From 10 A.M. until 3 P.M. he stood by Tracy & Middleton’s private telephone on the floor of the Stock Exchange—the Board Room—receiving messages from the office—chiefly orders to buy or sell stocks for customers—and transmitting the same messages to the “Board member” of the firm, Mr. Middleton; also telephoning Mr. Middleton’s reports to the office. He spoke6 with a soft, refined voice, and his blue eyes beamed so ingenuously8 upon the other telephone-boys in the same row of booths, that they said they had a Sally in their alley9, and they immediately nicknamed him Sally.
It was all very wonderful to young Hayward, who had been out of boarding-school but a few months—the excited rushing hither and thither11 178of worried-looking men, the frantic12 waving of hands, the maniacal13 yelling of the brokers executing their orders about the various “posts,” and their sudden relapse into semi-sanity as they jotted15 down the price at which they had sold or bought stocks. It was not surprising that he should fail to understand just how they did business; but what most impressed him was the fact, vouched16 for by his colleagues, that these same clamoring, gesticulating brokers were actually supposed to make a great deal of money. He heard of “Sam” Sharpe’s $100,000 winnings in Suburban17 Trolley18, and of “Parson” Black’s famous million-dollar coup19 in Western Delaware—the little gray man even being pointed20 out to him in corroboration21. But, then, he had also heard of Aladdin and the Wonderful Lamp, and Jack22 the Giant Killer23.
He learned the business, as nearly all boys must do in Wall Street, by absorption. If he asked questions he received replies, but no one volunteered any information for his guidance, and in self-defence he was forced to observe closely, to see how others did, and to remark what came of it. He heard nothing but speculate! speculate! in one guise24 or another, many words for the same meaning. It was all buying or selling of stocks—a 179concentrated and almost visible hope of making much money in the twinkling of an eye. Nobody talked of anything else on the Exchange. Bosom25 friends met at the opening of business and did not say “Good-morning,” but plunged26 without preamble27 into the only subject on earth—speculation28. And if one of them arrived late he inevitably29 inquired forthwith, “How’s the market?”—asked it eagerly, anxiously, as if fearful that the market had taken advantage of his absence to misconduct itself. The air was almost unbreathable for the innumerable “tips” to buy or sell securities and insecurities of all kinds. The brokers, the customers, the clerks, the Exchange door-keepers, all Wall Street read the morning papers, not to ascertain30 the news, but to pick such items as would, should, or might, have some effect on stock values. There was no god but the ticker, and the brokers were its prophets!
All about Sally were hundreds of men who looked as if they took their thoughts home with them and dined with them and slept with them and dreamed of them—the look had become settled, immutable31. And it was not a pleasant look, about the eyes and lips. He saw everywhere the feverishness32 of the “game.” Insensibly the atmosphere of the place affected33 him, colored his thoughts, induced 180certain fancies. As he became more familiar with the technique of the business he grew to believe, like thousands of youthful or superficial observers, that stock-market movements were comparable only to the gyrations of the little ivory ball about the roulette-wheel. The innumerable tricks of the trade, the uses of inside misinformation, the rationale of stock-market manipulation, were a sealed book to him. He heard only that his eighteen-year-old neighbor made $60 buying twenty shares of Blue Belt Line on Thursday and selling them on Saturday, 3? points higher; or that Micky Welch, Stuart & Stern’s telephone-boy, had a “tip” from one of the big room traders which he bravely “played”—as you “play” horse or “play” the red or the black—and cleared $125 in less than a week; or that Watson, a “two-dollar” broker4, made a “nice turn” selling Southern Shore. Or else he heard, punctuated34 with poignant35 oaths, how Charlie Miller36, one of the New Street door-keepers, lost $230 buying Pennsylvania Central, after he accidentally overheard Archie Chase, who was “Sam” Sharpe’s principal broker, tell a friend that the “Old Man” said “Pa. Cent.” was due for a ten-point rise; instead of which there had been a seven-point decline. Always the boy heard about the apparently37 irresponsible 181“bulges” and “drops,” of the winnings of the men who happened to guess correctly, or of the losses of those who had failed to “call the turn.” Even the vernacular38 of the place savored39 of the technicalities of a gambling40-house.
As time wore on the glamour41 of the game wore off; likewise his scruples42. His employers and their customers—all gentlemanly, agreeable people—speculated every day, and nobody found fault with them. It was not a sin; it was a regular business. And so, whenever there was a “good thing,” he “chipped in” one dollar to a telephone-boys’ “pool” that later operated in a New Street bucket shop to the extent of ten shares. His means were small, his salary being only $8 a week; and very often he thought that if he only had a little more money he would speculate on a larger scale and profit proportionately. If each time he had bought one share he had held twenty instead, he figured that he would have made no less than $400 in three months.
The time is ripe for other things when a boy begins to reason that way. Having no scruples against speculating, the problem with him became not, “Is it wrong to speculate?” but rather, “What shall I do to raise money for margin43 purposes?” It took nearly four months for him to 182arrive at this stage of mind. With many boys the question is asked and satisfactorily solved within three weeks. But Hayward was an exceptionally nice chap.
