After the Civil War the navy was neglected, being, so far as its cruising vessels7 were concerned, a wooden navy of not only obsolete9 types, but decayed or decaying vessels, which gradually became a reproach to the country and a laughing-stock for other maritime10 powers.
At the time of the “Virginius’s” difficulty with Spain, which occurred about five years after the close of the Civil War, a “grand fleet” was assembled at Key West under the command of Rear-Admiral Case. This fleet 158consisted of a large number of wooden cruising steamers of various types and classes, all obsolete, many of them unseaworthy, and all incapable12 of meeting an up-to-date ship of that period (1874-75) with any chance of success whatever. To these wooden hulks were added the double-turreted monitors “Terror,” “Amphitrite,” and “Monadnock,” which were built at the navy-yards of wood, and a batch14 of old worn-out single-turreted monitors. The bottoms of the wooden monitors were so weakened structurally15 that, whenever an effort was made to wedge up the spindles so that the turrets16 could revolve17, the bottom went down instead of the turret13 going up, the latter necessarily remaining immovable. Unquestionably any one, or at most any two, of our first-class modern battleships at this writing, 1903, could have annihilated18 and sunk the entire fleet in two or three hours, although it consisted, all types and classes taken together, of over forty vessels. This was an object lesson, and it to some extent aroused the sensibilities of the country; but the then existing administration of the Navy Department was under the absolute control of the navy-yard rings, and all naval work of every description was done in navy-yards. The “Spanish Scare,” as it was called, did, however, have the effect of spurring 159Congress to provide for the construction of eight (8) new vessels, the first provided for since the Civil War. Of these, three were given out to be built by contract; two, the “Huron” and “Alert,” small iron sloops-of-war or gun-vessels, were given to John Roach and built at his works at Chester; and another of the same class, the “Ranger,” was given to Harlan & Hollingsworth, of Wilmington, and built there. The other five were built in navy-yards, and were completed at different periods between 1875 and 1879.
BATTLESHIP ALABAMA
With this exception, nothing whatever was done toward increase or betterment of our naval force from 1865 until 1883. However, in 1881, General Garfield, having been elected President the preceding year and inaugurated the 4th of March, 1881, appointed Judge William H. Hunt, of Louisiana, Secretary of the Navy. General Garfield understood the naval needs of the country, referred to the subject vigorously in his inaugural21, and quite early in his administration, or about a month before he was assassinated22, prompted his Secretary of the Navy to take measures looking to the modernization23 of our national marine24. The result of this was the convening25 of a board early in the summer of 1881, of which Admiral John Rodgers was President. The instructions 160of this board were to investigate the existing state of foreign navies, to inquire into the immediate26 needs of our own, and to formulate27 a ship-building programme on modern lines, to be carried out as soon as the resources of the country would permit. On the 7th of November, 1881, this board, which is commonly known to history as the “First Naval Advisory Board,” reported in accordance with its instructions. It is not necessary here to go into detail with regard to the ship-building programme which they recommended. Suffice to say, that not one of the ships or types of ships which they recommended was ever actually built; but their deliberations and report attracted general public attention, caused the subject to be widely and patriotically28, although not very intelligently, discussed in the newspapers, so that, while the action of this first Naval Advisory Board did not produce any actual or visible results, it at least served to popularize the subject of the “New Navy.”
BATTLESHIP MAINE
In 1882, Mr. Hunt was appointed Minister to Russia, and was succeeded in the Secretaryship of the Navy by William E. Chandler, of New Hampshire. Mr. Chandler was a vigorous, active man, and lost no time in taking advantage of the public interest which had been aroused. The result of the further investigations29 161and reports which he caused to be made, and his communications to the President, and through the President to Congress based thereon, resulted in an act, approved March 3, 1883, providing for the construction of four new cruising vessels, and the launching and engining of the four double-turreted monitors “Puritan,” “Terror,” “Amphitrite,” and “Monadnock,” which at that time had been on the stocks about eight years. These were built of iron, and took the places in the Navy Register of the worthless wooden monitors of the same names.
On the first lot of new vessels and engines, the bids were all considerably30 below the cost estimated by the Advisory Board and the Bureaus, and the contracts were let as follows: For the four vessels, and the engines of the “Puritan,” monitor, to Mr. John Roach; for the engines of the “Terror,” monitor, to William Cramp & Sons; and for the “Amphitrite,” monitor, to the Harlan & Hollingsworth Company, of Wilmington, Delaware. Work under all these contracts proceeded with commendable31 alacrity32.
Considerable difficulty was at first experienced in procuring33 material for the new steel ships. The standard established by law was very high, and the methods of test devised by 162the board, to say the least, did nothing to ameliorate the rigors34 of the statute35. The steel-makers, however, bravely persevered36, and finally overcame their difficulties in the main, though a historical résumé of the progress of the new navy would be incomplete without the statement that none of the contractors37, under the Act of March 2, 1883, made any money, and some of them suffered serious loss; and this statement applies equally to the manufacturers who made the steel for the pioneer ships,—at least one old and well established concern being wrecked39 by the difficulties encountered, while others were embarrassed.
The year 1884 was signalized by a Presidential campaign of unusual bitterness, and, notwithstanding the cordiality with which all parties had joined hands in the inception40 of the new navy, the first session of the Forty-eighth Congress developed what for a time threatened to be at least a temporary hiatus. But wiser counsels at length prevailed, and, though no additions were made to the list of new ships authorized42, sufficient appropriations43 were made to prevent stoppage of work on those already under contract.
The results of the year 1884 were chiefly interesting because they demonstrated, after much bitter debate and heated discussion, that 163the cause of the new navy had acquired impetus44 sufficient to vanquish45 the party passions of even so violent a Presidential campaign as that which marked that year. That campaign over, the Forty-eighth Congress, at its second session, took up with zeal46 the promotion47 of the new navy, and the act approved March 3, 1885, authorized four additional vessels, toward the construction of which $1,895,000 was appropriated with practical unanimity48. The Act of March 3, 1885, marked an epoch49 in the history of the new navy. Prior to that time, the legislative50 practice had been to require separate enactment51 to authorize41 the construction of new vessels for the navy. In this case the authorization52 appeared in the body of the regular Naval Appropriation Bill, and that practice has been followed ever since. This innovation was debated in Committee of the Whole, and a point of order made to strike out the proposed authorization. The point of order was overruled by Hon. James B. McCreary, a Democratic member from Kentucky, with the approval of Speaker John G. Carlisle; Mr. McCreary being Chairman of the Committee of the Whole on the Naval Bill. Mr. McCreary ruled: 1st. That legislation in pursuance of any settled or established policy was germane53 in the annual appropriation bill which 164dealt with that subject matter. 2d. That the increase of the navy was clearly a settled and established policy, to which all branches of the government were committed. 3d. That in view of that fact the authorization of additional vessels of war could not be considered new legislation in the meaning of the rules, but must be regarded as progressive legislation in a direction previously54 sanctioned by Congress; that therefore the authorization of new ships was germane to the regular naval appropriation bill for each year, and was in order.
It is hard to overestimate55 the value of this ruling to the interests of the new navy. Every one familiar with legislative processes knows the advantage which appertains to the “right of way” enjoyed by a regular appropriation bill as compared with the average chances of an independent measure. These advantages are so marked, that it is quite proper to say that Mr. McCreary’s rule on this point was of greater importance than any other single incident in the legislative history of naval reconstruction56. In the Act of March 3, 1885, appeared another clause prohibiting the repair of any existing wooden vessel8 when the cost of such repair should exceed 20 per cent. upon the whole cost of such vessel entirely57 new. This clause was adopted upon the recommendation 165of Secretary Chandler, made in the previous year; its obvious object being to render impossible the perpetuation58 of the old and obsolete wooden ships. Its effect soon became apparent in a rapid elimination59 of old wooden vessels from the navy, until by 1890 only sixteen of them remained on the active list, and nearly, if not quite, every one of these was then in her last commission. It is impossible to overestimate the salutary effects of this clause. 1st. It “cleared the decks” of a lot of obsolete lumber60. 2d. It stimulated61 public opinion to demand prompt production of new and modern ships to take the places of the old and obsolete. 3d. It put an end to a policy of makeshifts which was always extravagant62, often wasteful63, and sometimes corrupt64.
The building of the four pioneer ships involved several new departures. The Congress that authorized their construction and made an appropriation toward it, also made provision for creating what was termed a second “Naval Advisory Board,” which was to have charge of the details of their building. By this expedient65 Congress hoped to avert66 the evils of the Bureau system on the one hand, and to limit the one-man power of the Secretary on the other. This board consisted of five members, three naval officers and two civilians68, to 166be selected by the Secretary of the Navy. Of the two civilians, one was a ship-builder, the other a mechanical engineer. The ship-builder was Henry Steers69. This gentleman was a nephew of George Steers, a somewhat celebrated70 naval architect in his time, whose principal achievement was the design of the yacht “America,” which won the cup which the English have struggled ever since to recapture. The famous steam-frigate71 “Niagara,” built a short time before the war, though constructed in a navy-yard, was designed by Henry Steers. During the paralysis72 of American ship-building which followed the Civil War, Mr. Steers became discouraged at the outlook and, having a considerable fortune, went into the banking73 business.
