From his general remarks on the action of Cavalry1, mounted or dismounted, against the various Arms, mounted or dismounted, the author passes to "IV.—The Fight of the Independent Cavalry" (p. 141), and the reader almost at once finds himself straying in a fog caused by the author's refusal to face straightforwardly2 the simple dominant3 fact that "Cavalry" are also riflemen. What does "Independent" mean? One would naturally assume it to mean what it means in our own Cavalry's phraseology, the "strategical" Cavalry which operates on a self-supporting independent basis, as distinguished4 from the divisional Cavalry, which is attached to, and dependent on, the various Infantry5 divisions. And this is the signification which the author gives to it in the opening words of the chapter. "Such fights," he says, "will occur during the offensive reconnaissance of the Cavalry, in[Pg 104] screening, and in enterprises against the enemy's communication and lines of approach" (that is, in raids), functions which are classified in the same order in the early part of the book as the normal functions of the Independent Cavalry, operating, in the first instance at any rate, against a hostile Independent Cavalry of the same stamp and vested with corresponding functions. We expect, accordingly, to hear a great deal about the "purely7 Cavalry fight," or shock-combat; but, to our bewilderment, after less than a page of exceedingly obscure reference to the "exceptional cases," where, owing to the absence of "other arms," such combats occur, the author proceeds to examine what he evidently regards as the normal case, "when the co-operation of other arms can seriously be counted on," and the whole of the forty-eight pages which follow implicitly8 assume that other Arms, whether in the shape of Artillery9, Infantry, cyclists, or what he vaguely10 calls "partisans," are present. Artillery alone are enough, he says, to scatter11 to the winds "purely Cavalry tactical principles," and "to set the stamp of fire upon the development of the fight" (p. 144). The unfortunate Cavalry subaltern must feel the ground sinking under his feet. The book he is studying, "Cavalry in War and Peace," is a treatise12 for[Pg 105] Cavalry on purely Cavalry tactical principles, and yet these principles cease to exist if even Artillery are on the scene, as in most normal cases it is assumed to be on the scene. Both in Germany and in England Horse Artillery is a recognized and integral part of the Independent Cavalry force whose functions the author is now considering. What is more, rifles are an invariable factor in the same force, German or English, or, indeed, in any force of Cavalry of whatever size, and however engaged, because they are carried by the Cavalry troopers themselves. And rifles, as the author will soon explain, make still worse havoc13 of purely Cavalry tactical principles. In other words, there are no such principles.
We may cut the matter short by merely advising the reader to solve his perplexities in the succeeding chapters by substituting for the word "Cavalry," whenever it occurs, the words "mounted riflemen," which, steel weapons apart, are what Cavalry are. There he will have a key to most of the contradictions and ambiguities14, and can form his own opinion on the lucidity15 and force of the injunctions laid down. The truth is that the General, in speaking of "other arms," really means not only other Arms of the service (i.e., Infantry and Artillery), but other weapons, as distinguished from lances and[Pg 106] swords, carried by Cavalry themselves—that is, rifles.
Armed with this clue, let us begin.
We must classify, says the author, with his critical eye on the Regulations, "for if we take all the various principles evolved from different tactical situations, and jumble16 them illogically together, or discuss them from points of view which are not closely based on the probable happenings of reality, we run a danger of confusing the judgment17 instead of clearing it." He proceeds himself to involve our judgments18 in irremediable confusion.
First of all, fights, according to the old phrase, are either offensive or defensive19. Offensive fights are of two sorts: "battles of encounter," where the "enemy is also pressing forward," and "attacks against localities or positions." Defensive fights are of only one main character: they require the defence of localities, positions, and defiles20. Then, in quite a separate category, comes a third class of fights—namely, "surprises, which merit separate consideration"—a consideration, it may be noted22, that they never get. The author forgets all about them. It matters little. His classification as it stands is as far removed from the "happenings of reality" as any classification could be; and to divorce[Pg 107] surprise, generally supposed to be the soul of all mounted action (because horses mean high mobility) from "battles of encounter," "attacks on localities," and other sorts of fights, is only to supply the crowning element of unreality. It must be remembered that his most comprehensive classification (of which the above is a subdivision) distinguishes between "the fight of the Independent Cavalry" and the "action of Cavalry in battle," by which latter phrase he means the great battle of all Arms; and that battle, he has said, is "always of a pre-arranged nature"—that is, lacking in opportunities for surprise. One would have imagined, therefore, that if he wanted an antithesis23 between surprise and something else, he would oppose the pre-arranged battle to the fight of the Independent Cavalry. Not so. "Surprises" are left out in the cold and eventually forgotten.
And what of these other sorts of fights defined under their various heads? Perhaps I had better take them in detail, rather than attempt a general diagnosis24.
