It was about this time that the Venezuelan minister, in a note expressing his appreciation14 of our efforts to bring about a settlement of the dispute, made the following statement:
Disastrous15 and fatal consequences would ensue for the independence of South America if, under the pretext16 of a question of boundaries, Great Britain should succeed in consummating17 the usurpation18 of a third part of our territory, and therewith a river so important as the Orinoco. Under the pretext of a mere19 question of boundaries which began on the banks of the Essequibo, we now find ourselves on the verge20 of losing regions lying more than five degrees away from that river.
On May 1, 1890, Mr. Blaine, Mr. Bayard’s successor as Secretary of State, instructed Mr. Robert T. Lincoln, our minister to England, “to use his good offices with Lord Salisbury to bring about the resumption of diplomatic intercourse21 between Great Britain and Venezuela as a preliminary step toward the settlement of the boundary dispute by arbitration.” He also requested him “to propose to Lord Salisbury, with a view to an accommodation, that an informal conference be had in Washington or in 245 London of representatives of the three powers.” The secretary added: “In such conference the position of the United States is one solely22 of impartial23 friendship toward both litigants24.”
In response to this instruction Mr. Lincoln had an interview with Lord Salisbury. On this occasion his Lordship said that her Majesty’s Government had not for some time been keen in attempts to settle the dispute, in view of their feeling of uncertainty25 as to the stability of the present Venezuelan Government and the frequency of revolutions in that quarter; but that he would take pleasure in considering our suggestion after consulting the Colonial Office, to which it would first have to be referred. Mr. Lincoln, in giving his impressions derived26 from the interview, says that “while Lord Salisbury did not intimate what would probably be the nature of his reply, there was certainly nothing unfavorable in his manner of receiving the suggestion”; and he follows this with these significant words: “If the matter had been entirely27 new and dissociated with its previous history, I should have felt from his tone that the idea of arbitration in some form, to put an end to the boundary dispute, was quite agreeable to him.” 246
On the 26th of May, 1890, Lord Salisbury addressed a note to Mr. Lincoln, in which his Lordship stated that her Majesty’s Government was at that moment in communication with the Venezuelan minister in Paris, who had been authorized28 to express the desire of his Government for the renewal29 of diplomatic relations, and to discuss the conditions on which it might be effected; that the terms on which her Majesty’s Government considered that a settlement of the question in issue between the two countries might be made, had been communicated to Venezuela’s representative; that his reply was still awaited, and that the British Government “would wish to have the opportunity of examining that reply, and ascertaining30 what prospect31 it would afford of an adjustment of existing differences, before considering the expediency32 of having recourse to the good offices of a third party.”
No mention was made, in this communication, nor at any time thereafter, so far as I can discover, of Mr. Blaine’s proposal of a conference among representatives of the three nations interested in an adjustment.
Lord Salisbury, in a despatch to the English representative at Washington, dated November 11, 1891, stated that our minister to 247 England had, in conversation with him, renewed, on the part of our Government, the expression of a hope that the Government of Great Britain would refer the boundary dispute to arbitration; that his Lordship had expressed his willingness to submit to arbitration all the questions which seemed to his government to be fairly capable of being treated as questions of controversy; that the principal obstacle was the rupture33 of diplomatic relations caused by Venezuela’s act; and that before the Government of Great Britain could renew negotiations34 they must be satisfied that those relations were about to be resumed with a prospect of their continuance.
While our Government was endeavoring to influence Great Britain in the direction of fair and just arbitration, and receiving for our pains only barren assurances and procrastinating35 excuses, the appeals of Venezuela for help, stimulated36 by allegations of constantly increasing English pretensions37, were incessantly38 ringing in our ears.
Without mentioning a number of these appeals, and passing over a period of more than two years, I shall next refer to a representation made by the Venezuelan minister at Washington on March 31, 1894, to Mr. Gresham, who 248 was then our Secretary of State. In this communication the course of the controversy and the alleged39 unauthorized acts of England from the beginning to that date were rehearsed with circumstantial particularity. The conduct of Great Britain in refusing arbitration was again reprobated, and pointed40 reference was made to a principle which had been asserted by the United States, “that the nations of the American continent, after having acquired the liberty and independence which they enjoy and maintain, were not subject to colonization41 by any European power.” The minister further declared that “Venezuela has been ready to adhere to the conciliatory counsel of the United States that a conference, consisting of its own Representative and those of the two parties, should meet at Washington or London for the purpose of preparing an honorable re?stablishment of harmony between the litigants,” and that “Great Britain has disregarded the equitable42 proposition of the United States.”