The other civilian67 member, the mechanical engineer, was Miers Coryell, of New York. This gentleman was connected in his professional capacity with the Cromwell Line of steamships75 plying76 between New York and New Orleans. He had shortly before the time under consideration designed an engine for the “Louisiana” of that line, which Mr. Roach built, involving an entirely new departure in sea-going engine construction. Perhaps the most concise77 way to describe this engine would be to say that it represented an effort to introduce 167the walking-beam of a side-wheel river steamboat into the engine compartment78 of a screw steamship74. The advantage claimed for it was that it permitted the use of vertical79 cylinders80 within a deck-height not sufficient to admit the regular type of vertical inverted81 cylinders. This it undoubtedly82 did; but there its merit stopped. For the rest it was cumbrous, complicated, and of weight exceedingly disproportionate to its power. This unspeakable device Mr. Coryell offered to the Advisory Board, and, to the speechless amazement83 of the engineering world, it was adopted as the propelling machinery84 of the most important ship then authorized for the navy. It is worthy11 of remark here that these beam-engines were subsequently taken out of the “Chicago,” and a pair of vertical inverted or slightly inclined engines of the usual type substituted. And it might also be observed that this work, with some alterations85 in the hull86, was done in the New York Navy-Yard at a cost of $1,300,000 as against an original contract price of $889,000 for the whole ship new; or, in other words, the cost of re-engining and overhauling87 the “Chicago” in a navy-yard was 40 per cent. more than the first cost of the new ship under contract in a private shipyard!
168The Navy Bureaus were not slow to discern what the creation of the Advisory Board meant for them. At first they tried to defeat it. Finding that impossible, two of the Bureau chiefs besought88 the Naval Committees of the Senate and House to provide that at least one of the four ships be built in a navy-yard. No member of the Senate committee favored this proposition, and but two members of the House committee, both of whom, it is hardly necessary to say, represented navy-yard districts and danced to the music of labor89 agitators90. Thus, at the inception of the new navy the navy-yard snake was “scotched,” if not killed.
When the contracts and specifications93 were drawn94 up in form, two facts became evident: One was that the knowledge of the new conditions of naval construction possessed95 by the authorities of the navy itself was altogether academic; and the other was that neither naval authorities nor civilians interested had any adequate idea of what the requirement of the law in regard to material actually signified. The law said that the ships must be built of “steel, of domestic manufacture, having a tensile strength of 60,000 pounds to the square inch, and an elongation of 25 per cent. in eight inches.”
169Verbally, this was the English Admiralty standard for mild steel plates and shapes. But the English had an elastic96 system of inspection97 which left much to be determined98 by the judgment99 and knowledge of the inspector100. The system adopted by our earlier inspectors101 of material was rigid102 as a rock and inelastic as cast-iron. The letter of the law, not the spirit of it, was their guide. These requirements and the mode of enforcing them would have been drastic had the mild-steel industry been in a flourishing condition. But as a matter of fact it had not been developed at all in this country; so they were formulating103 crucial requirements for the product of an industry which did not exist. The production of mild steel, or at least its use in naval construction, was still in the experimental stage then, even in England, its native home. The “Iris” and “Mercury,” the first all-steel ships built in England, had not been in commission more than two years, when the requirements for our new ships were formulated104 by the naval authorities and embodied105 in an Act of Congress.
Bessemer steel was produced in large quantities here at the time for making rails and tank-plates. But Bessemer could not stand the navy tests. Nothing but open-hearth steel could do it, and at the time when bids were 170asked for the first four ships there was not an open-hearth mill in the country that could make the ingots required for the plates and shapes of the sizes and qualities demanded. Still, American steel-makers were found willing to undertake the task, though the sequel soon proved that their conceptions of what confronted them were quite vague. When one surveys the open-hearth steel industry as it exists in the United States to-day (1901), largely exceeding that of Great Britain, and greater than that of all the rest of the world, exclusive of the United Kingdom, put together, it seems impossible to realize that it is all the growth of a score of years. As late as 1887 there was no forging-mill in this country that could forge a three-throw crank-shaft in one piece, and the “Baltimore’s” crank-shafts of that description had to be imported from Whitworth’s works in England.
Such were the conditions which confronted the ship-builders who made estimates and offered bids for the construction of the four pioneer steel ships of the new navy. When the bids were opened early in July, 1883, it became apparent that the views of bidders107 as to the character of the task they proposed to undertake were quite divergent. To avoid prolixity108, we will deal only with the “Chicago,” 171which was, in fact, the representative ship. For that vessel there were but two bidders worth considering,—Mr. Cramp and Mr. Roach. Mr. Roach bid $889,000 for the hull and machinery. Mr. Cramp bid a little over $1,000,000, or about 14 per cent. in excess of his competitor. As the sequel proved, Mr. Cramp, conservative as his bid was, or as it appeared to be, underwent no misfortune in failing to get the “Chicago” at $1,025,000. Whether Mr. Cramp could have been more successful than Mr. Roach was in creating the new open-hearth steel industry required to produce the material demanded by the law and the specifications need not be discussed. It may, however, be said that the excess of his bid over that of Mr. Roach was due wholly to his misgivings109 on this point; because on all other points involved, such as experience, skill, and efficiency of organization, he had some advantage.
Mr. Roach got all the ships. The contracts were signed July 26, 1883. The keel of the “Chicago” was laid December 5, 1883; she was launched December 5, 1885, only fifty-two days before the contract date for completion, which was January 26, 1886. Meantime the first of the ships, the despatch-boat “Dolphin,” had been completed, put on trial, and had failed 172to meet the requirements of the law. Here the evils of the inflexible110, inelastic, or “cast-iron” form of contract became instantly evident. The Navy Department could not accept the ship under those conditions without violating the law. Mr. Roach thereupon threw up his hands, and the government, as provided in the contract, had to take possession of the ships as they stood in his shipyard and complete them with its own resources, at the risk and expense of Mr. Roach and his bondsmen. This action on his part is hard to understand or explain. He was perfectly111 solvent112. Although, as the law and the contract stood, the Navy Department could not accept the “Dolphin,” in view of her deficiency in performance, Congress was soon to assemble, and Secretary Whitney was ready to ask for an amendment113 or modification114 of the law which would enable him to accept the ship with an equitable115 penalty for her deficiency, which, by the way, was not great. It was said at the time that Mr. Roach acted upon the advice of certain political friends holding high rank; that a certain group of Republican politicians believed that their party needed a martyr116 just at that juncture117, and they thought Mr. Roach would make a good one. Be this as it may, the government finished all the ships in the Roach yard, 173and the “Chicago,” contracted for July 26, 1883, was ready for her first commission the middle of April, 1889,—five years and nearly nine months building. We have dwelt with some prolixity on this branch of the subject for two reasons: first, because it was the beginning of the most important epoch in our naval history; and, second, because the errors, miscalculations, and consequent disasters it developed became themselves of very great value as object lessons for guidance or warning in subsequent transactions.
When Mr. Whitney became Secretary in March, 1885, he found ready to his hand authorization for four more ships, the designs of which had been partially118 worked out by the Bureaus during the previous winter. He, however, proceeded slowly; so deliberately119, that the contract for the first of the four ships built under the authorization of March 3, 1885, and August 3, 1886, was not signed until December 17, 1886, a year and nine months after he assumed the office. This delay was due to a variety of causes, the most important of which are interestingly and instructively described by Mr. Cramp himself in an account of his personal connection with the transactions. It may be premised that when Mr. Whitney became Secretary of the Navy, he very soon 174sought to avail himself of Mr. Cramp’s experience, professional ability, and practical knowledge. Mr. Cramp responded in the same spirit of frankness and candor120 as that in which the Secretary invited him. There was no mincing121 of matters in any direction. Mr. Cramp hewed122 to the line on all the abuses and shortcomings of the old régime, and he also pointed19 out methods by which they could be overcome or, at least, compelled to get out of the way. Mr. Whitney was a thorough business man and an able lawyer. Far removed both by character and by fortune from any possible temptation, Mr. Whitney’s sole object in taking the navy portfolio123 was to promote the public welfare, and thereby124 add lustre125 to his name.
But let Mr. Cramp tell his own story in his own way.
THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW NAVY.
“The practical beginning of the new navy occurred under the Administration of Mr. Chandler, and while he was Secretary of the Navy the ‘Chicago,’ ‘Boston,’ ‘Atlanta,’ and ‘Dolphin’ were constructed.
“The hulls126 of these vessels had been designed by the Advisory Board, and were about equal to any vessels constructed abroad at that time so far, I might say, as the models and general designs were concerned. Their outfit127 and guns were not fairly up to the prevailing128 practice 175abroad, and their engines were very inefficient129 and commonplace. They were not designed by the board, but were principally the designs of the contractor38. The ‘Chicago’ had engines of quite a fantastic design, suggested by one of the members in the board. The models and designs of the hulls, as compared with what had preceded them in the Navy Department after the end of the Civil War, were great achievements over the ridiculous specimens130 of the ship-building art that we were loaded with during that time. They were the production principally of Messrs. Steers and Fernald, assisted by Mr. Bowles, and were up to most of the requirements of the time.
“When the vessels were tried under the following Administration, that is, during the Secretaryship of Mr. Whitney, it was found that the power of the engines and the consequent speed developed were not up to the requirements of the law, although it might be said that they were up to the requirements of the contract.
“There was some considerable delay on the part of the Secretary, Mr. Whitney, in receiving the ships from the contractors on that particular account, a decision having been made by the Attorney-General that vessels contracted for and subsequently not coming up to the requirements and not in full accordance with the law were worthless, and would not be accepted.
“A violent uproar131 pervaded132 the entire country at that time on account of what they called the hesitating attitude of Mr. Whitney.
“The political administration of the government having changed, it was asserted that it was on account of the politics of the contractor that the vessels had not been accepted. Among the people who argued thus, all considerations of contract requirements of law were entirely ignored, and Mr. Whitney received untold133 denunciations 176from these sources; but he was one of those men whom adverse134 criticisms as to what he had done never disturb in the slightest degree.
“Mr. Whitney finally accepted the vessels conditionally135, after more or less contention136 which consumed some little time. But no more unfair denunciation or criticism of the actions and efforts of any man ever occurred than fell to his lot at that time.
“The second lot of vessels was given out by Mr. Whitney, who succeeded Mr. Chandler. Two of these vessels were built on plans provided by Mr. Whitney, and two were on modified plans of Mr. Chandler.
