A great and increasing proportion of persons would, if you asked them, maintain that all convictions are merely opinions. But it is not so. A fool may opine absolutely that a wise man is a fool, but the wise man knows that the fool is one. The same or opposite conclusions, political or{203} otherwise, may be arrived at by two persons from a view of the same facts, and each may be equally confident; but the conclusions of one may be knowledge, and those of the other opinion. The reality of the difference is indicated by the difference of the feelings which commonly subsist4 between those who opine and those who know. Those who opine hate those who know, and who speak as those who know. They think it an assumption of superiority, whereas it is only its reality, and cannot but appear more or less in its manner of expression. Those who know, are only contemptuous or indifferent towards such as impudently5 or ignorantly opine. The consequence is that the knowledge which is wisdom is nowhere, as an acknowledged force and factor in worldly affairs, and is only able to assert itself sub rosa, or by accident, or by the more or less underhand management of folly6 and ignorance.
What most people call “deep and earnest convictions” on political and social topics are generally muddle-headed medleys7 of knowledge of fact and opinion. They know that such and such a thing is an evil, and they opine that they see a way to amend8 it; and if wiser people point out to them that the evil would not be so amended9, or that greater evils would accrue10 from the attempt, they only feel that their “convictions” are affronted{204} and opposed by cold-blooded calculations. This kind of opinion is often as confident as actual knowledge. When Carlyle said that it was impossible to believe a lie, he can only have meant that it was impossible to believe it with that highest kind of certitude which consists in intellectual perception. Probably no one could believe a lie with that degree of faith which would enable him to suffer deliberate martyrdom for it. Protestant and Catholic martyrs11 have usually been sufferers for one and the same faith, or, at least, parts of the same faith, in which parts they have considered the whole to be involved. Very few, if any, have ever carried the courage of mere3 “opinions” to the stake.
There can be no absolute certitude about the impressions of the senses or the inferences drawn12 from them. There can be about moral and spiritual things. The knave13 may sincerely opine that it is best for his interests to lie and cheat; but the honest man knows that he is a being whose interests are above all external contingencies14, and that under certain circumstances it would be madness to behave otherwise than in a way which would be directly opposed to every argument and persuasion15 of the senses. It is only the mind of the most highly “scientific” constitution that will have its confidence in know{205}ledge of this kind tried by considerations of its moral and intellectual obligations to Hottentots and Australian aborigines. “We can live in houses without being architects”; and we can know, without knowing or caring to know how we came by our knowledge. The house of the gods has lasted intact since Abraham and Hesiod, and shows no sign yet of tumbling about our ears.
The faculty16 of knowing, as differing from that of opining, seems, as might be expected from what has been said, to have as much to do with the character of the will as of the mind. To be honest, Shakespeare tells us, is to be one in ten thousand; and to discern intellectually, or to know, is a part, and a very great part, of honesty. A man may have learned a dozen languages, and have the whole circle of the sciences at his fingers’ ends, and may know nothing worthy17 of being called knowledge; indeed, there is nothing which seems to be a greater hindrance18 to the acquisition of living knowledge than an engrossing20 devotion to the acquisition of words, facts, logical methods, and natural laws. It requires little learning to make a wise or truly knowing man, but much learning may not impossibly spoil one.
Mr. Matthew Arnold has said that a thorough classical education has often the same effects on a man’s character as a grave experience. The{206} reason is that it is a grave experience, a long series of small exercises of honesty, patience, and self-sacrifice, the sum of which is equal to a great and soul-sobering calamity21. The author of the Imitation notes a kindred fact when he says, “No man can know anything till he is tried.” Not only is the discipline of such an education, which, in its early stage at least has much in it that is repugnant and compulsory22, fitted to qualify the character for the reception of true knowledge, but it conveys also, in an eminent23 degree, the matter of true knowledge. Without any disrespect to Mr. Huxley, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and Professor Max Müller, we may affirm that the man who knew Plato, Homer, and ?schylus rightly, and knew little else, would know far more than he who knew all that these great scientists could teach, and knew nothing else.
