Discontent—at first whispered, and coming as the wind cometh—gradually took tongue; and discussion of the situation grew loud and varied3. One side declared that the orders for a general advance had been already given, when the President countermanded4 them upon the field, and sent orders by General Bonham to withdraw the pursuit. Another version of this reason was that there had been a council of the generals and Mr. Davis, at which it was agreed that the North must now be convinced of the utter futility5 of persisting in invasion; and that in the reaction her conservative men would make themselves heard; whereas the occupation of Washington would inflame6 the North and cause the people to rise as one man for the defense7 of their capital. An even wilder theory found believers; that the war in the South was simply one of defense, and crossing the Potomac would be invasion, the effect of which would retard8 recognition from abroad. Another again declared that there was a jealousy9 between Generals Johnston and Beauregard, and between each of them and the President, that prevented concert of action.
The people of the South were eminently11 democratic and had their own views—which they expressed with energy and vim—on all subjects during the war; so these theories, to account for the paralysis12 after Manassas, were each in turn discussed, and each found warm defenders13. But gradually it came to be generally conceded that none of them could be the true one. The President took no command on his visit to Manassas, for he reached the field only after the battle had been won and the flight commenced. Any suggestions that occurred to him were naturally made to General Johnston. There is good authority for stating that he did not make any criticism on one material point, stating to both generals that the whole plan, conduct and result of the battle met his fullest approval; and on reflection the whole people felt that their chief was too much a soldier to have committed the gross breach14 of discipline indicated. The story of the council came to be regarded as a silly fabrication. The fear of inflaming16 the North, coming on the heels of a complete and bloody17 victory, was about as funny as for a pugilist whose antagonist18's head was "in chancery" to cease striking lest he should anger him; and events immediately following Manassas showed there could be little jealousy or pique20 between the generals, or between them and the President. General Johnston, with the magnanimity of the true knight21 his whole career has shown him to be, declared that the credit of the plan and choice of the field of battle was due to General Beauregard; and Mr. Davis' proclamation on the success was couched in language that breathed only the most honest commendation of both generals and of their strategy. The fear of invasion prejudicing opinion abroad was as little believed as the other stories, for—outside of a small clique—there grew up at this time all over the South such a perfect confidence in its strength and its perfect ability to work its own oracle22, that very little care was felt for the action of Europe. In fact, the people were just now quite willing to wait for recognition of their independence by European powers, until it was already achieved. So, gradually the public mind settled down to the true reasons that mainly prevented the immediate19 following up of the victory.
A battle under all circumstances is a great confusion. With raw troops, who had never before been under fire, and who had been all day fiercely contending, until broken and disordered, the confusion must necessarily have been universal. As they broke, or fell back, brigade overlapped23 brigade, company mixed with company, and officers lost their regiments25. The face of the country, covered with thick underbrush, added to this result; so that when the enemy broke and the rout26 commenced, it was hard to tell whether pursuers or pursued were the most disorganized mass. The army of Manassas was almost entirely27 undisciplined, and had never before felt the intoxication28 of battle. On that terrible day it had fought with tenacity29 and pluck that belonged to the race; but it had largely been on the principle prevalent at weddings in the "ould country"—when you see a head, hit it! The few officers who desired a disciplined resistance soon saw the futility of obtaining it, and felt that as the men, individually, were fighting bravely and stubbornly, it were better only to hold them to that. When the pursuit came, the men were utterly30 worn and exhausted31; but, burning with the glow of battle, they followed the flying masses fast and far—each one led by his own instincts and rarely twenty of a company together.
A major-general, who left his leg on a later field, carried his company into this fight. During the pursuit he led it through a by-path to intercept32 a battery spurring down the road at full speed. They overtook it, mastered the gunners and turned the horses out of the press. In the deepening twilight33, he turned to thank the company, and found it composed of three of his own men, two "Tiger Rifles," a Washington artilleryman, three dismounted cavalry34 of the "Legion," a doctor, a quartermaster's clerk, and the Rev10. Chaplain of the First ——!
This was but a specimen35 of the style of the pursuit. There was but little cavalry—one regiment24 under Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart and a few single companies. No one brigade could be collected in anything like order; night was deepening and the enemy's flight was approaching what was reasonably supposed to be his reserve. Under these circumstances it was apparent that prudence36, if not necessity, dictated37 calling in the pursuit by the disordered troops. General Bonham—the ranking officer in front—saw this plainly; and on his own authority gave the order that appeared most proper to him. I never heard that, at this time, it was objected to by his superior officers.