Now, the position of telephone-boy is really important in that it requires not only a quick-witted but a trustworthy person to fill it. In the first place, the boy knows whether his firm is buying or selling certain stocks; he must exercise discrimination in the matter of awarding the orders, should the Board member of the firm happen to be unavailable when the boy receives the order. For example: International Pipe may be selling at 108. A man in Tracy & Middleton’s office, who has bought 500 shares of it at 104, wishes to “corral” his profits. He gives an order to the firm to sell the stock, let us say, “at the market,” that is, at the ruling market price. Tracy & Middleton immediately telephone over their private line to the Stock Exchange to their Board member to “sell 500 shares of International Pipe at the market.” The telephone-boy receives the message and “puts up” Mr. Middleton’s number, which means that on the multicolored, checkered44 strip on the frieze45 of the New Street wall, Mr. Middleton’s number, 611, appears by means of an electrical device. The moment 183Mr. Middleton sees that his number is “up,” he hastens to the telephone-booth to ascertain what is wanted. Now, if Mr. Middleton delays in answering his number the telephone-boy knows he is absent, and gives the order to a “two-dollar” broker, like Mr. Browning or Mr. Watson, who always hover46 about the booths looking for orders. He does the same if he knows that Mr. Middleton is very busy executing some other order, or if, in his judgment47, the order calls for immediate10 execution. The two-dollar broker sells the 500 shares of International Pipe to Allen & Smith, and “gives up” Tracy & Middleton on the transaction, that is, he notifies the purchaser that he is acting48 for T. & M., and Allen & Smith must look to the latter firm—the real sellers—for the stock bought. For this service the broker employed by Tracy & Middleton receives the sum of $2 for each 100 shares, while Tracy & Middleton, of course, charge their customers the regular commission of one eighth of one per cent., or $12.50 per each hundred shares.
Young Hayward attended to his business closely, and when Mr. Middleton was absent from the floor, or busy, he impartially49 distributed the firm’s telephoned buying or selling orders among the two-dollar brokers, for Tracy & Middleton did a 184very good commission business indeed. He was a nice-looking and nice-acting little chap, was Hayward—clean-faced, polite, and amiable50. The brokers liked him, and they “remembered” him at Christmas. The best memory was possessed51 by “Joe” Jacobs, who gave him $25, and insinuated52 that he would like to do more of Tracy & Middleton’s business than he had been getting.
“But,” said Sally, “the firm said I was to give the order to whichever broker I found first.”
“Well,” said Jacobs, oleaginously, “I am never too busy to take orders from such a nice young fellow as yourself, if you take the trouble to find me; and I’ll do something nice for you. Look here,” in a whisper, “if you give me plenty of business, I’ll give you $5 a week.” And he dived into the mob that was yelling itself hoarse53 about the Gotham Gas post.
Hayward’s first impulse was to tell his firm about it, because he felt vaguely54 that Jacobs would not have offered him $5 a week if he had not expected something dishonorable in return. Before the market closed, however, he spoke to Willie Simpson, MacDuff & Wilkinson’s boy, whose telephone was next to Tracy & Middleton’s. Sure enough, Willie expressed great indignation at Jacobs’s action.
185“It’s just like that old skunk,” said Willie. “Five dollars a week, when he can make $100 out of the firm. Don’t you do it, Sally. Why, Jim Burr, who had the place before you, used to get $20 a week from old man Grant and $50 a month from Wolff. You’ve got a cinch, if you only know how to work it. Why, they are supposed to give you fifty cents a hundred.” Willie had been in the business for two years, and he was a very well-dressed youth, indeed. Sally now understood how he managed it on a salary of $12 a week.
He did not say anything to the firm that day, nor any other day. And he didn’t say anything to Jacobs in return, but, by Willie’s sage5 advice, contented55 himself with merely withholding57 all orders from that oleaginous personage, until Mr. Jacobs was moved to remonstrate58. And Sally, who had learned a great deal in a week under Willie’s tuition, answered curtly59: “Business is very bad; the firm is doing hardly anything.”
“But Watson told me,” said Jacobs, angrily, “that he was doing a great deal of business for Tracy & Middleton. I want you to see that I get my share, or I’ll speak to Middleton and find out what the trouble is.”
“Is that so?” said Sally, calmly. “You might 186also tell Mr. Middleton that you offered me $5 a week to give you the bulk of our business.”
One of the most stringent60 laws of the Stock Exchange treats of “splitting” commissions. Any member who, in order to increase his business, charges an outsider or another member less than exactly the prescribed amount for buying or selling stocks, is liable to severe penalties. The offer of a two-dollar broker to give a telephone-boy fifty cents for each order of 100 shares secured was obviously a violation61 of the rule.
Jacobs came down to business at once. “I’ll make it $8,” he said, conciliatingly.
“Jim Burr, who had the position before me,” expostulated Sally, indignantly, “told me he received $25 a week from Mr. Grant, with an extra $10 thrown in from time to time, when Mr. Grant made some lucky turn, to say nothing of what the other men did for him.”
Three months before he could not have made this speech had his life depended on it. The rapid development of his character was due exclusively to the “forcing” power of the atmosphere which surrounded him.