The man who knows, often finds himself at great disadvantage in the presence of fact-gatherers and persons who opine. His attitude is necessarily affirmative, and often, to the great scandal and contempt of his adversaries25, simply affirmative. It does not enter into his calculations to have actively26 to defend a position which he sees to be impregnable; and when he leaves his proper occupation of “climbing trees in the Hesperides” to wield28 his club against those who know of no such{207} trees, he is like a Hercules fighting mosquitoes. They cannot even see his club, and the conflict generally ends, as did that between the Lady and Comus, with an angry and wholly unconvincing assertion of incompetence29.
Fain would I something say, yet to what end?
Thou hast nor ear, nor soul to apprehend30
The sublime31 notion and high mystery
That must be utter’d to unfold the sage32
And serious doctrine33 of virginity.
And thou art worthy that thou should’st not know
More happiness than is thy present lot.
Enjoy your dear wit and gay rhetoric34,
That hath so well been taught her dazzling fence;
Thou art not fit to hear thyself convinced.
Wordsworth, in a still greater passion, calls his scientific adversary35 “a fingering slave.” Of course this sort of thing tends to make the relations of the parties unpleasant; and in the eyes of the world the man of immense “information” and convinced ignorance goes off with the laurels36.
Metaphysics for the most part is justly open to the objection that it attempts to explain things which Aristotle declares to be too simple to be intelligible37—things which we cannot see with definiteness, not because they are beyond the focus of the mind’s eye, but because they are too much within it. The metaphysician Hegel says{208} that the sense of honour arises from our consciousness of infinite personal value. This may not be wholly satisfactory, but it is helpful; it is a part of the truth. But what do physicists38 make of such things as honour and chastity? They certainly endeavour to explain such ideas and feelings as they do everything else, but their explanations necessarily discredit39 these and all other things which profess24 to have “infinite value,” and which wise men know to have infinite value.
The knowledge which can be made common to all, is a foundation upon which a certain increasing school, finding popular “opinion” too sandy, is endeavouring to build up a new state of things, religious, moral, political, and social. This kind of “positivism,” which claims for its sanction the common, that is to say, the lowest experience of mankind, is and always has been the religion of the vulgar, to whatever class they belong. The growth of an unconscious and undogmatic positivism among the people at large is perhaps the most notable fact of the time. It shows itself not only in an increasing impatience40 of the notion that there is any reality which cannot be seen and felt, but in an intolerance even of any experience which is not, or cannot immediately be made, the experience of all. As boards and committees proverbially have to work on the level of the least{209} wise of their members, so the ideal perfection of this positivism would be government by the insight of the greatest dunderhead, since his experiences and perceptions alone would be sufficiently41 communicable to have the character of universality. Under such ideal conditions, every reality that makes life human would be completely eliminated. A man who should be detected in secretly entertaining principles of abstract honour, or trying to form his life upon the pattern of a beauty unknown to the arch-dunderhead, would fare as it fared in Athens with the man who dared to crown his house with a pediment; and vestries, consisting of the prophets of commonplace and popular experience, would vote everything in painting and poetry to be “bosh” which should be more esoteric in character than Frith’s “Railway Station” or Martin Tupper’s Proverbial Philosophy.
Science has already come very generally to mean, not that which may be known, but only such knowledge as every animal with faculties42 a little above those of an ant or a beaver43 can be induced to admit. Incommunicable knowledge, or knowledge which can be communicated at present only to a portion—perhaps a small portion—of mankind, is already affirmed to be no knowledge at all. A man who knows and acts up to his knowledge that it is better to suffer or inflict{210} any extremity44 of temporal evil, rather than lie or cheat, though he may not be able to give any universally intelligible account of his knowledge, is already beginning to be looked upon as a prig or a fanatic45; and chastity is already widely declared to be one of the “dead virtues,” and marriage only legalised fornication, because “the sublime notion and high mystery that must be uttered to unfold the sage and serious doctrine” of purity must be taken, if taken at all by the many, upon trust.
The pure and simple ideal of life founded upon facts of universal experience is, however, too base ever to be perfectly1 attained47 in this world. There will always be a lingering suspicion with many that some have powers of discernment and an experience which are not granted to all; there will always be hidden heretics who will believe that there are realities which cannot be seen or touched by the natural eye or hand, or even by the rational perception of the many; and the present downward tendency may perhaps be checked, or at least delayed, by recalling to the minds of men that, as yet, we are all living more or less by faith in the better knowledge of the few, and by reminding them of that abyss towards which a new step is taken whenever any item of that knowledge is denied, in order to{211} widen the foundations of the throne of popular experience.
