OFFENSIVE AND
DEFENSIVE1
Having determined2 that wars must vary in character according to the nature and importance of their object, we are faced with the difficulty that the variations will be of infinite number and of all degrees of distinction. So complex indeed is the graduation presented that at first sight it appears scarcely possible to make it the basis of practical study. But on further examination it will be seen that by applying the usual analytical3 method the whole subject is susceptible4 of much simplification. We must in short attempt to reach some system of classification; that is, we must see if it is not possible to group the variations into some well-founded categories. With a subject so complex and intangible the grouping must of course be to some extent arbitrary, and in some places the lines of demarcation will be shadowy; but if classification has been found possible and helpful in Zoology5 or Botany, with the infinite and minute individual variations with which they have to deal, it should be no less possible and helpful in the study of war.
The political theory of war will at any rate give us two broad and well-marked classifications. The first is simple and well known, depending on whether the political object of the war is positive or negative. If it be positive—that is, if our aim is to wrest6 something from the enemy—then our war in its main lines will be offensive. If, on the other hand, our aim [pg 32] be negative, and we simply seek to prevent the enemy wresting7 some advantage to our detriment8, then the war in its general direction will be defensive.
It is only as a broad conception that this classification has value. Though it fixes the general trend of our operations, it will not in itself affect their character. For a maritime9 Power at least it is obvious that this must be so. For in any circumstances it is impossible for such a Power either to establish its defence or develop fully10 its offence without securing a working control of the sea by aggressive action against the enemy's fleets. Furthermore, we have always found that however strictly11 our aim may be defensive, the most effective means of securing it has been by counter-attack over-sea, either to support an ally directly or to deprive our enemy of his colonial possessions. Neither category, then, excludes the use of offensive operations nor the idea of overthrowing12 our enemy so far as is necessary to gain our end. In neither case does the conception lead us eventually to any other objective than the enemy's armed forces, and particularly his naval13 forces. The only real difference is this—that if our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, and we should at least open with a true offensive movement; whereas if our object be negative our general plan will be preventive, and we may bide14 our time for our counter-attack. To this extent our action must always tend to the offensive. For counter-attack is the soul of defence. Defence is not a passive attitude, for that is the negation15 of war. Rightly conceived, it is an attitude of alert expectation. We wait for the moment when the enemy shall expose himself to a counter-stroke, the success of which will so far cripple him as to render us relatively16 strong enough to pass to the offensive ourselves.
From these considerations it will appear that, real and logical as the classification is, to give it the designation "offensive and defensive" is objectionable from every point of view. To begin with, it does not emphasise17 what the real and logical [pg 33] distinction is. It suggests that the basis of the classification is not so much a difference of object as a difference in the means employed to achieve the object. Consequently we find ourselves continually struggling with the false assumption that positive war means using attack, and negative war being content with defence.
That is confusing enough, but a second objection to the designation is far more serious and more fertile of error. For the classification "offensive and defensive" implies that offensive and defensive are mutually exclusive ideas, whereas the truth is, and it is a fundamental truth of war, that they are mutually complementary. All war and every form of it must be both offensive and defensive. No matter how clear our positive aim nor how high our offensive spirit, we cannot develop an aggressive line of strategy to the full without the support of the defensive on all but the main lines of operation. In tactics it is the same. The most convinced devotee of attack admits the spade as well as the rifle. And even when it comes to men and material, we know that without a certain amount of protection neither ships, guns, nor men can develop their utmost energy and endurance in striking power. There is never, in fact, a clean choice between attack and defence. In aggressive operations the question always is, how far must defence enter into the methods we employ in order to enable us to do the utmost within our resources to break or paralyse the strength of the enemy. So also with defence. Even in its most legitimate18 use, it must always be supplemented by attack. Even behind the walls of a fortress19 men know that sooner or later the place must fall unless by counter-attack on the enemy's siege works or communications they can cripple his power of attack.
It would seem, therefore, that it were better to lay aside the designation "offensive and defensive" altogether and substitute the terms "positive and negative." But here again we are confronted with a difficulty. There have been many wars in [pg 34] which positive methods have been used all through to secure a negative end, and such wars will not sit easily in either class. For instance, in the War of Spanish Succession our object was mainly to prevent the Mediterranean20 becoming a French lake by the union of the French and Spanish crowns, but the method by which we succeeded in achieving our end was to seize the naval positions of Gibraltar and Minorca, and so in practice our method was positive. Again, in the late Russo-Japanese War the main object of Japan was to prevent Korea being absorbed by Russia. That aim was preventive and negative. But the only effective way of securing her aim was to take Korea herself, and so for her the war was in practice positive.
