to worthless bits of paper unbacked by power, and to treaties that are fundamentally foolish, but to our own manliness134 and clear-sighted willingness to face facts.
There is, however, another lesson which this huge conflict may at least possibly teach. There is at least a chance that from this calamity135 a movement may come which will at once supplement and in the future perhaps altogether supplant136 the need of the kind of action so plainly indicated by the demands of the present. It is at least possible that the conflict will result in a growth of democracy in Europe, in at least a partial substitution of the rule of the people for the rule of those who esteem137 it their God-given right to govern the people. This, in its turn, would render it probably a little more unlikely that there would be a repetition of such disastrous138 warfare. I do not think that at present it would prevent the possibility of warfare. I think that40 in the great countries engaged, the peoples as a whole have been behind their sovereigns on both sides of this contest. Certainly the action of the Socialists139 in Germany, France, and Belgium, and, so far as we know, of the popular leaders in Russia, would tend to bear out the truth of this statement. But the growth of the power of the people, while it would not prevent war, would at least render it more possible than at present to make appeals which might result in some cases in coming to an accommodation based upon justice; for justice is what popular rule must be permanently140 based upon and must permanently seek to obtain or it will not itself be permanent.
Moreover, the horror that right-thinking citizens feel over the awful tragedies of this war can hardly fail to make sensible men take an interest in genuine peace movements and try to shape them so that they shall be more practical than at present. I most earnestly believe in every rational movement for peace. My objection is only to movements that do not in very fact tell in favor of peace or else that sacrifice righteousness to peace. Of course this includes objection to all treaties that make believe to do what, as a matter of fact, they fail to do. Under existing conditions universal and all-inclusive arbitration treaties have been utterly worthless, because where there is no power to compel nations to41 arbitrate, and where it is perfectly141 certain that some nations will pay no respect to such agreements unless they can be forced to do so, it is mere folly for others to trust to promises impossible of performance; and it is an act of positive bad faith to make these promises when it is certain that the nation making them would violate them. But this does not in the least mean that we must abandon hope of taking action which will lessen142 the chance of war and make it more possible to circumscribe143 the limits of war’s devastation144.
For this result we must largely trust to sheer growth in morality and intelligence among the nations themselves. For a hundred years peace has obtained between us and Great Britain. No frontier in Europe is as long as the frontier between Canada and ourselves, and yet there is not a fort, nor an armed force worthy of being called such, upon it. This does not result from any arbitration treaty or any other treaty. Such treaties as those now existing are as a rule observed only when they serve to make a record of conditions that already exist and which they do not create. The fact simply is that there has been such growth of good feeling and intelligence that war between us and the British Empire is literally145 an impossibility, and there is no more chance of military movements across the Canadian border than there is of such movement42 between New York and New Hampshire or Quebec and Ontario. Slowly but surely, I believe, such feelings will grow, until war between the Englishman and the German, or the Russian, or the Frenchman, or between any of them and the American, will be as unthinkable as now between the Englishman or Canadian and the American.
But something can be done to hasten this day by wise action. It may not be possible at once to have this action as drastic as would be ultimately necessary; but we should keep our purpose in view. The utter weakness of the Hague court, and the worthlessness when strain is put upon them of most treaties, spring from the fact that at present there is no means of enforcing the carrying out of the treaty or enforcing the decision of the court. Under such circumstances recommendations for universal disarmament stand on an intellectual par7 with recommendations to establish “peace” in New York City by doing away with the police. Disarmament of the free and liberty-loving nations would merely mean insuring the triumph of some barbarism or despotism, and if logically applied146 would mean the extinction147 of liberty and of all that makes civilization worth having throughout the world. But in view of what has occurred in this war, surely the time ought to be ripe for the nations to consider a43 great world agreement among all the civilized military powers to back righteousness by force. Such an agreement would establish an efficient world league for the peace of righteousness.