What is the battle of encounter? I have collected all the allusions25 I can find to this battle, in the hope of supplying an intelligible27 definition, but have to admit failure. On page 102 it is distinguished from an "arranged affair," a distinc[Pg 108]tion which in peace suggests those carefully-planned "knightly28 combats" on level pieces of ground, but which in war does not carry us very far. On page 147, however, the special case of a battle of encounter where "an opponent is unexpectedly met with," receives separate consideration. On page 142 it seems to denote the case "where the enemy is also pressing forward," again a somewhat nebulous description, for it is the common way of enemies to press forward. On page 143 one thinks for a moment that it is to be confined to "lesser29 bodies of Cavalry, unaccompanied by other arms"; but one speedily finds allusion26 to "larger bodies of Cavalry, accompanied by a proportion of other arms," and the co-operation of other arms becomes the predominant feature of the whole discussion. Yet on page 194, in discussing the action of the army Cavalry on the flank of a great battle, the author speaks of a battle of encounter between the rival Cavalry masses, as though this type of fight were confined to Cavalry. Again, on page 154 it is held to include the passage of defiles, though the defence of defiles, a function which is the necessary counterpart of the passage of defiles, is, as we have seen, regarded as belonging to a separate type of combat.
We have noted also the distinction between[Pg 109] the battles of encounter and "attacks of localities," and between these latter and the defence of localities (as though there were any antithesis between an encounter on the one hand and an attack or defence on the other!). But what is a "locality," an attack on which is distinguished from a battle of encounter? Here is a fresh mystery. A "locality," on page 174, is distinguished from a "prepared position," which Cavalry, he says here, are never to attack or defend,[4] and it appears, in fact, to be simply a place on which troops are (a "place within the meaning of the Act," we cannot help exclaiming). In the first words of the section on "Attack of Localities" this attack is explained as one upon "an enemy who takes up a defensive attitude."
If, therefore, in a battle of encounter, when both sides are "pressing forward," one side or the other halts temporarily (without preparing[Pg 110] or entrenching30 a position), the other side is in the position of attacking a locality; and if the former party repulses32 the attack and resumes its advance, then the position is reversed. Or if there is a temporary equilibrium33 in the fight, when neither party can make headway, then both are attacking and both are defending localities. But some such phenomena34 as these are common to all combats. Where, then, is the battle of encounter?
This is no idle question, and these are no hair-splitting criticisms, because the rules are held to differ in important respects in these various types of combats. In the battle of encounter there are some exceedingly dim indications of an opening for the steel, but an attack upon a "locality" "can obviously only be carried out dismounted" (p. 165). Pass by the old fallacious antagonism35 between mounted action and rifle action, and regard the essence of this proposition. Once again you have the refutation of the steel theory. The sentence means "fire governs combat." He who fires compels his enemy to accept combat on terms of fire.
But "Where am I?" the harassed36 student may exclaim. "What of these steel-charges against extended Infantry (and, by inference, against dismounted Cavalry), whose fire enforced extension in the attacking Cavalry?" Well, let[Pg 111] him read on. There is hope yet. For immediately after saying that an attack upon an enemy who takes up a defensive attitude can obviously only be carried out dismounted, he adds the sinister37 words: "It must be a matter, therefore, for serious consideration, whether such an operation shall be undertaken or not." The truth is that he has suddenly remembered those tiresome38 led horses. "There must be considerable numerical superiority to insure success." There must be a dismounted reserve for fire purposes, and a mounted reserve to secure the safety of the led horses, and "for reconnaissance and for operating against the enemy's flank and rear"; and then follows an acrimonious39 wrangle40 with the Regulations on the question of making one reserve, and that mounted, perform incompatible41 and contradictory42 functions. But, as usual, our sympathies are with the Regulations.
"Should the Cavalry commander not have at his disposal sufficient force to meet all these demands," says the General, "he will be generally better advised to abstain43 from the attack and to carry out his mission in some other manner...." "It is only when conscious of great moral and tactical superiority, or when there is any prospect44 of surprising the enemy, that an attack should be dared without the necessary numerical pre[Pg 112]ponderance" (p. 166). In other words, after his reductio ad absurdum of the steel, the writer in the next breath proceeds to an equally conclusive45 reductio ad absurdum of the rifle. Any Cavalry leader who acted on the General's principles would be instantly sent home in disgrace. According to these principles, numerically equal bodies of Cavalry cannot fight one another at all unless in those "exceptional cases" where the ground is favourable46 for the "purely Cavalry fight," when there are no other Arms to complicate47 the situation, and where neither side even for a moment "takes up a defensive attitude" for any purpose whatever. If any one of these conditions is unsatisfied, the numerically equal forces are mutually paralyzed, and each must seek to "carry out its mission in some other manner." But, alas48! by hypothesis there is no other manner. "The attack obviously can only be made dismounted." Presumably, then, these Cavalries49 are to do nothing at all in modern war.
