It is seen periodically in the United States: an industry apparently3 suffering from suicidal mania5. It is incomprehensible, inexplicable6, though mediocrities mutter: “Over-production!” and shake their heads complacently7, proud of having diagnosed the trouble. Here was the turpentine business, once great and lucrative8, now ruin-producing; formerly9 affording a comfortable livelihood10 to many thousands and now giving ever-diminishing wages to ever-diminishing numbers.
It was Mr. Alfred Neustadt, a banker in a famous turpentine district, who first called his 34brother-in-law’s attention to the pitiable sight. Mr. Jacob Greenbaum’s soul thrilled during Neustadt’s recital11. He perceived golden possibilities that dazzled him: He decided12 to form a Turpentine Trust.
First he bought for a song all the bankrupt stills; seven of them. Later on, in his scheme of trust creation, these self-same distilleries would be turned over to the “octopus,” at nice fat figures, as Greenbaum put it, self-admiringly, to his brother-in-law. Then he secured options on nine others, the tired-unto-death plants. In this way he was able to control “a large productive capacity” at an expenditure13 positively14 marvellous—it was so small. It was also in his brother-in-law’s name. Then the banking15 house of Greenbaum, Lazarus & Co. stepped in, interested accomplices16, duped or coerced17 into selling enough other distillers to assure success, cajoled the more stubborn, wheedled18 the more credulous19, gave way gracefully20 to the shrewder and gathered them all into the fold. The American Turpentine Company was formed, with a capital stock of $30,000,000 or 300,000 shares at $100 each. The cash needed, to pay Mr. Greenbaum, Neustadt and others who sold their plants for “part cash and part stock,” was provided by an issue of $25,000,000 of 6 per 35cent bonds, underwritten by a syndicate composed of Greenbaum, Lazarus & Co., I. & S. Wechsler, Morris Steinfelder’s Sons, Reis & Stern, Kohn, Fischel & Co., Silberman & Lindheim, Rosenthal, Shaffran & Co. and Zeman Bros.
They were men who never “speculated”; sometimes they “conducted financial operations.” They had shears22, not fleeces.
The prospectus23 of the “Trust” was a masterpiece of persuasiveness24 and vagueness, of slim statistics and alluring25 generalities. In due course of time the public subscribed26 for the greater part of the $25,000,000 of bonds, and both bonds and stock were “listed” on the New York Stock Exchange—that is, they were placed on the list of securities which members may buy or sell on the “floor” of the Exchange.
Tabularly expressed, the syndicate’s operations were as follows:
Authorized27 stock $30,000,000
Authorized bonds 25,000,000
___________
Total $55,000,000
Actual worth of property 12,800,000
___________
Aqua Pura $42,200,000
Paid to owners for 41 distilleries representing 90 per cent of the turpentine production (and 121 36per cent of the consumption!) of the United States:
Cash from bond sales $8,975,983
Bonds 12,000,000
Stock 18,249,800
___________
Total $39,225,783
Syndicate’s commission, stock 12,988,500
Retained in Co.’s treasury28, unissued 2,000,000
Expenses and discounts on bonds, etc. 785,717
___________
Total $55,000,000
These figures were not for publication. They told the exact truth.
The public knew nothing of the company’s earning capacity, save a few tentative figures from the prospectus, which was a sort of financial gospel according to Greenbaum, but which did not create fanatical devotees among investors29. The stock, unlike the Kipling ship, had not found itself. It was not market-proven, not seasoned; no one knew how much dependence30 to put on it; wherefore the banks would not take it as collateral31 security on loans and wherefore the “speculative32 community” (as the newspapers call the stock gamblers) would not touch it, since in a pinch it might prove utterly33 unvendible. It remained for the syndicate to make a “market” for it, to develop such a condition of affairs that anyone at 37any time could, without overmuch difficulty and without causing over-great fluctuations35, sell readily American Turpentine Company stock. The syndicate would have to earn its commission.
All the manufacturers who had received stock in part payment were told most impressively by Mr. Greenbaum not to sell their holdings under any circumstances at any price below $75 a share. Not knowing Mr. Greenbaum, they readily and solemnly promised to obey him. They even permitted themselves to think, after talking to him, that they would some day receive $80 per share for all their holdings. This precluded36 any untimely “unloading” by the only people outside the syndicate that held any Turpentine stock at all.
Mr. Greenbaum took charge of the market conduct of “Turp,” as the tape called the stock of the American Turpentine Company. At first, the price was marked up by means of “matched” orders—preconcerted and therefore not bona fide transactions. Mr. Greenbaum told one of his brokers38 to sell 1,000 shares of “Turp” to another of his brokers and shortly afterwards the second broker37 sold the same 1,000 shares to a third, by pre-arrangement—this being the matching process—with the result that the tape recorded transactions 38of 2,000 shares. After the “matching” had gone on for some time, readers of the tape were supposed to imagine that the stock was legitimately39 active and strong—two facts which in turn were supposed to whet41 the buying appetite. It was against the rule of the Exchange to “match” orders, but how could convictions be secured?
“Turp” began at 25 and as the syndicate had all the stock in the market, it was easily manipulated upward to 35. Every day, many thousands of shares, according to the Stock Exchange’s official records, “changed hands”—from Greenbaum’s right to his left and back again—and the price rose steadily42. But something was absent. The manipulation was not convincing. It did not make the general public nibble43. The only buyers were the “room traders,” that is, the professional stock gamblers who were members of the Exchange and speculated for themselves exclusively; and those customers of the commission houses who, because they were bound to speculate daily or die and because they studied the ticker-ribbon so assiduously, were known by the generic44 name of “tape-worms.” These gentry45, in and out of the Exchange, provided the tape in its curious language foretold46 a rise, would buy anything—from 39capitalized impudence47, as in the case of Back Bay Gas, whose property was actually worth nil48 and its capital stock was $100,000,000, up to Government bonds.
Now, the room traders and the tape-worms reasoned not illogically that the “Greenbaum gang” had all the stock and that perforce the “gang” had to find a market for it; and the only way to do this was by a nice “bull” or upward movement. When a stock rises and rises and rises the newspapers are full of pleasant stories about it and the lambs read but do not run away; they buy on the assumption that, as the stock has already risen ten points it may rise ten more. This explains why they make so much money in Wall Street—for the natives.
Greenbaum and his associates were exceptionally shrewd business men, thoroughly49 familiar with Wall Street and its methods, cautious yet bold, far-seeing yet eminently50 of the day. They were practical financiers. They marked up the price of “Turp” ten points; but they could not arouse public interest in it so that people would buy it. Indeed, at the end of three weeks, during which the “Street” had been flooded with impressive advice, printed and spoken, to buy because the price was going higher, all they had for their 40trouble was more stock-–6,000 shares from Ira D. Keep, a distiller, who sold out at 38 because he needed the money; and they also were obliged to buy back from the “room traders” at 35 and 36 and higher, the same stock the “gang” had sold at 30 and 31 and 32 and 34. Then the manipulators had to “support” the stock at the higher level, that is, they had to keep it from declining, which could be done only by continuous buying. By doing this the public might imagine there was considerable merit in a stock which was in such good demand from intelligent people as to remain firm, notwithstanding its previous substantial rise. And if somebody wanted “Turp” why shouldn’t the public want it? The public generally asks itself that question. It is in the nature of a nibble and rejoices the hearts of the financial anglers.