Moreover, it was not only the demoralization caused by the pursuit that was sufficient reason for not following up Manassas. The army, ordinarily, was not in a condition to advance into an enemy's country, away from its regular communications. In the first place, there was no transportation, and the arms were bad. It was a work of time to utilize38 the spoils; to distribute arms where most needed; to put the captured batteries in condition for use; and to replace with the splendid ambulances and army wagons39, that had been prepared for the holiday march to Richmond, the hastily and clumsily-constructed ones already in use; and to so give out the captured horses as best to utilize them. This latter was of the utmost moment before an advance could be attempted. The Confederates were shorter of transportation—even of defective40 character—than of anything else; and for days after the fight the flood-gates of heaven seemed to stand open, to deluge41 the country around Manassas until it became a perfect lake of mud. Roads already bad were washed into gullies; holes generally knee-deep became impassable. It is perfectly42 easy, therefore, to understand why, for a week after the battle, delay was necessary; but as week after week passed, and there was still no forward movement, it ceased to be strange that the people should murmur43, and ask why it was the army was satisfied with laurels44 easily won when fresh ones were within its grasp. All felt that veteran officers handling raw troops had to be more careful in their management, and to count more closely before putting them into the new and dangerous position of an invading army, than would meet with the concurrence45 of a populace naturally ardent46 and doubly heated by triumph.
But it is equally true that for ten days after the battle, Washington lay perfectly at the mercy of the South; and by that time the army of Manassas was in better condition than could be expected later; and it was anxious to move forward.
But the auspicious47 moment was not seized; time was given for the broken fragments of the union army to be patched again into something like organization. Fresh forts and earthworks were hastily thrown up; a perfect chain of defenses formed around Washington, and strongly garrisoned48. The pickets49 of the opposing armies were near enough to exchange constant shots, and even occasional "chaff50."
Still there was no movement; the summer wore away in utter inactivity. The camp at Orange Courthouse began to be looked upon as a stationary51 affair; while the usual difficulties of camp life—aggravated by the newness of the troops and the natural indisposition of the southron to receive discipline—began to show themselves. The army at this time was principally composed of the better educated and better conditioned class, who were the first to volunteer; and as I have already said, many of the privates were men of high position, culture and wealth. Thus composed, it was equal to great deeds of gallantry and dash. Elan was its characteristic—but it was hard to reduce to the stratified regularity52 of an army. Napier has laid down as an axiom that no man is a good soldier until he has become a perfect machine. He must neither reason nor think—only obey. Critics, perhaps equally competent, in reviewing the Crimean war, differ from this and declare the main advantage of the French troops over the Russian was a certain individuality—a pride in themselves and their army that had been entirely drilled out of their stolid53 adversaries54. Be this as it may, the esprit de corps55 of the Frenchman was in his corps only as such; and he would no more have discussed the wisdom, or prudence of any order—even in his own mind—than he would have thought of disobeying it.
The steady-going professional men who sprung to arms throughout the South could face a deadly fire, without blenching56, for hours; but they could not help reasoning, with nothing to do for twenty hours out of every twenty-four.
The gay young graduates of the promenade57 and ball-room could march steadily58, even gaily59, into the fiery60 belching61 of a battery, but they could not learn the practice of unreasoning blindness; and the staunch, hard-fisted countryman felt there was no use in it—the thing was over if the fighting was done—and this was a waste of time. Nostalgia—that scourge62 of camps—began to creep among the latter class; discontent grew apace among the former. Still the camp was the great object of interest for miles around; there were reviews, parades and division dinners; ladies visited and inspected it, and some even lived within its lines; but the tone of the army went down gradually, but steadily. During the summer more than one of Beauregard's companies—though of the best material and with a brilliant record—had to be mustered63 out as "useless and insubordinate." Excellence64 in drill and attention to duty both decreased; and it was felt by competent judges that rust65 was gradually eating away the fabric15 of the army. This was certainly the fault to a great extent of the officers, though it may, in part, have been due to the men themselves. In the beginning these had tried honestly to choose those among them best fitted for command; but like all volunteers, they fell into the grave error of choosing the most popular. Almost all candidates for office were equally eligible66 and equally untried; so personal considerations naturally came into play. Once elected, they did their duty faithfully, in the field; but were either too weak, or too inexperienced, to keep the strict rules of discipline applied67 during the trying inactivity of camp; and they were too conscious of the social and mental equality of their men to enforce the distinction between officer and private, without which the command loses half its weight. In some instances, too, the desire for popularity and for future advancement68 at the hands of friends and neighbors introduced a spirit of demagogism hurtful in the extreme.
