"But if the King of Ava shall fail to renew his former relations with the British Government, and if he shall recklessly seek to dispute its quiet possession of the province it has now declared to be its own, the Governor-General in Council will again put forth6 the power he holds and will visit with full retribution aggressions, which, if they be persisted in, must of necessity lead to the total subversion7 of the Burman State and to the ruin and exile of the King and his race."
In 1885 the fulfilment of this menace—prophecy it might be called—was brought about by the contumacy of the Government of Ava. The Burman State was "totally subverted8." Its territories were added to the British Empire. The King and his race were "ruined and exiled."
At the end of November, 1885, the British commander was in full possession of Mandalay, the capital. Our forces had made a procession up the great river, which is the main artery9 of the country, almost unopposed. Such opposition10 as there had been was childish in its feebleness and want of skill and purpose. Fortunately for us the King and his[2] ministers prided themselves on their voluntary army system. King Thebaw was not going to compel his subjects to defend their country. They were told to go about their daily tasks without fear or carefulness. They might sleep in their beds. He would see to it that the foreign barbarians11 were driven into the sea whence they had come. Unfortunately the soldiers to whom he trusted were insufficiently12 trained, badly armed and equipped. He had intended, perhaps, to remedy all this and to train his troops for six months before the fighting began.
His enemy, however, was unreasonably14 hasty and had an abundance of fast steamers for transporting the invading force. Before the training could begin or the arms be provided or the officers instructed, the invaders15 were before Ava, where the bulk of the defending army had been collected, and a few miles from the capital. The King's government was as helpless as it had been arrogant16 and pretentious17. Ministers of State were sent down in hot haste with messages of submission18 and surrender.
The army, however, took a different view of the case. They refused to obey the order to surrender which had come from Mandalay. Before General Prendergast could land his men they dispersed19 over the country in every direction with their arms, and as the British force had no cavalry20 to pursue them, they got away to a man. At first under various leaders, few of whom showed any military talent, they waged a guerilla warfare21 against the invaders; and afterwards, when their larger divisions had been defeated and broken up, they succeeded in creating a state of anarchy22 and brigandage23 ruinous to the peasantry and infinitely24 harassing25 to the British.
On the 29th of November Mandalay was occupied and the King a prisoner on his way down the river to Rangoon. The waterway from Mandalay to the sea was under our control. A few of the principal places on the banks of the river had been held by small garrisons26 as the expedition came up, and the ultimate subjugation27 of the Burman people was assured. The trouble, however, was to come.
To a loosely organized nation like the Burmese, the occupation of the capital and the removal of the King meant nothing. They were still free to resist and fight. It was[3] to be five years before the last of the large gangs was dispersed, the leaders captured, and peace and security established.
Burma will be, in all likelihood, the last important province to be added to the Indian Empire. Eastward28 that Empire has been extended as far as our arms can well reach. Its boundaries march with Siam, with the French dominion4 of Tongking, and on the East and North for a vast distance with China. Our convention with France for the preservation29 of the territory which remains30 to Siam and our long friendship with the latter country bars any extension of our borders in that direction. It is improbable that we shall be driven to encroach on Chinese territory; and so far as the French possessions are concerned, a line has been drawn31 by agreement which neither side will wish to cross.
In all likelihood, therefore, the experience gained in Burma will not be repeated in Asia. Nevertheless it may be worth while to put on record a connected account of the methods by which a country of wide extent, destitute32 of roads and covered with dense33 jungle and forest, in which the only rule had become the misrule of brigands34 and the only order systematic35 disorder36, was transformed in a few years into a quiet and prosperous State.
I cannot hope that the story will be of interest to many, but it may be of some interest and perhaps of use to those who worked with me and to their successors.
From 1852 to 1878 King Mind?n ruled Upper Burma fairly well. He had seized the throne from the hands of his brother Pagan Min, whose life he spared with more humanity than was usual on such occasions. He was, to quote from the Upper Burma Administration Report of 1886, "an enlightened Prince who, while professing37 no love for the British, recognized the power of the British Government, was always careful to keep on friendly terms with them, and was anxious to introduce into his kingdom, as far as was compatible with the maintenance of his own autocratic power, Western ideas and Western civilization." He was tolerant in religious matters even for a Burmese Buddhist38. He protected and even encouraged the Christian39 missions in Upper Burma, and for Dr. Marks, the[4] representative of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Mandalay he built a handsome teak church and a good clergy-house, giving a tinge40 of contempt to his generosity41 by putting them down by the Burmese burial-ground. The contempt was not for the religion but for the foreign barbarians who professed42 it.