On July 13, 1894, Mr. Gresham sent a despatch to Mr. Bayard, formerly43 Secretary of State, but then ambassador to England, inclosing the communication of the Venezuelan minister, calling particular attention to its contents, and at the same time briefly44 discussing the boundary dispute. In this despatch Mr. Gresham said: 249
The recourse to arbitration first proposed in 1881, having been supported by your predecessors45, was in turn advocated by you, in a spirit of friendly regard for the two nations involved. In the meantime successive advances of British settlers in the region admittedly in dispute were followed by similar advances of British Colonial administration, contesting and supplanting46 Venezuelan claims to exercise authority therein.
He adds: “Toward the end of 1887, the British territorial claim, which had, as it would seem, been silently increased by some twenty-three thousand square miles between 1885 and 1886, took another comprehensive sweep westward to embrace” a certain rich mining district. “Since then,” the secretary further states, “repeated efforts have been made by Venezuela as a directly interested party, and by the United States as the impartial friend of both countries, to bring about a resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been suspended in consequence of the dispute now under consideration.”
This despatch concludes as follows:
The President is inspired by a desire for a peaceable and honorable adjustment of the existing difficulties between an American state and a powerful transatlantic nation, and would be glad to see the re?stablishment of such diplomatic relations between them as would promote that end. I can discover but 250 two equitable solutions to the present controversy. One is the arbitral determination of the rights of the disputants as the respective successors to the historical rights of Holland and Spain over the region in question. The other is to create a new boundary-line in accordance with the dictates47 of mutual48 expediency and consideration. The two Governments having so far been unable to agree on a conventional line, the consistent and conspicuous49 advocacy by the United States and England of the principle of arbitration, and their recourse thereto in settlement of important questions arising between them, makes such a mode of adjustment especially appropriate in the present instance; and this Government will gladly do what it can to further a determination in that sense.
In another despatch to Mr. Bayard, dated December 1, 1894, Mr. Gresham says:
I cannot believe Her Majesty’s Government will maintain that the validity of their claim to territory long in dispute between the two countries shall be conceded as a condition precedent50 to the arbitration of the question whether Venezuela is entitled to other territory, which until a recent period was never in doubt. Our interest in the question has repeatedly been shown by our friendly efforts to further a settlement alike honorable to both countries, and the President is pleased to know that Venezuela will soon renew her efforts to bring about such an adjustment.
Two days afterward51, on December 3, 1894, the President’s annual message was sent to the 251 Congress, containing the following reference to the controversy:
The boundary of British Guiana still remains52 in dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. Believing that its early settlement on some just basis alike honorable to both parties is in the line of our established policy to remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea, I shall renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants and to induce a reference to arbitration—a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously53 favors in principle and respects in practice, and which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary54.
On the twenty-second day of February, 1895, a joint55 resolution was passed by the Congress, earnestly recommending to both parties in interest the President’s suggestion “that Great Britain and Venezuela refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly arbitration.”
A despatch dated February 23, 1895, from Great Britain’s Foreign Office to the English ambassador at Washington, stated that on the twenty-fifth day of January, 1895, our ambassador, Mr. Bayard, had, in an official interview, referred to the boundary controversy, and said “that his Government would gladly lend their good offices to bring about a settlement by means of an arbitration.” The despatch further 252 stated that Mr. Bayard had thereupon been informed that her Majesty’s Government had expressed their willingness to submit the question, within certain limits, to arbitration, but could not agree to the more extensive reference on which the Venezuelan Government insisted; that Mr. Bayard called again on the twentieth day of February, when a memorandum56 was read to him concerning the situation and a map shown him of the territory in dispute; that at the same time he was informed that the Venezuelans had recently made an aggression57 upon the territory of English occupation, and, according to report, ill-treated some of the colonial police stationed there, and that it was the boundary defined by the Schomburgk line which had thus been violated in a marked manner by the Venezuelans.