Every attempt to sell “Turp” met with failure. At length it was decided to allow the price to sink back to an “invitingly low” level. It was done. But still the invited public refused to buy. Efforts to encourage a short interest to over-extend itself unto “squeezable” proportions failed similarly. The Street was afraid to go “short” of a stock which was so closely held. The philosophy of short selling is simple; it really amounts to betting 41that values will decline. A man who “sells short” sells what he does not possess, but hopes to buy, later on, at a lower price. But since he must deliver what he sells he borrows it from some one else, giving the lender ample security. To “cover” or to “buy in” is to purchase stock previously53 sold short. Obviously, it is unwise to be short of a stock which is held by such a few that it may be difficult to borrow it. To “squeeze” shorts is to advance the price in order to force “covering.” This is done when the short interest is large enough to make it worth while.
In the course of the next few months, after a series of injudicious fluctuations which gave to “Turp” a bad name, even as Wall Street names went, despite glowing accounts of the company’s wonderful business and after distributing less than 35,000 shares, the members of the “Turpentine Skindicate,” as it was popularly called, sorrowfully acknowledged that, while they had skilfully55 organized the trust and had done fairly well with the bonds, they certainly were not howling successes as manipulators. During the following eight months they sold more stock. They spared not the widow nor the orphan56. They even “stuck” their intimate friends. They had sold 42for something what had cost them nothing; it was natural to wish to sell more.
Now, manipulators of stocks are born, not made. The art is most difficult, for stocks should be manipulated in such wise that they will not look manipulated. Anybody can buy stocks or can sell them. But not every one can sell stocks and at the same time convey the impression that he is buying them, and that prices therefore must inevitably57 go much higher. It requires boldness and consummate58 judgment59, knowledge of technical stock-market conditions, infinite ingenuity60 and mental agility61, absolute familiarity with human nature, a careful study of the curious psychological phenomena62 of gambling63 and long experience with the Wall Street public and with the wonderful imagination of the American people; to say nothing of knowing thoroughly the various brokers to be employed, their capabilities64, limitations and personal temperaments65; also, their price.
Adequate manipulative machinery66, moreover, can be perfected only with much toil67 and patience and money. Professional Wall Street will always tell you that “the tape tells the story.” The little paper ribbon, therefore, must be made to tell such stories as the manipulator desires should 43be told to the public; he must produce certain effects which should preserve an appearance of alluring spontaneity and, above all, of legitimacy68 and candor69; he must be a great artist in mendacity and at the same time have the superb self-confidence of a grizzly70.
Several members of the syndicate had many of these qualities, but none had them all. It was decided to put “Turp” stock in the hands of Samuel Wimbleton Sharpe, the best manipulator Wall Street had ever known. “Jakey” Greenbaum said he would conduct the negotiations71 with the great plunger.
Sharpe was a financial free-lance, free-booter and free-thinker. He had made his first fortune in the mining camps of Arizona and finding that field too narrow had come to New York, where he could gamble to his heart’s content. He was all the things that an ideal manipulator should be and several more. He had arrived in New York with a sneer72 on his lips and a loaded revolver in his financial hands. The other “big operators” looked at him in pained astonishment73. “I carry my weapons openly,” Sharpe told them, “and you conceal74 your dirks. Don’t hurt yourselves trying to look honest. I never turn my back on such as you.” Of this encounter was born a hostility75 44that never grew faint. Sharpe had nothing of his own to unload on anyone else, no property to overcapitalize and sell to an undiscriminating public by means of artistic76 lies and his enemies often did. So they called him a gambler, very bitterly, and he called them philanthropists, very cheerfully. If he thought a stock was unduly77 high he sold it confidently, aggressively, stupendously. If he thought a stock was too low he bought it boldly, ready to take all the offerings and bid for more. And once on the march, he might be temporarily checked, be forced by the enemy to halt for a day or a week or a month; but inevitably he arrived. And such an arrival!
And as a manipulator of stock-values he had no equal. On the bull side he rushed a stock upward so steadily, so boldly and brilliantly, but, above all, so persuasively78, that lesser79 gamblers almost fought to be allowed to take it off his hands at incredibly high prices. And when in the conduct of one of his masterly bear campaigns he saw fit to “hammer” the market, values melted away as by magic—Satanic magic, the poor lambs thought. All stocks looked “sick,” looked as though prices would go much lower; murmurs80 of worse things to come were in the air, vague, disquieting81, ruin-breeding. The atmosphere of the 45Street was supersaturated with apprehension82, and the black shadow of Panic brooded over the Stock Exchange, chilling the little gamblers’ hearts, wiping out the last of the little gamblers’ margins83. And even the presidents of the solid, conservative banks studied the ticker uneasily in their offices.
Greenbaum was promptly84 admitted to Sharpe’s private office. It was a half-darkened room, the windows having wire-screens, summer and winter, in order that prying85 eyes across the street might not see his visitors or his confidential86 brokers, whose identity it was advisable should remain unknown to the Street. He was walking up and down the room, pausing from time to time to look at the tape. The ticker is the only telescope the stock-market general has; it tells him what his forces are doing and how the enemy is meeting his attacks. Every inch of the tape is so much ground; every quotation87 represents so many shots.
There was something feline88 in Sharpe’s stealthy, soundless steps, in his mustaches, in the conformation of his face—broad of forehead and triangulating chin-ward. In his eyes, too, there was something tigerish—unmelodramatically cold hearted and coldly curious as they looked upon Mr. Jacob Greenbaum. Unconsciously the unfanciful Trust-maker asked himself whether Sharpe’s heart-beats 46were not ticker ticks, impassively indicating the pulse of the stock-market.
“Hallo, Greenbaum.”
“How do you do, Mr. Sharpe?” quoth the millionaire senior partner of the firm of Greenbaum, Lazarus & Co. “I hope you are well?” He bent89 his head to one side, his eyes full of a caressing90 scrutiny91, as though to ascertain92 the exact condition of Sharpe’s health. “Yes, you must be. I haven’t seen you look so fine in a long time.”
“You didn’t come up here just to tell me this, Greenbaum, did you? How’s your Turpentine? Oh!”—with a long whistle—“I see. You want me to go into it, hey?” And he laughed—a sort of half-chuckle, half-snarl.
Greenbaum looked at him admiringly; then, with a tentative smile, he said: “I am discovered!”
Nearly every American may be met as an equal on the field of Humor. To jest in business matters of the greatest importance bespoke93 the national trait. Moreover, if Sharpe declined, Greenbaum could treat the entire affair—the proposal and the rejection—as parts of a joke.
“Well?” said Sharpe, unhumorously.
“What’s the matter with a pool?”