“In compliance137 with the provisions of the act which authorized the ‘Secretary to prepare drawings,’ Mr. Whitney purchased from Armstrong the drawings that had been prepared for the Spanish government, and the drawings of the ‘Naniwa Khan,’ which ship they had built for Japan. These two vessels became the ‘Baltimore’ and ‘Charleston.’ Cruiser No. 1 of Mr. Chandler’s plans was not given out; as the bids were above the limitation price, the smaller cruiser was given out under modified conditions. This vessel became the ‘Yorktown.’
“Before the advertisement was printed, Mr. Whitney invited all of the expectant bidders to examine the plans and specifications which he had purchased, and without exception all recorded their indorsement, and some in extravagant terms. After Mr. Whitney’s retirement138, the contractor who had indorsed them in the most extravagant manner was the first and only one to find fault.
“We bid on all the vessels and in accordance with the conditions of the advertisement with the exception of that of the ‘Yorktown.’ On that vessel we bid on the government designs, and designs of our own which embodied a 177proposition to install the first triple-expansion engines in the navy. Our bid for the ‘Newark’ being higher than the government allowance, we did not get her. As I said before, she was not awarded.
“When it was found that Mr. Whitney had purchased abroad the drawings that I have already referred to,—the drawings of the vessels that ultimately came to be the ‘Baltimore’ and ‘Charleston,’—he was fiercely assailed139 by certain parties in the Navy Department, while certain others indorsed his action; but the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Steam Engineering were conspicuous140 in their opposition141. The most conspicuous in support of the Secretary was Commodore Walker. We received our share of adverse criticism because we had indorsed the steps he had taken.
“The design of the ‘Baltimore’ and the ‘Charleston’ represented the best types of vessels that were constructed up to that time. They were far in advance of any other war-ships of that period, and in fact they really formed the basis of future constructions in the world’s navies.
“It was more by good luck than by good management that Mr. Whitney secured those particular drawings which proved to be of such superior character. They were offered to our Naval Attaché, who happened to be abroad in England at that time, by the Armstrong Company. They had designed the two vessels which subsequently became the ‘Baltimore’ and ‘Charleston’ of our navy. The design of the ‘Baltimore’ was made in competition with Thompson for the Spanish government. For certain reasons, which I need not mention here, the designs of Thompson were accepted and the contract for the construction of the ship was awarded to them. She was known as the ‘Reina Regente.’ It was at this point that the Armstrongs presented their rejected drawing and the drawings for the 178‘Naniwa Khan’ for sale to our Naval Attaché there. They had already built two vessels like the ‘Naniwa Khan’ for the Japanese navy. These vessels were looked upon by the experts of the naval world as being the two best specimens of their type that had ever been built up to that time.
“At the time the sale was made, the Armstrongs, knowing nothing of the capabilities142 of this country and having, like most British ship-builders and many Americans at that time, a very mean and very poor opinion of every ship-builder in this country, they suggested that, in awarding the contract, a condition should be inserted providing for the payment of superintendents143 whom they should send over from their works to superintend the building, and designing of the engines, and operating them after their completion. Considering what to them appeared a barbarian144 incapacity on our part, they were loath145 to risk their reputation without protection.
“We accepted the condition at the time, anxious to get the contracts, feeling sure that it would never be needed, and that we could prevail upon Mr. Whitney and the naval people as to the impropriety of it.
“After the contract was awarded and the work was started, Mr. Whitney concluded that, notwithstanding the provision was there, he would never use it, and never require it of us.
“In fact, we made a great many improvements in the boilers148 of the ‘Baltimore,’ and some improvements in the engines. These improvements in the boilers of the ‘Baltimore’ formed the basis and the standard of construction of all the Scotch91 boilers that have been built for the navy since that time.
“At the beginning of our work on these ships we did not get much co-operation on the part of some of the 179Bureaus, in view of the foreign character of most of the work, and in view, too, of the fact that some of it was of our own, both being equally obnoxious149, as they originated outside of the Bureaus. We met with a great deal of opposition at the beginning in getting up the specifications and plans.
“Certain subsequent changes in the personnel that were made in the Bureau of Steam Engineering—Mr. Melville having been placed at the head of it—modified the situation, and he joined the Secretary in his efforts with his usual vigor20. A part of the trouble I refer to in getting a start on the work was owing to lack of experience and knowledge of contract and specification92 requirements which were placed in the Law Department of the navy for the first time.
“The Law Department of the navy at that time was beginning to make a show, and to them, under some mistake, was delegated the getting up of the contracts and specifications. It was here where my trouble commenced. The Law Department endeavored to provide for everything that could possibly occur, or everything that they thought would occur, and for many matters that could not be considered at all; and the specifications soon began to assume enormous proportions, being filled with impossible requirements.
“I got over most of these difficulties and minor150 details which they intended to lug151 into the contract by having introduced at the termination of certain paragraphs of the specifications, where explanations were unsatisfactory, misleading, and inadequate152, a clause using the words: ‘As the Department may determine.’
“My previous experience with the Navy Department and naval officials generally led me to believe that I could always make out my case when it was right.
180“At the beginning of the work, Mr. Whitney notified us that he considered himself and all the naval officials as partners and associates of the contractor, each mutually interested and determined to get the best vessel they could for the navy. He considered that the government ought to co-operate with the contractors, and that the contractors should in turn co-operate with the government; that the inspector was not an enemy, and never once considered him so. He considered it was his duty to afford all encouragement possible in aiding the contractors to carry out the plans. During the close of a conversation which I had with Mr. Whitney at one time during that period, he said to me: ‘I want you to inform me of what you see going wrong, no matter where the fault originated; and I will hold you personally responsible in every case where you neglect to inform me whenever anything is not going right or not being done right, whether it be your own fault or that of the government.’
“Coming back to the ships and referring to the purchasing of the drawings abroad: At the time that Mr. Whitney bought those drawings, it occurred to us that the triple-expansion engine which was being developed by Kirk was a marked advance over the plain compound of Elder; and I suggested to Mr. Whitney the propriety146 of buying plans of triple-expansion engines from us for the smaller ship which afterward153 was the ‘Yorktown.’ Of course this was before the ships were given out. He told us to go ahead. We went to work and made the drawings, which we thought were much in advance of anything of that kind in existence, and we fully154 expected that they would be bought by Mr. Whitney, as he had purchased the foreign drawings. When the drawings were finished, I took them down to Washington and showed them to him. He was at this time so disgusted with and 181tired of the great uproar that had been made about purchasing drawings abroad, that he did not say much about it. He did not decline, however, to buy them; but, finding that he was not enthusiastic, I accepted promptly155 the situation, and simply exhibited them to him as something we had gotten up. I then returned home and threw them aside, and prepared for the coming opening of the bids which had been advertised for in the papers. The day before the bids were to be opened, I suddenly conceived the idea of giving the triple-expansion plans another chance by making an alternative bid on the ‘Yorktown,’ embodying156 engines of the triple-expansion type. So I rushed back to Philadelphia, got the drawings that we had previously prepared, and returned to Washington in time to put them in with our other bid for the ‘Yorktown.’ As we were responsible for the horse-power, weight, etc., we felt that we could get it a great deal better, and more satisfactory results all around, with triple-expansion engines than with uncertain and unknown performance of the Bureau drawings. Our bid being lowest on triple-expansion engines, being the only one, the contract was awarded to us.
“The success of these engines in the ‘Yorktown’ was of a highly marked character, and it emboldened158 us to introduce them in our bids for the new lot of construction that had been advertised for.
“It was at this time the New York Herald159 published in large type a paper of mine on the triple-expansion engine, and Commodore Walker had it printed in the Reports of the Information Bureau. Walker was always in the front when a good thing was to be promoted, and was conspicuous in his co-operation with Mr. Whitney.
“When the ships that followed the ‘Baltimore’ were given out, we secured the contracts for the construction of 182the ‘Philadelphia’ and ‘Newark.’ We bid on the ‘Newark’ a second time. A great deal of unpleasant feeling was manifested on the part of the Bureau of Construction when we failed to bid within the limitation price at the time she was first advertised. We introduced in her, however, the triple-expansion engine in place of the Department’s. We also bid on ‘Philadelphia’ with hull duplicate of the ‘Baltimore,’ with triple-expansion engines of the same type as the ‘Yorktown.’
“What ultimately became the ‘San Francisco’ was given to Mr. Scott, who bid on the basis of ‘Baltimore’s’ plans of hull with the ‘Baltimore’s’ engines. After the contract was awarded to him, he agreed to substitute the ‘Newark’s’ hull plans in place of the ‘Baltimore’ type with a design of engine that the Bureau of Steam Engineering had made at our shipyard by some of their officers who were on duty there and certain of our draughtsmen,—a type of engine that they considered to be an improvement over the ‘Baltimore’s’ engines. The Department granted this substitution.
“The Bureaus that had denounced Mr. Whitney for buying foreign drawings had been spending money very lavishly160 for some years in securing plans abroad. The Bureau of Steam Engineering and the Bureau of Construction were spending about $100,000 a year in the purchase of drawings.
“The hull of the ‘Yorktown,’ which was designed by the Bureau, was based on the design of the ‘Archer’ class.
“The ‘Newark,’ which was also designed by the Bureau at that time, was based on the design of the ‘Mersey’ class as to specifications and general construction, while the model was not of that class.
BATTLESHIP RETVIZAN—RUSSIAN
“The Bureau of Engineering, which had been laboring161 for some years with a view to a consolidation162 of all of 183the constructive163 departments of the navy,—hulls, engines, guns,—under their Bureau, bought abroad entire plans of ships, hulls, and engines combined. I saw a complete set of plans and drawings of the ‘Polyphemus,’ which was designed as a sort of ram5 by the British government, and also the two vessels ‘Warspite’ and ‘Impérieuse,’ rather of a fantastic design, which the British government was building. These vessels were somewhat of a departure from previous vessels constructed in the British navy and were very crude. They were designed by some one in England who was not up to the capabilities of his fellow-constructors there. They were not duplicated. They are the poorest specimens of ships in the British navy.