His measures for encouraging trade and increasing and ordering the revenues were good, and the country prospered43 under him. In Burma there are no hereditary44 leaders of the people. There is no hereditary aristocracy outside the royal family, and their descendants rapidly merge45 into the people. There was no law or binding46 custom determining the descent of the crown within the family. Every one with royal blood, however little, in his veins47 was a potential pretender. Whenever the crown demised48 the succession was settled by intrigue49 or violence, and possible aspirants50 were removed by the prince who had obtained the prize. There was no other way of securing its peaceful enjoyment51.
Under the King was the Hlutdaw, or great Council of State, composed of the Chief Ministers, who were appointed by the King from the courtiers who had the good fortune to be known to him or had helped him to the throne. To each of these was assigned a province of the empire, which he governed through a deputy.
The immediate52 power was vested in the deputy, who resided in the province and remitted53 to the Minister as much as he could collect over and above the amount due to the crown and, it need hardly be said, necessary for his own needs. The provinces were divided into townships, which were ruled by officials appointed by the governors, no doubt with regard to local influence and claims, and with a general inclination54 to keep the office in a family.
The really stable part of the administration on which everything rested was the village, the headship of which was by custom hereditary, but not necessarily in the direct line.
As there was little central control, it may be supposed that under a system of this kind the people were pillaged55, and doubtless they were to some extent. But the deputy-governor on the spot had no organized police or militia56 to[5] support him. If he wanted to use force he had to pay for it, and if he drove his province to the point of rebellion he was unlikely to profit by it.
The amount of revenue was fixed57 at Mandalay with reference to a rough estimate of what the province could pay, and that was divided amongst the townships and again amongst the villages. The headman of each village, assisted by a committee or Punchayet, as it would be called in India, settled the sum due from each householder, and this was as a rule honestly and fairly done. It was not a bad system on the whole, and it was in its incidence probably as just as local taxation58 in Great Britain, which I admit is somewhat faint praise.
As to the administration of justice between man and man and the security of life and property, there was no doubt little refinement59 of law and not always impartiality60 in the judges. The majority of civil cases in a society like Burma, where there are few rich men and no great landowners, must be trivial, and in Burma disputes were settled by arbitration61 or by the village headmen, who could rarely set at nought62 the opinion of their fellow-villagers.
In a country which is under-populated and contains vast areas of land fit for cultivation63 unoccupied and free to all, migration64 is a great check on oppression. Life is simple in Burma. The climate for the most of the year makes a roof unnecessary; flitting is easy. Every man is his own carpenter. He has put together his house of bamboo and planks65 cut by his own hands. He knows how to take it down. He has not to send for contractors66 or furniture vans. There are the carts and the plough cattle in his sheds. He has talked things over with his wife, who is a capable and sensible woman.
One morning they get up, and instead of going to his fields or his fishing or whatever it may be, he takes his tools, and before sunset, his wife helping67, the house is down and, with the simple household goods, is in the cart. The children find a place in it, or if they are old enough they run along with the mother. If the local magistrate68 is so blind to his own interests as to oppress his people, there is another wiser man a few score leagues away who is ready to welcome them. For what is the good of land without[6] men to live on it? Is not the King's revenue assessed at so much to the house? But suppose the worst comes to the worst and the man in power is a fiend, and neither property nor life nor honour is safe from him, even then there is the great forest, in which life, though hard, is a real pleasure to a man; and, given a good leader, the oppressed may soon change places with his oppressor.
We are too ready to imagine that life under such a King as Mind?n or even as Thebaw must be unbearable69. We fancy them armed with all the organization of the Inland Revenue Department and supported by a force like our constabulary. Fortunately they were not. No system of extortion yet devised by the most ruthless and greedy tyrant70 is at all comparable in its efficacy to the scientific methods of a modern revenue officer. The world will see to what a perfection of completeness the arts of oppression and squeezing can be carried when the power of modern European organization is in the hands of a socialist71 government.