47“How big?” coldly.
“Up to the limit.” Again the Trust-maker smiled, uncertainly.
“You haven’t all the capital stock, I hope.”
“Well, call it 100,000 shares,” said Greenbaum, more uncertainly and less jovially94.
“Who is to be in it besides you?”
“Oh, you know; the same old crowd.”
“Oh, I know,” mimicked95 Mr. Sharpe, scornfully, “the same old crowd. You ought to have come to me before; it will take something to overcome your own reputations. How much will each take?”
“We’ll fix that O. K. if you take hold,” answered Greenbaum, laughingly. “We’ve got over 100,000 shares and we’d rather some one else held some of it. We ain’t hogs96. Ha! Ha!”
“But, the distillers?”
“They are in the pool. I’ve got most of their stock in my office. I’ll see that it does not come out until I say so.”
There was a pause. Between Sharpe’s eyebrows97 were two deep lines. At length, he said:
“Bring your friends here, this afternoon. Good-by, Greenbaum. And, I say, Greenbaum.”
“Yes?”
“No funny tricks at any stage of the game.”
48“What’s the use of saying such things, Mr. Sharpe?” with an experimental frown.
“The use is so you won’t try any. Come at four,” and Mr. Sharpe began to pace up and down the room. Greenbaum hesitated, still frowning tentatively; but he said nothing and at length went out.
Sharpe looked at the tape. “Turp” was 29?.
He resumed his restless march back and forth98. It was only when the market “went against him” that Mr. Sharpe did not pace about the room in the mechanical way of a menagerie animal, glancing everywhere but seeing nothing. When something unexpected happened in the market Sharpe stood immobile beside the ticker, because his overworked nerves were tense—like a tiger into whose cage there enters a strange and eatable animal.
On the minute of four there called on Mr. Sharpe the senior partners of the firms of Greenbaum, Lazarus & Co., I. & S. Wechsler, Morris Steinfelder’s Sons, Reis & Stern, Kohn, Fischel & Co., Silberman & Lindheim, Rosenthal, Shaffran & Co., and Zeman Bros.
They were ushered99 not into the private office, but into a sumptuously100 furnished room, the walls of which were covered with dashing oil paintings 49of horses and horse-races. The visitors seated themselves about a long oaken table.
Mr. Sharpe appeared at the threshold.
“How do you do, gentlemen? Don’t move, please; don’t move.” He made no motion to shake hands with any of them, but Greenbaum came to him and held out his fat dexter resolutely101 and Sharpe took it. Then Greenbaum sat down and said, “We’re here,” and smiled, blandly102.
Sharpe stood at the head of the polished, shining table, and glanced slowly down the double row of alert faces. His look rested a fraction of a minute on each man’s eyes—a sharp, half-contemptuous, almost menacing look that made the older men uncomfortable and the younger resentful.
“Greenbaum tells me you wish to pool your Turpentine stock and have me market it for you.”
All nodded; a few said “yes”; one—Lindheim, aetat 27—said, flippantly, “That’s what.”
“Very well. What will each man’s proportion be?”
“I have a list here, Sharpe,” put in Greenbaum. He intentionally103 omitted the “Mr.” for effect upon his colleagues. Sharpe noted105 it, but did not mind it.
50Sharpe read aloud:
Greenbaum, Lazarus & Co 38,000 shares.
I. & S. Wechsler 14,000 shares.
Morris Steinfelder’s Sons 14,000 shares.
Reis & Stern 11,000 shares.
Kohn, Fischel & Co 10,000 shares.
Silberman & Lindheim 9,000 shares.
Rosenthal, Shaffran & Co 9,800 shares.
Zeman Bros 8,600 shares.
______________
Total 114,400 shares.
“Is that correct, gentlemen?” asked Sharpe.
Greenbaum nodded his head and smiled affably as befitted the holder106 of the biggest block. Some said “Yes”; others, “That is correct.” Young Lindheim said, “That’s what.” The founders107 of the firm—his uncle and his father—were dead, and he had inherited the entire business from the two. His flippancy108 was not inherited from either.
“It is understood,” said Sharpe, slowly, “that I am to have complete charge of the pool, and conduct operations as I see fit. I want no advice and no questions. If there is any asking to be done, I’ll do it. If my way does not suit you we’ll call the deal off right here, because it’s the only way I have. I know my business, and if you know yours you’ll keep your mouths shut in this office and out of it.”
51No one said a word, not even Lindheim.
“Each of you will continue to carry the stock for which he has agreed to stand in the pool. You’ve had it a year and couldn’t sell it, and you might keep it a few weeks more, until I sell it for you. It must be subject to my call at one minute’s notice. I’ve looked into the company’s business, and I think the stock can easily sell at 75 or 80.”
Something like a gasp109 of astonishment came from those eight hardened speculators. Then Greenbaum smiled, knowingly, as if that were his programme, memorized and spoken by Sharpe.
“It is also understood,” went on Sharpe, very calmly, “that none of you has any other stock for sale at any price, excepting his proportion in this pool, and that proportion, of course, is not to be sold excepting by me.” No one said a word, and he continued:
“My profit will be 25 per cent of the pool’s winnings, figuring on the stock having been put in at 29. The remaining profits will be divided pro1 rata among you; the necessary expenses will be shared similarly. I think that’s all. And, gentlemen, no unloading on the sly—not one share.”
“I want you to understand, Mr. Sharpe, that 52we are not in the habit of—” began Greenbaum with perfunctory dignity. He felt it was his duty to remonstrate110 before his colleagues.
“Oh, that’s all right, Greenbaum. I know you. That’s why I’m particular. We’ve all been in Wall Street more than a month or two. I simply said, ‘No shenanigan.’ And, Greenbaum,” he added, very distinctly, while his eyes took on that curious, cold, menacing look, “I mean it, every d——d word of it. I want the numbers of all your stock-certificates. Excuse me, gentlemen. I am very busy. Good-afternoon.”
And that is how the famous bull pool in Turpentine came to be formed. They thought he might have been nicer, more diplomatic; but as they had sought him, not he them, they bore with his eccentricities111. Each pool manager had his way, just as there are various kinds of pools.
“Sam is not half a bad fellow,” Greenbaum told them, as if apologizing for a dear friend’s weaknesses. “He wants to make out he is a devil of a cynic, but he’s all right. If you humor him you can make him do anything. I always let him have his way.”
On the very next day began the historical advance 53in Turpentine. It opened up at 30. The specialists—brokers who made a specialty112 of dealing113 in it—took 16,000 shares, causing an advance to 32?. Everybody who had been “landed” with the shares at higher figures, and had bitterly regretted it ever since, now began to feel hopeful. As never before a stock had been manipulated, with intent to deceive and malice114 prepense, so did Sharpe manipulate Turpentine stock. The tape told the most wonderful stories in the world, not the less wonderful because utterly untrue. Thus, one day the leading commission houses in the Street were the buyers, which inevitably led to talk of “important developments”; and the next day brokers identified with certain prominent financiers took calmly, deliberately115, nonchalantly, all the offerings; which clearly indicated that the aforementioned financiers had acquired a “controlling interest”—the majority of the stock—of the American Turpentine Company. And on another day there was a long string of purchases of “odd” lots—amounts less than 100 shares—by brokers that usually did business for the Greenbaum syndicate, meaning that friends of the syndicate had received a “tip” straight from “the inside” and were buying for investment.