For these combined reasons the army of Manassas, which a few weeks before had gone so gaily "into the jaws69 of death," began rapidly to mildew70 through warp71 and woof; and the whole texture72 seemed on the point of giving way.
Thoughtful men—who had waited calmly and coolly when the first burst of impatience73 had gone up—began now to ask why and how long this lethargy was to continue. They saw its bad effects, but believed that at the next blast of the bugle74 every man would shake off the incubus75 and rise in his might a patriot76 soldier; they saw the steady stream of men from North and West pouring into Washington, to be at once bound and held with iron bands of discipline—the vast preparation in men, equipments, supplies and science that the North was using the precious days granted her to get in readiness for the next shock. But they felt confident that the southern army—if not allowed to rust too long—would again vindicate77 the name it had won at Manassas.
These thinkers saw that some branches of the Government still kept up its preparations. Throughout the length of the land foundries were going up, and every improvement that science or experience could suggest was making in the construction of arms and ammunition78; water-power, everywhere off the line of attack, was utilized79 for powder-mills and rope-walks; every cloth factory in the country was subsidized; and machinery80 of great variety and power was being imported on Government account. Over Richmond constantly hung a dense81 cloud of coal smoke; and the incessant82 buzz of machinery from factories, foundries and lathes83, told of increased rather than abated84 effort in that branch of the Government. Then, too, the most perfect confidence was felt in the great strategic ability of General Johnston—who had already found that high level in the opinion of his countrymen, from which neither the frowns of government, the combination of cliques85, nor the tongues of slanderers could afterward86 remove him.
They believed, too, in the pluck and dash of Beauregard; and, combining this with the outside activity, evident in every direction, felt there must be good and sufficient reason for the—to them—inexplicable quiet about the Potomac.
But perhaps the very worst feature was the effect of the victory upon the tone of the people at large. The very tongues that had wagged most impatiently at the first delay—that had set in motion the wild stories by which to account for it—had been the first to become blatant87 that the North was conquered. The minutest details of the fight were carried over the land, repeated at country courts and amplified88 at bar-room assemblages, until the common slang was everywhere heard that one Southron was equal to a dozen Yanks. Instead of using the time, so strangely given by the Government, in making earnest and steady strides toward increasing the army, improving its morale89 and adding to its supplies, the masses of the country were upon a rampage of boastfulness, and the notes of an inflated90 triumph rang from the Potomac to the Gulf91.
In this regard the effect of the victory was most injurious; and had it not been for the crushing results—from a strategic point of view—that would have followed it, partial defeat might have proved a blessing92 in its place.
The one, while it threw a gloom over the country, would have nerved the people to renewed exertion93 and made them look steadily and unwaveringly at the true dangers that threatened them. The other gave them time to fold their hands and indulge in a complacency, ridiculous as it was enervating94.
They ceased to realize the vast resources of the union in men, money and supplies; and more than all, they underrated the dogged perseverance95 of Yankee character. It was as though a young boxer96, in a deadly conflict with a giant, had dealt a staggering blow; and while the Titan braced97 his every muscle for a deadlier gripe, the weaker antagonist wasted his time lauding98 his strength and feeling his biceps.
Meantime, the keen, hard sense of the Washington Government wasted no time in utilizing99 the reaction on its people. The press and the public clamored for a victim, and General Scott was thrown into its maw unhesitatingly. The old hero was replaced by the new, and General McClellan—whose untried and inexperienced talent could hardly have augured100 his becoming, as he did, the best general of the northern army—was elevated to his place to please the "dear public."
The rabid crowds of men and men-women—whose prurient101 curiosity had driven them to follow the great on-to-Richmond, with hopes of a first view of the triumphant102 entry of the Grand Army—soon forgot their uncomfortable and terrified scramble103 to the rear. They easily changed their whine104 of terror to a song of triumph; and New England Judiths, burning to grasp the hair of the Holofernes over the Potomac, pricked105 the flagging zeal106 of their male companions.