I am not making an unfair use of isolated50 passages. In later portions of his work the General frequently repeats his warnings against fire-action without great numerical and moral superiority, though not, perhaps, so frequently and emphatically as he inveighs51 against impracticable shock-action. Under "VIII.—The Various Units in the[Pg 113] Fight" (p. 239), we learn that a "squadron is generally too weak to carry out an offensive fight on foot." By the time you have abstracted horse-holders, "mounted and dismounted reserves," and "patrols and sentries," there is nothing left with which to fight. Similarly, a squadron must never "undertake a defensive fight on foot unless absolutely necessary, or when the led horses can be disposed in a safe place in the neighbourhood, where the flanks cannot be turned, or where the arrival of reinforcements can be relied on." Observe that there is no limitation here as to the strength of the enemy, no demand for numerical or moral superiority. The rule is almost absolute. A squadron can only charge on horseback. So that in average enclosed country, where charges cannot be arranged, two opposed squadrons must maintain a masterly inactivity. We think of the 74 isolated "Zarps" at Bergendal in their desperate defence against enormous odds52, and of the 150 Griqualanders who defied a division of Cavalry for a whole day at Dronfield.
But the General is far from stopping with the squadron. "The regiment53 will seldom be called upon to fight independently, but will operate in more or less close co-operation with other troops." It can act dismounted, but only "against weaker hostile detachments." In defence, how[Pg 114]ever, it is "formidable," because—strange reason—it can detach two whole squadrons to guard the led horses! Well, it is no wonder that the author neglects and discourages the study of modern war. Supposing De Wet, for example, had acted on his principles! His brilliant intervention54 at Paardeberg was made with 350 men. Or go to Manchuria. Naganuma's masterly raid of January to February, 1905, when he rode round the Russian army and blew up the great bridge of Hsin-kai-ho, was made with 172 Cavalrymen, who acted throughout solely55 by fire, and would have been impotent without it. The author professes56 to admire the exploits of the Americans in 1861-1865. What does he suppose their Cavalry leaders would have thought of his theories?
The brigade of two regiments57, we learn next, is almost as feeble a unit as a regiment. "It cannot," he says vaguely, "engage an opponent of any strength who may have to be dealt with by mounted or dismounted action, or the two in combination." "In view of its small offensive power, it will run a great risk of suffering defeat, especially when dismounted." In defence, "if the led horses do not require too large an escort," etc., it "may be an important factor of strength."
The division of six regiments (of 400 men per regiment) is a somewhat more useful unit. "If[Pg 115] its full strength can be employed in the charge," it "represents, even against troops using the rifle" (what troops? of what strength?), "a considerable fighting power." Nevertheless, it can attack "only weak detachments with a prospect of success." "The resistance of a body of equal strength" (a body of what? how composed?) "when circumstances demand a dismounted attack can never be overcome." Mounted, however, and "charging in close formation," it can attack even a stronger enemy (what sort of enemy?), "regardless of consequences."
Finally, a corps58 of two divisions "can aim at decisive results," and, alone of all units, can engage in "independent strategic missions," which we may suppose, without further explanation, to mean raids. But in these "fire-power is an important factor," and it is hinted that even the corps will not have enough fire-power.
The General complains that his writings "fall on barren soil." Well they may. Antiquated59 as the methods of the German Cavalry are, they at any rate intend to fight. A Cavalry educated on the maxims61 of the author might as well be left at home.
And this is the author that Sir John French, who knows what our own mounted riflemen did in[Pg 116] South Africa, holds up as a model to our Cavalry. He has not one word of criticism, not a single reservation, to make on any of the passages I have quoted. On the contrary, he tells our men, in general terms, that it is all true, and implies that the greatest of his compatriot soldiers, Lord Roberts, makes "appeals from vanity to ignorance." A perusal62 of this chapter, and of Sir John French's effusive63 eulogy64, ought to make every British soldier, home or colonial, indignant.
Its conclusion (pp. 245-246) is not the least remarkable65 part of it. "It will seldom be possible," says the General, conscious, seemingly, that his counsels have not been vividly66 luminous67, "and generally unnecessary to undertake or carry out the very best course of action, for we may certainly count on numerous errors and vacillations on the part of the enemy, especially in the case of Cavalry warfare68." Well, we may heartily69 endorse70 the words I have italicized.
Then, as a last desperate resort, come high-sounding generalities. "The indomitable will to conquer carries with it a considerable guarantee of success ... and the offensive is the weapon with which he [the Cavalry leader] can best enforce his will." Offensive!