Then, one fine, sunshiny day, when everybody felt 54very well and the general market was particularly firm, the loquacious116 tape told the watchful117 professional gamblers of Wall Street—oh, so plainly!—that there was “inside realizing”; said, almost articulately to them, that the people most familiar with the property were unloading. Sharpe was selling, with intentional104 clumsiness, stock he had been forced to accumulate during his bull manipulation—for in order to advance the price he had to buy much—and he was not averse118 to conveying such impressions as would lead to the creation of a short interest, large enough to make it profitable to “squeeze.” He had too much company on the bull side. And sure enough the professional gamblers said: “Aha! They are through with it. The movement is over!” and sold “Turp” short confidently, for a worthless stock had no business to be selling at $46 a share. The price yielded and they sold more the next day. But lo, on the day following, the Board member of a very conservative house went into the “Turp” crowd and bought it—he did not “bid up” the price at all, but bought and bought until he had accumulated 20,000 shares, and the bears became panic-stricken, and rumors120 of a nearby dividend121 began to circulate, and the bears covered their shorts at a loss and “went long”—bought 55in the hope of a further rise—and the stock closed at 52.
And Sharpe reduced very greatly the amount of “Turp” stock he had been obliged to take for manipulative purposes. So far he was buying more than he sold. Later he would sell more than he bought. When the demand exceeds the vendible34 supply, obviously the price rises; when the supply for sale exceeds the demand, a fall results. But the average selling price of a big line may be high enough to make the operation profitable, even though a decline occurs during the course of the selling.
For a week “Turp” rested; then it began to rise once more. At 56 and 58 it became the most active stock of the entire list. Everybody talked about it. The newspapers began to publish statements of the company’s wonderful earnings122, and the Street began to think that, in common with other “trusts,” the American Turpentine Company must be a very prosperous concern. The company at this time developed a habit of advancing prices a fraction of a cent per gallon every week, so that the papers could talk of the boom in the turpentine trade.
At 60 the Street thought there really must be something behind the movement, for no mere123 56manipulation could put up the price thirty points in a month’s time, which shows what a wonderful artist Sharpe was. And people began to look curiously124 and admiringly and enviously125 and in many other ways at “Jakey” Greenbaum and his accomplices, and to accuse them of having intentionally kept down the price of the stock for a year in order to “freeze out” the poor, unsophisticated stockholders, and to “tire out” some of the early buyers, because “Turp,” being “a good thing,” Greenbaum et al. wanted it all for themselves. And Greenbaum et al. smiled guiltily and said nothing, though Jakey winked128 from time to time when they spoke51 to him about it; and old Isidore Wechsler cultivated a Napoleon III. look of devilish astuteness129; and “Bob” Lindheim became almost dignified130; and myopic131 little Morris Steinfelder gained 15 pounds and Rosenthal stopped patting everybody on the back, and mutely invited everybody to pat him on the back.
Then Sharpe sent for “Jakey,” and on the next day young “Eddie” Lazarus swaggeringly offered to wager132 $10,000 against $5,000 that a dividend on “Turp” stock would be declared during the year. Whereupon the newspapers of their own accord began to guess how great a dividend 57would be paid, and when; and various figures were mentioned in the Board room by brokers who confided133 to their hearers that they “got it on the dead q. t., straight from the inside.” And two days later Sharpe’s unsuspected brokers offered to pay 1? per cent for the dividend on 100,000 shares, said dividend to be declared within sixty days or the money forfeited134. And the stock sold up to 66?, and the public wanted it. A big, broad market had been established, in which one could buy or sell the stock with ease by the tens of thousands of shares. The 114,400 shares, which at the inception135 of the movement at the unsalable price of $30 a share represented a theoretical $3,432,000, now readily vendible at $65 a share, meant $7,422,000; not half bad for a few weeks’ work.
And still Sharpe, wonderful man that he was, gave no sign that he was about to begin unloading. Whereupon the other members of the pool began to wish he were not quite so greedy. They were satisfied to quit, they said. The presence of the pool’s stock in their offices began to irritate them. They knew the vicissitudes136 of life, the uncertainties137 of politics, and of the stock market. Supposing some crazy anarchist138 blew up the President of the United States, or the 58Emperor of Germany were to insult his grandmother, the market would “break” to pieces, and their $4,000,000 of paper profits would disappear. They implored139, individually and collectively, Mr. Jacob Greenbaum to call on Sharpe; and Greenbaum, disregarding a still, small voice that warned him against it, went to Sharpe’s office, and came out of it, two minutes later, somewhat flushed, and assured his colleagues one by one that Sharpe was all right, and that he seemed to know his business. Also, that he was cranky that day. He always was, added Greenbaum forgivingly, when one of his horses lost a race.
The stock fluctuated between 60 and 65. It seemed to be having a resting spell. But as it had enjoyed these periods of repose140 on three several occasions during the rise—at 40 and 48 and 56–-the public became all the more eager to buy it whenever it fell to 60 or 59, for the Street was now full of tips that “Turp” would go to par4. And such was the public’s speculative temper and Mr. Sharpe’s good work that disinterested141 observers were convinced the stock would surely sell above 90 at the very least. Mr. Sharpe still bought and sold, but he sold twice as much as he bought, and the big block he had been obliged 59to take in the course of his manipulation diminished. On the next day he hoped to begin selling the pool stock.
That very day Mr. Greenbaum, as he returned to his office from his luncheon142, felt well pleased with the meal and therefore with himself and therefore with everything. He scanned a yard or two of the tape and smiled. “Turp” was certainly very active and very strong.
“In such a market,” thought Mr. Greenbaum, “Sharpe can’t possibly tell he’s getting stock from me. In order to be on the safe side I’m going to let him have a couple of thousand. Then, should anything happen, I’d be that much ahead. Ike!” he called to a clerk.
“Yes, sir.”
“Sell two—wait; make it 3,000–-no, never mind. Send for Mr. Ed Lazarus.” And he muttered to himself, with a sub-thrill of pleasure: “I can just as well as not make it 5,000 shares.”
“Eddie,” he said to his partner’s son, “give an order to some of the room traders, say to Willie Schiff, to sell five—er—six—tell him to sell 7,000 shares of Turpentine and to borrow the stock. I am not selling a share, see?” with a wink127. “It’s short selling by him, do you understand?”