The peculiar107 error that they were fighting for the union and the flag—so cruelly dissipated of late—threw thousands into the ranks; heavy bounties108 and hopes of plunder109 drew many more; and the still frequent interstices were filled with many an Irish-German amalgam110, that was supposed to be peculiarly good food for powder.
And so the summer wore on, the demoralizing influence of the inaction in the camps of the South increasing toward its close. The affair at Leesburg, occurring on the 20th of October, was another brilliant success, but equally barren of results. It showed that the men would still fight as readily and as fiercely, and that their officers would lead them as gallantly111, as before; it put a few hundred of the enemy hors de combat and maintained "the right of way" by the river to the South. But it was the occasion for another shout of triumph—perfectly incommensurate with its importance—to go up from the people; and it taught them still more to despise and underrate the power of the government they had so far successfully and brilliantly defied.
Elsewhere than on the Potomac line, the case had been a little different. Magruder, on the Peninsula, had gained no success of note. A few unimportant skirmishes had taken place and the Confederate lines had been contracted—more from choice than necessity. But the combatants were near enough—and respected each other enough—for constant watchfulness112 to be considered necessary; and, though the personnel of the army was, perhaps, not as good as that of the Potomac, in the main its condition was better.
At Norfolk nothing had been done but to strengthen the defenses. General Huger had striven to keep his men employed; and they, at least, did not despise the enemy that frowned at them from Fort Monroe, and frequently sent messages of compliment into their camps from the lips of the "Sawyer gun." The echo of the p?ans from Manassas came back to them, but softened113 by distance and tempered by their own experience—or want of it.
In Western Virginia there had been a dull, eventless campaign, of strategy rather than action. General Wise had taken command on the first of June, and early in August had been followed by General John B. Floyd—the ex-U.S. Secretary of War.
These two commanders unfortunately disagreed as to means and conduct of the campaign; and General R. E. Lee was sent to take general command on this—his first theater of active service. His management of the campaign was much criticised in many quarters; and the public verdict seemed to be that, though he had an army of twenty thousand men, tolerably equipped and familiar with the country, Rosecrans out-man?uvered him and accomplished114 his object in amusing so considerable a Confederate force. Certain it is that, after fronting Lee at Big Sewell for ten or twelve days, he suddenly withdrew in the night, without giving the former even a chance for a fight.
The dissatisfaction was universal and outspoken115; nor was it relieved by the several brilliant episodes of Gauley and Cotton Hill, that General Floyd managed to throw into his dark surroundings.
It is hard to tell how much foundation the press and the public had for this opinion. There had been no decisive disaster, if there had been no actual gain; and the main result had been to maim116 men and show that both sides would fight well enough to leave all collisions matters of doubt.
It may not here be out of place to correct a false impression that has crept into the history of the times regarding General Floyd. The courteous117 press of the North—and not a few political enemies who felt safety in their distance from him—constantly branded him as "traitor118" and "thief." They averred119 that he had misused120 his position and betrayed the confidence reposed121 in him as U.S. Secretary of War, to send government arms into the South in view of the approaching need for them. Even General Scott—whose position must have given him the means of knowing better—reiterates these calumnies122, the falsity of which the least investigation123 exposed at once.
Mr. Buchanan, in his late book, completely exonerates124 General Floyd from this charge; and the committee to whom it was referred reported that of 10,151 rifles distributed by him in 1860, the Southern and South-Western states received only 2,849!
Followed by the hate of one government to receive the coldness of the other, John B. Floyd still strove with all his strength for the cause he loved.
"After life's fitful fever he sleeps well"
in his dear Virginia soil; and whatever his faults—whatever his errors—no honest man, North or South, but must rejoice that his enemies even acquitted125 him of this one.
Then the results elsewhere had not been very encouraging when compared with the eastern campaign; though Sterling126 Price had managed to more than hold his own against all obstacles, and Jeff Thompson had been doing great things with little means in south-western Missouri.
Still, since Rich Mountain, no serious disaster had befallen Confederate arms, and the people were fain to be satisfied.