The reader may infer from the passages I have quoted that it is not necessary to examine in[Pg 117] close detail the General's instructions for the "battle of encounter" and the "attack of localities." He will trip at every ambiguous sentence, baffled by contradictions or qualifications somewhere else, and perpetually befogged either by the vague word "enemy" or the implied distinction between "Cavalry" and "other arms"—a distinction which is generally irrelevant71, since all Arms are linked together by that great common denominator, the firearm. I have already noted how the presence of artillery dissipates "purely Cavalry tactical principles." Modern artillery fire, he says, necessitates72 deployment73 at 6,500 yards from the enemy at least. That is nearly four miles away, and the questions at once arise, Who are these invisible troops with Artillery? What is their strength and composition? Have they some of those troublesome cyclists and Infantry, or some of those unorthodox Mounted Infantry or Cavalry acting74 improperly75 as Mounted Infantry, who will make an additional complication in a situation already compromised by Artillery?
The German Regulations are superbly indifferent to these questions, and accordingly come in for fresh condemnation76. Cavalry are supposed to know at four miles what the composition, strength, and intentions of the enemy are, and[Pg 118] if the enemy is Cavalry (the cyclists and Infantry prescribed by the Regulations themselves are ignored), the echelon77 system (previously outlined) is to provide for all contingencies78. The author pitilessly dissects79 this childlike scheme. "In peace man?uvres," he remarks caustically80, "there is always a tacit understanding that the enemy is no stronger than one's own force." In war it is otherwise. To clear up the situation "energetic contact with the enemy by fire-action is necessary." "Only by a protracted81 action can the enemy be forced to disclose his strength and intentions," and "a protracted fight can only be carried out by fire-action." Perfectly82 sound, we agree; and then we remember, with a start, those terrible led horses, and the doctrines83 founded on them. "It is only when conscious of a great moral and tactical superiority, or when there is any prospect of surprising the enemy, that an attack should be dared without the necessary numerical preponderance." In other words, the author once more categorically contradicts himself. After first saying that fire-action—and "protracted," "energetic" fire-action—is the only means of forcing the enemy to disclose his strength and intentions, he adds in the next breath that such action is on no account to be undertaken unless the enemy's strength is already known, and he is known to be[Pg 119] greatly inferior, either numerically, or tactically and morally! Is it any matter of surprise that the Germans are slow to listen to General von Bernhardi?
The same deadly instinct for self-refutation dogs the General through his satire84 on the regulation method of "passing a defile21" (p. 154). In peace "one side is kept as far from the defile as possible, in order that the passage on the other side may be possible," and that both may have the luxury of a knightly combat. These practices the General prophesies85 will lead to "enormous losses in war," and he pleads for a modicum86 of commonplace fire-action. "Whether," he gravely remarks, "the attack be undertaken mounted or dismounted will depend upon the attitude of the enemy and the attendant circumstances." Yes, but we know from other sources what that means—namely, that if the enemy shows a "defensive attitude," the attack will be by fire; but that there will be no attack at all, even so, unless he is greatly inferior, either morally and tactically or numerically.
Later we have a condemnation of Regulation No. 519, which directs the Army Cavalry, not only to drive the hostile Cavalry from the field, but to press back or break through "detachments of all arms." "I cannot conceive," says the[Pg 120] General, "any real case in which Cavalry can break through hostile detachments of all arms." Poor Cavalry! If mounted riflemen laboured under such a disability, there would have been no South African War at all—literally none.
Then Regulation No. 403 falls a victim. It is certainly an easy prey87. "Personal observation [i.e., by the commander] is always the best, and is essential in the case of offensive action against Cavalry." The Regulations, of course, assume that both Cavalries disdain88 to use their rifles, and whirl about in huge ordered masses up to the moment of contact; but the author plaintively89 argues that fire rules the situation, and makes the zone of combat such that it is utterly90 impossible for one individual to have ocular perception of all that is going on. "One brigade will often fight on foot, the other mounted," he complains, "so that a handling of a division according to rule is practically impossible." True comment, but how futile91!
Then, conscious (as he so often is conscious) that his counsels may have a damping effect on his hearers, he ends in a burst of poetry. "The enemy's fire must not paralyze the idea of offensive action" (he means shock, though he does not like to say so). "We must act 'regardless of consequences,' 'wrest92 victory,'" etc., according to[Pg 121] the hackneyed Cavalry phraseology, upon which modern war throws such a pitilessly searching light.