“You must be crazy,” said Jacobs, angrily. “Why, I never get much more than a thousand shares a week from Tracy & Middleton, and usually 187less. Say, you ought to be on the floor. You are wasting your talent in the telephone business, you are. Let’s swap62 places, you and I.”
“According to our books,” said Sally to the irate63 broker, having been duly coached by Mr. William Simpson, “the last week you did business for us you did 3,800 shares, and received $76.”
“That was an exceptional week. I’ll make it $10,” said Jacobs.
“Twenty-five,” whispered Sally, determinedly64.
“Let’s split the difference,” murmured Jacobs, wrathfully. “I’ll give you $15 a week, but you must see that I get at least 2,500 shares a week.”
“All right. I’ll do the best I can for you, Mr. Jacobs.”
And he did, for the other brokers gave him only twenty-five cents, or at the most fifty cents per hundred shares. In the course of a month or two Sally was in possession of an income of $40 a week. And he was only eighteen.
II.
Time-passed. As it had happened with his predecessor65, so did it happen now with Sally. He began by speculating, wildly at first, more carefully later on. He met with sundry66 reverses, but he also made some very lucky turns indeed, and 188he was “ahead of the game” by a very fair amount—certainly a sum far greater than any plodding67 clerk could save in five years, greater than many an industrious68 mechanic saves in his entire life. From the bucket-shops he went to the Consolidated69 Exchange. Then he asked Jacobs and the other two-dollar brokers to let him deal in a small way with them, which they did out of personal liking70 for him, until he had three separate accounts and could “swing a line” of several hundred shares. He became neither more nor less than 10,000 other human beings in Wall Street—moved by the same impulses, actuated by the same feelings, experiencing the same emotions, having the same thoughts and the same views of what they are pleased to call their “business.”
At last the blow fell which Sally had so long dreaded—he was “promoted” to a clerkship in Tracy & Middleton’s office. The firm meant to reward him for his devotion to his work, for his brightness and quickness. From $15 a week they raised his salary to $25, which they considered quite generous, especially in view of his youth, and that he had started three years before with $8. He was only twenty now. But Sally, knowing it meant the abandonment of his lucrative71 189perquisites as telephone “boy,” bemoaned72 his undeserved fate.
He took the money he had made to Mr. Tracy and told him an interesting story of a rich aunt and a legacy73, and asked him to let him open an account in the office. Tracy congratulated his young clerk, took the $6,500, and thereafter Sally was both an employee and a customer of Tracy & Middleton.
Addicted74 to sharp practices though Mr. Tracy was and loving commissions as he did, he nevertheless sought to curb75 Sally’s youthful propensity76 for “plunging77,” which was as near being kind as it was possible for a stock-broker to be. But the money had “come easy.” That is why fortunes won by stock gamblers are lost with apparent recklessness or stupidity. Sally speculated with varying success, running up his winnings to $10,000, and seeing them dwindle78 later to $6,000. But in addition to becoming an inveterate79 speculator, he gained much valuable experience. And when he had learned the tricks of the trade he was taken from the ledgers80 and turned loose in the customers’ room, to take the latter’s orders and keep them in good humor and tell them the current stories, and give them impressively whispered “tips,” and “put them into” various “deals” of 190the firm, and see that they traded as often as possible, which meant commissions for the firm. He became friendly and even familiar with Tracy & Middleton’s clients, among whom were some very wealthy men, for a stock-broker’s office is a democratic place. Men who would not have dreamed of taking their Wall Street acquaintances to their homes or to their clubs for a million reasons, all but called each other by their first names there.
He really was a bright, amiable fellow, very obliging—he was paid for it by the firm—and he made the most of his opportunities. The customers grew to like him exceedingly well, and to think with respect of his judgment, market-wise. One day W. Basil Thornton, one of the wealthiest and boldest customers of the firm, complained of the difficulty of “beating the game” with the heavy handicap of the large brokerage commission.
Jestingly, yet hoping to be taken seriously, Sally said: “Join the New York Stock Exchange or buy me a seat, and form the firm of Thornton & Hayward. Just think, Colonel, we would have your trade, and you could bring some friends, and I could bring mine, and I think many of these”—pointing to Tracy & Middleton’s customers—“would 191come over to us. They all think a lot,” diplomatically, “of your opinions on the market.”
Thornton was favorably impressed with the idea, and Sally saw it. From that moment on he worked hard to gain the Colonel’s confidence. It was he who gave Thornton the first hint of Tracy & Middleton’s condition, which led to the withdrawal81 of Thornton’s account—and his own—from the office. It was a violation of confidence and of business ethics82, but Thornton was very grateful when, two months later, Tracy & Middleton failed, under circumstances which were far from creditable, and which were discussed at great length by the Street. He showed his gratitude83 by adding a round sum to Sally’s $11,500, and Willis N. Hayward became a member of the New York Stock Exchange. Shortly afterward84 the firm of Thornton & Hayward, Bankers and Brokers, was formed. Sally, then in his twenty-fifth year, had become a seasoned Wall Street man.
III.