点击收听单词发音
1 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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2 lull | |
v.使安静,使入睡,缓和,哄骗;n.暂停,间歇 | |
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3 varied | |
adj.多样的,多变化的 | |
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4 countermanded | |
v.取消(命令),撤回( countermand的过去分词 ) | |
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5 futility | |
n.无用 | |
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6 inflame | |
v.使燃烧;使极度激动;使发炎 | |
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7 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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8 retard | |
n.阻止,延迟;vt.妨碍,延迟,使减速 | |
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9 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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10 rev | |
v.发动机旋转,加快速度 | |
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11 eminently | |
adv.突出地;显著地;不寻常地 | |
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12 paralysis | |
n.麻痹(症);瘫痪(症) | |
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13 defenders | |
n.防御者( defender的名词复数 );守卫者;保护者;辩护者 | |
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14 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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15 fabric | |
n.织物,织品,布;构造,结构,组织 | |
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16 inflaming | |
v.(使)变红,发怒,过热( inflame的现在分词 ) | |
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17 bloody | |
adj.非常的的;流血的;残忍的;adv.很;vt.血染 | |
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18 antagonist | |
n.敌人,对抗者,对手 | |
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19 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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20 pique | |
v.伤害…的自尊心,使生气 n.不满,生气 | |
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21 knight | |
n.骑士,武士;爵士 | |
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22 oracle | |
n.神谕,神谕处,预言 | |
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23 overlapped | |
_adj.重叠的v.部分重叠( overlap的过去式和过去分词 );(物体)部份重叠;交叠;(时间上)部份重叠 | |
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24 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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25 regiments | |
(军队的)团( regiment的名词复数 ); 大量的人或物 | |
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26 rout | |
n.溃退,溃败;v.击溃,打垮 | |
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27 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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28 intoxication | |
n.wild excitement;drunkenness;poisoning | |
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29 tenacity | |
n.坚韧 | |
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30 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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31 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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32 intercept | |
vt.拦截,截住,截击 | |
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33 twilight | |
n.暮光,黄昏;暮年,晚期,衰落时期 | |
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34 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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35 specimen | |
n.样本,标本 | |
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36 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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37 dictated | |
v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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38 utilize | |
vt.使用,利用 | |
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39 wagons | |
n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 );铁路货车;小手推车 | |
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40 defective | |
adj.有毛病的,有问题的,有瑕疵的 | |
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41 deluge | |
n./vt.洪水,暴雨,使泛滥 | |
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42 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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43 murmur | |
n.低语,低声的怨言;v.低语,低声而言 | |
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44 laurels | |
n.桂冠,荣誉 | |
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45 concurrence | |
n.同意;并发 | |
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46 ardent | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,强烈的,烈性的 | |
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47 auspicious | |
adj.吉利的;幸运的,吉兆的 | |
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48 garrisoned | |
卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 ); 派部队驻防 | |
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49 pickets | |
罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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50 chaff | |
v.取笑,嘲笑;n.谷壳 | |
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51 stationary | |
adj.固定的,静止不动的 | |
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52 regularity | |
n.规律性,规则性;匀称,整齐 | |
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53 stolid | |
adj.无动于衷的,感情麻木的 | |
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54 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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55 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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56 blenching | |
v.(因惊吓而)退缩,惊悸( blench的现在分词 );(使)变白,(使)变苍白 | |
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57 promenade | |
n./v.散步 | |
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58 steadily | |
adv.稳定地;不变地;持续地 | |
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59 gaily | |
adv.欢乐地,高兴地 | |
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60 fiery | |
adj.燃烧着的,火红的;暴躁的;激烈的 | |
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61 belching | |
n. 喷出,打嗝 动词belch的现在分词形式 | |
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62 scourge | |
n.灾难,祸害;v.蹂躏 | |
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63 mustered | |
v.集合,召集,集结(尤指部队)( muster的过去式和过去分词 );(自他人处)搜集某事物;聚集;激发 | |
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64 excellence | |
n.优秀,杰出,(pl.)优点,美德 | |