The religion of universal experience must of course begin, as the dogmatic positivist insists, in the denial of God, or, what is exactly equivalent, in the assertion that, if God exists, He is altogether unknowable and removed from the practical interests of life. Now, let it be remembered that for a man to deny that God can be known is quite a different thing from his not being able to affirm, from positive knowledge, the reverse. A very small minority of mankind, but a minority which includes almost all who have attained the highest peaks of heroic virtue46, and many who have been no less eminent for power of intellect and practical wisdom, have declared that, to them at least, God is knowable, communicable with, and personally discernible with a certainty which exceeds all other certainties; and they have further affirmed that this knowledge comes and can only come from a man’s putting himself en rapport49 with the Divinity by an, in the beginning, more or less experimental faith, and by a conformity50 to the dictates51 of the highest conscience, so perfect as to involve, for a considerable period at least, laborious52 and painful self-denial. Now it would be placing oneself upon a level with such assertors of the highest knowledge to say that one knows that these declarations{212} are true, however strong the presumption53 of their truth may appear; but it is simply vulgar and brutal54 impudence55 for any one to assert positively56 that they are untruths or illusions, merely because his own experience and that of his pot-companions contains nothing which gives the least clue to their meaning. The reductio ad absurdum becomes complete when the same argument is carried into regions of more extended experience. A drunken bargeman has exactly the same right to deny the reality of the asserted experiences of a Petrarch or a Wordsworth as these would have to deny those of the saint or the apostle; and to descend57 a few steps farther, the amateur of abominable58 delights and the violator of natural relationships would justly, upon the widest experimental grounds, claim exemption59 from a condemnation60 chiefly founded upon an obscure perception and an intuitive horror of which he for his part had no experience.
Popular positivism will, however, always stop short of the length to which the doctrines61 of its prophets would lead it, and will, from time to time, be beaten back into the paths of the positivism of the nobler few on which all virtue and religion are founded, by finding itself in contact with the tremendous paradox62, that the most universally beneficial and admired fruits of civilisation63 are and{213} always have been gathered from trees of which the roots are wholly out of common view. The heroes themselves of the people will always refute popular experience better than any philosopher can. Though a Gladstone may dazzle them for a day by investing with a fatuous64 glamour65 the principles and platitudes67 with which the vulgar are familiar, it is to a Gordon, with inimitable courage and honour, the obvious outcome of unintelligible68 thoughts and experiences, that they will look with abiding69 reverence70, and an elevating instinct that such men habitually71 move about in worlds by them unrealised.
The immense and unalterable inequalities in the knowing faculties of man are the source and in part the justification72 of that social inequality which roughly and very partially73 reflects them. Many otherwise amiable74 and conservative thinkers have, however, made the mistake of conceding that such inequality is, abstractedly considered, an evil, though a hopelessly incurable75 one. Conservative teaching would be much more effective than it is, were it more frequently occupied with proving that such inequality is no evil, but a very great good for all parties.
Dr. Johnson, who sometimes let fall, in off-hand talk, sayings of such depth, simplicity76, and significance that we must go back to the philosophers of{214} antiquity77 to find the like of them, once remarked that “inequality is the source of all delight.” This saying, which must seem surprising to most modern ears, is absolutely true and even demonstrable.
All delight—not all pleasure, which is quite a different thing—will be found, when thoroughly78 examined, to consist in the rendering79 and receiving of love and the services of love. Hence the great and fortunately inextinguishable fountains of delight in the relationships of man and woman and of parents and children. It is true that a low and inorganic80 form of national polity may, to some extent, suppress even these pure springs of felicity; but, so long as there are women and children in the world, it can never become quite joyless. The doctrines of liberty, fraternity, and equality are known instinctively81 only by very bad children, and most women, when once they have been in love, repudiate82 such teaching indignantly, under whatever polity they may have been born.