From the start the new firm did well. Colonel Thornton and two or three friends who followed him from Tracy & Middleton’s office, all of them “plungers,” were almost enough to keep Hayward busy on the Exchange executing orders, and, 192moreover, new customers were coming in. Had he been satisfied with this start, and with letting time do the rest, he would have fared very well. But he began to speculate for himself, and all reputable commission men will tell you, with varying degrees of emphasis, that this not only “ties up” the firm’s money, but that no man can “trade”—speculate—on his own hook and at the same time do justice to his customers.
Thornton was a rich man, and protected his own speculations85 more than amply. He noticed the development of his young partner’s gambling proclivities86, and remonstrated87 with him—in a kindly88, paternal89 sort of way.
Sally vowed90 he would stop.
Within less than three months he had broken his promise twice, and his unsuccessful operations in Alabama Coal at one time threatened seriously to embarrass the firm.
Colonel Thornton came to the rescue.
Sally promised, with a solemnity born of sincere fear, never to do it again.
But fright lasts but a little space, and memory is equally short-lived. Wall Street has no room for men with an excess of timidity or of recollection. He had gambled before he joined the New York Stock Exchange. After all, if speculating 193were a crime and convictions could be secured in fifty out of a hundred flagrant instances, one half the male population of the United States would perforce consist of penitentiary91 guards forever engaged in watching over the convicted other half, Sally told a customer one day.
And then, too, Willis N. Hayward, the Board member of Thornton & Hayward, was a very different person from Sally, the nice little telephone-boy of Tracy & Middleton’s. His cheeks were not pink; they were mottled. His eyes were not clear and ingenuous7; they were shifty and a bit watery92. He had been in Wall Street eight or ten years, and he overworked his nerves every day from 10 A.M. to 3 P.M. on the Stock Exchange; also from 5 P.M. to midnight at the café of a big up-town hotel, where Wall Street men gathered to talk shop. His system craved93 stimulants94; gambling and liquor were the strongest he knew.
When, after three years, the firm expired by limitation, Colonel Thornton withdrew. He had had enough of Hayward’s plunging. To be sure, Sally had become a shrewd “trader,” and he had made $75,000 during the big bull boom; but he was at heart a “trader,” which is to say, a mere56 gambler in stocks, and not a desirable commission man.
194But Sally, flushed with success on the bull side, did not worry when Thornton refused to continue the partnership95. The slogan was “Buy A. O. T. It’s sure to go up!” the initial standing96 for Any Old Thing! The most prosperous period in the industrial and commercial history of the United States begot97 an epidemic98 of speculative99 madness such as was never before known, and probably never again will be. Everybody had money in abundance, and the desire for speculation in superabundance. Sally formed a new firm immediately—Hayward & Co.—with his cashier as partner.
IV.
All mundane100 things have an end, even bull markets and bear markets. The bull market saw Hayward & Co. doing a good business, as did everybody else in Wall Street. It ended, and the firm’s customers, after a few bad “slumps” in prices, were admonished101 to turn bears in order to recoup their losses. Bears believe prices are too high and should go lower; bulls, optimists102, believe the opposite. The public can’t sell stocks “short” any more than the average man is left-handed. These customers were no exception, so they did nothing.
195Hayward had “overstayed” the bull market, though not disastrously103; that is, he was in error regarding the extent and duration of the upward movement of prices. He proceeded to fall into a similar error on the bear, or downward, side. The market had been extremely dull following what the financial writers called a “severe decline,” but which meant the loss of millions of dollars by speculators. A panic had been narrowly averted104 by a timely combination of “powerful interests,” after which the market became professional. In the absence of complaisant105 lambs, the financial cannibals known as “room traders” and “pikers” tried to “scalp eighths” out of each other for weeks—to take advantage of fractional fluctuations106 instead of waiting for big movements. Hayward’s customers, like everybody else’s customers, were not speculating. So he used their money to protect his own speculations. Office expenses were numerous and heavy, and commissions few and light.
Hayward was very bearish107. He had sold stocks, sharing the belief of the majority of his fellows, that the lowest prices had not been reached. As a result he was heavily “short,” and he could not “cover” at a profit, because prices had advanced very slowly, but very steadily108.
196One day a big gambler in Chicago, bolder or keener than his Eastern brethren, thought the time was ripe for a “bull” or upward movement in general, and particularly in Consolidated Steel Rod Company’s stock. He was the chairman of the board of directors. Mr. William G. Dorr decided109 upon a plan whereby the stock would be made attractive to that class of speculative investors110, so to speak, who liked to buy stocks making generous disbursements of profits to their holders112. Mr. Dorr’s plan was kept a secret. The first step consisted of sending in large buying orders, handled by prominent brokers, and synchronously113 the publication, in the daily press, of various items, all reciting the wonderful prosperity of the Consolidated Steel Rod Company and its phenomenal earnings114; also the unutterable cheapness of the stock at the prevailing115 price. Mr. Dorr and associates, of course, had previously116 taken advantage of the big “slump” or fall in values to buy back at 35 the same stock they had sold to the public some weeks before at 70. Having acquired this cheap stock, they “manipulated”—by means of further purchase—the price so that they could sell out at a profit.