It need not be supposed, therefore, that under King Mind?n life in Upper Burma was bad, and it must be remembered that since 1852 escape to British Burma, although forbidden, was not impossible.
Under Thebaw things were different. Mind?n was on the whole well-intentioned, and had kept the power in his own hands. Thebaw was weak and incompetent72, and the Ministers who had most influence with him were the worst men. With his barbarities, old-fashioned rather than unexampled, and perhaps not much worse than the measures of precaution usually taken in Burma after the succession of a new king, or with the causes of the war which led to his deposition73, the present narrative74 is not concerned. It is desired to give as clear an idea as possible of the state of Upper Burma when we were called upon to administer the country.
The rapacity75 and greed of the Court, where the Queen Supayalat was the ruling spirit, set the example to the whole hierarchy76 of officials. The result was a state of extreme disorder throughout the whole kingdom. The demands made on the people for money became excessive and intolerable. Men left their villages and took to the jungle. Bands of armed brigands, some of considerable strength under active leaders, sprang up everywhere. Formed in the first instance as a protest and defence against extortion, they soon began to live on the country and to terrorize the peasantry. After a time, brigands and Ministers, finding themselves working for a common object, formed an unholy alliance for loot. The leaders of the bands came to an understanding with the more powerful officials, who in turn leant upon them for support.
The Palace, Mandalay—"Centre of the Universe."
[7]
Under such conditions it was not wonderful that the sudden seizure77 of the capital and the summary removal of the King should have completed the dissolution of society, already far advanced. The British Government, if it had decided78 to annex1 Upper Burma, might by a more leisurely79 occupation, not only with a larger military force, but with a complete staff of civil administrators80, have saved the people from some years of anarchy and great suffering. But that is not our way, and under modern political conditions in England is impossible.
The country was taken and its government destroyed before we had decided what we should do with it, or considered the effect on the people.
The King's rule ended on the 29th of November, 1885. On the 1st of January, 1886, the Viceroy's proclamation included Upper Burma in Her Majesty's dominions. The administration of the country was temporarily provided for by allowing the Hlutdaw, or great Council of State, to continue in power, discharging all its functions as usual, but under the guidance of Colonel (afterwards Sir E. B.) Sladen, who was attached as Political officer to General Prendergast's staff. All Civil officers, British and Burmese, were placed under the Hlutdaw's orders, and the King's Burmese officials throughout the country were instructed to go on with the regular performance of their duties as if nothing had occurred. Some arrangement had to be made, and probably this was the best possible. The best was bad.
On the 15th of December the Chief Commissioner81, Sir Charles Bernard, arrived at Mandalay from Rangoon. On his way up the river he had visited Minhla, Pagan and Myingyan, where Civil officers, supported by small garrisons,[8] had been placed by General Prendergast. He decided that these three districts should be removed from the jurisdiction82 of the Hlutdaw and controlled directly by himself. Mandalay town and district were similarly treated. A British officer was appointed to govern them, under the immediate orders of Colonel Sladen, who was responsible to the Chief Commissioner.
All this must have confused the minds of the people and prevented those who were ready to submit to the British power from coming forward. Fortunately this period of hesitation83 was short. From the 26th of February, 1886, Upper Burma became a province of British India.
When the Chief Commissioner, who had gone down to Rangoon with the Viceroy, returned to Mandalay, the Hlutdaw was finally dissolved and Sir Charles Bernard took the government into his own hands. A few of the Burmese Ministers were retained as advisers84. At first they were of some use as knowing the facts and the ways of the King's administration. Very soon they became superfluous85.
It must not be supposed that no steps had been taken towards the construction of an administration during the first two months of the year. Anticipating the decision of Her Majesty's Government, Sir Charles Bernard had applied86 his signal energy to this work, and before the end of February the Viceroy had laid his rough proposals before the Secretary of State. As soon as Upper Burma was incorporated with British India the scheme of government already drafted came into force.