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65 rust | |
n.锈;v.生锈;(脑子)衰退 | |
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66 eligible | |
adj.有条件被选中的;(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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67 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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68 advancement | |
n.前进,促进,提升 | |
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69 jaws | |
n.口部;嘴 | |
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70 mildew | |
n.发霉;v.(使)发霉 | |
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71 warp | |
vt.弄歪,使翘曲,使不正常,歪曲,使有偏见 | |
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72 texture | |
n.(织物)质地;(材料)构造;结构;肌理 | |
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73 impatience | |
n.不耐烦,急躁 | |
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74 bugle | |
n.军号,号角,喇叭;v.吹号,吹号召集 | |
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75 incubus | |
n.负担;恶梦 | |
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76 patriot | |
n.爱国者,爱国主义者 | |
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77 vindicate | |
v.为…辩护或辩解,辩明;证明…正确 | |
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78 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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79 utilized | |
v.利用,使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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80 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
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81 dense | |
a.密集的,稠密的,浓密的;密度大的 | |
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82 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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83 lathes | |
车床( lathe的名词复数 ) | |
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84 abated | |
减少( abate的过去式和过去分词 ); 减去; 降价; 撤消(诉讼) | |
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85 cliques | |
n.小集团,小圈子,派系( clique的名词复数 ) | |
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86 afterward | |
adv.后来;以后 | |
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87 blatant | |
adj.厚颜无耻的;显眼的;炫耀的 | |
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88 amplified | |
放大,扩大( amplify的过去式和过去分词 ); 增强; 详述 | |
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89 morale | |
n.道德准则,士气,斗志 | |
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90 inflated | |
adj.(价格)飞涨的;(通货)膨胀的;言过其实的;充了气的v.使充气(于轮胎、气球等)( inflate的过去式和过去分词 );(使)膨胀;(使)通货膨胀;物价上涨 | |
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91 gulf | |
n.海湾;深渊,鸿沟;分歧,隔阂 | |
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92 blessing | |
n.祈神赐福;祷告;祝福,祝愿 | |
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93 exertion | |
n.尽力,努力 | |
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94 enervating | |
v.使衰弱,使失去活力( enervate的现在分词 ) | |
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95 perseverance | |
n.坚持不懈,不屈不挠 | |
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96 boxer | |
n.制箱者,拳击手 | |
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97 braced | |
adj.拉牢的v.支住( brace的过去式和过去分词 );撑牢;使自己站稳;振作起来 | |
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98 lauding | |
v.称赞,赞美( laud的现在分词 ) | |
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99 utilizing | |
v.利用,使用( utilize的现在分词 ) | |
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100 augured | |
v.预示,预兆,预言( augur的过去式和过去分词 );成为预兆;占卜 | |
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101 prurient | |
adj.好色的,淫乱的 | |
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102 triumphant | |
adj.胜利的,成功的;狂欢的,喜悦的 | |
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103 scramble | |
v.爬行,攀爬,杂乱蔓延,碎片,片段,废料 | |
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104 whine | |
v.哀号,号哭;n.哀鸣 | |
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105 pricked | |
刺,扎,戳( prick的过去式和过去分词 ); 刺伤; 刺痛; 使剧痛 | |
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106 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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107 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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108 bounties | |
(由政府提供的)奖金( bounty的名词复数 ); 赏金; 慷慨; 大方 | |
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109 plunder | |
vt.劫掠财物,掠夺;n.劫掠物,赃物;劫掠 | |
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110 amalgam | |
n.混合物;汞合金 | |
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111 gallantly | |
adv. 漂亮地,勇敢地,献殷勤地 | |
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112 watchfulness | |
警惕,留心; 警觉(性) | |
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113 softened | |
(使)变软( soften的过去式和过去分词 ); 缓解打击; 缓和; 安慰 | |
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114 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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115 outspoken | |
adj.直言无讳的,坦率的,坦白无隐的 | |
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116 maim | |
v.使残废,使不能工作,使伤残 | |
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117 courteous | |
adj.彬彬有礼的,客气的 | |
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118 traitor | |
n.叛徒,卖国贼 | |
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119 averred | |
v.断言( aver的过去式和过去分词 );证实;证明…属实;作为事实提出 | |
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120 misused | |
v.使用…不当( misuse的过去式和过去分词 );把…派作不正当的用途;虐待;滥用 | |
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121 reposed | |
v.将(手臂等)靠在某人(某物)上( repose的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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122 calumnies | |
n.诬蔑,诽谤,中伤(的话)( calumny的名词复数 ) | |
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123 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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124 exonerates | |
n.免罪,免除( exonerate的名词复数 )v.使免罪,免除( exonerate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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125 acquitted | |
宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 ); 使(自己)作出某种表现 | |
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126 sterling | |
adj.英币的(纯粹的,货真价实的);n.英国货币(英镑) | |
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