It so happened, however, that once before dividend117 rumors118 about “Con. Steel Rod” had 197been disseminated119, with the connivance120 of Dorr, and they had not come true, to the great detriment121 of credulous122 buyers and the greater profit of the insiders, who were “short” of the stock “up to their necks”—a typical bit of stock-jobbing whereat other and more artistic123 stock-jobbers had expressed the greatest indignation. Instead of putting the stock on a dividend-paying basis, the directors had decided—at the last hour—that it would not be conservative to do so, whereupon the stock had “broken” seventeen points. The lambs lost hundreds of thousands of dollars; the insiders gained as much. It was a “nice turn.”
Hayward remembered this, and when the stock, after several days of conspicuous124 activity and steady advances, rose to 52, he promptly125 sold “short” 5,000 shares—believing that the barefaced126 manipulation would not raise the stock much above that figure, and that before long it must decline. Only a month previously it had sold at 35 and nobody wanted any of it. He was all the more decided in his opinion that the “top” had been reached by prices, because Mr. Dorr, in a Chicago paper, had stated that the stockholders would probably receive an entire year’s dividend at one fell swoop127 by reason of the unexampled prosperity in the steel rod trade. Such an action was 198unprecedented. It had been talked about at various times in connection with other stocks, but it had never come true. Why should it come true in this instance?
Hayward, familiar with Dorr’s record, promptly “coppered” his “tip” to buy, banking128 on Dorr’s consistent mendacity. But Mr. William G. Dorr, shrewdest and boldest of all Western stock gamblers, fooled everybody—he actually told the truth. That week the directors did exactly as he had predicted. When a speculator of his calibre lies he fools only one half—the foolish half—of the Street. When he tells the truth he deceives everybody. Before Wall Street could recover from the shock the price of the stock was up 5 points, which meant that Hayward was out $25,000 on that deal alone. But, in addition, the general list was carried upward sympathetically. The semi-paralyzed bulls regained129 confidence as they saw the successful outcome of the Chicago gambler’s man?uvres in Consolidated Steel Rod. Money rates and bear hopes fell; stock values and bull courage rose! Hayward began “covering” Steel Rod. He “bought in” 5,000 shares, and after he finished he had lost $26,750 by the deal. He was still “short” about 12,000 shares of other stocks, on which his 199“paper” losses, at the last quoted prices, were over $35,000; but if he tried to buy back such a large amount of stock in a market so sensitive to any kind of bull impetus130, he would send prices upward in a jiffy, increasing his own losses very materially.
He went to his office that morning in a tremor131. He consulted the cashier, and found he had only $52,000 at the bank, of which two thirds belonged to his customers. He was already, morally speaking, an embezzler132. He was ruined if he didn’t cover, and he was ruined if he did. His “seat” on the Stock Exchange was worth possibly $40,000, not a cent more; and as he personally owed his out-of-town correspondents nearly $38,000, he could not avoid being hopelessly ruined. Moreover, his bankruptcy133 would not be an “honest” failure, for, as he told himself bitterly, after the harm was done, “I had no business to speculate on my own hook with other people’s money.”
He had felt it rather than had seen it coming, for, gambler-like, he had closed his eyes and had buried his head in the sand of hope, trusting in luck to protect him from punishment. But now he was face to face with the question that every gambler dreads134: “If I stood to lose all, how desperate a risk would I take in order to get it 200back?” The answer is usually so appallingly135 thief-like that the numerous Haywards of the Stock Exchange and the Board of Trade forthwith stop thinking with a suddenness that does credit to the remnants of their honesty. But it haunts them, does the ominous136 question and the commenced but unfinished answer.
As he left his office to go to the “Board Room” he put to himself the fateful query137. But he would not let himself answer it until he had stopped at “Fred’s,” the official barroom of the Stock Exchange, and had taken a stiff drink of raw whiskey. Then the answer came.
He was ruined anyhow. If he failed without further ado, that is, without increasing his liabilities, he would be cursed by twenty-five of his customers and by fifteen of his fellow-brokers who were “lending” stocks to him. But if he made one last desperate effort, he might pull out of the hole; or, at the worst, why, the number of cursing customers would remain the same, but the fellow-brokers would rise to twenty or thirty.
He took another stiff drink. The market had become undoubtedly138 a bull market. The bears had been fighting the advance, and there still remained a stubborn short interest in certain stocks, as, for example, in American Sugar Company 201stock. Now if that short interest could be stampeded it might mean an eight or ten-point advance. If he bought 10,000 or 15,000 shares and sold them at an average profit of four or five points, he would put off the disaster, and if he made ten points he would be a great operator. He had, to be sure, no business to buy even 1,000 shares of Sugar; but then he had no business to be on the verge139 of bankruptcy.
The liquor was potent140. Sally said to himself, aggrievedly: “I might as well be hung for a flock as for one measly old mutton.”
He walked a trifle unsteadily from “Fred’s” across the narrow asphalted New Street to the Stock Exchange. He paused at the entrance. There was no escape. Unless he could make a lucky strike, he would fail ignominiously141.
“Pike’s Peak or bust142!” he muttered to himself, and walked into the big room.