The country was mapped out into fourteen districts, corresponding as closely as possible to the existing provinces under the King, namely:—
Mandalay Minbu Pagan
Katha Bhamo Ningyan, afterwards
Ava Shwèbo called Pyinmana
Chindwin Kyauksè Ye-w
Myingyan Sagaing Yamèthin
and after a time three more were added: Taungdwingyi, Meiktila, and the Ruby87 Mines. The boundaries were necessarily left vague at first until more accurate knowledge of the country enabled them to be defined. At first there[9] were no maps whatever. The greater part of the country had not been occupied nor even visited by us.
To each district was appointed an officer of the Burma Commission under the style of Deputy Commissioner, with a British police officer to assist him and such armed force of police as could be assigned to him. His first duty was to get in touch with the local officials and to induce those capable and willing to serve us to retain or take office under our Government.
Having firmly established his authority at headquarters, he was to work outwards88 in a widening circle, placing police posts and introducing settled administration as opportunity offered. He was, however, to consider it his primary object to attack and destroy the robber bands and to protect the loyal villages from their violence. There were few districts in which the guerilla leaders were not active. Their vengeance89 on every Burman who attempted to assist the British was swift and unmerciful. As it was impossible at first and for some time to afford adequate protection, villages which aided and sheltered the enemy were treated with consideration. The despatch90 of flying columns moving through a part of the country and returning quickly to headquarters was discouraged. There was a tendency in the beginning of the business to follow this practice, which was mischievous91. If the people were friendly and helped the troops, they were certain to suffer when the column retired92. If they were hostile, a hasty visit had little effect on them. They looked on the retirement93 as a retreat and became more bitter than before.
Upper Burma was incorporated with British India on the 26th of February. Thereupon the elaborate Statute94 law of India, including the Civil and Criminal Codes, came into force, a body of law which implies the existence of a hierarchy of educated and trained officials, with police and gaols95 and all the machinery96 of organized administration. But there were none of these things in Upper Burma, which was, in fact, an enemy's country, still frankly97 hostile to us. This difficulty had been foreseen, and the proper remedy suggested in Lord Dufferin's minute (dated at Mandalay on the 17th of February, 1886) in which he proposed to annex the country.
[10]
The Acts for the Government of India give to the Secretary of State the power of constituting any province or part of a province an excepted or scheduled district, and thereupon the Governor of the province may draw up regulations for the peace and good government of the district, which, when approved by the Governor-General in Council, have the full force of law.[1]
This machinery is put in force by a resolution of the Secretary of State in Council, and at the Viceroy's instance a resolution for this purpose was made, with effect from and after the 1st of March, 1886. It applied to all Upper Burma except the Shan States.
Sir Charles Bernard was ready to take advantage of the powers given to him. Early in March he published an admirable rough code of instructions, sufficiently13 elastic98 to meet the varying conditions, and at the same time sufficiently definite to prevent anything like injustice99 or oppression. The summary given in Section 10 of the Upper Burma Administration Report for 1886 shows their nature.
"By these instructions each district was placed in charge of a Civil officer, who was invested with the full powers of a Deputy Commissioner, and in criminal matters with power to try as a magistrate any case and to pass any sentence. The Deputy Commissioner was also invested with full power to revise the proceedings100 of any subordinate magistrate or official and to pass any order except an order enhancing a sentence. In criminal matters the courts were to be guided as far as possible by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Penal101 Code, and the Evidence Act (i.e., the Indian Codes). But dacoity or robbery was made punishable with death, though magistrates102 were instructed to pass capital sentences only in very heinous103 cases. In order to provide a safeguard against undue104 severity in the infliction105 of punishments, it was ordered that no capital sentence should be carried out except after confirmation106 by the Chief Commissioner. No regular appeals were allowed from any decision; but it was open for any one who felt aggrieved107 by the decision of a subordinate officer to move the Deputy Commissioner to revise the order, and for any one who demurred108 to an order passed by a Deputy Commissioner to bring the matter to the notice of the Chief Commissioner.
[11]
"In revenue matters the customs of the country were as far as possible to be observed, save that no monopolies (except that of precious stones) were allowed and no customs or transport duties were levied109. As regards excise110 administration, in accordance with the custom of the country the sale of opium111 and of intoxicating112 liquors to Burmans was prohibited. But a limited number of licences were issued for the sale of liquors to persons not of Burmese race, and the Chinese were specially113 exempted114 from the restrictions115 imposed on the traffic in opium."