The next section, "Attack of Localities," needs little further comment. This attack must be done exclusively by fire, but in practice it can never be done. That is the only deduction93 we can arrive at. But there is one highly important point. At the end of the section the bewildered reader finds himself involved in a lengthy94 discussion on the sword and lance in mounted combat—a discussion from which I have already quoted, and which arises out of a radically95 false analogy between those steel weapons and the bayonet carried by the foot-soldier. If Cavalry have to do the same work as Infantry, should not they carry bayonets? That is how the debate arises. It is an interesting debate, on which anyone must frankly96 admit there may be legitimate97 difference of opinion. Even for Infantry the bayonet is somewhat under a cloud, as the General himself contends; and Mounted Infantry, or Cavalry acting as such, have powers of surprise and envelopment98 derived99 from the horse which may perhaps be held to compensate100 them for the doubtful advantage of a bayonet. Instead of reasoning thus, the General treats the bayonet only as a possible substitute for the sword, and rejects it on that ground. But what has the sword to do with the bayonet?[Pg 122] The sword is meant for use on horseback; the bayonet is fixed101 to the rifle, and is used on foot as a factor in fire-tactics. The essence of the whole controversy102 we are engaged upon is whether it is any longer possible in modern war to fight on horseback, and whether the rifle should not be the weapon par6 excellence103 of mounted troops. Whether you reinforce it with the bayonet or not is a distinct question, which has no relation whatever to the value of the sword and lance. It seems absolutely hopeless to get this distinction grasped. Over and over again in the letters and articles on this controversy the same old fallacy recurs104, and, as I shall show later, it influences the German General more deeply than he realizes.
The section on "Defence" (p. 176) is short, and mainly consists of the elaborated truism that all defence should have an offensive character. The General seems to think that this maxim60 applies especially to Cavalry. It is the old delusion105 that Cavalry is a more offensive Arm than Infantry, and it leads him inexorably to the fatal conclusion that Cavalry cannot be trusted to undertake a "completely passive defence." They will only attempt to do so—but observe the comprehensive breadth of the exceptions—when it is a case of "holding a crossing over some obstacle, defending an isolated locality, or gaining[Pg 123] time." In these cases a retirement106 may be involved "which is difficult to carry out on account of the led horses, and should only be attempted in very favourable country. It demands that the fight shall be broken off—always a difficult matter, and, to Cavalry encumbered108 by these led horses, one of considerable danger." "Remounting when pressed by the enemy is always a critical matter." It makes one hot to hear this sort of thing commended to British soldiers by Sir John French. It spells disgrace in war. Troops who cannot break off a fight cannot fight at all. "Colonel X., be good enough to cover my retreat with your regiment. Defend that crossing, please, or that locality, and gain me time." "Very sorry, sir, but the ground is unfavourable, and my led horses encumber107 me." Supposing our gallant109 Colonials had said that at Sannah's Post? They found, indeed, how "critical a matter" it is to remount when pressed by the enemy, for the Boers charged right into them again and again; but they did not flinch110, and they saved their column from ruin, while the Cavalry engaged, equally brave men, but ignorant of their true r?le in war, failed in the task set them. But all this is "abnormal," Sir John French would say. A respectable hostile Cavalry would have summoned us to knightly combats with the steel.
[Pg 124]
And then (on p. 184) we come, as usual, to the corresponding reductio ad absurdum. "In mounted combat [i.e., with the steel] the breaking off of the fight is quite impossible. Troops once engaged must carry the fight through. Even when retreating from the mêlée fighting Cavalry has no means of extricating111 itself. It is then entirely112 dependent on the enemy, and can only retire at the most rapid speed," etc. "Whoever expects to rally a beaten Cavalry division after a mounted fight by blowing the divisional call lays himself open to bitter disappointment."
No wonder so much stress is laid on the offensive character of Cavalry!
II.—The British View.
We have now completed our review of the author's theories on the action of the Independent Cavalry, and I must ask the reader for a moment to compare with his views the instruction on the same topics contained in our own Manual, "Cavalry Training." The same fundamental error vitiates the whole of this instruction, but in an infinitely113 more mischievous114 form. The German author makes both shock and fire equally absurd, but his respect for shock never deters115 him from telling in his own strange way home-truths[Pg 125] about fire which at least force the reader to construct for himself cosmos116 out of chaos117. Our authorities, conscious that the intermingling of shock and fire will create difficulties only too apparent to Englishmen with any knowledge or memory of South Africa, divorce them completely from one another. In their Manual, Cavalry acting against Cavalry, whatever the terrain118 or other circumstances, are assumed never to employ fire-action, whose results are described as "negative," but only to employ shock. If the reader will turn to pages 196-212, which deal with the Independent or strategical Cavalry, he will observe with what really remarkable ingenuity119 the compilers manage to avoid even the remotest recognition of the fact that Cavalrymen carry rifles. The word "fire" is not breathed, though to the intelligence even of the most ignorant layman120 it must be plain that fire must dominate and condition the functions described, especially those beginning with the "approach march when within striking distance of the hostile Cavalry" (p. 202).