“Good-morning, Mr. Hayward,” said the doorkeeper. Hayward nodded absently, caught himself repeating, “Pike’s Peak or bust!” and walked straight toward the Sugar post.
He began to bid for stock. One thousand shares at 116; he got it. Another thousand; it was forthcoming at 116?. A third thousand; somebody was glad to sell it at 116?. So far, so 202bad. Then he bid 117 for 2,500 shares, and it was promptly sold. But when he bid “117 for any part of 5,000!” the crowd hesitated; the brokers were not altogether sure Hayward was “good for it”; his ability to pay for the stock was not undoubted. So Sally, taking advantage of the hesitation143, bid 117? and 117? for 5,000 Sugar, at which price “Billy” Thatcher144, a two-dollar broker, sold it to him. It made 10,500 shares Hayward had bought, and the stock had risen only 1? points. The shorts were not frightened a wee bit. But Sally was. He rushed out of the crowd to his telephone and made a pretence145 of “reporting” the transactions to his office, as he would have done had they been bona fide purchases. He was followed by a hundred sharply curious—and curiously146 sharp—eyes. They saw him hold the telephone receiver to his ear with an expression of great interest, as if he were listening to an important message. But the only message he heard was that of his heart-beats, that seemed to say, almost articulately: “You have played and you have lost; you have played and you have lost. Therefore, you are that much worse off than before. You must play again—and not lose!”
He left his telephone and rushed back to the Sugar crowd. He was less excited, less like a 203drunken man; his face was no longer flushed, but pale. And anon there flashed upon him, as if in candent letters, the words Pike’s Peak or bust! But Pike’s Peak glowed dully, feebly, while the alternative was of a lurid147 splendor148. And he blinked his eyes and made a curious impatient motion with his hand, as one waves away an annoying insect.
He gave an order for 5,000 Sugar to his friend, Newton Hartley.
“Is this for yourself, Sally?” asked Hartley.
“No. It’s for one of the biggest men in the Street, Newt. It’s all right. Absolutely O. K.”
And thus reassured149, Hartley bought the stock. The price was 118. The seller would hold Hartley responsible for the purchase money if Hayward “laid down”—refused to pay.
Sally wiped his forehead twice, quite unnecessarily. The shorts were not stampeding. Any attempt to sell out the 15,000 shares he had bought would result only in depressing the price, five points at least. It was worse than bad, the outlook for him.
He gave another order to buy 5,000 shares to “Billy” Lansing, an old and reliable two-dollar broker, but Lansing declined it. He tried another, but the order was not accepted. They mistrusted 204him; but he could not even bluster150, for they excused themselves on the ground of having important orders elsewhere. So he had recourse to another personal friend—J. G. Thompson.
“Joe, buy 5,000 Sugar.”
“Are you sober?” said Thompson, seriously.
“See for yourself,” answered Sally, laughingly. He had nerve. “Old man, I’ve got a very big order from one of the biggest men in the Street. Some important developments are going on.”
“Sally, are you sure you’ve got an order from some one else?” asked the unconvinced broker. His incredulity was obviously in the nature of an insult, but it was pardonable, for there was too much at stake.
“Joe, come over to the office and I’ll show you.—Really, I can’t tell you. But I can advise you, as a friend, to buy Sugar for all you are worth.” And as he uttered the lie he looked straight into Thompson’s eyes.
“Hayward, are you sure? Are you sure you’re not making a mistake?” He wanted the commission of $100, but he did not feel certain of his friend.
“Oh, hell, no. I’ve got a lot more to buy. It’s all right. Go ahead, Joe.”
And Joe went ahead. He bought the 5,000 205shares. The stock rose to 119?, and Hayward, warned by his experience with Hartley and Thompson, did not ask either friend or foe151 to buy another 5,000 shares for him. What he did was to distribute buying orders for 10,000 shares in lots of 500. Brokers now accepted his orders, for they were not so large as to be dangerous. And the stock rose to 122?. A few shorts were frightened. He might win out after all; he might make Pike’s Peak. He began to bid up the stock. He even bought “cash” stock, that is, stock for which he paid cash, had to pay cash outright152, receiving the certificates forthwith, presumably to hand over to some investor111 of millions. Everybody on the “floor” was talking about Hayward. The entire market had risen in sympathy with Sugar.
But at 124 it seemed as if the entire capital stock was for sale. He ceased buying. He had accumulated 38,000 shares. To pay for the stock necessitated153 about six and one-half millions! But if he could unload on an average of only 122 he might “come out even” in his other troubles.
He gave an order to sell 10,000 shares to a broker to whom he had always been a good friend. It was a fatal mistake. The broker, Louis W. Wechsler, had previously sold 1,000 shares to 206Hayward for “cash” at 122. He suspected what was coming, and declining the order, he himself went to Hayward’s office and asked for a check. The cashier sought to put him off with excuses, and Wechsler now being certain of the true state of affairs, returned to the Board and began to sell Sugar short for his own account. If a crash came he would make instead of losing it. Hayward was sure to be ruined, and Wechsler told himself sophistically that he was only profiting by the inevitable154. In the meantime Sally had sold the 10,000 shares through another broker, and the price had declined to 121?. But Wechsler’s 5,000 shares put it down to 120?. And somebody else sold more, and the shorts recovered from their fright, and the fatal hour was approaching when Hayward would have to settle. Pike’s Peak or bust! He did, indeed, need a veritable Pike’s Peak of dollars to pay for the 28,000 Sugar he had on hand. So he busted155.