On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in the majority of wars the side with the positive object has acted generally on the offensive and the other generally on the defensive. Unpractical therefore as the distinction seems to be, it is impossible to dismiss it without inquiring why this was so, and it is in this inquiry21 that the practical results of the classification will be found to lie—that is, it forces us to analyse the comparative advantages of offence and defence. A clear apprehension22 of their relative possibilities is the corner stone of strategical study.
Now the advantages of the offensive are patent and admitted. It is only the offensive that can produce positive results, while the strength and energy which are born of the moral stimulation23 of attack are of a practical value that outweighs24 almost every other consideration. Every man of spirit would desire to use the offensive whether his object were positive or [pg 35] negative, and yet there are a number of cases in which some of the most energetic masters of war have chosen the defensive, and chosen with success. They have chosen it when they have found themselves inferior in physical force to their enemy, and when they believed that no amount of aggressive spirit could redress25 that inferiority.
Obviously, then, for all the inferiority of the defensive as a drastic form of war it must have some inherent advantage which the offensive does not enjoy. In war we adopt every method for which we have sufficient strength. If, then, we adopt the less desirable method of defence, it must be either that we have not sufficient strength for offence, or that the defence gives us some special strength for the attainment26 of our object.
What, then, are these elements of strength? It is very necessary to inquire, not only that we may know that if for a time we are forced back upon the defensive all is not lost, but also that we may judge with how much daring we should push our offensive to prevent the enemy securing the advantages of defence.
As a general principle we all know that possession is nine points of the law. It is easier to keep money in our pocket than to take it from another man's. If one man would rob another he must be the stronger or better armed unless he can do it by dexterity28 or stealth, and there lies one of the advantages of offence. The side which takes the initiative has usually the better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or stealth. But it is not always so. If either by land or sea we can take a defensive position so good that it cannot be turned and must be broken down before our enemy can reach his objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes to us. We choose our own ground for the trial of strength. We are hidden on familiar ground; he is exposed on ground that is less familiar. We can lay traps and prepare surprises by counter-attack, when he is most dangerously exposed. Hence [pg 36] the paradoxical doctrine29 that where defence is sound and well designed the advantage of surprise is against the attack.
It will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in defence they depend on the preservation30 of the offensive spirit. Its essence is the counter-attack—waiting deliberately31 for a chance to strike—not cowering32 in inactivity. Defence is a condition of restrained activity—not a mere33 condition of rest. Its real weakness is that if unduly34 prolonged it tends to deaden the spirit of offence. This is a truth so vital that some authorities in their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the misleading maxim35, "That attack is the best defence." Hence again an amateurish36 notion that defence is always stupid or pusillanimous37, leading always to defeat, and that what is called "the military spirit" means nothing but taking the offensive. Nothing is further from the teaching or the practice of the best masters. Like Wellington at Torres Vedras, they all at times used the defensive till the elements of strength inherent in that form of war, as opposed to the exhausting strain inherent in the form that they had fixed38 upon their opponents, lifted them to a position where they in their turn were relatively strong enough to use the more exhausting form.
The confusion of thought which has led to the misconceptions about defence as a method of war is due to several obvious causes. Counter-attacks from a general defensive attitude have been regarded as a true offensive, as, for instance, in Frederick the Great's best-known operations, or in Admiral Tegetthoff's brilliant counterstroke at Lissa, or our own [pg 37] operations against the Spanish Armada. Again, the defensive has acquired an ill name by its being confused with a wrongly arrested offensive, where the superior Power with the positive object lacked the spirit to use his material superiority with sufficient activity and perseverance39. Against such a Power an inferior enemy can always redress his inferiority by passing to a bold and quick offensive, thus acquiring a momentum40 both moral and physical which more than compensates41 his lack of weight. The defensive has also failed by the choice of a bad position which the enemy was able to turn or avoid. A defensive attitude is nothing at all, its elements of strength entirely42 disappear, unless it is such that the enemy must break it down by force before he can reach his ultimate objective. Even more often has it failed when the belligerent43 adopting it, finding he has no available defensive position which will bar the enemy's progress, attempts to guard every possible line of attack. The result is of course that by attenuating44 his force he only accentuates45 his inferiority.