60“Do I? Well, I guess. I’ll fix that part O.K.,” said young Lazarus, complacently. He thought he would cover Greenbaum’s tracks so well as to deceive everybody, including that highly disagreeable man, Samuel Wimbleton Sharpe. He felt so confident, so elated, did the young man, that when he gave the order to his friend and club-mate, Willie Schiff, he raised it to 10,000 shares. Greenbaum’s breach143 of faith had grown from the relatively144 small lot of 2,000 shares to five times that amount. It was to all appearances short stock, and it was duly “borrowed” by young Schiff. It was advisable that it should so appear. In the first place no member of the pool could supply the stock which he held, because Sharpe could trace the selling to the office, as he had the numbers of the stock certificates. And, again, short selling does not have the weakening effect that long selling has. When stock is sold short it is evident that sooner or later the seller will have to buy it back; that is, a future demand for the stock is assured from this source, if from no other. Whereas, long stock is that actually held by some one.
Isidore Wechsler, who held 14,000 shares, was suffering from a bad liver the same day that Greenbaum was suffering from nothing at all, not 61even a conscience. A famous art collection would be sold at auction145 that week, and he felt sure his vulgar friend, “Abe” Wolff, would buy a couple of exceptionally fine Troyons and a world-famous Corot, merely to get his name in the papers.
“‘Turp,’ 62?,” said his nephew, who was standing52 by the ticker.
Then old Wechsler had an idea. If he sold 2,000 shares of Turpentine at 62 or 63, he would have enough to buy the best ten canvases of the collection. His name—and the amounts paid—would grace the columns of the papers. What was 3,000 shares, or even 4,000, when Sharpe had made such a big, broad market for the stock?
“Why, I might as well make it 5,000 shares while I’m about it, for there’s no telling what may happen if Sharpe should overstay his market. I’ll build a new stable at Westhurst”—his country place—“and call it,” said old Wechsler to himself, in his peculiar146, facetious147 way so renowned148 in Wall Street, “the Turpentine Horse Hotel, in honor of Sharpe.” And so his 5,000 shares were sold by E. Halford, who had the order from Herzog, Wertheim & Co., who received it from Wechsler. It was short selling, of course.
Total breach of faith, 15,000 shares.
Now that very evening Bob Lindheim’s extremely 62handsome wife wanted a necklace, and wanted it at once; also she wanted it of filbert-sized diamonds. She had heard her husband speak highly of Sam Sharpe’s masterly manipulation of Turpentine, and she knew he was “in on the ground floor.” She read the newspapers, and she always followed the stock market diligently149, for Bob, being young and loving, used to give her a share in his stock deals from time to time, and she learned to figure for herself her “paper” or theoretical profits, when there were any, so that Bob couldn’t have “welched” if he had wished. On this particular evening she had statistics ready for him, showing how much money he had made; and she wanted that necklace. She had longed for it for months. It cost only $17,000. But there was also a lovely bracelet150, diamonds and rubies151, and——
Lindheim, to his everlasting152 credit, remonstrated153 and told her: “Wait until the pool realizes, sweetheart. I don’t know at what price that will be, for Sharpe says nothing. But I know we’ll all make something handsome, and so will you. I’ll give you 500 shares at 30. There!”
“But I want it now!” she protested, pouting154. She was certainly beautiful, and when she pouted155, with her rich, red lips——
63“Wait a week, dear,” he urged nevertheless.
“Lend me the money now, and I’ll pay it back to you when you give me what I make on the deal,” she said, with fine finality. And seeing hesitation156 in Bob’s face, she added, solemnly: “Honest, I will, Bob. I’ll pay you back every cent, this time.”
“I’ll think about it,” said Bob. He always said it when he had capitulated, and she knew it, and so she said, magnanimously: “Very well, dear.”
Lindheim thought 1,000 shares would do it, so he decided to sell a thousand the next day, for you can never tell what may happen, and accidents seldom help the bulls. But as he thought of it in his office more calmly, more deliberately, away from his wife and from the influence she exercised over him, it struck him forcibly that it was wrong to sell 1,000 shares of Turpentine stock. He might as well as not make it 2,500; and he did. He was really a modest fellow, and very young. His wife’s cousin sold the stock for him, apparently short.
Total breach of faith, 17,500 shares. The market stood it well. Sharpe was certainly a wonderful chap.
Unfortunately, Morris Steinfelder, Jr., decided 64to sell 1,500 “Turp,” and did so. The stock actually rose a half point on his sales. So he sold another 1,500, and, as a sort of parting shot, 500 shares more. All this through an unsuspected broker.
Total breach of faith, 21,000 shares. The market was but slightly affected157.
Then Louis Reis of Reis & Stern, “Andy” Fischel of Kohn, Fischel & Co., Hugo Zeman of Zeman Bros., and “Joe” Shaffran of Rosenthal, Shaffran & Co., all thought they could break their pledges to Sharpe with impunity158, and each sold, to be on the safe side. This last lump figured up as follows:
Sales First Contemplated159. Period of Hesitancy. Actual Sales.
Shares. Minutes. Shares.
Louis Reis 1,500 3 2,600
Andy Fischel 2,000 15 5,000
Hugo Zeman 1,000 0 1,000
Joe Shaffran 500 1? 1,800
Total breach of faith, 31,400 shares.
The market did not take it well. Sharpe, endeavoring to realize on the remainder of his manipulative purchases, found that “some one had been there before him.”
65An accurate list of the buyers and sellers was sent in every day by his lieutenants160, for all but the most skilful54 operators invariably betray themselves when they attempt to sell a big block of stock. He scanned it very carefully now, and put two and two together; and he made certain inquiries161 and put four and four together—four names and four other names. He saw through the time-worn device of the fictitious162 short selling. He knew the only people who would dare sell such a large amount must be his colleagues. He also was convinced that their breach of faith was not a concerted effort, because if they had discussed the matter they would have sold a smaller quantity. He knew where nearly every share of the stock was. It was his business to know everything about it.
“Two,” he said to his secretary, “may play at that game.” And he began to play.
By seemingly reckless, plunging163 purchases he started the stock rushing upward with a vengeance-–63, 64, 65, 66, four points in as many minutes. The floor of the Stock Exchange was the scene of the wildest excitement. The market—why, the market was simply Turpentine. Everybody was buying it, and everybody was wondering how high it would go, Greenbaum and the 66other seven included. It looked as if the stock had resumed its triumphant164 march to par.
Then Sharpe called in all the stock his brokers were loaning to the shorts, and he himself began to borrow it. This, together with the legitimate40 requirements of the big short interest, created a demand so greatly in excess of the supply that Turpentine loaned at a sixty-fourth, at a thirty-second, at an eighth, and finally at a quarter premium165 over night. It meant that the shorts had either to cover or to pay $25 per diem for the use of each 100 shares of stock they borrowed. On the 31,400 shares that the syndicate was borrowing it meant an expense of nearly $8,000 a day; and in addition the stock was rising in price. The shorts were losing at the rate of many thousands a minute. There was no telling where the end would be, but it certainly looked stormy for both the real and the fictitious shorts.
Mr. Sharpe sent a peremptory166 message to Greenbaum, Lazarus & Co.; I. & M. Wechsler; Morris Steinfelder’s Sons; Reis & Stern; Kohn, Fischel & Co.; Silberman & Lindheim; Rosenthal, Shaffran & Co.; and Zeman Bros. It was the same message to all:
“Send me at once all your Turpentine stock!”