Thus in four months after annexation116 the country had been parcelled into seventeen districts, each under the charge of a Deputy Commissioner, who was guided by the provisional instructions and worked at first directly under the Chief Commissioner. It was thought (vide Lord Dufferin's minute of February 17, 1886) that the province could be worked, in the beginning, without any authority such as Divisional Commissioners117 or Sessions Judges interposed between the Chief Commissioner and the district officers. "I would adopt, as I have already said," wrote Lord Dufferin, "the simplest and cheapest system of administration open to us. There will be in each district or circle one British Civil officer and one police officer. The Civil officer will work through the indigenous118 agency of the country, Myo-?ks (governors of towns), Thugyis (headmen of villages) and others, confining his efforts in the first instance to the restoration of order, the protection of life and property, and the assessment119 and collection of the ordinary revenue.... But most of the unimportant criminal work and nearly all the civil suits must be disposed of by the native officials, subject to the check and control of the district officer."
The area of the province, excluding the Shan States, which were left to the care of their own chiefs, was nearly one hundred thousand square miles. It was divided into seventeen districts. There were no roads in the interior, much of which was difficult country. The Irrawaddy, it is true,[12] formed a splendid line of communication from north to south. But the river was not connected with the districts east or west of it by anything better than an ordinary village cart-track, with numerous streams and rivers, most of them unbridged. The Eastern districts between the Sittang and the Irrawaddy were especially inaccessible120. Under such circumstances it was impossible for any man to discharge the duties imposed on the Chief Commissioner, even if all his subordinates had been endowed with ripe wisdom and experience. Only a man of the heroic energy and devotion of Sir Charles Bernard could have conceived it possible. Moreover, the Chief Commissioner was to be responsible for all death sentences, and was to be the final Court of Revision for the province; while the lower province also remained in his charge, and although he was relieved of the routine work of Lower Burma, the responsibility still rested on him, and was by no means nominal121. It was not business.
The difficulty soon began to be felt. In June a Commissioner was appointed for the Eastern Division, Mr. St. G. Tucker, from the Punjab. In August and September three more commissionerships were constituted, to one of which, the Northern, was appointed Mr. Burgess (the late Mr. G. D. Burgess), of the Burma Commission; to the Central Division, Mr. F. W. Fryer (now Sir Frederick Fryer), from the Punjab; and Mr. J. D. La Touche (now Sir James La Touche) from the North-Western Provinces to the Southern Division. The Chief Commissioner delegated to them, in their respective divisions, the general control of the district officers and the revision of their judicial122 proceedings, including the duty of confirming sentences of death.
The administrative123 divisions of the province, excluding the Shan States, then stood as follows:—
1. The Northern Division Bhamo
Katha
Shwèbo
Ruby Mines
Mandalay
[13]
2. The Central Division Sagaing
Kyauksè
Yeu
Chindwin
Ava
3. The Eastern Division Meiktila
Yamèthin
Ningyan (afterwards called Pyinmana)
4. The Southern Division Myingyan
Pagan
Minbu
Taungdwingyi
This organization enabled the Chief Commissioner to attend to his own work and brought the task of governing the whole of Burma within the powers of an energetic man. It enabled him to give sufficient time to the organization of the revenue and of the police and to the exercise of that control without which there could be no united action. The attempt to govern without an authority intervening between the executive officers in the districts and the head of the province was due to a desire for economy, and to the belief that in this way there would be closer connection and easier communication between the Chief Commissioner and the executive officers. In fact, the contrary was the result, and in all such cases must be.
The framework of a civil administration had now been formed. It remained to give the district officers such armed support as would enable them to govern their charges.
In the autumn of 1886 the country generally was far from being under our control. It had been supposed that our coming was welcome to the people and that "the prospects124 of the substitution of a strong and orderly government for the incompetent and cruel tyranny of their former ruler" was by the people generally regarded with pleasure. (See Lord Dufferin's minute of February 17, 1886.) But[14] by July it had become evident that a considerable minority of the population, to say the least, did not want us, and that until we proved our strength it was idle to expect active help even from our friends.