“Mr. Whitney was exceedingly fortunate in the officer whom he found at the head of the most important Bureau. This was Commodore John G. Walker, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and unquestionably the ablest and most forceful man of his time in the navy. American naval officers, as a rule, are able men in the professional sense; but Walker, while equal to the very best and superior to most of them in that regard, possessed an additional fund of tact164, equipment, and energy in purely165 administrative166 directions seldom equalled and never surpassed in the history of our navy. He had enjoyed, also, considerable experience in civic167 responsibility, having been for a considerable period identified with the management of an important railway corporation prior to his appointment as Chief of the Bureau in 1881. His term of four years was about to expire when Mr. Whitney assumed office, but at the instance of the latter he was immediately reappointed, and served through the entire term until 1889. Commodore Walker was exactly the man for the place, which was that of chief adviser168 to the Secretary. To a 184perfect acquaintance with the personnel of the service, he joined a freedom from narrow predilections169 and selfish aims seldom found in any veteran regular officer of any branch, and his sense of the material needs of the navy was broad, keen, and practical. Moreover, in mental character and manly170 temperament171 he was congenial to Mr. Whitney. For these reasons, and imbued172 with a common purpose, Commodore Walker and the Secretary coalesced173 from the first day of their association, and remained in the most perfect accord throughout the four most important years in the history of the new navy. On some occasions it happened that Walker sustained the Secretary and helped him carry out most important reforms and policies of progress against powerful opposition in the navy itself and in the Department.
“Commodore Walker’s influence among Senators and Representatives in Congress, built up during his first four years in the Bureau, was superior to that of any other officer, and occasionally it proved equal to that of a considerable majority of them combined. His powers were uniformly exerted in behalf of the readiest and most practical methods of increasing the navy in number, excellence174, and force of its ships and in organization and training of its personnel. Against all efforts to perpetuate175 the obsolete, cumbrous, and abnormal navy-yard system of construction he set his face with all the strength and resolution he possessed. For detailed176 discussion of the questions involved in this phase of the subject, neither the limitations of space nor the patience of scientific readers offer opportunity. Suffice it to say, that the antique, red-tape-ridden and muddle-brained policy of trying to build new ships of the modern type under military methods was in the main abandoned.
“Commodore Walker also ably supported Mr. Whitney’s 185policy of purchasing modern designs and plans of hulls and machinery abroad, a policy which a large and influential177 group of naval officers vehemently178 opposed. On the whole, it is not too much to say that, in the all-round importance of his usefulness to the new navy, Commodore Walker fairly divided honors with Mr. Whitney himself.
“That Walker’s all-round ability and energy were understood and appreciated by others besides Secretary Whitney is abundantly attested179 by the fact that upon his retirement in 1897, at the age of sixty-two, he was appointed chairman or president of the Isthmian Canal Commission, which he still holds at this writing (1903), in his seventieth year. Taking his career altogether from graduation at the Naval Academy in 1856; then through the Civil War, in which he played a distinguished180 part; then for some time in the civic pursuits already mentioned; then as Chief of Bureau and principal adviser to the Secretary for eight years; then as Admiral in command of the ‘White Squadron’; and, finally, as president of the Canal Commission, it is safe to say that few officers in our navy have done more important public service than John G. Walker.”
The most important matter adjusted in the conferences of Mr. Cramp with Mr. Whitney was the arrangement of the form of contract so that it might be, within a narrow margin181, flexible or elastic. The operation of other contracts had clearly shown the need of such modification, and a solution was reached without difficulty, though not without much deliberation.
186The matter under immediate consideration was the form of contract for the “Baltimore.” The guarantee to be required was that her engines should develop a mean of 9000 collective indicated horse-power for four consecutive182 hours, a lower or minimum limit being also prescribed. They had before them the form of contract for the Roach ships.
Mr. Cramp remarked that the guarantee for the “Baltimore” was 9000 indicated horse-power.
“Suppose, Mr. Secretary,” he said, “that we should use that form of contract, and the engines of the ‘Baltimore’ should develop only 8999 indicated horse-power, what could you do?”
“Well, Mr. Cramp, under this form of contract, construed183 according to law, I could not accept her. There ought to be a way of averting184 such a possibility. What can you suggest?”
Mr. Cramp then proposed to apply to our naval contracts the principle often recognized in agreements for construction of merchant steamships and also in the naval contracts of foreign governments, namely, a sliding scale of penalties for deficiency in performance, with a minimum limit; and, in case the ship should prove unable to reach the minimum limit after 187a fair number of trials, the owner (if a merchant vessel) or the government (if a naval ship) might at will either reject her altogether or accept her under a supplemental agreement. Mr. Cramp also explained the usual basis upon which penalties for deficiency were computed185 and imposed in our own merchant practice and in foreign navies.
The Secretary assented186 to this suggestion, and pronounced it the only business-like plan for solution of the difficulty he had heard. But he said that, in order to make the arrangement perfectly equitable, there should be a premium for excess over and above guaranteed performance, corresponding to or commensurate with the penalty for deficiency.
These discussions led to the adoption187 of what became known as the premium system. Some time afterward, when Mr. Whitney was before the Naval Committee, the subject came up, and one member referred to it as “a bonus to contractors.”
“If you use the word ‘bonus’ in the sense of a gift,” said the Secretary, “it is a misapprehension. It is part of an equitable transaction. Performance is a prime element of value in a ship-of-war. We stipulate188 in our contracts for a specific performance. We consider the guaranteed performance as representing 188the normal value of the ship. If upon trial the performance falls below the normal, it reduces the value of the ship to that extent, and we meet it with proportionate penalties deducted189 from the contract price. But if upon trial the performance exceeds the normal, the value of the ship is increased, and we propose to meet such cases with premium proportionate to the excess of guaranteed performance. In either case we simply pay for as good a ship as we get, be it above or below the normal. It is a poor rule that won’t work both ways.”
Mr. Whitney’s terse190 observations embodied the whole logic191 of the penalty and premium system, and his argument was so conclusive192 that no further discussion seemed to be desired. The system remained in effect nearly ten years, and was applied193 to every vessel built for the new navy up to and including the “Iowa” and “Brooklyn.” Every ship built by Mr. Cramp earned a premium for excess of either indicated horse-power or speed. None of his ships exhibited deficiency. The list is rather interesting, because it exhibits more graphically194 than any other method could do the actual extent to which the contract requirement was exceeded in each case. 189
“Yorktown” (horse-power) $39,825.00
“Baltimore” (horse-power) 106,441.00
“Newark” (horse-power) 36,857.00
“Philadelphia” (speed) 100,000.00
“New York” (speed) 200,000.00
“Columbia” (speed) 300,000.00
“Minneapolis” (speed) 414,600.00
“Indiana” (speed) 50,000.00
“Massachusetts” (speed) 100,000.00
“Iowa” (speed) 217,420.00
“Brooklyn” (speed) 350,000.00
–––––––––––
$1,915,143.00
When the administration of Mr. Whitney ended in March, 1889, he left over to his successor the most important work in the way of new departure yet attempted. Of his successor, General B. F. Tracy, of New York, Mr. Cramp, speaking of the man and the task before him, says:
“Secretary Tracy entered the Navy Department under very favorable auspices195. He was himself free from entanglements196, political or personal. His previous public life, aside from service as a colonel and brigadier-general in the Civil War, had been confined to legal and judicial197 positions, his highest post having been that of Justice of the New York Court of Appeals, the Court of last resort. To the affairs of the Navy Department in general he applied the judicial habits formed on the Bench. In technical matters, he enjoyed at the outset of his administration the continuing services of Commodore—now 190become Rear-Admiral—Walker, whose term extended till December, 1889; and who, by the way, had the honor, after eight years of service as Chief of Bureau, to command the first American squadron of modern war-ships known to history as ‘the White Squadron.’
“With regard to the task of rebuilding the navy, which was then, and still is, the chief responsibility of a Secretary, Mr. Tracy had but to carry on a programme already well begun. He was not, however, content with following simply the lines laid out before him. He at once proceeded to lengthen198 them and to widen their scope. Under his administration was begun and carried out the ‘battle-ship and armored cruiser programme’ which gave to the navy the fleet that made our success in the Spanish War so swift and so easy.
“The distinguishing traits of Tracy’s administration were the unbroken co-operation between the executive and legislative branches of the government in everything pertaining199 to the new navy, and the remarkable200 progress made in size, power, speed, and other prime qualities of war-ships, together with the almost incredible development of all contributory industries. In this connection should also be mentioned the constant and powerful support which President Harrison gave to the Secretary of the Navy in every possible manner, from first to last.
“In his methods of considering propositions laid before him, Mr. Tracy was always deliberate and cautious; but in executing a programme once resolved upon, he was equally prompt and peremptory201. He never determined to begin anything until he could foresee the end of it, and when he had reached a conclusion on that basis he was wont202 to push practical operations with untiring energy. In some respects, when giving preliminary consideration 191to subjects, he may have been less self-reliant or more disposed to feel the influence of his military subordinates than Mr. Whitney was; but in energy of execution he had no superior. As a general consequence, Mr. Tracy’s four years in the Navy Department made a history that compares favorably with that of any predecessor203 from the foundation of the Department itself in 1797 to his own time.
