It is evident that there is a very considerable dread1 of the power and intentions of Russia in this country. It is well that the justification2 of this dread should be discussed now, for it is likely to affect the attitude of British and American Liberalism very profoundly, both towards the continuation of the war and towards the ultimate settlement.
It is, I believe, an exaggerated dread arising out of our extreme ignorance of Russian realities. English people imagine Russia to be more purposeful than she is, more concentrated, more inimical to Western civilisation3. They think of Russian policy as if it were a diabolically4 clever spider in a dark place. They imagine that the tremendous unification of State and national pride and ambition which has made the German Empire at last insupportable, may presently be repeated upon an altogether more gigantic scale, that Pan-Slavism will take the place of Pan-Germanism, as the ruling aggression5 of the world.
70This is a dread due, I am convinced, to fundamental misconceptions and hasty parallelisms. Russia is not only the vastest country in the world, but the laxest; she is incapable6 of that tremendous unification. Not for two centuries yet, if ever, will it be necessary for a reasonably united Western Europe to trouble itself, once Prussianism has been disposed of, about the risk of definite aggression from the East. I do not think it will ever have to trouble itself.
Socially and politically, Russia is an entirely7 unique structure. It is the fashion to talk of Russia as being “in the fourteenth century,” or “in the sixteenth century.” As a matter of fact, Russia, like everything else, is in the twentieth century, and it is quite impossible to find in any other age a similar social organisation8. In bulk, she is barbaric. Between eighty and ninety per cent. of her population is living at a level very little above the level of those agricultural Aryan races who were scattered9 over Europe before the beginning of written history. It is an illiterate10 population. It is superstitious11 in a primitive12 way, conservative and religious in a primitive way, it is incapable of protecting itself in the ordinary commerce of modern life; against the business enterprise of better educated races it has no weapon but a peasant’s poor cunning. It is, indeed, a helpless, unawakened mass. Above these peasants come a few millions 71of fairly well-educated and actively13 intelligent people. They are all that corresponds in any way to a Western community such as ours. Either they are officials, clerical or lay, in the great government machine that was consolidated14 chiefly by Peter the Great to control the souls and bodies of the peasant mass, or they are private persons more or less resentfully entangled16 in that machine. At the head of this structure, with powers of interference strictly17 determined18 by his individual capacity, is that tragic19 figure, the Tsar. That, briefly20, is the composition of Russia, and it is unlike any other State on earth. It will follow laws of its own and have a destiny of its own.
Involved with the affairs of Russia are certain less barbaric States. There is Finland, which is by comparison highly civilised, and Poland, which is not nearly so far in advance of Russia. Both these countries are perpetually uneasy under the blundering pressure of foolish attempts to “Russianize” them. In addition, in the South and East are certain provinces thick with Jews, whom Russia can neither contrive21 to tolerate nor assimilate, who have no comprehensible projects for the help or reorganisation of the country, and who deafen22 all the rest of Europe with their bitter, unhelpful tale of grievances24, so that it is difficult to realise how local and partial are their wrongs. There is a certain “Russian idea,” containing within itself 72all the factors of failure, inspiring the general policy of this vast amorphous25 State. It found its completest expression in the works of the now defunct26 Pobedonostsev, and it pervades27 the bureaucracy. It is obscurantist, denying the common people education; it is orthodox, forbidding free thought and preferring conformity28 to ability; it is bureaucratic29 and autocratic; it is Pan-Slavic, Russianizing, and aggressive. It is this “Russian idea” that Western Liberalism dreads30, and, as I want to point out, dreads unreasonably31. I do not want to plead that it is not a bad thing; it is a bad thing. I want to point out that, unlike Prussianism, it is not a great danger to the world at large.
So long as this Russian idea, this Russian Toryism, dominates Russian affairs, Russia can never be really formidable either to India, to China, or to the Liberal nations of Western Europe. And whenever she abandons this Toryism and becomes modern and formidable, she will cease to be aggressive. That is my case. While Russia has the will to oppress the world she will never have the power; when she has the power she will cease to have the will. Let me state my reasons for this belief as compactly as possible, because if I am right a number of Liberal-minded people in Great Britain and America and Scandinavia, who may collectively have a very great influence upon the settlement of Europe that will follow this war, are wrong. They 73may want to bolster32 up a really dangerous and evil Austria-cum-Germany at the expense of France, Belgium, and subject Slav populations, because of their dread of this Russia which can never be at the same time evil and dangerous.
