It is now something more than a century since the general division of psychic5 phenomena6 into intellect, feeling and will, first came into repute, but still some psychologists of note do not agree to this fundamental classification, but would unite feeling and will in a single order. As to the subdivisions of feeling and will we are confessedly wholly at sea. In intellect it is only on the lower side, sensation and perception, that anything of great scientific value has been accomplished7; and even now it cannot be said that the classes of sensation have been marked off with perfect certainty. In the higher range of intellect psychology can do scarcely more than accept 2some ready-made divisions from common observation and logic8. And if so little has been settled in the comparatively simple work of a descriptive classification of the facts of mind, we may be assured that still less has been accomplished toward a scientific consensus for the laws of mind. Weber’s law alone seems to stand on any secure basis of experiment, but its range and meaning are still far from being determined10. Even the laws of the association of ideas are still the subjects of endless controversy11. Also in method there is manifestly the greatest disagreement. The physiological12 and introspective schools each magnify their own methods, sometimes so far as to discredit13 all others. Physiological method has won for itself a certain standing14, indeed, but just what are its limitations is still far from being settled.
But the grievous lack of generally accepted results is most apparent in the domain15 of feeling. The discussion of feeling in most manuals is very meagre and unsatisfactory. Professor James’s recent treatise16, for instance, gives some 900 pages to the Intellect, and about 100 pages each to Feeling and Will. There is little thorough analysis and no perfected inductive classification. We often, indeed, find essays of literary value which appeal to the authority of literature. But to refer to Shakspeare or Goethe as psychological authorities, or in illustration or proof of psychological laws, is generally a doubtful procedure. The literary and artistic17 treatment of human nature is quite distinct from the scientific, and literature and art cannot be said to be of much more value for psychology than for physics, chemistry, or biology. To appeal to the Bible or Shakspeare in matters psychological, is usually as misleading as to consult them for light on geology or botany. Even the fuller treatises18 on the subject of feeling rarely reach beyond literary method and common observation, being for the most part a collection and arrangement of the results of common sense, 3accepting common definitions, terms, and classifications. Now, science is always more than common sense and common perception, it is uncommon19 sense; it is an insight and a prolonged special investigation20 which penetrates21 beneath the surface of things and shows them in those inner and deeper relations which are entirely22 hid from general observation. Common views in psychology are likely to be as untrustworthy as in physics or astronomy, or any other department. Science must, indeed, start with common sense, but it does not deserve the name of science till it gets beyond it.
Again, the subject of pleasure, pain, and emotion, is usually discussed with considerable ethical23 or philosophical24 bias25. The whole subject of feeling has been so naturally associated with ethics26 and philosophy from the earliest period of Greek thought that a purely27 colourless scientific treatment is quite difficult. Furthermore, feeling has been too often discussed from an a priori point of view, as in the rigid28 following out of the Herbartian theory of feeling as connected with hindrance29 or furtherance of representation. Still further, the physical side of emotion has been so emphasized by the physiological school as to distract attention from purely psychological investigation.
It is obvious, then, on the most cursory30 review, that very little has been accomplished in the pure psychology of feeling. Here is a region almost unexplored, and which, by reason of the elusiveness31 and obscurity of the phenomena, has seemed to some quite unexplorable. Dr. Nahlowsky truly remarks, that feeling is a “strange mysterious world, and the entrance to it is dark as to Hades of old.” Is there any way out of this darkness and confusion? If the study of feeling is to become scientific, we must, I think, assume that all feeling is a biological function governed by the general laws of life and subject in origin and development to the law of struggle for existence. Assuming this strictly33 scientific point of view, we 4have to point out some difficulties in the way of the introspective psychology of feeling as compared with other departments of biological science.
We trace directly and with comparative ease any physiological organ and function from its simplest to its most complex form; for example, in the circulation of the blood there is clearly observable a connected series from the most elementary to the most specialized34 heart as developed through the principle of serviceability. In some cases, as in the orohippus, a form in the evolution of the horse, we are able to predict an intermediate organism. Psychology is still far from this deductive stage; we have no analogous35 series of psychic forms, much less are able to supply, a priori, the gaps in a series. The reason for this is mainly the inevitable36 automorphism of psychological method. In biology we are not driven to understand life solely37 through analogy with our own life, but in psychology mind in general must be interpreted through the self-observation of the human mind. In biology we see without effort facts and forms of life most diverse from our own; the most strange and primitive38 types are as readily discernible as the most familiar and advanced, the most simple as the most complex. We study a fish just as readily as a human body, but the fish’s mind—if it has any—seems beyond our ken39, at least is not susceptible40 of direct study, but a matter for doubtful inference and speculation41. Whether a given action does or does not indicate consciousness, and what kind of consciousness, this is most difficult to determine. Thus we have the most various interpretations42, some, as Clifford, even going so far as to make psychic phenomena universal in matter, others, on the other hand, as Descartes, limiting them to man alone.
The difficulty of this subjective43 method, this reflex investigation, is almost insurmountable. Consciousness must act as both revealer and revealed, must be a light which enlightens itself. A fact of consciousness to be 5known must not simply exist like a physical fact or object, as a piece of stone, but it must be such that the observing consciousness realizes or re-enacts it. To know the fact we must have the fact, we must be what we know. Mind is pure activity; we do not see an organ and ask what it is for, what does it do; but we are immediately conscious of consciousness as activity, and not as an objective organ. We must here, then, reverse the general order and know the activity before we can identify the organ as a physical basis.
By the purely objective vision of the lower sciences we can easily determine a genetic44 series of forms most remote from our own life, but in psychology, mind can be for us only what mind is in us. The primitive types of psychosis are, no doubt, as remote and foreign from our own as is the primitive type of heart or nervous system from that of man’s. In the case of heart and nerve we can objectively trace with certainty the successive steps, but in endeavouring to realize by subjective method the evolution of mind we are involved in great doubt and perplexity. How can we understand an insect’s feelings? How can we appreciate minds which are without apprehension45 of object, though there is reason to believe such minds exist? Only to a very limited extent can a trained and sympathetic mind project itself back into some of its immediately antecedent stages. Consciousness, because of its self-directive and self-reflective power, is the most elastic46 of functions, yet it can never attain47 the power of realizing all its previous stages. Sometimes, however, the mind in perfect quiescence48 tends to relapse into primitive modes, which may afterward50 be noted51 by reflection, but such occasions are comparatively rare. The subjective method means a commonalty of experience which is often impossible to attain. Thus a man may believe there are feelings of maternity52; he has observed the expression of nursing mothers, and knows in a general way that here is a peculiar53 psychosis 6into which he can never enter, and which is, therefore, beyond his scientific analysis. The psychic life of the child is more akin54 to his than that of the mother; yet it is only by an incessant55 cultivation56 of receptivity and repression57 of adult propensities58 that one can ever attain any true inkling of infant experience. There is then, I think, a vast range of psychic life which must for ever lie wholly hidden from us, either as infinitely59 below or infinitely above us; there is also an immense realm where we can only doubtfully infer the presence of some form of consciousness without being able to discriminate60 its quality, or in exceptional cases to know it very partially61; and there is but a relatively62 small sphere where scientific results of any large value may be expected. By reason of its objective method the realm of physical science is practically illimitable, but psychic science is, by reason of its subjective method, kept for ever within narrow boundaries.
We must then take into account the inherent difficulties of the subjective method as applied63 to the study of feeling and mind in general, and yet we must recognise its necessity. No amount of objective physiological research can tell us anything about the real nature of a feeling, or can discover new feelings. Granting that neural64 processes are at the basis of all feelings as of all mental activities, we can infer nothing from the physiological activity as to the nature of the psychic process. It is only such feelings and elements as we have already discovered and analyzed65 by introspection that can be correlated with a physical process. Nor can we gain much light even if we suppose—which is granting a good deal in our present state of knowledge—that there exists a general analogy between nerve growth and activity, and mental operations. If relating, i.e., cognition, is established on basis of inter-relation in brain tissue, if every mental connecting means a connecting of brain fibres, we might, indeed, determine the number of thoughts, but we could not tell what the 7thoughts were. So if mental disturbance66 always means bodily disturbance, we can still tell nothing more about the nature of each emotion than we knew before. We must first know fear, anger, etc., as experiences in consciousness before we can correlate them with corporeal67 acts.
Is now this necessarily subjective method peculiarly limited as to feeling? Can we know feeling directly as psychic act or only indirectly68 through accompaniments? Mr. James Ward9 (vide article on Psychology in the Encyclop?dia Britannica, p. 49, cf. p. 71) remarks that feelings cannot be known as objects of direct reflection, we can only know of them by their effects on the chain of presentation. The reason for this is, that feeling is not presentation, and “what is not presented cannot be re-presented.” “How can that which was not originally a cognition become such by being reproduced?”
It cannot. But do we need to identify the known with knowing, in order that it may be known? Must feeling be made into a cognition to be cognized? It is obvious enough that no feeling can be revived into a representation of itself, but no more can any cognition or any mental activity. Revival69 or recurrence70 of consciousness can never constitute consciousness of consciousness which is an order apart. If cognition is only presentation and re-presentation of objects, we can never attain any apprehension of consciousness, any cognition of a cognition or of a feeling or of a volition71, for they are all equally in this sense subjective acts. Re-presentation at any degree is never by itself sense of re-presentation or knowledge of the presentation.
Of course, the doctrine72 of relativity applies to introspection as to all cognition, and subject qua subject is as unknowable as object qua object. We do not know feeling in itself, nor anything else in itself, the subjective like the objective ding an sich is beyond our ken. Yet kinds 8of consciousness are as directly apprehended73 and discriminated74 as kinds of things, but the knowing is, as such, distinct from the known even when knowing is known. Here the act knowing is not the act known and is different in value. The object known is not, at least from the purely psychological point of view, ever to be confounded with the knowing, to be incorporated into cognition by virtue75 of being cognized. Feeling, then, seems to be as directly known by introspection and reflection as any other process. It is not a hypothetical cause brought in by the intellect to explain certain mental phenomena, but it is as distinctly and directly apprehended as cognition or volition.
The distinction between having a feeling and knowing a feeling is a very real one, though common phraseology confuses them. We say of a brave man, he never knew fear; by which we mean he never feared, never experienced fear, and not that he was ignorant of fear. Again, in like manner, we say sometimes of a very healthy person, he never knew what pain was, meaning he never felt pain. These expressions convey a truth in that they emphasize that necessity of experience in the exercise of the subjective method upon which we have already commented, but still they obscure a distinction which must be apparent to scientific analysis. We cannot know feeling except through realization76, yet the knowing is not the realization. Being aware of the pain and the feeling pain are distinct acts of consciousness. All feeling, pain and pleasure, is direct consciousness, but knowledge of it is reflex, is consciousness of consciousness. The cognition of the pain as an object, a fact of consciousness, is surely a distinct act from the pain in consciousness, from the fact itself. The pain disturbance is one thing and the introspective act by which it is cognized quite another.
These two acts are not always associated, though they are commonly regarded as inseparable. It is a common 9postulate that if you have a pain you will know it, or notice it. If we feel pained, we always know it. This seemingly true statement comes of a confounding of terms. If I have a pain, I must, indeed, be aware of it, know it, in the sense that it must be in consciousness; but this makes, aware of pain, and knowing pain, such very general phrases as to equal experience of pain or having pain. But there is no knowledge in pain itself, nor pain in the knowing act per se. The knowing the pain must be different from the pain itself, and is not always a necessary sequent. We may experience pain without cognizing it as such. When drowsy77 in bed I may feel pain of my foot being “asleep,” but not know it as a mental fact. We may believe, indeed, that pain often rises and subsides78 in consciousness without our being cognizant of it, but, of course, in the nature of the case there is no direct proof, for proof implies cognizance of fact. Pain as mental fact, an object for consciousness, not an experience in consciousness, is what is properly meant by knowing pain. Consciousness-of-pain as knowledge of it is not always involved by pain-in-consciousness as experience of it. Consciousness of pain by its double meaning as cognizance of pain and experience of pain leads easily to obscurity of thought upon this subject. But experience does not, if we may trust the general law of evolution from simple to complex, at the first contain consciousness of experience. This latter element is but gradually built up into experience, though in the end they are so permanently79 united in developed ego80 life that it is difficult to perceive their distinctness and independence. That pain and pleasure are cognized as facts of consciousness seems to us clear, but this does not deny that for us, at least, they may be cognizable only in fusion32 with other elements, as with sensation or volition. But whether known only with other elements or not, pleasure-pain is equally known only by direct introspection. I know directly and immediately 10pain and pleasure when I experience them, though they always occur bound up with some sensation. It may be that I never experience mere81 pain but some kind of pain, as a pricking83 pain, burning pain, etc., and that I always recall pain by its sensation tone, that I cannot isolate84 it by any act of attention. (E. B. Titchener, Philosophical Review, vol. iii., p. 431.) However I know that I have pain as well as I know that I have a pricking or burning sensation. “Did you feel the prick82?” “Yes.” “Was it painful or pleasurable?” “Pleasurable”; such a common colloquy85 implies as direct consciousness of the pleasure-pain as of the sensation. That I can at once discriminate a sensation as either pleasurable or painful certainly shows a direct awareness86 of pleasure-pain.