“One of the first and most important matters that came before Secretary Tracy was the design of the armored cruiser ‘New York,’ the appropriation for its construction having been one of the last acts of the Congress that went out with Mr. Whitney. This ship was intended to be an echo to the ‘Blake’ and ‘Blenheim’ type of protected cruisers, and they were the largest heretofore constructed. The question was asked by the Secretary of the head of one of the Bureaus, during the discussion of the details of the ship, if there could not be an improvement in the salient features of the design over the ‘Blake,’ as merely copying her was obnoxious to him. He had heard of the ‘Dupuy de Lome,’ the first of the armored cruisers, and he conceived the idea of adding vertical armor on the sides of the ship in addition to the sloping armor of the protected deck as an additional protection, and of sufficient importance to warrant its adoption in the new design. He argued that no projectile205 could penetrate206 the outer plates and strike the sloping plate at the same angle in both, etc.
“Strong objections were urged by the head of the Bureau who had been consulted about it, and the legend of weights of the ‘Blake’ as published and the distribution of them in the ‘Blake’ were shown with the assertion that nothing could be done. The Secretary became more persistent207 as the opposition increased, and the wires between 192the Department and the British Admiralty became hot from the number of messages that passed as to the ‘Blake’ and ‘Blenheim.’
“While the Secretary was perplexed208 with the opposition of officers who should have aided rather than opposed him, we happened to meet, and he asked if I could duplicate the ‘Blake’ and her performance if side armor of moderate thickness were added, and also asked my views of the ‘Dupuy de Lome’ and other ships of the same kind.
“I promptly stated that I could do it, and explained the idea of ‘Dupuy de Lome,’ also giving him the names of three other armored cruisers the French had under way. I went into the Secretary’s room at 3 P.M. and discussed the whole subject with him till 8 P.M.; then left, and promised to return promptly with additional information.
“At the next interview I furnished the Secretary with a complete detail of what would be required to make an armored cruiser on the ‘Blake’s’ dimensions and performance, and stated that I would like to bid in Class II on an alternative design with side armor.
“The Secretary handed my details and allotment of weights to the proper officer, and the Department proceeded to get up the plans and specifications. Frequent interviews with the Secretary occurred as the work progressed, and I felt sure that under Class II, permitting alternative designs, the contract would be awarded. Before the time for awarding the contract had arrived, I found that the plans were being developed under the conditions that I had given the Secretary; but when the plans were exhibited before bids were sent in, it transpired209 that the boilers had been placed three abreast210 in 193the government plans, bringing them within a few feet of the side of the ship.
“I then designed a plan for arranging the six boilers in pairs, making the coal-bunkers on the sides of the ship. This arrangement of coal-bunkers facilitated the prompt coaling of the ship and the handling of it. It also permitted a liberal amount of ‘coal protection’ for the boilers and engines, which was considered of important value at that time, and, what was of more weight than any other consideration, the introduction of two longitudinal bulkheads that extended the entire length of the engine and boiler147 spaces on each side of the ship. With three boilers abreast, the ship was liable to be sunk at any time by a collision with a coal-barge or passing schooner211; any penetration212 of the side abreast of boiler, besides resulting in a speedy foundering213, would certainly unship the side boiler, adding thereby an explosion to the other damage.
“With the boilers in pairs, it would be necessary for a ramming214 vessel to penetrate the side and two bulkheads and enter ten feet to do any damage, so the chances of being destroyed by ramming would be reduced to a minimum. I also lengthened215 the vessel over the Department’s plan, but kept all the conditions of specifications intact, except as to dimensions.
“After the bids were opened, it was found that ours was the lowest in Class II, and lower than any other bid, taking the competition as a whole. The Secretary then called a conference, at which all the bidders and the Chief Constructor were present, and, after thorough discussion of all the points involved, awarded the contract to the Cramp Company under the bid in Class II on the modified plan I had suggested and offered as to boiler arrangement and other details conformable to it.
194“The ship was named the ‘New York,’ and on trial trip she largely exceeded her contract speed and requirements of coal endurance and in all other respects; while the ‘Blake’ on trial was a failure; her engines had to be practically rebuilt, and then did not come within the scope of reasonable competition.
“Mr. Tracy can fairly claim credit for the design of the ‘New York,’ and the project for the construction of the ‘Indiana,’ ‘Massachusetts,’ and the ‘Oregon’ class of battleships was also due to his foresight216.”
It is not within the scope of this Memoir217 to trace the progress of the new navy ship by ship, or even by naval programmes from year to year. For the purpose of this work, it suffices to say that, of the total number of battleships, armored cruisers, and first-class protected cruisers actually in service at this writing (1903), Mr. Cramp has built about a majority as against all other American ship-builders combined. There are ten battleships in commission, of which Mr. Cramp has built five; two armored cruisers, both built by him; ten protected cruisers of the first class, of which five hail from Cramps’ shipyard: that is to say, a total of twenty-two vessels, all first-class in their respective types, of which Mr. Cramp has built twelve as against ten by all other American ship-builders put together, navy-yards included.
BATTLESHIP RETVIZAN—DOCKING WITH SUBMARINE
Of course, we exclude from this reckoning 195the two show-ships built by Armstrong for a South American government and foolishly bought by our Navy Department in the paroxysmal flurry incident to the outbreak of the Spanish War. The main excuse for buying them was that, if we did not, Spain would. So be it. Better to have let Spain buy them, if they could not have strengthened her navy more than they did ours. At any rate, had Spain bought them, we might have captured or destroyed them, as we did nearly all her ships. They would probably have been worth capture or destruction, but they were never worth buying.
Since 1887, a period of sixteen years, Mr. Cramp has completed fifteen ships for the navy (including the “Vesuvius” and “Terror”), and is building three more at this writing. In every case these ships embody157 in plan and design more or less of his own knowledge, skill, and experience. In some cases the designs are altogether his own. In others the machinery is his, with important modifications218 of the Department’s hull. In no case has he built a ship wholly upon the plans of the Department. While this has redounded219 to the benefit of the navy, it would be idle to say that it has been in the long run advantageous220 to Mr. Cramp. On the other hand, its tendency 196has been otherwise: A certain class of naval officers have chosen to consider Mr. Cramp’s constantly recurring221 propositions to modify and improve their designs as having the force and effect of criticisms, and, to say the least, they have not been grateful to him for his pains. On the contrary, no little jealousy222 and some resentment223 have been the results, and he has been made to feel their consequences more than once. The chief misfortune of this state of affairs is that it precludes224 the cordial co-operation which should exist between officers of the Navy Department and a contractor engaged in building naval vessels, and creates in its stead a sense of antagonism225 which tends to augment226 the difficulties of naval construction, which are great and perplexing enough at the best.
But Mr. Cramp has not concerned himself with the building of naval ships alone. He has delved227 into the problems presented by the uses to which the ships are put when completed. The results of his observations in this direction were embodied in an address to the Naval War College read before that institution, June 18, 1897, by invitation of the Commandant, a little less than a year before the Spanish War. The experience of that struggle, brief as it 197was, and decided228 almost wholly by sea power, made this paper little short of prophetic.
Some extracts from it will serve to exhibit the trend of Mr. Cramp’s thought in the direction of the practical uses and needs of ships-of-war after they leave the ship-builder’s hands. Among other things he said:
“The accomplishment229 of the objects of sea-warfare230 will depend partly upon the character of the armaments and partly on the wisdom with which their operations are directed; nor can any one gainsay231 that the wisdom of direction will depend on the conversancy232 of officers with the nature and necessities of the material units of which the armaments are composed.
“These propositions being taken for granted, it becomes clear that there can be no effective system of teaching the art of naval warfare which does not embrace exhaustive study of and consequent close familiarity with the instruments by which the principles of the art are to be carried into force and effect.
“From this point of view it must be admitted that questions within the province of the naval architect and problems which he is best qualified233 to solve form an essential part of such a curriculum in its largest and most comprehensive aspects.
“The unvarying tendency of naval progress is to exalt234 the importance of the naval architect and to augment the value of the constructor as a factor in the sum-total of sea power.
“The naval armament of to-day is a mechanism235. If we view it as a single ship, it is a mechanical unit whose warlike value depends on its excellence as a fighting machine. 198If we view it as a fleet, it is an assembly of mechanical units, the warlike value of which will depend alike on the excellence of each unit as a fighting machine, and on the adaptation of each unit to its consorts236 to produce the most symmetrical efficiency of the group as a whole.
“For this reason, the word seamanship, in the old-fashioned or conventional sense, has ceased to cover adequately the requirements of knowledge, skill, and aptness which the modern conditions of naval warfare impose upon the officer in command or subordinate.
“By this I mean not to depreciate237 seamanship pure and simple, but to point out that modern conditions require an enlargement of the meaning of the term and a broadening of its scope of function far beyond the exactions of any former period.
“In the old days there was no essential difference in ships except in size. Experience in a sloop-of-war qualified an officer to assume, at once and in full efficiency, equivalent duties in a frigate, a seventy-four, or a three-decker. Familiarity with one ship, irrespective of rate, was familiarity with all ships. Tactical lessons learned in man?uvring one fleet were alike applicable to the man?uvring of all fleets. Even the application of steam as a propulsive238 auxiliary239 in its earlier stages did not radically240 alter the old conditions. At all events, it did not practically erase241 them, as the present development has done.
“This growth of complexity242 and elaboration, and this almost infinite multiplication243 of parts and devices in modern ships, have entailed244 upon the naval architect and constructor demands and difficulties never dreamed of in the earlier days. The staff required to design and construct an ‘Iowa’ is multiplied in number, and the complexity 199of its organization augmented245, as compared with that required for the design and construction of the ‘New Ironsides,’ almost infinitely246.
“Similar conditions apply to command and management; so that, while the building of a modern battleship entails247 enormous work and responsibility on the naval architect, constructor, and staff, the effective use of her as a tool in the trade of war presents an equal variety and intricacy of problems to students of the art of naval warfare in this college.
