When our original thirteen States, actuated by “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” presented to the world the causes which impelled6 them to separate from the mother country and to cast off all allegiance to the Crown of England, they gave prominence7 to the declaration that “the history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny 4 over these States.” This was followed by an indictment9 containing not less than eighteen counts or accusations10, all leveled at the King and the King alone. These were closed or clenched11 by this asseveration: “A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant12 is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.” In this arraignment13 the English Parliament was barely mentioned, and then only as “others,” with whom the King had conspired14 by “giving his assent15 to their act of pretended legislation,” and thus giving operative force to some of the outrages16 which had been put upon the colonies.
It is thus apparent that in the indictment presented by the thirteen colonies they charged the King, who in this connection may properly be considered as the Chief Executive of Great Britain, with the crimes and offenses17 which were their justification18 for the following solemn and impressive decree:
We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme19 Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent 5 States; that they are absolved20 from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that as free and independent States they have full power to levy22 war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence23, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.
To this irrevocable predicament had the thirteen States or colonies been brought by their resistance to the oppressive exercise of executive power.
In these circumstances it should not surprise us to find that when, on the footing of the Declaration of Independence, the first scheme of government was adopted for the revolted States, it contained no provision for an executive officer to whom should be intrusted administrative24 power and duty. Those who had suffered and rebelled on account of the tyranny of an English King were evidently chary25 of subjecting themselves to the chance of a repetition of their woes26 through an abuse of the power that might necessarily devolve upon an American President. 6
Thus, under the Articles of Confederation, “The United States of America,” without an executive head as we understand the term, came to the light; and in its charter of existence it was declared that “the articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the union shall be perpetual.”
Let us not harbor too low an opinion of the Confederation. Under its guidance and direction the war of the Revolution was fought to a successful result, and the people of the States which were parties to it became in fact free and independent. But the Articles of Confederation lacked the power to enforce the decree they contained of inviolable observance by every State; and the union, which under their sanction was to be permanent and lasting27, early developed symptoms of inevitable28 decay.
It thus happened that within ten years after the date of the Articles of Confederation their deficiencies had become so manifest that representatives of the people were again assembled in convention to consider the situation and to devise a plan of government that would form “a more perfect union” in place of the crumbling29 structure which had so lately been proclaimed as perpetual.
The pressing necessity for such action cannot 7 be more forcibly portrayed30 than was done by Mr. Madison when, in a letter written a short time before the convention, he declared:
Our situation is becoming every day more and more critical. No money comes into the Federal treasury31; no respect is paid to the Federal authority; and people of reflection unanimously agree that the existing Confederacy is tottering32 to its foundation. Many individuals of weight, particularly in the Eastern district, are suspected of leaning towards monarchy33. Other individuals predict a partition of the States into two or more confederacies.
It was at this time universally conceded that if success was to follow the experiment of popular government among the new States, the creation of an Executive branch invested with power and responsibility would be an absolutely essential factor. Madison, in referring to the prospective34 work of the convention, said:
A national executive will also be necessary. I have scarcely ventured to form my own opinion yet, either of the manner in which it ought to be constituted, or of the authorities with which it ought to be clothed.
We know that every plan of government proposed or presented to the convention embodied35 in some form as a prominent feature 8 the establishment of an effective Executive; and I think it can be safely said that no subject was submitted which proved more perplexing and troublesome. We ought not to consider this as unnatural36. Many members of the convention, while obliged to confess that the fears and prejudices that refused executive power to the Confederacy had led to the most unfortunate results, were still confronted with a remnant of those fears and prejudices, and were not yet altogether free from the suspicion that the specter of monarchy might be concealed37 behind every suggestion of executive force. Others less timid were nevertheless tremendously embarrassed by a lack of definite and clear conviction as to the manner of creating the new office and fixing its limitations. Still another difficulty, which seems to have been all-pervading and chronic38 in the convention, and which obstinately39 fastened itself to the discussion of the subject, was the jealousy40 and suspicion existing between the large and small States. I am afraid, also, that an unwillingness41 to trust too much to the people had its influence in preventing an easy solution of the executive problem. The first proposal made in the convention that the President should be elected by the people was accompanied by an apologetic 9 statement by the member making the suggestion that he was almost unwilling42 to declare the mode of selection he preferred, “being apprehensive43 that it might appear chimerical44.” Another favored the idea of popular election, but thought it “impracticable”; another was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being, as alleged45, “too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deception”; and again, it was declared that “it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate46 to the people as it would to refer a trial of colors to a blind man.”