There was consternation167 and dismay, also admiration168 67and self-congratulation, among the recipients169 of the message. They would have to buy back in the open market the stock they had sold a few days before. It would mean losses on the treasonable transactions of fully21 a quarter of a million, but the pool “stood to win” simply fabulous170 sums, if Mr. Sharpe did his duty.
There were some large blocks of stock for sale at 66, but Sharpe’s brokers cleared the figures with a fierce, irresistible171 rush, whooping172 exultantly173. The genuine short interest was simply panic-stricken, and atop it all there came orders to buy an aggregate174 of 31,400 shares—orders from Messrs. Greenbaum, Wechsler, Lindheim, Steinfelder, Reis, Fischel, Shaffran, and Zeman. The stock rose grandly on their buying: 4,000 shares at 66; 2,200 at 66?; 700 at 67?; 1,200 at 68; 3,200 at 69?; 2,000 at 70; 5,700 at 70?; 1,200 at 72. Total, 31,400 shares bought in by the “Skindicate.” Total, 31,400 shares sold by Samuel Wimbleton Sharpe to his own associates in the great Turpentine pool. In all he found buyers for 41,700 shares that day, but it had taken purchases of exactly 21,100 to “stampede the shorts” earlier in the day, and in addition he held 17,800 shares acquired in the course of his bull manipulation, which had not been disposed of 68when he discovered the breach of faith, so that at the day’s close he found himself not only without a share of stock manipulatively purchased, but “short” for his personal account of 2,800 shares.
The newspapers published picturesque175 accounts of the “Great Day in Turpentine.” A powerful clique176, they said, owned so much of the stock—had “cornered” it—that they could easily mark up the price to any figure. They called it a “memorable squeeze.” It was hinted also that Mr. Sharpe had been on the wrong side of the market, and one paper gave a wealth of details and statistics in bold, bad type to prove that the wily bear leader had been caught short of 75,000 shares, and had covered at a loss of $1,500,000. A newspaper man whose relations with Sharpe were intimate asked him, very carelessly: “What the deuce caused the rise in Turpentine?” and Sharpe drawled: “I don’t know for a certainty, but I rather imagine it was inside buying!”
On the next day came the second chapter of the big Turpentine deal. Mr. Sharpe, having received the pool’s 114,400 shares, divided it into three lots, 40,000 shares, 50,000 shares, and 24,400 shares. The market had held fairly strong, but the lynx-eyed room traders failed to perceive the usual “support” in “Turp” and began to 69sell it in order to make sure. There was enough commission-house buying and belated short-covering to keep it moderately steady. Then the room traders redoubled their efforts to depress it, by selling more than there were buying orders for; also by selling it cheaper than was warranted by the legitimate demand for the stock. It was a favorite trick to offer to sell thousands of shares lower than people were willing to pay, in order to frighten the timid holders126 and make them sell; which in turn would make still others sell, until the movement became general enough to cause a substantial fall.
Slowly the price began to yield. All that was needed was a leader. Whereupon Mr. Sharpe took the first lot of pool stock, 40,000 shares, and hurled177 it full at the market. The impact was terrible; the execution appalling178. The market reeled crazily. The stock, which after selling up to 72? had “closed” on the previous day at 71?, dropped twenty points and closed at 54. The newspapers said that the corner was “busted”; that the “squeeze” was over. Hundreds of people slept ill that night. Scores did not sleep at all.
On the next day he fired by volleys 50,000 shares more at the market. The stock sank to 41?. Such a break was almost unprecedented179.
70The Street asked itself if it were not on the eve of a crash that would become historic in a district whose chronology is reckoned by big market movements.
Greenbaum rushed to Sharpe’s office. The terrible break gave him courage to do anything. A Wall Street worm will turn when the market misbehaves itself.
“What’s the matter?” he asked angrily. “What are you doing to Turpentine?”
Sharpe looked him full in the face, but his voice was even and emotionless as he replied: “Somebody has been selling on us. I don’t know who. I wish I did. I was afraid I might have to take 100,000 shares more, so I just sold as much as I could. I’ve marketed most of the pool’s stock. If it had not been for the jag of stock I struck around 60 and 62, Turpentine would be selling at 85 or 90 to-day. Come again next week, Greenbaum; and keep cool. Did you ever know me to fail? Good-by, Greenbaum; and don’t raise your voice when you speak to me.”
“This has gone too far,” said Greenbaum, hotly. “You must give me an explanation or by Heaven I’ll——”
“Greenbaum,” said Mr. Sharpe, in a listless 71voice, “don’t get excited. Good-by, Greenbaum. Be virtuous180 and you will be happy.” And he resumed his caged-tiger pacing up and down his office. As by magic, Mr. Sharpe’s burly private secretary appeared, and said: “This way, Mr. Greenbaum,” and led the dazed Trust-maker from the office. On his return Sharpe told him: “There is no need to accuse those fellows of breach of faith. They’d deny it.”
The next day Mr. Sharpe simply poured the remaining 25,000 shares of the pool’s stock on the market as one pours water from a pitcher181 into a cup. The bears had it all their own way. The loquacious tape said, ever so plainly: “This is nothing but inside liquidation182, all the more dangerous and ominous183 since it is at such low figures and is so urgent in its character. Heaven alone can tell where it will end; and there is no telephone communication thither184.”
Everybody was selling because somebody had started a rumor119 that the courts had dissolved the company for gross violation185 of the Anti-Trust law, and that a receiver had been appointed. Having sold out the last of the pool’s stock, Mr. Sharpe “took in” at $22 a share the 2,800 shares which he had put out at $72, a total profit on his small “line” of $140,000.
72Turpentine stock had declined fifty points in fifteen business hours. It meant a shrinkage in the market value of the company’s capital stock of $15,000,000. The shrinkage in the self-esteem of some of the pool was measurable only in billions.
Sharpe notified his associates that the pool had completely realized—i.e., had sold out—and that he would be pleased to meet them at his office on Monday—this was Thursday—at eleven A.M., when he would have checks and an accounting186 ready for them. He refused himself to Greenbaum, Wechsler, Zeman, Shaffran, and others who called to see what could be done to save their reputations from the wreck187 of Turpentine. The stalwart private secretary told them that Mr. Sharpe was out of town. He was a very polite man, was the secretary; and an amateur boxer188 of great proficiency189.
Failing to find Sharpe, they hastily organized a new pool, of a self-protective character, and sent in “supporting” orders. They were obliged to take large quantities of stock that day and the next in order to prevent a worse smash, which would hurt them in other directions. They found themselves with more than 50,000 shares on their hands, and the price was only 26 @ 28. And 73merely to try to sell the stock at that time threatened to start a fresh Turpentine panic.