Between unequals sweet is equal love;
and the fact is that there is no love, and therefore no sweetness, which is not thus conditioned; and the greater the inequality the greater the sweetness. Hence the doctrine that infinite felicity can only arise from the mutual83 love of beings{215} infinitely84 unequal—that is, of the creator and the creature. Inequality, far from implying any dishonour85 on either side of the mutual compact of love, is the source of honour to both. Hooker, writing of marriage, says: “It is no small honour to a man that a creature so like himself should be subjected to him”; and we all know that the honour to woman which the chivalry86 of the middle ages made an abiding constituent87 of civilisation, was founded upon Catholic views of her subjection, and the obligation to give special honour, as of right, to the weaker vessel88. Look also at the relations which usually subsist between an hereditary89 gentleman and his hereditary unequals and dependants90, and compare them with the ordinary fraternal relations between a Radical91 master-tradesman and his workmen. The intercourse92 between the gentleman and his hind19 or labourer is free, cheerful, and exhilarating, because there is commonly in it the only equality worth regarding, that of goodwill93; whereas the commands of the sugar-boiler or the screw-maker to their brothers are probably given with a frown and received with a scowl94. Social inequality, since it arises from unalterable nature and inevitable95 chance, is irritating only when it is not recognised. The American plutocrat may be forced to travel for a week in the company of a hodman, because{216} American theories discountenance first and third class carriages; but catch him speaking to him! Whereas an English duke, if by chance thrown into the companionship of an honest countryman, would be on the best of terms with him before an hour was over, and the good understanding between the two would be made all the easier should the latter have on his distinguishing smock-frock. The genuine Tory is the most accessible of persons, the genuine Radical the least so. The one takes things as they are and must be, the other views them as they are not and cannot be, and, kicking against imaginary evils, often pays the penalty of finding himself firmly saddled with the realities.
“One can live in a house without being an architect,” and it is not at all necessary that the common people should understand the English constitution in order to feel that their lives are the sweeter and nobler because they are members of its living organism. Not a ploughboy or a milkmaid but would feel, without in the least knowing why, that a light had passed from their lives with the disappearance96 of social inequalities, and the consequent loss of their dignity as integral parts of a somewhat that was greater than themselves.
The other day, walking in a country lane, I saw what appeared at a little distance to be a dying{217} animal. On a closer view it proved to be the carcase of a sheep which had in great measure been actually transformed into a mass of the soft, white, malodorous grubs known to anglers by the name of gentles. The struggles of these creatures to get at the food which they concealed97 produced a strong and regular pulsation98 throughout the whole mass, and gave it a ghastly semblance99 of breathing. The ordered state of England, according to its ideal, which for many generations has been more or less realised, compared with the sort of democracy to which we are fast drifting and have wellnigh attained, is much like the animal in which myriads100 of individual organs, nerves, veins101, tissues, and cells formed subordinated parts of one living thing, compared with this pulsating102 mass of grubs, each one of which had no thought but of its just share of carrion103.
Democracy is only a continually shifting aristocracy of money, impudence, animal energy, and cunning, in which the best grub gets the best of the carrion; and the level to which it tends to bring all things is not a mountain tableland, as its promoters would have their victims think, but the unwholesome platitude66 of the fen27 and the morass104, of which black envy would enjoy the malaria105 so long as all others shared in it. Whatever may be the pretences106 set forth107 by the lead{218}ing advocates of such a state of things among us, it is manifest enough that black envy is the principal motive108 with many of them, who hate the beauty of the ordered life, to be ruling stars of which they cannot attain48, just as certain others are said to “hate the happy light from which they fell.” They hate hereditary honours, chiefly because they produce hereditary honour, and create a standard of truth and courage for which even the basest are the better in so far as they are shamed by it. Do the United States, some may ask, justify109 this condemnation? They are but a poor approach to the idea of democracy which seems now about to be realised among us: but they have already gone a long way towards extinguishing that last glory of, and now best substitute for, a generally extinct religion—a sense of honour among the people. “Why, what a dern’d fool you must be!” exclaimed a New York shopkeeper to a friend of mine, who had received a dollar too much in changing a note, and returned it. If there is a shopkeeper in England who would think such a thing, there is certainly not one who would dare to say it.
Nor, in losing sight of the sense of “infinite personal value,” which is the source of honour and the growth of a long-enduring recognition of inevitable inequalities, have the Americans preserved delight. Dr. Johnson’s saying finds a remarkable{219} comment in the observation of a recent American traveller: “In the United States there is everywhere comfort, but no joy.”