He threw up his hands. He acknowledged defeat to himself. The tension was over. He was no longer excited, but cool, almost cynical156. On one of the little slips of paper on which brokers jot14 down memoranda157 of their transactions he scribbled158 a message in lead pencil. It was his last official lie, and would cost Hartley and Thompson 207and other friends, as well as his customers, many thousands of dollars. It was as follows:
“Owing to the refusal of their bank to extend the usual facilities to them, Hayward & Co. are compelled to announce their suspension.”
“Boy!” he yelled. And he gave the bit of paper to one of the Exchange messenger boys in gray. “Take this to the Chairman.”
And he walked slowly, almost swaggeringly, out of the New York Stock Exchange—for the last time—as the Chairman pounded with his gavel until the usual crowd gathered about the rostrum, and listened to the announcement of the failure of “Sally” Hayward, who began as a nice little telephone-boy and ended as a stock-gambler.
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1
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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2
vacancy
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| n.（旅馆的）空位，空房，（职务的）空缺 | |
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3
brokers
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| n.（股票、外币等）经纪人( broker的名词复数 )；中间人；代理商；（订合同的）中人v.做掮客（或中人等）( broker的第三人称单数 )；作为权力经纪人进行谈判；以中间人等身份安排… | |
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broker
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| n.中间人，经纪人；v.作为中间人来安排 | |
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5
sage
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| n.圣人，哲人；adj.贤明的，明智的 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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7
ingenuous
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| adj.纯朴的，单纯的；天真的；坦率的 | |
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8
ingenuously
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| adv.率直地，正直地 | |
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9
alley
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| n.小巷，胡同；小径，小路 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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12
frantic
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| adj.狂乱的，错乱的，激昂的 | |
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13
maniacal
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| adj.发疯的 | |
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14
jot
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| n.少量；vi.草草记下；vt.匆匆写下 | |
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15
jotted
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| v.匆忙记下( jot的过去式和过去分词 )；草草记下，匆匆记下 | |
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16
vouched
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| v.保证( vouch的过去式和过去分词 )；担保；确定；确定地说 | |
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17
suburban
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| adj.城郊的，在郊区的 | |
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18
trolley
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| n.手推车，台车；无轨电车；有轨电车 | |
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19
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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20
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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21
corroboration
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| n.进一步的证实，进一步的证据 | |
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22
jack
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| n.插座，千斤顶，男人；v.抬起，提醒，扛举；n.（Jake）杰克 | |
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23
killer
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| n.杀人者，杀人犯，杀手，屠杀者 | |
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24
guise
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| n.外表，伪装的姿态 | |
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25
bosom
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| n.胸，胸部；胸怀；内心；adj.亲密的 | |
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26
plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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27
preamble
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| n.前言；序文 | |
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28
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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29
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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30
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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31
immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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32
feverishness
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33
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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34
punctuated
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| v.（在文字中）加标点符号，加标点( punctuate的过去式和过去分词 )；不时打断某事物 | |
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35
poignant
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| adj.令人痛苦的，辛酸的，惨痛的 | |
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36
miller
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| n.磨坊主 | |
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37
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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38
vernacular
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| adj.地方的，用地方语写成的；n.白话；行话；本国语；动植物的俗名 | |
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39
savored
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| v.意味，带有…的性质( savor的过去式和过去分词 )；给…加调味品；使有风味；品尝 | |
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40
gambling
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| n.赌博；投机 | |
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41
glamour
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| n.魔力，魅力；vt.迷住 | |
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42
scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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43
margin
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| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
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44
checkered
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| adj.有方格图案的 | |
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45
frieze
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| n.(墙上的)横饰带，雕带 | |
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46
hover
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| vi.翱翔，盘旋；徘徊；彷徨，犹豫 | |
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47
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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48
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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49
impartially
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| adv.公平地，无私地 | |
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50
amiable
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| adj.和蔼可亲的，友善的，亲切的 | |
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51
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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52
insinuated
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| v.暗示( insinuate的过去式和过去分词 )；巧妙或迂回地潜入；（使）缓慢进入；慢慢伸入 | |
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53
hoarse
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| adj.嘶哑的，沙哑的 | |
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54
vaguely
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| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
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55
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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56
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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57
withholding
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| 扣缴税款 | |
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58
remonstrate
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| v.抗议，规劝 | |
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59
curtly
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| adv.简短地 | |
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60
stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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61
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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62
swap
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| n.交换；vt.交换，用...作交易 | |
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63
irate
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| adj.发怒的，生气 | |
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64
determinedly
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| adv.决意地；坚决地，坚定地 | |
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65
predecessor
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| n.前辈，前任 | |
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66
sundry
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| adj.各式各样的，种种的 | |
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67
plodding
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| a.proceeding in a slow or dull way | |
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68
industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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69
consolidated
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| a.联合的 | |
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70
liking
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| n.爱好；嗜好；喜欢 | |
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71
lucrative
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| adj.赚钱的，可获利的 | |
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72
bemoaned
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| v.为（某人或某事）抱怨( bemoan的过去式和过去分词 )；悲悼；为…恸哭；哀叹 | |
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73
legacy
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| n.遗产，遗赠；先人(或过去)留下的东西 | |
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74
addicted