“Such questions and such problems cannot be relegated248 to the category of details. Even if we consider the art of naval warfare in the aspects only of strategy and tactics, both will be affected249 for better or for worse by the behavior and performance of the units composing the force in operation. This being admitted, it follows that the behavior and performance of the units will be as the knowledge and capacity of captains and their staffs, and that no extent of skill and capacity in the admiral directing the whole can overcome or evade250 the consequences of incapacity and failure on the part of a captain commanding a part.
“As the speed of any fleet is that of its slowest ship, so will its man?uvring power be limited by the capacity of its poorest captain. As it might easily happen that the slowest or least handy ship and the poorest captain would be joined, the quality of the other ships and the ability of the other officers would go for nothing.
“In view of the complex character of the ships themselves, and the difficulty and danger of man?uvring them under the most favorable conditions, as pointed out, the experience of the first general action will demonstrate the necessity of having all the battleships in a fleet as nearly alike as possible in size, type, and capacity of performance. 200Such provision would not equalize the personal factor of different commanding officers, but it would at least give them all an equal chance at the start.
“For this reason I have always considered it unwise to multiply types or to modify seriously those which the best judgment we are able to form approves.
“These considerations seem conclusive against multiplication of types, and in favor of adhering to one that plainly meets the requirements of our national situation and policy.
“The composition of a battleship fleet under such conditions would minimize the tactical dangers and difficulties referred to earlier, but they would still remain very great, and nothing can mitigate251 them except frequent and arduous252 drill in squadron of evolution, so that our captains may become familiar with their weapons before being called upon to use them in actual battle. There will be scant253 opportunity to drill a battleship squadron after the outbreak of war.
“In my judgment, it is hardly possible to overvalue the importance of homogeneity in fleet organizations, and I am sure that the very first and perhaps greatest lesson taught by an encounter between fleets of modern battleships will be the advantage of similarity of type and equality of performance in the units of action.
“To this element of the art of naval warfare, then, I would invite your most earnest and penetrating254 attention and study.
“Assuming this problem to be satisfactorily solved and the material of the fleet in the most effective possible condition, so far as relation of units to each other and to the sum-total is concerned, we have still left for consideration the difference between men, the lack of uniformity in personnel. Homogeneity of material may be 201attained by adherence255 to a wise programme of design and construction; but homogeneity of personnel, in the sense of uniform capacity and efficiency among individuals, is beyond human art or science to produce, because the difference between men is the decree of a higher power. The existence of this college is itself a devout256 recognition of that great fact, because its whole objective is to mitigate or minify as much as possible this inherent human frailty257, by exhausting the resources of training and study, of precept258 and example.
“I do not by any means argue that the commander of a ship should be a naval architect or constructor. But, having familiarized himself with the principles of that art which touch directly and immediately his function of handling his ship under sea conditions of common occurrence, and having gained sufficient knowledge of her traits, he should be able to form an instant and correct judgment as to her point of best behavior in any sea-way. It goes without saying that sea experience is the only school in which these problems can be worked out.
“Knowledge of that character cannot be acquired by study of the experience of others. Close and earnest attention to this course of, at best partial, information cannot serve as a substitute for experience of one’s own. At most it can only provide a sound basis on which to take quick advantage of one’s own experience, when confronted with an actual situation.
“This brings me to the proposition that the modern battleship, with all its complexities259, weights, and peculiarities260 of design and model, entails upon commanding officers a new requirement which I can find no better terms to describe than ‘battleship seamanship.’ It is a development of the seafaring art which, as events have proved, is by no means yet mastered in the greatest and most actively261 202exercised navy of the world; therefore it would be too much to expect its mastery in navies of far less magnitude and, hence, less means for distribution of opportunities to gain experience.
“It therefore follows indisputably that navies of the lesser262 magnitude should constantly exhaust their means of enabling officers to gain sea experience by keeping all their large ships in active evolution all the time.
“Having thus viewed the modern battleship as a mechanical unit herself, we may profitably pass to brief consideration of the great number and variety of mechanisms263 composing her. In the strict professional or technical sense, these mechanisms concern mainly the engineer and the electrician. But as the foundation of all warlike efficiency in personnel is discipline, and as the foundation of all discipline is the inevitable264 principle of a single head, one commander, who is to all intents and purposes an absolute monarch265, it should follow that ‘the king can do no wrong.’
“I have already remarked that the captain need not be a naval architect or constructor to comprehend and be able to apply the group of principles of that art which touch his functions directly in managing his ship as a whole; likewise, I would say here that he need not be engineer or electrician in his relation to the numerous and diverse mechanisms whose proper operation and control are essential to the efficiency of his command.
“But, if he really commands, he must know enough about the instruments that do his work to know when they are doing it well and when not; to know whether his subordinates immediately in charge of the several devices are operating them properly or not; to know when defects exist and when they have been made good. If he does not know or cannot learn these things, he must 203depend wholly on subordinates immediately in charge; and their reports will be law to him, or if not law, at least decisions from which he has no appeal. Manifestly such a situation is utterly266 incompatible267 with the independent and self-relying autocracy268 which is the essential and fundamental principle of naval command, without which discipline must sooner or later vanish into mere204 empty form or conventional myth. These facts, even more than any other considerations, argue for uniformity of type, previously touched upon, so that in learning the traits of one battleship the officer acquires experience and knowledge applicable at once to the discharge of his duties in another.
“The foregoing discussion is limited to matters affecting the unit of action, the single ship, and the captain. Passing to consideration of the unit of operation, the fleet and the admiral, we find another array of problems equally within the scope of this paper.
“Let us assume that the composition of the fleet has been made as nearly homogeneous as possible, by carrying out the principles previously stated for ships and their captains, and that the admiral finds himself in command of an ideal fleet as to material and personnel. Actual differences in efficiency among the several units of action will still remain, and it will become the first duty of the admiral to ascertain269 and locate these diversities with unerring judgment and unsparing perception. He should know to a nicety the personal equation of every captain and the effective individuality of every ship.
“Among the captains he should be able to differentiate270 the traits of relative quickness of perception, promptness of action, readiness of responsibility, and boldness of execution.”
204Among the most important services of Mr. Cramp to the new navy was his instrumentality in bringing about the system of classifying bids. Prior to 1885, whenever contract construction was to be done, the plans of the Department, pure and simple, were the standard. If any bidder106 proposed to deviate271 from them in any way,—no matter how palpable the improvement,—his bid would be held irregular and thrown out. The issue came on the machinery of the ships authorized by the Act of March 3, 1885. Of these four ships, the “Baltimore’s” plans had been purchased abroad, hull and machinery, and were accepted practically without change. But the Department’s design involved the then nearly, if not quite, obsolete compound engine for the other three, “Newark,” “Yorktown,” and “Petrel.” Mr. Cramp, desiring to bid on the “Newark” and “Yorktown,” was doubtful whether he could develop the indicated horse-power, which the form of contract required him to guarantee, with the Department’s compound engines. He was, however, confident that he could do it with triple-expansion engines of his own design.
To overcome the difficulty, he suggested to Secretary Whitney that, in issuing the circular asking for proposals, a classification of bids be 205provided for. This suggestion was at once adopted, and bids were authorized to be offered in three classes: Class I, the Department’s plans pure and simple; Class II, the Department’s plans modified by the bidder as to hull or machinery or both; and Class III, the bidder’s plans wholly. This arrangement broke up the embargo272 of the Bureaus, and admitted the results of the study, experience, and skill of practical ship-builders. Some of the Bureaus fought the plan with all their energy, but the contest they made had no other result than to convince them that Mr. Whitney was the de facto as well as the de jure head of the Department,—a quite novel experience for them! Some time afterward Classes II and III were merged273, so that all departures from the Department’s plans, whether modifications of them or complete substitution of bidder’s plans for them, were grouped under Class II, which has become the established practice in inviting274 proposals. Mr. Cramp’s bids have usually been in Class II; involving in most cases more or less extensive modifications of the Department’s plans, and in two cases, the “Philadelphia” and the “Maine,” his own plans complete. The value of this new departure lay in the fact that it gave the Navy Department the benefit of all the progress of 206the country in the ship-building art as actually practised by men who were building ships for a living, and emancipated275 it from the dominion276 of the cloister277. It has become a part of the permanent policy of the government.
CRUISER VARIAG—RUSSIAN
The history of Mr. Cramp’s contributions to the new navy must, at this writing, be left an unfinished chapter. Having built and delivered to the government five first-class battleships, two first-rate armored cruisers, five first-class protected cruisers, together with a double-turreted monitor, a gunboat and a torpedo278 vessel, he is yet building three armored cruisers of the largest dimensions and most approved type. His contributions to the literature of the subject, ranging over a score of years, have been in their way of hardly less importance and interest than his achievements in producing its warlike material. Their full test, in all forms and through all channels,—hearings before committees, communications to the Navy Department and its Bureaus, newspaper interviews and magazine papers,—would, if reproduced in extenso, fill two volumes larger than this one. Suffice it to say here that there is no practical subject pertaining to naval art or science, from the design and construction of ships-of-war to their management in service, which he has not from time 207to time discussed as opportunity offered or occasion required. If he has at times shown a spirit approaching intolerance when dealing279 with invasions of his profession by inexperienced, untrained, or incapable men, it may be explained by the logic of a favorite quotation280 of his own, “Fools rush in where angels fear to tread!” Be this as it may, it is yet to be said that, if not always charitable in his criticisms and not always liberal in the standard of competency which he has set so high and maintained so vigorously, his professional motives281 have always been worthy and his efforts sincere and earnest. Whatever may be the future growth or achievements of the modern American navy, the name of Charles H. Cramp will ever be found indelibly stamped upon its historical origin and primary development. The ships he has built have won battles, gained campaigns, and vanquished282 the enemies of the country in war. They have held the lead in renewing the one-time waning283 naval prestige of our flag, and in restoring the sea power of the United States to its rightful rank among the nations.