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consecrates
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| n.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的名词复数 )；奉献v.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的第三人称单数 )；奉献 | |
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industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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redress
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recurrence
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hideous
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| adj.丑陋的，可憎的，可怕的，恐怖的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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8
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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9
assassination
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| n.暗杀；暗杀事件 | |
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10
politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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11
irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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12
forfeited
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| （因违反协议、犯规、受罚等）丧失，失去( forfeit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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13
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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14
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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15
admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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16
virile
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| adj.男性的；有男性生殖力的；有男子气概的；强有力的 | |
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17
hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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18
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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19
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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20
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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21
reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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22
adherence
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| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
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23
tersely
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| adv. 简捷地, 简要地 | |
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24
akin
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| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
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25
chancellor
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| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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26
scrap
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| n.碎片；废料；v.废弃，报废 | |
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27
valor
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| n.勇气，英勇 | |
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28
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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29
thrifty
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| adj.节俭的；兴旺的；健壮的 | |
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30
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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31
construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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32
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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33
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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34
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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35
innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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36
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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37
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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38
warfare
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|
| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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39
torpedo
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|
| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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40
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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41
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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42
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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43
trampling
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|
| 踩( trample的现在分词 )； 践踏； 无视； 侵犯 | |
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44
offset
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|
| n.分支，补偿；v.抵消，补偿 | |
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45
opposition
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|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
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46
valiantly
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|
| adv.勇敢地，英勇地；雄赳赳 | |
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47
valiant
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|
| adj.勇敢的，英勇的；n.勇士，勇敢的人 | |
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48
physically
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| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
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49
visualize
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| vt.使看得见，使具体化，想象，设想 | |
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50
woe
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|
| n.悲哀，苦痛，不幸，困难；int.用来表达悲伤或惊慌 | |
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51
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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52
wrecking
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| 破坏 | |
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53
toil
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| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
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54
necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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55
purely
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|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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56
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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57
ravaged
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| 毁坏( ravage的过去式和过去分词 )； 蹂躏； 劫掠； 抢劫 | |
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58
sift
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| v.筛撒，纷落，详察 | |
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59
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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60
entirely
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|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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61
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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62
infliction
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|
| n.（强加于人身的）痛苦，刑罚 | |
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63
patriotic
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|
| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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64
veins
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|
| n.纹理；矿脉( vein的名词复数 )；静脉；叶脉；纹理 | |
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65
determined
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|
| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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66
triumphant
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|
| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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67
disturbance
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|
| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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68
well-being
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|
| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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69
forfeiting
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|
| （因违反协议、犯规、受罚等）丧失，失去( forfeit的现在分词 ) | |
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70
gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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71
misery
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|
| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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72
trampled
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|
| 踩( trample的过去式和过去分词 )； 践踏； 无视； 侵犯 | |
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73
speculations
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|
| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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74
dodge
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|
| v.闪开，躲开，避开；n.妙计，诡计 | |
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75
arbitration
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|
| n.调停，仲裁 | |
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76
elastic
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|
| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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77
scrupulous
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|
| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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78
contention
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|
| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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79
acting
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|
| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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80
disinterested
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|
| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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81
altruism
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|
| n.利他主义，不自私 | |
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82
victorious
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|
| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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83
retaliating
|
|
| v.报复，反击( retaliate的现在分词 ) | |
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84
covenanted
|
|
| v.立约，立誓( covenant的过去分词 ) | |
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85
overriding
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| a.最主要的 | |
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86
dealing
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|
| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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87
afterward
|
|
| adv.后来；以后 | |
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88
cataclysm
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|
| n.洪水，剧变，大灾难 | |
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89
inexplicable
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|
| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
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90
forth
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|
| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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91
infinitely
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|
| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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92
pointed
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|
| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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93
worthy
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|
| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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94
succumbed
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|
| 不再抵抗（诱惑、疾病、攻击等）( succumb的过去式和过去分词 )； 屈从； 被压垮； 死 | |
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95
heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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96
submission
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|
| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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97
ineptitude
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|
| n.不适当；愚笨，愚昧的言行 | |
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98
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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99
verbiage
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| n.冗词；冗长 | |
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100
plight
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| n.困境，境况，誓约，艰难；vt.宣誓，保证，约定 | |
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101
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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102
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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103
heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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104
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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105
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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106
nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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107
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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108
belligerents
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| n.交战的一方（指国家、集团或个人）( belligerent的名词复数 ) | |
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109
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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110
reveres
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| v.崇敬，尊崇，敬畏( revere的第三人称单数 ) | |
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111
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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112
homely
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| adj.家常的，简朴的；不漂亮的 | |
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113
persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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114
deriding
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| v.取笑，嘲笑( deride的现在分词 ) | |
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115
scrupulously
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| adv.一丝不苟地；小心翼翼地，多顾虑地 | |
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116
offense
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| n.犯规，违法行为；冒犯，得罪 | |
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117
courteously
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| adv.有礼貌地，亲切地 | |
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118
assails
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| v.攻击( assail的第三人称单数 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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119
criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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120
imperatively
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| adv.命令式地 | |
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121
lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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122
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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123
brutally
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|
| adv.残忍地，野蛮地，冷酷无情地 | |
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124
decency
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| n.体面，得体，合宜，正派，庄重 | |
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125
lamentably
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| adv.哀伤地，拙劣地 | |
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126
negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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127
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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128
overthrow
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|
| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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129
conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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130
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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131
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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132
deviate
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| v.(from)背离，偏离 | |
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133
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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134
manliness
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| 刚毅 | |
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135
calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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136
supplant
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| vt.排挤；取代 | |
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137
esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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138
disastrous
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|
| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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139
socialists
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| 社会主义者( socialist的名词复数 ) | |
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140
permanently
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|
| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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141
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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142
lessen
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| vt.减少，减轻；缩小 | |
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143
circumscribe
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| v.在...周围划线，限制，约束 | |
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144
devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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145
literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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146
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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147
extinction
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| n.熄灭，消亡，消灭，灭绝，绝种 | |
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