This despatch concludes as follows:
On Mr. Bayard’s observing that the United States Government was anxious to do anything in their power to facilitate a settlement of the difficulty by arbitration, I reminded his Excellency that although Her Majesty’s Government were ready to go to arbitration as to a certain portion of the territory which I had pointed out to him, they could not consent to any departure from the Schomburgk line.
It now became plainly apparent that a new stage had been reached in the progress of our 253 intervention58, and that the ominous59 happenings embraced within a few months had hastened the day when we were challenged to take our exact bearings, lest we should miss the course of honor and national duty. The more direct tone that had been given to our despatches concerning the dispute, our more insistent60 and emphatic61 suggestion of arbitration, the serious reference to the subject in the President’s message, the significant resolution passed by Congress earnestly recommending arbitration, all portended62 a growth of conviction on the part of our Government concerning this controversy, which gave birth to pronounced disappointment and anxiety when Great Britain, concurrently63 with these apprising64 incidents, repeated in direct and positive terms her refusal to submit to arbitration except on condition that a portion of the disputed territory which Venezuela had always claimed to be hers should at the outset be irrevocably conceded to England.
During a period of more than fourteen years our Government, assuming the character of a mutual and disinterested65 friend of both countries, had, with varying assiduity, tendered its good offices to bring about a pacific and amicable66 settlement of this boundary controversy, only to be repelled67 with more or less civility by 254 Great Britain. We had seen her pretensions in the disputed regions widen and extend in such manner and upon such pretexts68 as seemed to constitute an actual or threatened violation69 of a doctrine70 which our nation long ago established, declaring that the American continents are not to be considered subjects for future colonization by any European power; and despite all this we had, nevertheless, hoped, during all these years, that arrangement and accommodation between the principal parties would justify71 us in keeping an invocation of that doctrine in the background of the discussion. Notwithstanding, however, all our efforts to avoid it, we could not be unmindful of the conditions which the progress of events had created, and whose meaning and whose exigencies72 inexorably confronted us. England had finally and unmistakably declared that all the territory embraced within the Schomburgk line was indisputably hers. Venezuela presented a claim to territory within the same limits, which could not be said to lack strong support. England had absolutely refused to permit Venezuela’s claim to be tested by arbitration; and Venezuela was utterly73 powerless to resist by force England’s self-pronounced decree of ownership. If this decree was not justified74 by the facts, and it 255 should be enforced against the protest and insistence75 of Venezuela and should result in the possession and colonization of Venezuelan territory by Great Britain, it seemed quite plain that the American doctrine which denies to European powers the colonization of any part of the American continent would be violated.
If the ultimatum76 of Great Britain as to her claim of territory had appeared to us so thoroughly77 supported upon the facts as to admit of small doubt, we might have escaped the responsibility of insisting on an observance of the Monroe Doctrine in the premises78, on our own account, and have still remained the disinterested friend of both countries, merely contenting ourselves with benevolent79 attempts to reconcile the disputants. We were, however, far from discovering such satisfactory support in the evidence within our reach. On the contrary, we believed that the effects of our acquiescence80 in Great Britain’s pretensions would amount to a failure to uphold and maintain a principle universally accepted by our Government and our people as vitally essential to our national integrity and welfare. The arbitration, for which Venezuela pleaded, would have adjudged the exact condition of the rival claims, would have forever silenced Venezuela’s complaints, 256 and would have displaced by conclusive81 sentence our unwelcome doubts and suspicions; but this Great Britain had refused to Venezuela, and thus far had also denied to us.
Recreancy82 to a principle so fundamentally American as the Monroe Doctrine, on the part of those charged with the administration of our Government, was of course out of the question. Inasmuch, therefore, as all our efforts to avoid its assertion had miscarried, there was nothing left for us to do consistently with national honor but to take the place of Venezuela in the controversy, so far as that was necessary, in vindication83 of our American doctrine. Our mild and amiable84 proffers85 of good offices, and the hopes we indulged that at last they might be the means of securing to a weak sister republic peace and justice, and to ourselves immunity86 from sterner interposition, were not suited to the new emergency. In the advanced condition of the dispute, sympathy with Venezuela and solicitude87 for her distressed88 condition could no longer constitute the motive89 power of our conduct, but these were to give way to the duty and obligation of protecting our own national rights.