A plan was first adopted by the convention which provided for the selection of the President by the Congress, or, as it was then called, by the National Legislature. Various other plans were proposed, but only to be summarily rejected in favor of that which the convention had apparently47 irrevocably decided48 upon. There were, however, among the members, some who, notwithstanding the action taken, lost no opportunity to advocate, with energy and sound reasons, the substitution of a mode of electing the President more in keeping with the character of the office and the genius of a popular government. This fortunate persistence50 10 resulted in the reopening of the subject and its reference, very late in the sessions of the convention, to a committee who reported in favor of a procedure for the choice of the Executive substantially identical with that now in force; and this was adopted by the convention almost unanimously.
This imperfect review of the incidents that led up to the establishment of the office of President, and its rescue from dangers which surrounded its beginning, if not otherwise useful, ought certainly to suggest congratulatory and grateful reflections. The proposition that the selection of a President should rest entirely51 with the Congress, which came so near adoption52, must, I think, appear to us as something absolutely startling; and we may well be surprised that it was ever favorably considered by the convention.
In the scheme of our national Government the Presidency is pre?minently the people’s office. Of course, all offices created by the Constitution, and all governmental agencies existing under its sanction, must be recognized, in a sense, as the offices and agencies of the people—considered either as an aggregation53 constituting the national body politic21, or some of its divisions. When, however, I now speak of the 11 Presidency as being pre?minently the people’s office, I mean that it is especially the office related to the people as individuals, in no general, local, or other combination, but standing49 on the firm footing of manhood and American citizenship54. The Congress may enact55 laws; but they are inert56 and vain without executive impulse. The Federal courts adjudicate upon the rights of the citizen when their aid is invoked57. But under the constitutional mandate58 that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” every citizen, in the day or in the night, at home or abroad, is constantly within the protection and restraint of the Executive power—none so lowly as to be beneath its scrupulous59 care, and none so great and powerful as to be beyond its restraining force.
In view of this constant touch and the relationship thus existing between the citizen and the Executive, it would seem that these considerations alone supplied sufficient reason why his selection should rest upon the direct and independent expression of the people’s choice. This reason is reinforced by the fact that inasmuch as Senators are elected by the State legislatures, Representatives in Congress by the votes of districts or States, and judges are appointed by the President, it is only in the selection 12 of the President that the body of the American people can by any possibility act together and directly in the equipment of their national Government. Without at least this much of participation60 in that equipment, we could hardly expect that a ruinous discontent and revolt could be long suppressed among a people who had been promised a popular and representative government.
I do not mean to be understood as conceding that the selection of a President through electors chosen by the people of the several States, according to our present plan, perfectly61 meets the case as I have stated it. On the contrary, it has always seemed to me that this plan is weakened by an unfortunate infirmity. Though the people in each State are permitted to vote directly for electors, who shall give voice to the popular preference of the State in the choice of President, the voters throughout the nation may be so distributed, and the majorities given for electors in the different States may be such, that a minority of all the voters in the land can determine, and in some cases actually have determined62, who the President should be. I believe a way should be devised to prevent such a result.
It seems almost ungracious, however, to find 13 fault with our present method of electing a President when we recall the alternative from which we escaped, through the final action of the convention which framed the Constitution.
It is nevertheless a curious fact that the plan at first adopted, vesting in Congress the presidential election, was utterly63 inconsistent with the opinion of those most prominent in the convention, as well as of all thoughtful and patriotic64 Americans who watched for a happy result from its deliberations, that the corner-stone of the new Government should be a distinct division of powers and functions among the Legislative65, Executive, and Judicial66 branches, with the independence of each amply secured. Whatever may have been the real reasons for giving the choice of the President to Congress, I am sure those which were announced in the convention do not satisfy us in this day and generation that such an arrangement would have secured either the separateness or independence of the Executive department. I am glad to believe this to be so palpable as to make it unnecessary for me to suggest other objections, which might subject me to the suspicion of questioning the wisdom or invariably safe motives67 of Congress in this relation. It is much more agreeable to acknowledge gratefully that a 14 danger was avoided, and a method finally adopted for the selection of the Executive head of the Government which was undoubtedly68 the best within the reach of the convention.
The Constitution formed by this convention has been justly extolled69 by informed and liberty-loving men throughout the world. The statesman who, above all his contemporaries of the past century, was best able to pass judgment70 on its merits formulated71 an unchallenged verdict when he declared that “the American Constitution is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.”
We dwell with becoming pride upon the intellectual greatness of the men who composed the convention which created this Constitution. They were indeed great; but the happy result of their labor72 would not have been saved to us and to humanity if to intellectual greatness there had not been added patriotism73, patience, and, last but by no means least, forbearing tact74. To these traits are we especially indebted for the creation of an Executive department, limited against every possible danger of usurpation8 or tyranny, but, at the same time, strong and independent within its limitations.