The various problems bravely but confusedly tackled by General von Bernhardi are here quietly ignored. Everything is so arranged as to lead up without hitch121 to the physical collision on horseback of the two opposing Cavalry "masses."[Pg 126] There is no echo of von Bernhardi's rule about early deployment in view of Artillery fire. Our own Artillery, it is true, is to "throw into confusion" the enemy's Cavalry—a compliment which no doubt the enemy may return (p. 208). But, confusion or no confusion, the climax122 is to be the purest of pure Cavalry fights. Scouts123 and patrols are to observe the enemy and to prevent our own commander from "engaging his brigades on unfavourable ground" (note that pregnant warning); but there is no suspicion or suggestion of von Bernhardi's "protracted fire-fight" in order to discover the strength and intentions of the enemy, especially in view of the possibility that the enemy may, with unsportsmanlike perversity124, choose ground which is "unfavourable to our brigades." Our Cavalry Commander (p. 205), it is to be inferred, is to perform the physical impossibility enjoined125 by the German Regulations, and criticized by von Bernhardi (pp. 160-162), of personally overlooking the whole of the attack and the ground which it is to cover. Needless to say, there is not a whisper about those sinister prophecies of the German author that "one brigade will often fight on foot, the other mounted"; that it will be impossible "to put a division into the fight (i.e., shock-fight) in proper cohesion"; that, in view of fire, "the situa[Pg 127]tion during the rapidly changing phases of the Cavalry fight will often be quite different from what was expected when the tasks were allotted"; and that, fire apart, European topography is such that opportunities for the "collisions" of Cavalry masses will be very rare.
With our authorities all goes by clockwork on Frederician and Napoleonic lines. "The enemy should be surprised," so that the charge may follow immediately after the deployment. The attack is to be on the echelon system ridiculed126 by von Bernhardi, but the encounter, nevertheless, is not to be "broken up," but is to be by the "simultaneous action of all brigades." The artless enemy co-operates, allows himself to be surprised upon the right piece of "favourable" ground, and courteously128 presents an objective which may be struck simultaneously129. The Artillery of both sides ceases fire, fascinated by the sublime130 spectacle of the "collision"; the machine-guns, which have been "affording a means of developing fire without dismounting," also retire from business, and the knightly combat rages on its appointed level arena131. Then comes the pursuit (p. 211). Troops are either to "pursue at top speed in disorder," or to "rally at once at the halt"; and on page 128 elaborate directions will be found for the practice of this "rally," which von[Pg 128] Bernhardi says is an "absolute impossibility in war," and that it is "indeed astounding132 that we should give way to such self-deception." Is the rally, we wonder, one of the "best foreign customs" which Sir John French urges us to assimilate, or one of the worst, which he has accidentally overlooked?
It is only when our authorities have finished with the pursuit, which is to "completely exhaust and disorganize the beaten enemy," and when, the hostile Cavalrymen vanquished133, our own Cavalry has been safely launched on its reconnoitring duties (p. 212), that they consider, under quite a distinct heading, and without a hint that it may have anything to do with what precedes, the dismounted action of Cavalry against what is described with judicious134 vagueness as an "enemy" (pp. 213-216). Then we have the same demoralizing injunction that von Bernhardi, in his fire-mood, so strongly combats—namely, that a "fire-fight is not to be protracted"; and the same equally vicious suggestion that von Bernhardi, in his steel-mood, acquiesces135 in—namely, that defence in any shape is a somewhat abnormal function of Cavalry; that they are not supposed to conduct stubborn defences ("tenacious" is Sir John French's own term); and that they should never demean them[Pg 129]selves by constructing anything serious in the way of entrenchment136 (p. 215). But it is scarcely necessary to add that the led horses are not the nightmare to our authorities that they are to von Bernhardi, and that we do not yet stultify137 our own directions for fire-action by warnings about the minimum size of units, and the imperative138 need for moral, numerical, and tactical superiority. Yet these warnings are regarded, according to his own account, as inspired wisdom by Sir John French, whose own introductory remarks are conceived in an even more reactionary139 spirit than those of the "acknowledged authority" whom he recommends to British readers.