Mr. Gresham, who since the fourth day of March, 1893, had been our Secretary of State, 257 died in the latter days of May, 1895. His love of justice, his sympathy with every cause that deserved sympathy, his fearless and disinterested patriotism90, and his rare mental endowments, combined to make him a noble American and an able advocate of his country’s honor. To such a man every phase of the Venezuelan boundary dispute strongly appealed; and he had been conscientiously91 diligent92 in acquainting himself with its history and in considering the contingencies93 that might arise in its future development. Though his death was most lamentable94, I have always considered it a providential circumstance that the Government then had among its Cabinet officers an exceptionally strong and able man, in every way especially qualified95 to fill the vacant place, and thoroughly familiar with the pending96 controversy—which seemed every day to bring us closer to momentous97 duty and responsibility.
Mr. Olney was appointed Secretary of State early in June, 1895; and promptly98 thereafter, at the suggestion of the President, he began, with characteristic energy and vigor99, to make preparation for the decisive step which it seemed should no longer be delayed.
The seriousness of the business we had in hand was fully100 understood, and the difficulty or 258 impossibility of retracing101 the step we contemplated102 was thoroughly appreciated. The absolute necessity of certainty concerning the facts which should underlie103 our action was, of course, perfectly104 apparent. Whatever our beliefs or convictions might be, as derived from the examination we had thus far given the case, and however strongly we might be persuaded that Great Britain’s pretensions could not be conceded consistently with our maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, it would, nevertheless, have been manifestly improper105 and heedless on our part to find conclusively106 against Great Britain, before soliciting107 her again and in new circumstances to give us an opportunity to judge of the merits of her claims through the submission108 of them to arbitration.
It was determined, therefore, that a communication should be prepared for presentation to the British Government through our ambassador to England, detailing the progress and incidents of the controversy as we apprehended109 them, giving a thorough exposition of the origin of the Monroe Doctrine, and the reasons on which it was based, demonstrating our interest in the controversy because of its relation to that doctrine, and from our new standpoint 259 and on our own account requesting Great Britain to join Venezuela in submitting to arbitration their contested claims to the entire territory in dispute.
This was accordingly done; and a despatch to this effect, dated July 20, 1895, was sent by Mr. Olney to her Majesty’s Government through Mr. Bayard, our ambassador.
The Monroe Doctrine may be abandoned; we may forfeit110 it by taking our lot with nations that expand by following un-American ways; we may outgrow111 it, as we seem to be outgrowing112 other things we once valued; or it may forever stand as a guaranty of protection and safety in our enjoyment113 of free institutions; but in no event will this American principle ever be better defined, better defended, or more bravely asserted than was done by Mr. Olney in this despatch.
After referring to the various incidents of the controversy, and stating the conditions then existing, it was declared:
The accuracy of the foregoing analysis of the existing status cannot, it is believed, be challenged. It shows that status to be such, that those charged with the interests of the United States are now forced to determine exactly what those interests are and what course of action they require. It compels them to decide 260 to what extent, if any, the United States may and should intervene in a controversy between, and primarily concerning, only Great Britain and Venezuela, and to decide how far it is bound to see that the integrity of Venezuelan territory is not impaired114 by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist115.
After an exhaustive explanation and vindication of the Monroe Doctrine, and after asserting that aggressions by Great Britain on Venezuelan soil would fall within its purview116, the despatch proceeded as follows:
While Venezuela charges such usurpation, Great Britain denies it; and the United States, until the merits are authoritatively117 ascertained118, can take sides with neither. But while this is so,—while the United States may not, under existing circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the two parties is right and which is wrong,—it is certainly within its right to demand that the truth be ascertained. Being entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain, it is necessarily entitled to know whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going on.... It being clear, therefore, that the United States may legitimately119 insist upon the merits of the boundary question being determined, it is equally clear that there is but one feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration.