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1 advisory | |
adj.劝告的,忠告的,顾问的,提供咨询 | |
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2 appropriation | |
n.拨款,批准支出 | |
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3 naval | |
adj.海军的,军舰的,船的 | |
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4 cramp | |
n.痉挛;[pl.](腹)绞痛;vt.限制,束缚 | |
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5 ram | |
(random access memory)随机存取存储器 | |
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6 premium | |
n.加付款;赠品;adj.高级的;售价高的 | |
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7 vessels | |
n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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8 vessel | |
n.船舶;容器,器皿;管,导管,血管 | |
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9 obsolete | |
adj.已废弃的,过时的 | |
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10 maritime | |
adj.海的,海事的,航海的,近海的,沿海的 | |
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11 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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12 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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13 turret | |
n.塔楼,角塔 | |
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14 batch | |
n.一批(组,群);一批生产量 | |
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15 structurally | |
在结构上 | |
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16 turrets | |
(六角)转台( turret的名词复数 ); (战舰和坦克等上的)转动炮塔; (摄影机等上的)镜头转台; (旧时攻城用的)塔车 | |
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17 revolve | |
vi.(使)旋转;循环出现 | |
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18 annihilated | |
v.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃 | |
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19 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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20 vigor | |
n.活力,精力,元气 | |
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21 inaugural | |
adj.就职的;n.就职典礼 | |
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22 assassinated | |
v.暗杀( assassinate的过去式和过去分词 );中伤;诋毁;破坏 | |
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23 modernization | |
n.现代化,现代化的事物 | |
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24 marine | |
adj.海的;海生的;航海的;海事的;n.水兵 | |
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25 convening | |
召开( convene的现在分词 ); 召集; (为正式会议而)聚集; 集合 | |
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26 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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27 formulate | |
v.用公式表示;规划;设计;系统地阐述 | |
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28 patriotically | |
爱国地;忧国地 | |
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29 investigations | |
(正式的)调查( investigation的名词复数 ); 侦查; 科学研究; 学术研究 | |
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30 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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31 commendable | |
adj.值得称赞的 | |
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32 alacrity | |
n.敏捷,轻快,乐意 | |
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33 procuring | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的现在分词 );拉皮条 | |
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34 rigors | |
严格( rigor的名词复数 ); 严酷; 严密; (由惊吓或中毒等导致的身体)僵直 | |
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35 statute | |
n.成文法,法令,法规;章程,规则,条例 | |
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36 persevered | |
v.坚忍,坚持( persevere的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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37 contractors | |
n.(建筑、监造中的)承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
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38 contractor | |
n.订约人,承包人,收缩肌 | |
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39 wrecked | |
adj.失事的,遇难的 | |
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40 inception | |
n.开端,开始,取得学位 | |
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41 authorize | |
v.授权,委任;批准,认可 | |
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42 authorized | |
a.委任的,许可的 | |
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43 appropriations | |
n.挪用(appropriation的复数形式) | |
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44 impetus | |
n.推动,促进,刺激;推动力 | |
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45 vanquish | |
v.征服,战胜;克服;抑制 | |
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46 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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47 promotion | |
n.提升,晋级;促销,宣传 | |
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48 unanimity | |
n.全体一致,一致同意 | |
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49 epoch | |
n.(新)时代;历元 | |
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50 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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51 enactment | |
n.演出,担任…角色;制订,通过 | |
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52 authorization | |
n.授权,委任状 | |
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53 germane | |
adj.关系密切的,恰当的 | |
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54 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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55 overestimate | |
v.估计过高,过高评价 | |
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56 reconstruction | |
n.重建,再现,复原 | |
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57 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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58 perpetuation | |
n.永存,不朽 | |
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59 elimination | |
n.排除,消除,消灭 | |
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60 lumber | |
n.木材,木料;v.以破旧东西堆满;伐木;笨重移动 | |
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61 stimulated | |
a.刺激的 | |
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62 extravagant | |
adj.奢侈的;过分的;(言行等)放肆的 | |
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63 wasteful | |
adj.(造成)浪费的,挥霍的 | |
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64 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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65 expedient | |
adj.有用的,有利的;n.紧急的办法,权宜之计 | |
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66 avert | |
v.防止,避免;转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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67 civilian | |
adj.平民的,民用的,民众的 | |
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68 civilians | |
平民,百姓( civilian的名词复数 ); 老百姓 | |
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69 steers | |
n.阉公牛,肉用公牛( steer的名词复数 )v.驾驶( steer的第三人称单数 );操纵;控制;引导 | |
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70 celebrated | |
adj.有名的,声誉卓著的 | |
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71 frigate | |
n.护航舰,大型驱逐舰 | |
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72 paralysis | |
n.麻痹(症);瘫痪(症) | |
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73 banking | |
n.银行业,银行学,金融业 | |
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74 steamship | |
n.汽船,轮船 | |
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75 steamships | |
n.汽船,大轮船( steamship的名词复数 ) | |
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76 plying | |
v.使用(工具)( ply的现在分词 );经常供应(食物、饮料);固定往来;经营生意 | |
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77 concise | |
adj.简洁的,简明的 | |
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78 compartment | |
n.卧车包房,隔间;分隔的空间 | |
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79 vertical | |
adj.垂直的,顶点的,纵向的;n.垂直物,垂直的位置 | |
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80 cylinders | |
n.圆筒( cylinder的名词复数 );圆柱;汽缸;(尤指用作容器的)圆筒状物 | |
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81 inverted | |
adj.反向的,倒转的v.使倒置,使反转( invert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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82 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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83 amazement | |
n.惊奇,惊讶 | |
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84 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
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85 alterations | |
n.改动( alteration的名词复数 );更改;变化;改变 | |
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86 hull | |
n.船身;(果、实等的)外壳;vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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87 overhauling | |
n.大修;拆修;卸修;翻修v.彻底检查( overhaul的现在分词 );大修;赶上;超越 | |
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88 besought | |
v.恳求,乞求(某事物)( beseech的过去式和过去分词 );(beseech的过去式与过去分词) | |
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89 labor | |
n.劳动,努力,工作,劳工;分娩;vi.劳动,努力,苦干;vt.详细分析;麻烦 | |
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90 agitators | |
n.(尤指政治变革的)鼓动者( agitator的名词复数 );煽动者;搅拌器;搅拌机 | |
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91 scotch | |
n.伤口,刻痕;苏格兰威士忌酒;v.粉碎,消灭,阻止;adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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92 specification | |
n.详述;[常pl.]规格,说明书,规范 | |
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93 specifications | |
n.规格;载明;详述;(产品等的)说明书;说明书( specification的名词复数 );详细的计划书;载明;详述 | |
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94 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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95 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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96 elastic | |
n.橡皮圈,松紧带;adj.有弹性的;灵活的 | |
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97 inspection | |
n.检查,审查,检阅 | |
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98 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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99 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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100 inspector | |
n.检查员,监察员,视察员 | |
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101 inspectors | |
n.检查员( inspector的名词复数 );(英国公共汽车或火车上的)查票员;(警察)巡官;检阅官 | |
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102 rigid | |
adj.严格的,死板的;刚硬的,僵硬的 | |
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103 formulating | |
v.构想出( formulate的现在分词 );规划;确切地阐述;用公式表示 | |
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104 formulated | |
v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 );规划;确切地阐述;用公式表示 | |
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105 embodied | |
v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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106 bidder | |
n.(拍卖时的)出价人,报价人,投标人 | |
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107 bidders | |
n.出价者,投标人( bidder的名词复数 ) | |
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108 prolixity | |
n.冗长,罗嗦 | |
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109 misgivings | |
n.疑虑,担忧,害怕;疑虑,担心,恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 );疑惧 | |
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110 inflexible | |
adj.不可改变的,不受影响的,不屈服的 | |
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111 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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112 solvent | |
n.溶剂;adj.有偿付能力的 | |
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113 amendment | |
n.改正,修正,改善,修正案 | |
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114 modification | |
n.修改,改进,缓和,减轻 | |
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115 equitable | |
adj.公平的;公正的 | |
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116 martyr | |
n.烈士,殉难者;vt.杀害,折磨,牺牲 | |
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117 juncture | |
n.时刻,关键时刻,紧要关头 | |
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118 partially | |
adv.部分地,从某些方面讲 | |
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119 deliberately | |
adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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120 candor | |
n.坦白,率真 | |
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121 mincing | |
adj.矫饰的;v.切碎;切碎 | |
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122 hewed | |
v.(用斧、刀等)砍、劈( hew的过去式和过去分词 );砍成;劈出;开辟 | |
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123 portfolio | |
n.公事包;文件夹;大臣及部长职位 | |
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124 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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125 lustre | |
n.光亮,光泽;荣誉 | |
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126 hulls | |
船体( hull的名词复数 ); 船身; 外壳; 豆荚 | |
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127 outfit | |
n.(为特殊用途的)全套装备,全套服装 | |
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128 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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129 inefficient | |
adj.效率低的,无效的 | |
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130 specimens | |
n.样品( specimen的名词复数 );范例;(化验的)抽样;某种类型的人 | |
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131 uproar | |
n.骚动,喧嚣,鼎沸 | |
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132 pervaded | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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133 untold | |
adj.数不清的,无数的 | |
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134 adverse | |
adj.不利的;有害的;敌对的,不友好的 | |
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135 conditionally | |
adv. 有条件地 | |
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136 contention | |
n.争论,争辩,论战;论点,主张 | |
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137 compliance | |
n.顺从;服从;附和;屈从 | |
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138 retirement | |
n.退休,退职 | |
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139 assailed | |
v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 );困扰;质问;毅然应对 | |
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140 conspicuous | |
adj.明眼的,惹人注目的;炫耀的,摆阔气的 | |
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141 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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142 capabilities | |
n.能力( capability的名词复数 );可能;容量;[复数]潜在能力 | |
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143 superintendents | |
警长( superintendent的名词复数 ); (大楼的)管理人; 监管人; (美国)警察局长 | |