If pure pleasure-pain is primitive consciousness (see chap. ii.), it must be most rare phenomenon in such an advanced consciousness as that of the human adult: and it is not surprising that one should search for it in vain. But in any case it could not yield to attention. Attention as cognition views its object in relation, in a milieu87; it can reproduce only by fastening upon something to reproduce by, but pure pleasure-pain has nothing connected with it. Again, attention as volition cannot reproduce mere pleasure-pain which is not volitional88 in its origin and growth like sensing, perceiving, or ideating. We merely “suffer” pain. Both pleasure and pain in themselves are purely passive; willing cannot directly affect them, and they are not, like cognitions, modes of volition, or effortful activities. For man to have a primitive consciousness by exercise of will would be quite as difficult as to turn himself into a protozo?n.
Further, would not attention as introspective alertness to discover such a fact of consciousness as pure pleasure-pain denote that consciousness is thereby89 raised far above the level at which such a phenomenon can occur? In general also constant introspective attention tends to defeat 11itself. A continual intentness and watching for a given psychic phenomenon is a state which, the more intense and persistent90 it is, tends to bar out the particular state watched for, and, indeed, all other states than itself. If attention as act engrosses91, it defeats itself.
If, however, undifferentiated pleasure-pain should at any time occur in human consciousness, might we become immediately and spontaneously aware of it? By its very nature it may escape conscious attentive92 investigation, but may there not be a direct and simple awareness or apperception of it? We might suppose that one man tells another, “I was very sick, and in state of coma93 I had pain, merely pain, not any kind of pain or pain anywhere, but just pain, that was all the consciousness I had.” Such an expression is intelligible94, and may be a fact. However, it is in the phenomena of lapse49 and rise of consciousness that we see evidences that undifferentiated feeling probably occurs, and that sometimes in high psychisms. In the following chapter we discuss then this point as a matter of judgment95 of tendencies, rather than on basis of direct evidence of introspection, though this is not barred out.
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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consensus
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| n.(意见等的)一致，一致同意，共识 | |
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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unanimity
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| n.全体一致，一致同意 | |
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psychic
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| n.对超自然力敏感的人；adj.有超自然力的 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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treatises
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| n.专题著作，专题论文，专著( treatise的名词复数 ) | |
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uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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penetrates
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| v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 )；刺入；了解；渗透 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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cursory
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| adj.粗略的；草率的；匆促的 | |
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elusiveness
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| 狡诈 | |
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fusion
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| n.溶化；熔解；熔化状态，熔和；熔接 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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specialized
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| adj.专门的，专业化的 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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ken
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| n.视野，知识领域 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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interpretations
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| n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解 | |
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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genetic
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| adj.遗传的，遗传学的 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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elastic
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| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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quiescence
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| n.静止 | |
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lapse
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| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
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afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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maternity
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| n.母性，母道，妇产科病房；adj.孕妇的，母性的 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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akin
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| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
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incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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repression
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| n.镇压，抑制，抑压 | |
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propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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discriminate
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| v.区别，辨别，区分；有区别地对待 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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neural
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| adj.神经的，神经系统的 | |
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analyzed
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| v.分析( analyze的过去式和过去分词 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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corporeal
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| adj.肉体的，身体的；物质的 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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recurrence
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| n.复发，反复，重现 | |
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volition
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| n.意志；决意 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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discriminated
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| 分别，辨别，区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 )； 歧视，有差别地对待 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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drowsy
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| adj.昏昏欲睡的，令人发困的 | |
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subsides
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| v.（土地）下陷（因在地下采矿）( subside的第三人称单数 )；减弱；下降至较低或正常水平；一下子坐在椅子等上 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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ego
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| n.自我，自己，自尊 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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82
prick
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| v.刺伤，刺痛，刺孔；n.刺伤，刺痛 | |
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pricking
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| 刺，刺痕，刺痛感 | |
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isolate
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| vt.使孤立，隔离 | |
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colloquy
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| n.谈话，自由讨论 | |
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awareness
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| n.意识，觉悟，懂事，明智 | |
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milieu
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| n.环境；出身背景；(个人所处的)社会环境 | |
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volitional
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| adj.意志的，凭意志的，有意志的 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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90
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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engrosses
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| v.使全神贯注( engross的第三人称单数 ) | |
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attentive
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| adj.注意的，专心的；关心(别人)的，殷勤的 | |
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coma
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| n.昏迷，昏迷状态 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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