Now, first let me point out what the Boer War showed, and what this tremendous conflict in Belgium is already enforcing, that the day of the unintelligent common soldier is past; that men who are animated33 and individualised can, under modern conditions, fight better than men who are unintelligent and obedient. Soldiering is becoming more specialised. It is calling for the intelligent handling of weapons so elaborate and destructive that great masses of men in the field are an encumbrance34 rather than a power. Battles must spread out, and leading give place to individual initiative. Consequently Russia can only become powerful enough to overcome any highly civilised European country by raising its own average of education and initiative, and this it can do only by abandoning its obscurantist methods, by liberalising upon the Western European model. That is to say, it will have to teach its population to read, to multiply its schools, and increase its universities; and that will make an entirely different Russia from this one we fear. It involves a relaxation35 of the grip of orthodoxy, an alteration36 of the intellectual outlook of officialdom, an abandonment of quasi-religious 74autocracy—in short, the complete abandonment of the “Russian idea” as we know it. And it means also a great development of local self-consciousness. Russia seems homogeneous now, because in the mass it is so ignorant as to be unaware37 of its differences; but an educated Russia means a Russia in which Ruthenian and Great Russian, Lett and Tartar will be mutually critical and aware of one another. The existing Russian idea will need to give place to an entirely more democratic, tolerant, and cosmopolitan38 idea of Russia as a whole, if Russia is to merge39 from its barbarism and remain united. There is no cheap “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles” sentiment ready-made to hand. National quality is against it. Patience under patriotism40 is a German weakness. Russians could no more go on singing and singing, “Russia, Russia over all,” than Englishmen could go on singing “Rule, Britannia.” It would bore them. The temperament41 of none of the Russian peoples justifies42 the belief that they will repeat on a larger scale even as much docility43 as the Germans have shown under the Prussians. No one who has seen the Russians, who has had opportunities of comparing Berlin with St. Petersburg or Moscow, or who knows anything of Russian art or Russian literature, will imagine this naturally wise, humorous, and impatient people reduplicating the self-conscious drill-dulled, soulless culture of Germany, or 75the political vulgarities of Potsdam. This is a terrible world, I admit, but Prussianism is the sort of thing that does not happen twice.
Russia is substantially barbaric. Who can deny it? State-stuff rather than a State. But people in Western Europe are constantly writing of Russia and the Russians as though the qualities natural to barbarism were qualities inherent in the Russian blood. Russia massacres44, sometimes even with official connivance45. But Russia in all its history has no massacres so abominable46 as we gentle English were guilty of in Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Russia, too, “Russianizes,” sometimes clumsily, sometimes rather successfully. But Germany has sought to Germanise—in Bohemia and Poland, for instance, with conspicuous47 violence and failure. We “Anglicised” Ireland. These forcible efforts to create uniformity are natural to a phase of social and political development, from which no people on earth have yet fully15 emerged. And if we set ourselves now to create a reunited Poland under the Russian crown, if we bring all the great influence of the Western Powers to bear upon the side of the liberalising forces in Finland, if we do not try to thwart48 and stifle49 Russia by closing her legitimate50 outlet51 into the Mediterranean52, we shall do infinitely53 more for human happiness than if we distrust her, check her, and force her back upon the barbarism 76from which, with a sort of blind pathetic wisdom, she seeks to emerge.
It is unfortunate for Russia that she has come into conspicuous conflict with the Jews. She has certainly treated them no worse than she has treated her own people, and she has treated them less atrociously than they were treated in England during the Middle Ages. The Jews by their particularism invite the resentment54 of all uncultivated humanity. Civilisation and not revolt emancipates55 them. And while Russian reverses will throw back her civilisation and intensify56 the sufferings of all her subject Jews, Russian success in this alliance will inevitably57 spell Westernisation, progress, and amelioration for them. But unhappily this does not seem to be patent to many Jewish minds. They have been embittered58 by their wrongs, and, in the English and still more in the American Press, a heavy weight of grievance23 against Russia finds voice, and distorts the issue of this. While we are still only in the opening phase of this struggle for life against the Prussianised German Empire, this struggle to escape from the militarism that has been slowly strangling civilisation, it is a huge misfortune that this racial resentment, which, great as it is, is still a little thing beside the world issues involved, should break the united front of western civilisation, and that the confidence of Russia should be threatened, 77as it is threatened now by doubt and disparagement59 in the Press. We are not so sure of victory that we can estrange60 an ally. We have to make up our minds to see all Poland reunited under the Russian Crown, and if the Turks choose to play a foolish part, it is not for us to quarrel now about the fate of Constantinople. The Allies are not to be tempted61 into a quarrel about Constantinople. The balance of power in the Balkans, that is to say, incessant62 intrigue63 between Austria and Russia, has arrested the civilisation of South-eastern Europe for a century. Let it topple. An unchallenged Russia will be a wholesome64 check, and no great danger for the new greater Servia and the new greater Rumania and the enlarged and restored Bulgaria this war renders possible.
One civilised country only does Russia really “threaten,” and that country is Sweden. Sweden has a vast wealth of coal and iron within reach of Russia’s hand. And I confess I watch Scandinavia with a certain terror during these days. Sweden is the only European country in which there is a pro-German militarist party, and she may be tempted—I do not know how strongly she may not have been tempted already—to drag herself and Norway into this struggle on the German side. If she does, our Government will be not a little to blame for not having given her, and induced Russia 78to give her, the strongest joint65 assurances and guarantees of her integrity for ever. But if the Scandinavian countries abstain66 from any participation67 in this present war, then I do not see what is to prevent us and France and Russia from making the most public, definite, and binding68 declaration of our common interest in Sweden’s integrity and our common determination to preserve it.
Beyond that, I see no danger to civilisation in Russia anywhere—at least, no danger so considerable as the Kaiser-Krupp power we fight to finish. This war, even if it brings us the utmost success, will still leave Russia face to face with a united and chastened Germany. For it must be remembered that the downfall of Prussianism and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, will leave German Germany not smaller but larger than she is now. To India, decently governed and guarded, with an educational level higher than her own, and three times her gross population, Russia can only be dangerous through the grossest misgovernment on our part, and her powers of intervention69 in China will be restricted for many years. But all our powers of intervention in China will be restricted for many years. A breathing space for Chinese reconstruction70 is one of the most immediate71 and least equivocal blessings72 of this war. Unless the Chinese are unteachable—and only stupid people suppose them a stupid race—the China of 1934 79will not be a China for either us or Russia to meddle73 with. So where in all the world is this danger from Russia?
The danger of a Krupp-cum-Kaiser dominance of the whole world, on the other hand, is immediate. Defeat, or even a partial victory for the Allies, means nothing less than that.
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1
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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diabolically
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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6
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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7
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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illiterate
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| adj.文盲的；无知的；n.文盲 | |
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superstitious
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| adj.迷信的 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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consolidated
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| a.联合的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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tragic
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| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
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briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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contrive
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| vt.谋划，策划；设法做到；设计，想出 | |
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deafen
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| vt.震耳欲聋；使听不清楚 | |
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grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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grievances
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| n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 )；苦衷；不满；牢骚 | |
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amorphous
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| adj.无定形的 | |
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defunct
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| adj.死亡的；已倒闭的 | |
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pervades
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的第三人称单数 ) | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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bureaucratic
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| adj.官僚的，繁文缛节的 | |
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30
dreads
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| n.恐惧，畏惧( dread的名词复数 )；令人恐惧的事物v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的第三人称单数 ) | |
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unreasonably
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| adv. 不合理地 | |
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bolster
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| n.枕垫；v.支持，鼓励 | |
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animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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encumbrance
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| n.妨碍物，累赘 | |
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relaxation
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| n.松弛，放松；休息；消遣；娱乐 | |
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alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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unaware
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| a.不知道的，未意识到的 | |
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cosmopolitan
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| adj.世界性的，全世界的，四海为家的，全球的 | |
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merge
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| v.(使)结合，(使)合并，(使)合为一体 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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42
justifies
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| 证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
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43
docility
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| n.容易教，易驾驶，驯服 | |
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massacres
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| 大屠杀( massacre的名词复数 )； 惨败 | |
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connivance
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| n.纵容；默许 | |
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46
abominable
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| adj.可厌的，令人憎恶的 | |
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47
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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thwart
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| v.阻挠，妨碍，反对；adj.横(断的) | |
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49
stifle
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| vt.使窒息；闷死；扼杀；抑止，阻止 | |
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50
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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51
outlet
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| n.出口/路；销路；批发商店；通风口；发泄 | |
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52
Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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53
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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54
resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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55
emancipates
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| vt.解放（emancipate的第三人称单数形式） | |
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56
intensify
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| vt.加强；变强；加剧 | |
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57
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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58
embittered
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| v.使怨恨，激怒( embitter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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59
disparagement
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| n.轻视，轻蔑 | |
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60
estrange
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| v.使疏远，离间，使离开 | |
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61
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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62
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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64
wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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reconstruction
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| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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72
blessings
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| n.（上帝的）祝福( blessing的名词复数 )；好事；福分；因祸得福 | |
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meddle
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| v.干预，干涉，插手 | |
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