They met Sharpe on Monday. His speech was not so short as usual. He had previously sent to each man an envelope containing a check and a statement, and now he said, in a matter-of-fact tone:
“Gentlemen and Greenbaum, you all know what I did for Turpentine on the up-tack. Around 62 I began to strike some stock which I couldn’t account for. I knew none of you had any for sale, of course, as you had pledged me your honorable words not to sell, save through me. But the stock kept coming out, even though the sellers borrowed against it, as if it were short stock, and I began to fear I had met an inexhaustible supply. It is always best on such occasions to act promptly, and so, after driving in the real shorts, I sold out our stock. The average selling price was 40. If it had not been for that mysterious selling it would have been 80. After commissions and other legitimate pool expenses, I find we have made nine points net, or $1,029,600, of which 25 per cent., or $250,000, come to me according to the agreement. It is too bad some people didn’t know enough to hold their stock for 90. But I find Wall Street is full of uncertainties—there 74is so much stupidity in the district. I trust you are satisfied. In view of the circumstances, I am. Yes, indeed. Good-day, gentlemen; and you too, Greenbaum, good-day.”
There was nothing tigerish about him. He was affable and polished; they could see that he seemed pleased to the purring point. He nodded to them and went into his inner office.
They blustered190 and fumed191 among themselves and gained courage thereby192 and tried Sharpe’s door and found it locked. They knocked thereon, vehemently193, and the ubiquitous private secretary came out and told them that Mr. Sharpe had an important engagement and could not be disturbed, but that he was authorized to discuss any item of the statement, and he had charge of all the vouchers194, in the shape of brokers’ reports, etc. So they expressed their opinions of the private secretary and of his master rather mildly, and went out, crestfallen195. Outside they compared notes, and in a burst of honesty they confessed. Then, illogically enough, they cursed Sharpe. The pool was not “ahead of the game.” They had so much more stock on their hands than they desired, that in reality they were heavy losers!
And as time wore on they had to buy more “Turp”; and more “Turp”; and still more 75“Turp.” They thought they could emulate196 Sharpe and rush the price up irresistibly197, at any rate up to 50. They declared a dividend of 2 per cent on the stock. But they could not market Turpentine. Again and again they tried, and again and again they failed. And each time the failure was worse because they had to take more stock.
It is now quoted at 16 @ 18. But it is not readily vendible at that figure; nor, indeed, at any price. Opposition198 distilleries are starting up in all the turpentine districts, and the trade outlook is gloomy. And the principal owners of the stock of the American Turpentine Company, holding among them not less than 140,000 out of the entire issue of 300,000 unvendible shares, are the famous “Greenbaum Skindicate.”
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
pro
|
|
| n.赞成，赞成的意见，赞成者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
survivors
|
|
| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
par
|
|
| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
mania
|
|
| n.疯狂；躁狂症，狂热，癖好 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
inexplicable
|
|
| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
complacently
|
|
| adv. 满足地, 自满地, 沾沾自喜地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
lucrative
|
|
| adj.赚钱的，可获利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
formerly
|
|
| adv.从前，以前 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
livelihood
|
|
| n.生计，谋生之道 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
recital
|
|
| n.朗诵，独奏会，独唱会 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
expenditure
|
|
| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
positively
|
|
| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
banking
|
|
| n.银行业，银行学，金融业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
accomplices
|
|
| 从犯，帮凶，同谋( accomplice的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
coerced
|
|
| v.迫使做( coerce的过去式和过去分词 )；强迫；（以武力、惩罚、威胁等手段）控制；支配 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
wheedled
|
|
| v.骗取（某物），哄骗（某人干某事）( wheedle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
credulous
|
|
| adj.轻信的，易信的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
gracefully
|
|
| ad.大大方方地；优美地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
shears
|
|
| n.大剪刀 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
prospectus
|
|
| n.计划书；说明书；慕股书 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
persuasiveness
|
|
| 说服力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
alluring
|
|
| adj.吸引人的，迷人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
subscribed
|
|
| v.捐助( subscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；签署，题词；订阅；同意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
authorized
|
|
| a.委任的，许可的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
treasury
|
|
| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
investors
|
|
| n.投资者，出资者( investor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
dependence
|
|
| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
collateral
|
|
| adj.平行的；旁系的；n.担保品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
speculative
|
|
| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
utterly
|
|
| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
vendible
|
|
| adj.可销售的，可被普遍接受的n.可销售物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
fluctuations
|
|
| 波动，涨落，起伏( fluctuation的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
precluded
|
|
| v.阻止( preclude的过去式和过去分词 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
broker
|
|
| n.中间人，经纪人；v.作为中间人来安排 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
brokers
|
|
| n.（股票、外币等）经纪人( broker的名词复数 )；中间人；代理商；（订合同的）中人v.做掮客（或中人等）( broker的第三人称单数 )；作为权力经纪人进行谈判；以中间人等身份安排… | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
legitimately
|
|
| ad.合法地；正当地，合理地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
legitimate
|
|
| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
whet
|
|
| v.磨快，刺激 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
steadily
|
|
| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
nibble
|
|
| n.轻咬，啃；v.一点点地咬，慢慢啃，吹毛求疵 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
generic
|
|
| adj.一般的，普通的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
gentry
|
|
| n.绅士阶级，上层阶级 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
foretold
|
|
| v.预言，预示( foretell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
impudence
|
|
| n.厚颜无耻；冒失；无礼 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
nil
|
|
| n.无，全无，零 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
eminently
|
|
| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
spoke
|
|
| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
standing
|
|
| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
previously
|
|
| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
skilful
|
|
| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
skilfully
|
|
| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
orphan
|
|
| n.孤儿；adj.无父母的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
inevitably
|
|
| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
consummate
|
|
| adj.完美的；v.成婚；使完美 [反]baffle | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
ingenuity
|
|
| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
agility
|
|
| n.敏捷，活泼 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
phenomena
|
|
| n.现象 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
gambling
|
|
| n.赌博；投机 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
capabilities
|
|
| n.能力( capability的名词复数 )；可能；容量；[复数]潜在能力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
temperaments
|
|
| 性格( temperament的名词复数 )； （人或动物的）气质； 易冲动； （性情）暴躁 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
machinery
|
|
| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
toil
|
|
| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
legitimacy
|
|
| n.合法，正当 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
candor
|
|
| n.坦白，率真 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
grizzly
|
|
| adj.略为灰色的，呈灰色的；n.灰色大熊 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
negotiations
|
|
| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
sneer
|
|
| v.轻蔑；嘲笑；n.嘲笑，讥讽的言语 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
astonishment
|
|
| n.惊奇，惊异 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
conceal
|
|
| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
hostility
|
|
| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
artistic
|
|
| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
unduly
|
|
| adv.过度地，不适当地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
persuasively
|
|
| adv.口才好地；令人信服地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
lesser
|
|
| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
murmurs
|
|
| n.低沉、连续而不清的声音( murmur的名词复数 )；低语声；怨言；嘀咕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
disquieting
|
|
| adj.令人不安的，令人不平静的v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
apprehension
|
|
| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
margins
|
|