The total military force hitherto employed in Upper Burma had been about fourteen thousand men. There was not anywhere in the whole country a well-armed or organized body of the enemy. A few hundred British troops could have marched from north to south or from east to west without meeting with very serious opposition or suffering much loss. Small flying columns could be moved through the country and might find no enemy, and might even gather from the demeanour of the people that they were welcome. When the soldiers passed on, the power of the British Government went with them, and the villagers fell back under the rule of the guerilla leaders and their gangs. At first there may have been some faint tinge of patriotism125 in the motives126 which drove the leaders and members of these bands to take the field. Very soon they became mere127 brigands, living on the villagers and taking whatever they wanted, including their women.
"These bands are freebooters," wrote Sir George White[2] (to the Quartermaster-General in India, July 17, 1886), "pillaging128 wherever they go, but usually reserving the refinement of their cruelty for those who have taken office under us or part with us. Flying columns arrive too late to save the village. The villagers, having cause to recognize that we are too far off to protect them, lose confidence in our power and throw in their lot with the insurgents129. They make terms with the leaders and baffle pursuit of those leaders by roundabout guidance or systematic silence. In a country itself one vast military obstacle, the seizure of the leaders of the rebellion, though of paramount130 importance, thus becomes a source of greatest difficulty."
[15]
The experience of the first half of 1886 had brought home to the Government of India as well as to the military officers in the field that the resistance was more widespread and more obstinate131 than any one had foreseen. Sir George White considered that "the most effective plan of establishing our rule, and at the same time protecting and gaining touch of the villages, is a close occupation of the disturbed districts by military posts" (ibid.). Under the circumstances, this was the best course to adopt, provided that the posts were strong enough to patrol the country and to crush every attempt at rising. The people might be held down in this way, but not governed. Something more was necessary. The difficulties were to be overcome rather by the vigorous administration of civil government than by the employment of military detachments scattered132 over the country. A sufficient force of armed police at the disposal of the civil officers was therefore a necessity.
It had been foreseen from the first by Sir Charles Bernard and the Government of India, although the strength of the force necessary to achieve success was much under-estimated. In February, 1886, two military police levies133, each of five hundred and sixty-one men, were raised from the Indian army. Of these one was sent to the Chindwin district and one to Mandalay. At the same time the recruitment of two thousand two hundred men in Northern India for a military police force was ordered. These men were untrained and came over in batches134 as they were raised. They were trained and disciplined at Mandalay and other convenient places, and were distributed to the districts when they were sufficiently formed. Thus besides the soldiers the Chief Commissioner had about 3,300 men at his disposal.
As the year went on and the magnitude of the undertaking135 began to be understood, the need of a much larger force was admitted. Two more levies were sanctioned. One from Northern India was raised without difficulty, and was posted to the railway line from Toungoo to Mandalay, which had been tardily136 sanctioned by the Secretary of State in November, 1886, and was at once put in hand. The other, a Gurkha battalion137 for use in the Northern frontier subdivision of Mogaung, was more difficult to recruit. At the end of the year two companies had arrived, and after being trained at Mandalay had gone on to Bhamo. By this time forty-six posts were held by the military police. The hunger for men, however, so far from being satisfied, continued to grow. After reviewing the position[16] in November (1886) Sir Charles Bernard decided to ask the Government of India for sixteen thousand men, including those already sanctioned, nine thousand to be recruited in India and seven thousand in Burma.
It was proposed that ultimately half of this force should be Indians and half local men. They were all to be engaged for three years, and were to be drilled and disciplined, and divided into battalions138, one for each district. Each battalion was to contain fixed proportions of Indians and local men, "under the command of a military officer for the purpose of training and discipline and under the orders of the local police officers for ordinary police work." At this time it was believed that Burmans, Shans, Karens and Kachins could by training and discipline become a valuable element in a military police force, and the experiment was made at Mandalay. This was the beginning of the Burma military police force, which contributed so pre-eminently to the subjugation and pacification139 of the province. The attempt to raise any part of it locally was, however, very quickly abandoned, and it was recruited, with the exception of a few companies of Karens, entirely140 from Indians.