The demand of Great Britain that her right to a portion of the disputed territory should be 261 acknowledged as a condition of her consent to arbitration as to the remainder, was thus characterized:
It is not perceived how such an attitude can be defended, nor how it is reconcilable with that love of justice and fair play so eminently120 characteristic of the English race. It in effect deprives Venezuela of her free agency and puts her under virtual duress121. Territory acquired by reason of it will be as much wrested122 from her by the strong hand as if occupied by British troops or covered by British fleets.
The despatch, after directing the presentation to Lord Salisbury of the views it contained, concluded as follows:
They call for a definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain will consent or decline to submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It is the earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will be on the side of arbitration, and that Great Britain will add one more to the conspicuous precedents123 she has already furnished in favor of that wise and just mode of settling international disputes. If he is to be disappointed in that hope, however,—a result not to be anticipated, and in his judgment124 calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations between this country and Great Britain,—it is his wish to be made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will enable him to lay the whole subject before Congress in his next annual message.
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1 despatch | |
n./v.(dispatch)派遣;发送;n.急件;新闻报道 | |
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2 controversy | |
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10 amicably | |
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11 arbitration | |
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18 usurpation | |
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19 mere | |
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79 benevolent | |
adj.仁慈的,乐善好施的 | |
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80 acquiescence | |
n.默许;顺从 | |
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81 conclusive | |
adj.最后的,结论的;确凿的,消除怀疑的 | |
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82 recreancy | |
n.胆小;怯懦;不忠;变节 | |
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83 vindication | |
n.洗冤,证实 | |
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84 amiable | |
adj.和蔼可亲的,友善的,亲切的 | |
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85 proffers | |
v.提供,贡献,提出( proffer的第三人称单数 ) | |
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86 immunity | |
n.优惠;免除;豁免,豁免权 | |
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87 solicitude | |
n.焦虑 | |
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88 distressed | |
痛苦的 | |
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89 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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90 patriotism | |
n.爱国精神,爱国心,爱国主义 | |
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91 conscientiously | |
adv.凭良心地;认真地,负责尽职地;老老实实 | |
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92 diligent | |
adj.勤勉的,勤奋的 | |
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93 contingencies | |
n.偶然发生的事故,意外事故( contingency的名词复数 );以备万一 | |
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94 lamentable | |
adj.令人惋惜的,悔恨的 | |
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95 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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96 pending | |
prep.直到,等待…期间;adj.待定的;迫近的 | |
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97 momentous | |
adj.重要的,重大的 | |
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98 promptly | |
adv.及时地,敏捷地 | |
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99 vigor | |
n.活力,精力,元气 | |
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100 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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101 retracing | |
v.折回( retrace的现在分词 );回忆;回顾;追溯 | |
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102 contemplated | |
adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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103 underlie | |
v.位于...之下,成为...的基础 | |
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104 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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105 improper | |
adj.不适当的,不合适的,不正确的,不合礼仪的 | |
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106 conclusively | |
adv.令人信服地,确凿地 | |
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107 soliciting | |
v.恳求( solicit的现在分词 );(指娼妇)拉客;索求;征求 | |
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108 submission | |
n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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109 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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110 forfeit | |
vt.丧失;n.罚金,罚款,没收物 | |
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111 outgrow | |
vt.长大得使…不再适用;成长得不再要 | |
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112 outgrowing | |
长[发展] 得超过(某物)的范围( outgrow的现在分词 ); 长[发展]得不能再要(某物); 长得比…快; 生长速度超过 | |
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113 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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114 impaired | |
adj.受损的;出毛病的;有(身体或智力)缺陷的v.损害,削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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115 antagonist | |
n.敌人,对抗者,对手 | |
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116 purview | |
n.范围;眼界 | |
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117 authoritatively | |
命令式地,有权威地,可信地 | |
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118 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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119 legitimately | |
ad.合法地;正当地,合理地 | |
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120 eminently | |
adv.突出地;显著地;不寻常地 | |
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121 duress | |
n.胁迫 | |
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122 wrested | |
(用力)拧( wrest的过去式和过去分词 ); 费力取得; (从…)攫取; ( 从… ) 强行取去… | |
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123 precedents | |
引用单元; 范例( precedent的名词复数 ); 先前出现的事例; 前例; 先例 | |
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124 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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