| 边( margin的名词复数 )； 利润； 页边空白； 差数 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
promptly
|
|
| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
prying
|
|
| adj.爱打听的v.打听，刺探（他人的私事）( pry的现在分词 )；撬开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
confidential
|
|
| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
quotation
|
|
| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
feline
|
|
| adj.猫科的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
bent
|
|
| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
caressing
|
|
| 爱抚的，表现爱情的，亲切的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
scrutiny
|
|
| n.详细检查，仔细观察 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
ascertain
|
|
| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
bespoke
|
|
| adj.（产品）订做的；专做订货的v.预定( bespeak的过去式 )；订（货）；证明；预先请求 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
jovially
|
|
| adv.愉快地，高兴地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
mimicked
|
|
| v.（尤指为了逗乐而）模仿( mimic的过去式和过去分词 )；酷似 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
hogs
|
|
| n.（尤指喂肥供食用的）猪( hog的名词复数 )；（供食用的）阉公猪；彻底地做某事；自私的或贪婪的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
eyebrows
|
|
| 眉毛( eyebrow的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
forth
|
|
| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
ushered
|
|
| v.引，领，陪同( usher的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
sumptuously
|
|
| 奢侈地，豪华地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
resolutely
|
|
| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
blandly
|
|
| adv.温和地，殷勤地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
intentionally
|
|
| ad.故意地，有意地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
intentional
|
|
| adj.故意的，有意（识）的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
noted
|
|
| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
holder
|
|
| n.持有者，占有者；(台，架等)支持物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
founders
|
|
| n.创始人( founder的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
flippancy
|
|
| n.轻率；浮躁；无礼的行动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
gasp
|
|
| n.喘息，气喘；v.喘息；气吁吁他说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
remonstrate
|
|
| v.抗议，规劝 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
eccentricities
|
|
| n.古怪行为( eccentricity的名词复数 )；反常；怪癖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
specialty
|
|
| n.(speciality)特性，特质；专业，专长 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
dealing
|
|
| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
malice
|
|
| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
deliberately
|
|
| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
loquacious
|
|
| adj.多嘴的，饶舌的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
watchful
|
|
| adj.注意的，警惕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
averse
|
|
| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
rumor
|
|
| n.谣言，谣传，传说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
rumors
|
|
| n.传闻( rumor的名词复数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷v.传闻( rumor的第三人称单数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
dividend
|
|
| n.红利，股息；回报，效益 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
earnings
|
|
| n.工资收人；利润，利益，所得 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
curiously
|
|
| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
enviously
|
|
| adv.满怀嫉妒地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
holders
|
|
| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
wink
|
|
| n.眨眼，使眼色，瞬间；v.眨眼，使眼色，闪烁 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
winked
|
|
| v.使眼色( wink的过去式和过去分词 )；递眼色（表示友好或高兴等）；（指光）闪烁；闪亮 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
astuteness
|
|
| n.敏锐；精明；机敏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
dignified
|
|
| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
myopic
|
|
| adj.目光短浅的，缺乏远见的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
wager
|
|
| n.赌注；vt.押注，打赌 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
confided
|
|
| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
forfeited
|
|
| （因违反协议、犯规、受罚等）丧失，失去( forfeit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
inception
|
|
| n.开端，开始，取得学位 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
vicissitudes
|
|
| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
uncertainties
|
|
| 无把握( uncertainty的名词复数 )； 不确定； 变化不定； 无把握、不确定的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
anarchist
|
|
| n.无政府主义者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
implored
|
|
| 恳求或乞求（某人）( implore的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
repose
|
|
| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
disinterested
|
|
| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
luncheon
|
|
| n.午宴，午餐，便宴 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
breach
|
|
| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
relatively
|
|
| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
auction
|
|
| n.拍卖；拍卖会；vt.拍卖 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
peculiar
|
|
| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
facetious
|
|
| adj.轻浮的，好开玩笑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
renowned
|
|
| adj.著名的，有名望的，声誉鹊起的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
diligently
|
|
| ad.industriously;carefully | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
bracelet
|
|
| n.手镯，臂镯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
rubies
|
|
| 红宝石( ruby的名词复数 )； 红宝石色，深红色 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
everlasting
|
|
| adj.永恒的，持久的，无止境的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
153
remonstrated
|
|
| v.抗议( remonstrate的过去式和过去分词 )；告诫 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
154
pouting
|
|
| v.撅（嘴）( pout的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
155
pouted
|
|
| v.撅（嘴）( pout的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
156
hesitation
|
|
| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
157
affected
|
|
| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
158
impunity
|
|
| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
159
contemplated
|
|
| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
160
lieutenants
|
|
| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
161
inquiries
|
|
| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
162
fictitious
|
|
| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
163
plunging
|
|
| adj.跳进的，突进的v.颠簸( plunge的现在分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
164
triumphant
|
|
| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
165
premium
|
|
| n.加付款；赠品；adj.高级的；售价高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
166
peremptory
|
|
| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
167
consternation
|
|
| n.大为吃惊，惊骇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
168
admiration
|
|
| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
169
recipients
|
|
| adj.接受的；受领的；容纳的；愿意接受的n.收件人；接受者；受领者；接受器 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
170
fabulous
|
|
| adj.极好的；极为巨大的；寓言中的，传说中的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
171
irresistible
|
|
| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
172
whooping
|
|
| 发嗬嗬声的，发咳声的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
173
exultantly
|
|
| adv.狂欢地，欢欣鼓舞地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
174
aggregate
|
|
| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
175
picturesque
|
|
| adj.美丽如画的，（语言）生动的，绘声绘色的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
176
clique
|
|
| n.朋党派系，小集团 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
177
hurled
|
|
| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
178
appalling
|
|
| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
179
unprecedented
|
|
| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
180
virtuous
|
|
| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
181
pitcher
|
|
| n.(有嘴和柄的)大水罐；(棒球)投手 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
182
liquidation
|
|
| n.清算，停止营业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
183
ominous
|
|
| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
184
thither
|
|
| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
185
violation
|
|
| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
186
accounting
|
|
| n.会计，会计学，借贷对照表 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
187
wreck
|
|
| n.失事，遇难；沉船；vt.(船等)失事，遇难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
188
boxer
|
|
| n.制箱者，拳击手 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
189
proficiency
|
|
| n.精通，熟练，精练 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
190
blustered
|
|
| v.外强中干的威吓( bluster的过去式和过去分词 )；咆哮；（风）呼啸；狂吹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
191
fumed
|
|
| 愤怒( fume的过去式和过去分词 )； 大怒； 发怒； 冒烟 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
192
thereby
|
|
| adv.因此，从而 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
193
vehemently
|
|
| adv. 热烈地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
194
vouchers
|
|
| n.凭证( voucher的名词复数 )；证人；证件；收据 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
195
crestfallen
|
|
| adj. 挫败的，失望的，沮丧的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
196
emulate
|
|
| v.努力赶上或超越，与…竞争；效仿 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
197
irresistibly
|
|
| adv.无法抵抗地，不能自持地；极为诱惑人地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
198
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |