This was the keynote of a solemn warning made in the House of Lords by Earl Roberts. His lordship, whilst drawing attention to our present inadequate2 forces, strongly urged that action should be taken in accordance with the recommendations of the Elgin Commission that "no military system could be considered satisfactory which did not contain powers of expansion outside the limit of the regular forces of the Crown."
"The lessons of the late war appear to have been forgotten. The one prevailing3 idea seems to be," said Earl Roberts, "to cut down our military expenditure4 without reference to our increased responsibilities and our largely augmented5 revenue. History tells us in the plainest terms that an Empire which cannot defend its own possessions must inevitably6 perish." And with this view both Lord Milner and the Marquis of Lansdowne concurred7. But surely this is not enough. If we are to retain our position as the first nation of the world we must be prepared to defend any raid made upon our shores.
The object of this book is to illustrate8 our utter unpreparedness for war from a military standpoint; to show how, under certain conditions which may easily occur, England can be successfully invaded by Germany; and to present a picture of the ruin which must inevitably fall upon us on the evening of that not far-distant day.
Ever since Lord Roberts formulated9 his plans for the establishment of rifle-clubs I have been deeply interested in the movement: and after a conversation with that distinguished10 soldier the idea occurred to me to write a forecast, based upon all the available military knowledge—which [2]would bring home to the British public vividly11 and forcibly what really would occur were an enemy suddenly to appear in our midst. At the outset it was declared by the strategists I consulted to be impossible. No such book could ever be written, for, according to them, the mass of technical detail was far too great to digest and present in an intelligible12 manner to the public.
Lord Roberts, however, gave me encouragement. The skeleton scheme of the manner in which England could be invaded by Germany was submitted to a number of the highest authorities on strategy, whose names, however, I am not permitted to divulge13, and after many consultations14, much criticism, and considerable difference of opinion, the "general idea," with amendment15 after amendment, was finally adopted.
That, however, was only a mere16 preliminary. Upon questions of tactics each tactician17 consulted held a different view, and each criticised adversely18 the other's suggestions.
One way alone remained open—namely, to take the facts exactly as they stood, add the additional strength of the opposing nations as they at present are, and then draw logical conclusions. This, aided by experts, was done: and after many days of argument with the various authorities, we succeeded in getting them in accord as to the general practicability of an invasion.
Before putting pen to paper it was necessary to reconnoitre carefully the whole of England from the Thames to the Tyne. This I did by means of a motor-car, travelling 10,000 miles of all kinds of roads, and making a tour extending over four months. Each town, all the points of vantage, military positions, all the available landing places on the coast, all railway connections, and telephone and telegraph communications, were carefully noted19 for future reference. With the assistance of certain well-known military experts, the battlefields were carefully gone over and the positions marked upon the Ordnance20 map. Thus, through four months we pushed on day by day collecting information and material, sometimes in the big cities, sometimes in the quietest and remotest hamlets, all of which was carefully tabulated21 for use.
Whatever critics may say, and however their opinions may differ, it can only be pointed22 out, first, that the "general idea" of the scheme is in accordance with the[3] expressed and published opinions of the first strategists of to-day, and that, as far as the forecast of events is concerned, it has been written from a first-hand knowledge of the local colour of each of the scenes described. The enemy's Proclamations reproduced are practically copies of those issued by the Germans during the war of 1870.
That the experts and myself will probably be condemned23 as alarmists and denounced for revealing information likely to be of assistance to an enemy goes without saying. Indeed, an attempt was made in the House of Commons to suppress its publication altogether. Mr. R. C. Lehmann, who asked a question of the Prime Minister, declared that it was "calculated to prejudice our relations with the other Powers," while the late Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, in a subsequent letter apologising to me for condemning24 in the House a work he had not read, repeated that it was likely to "produce irritation25 abroad and might conceivably alarm the more ignorant public at home."
Such a reflection, cast by the late Prime Minister upon the British nation was, to say the least, curious, yet it only confirmed the truth that the Government are strenuously26 seeking to conceal27 from our people the appalling28 military weakness and the consequent danger to which the country is constantly open.
To be weak is to invite war: to be strong is to prevent it.
To arouse our country to a sense of its own lamentable29 insecurity is the object of this volume, which is somewhat compressed from the form in which it originally appeared, and that other nations besides ourselves are interested in England's grave peril30 is proved by the fact that it has already been published in the German, French, Spanish, Danish, Russian, Italian, and even Japanese languages.
WILLIAM LE QUEUX.
Speaking in the House of Lords on the 10th July 1905, I said:—"It is to the people of the country I appeal to take up the question of the Army in a sensible practical manner. For the sake of all they hold dear, let them bring home to themselves what would be the condition of Great Britain if it were to lose its wealth, its power, its position." The catastrophe that may happen if we still remain in our present state of unpreparedness is visibly and forcibly illustrated31 in Mr. Le Queux's new book which I recommend to the perusal32 of every one who has the welfare of the British Empire at heart.
Roberts, FM
29. Nov. 1905
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1 catastrophe | |
n.大灾难,大祸 | |
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2 inadequate | |
adj.(for,to)不充足的,不适当的 | |
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3 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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4 expenditure | |
n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出;使用,消耗 | |
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5 Augmented | |
adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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6 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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7 concurred | |
同意(concur的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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8 illustrate | |
v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
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9 formulated | |
v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 );规划;确切地阐述;用公式表示 | |
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10 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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11 vividly | |
adv.清楚地,鲜明地,生动地 | |
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12 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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13 divulge | |
v.泄漏(秘密等);宣布,公布 | |
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14 consultations | |
n.磋商(会议)( consultation的名词复数 );商讨会;协商会;查找 | |
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15 amendment | |
n.改正,修正,改善,修正案 | |
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16 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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17 tactician | |
n. 战术家, 策士 | |
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18 adversely | |
ad.有害地 | |
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19 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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20 ordnance | |
n.大炮,军械 | |
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21 tabulated | |
把(数字、事实)列成表( tabulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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22 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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23 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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24 condemning | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的现在分词 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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25 irritation | |
n.激怒,恼怒,生气 | |
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26 strenuously | |
adv.奋发地,费力地 | |
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27 conceal | |
v.隐藏,隐瞒,隐蔽 | |
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28 appalling | |
adj.骇人听闻的,令人震惊的,可怕的 | |
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29 lamentable | |
adj.令人惋惜的,悔恨的 | |
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30 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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31 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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32 perusal | |
n.细读,熟读;目测 | |
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