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144 barbarian | |
n.野蛮人;adj.野蛮(人)的;未开化的 | |
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145 loath | |
adj.不愿意的;勉强的 | |
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146 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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147 boiler | |
n.锅炉;煮器(壶,锅等) | |
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148 boilers | |
锅炉,烧水器,水壶( boiler的名词复数 ) | |
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149 obnoxious | |
adj.极恼人的,讨人厌的,可憎的 | |
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150 minor | |
adj.较小(少)的,较次要的;n.辅修学科;vi.辅修 | |
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151 lug | |
n.柄,突出部,螺帽;(英)耳朵;(俚)笨蛋;vt.拖,拉,用力拖动 | |
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152 inadequate | |
adj.(for,to)不充足的,不适当的 | |
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153 afterward | |
adv.后来;以后 | |
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154 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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155 promptly | |
adv.及时地,敏捷地 | |
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156 embodying | |
v.表现( embody的现在分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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157 embody | |
vt.具体表达,使具体化;包含,收录 | |
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158 emboldened | |
v.鼓励,使有胆量( embolden的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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159 herald | |
vt.预示...的来临,预告,宣布,欢迎 | |
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160 lavishly | |
adv.慷慨地,大方地 | |
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161 laboring | |
n.劳动,操劳v.努力争取(for)( labor的现在分词 );苦干;详细分析;(指引擎)缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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162 consolidation | |
n.合并,巩固 | |
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163 constructive | |
adj.建设的,建设性的 | |
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164 tact | |
n.机敏,圆滑,得体 | |
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165 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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166 administrative | |
adj.行政的,管理的 | |
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167 civic | |
adj.城市的,都市的,市民的,公民的 | |
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168 adviser | |
n.劝告者,顾问 | |
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169 predilections | |
n.偏爱,偏好,嗜好( predilection的名词复数 ) | |
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170 manly | |
adj.有男子气概的;adv.男子般地,果断地 | |
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171 temperament | |
n.气质,性格,性情 | |
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172 imbued | |
v.使(某人/某事)充满或激起(感情等)( imbue的过去式和过去分词 );使充满;灌输;激发(强烈感情或品质等) | |
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173 coalesced | |
v.联合,合并( coalesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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174 excellence | |
n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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175 perpetuate | |
v.使永存,使永记不忘 | |
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176 detailed | |
adj.详细的,详尽的,极注意细节的,完全的 | |
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177 influential | |
adj.有影响的,有权势的 | |
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178 vehemently | |
adv. 热烈地 | |
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179 attested | |
adj.经检验证明无病的,经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 );证实;声称…属实;使宣誓 | |
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180 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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181 margin | |
n.页边空白;差额;余地,余裕;边,边缘 | |
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182 consecutive | |
adj.连续的,联贯的,始终一贯的 | |
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183 construed | |
v.解释(陈述、行为等)( construe的过去式和过去分词 );翻译,作句法分析 | |
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184 averting | |
防止,避免( avert的现在分词 ); 转移 | |
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185 computed | |
adj.[医]计算的,使用计算机的v.计算,估算( compute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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186 assented | |
同意,赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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187 adoption | |
n.采用,采纳,通过;收养 | |
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188 stipulate | |
vt.规定,(作为条件)讲定,保证 | |
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189 deducted | |
v.扣除,减去( deduct的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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190 terse | |
adj.(说话,文笔)精炼的,简明的 | |
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191 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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192 conclusive | |
adj.最后的,结论的;确凿的,消除怀疑的 | |
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193 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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194 graphically | |
adv.通过图表;生动地,轮廓分明地 | |
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195 auspices | |
n.资助,赞助 | |
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196 entanglements | |
n.瓜葛( entanglement的名词复数 );牵连;纠缠;缠住 | |
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197 judicial | |
adj.司法的,法庭的,审判的,明断的,公正的 | |
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198 lengthen | |
vt.使伸长,延长 | |
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199 pertaining | |
与…有关系的,附属…的,为…固有的(to) | |
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200 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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201 peremptory | |
adj.紧急的,专横的,断然的 | |
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202 wont | |
adj.习惯于;v.习惯;n.习惯 | |
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203 predecessor | |
n.前辈,前任 | |
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204 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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205 projectile | |
n.投射物,发射体;adj.向前开进的;推进的;抛掷的 | |
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206 penetrate | |
v.透(渗)入;刺入,刺穿;洞察,了解 | |
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207 persistent | |
adj.坚持不懈的,执意的;持续的 | |
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208 perplexed | |
adj.不知所措的 | |
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209 transpired | |
(事实,秘密等)被人知道( transpire的过去式和过去分词 ); 泄露; 显露; 发生 | |
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210 abreast | |
adv.并排地;跟上(时代)的步伐,与…并进地 | |
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211 schooner | |
n.纵帆船 | |
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212 penetration | |
n.穿透,穿人,渗透 | |
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213 foundering | |
v.创始人( founder的现在分词 ) | |
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214 ramming | |
n.打结炉底v.夯实(土等)( ram的现在分词 );猛撞;猛压;反复灌输 | |
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215 lengthened | |
(时间或空间)延长,伸长( lengthen的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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216 foresight | |
n.先见之明,深谋远虑 | |
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217 memoir | |
n.[pl.]回忆录,自传;记事录 | |
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218 modifications | |
n.缓和( modification的名词复数 );限制;更改;改变 | |
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219 redounded | |
v.有助益( redound的过去式和过去分词 );及于;报偿;报应 | |
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220 advantageous | |
adj.有利的;有帮助的 | |
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221 recurring | |
adj.往复的,再次发生的 | |
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222 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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223 resentment | |
n.怨愤,忿恨 | |
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224 precludes | |
v.阻止( preclude的第三人称单数 );排除;妨碍;使…行不通 | |
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225 antagonism | |
n.对抗,敌对,对立 | |
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226 augment | |
vt.(使)增大,增加,增长,扩张 | |
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227 delved | |
v.深入探究,钻研( delve的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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228 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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229 accomplishment | |
n.完成,成就,(pl.)造诣,技能 | |
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230 warfare | |
n.战争(状态);斗争;冲突 | |
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231 gainsay | |
v.否认,反驳 | |
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232 conversancy | |
n.熟练,精通 | |
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233 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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234 exalt | |
v.赞扬,歌颂,晋升,提升 | |
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235 mechanism | |
n.机械装置;机构,结构 | |
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236 consorts | |
n.配偶( consort的名词复数 );(演奏古典音乐的)一组乐师;一组古典乐器;一起v.结伴( consort的第三人称单数 );交往;相称;调和 | |
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237 depreciate | |
v.降价,贬值,折旧 | |
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238 propulsive | |
adj.推进的 | |
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239 auxiliary | |
adj.辅助的,备用的 | |
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240 radically | |
ad.根本地,本质地 | |
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241 erase | |
v.擦掉;消除某事物的痕迹 | |
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242 complexity | |
n.复杂(性),复杂的事物 | |
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243 multiplication | |
n.增加,增多,倍增;增殖,繁殖;乘法 | |
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244 entailed | |
使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 ); 需要; 限定继承; 使必需 | |
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245 Augmented | |
adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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246 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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247 entails | |
使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 ); 需要; 限定继承; 使必需 | |
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248 relegated | |
v.使降级( relegate的过去式和过去分词 );使降职;转移;把…归类 | |
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249 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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250 evade | |
vt.逃避,回避;避开,躲避 | |
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251 mitigate | |
vt.(使)减轻,(使)缓和 | |
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252 arduous | |
adj.艰苦的,费力的,陡峭的 | |
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253 scant | |
adj.不充分的,不足的;v.减缩,限制,忽略 | |
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254 penetrating | |
adj.(声音)响亮的,尖锐的adj.(气味)刺激的adj.(思想)敏锐的,有洞察力的 | |
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255 adherence | |
n.信奉,依附,坚持,固着 | |
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256 devout | |
adj.虔诚的,虔敬的,衷心的 (n.devoutness) | |
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257 frailty | |
n.脆弱;意志薄弱 | |
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258 precept | |
n.戒律;格言 | |
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259 complexities | |
复杂性(complexity的名词复数); 复杂的事物 | |
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260 peculiarities | |
n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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261 actively | |
adv.积极地,勤奋地 | |
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262 lesser | |
adj.次要的,较小的;adv.较小地,较少地 | |
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263 mechanisms | |
n.机械( mechanism的名词复数 );机械装置;[生物学] 机制;机械作用 | |
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264 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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265 monarch | |
n.帝王,君主,最高统治者 | |
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266 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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267 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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268 autocracy | |
n.独裁政治,独裁政府 | |
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269 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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270 differentiate | |
vi.(between)区分;vt.区别;使不同 | |
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271 deviate | |
v.(from)背离,偏离 | |
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272 embargo | |
n.禁运(令);vt.对...实行禁运,禁止(通商) | |
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273 merged | |
(使)混合( merge的过去式和过去分词 ); 相融; 融入; 渐渐消失在某物中 | |
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274 inviting | |
adj.诱人的,引人注目的 | |
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275 emancipated | |
adj.被解放的,不受约束的v.解放某人(尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚)( emancipate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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276 dominion | |
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
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277 cloister | |
n.修道院;v.隐退,使与世隔绝 | |
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278 torpedo | |
n.水雷,地雷;v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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279 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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280 quotation | |
n.引文,引语,语录;报价,牌价,行情 | |
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281 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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282 vanquished | |
v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 );战胜;克服;抑制 | |
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283 waning | |
adj.(月亮)渐亏的,逐渐减弱或变小的n.月亏v.衰落( wane的现在分词 );(月)亏;变小;变暗淡 | |
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