The finishing touches to the comedy of the shock-duel are given in the revised Mounted Infantry Manual of 1909; for, although in this connection the Cavalry Manual never breathes a word about its sister Arm, it is, as I have before mentioned, one of the regular duties of the Mounted Infantry to co-operate with the Cavalry, not only in reconnaissance, but in battle. Under the heading "Co-operation with Cavalry when Acting Offensively against Hostile Cavalry," the Mounted Infantry are to "seize points of tactical importance from which effective rifle and machine-gun fire can be brought to bear on the flanks of the opposing Cavalry before the moment of contact."[Pg 130] We picture an amphitheatre, like Olympia, both rims140 of the horseshoe lined with hidden riflemen, and two solid blocks of Cavalry galloping141 towards one another in the arena below, and we are alarmed for the fate of the horsemen, exposed in such a formation to a sleet142 of bullets. But we come to a fortunate reservation. "Fire will rarely be opened upon the hostile Cavalry or Artillery until contact is imminent143. The object aimed at is the defeat of the hostile Cavalry, and a premature144 opening of fire is liable to cause it to draw off and man?uvre, in order to bring off the Cavalry encounter outside effective rifle-range." Surely some humorist of the Mounted Infantry, coerced145 by the General Staff into finding a r?le for his Arm which should not trench31 upon the sacred preserves of the Cavalry, penned these exquisite146 lines by way of stealthy revenge! What delicate consideration for the "knightly" weapons! What an eye for theatrical147 effect! What precautions against the disturbance148 of the collision by the premature discharge of vulgar firearms! And what a tactful show of apprehension149 lest these reminders150 of the degenerate151 twentieth century should scare away the old-world pageant152 to regions beyond "effective rifle-range"! It will be noticed that even the Artillery of the enemy is to be immune until[Pg 131] "contact is imminent"—a somewhat doubtful risk to take without a written guarantee from the enemy that his Artillery will reciprocate153 the courtesy. (For the Gunners' view, see below, p. 204.)
Finally, with what unerring neatness, under his veil of genial154 irony155, does our humorist manage to expose and satirize156 the futility157 of the lance and sword and the deadly pre-eminence of the rifle! He recognizes that it is only by the indulgence and self-restraint of riflemen that swords and lances can be used, and he knows, as we all know, that it is physically158 impossible for modern Cavalry, in war or peace, to find any spot on the globe which is "outside effective rifle-range"—unless they take the unsoldierly course of throwing away their own rifles. In peace, of course, as von Bernhardi constantly reminds us, rifles may be, and frequently are, ignored, even if they are not left in barracks; but in "real war" there is no use for troops who can only fight outside effective rifle-range. I need only add that the ideal Cavalry combat, as envisaged159 by our authorities, is precisely160 the combat which von Bernhardi stigmatizes161 in peace man?uvres as a "spectacular battle-piece." Mounted Infantry to him represent a force which, by "seizing the rifle," will "compel" the opposing[Pg 132] Cavalry to "advance dismounted." The case imagined is what he regards as the normal case of "co-operation with other arms," and it will be remembered that "he can conceive no case in which Cavalry [i.e., using the steel] can break through a hostile detachment of all arms."
One stands in awe162 before the almost miraculous163 tenacity164 of a belief which can give birth to such puerilities as I have quoted from our Manuals without perishing instantly under the ridicule127 of persons conversant165 with war. If the thing described had ever once happened, it would be different, but it never has happened, and never can or will happen. In war no Commander-in-Chief would tolerate even a tendency towards such child's-play. Otherwise, in pessimistic moments, one might tremble for the Navy. Supposing our Dreadnoughts were trained to withhold166 their fire so as to decoy hostile wooden three-deckers into collisions with our wooden three-deckers, and encounters settled by cutlasses on the lines of Salamis and Syracuse?
The parallel is not discourteous167 to the Cavalry. When they will it, they can be Dreadnoughts. But their shock-charge is as obsolete168 as sails and wood in naval169 war.
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1
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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straightforwardly
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| adv.正直地 | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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implicitly
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| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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vaguely
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| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
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scatter
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| vt.撒，驱散，散开；散布/播；vi.分散，消散 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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havoc
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| n.大破坏，浩劫，大混乱，大杂乱 | |
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ambiguities
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| n.歧义( ambiguity的名词复数 )；意义不明确；模棱两可的意思；模棱两可的话 | |
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lucidity
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| n.明朗，清晰，透明 | |
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jumble
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| vt.使混乱，混杂；n.混乱；杂乱的一堆 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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antithesis
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| n.对立；相对 | |
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diagnosis
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| n.诊断，诊断结果，调查分析，判断 | |
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allusions
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| 暗指，间接提到( allusion的名词复数 ) | |
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allusion
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| n.暗示，间接提示 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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knightly
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| adj. 骑士般的 adv. 骑士般地 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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30
entrenching
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| v.用壕沟围绕或保护…( entrench的现在分词 )；牢固地确立… | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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repulses
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| v.击退( repulse的第三人称单数 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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36
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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acrimonious
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| adj.严厉的，辛辣的，刻毒的 | |
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40
wrangle
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| vi.争吵 | |
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41
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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42
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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43
abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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45
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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46
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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complicate
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| vt.使复杂化，使混乱，使难懂 | |
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alas
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| int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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49
cavalries
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| 骑兵（cavalry的复数形式） | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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inveighs
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| v.猛烈抨击，痛骂，谩骂( inveigh的第三人称单数 ) | |
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52
odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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53
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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54
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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55
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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professes
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| 声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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62
perusal
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| n.细读，熟读；目测 | |
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effusive
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| adj.热情洋溢的；感情(过多)流露的 | |
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eulogy
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| n.颂词；颂扬 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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vividly
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| adv.清楚地，鲜明地，生动地 | |
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luminous
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| adj.发光的，发亮的；光明的；明白易懂的；有启发的 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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heartily
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| adv.衷心地，诚恳地，十分，很 | |
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endorse
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| vt.(支票、汇票等)背书，背署；批注；同意 | |
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71
irrelevant
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| adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的 | |
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72
necessitates
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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improperly
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| 不正确地，不适当地 | |
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condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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echelon
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| n.梯队；组织系统中的等级；v.排成梯队 | |
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contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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dissects
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| v.解剖（动物等）( dissect的第三人称单数 )；仔细分析或研究 | |
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caustically
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| adv.刻薄地；挖苦地；尖刻地；讥刺地 | |
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protracted
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| adj.拖延的；延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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satire
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| n.讽刺，讽刺文学，讽刺作品 | |
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85
prophesies
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| v.预告，预言( prophesy的第三人称单数 ) | |
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modicum
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| n.少量，一小份 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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disdain
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| n.鄙视，轻视；v.轻视，鄙视，不屑 | |
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plaintively
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| adv.悲哀地，哀怨地 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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wrest
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| n.扭，拧，猛夺；v.夺取，猛扭，歪曲 | |
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deduction
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| n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎 | |
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lengthy
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| adj.漫长的，冗长的 | |
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radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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envelopment
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| n.包封，封套 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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102
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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103
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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recurs
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| 再发生，复发( recur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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encumber
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| v.阻碍行动，妨碍，堆满 | |
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encumbered
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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109
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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110
flinch
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| v.畏缩，退缩 | |
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111
extricating
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的现在分词 ) | |
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112
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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113
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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114
mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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115
deters
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| v.阻止，制止( deter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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116
cosmos
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| n.宇宙；秩序，和谐 | |
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117
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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118
terrain
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| n.地面，地形，地图 | |
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119
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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120
layman
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| n.俗人，门外汉，凡人 | |
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hitch
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| v.免费搭(车旅行)；系住；急提；n.故障；急拉 | |
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122
climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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123
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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124
perversity
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| n.任性；刚愎自用 | |
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125
enjoined
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| v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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126
ridiculed
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| v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ridicule
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| v.讥讽，挖苦；n.嘲弄 | |
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128
courteously
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| adv.有礼貌地，亲切地 | |
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simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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arena
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| n.竞技场，运动场所；竞争场所，舞台 | |
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astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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acquiesces
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的第三人称单数 ) | |
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entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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137
stultify
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| v.愚弄；使呆滞 | |
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138
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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139
reactionary
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| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
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140
rims
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| n.（圆形物体的）边( rim的名词复数 )；缘；轮辋；轮圈 | |
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galloping
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| adj. 飞驰的, 急性的 动词gallop的现在分词形式 | |
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142
sleet
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| n.雨雪；v.下雨雪，下冰雹 | |
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143
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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145
coerced
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| v.迫使做( coerce的过去式和过去分词 )；强迫；（以武力、惩罚、威胁等手段）控制；支配 | |
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exquisite
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| adj.精美的；敏锐的；剧烈的，感觉强烈的 | |
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theatrical
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| adj.剧场的，演戏的；做戏似的，做作的 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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reminders
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| n.令人回忆起…的东西( reminder的名词复数 )；提醒…的东西；（告知该做某事的）通知单；提示信 | |
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degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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152
pageant
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| n.壮观的游行；露天历史剧 | |
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153
reciprocate
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| v.往复运动；互换；回报，酬答 | |
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154
genial
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| adj.亲切的，和蔼的，愉快的，脾气好的 | |
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irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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156
satirize
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| v.讽刺 | |
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157
futility
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| n.无用 | |
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158
physically
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| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
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159
envisaged
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| 想像，设想( envisage的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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161
stigmatizes
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| v.使受耻辱，指责，污辱( stigmatize的第三人称单数 ) | |
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162
awe
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| n.敬畏，惊惧；vt.使敬畏，使惊惧 | |
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163
miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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164
tenacity
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| n.坚韧 | |
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165
conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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166
withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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167
discourteous
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| adj.不恭的，不敬的 | |
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168
obsolete
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| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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