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| adj.沉溺于....的，对...上瘾的 | |
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75
curb
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| n.场外证券市场，场外交易；vt.制止，抑制 | |
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76
propensity
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| n.倾向；习性 | |
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77
plunging
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| adj.跳进的，突进的v.颠簸( plunge的现在分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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78
dwindle
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| v.逐渐变小（或减少） | |
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79
inveterate
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| adj.积习已深的，根深蒂固的 | |
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80
ledgers
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| n.分类账( ledger的名词复数 ) | |
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81
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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82
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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83
gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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84
afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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85
speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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86
proclivities
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| n.倾向，癖性( proclivity的名词复数 ) | |
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87
remonstrated
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| v.抗议( remonstrate的过去式和过去分词 )；告诫 | |
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88
kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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89
paternal
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| adj.父亲的，像父亲的，父系的，父方的 | |
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90
vowed
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| 起誓，发誓（vow的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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91
penitentiary
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| n.感化院；监狱 | |
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92
watery
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| adj.有水的，水汪汪的；湿的，湿润的 | |
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93
craved
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| 渴望，热望( crave的过去式 )； 恳求，请求 | |
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94
stimulants
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| n.兴奋剂( stimulant的名词复数 )；含兴奋剂的饮料；刺激物；激励物 | |
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95
partnership
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| n.合作关系，伙伴关系 | |
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96
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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97
begot
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| v.为…之生父( beget的过去式 )；产生，引起 | |
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98
epidemic
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| n.流行病；盛行；adj.流行性的，流传极广的 | |
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99
speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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100
mundane
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| adj.平凡的；尘世的；宇宙的 | |
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101
admonished
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| v.劝告( admonish的过去式和过去分词 )；训诫；（温和地）责备；轻责 | |
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102
optimists
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| n.乐观主义者( optimist的名词复数 ) | |
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103
disastrously
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| ad.灾难性地 | |
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104
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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105
complaisant
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| adj.顺从的，讨好的 | |
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106
fluctuations
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| 波动，涨落，起伏( fluctuation的名词复数 ) | |
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107
bearish
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| adj.(行情)看跌的，卖空的 | |
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108
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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109
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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investors
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| n.投资者，出资者( investor的名词复数 ) | |
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111
investor
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| n.投资者，投资人 | |
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112
holders
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| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
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113
synchronously
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| ad.同时地 | |
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114
earnings
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| n.工资收人；利润，利益，所得 | |
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115
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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116
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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117
dividend
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| n.红利，股息；回报，效益 | |
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118
rumors
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| n.传闻( rumor的名词复数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷v.传闻( rumor的第三人称单数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
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disseminated
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| 散布，传播( disseminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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connivance
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| n.纵容；默许 | |
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detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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credulous
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| adj.轻信的，易信的 | |
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artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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barefaced
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| adj.厚颜无耻的，公然的 | |
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swoop
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| n.俯冲，攫取；v.抓取，突然袭击 | |
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banking
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| n.银行业，银行学，金融业 | |
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regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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tremor
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| n.震动，颤动，战栗，兴奋，地震 | |
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embezzler
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| n.盗用公款者，侵占公款犯 | |
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bankruptcy
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| n.破产；无偿付能力 | |
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dreads
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| n.恐惧，畏惧( dread的名词复数 )；令人恐惧的事物v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的第三人称单数 ) | |
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appallingly
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| 毛骨悚然地 | |
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ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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query
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| n.疑问，问号，质问；vt.询问，表示怀疑 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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ignominiously
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| adv.耻辱地，屈辱地，丢脸地 | |
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bust
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| vt.打破；vi.爆裂；n.半身像；胸部 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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thatcher
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| n.茅屋匠 | |
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pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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lurid
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| adj.可怕的；血红的；苍白的 | |
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splendor
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| n.光彩；壮丽，华丽；显赫，辉煌 | |
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reassured
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| adj.使消除疑虑的；使放心的v.再保证，恢复信心( reassure的过去式和过去分词) | |
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bluster
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| v.猛刮；怒冲冲的说；n.吓唬，怒号；狂风声 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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outright
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| adv.坦率地；彻底地；立即；adj.无疑的；彻底的 | |
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necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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busted
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| adj. 破产了的，失败了的，被降级的，被逮捕的，被抓到的 动词bust的过去式和过去分词 | |
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cynical
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| adj.(对人性或动机)怀疑的，不信世道向善的 | |
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memoranda
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| n. 备忘录, 便条 名词memorandum的复数形式 | |
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scribbled
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| v.潦草的书写( scribble的过去式和过去分词 )；乱画；草草地写；匆匆记下 | |
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