To conclude, it is quite possible to change the forms of social inequality, but to do away with the fact is of all things the most impossible. It is the trick or ignorance of the demagogue to charge existing inequalities with the evils and injustices110 in which they began, and with which they were attended for a long time afterwards. When conquest or revolution establishes the ever-inevitable political and social inequalities in new forms, it takes many generations of misery111 and turmoil112 to introduce into them the moral equality which renders them not only tolerable, but the source of true freedom and happiness.
THE END
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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impudently
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folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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medleys
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| n.混杂物( medley的名词复数 )；混合物；混杂的人群；混成曲（多首声乐曲或器乐曲串联在一起） | |
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amend
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| vt.修改，修订，改进；n.[pl.]赔罪，赔偿 | |
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Amended
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| adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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accrue
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| v.(利息等)增大，增多 | |
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martyrs
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| n.martyr的复数形式；烈士( martyr的名词复数 )；殉道者；殉教者；乞怜者（向人诉苦以博取同情） | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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knave
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| n.流氓；（纸牌中的）杰克 | |
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contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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hind
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| adj.后面的，后部的 | |
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engrossing
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| adj.使人全神贯注的，引人入胜的v.使全神贯注( engross的现在分词 ) | |
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calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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compulsory
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| n.强制的，必修的；规定的，义务的 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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fen
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| n.沼泽，沼池 | |
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wield
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| vt.行使，运用，支配；挥，使用(武器等) | |
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incompetence
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| n.不胜任，不称职 | |
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apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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sage
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| n.圣人，哲人；adj.贤明的，明智的 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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rhetoric
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| n.修辞学，浮夸之言语 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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laurels
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| n.桂冠，荣誉 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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physicists
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| 物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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impatience
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| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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beaver
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| n.海狸，河狸 | |
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extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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fanatic
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| n.狂热者，入迷者；adj.狂热入迷的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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rapport
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| n.和睦，意见一致 | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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brutal
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| adj.残忍的，野蛮的，不讲理的 | |
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impudence
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| n.厚颜无耻；冒失；无礼 | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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57
descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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abominable
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| adj.可厌的，令人憎恶的 | |
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exemption
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| n.豁免，免税额，免除 | |
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condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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61
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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paradox
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| n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法；自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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fatuous
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| adj.愚昧的；昏庸的 | |
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glamour
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| n.魔力，魅力；vt.迷住 | |
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platitude
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| n.老生常谈，陈词滥调 | |
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platitudes
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| n.平常的话，老生常谈，陈词滥调( platitude的名词复数 )；滥套子 | |
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unintelligible
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| adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的 | |
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abiding
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| adj.永久的，持久的，不变的 | |
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reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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amiable
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| adj.和蔼可亲的，友善的，亲切的 | |
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incurable
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| adj.不能医治的，不能矫正的，无救的；n.不治的病人，无救的人 | |
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simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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inorganic
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| adj.无生物的；无机的 | |
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instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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repudiate
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| v.拒绝，拒付，拒绝履行 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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dishonour
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| n./vt.拒付（支票、汇票、票据等）；vt.凌辱，使丢脸；n.不名誉，耻辱，不光彩 | |
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chivalry
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| n.骑士气概，侠义；（男人）对女人彬彬有礼，献殷勤 | |
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constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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dependants
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| 受赡养者，受扶养的家属( dependant的名词复数 ) | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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scowl
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| vi.(at)生气地皱眉，沉下脸，怒视；n.怒容 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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pulsation
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| n.脉搏，悸动，脉动；搏动性 | |
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semblance
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| n.外貌，外表 | |
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myriads
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| n.无数，极大数量( myriad的名词复数 ) | |
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veins
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| n.纹理；矿脉( vein的名词复数 )；静脉；叶脉；纹理 | |
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pulsating
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| adj.搏动的，脉冲的v.有节奏地舒张及收缩( pulsate的现在分词 )；跳动；脉动；受（激情）震动 | |
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103
carrion
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| n.腐肉 | |
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morass
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| n.沼泽，困境 | |
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105
malaria
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| n.疟疾 | |
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106
pretences
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| n.假装( pretence的名词复数 )；作假；自命；自称 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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110
injustices
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| 不公平( injustice的名词复数 )； 非正义； 待…不公正； 冤枉 | |
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misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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turmoil
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| n.骚乱，混乱，动乱 | |
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