Clear and well proven as these considerations are for land warfare46, their application to the sea is not so obvious. It will be objected that at sea there is no defensive. This is generally true for tactics, but even so not universally true. Defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in defended anchorages. These were always a reality, and the mine has increased their possibilities. In the latest developments of naval warfare we have seen the Japanese at the Elliot Islands preparing a real defensive position to cover the landing of their Second Army in the Liaotung Peninsula. Strategically the proposition is not true at all. A strategical defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land, and our own gravest problems have often been how to break down such an attitude when [pg 38] our enemy assumed it. It usually meant that the enemy remained in his own waters and near his own bases, where it was almost impossible for us to attack him with decisive result, and whence he always threatened us with counterattack at moments of exhaustion47, as the Dutch did at Sole Bay and in the Medway. The difficulty of dealing48 decisively with an enemy who adopted this course was realised by our service very early, and from first to last one of our chief preoccupations was to prevent the enemy availing himself of this device and to force him to fight in the open, or at least to get between him and his base and force an action there.
Probably the most remarkable49 manifestation50 of the advantages that may be derived51 in suitable conditions from a strategical defensive is also to be found in the late Russo-Japanese War. In the final crisis of the naval struggle the Japanese fleet was able to take advantage of a defensive attitude in its own waters which the Russian Baltic fleet would have to break down to attain27 its end, and the result was the most decisive naval victory ever recorded.
The deterrent52 power of active and dexterous53 operations from such a position was well known to our old tradition. The device was used several times, particularly in our home waters, to prevent a fleet, which for the time we were locally [pg 39] too weak to destroy, from carrying out the work assigned to it. A typical position of the kind was off Scilly, and it was proved again and again that even a superior fleet could not hope to effect anything in the Channel till the fleet off Scilly had been brought to decisive action. But the essence of the device was the preservation of the aggressive spirit in its most daring form. For success it depended on at least the will to seize every occasion for bold and harassing54 counter-attacks such as Drake and his colleagues struck at the Armada.
To submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a superior enemy's fleet is another form of defensive, but one that is almost wholly evil. For a short time it may do good by permitting offensive operations elsewhere which otherwise would be impossible. But if prolonged, it will sooner or later destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable55 of effective aggression56.
The conclusion then is that although for the practical purpose of framing or appreciating plans of war the classification of wars into offensive and defensive is of little use, a clear apprehension of the inherent relative advantages of offence and defence is essential. We must realise that in certain cases, provided always we preserve the aggressive spirit, the [pg 40] defensive will enable an inferior force to achieve points when the offensive would probably lead to its destruction. But the elements of strength depend entirely on the will and insight to deal rapid blows in the enemy's unguarded moments. So soon as the defensive ceases to be regarded as a means of fostering power to strike and of reducing the enemy's power of attack it loses all its strength. It ceases to be even a suspended activity, and anything that is not activity is not war.
With these general indications of the relative advantages of offence and defence we may leave the subject for the present. It is possible of course to catalogue the advantages and disadvantages of each form, but any such bald statement—without concrete examples to explain the meaning—must always appear controversial and is apt to mislead. It is better to reserve their fuller consideration till we come to deal with strategical operations and are able to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its various forms. Leaving therefore our first classification of wars into offensive and defensive we will pass on to the second, which is the only one of real practical importance.
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1
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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analytical
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| adj.分析的；用分析法的 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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zoology
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| n.动物学，生态 | |
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wrest
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| n.扭，拧，猛夺；v.夺取，猛扭，歪曲 | |
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wresting
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| 动词wrest的现在进行式 | |
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detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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overthrowing
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| v.打倒，推翻( overthrow的现在分词 )；使终止 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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bide
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| v.忍耐；等候；住 | |
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negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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emphasise
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| vt.加强...的语气，强调，着重 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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stimulation
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| n.刺激，激励，鼓舞 | |
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outweighs
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| v.在重量上超过( outweigh的第三人称单数 )；在重要性或价值方面超过 | |
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redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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dexterity
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| n.(手的)灵巧，灵活 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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cowering
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| v.畏缩，抖缩( cower的现在分词 ) | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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unduly
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| adv.过度地，不适当地 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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amateurish
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| n.业余爱好的，不熟练的 | |
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pusillanimous
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| adj.懦弱的，胆怯的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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perseverance
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| n.坚持不懈，不屈不挠 | |
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momentum
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| n.动力，冲力，势头；动量 | |
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compensates
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| 补偿，报酬( compensate的第三人称单数 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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belligerent
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| adj.好战的，挑起战争的；n.交战国，交战者 | |
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attenuating
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| v.（使）变细( attenuate的现在分词 )；（使）变薄；（使）变小；减弱 | |
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accentuates
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| v.重读( accentuate的第三人称单数 )；使突出；使恶化；加重音符号于 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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exhaustion
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| n.耗尽枯竭，疲惫，筋疲力尽，竭尽，详尽无遗的论述 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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deterrent
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| n.阻碍物，制止物；adj.威慑的，遏制的 | |
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dexterous
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| adj.灵敏的；灵巧的 | |
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harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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