The Constitution declares: “The executive 15 power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,” and this is followed by a recital75 of the specific and distinctly declared duties with which he is charged, and the powers with which he is invested. The members of the convention were not willing, however, that the executive power which they had vested in the President should be cramped76 and embarrassed by any implication that a specific statement of certain granted powers and duties excluded all other executive functions; nor were they apparently willing that the claim of such exclusion77 should have countenance78 in the strict meaning which might be given to the words “executive power.” Therefore we find that the Constitution supplements a recital of the specific powers and duties of the President with this impressive and conclusive79 additional requirement: “He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” This I conceive to be equivalent to a grant of all the power necessary to the performance of his duty in the faithful execution of the laws.
The form of Constitution first proposed to the convention provided that the President elect, before entering upon the duties of his office, should take an oath, simply declaring: “I will faithfully execute the office of President of the 16 United States.” To this brief and very general obligation there were added by the convention the following words: “and will to the best of my judgment and power preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Finally, the “Committee on Style,” appointed by the convention, apparently to arrange the order of the provisions agreed upon, and to suggest the language in which they would be best expressed, reported in favor of an oath in these terms: “I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States”; and this form was adopted by the convention without discussion, and continues to this day as the form of obligation which binds80 the conscience of every incumbent81 of our Chief Magistracy.
It is therefore apparent that as the Constitution, in addition to its specification82 of especial duties and powers devolving upon the President, provides that “he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and as this was evidently intended as a general devolution of power and imposition of obligation in respect to any condition that might arise relating to the execution of the laws, so it is likewise apparent 17 that the convention was not content to rest the sworn obligation of the President solely83 upon his covenant84 to “faithfully execute the office of President of the United States,” but added thereto the mandate that he should preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, to the best of his judgment and power, or, as it was afterward expressed, to the best of his ability. Thus is our President solemnly required not only to exercise every power attached to his office, to the end that the laws may be faithfully executed, and not only to render obedience85 to the demands of the fundamental law and executive duty, but to exert all his official strength and authority for the preservation, protection, and defense86 of the Constitution.
I have thus far presented considerations which while they have to do with my topic are only preliminary to its more especial and distinct discussion. In furtherance of this discussion it now becomes necessary to quote from the Constitution the following clause found among its specification of presidential duty and authority:
And he shall nominate, and by and with the advice of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls87, judges of the Supreme 18 Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law.
This clause was the subject of a prolonged and thorough debate in Congress which occurred in the year 1789 and during the first session of that body assembled under the new Constitution.
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1
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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vindication
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| n.洗冤，证实 | |
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impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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prominence
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| n.突出；显著；杰出；重要 | |
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usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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indictment
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| n.起诉；诉状 | |
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accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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clenched
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| v.紧握，抓紧，咬紧( clench的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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arraignment
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| n.提问，传讯，责难 | |
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conspired
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| 密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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offenses
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| n.进攻( offense的名词复数 )；（球队的）前锋；进攻方法；攻势 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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absolved
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| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的过去式和过去分词 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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chary
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| adj.谨慎的，细心的 | |
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woes
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| 困境( woe的名词复数 )； 悲伤； 我好苦哇； 某人就要倒霉 | |
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lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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crumbling
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| adj.摇摇欲坠的 | |
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portrayed
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| v.画像( portray的过去式和过去分词 )；描述；描绘；描画 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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tottering
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| adj.蹒跚的，动摇的v.走得或动得不稳( totter的现在分词 )；踉跄；蹒跚；摇摇欲坠 | |
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monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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prospective
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| adj.预期的，未来的，前瞻性的 | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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chronic
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| adj.(疾病)长期未愈的，慢性的；极坏的 | |
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obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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apprehensive
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| adj.担心的，恐惧的，善于领会的 | |
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chimerical
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| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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51
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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52
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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53
aggregation
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| n.聚合，组合；凝聚 | |
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54
citizenship
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| n.市民权，公民权，国民的义务(身份) | |
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55
enact
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| vt.制定(法律)；上演，扮演 | |
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inert
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| adj.无活动能力的，惰性的；迟钝的 | |
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invoked
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| v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求 | |
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mandate
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| n.托管地；命令，指示 | |
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scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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extolled
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| v.赞颂，赞扬，赞美( extol的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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tact
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| n.机敏，圆滑，得体 | |
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recital
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| n.朗诵，独奏会，独唱会 | |
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cramped
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| a.狭窄的 | |
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77
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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binds
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| v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 )；装订；捆绑；（用长布条）缠绕 | |
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81
incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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82
specification
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| n.详述；[常pl.]规格，说明书，规范 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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84
covenant
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| n.盟约，契约；v.订盟约 | |
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85
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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86
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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consuls
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| 领事( consul的名词复数 )； （古罗马共和国时期）执政官 （古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长，同时共有两位，每年选举一次） | |
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