But to return to the middle of 1886. Sir George White, in writing to Army Headquarters, urged the necessity of reinforcements. The fighting had, it is true, been trivial and deaths in action or by wounds had amounted to six officers and fifty-six men only. Disease, however, had been busy. Exposure and fatigue141 in a semi-tropical climate, the want of fresh food in a country which gave little but rice and salt fish, was gradually reducing the strength and numbers of the force. One officer and two hundred and sixty-nine men had died of disease and thirty-nine officers and nine hundred and twenty men had been invalided142 between November, 1885, and July, 1886.
There were few large bodies of the enemy in the field—few at any rate who would wait to meet an attack. It was only by a close occupation of the disturbed districts by military posts that progress could be made. The Major-General Commanding did not shrink from this measure, although it used up his army. Fourteen thousand men looks on paper a formidable force, but more men, more[17] mounted infantry143, and especially more cavalry were necessary.
It had been a tradition at Army Headquarters, handed down probably from the first and second Burmese Wars, that cavalry was useless in Burma. The experience of 1885-6 proved it to be the most effective arm. It was essential to catch the "Bos," or captains of the guerilla bands, who gave life and spirit to the whole movement. Short compact men, nearly always well mounted, with a modern jockey seat, they were the first as a rule to run away. The mounted infantry man, British or Indian, a stone or two heavier, and weighted with rifle, ammunition144, and accoutrements, on an underbred twelve-hand pony145, had no chance of riding down a "Bo." But the trooper inspired the enemy with terror.
"In a land where only ponies146 are bred the cavalry horses seem monsters to the people, and the long reach and short shrift of the lance paralyse them with fear," wrote Sir George White, and asked that as soon as the rains had ceased "three more regiments147 of cavalry, complete in establishments," should be added to the Upper Burma Field Force.
The proposal was accepted by the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Roberts, and approved by the Government of India. It may be said here once for all that the Government of India throughout the whole of this business were ready to give the local authorities, civil and military, everything that was found necessary for the speedy completion of the work in hand, the difficulties of which they appreciated, as far as any one not on the spot could.
"It is proposed," they wrote to Lord Cross (August 13, 1886), "to reinforce the Upper Burma Field Force by three regiments of native cavalry and to relieve all or nearly all the corps148 and batteries which were despatched to Burma in October last. The troops to be relieved will be kept four or five months longer, so that, including those sent in relief, the force will be very considerable and should suffice to complete rapidly and finally the pacification and settlement of the whole country."
In consequence of the increased strength of the field[18] force the Government of India directed Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Macpherson, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to transfer his headquarters to Burma and remain there until the conclusion of the operations. Unfortunately, Sir Herbert died shortly after reaching Burma. The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Roberts, then took charge of the business and landed in Rangoon in November.
It was evident that Sir George White had not exaggerated the difficulties of the work. After taking stock of the position, Roberts asked for five more regiments to be sent from India. During the cold or, as it should be called in Burma, the dry season following, much was done to gain control of the country, under the personal supervision149 of the Commander-in-Chief. Especially in the Eastern Division, where large bands of men under various pretenders had been most troublesome, the stern energy of General Lockhart produced a rapid and wholesome150 change. When Sir Frederick returned to India in February, 1887, the subjugation of Upper Burma had been accomplished151 and the way was cleared for the civil administration. But four years of constant patient work were needed before the country was pacified152 and the peasant who wished to live a life of honest industry could accomplish his desire.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
annex
|
|
| vt.兼并，吞并；n.附属建筑物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
annexing
|
|
| 并吞( annex的现在分词 )； 兼并； 强占； 并吞（国家、地区等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
dominions
|
|
| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
dominion
|
|
| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
hostilities
|
|
| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
forth
|
|
| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
subversion
|
|
| n.颠覆，破坏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
subverted
|
|
| v.颠覆，破坏（政治制度、宗教信仰等）( subvert的过去式和过去分词 )；使（某人）道德败坏或不忠 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
artery
|
|
| n.干线，要道；动脉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
barbarians
|
|
| n.野蛮人( barbarian的名词复数 )；外国人；粗野的人；无教养的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
insufficiently
|
|
| adv.不够地，不能胜任地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
sufficiently
|
|
| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
unreasonably
|
|
| adv. 不合理地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
invaders
|
|
| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
arrogant
|
|
| adj.傲慢的，自大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
pretentious
|
|
| adj.自命不凡的，自负的，炫耀的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
submission
|
|
| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
dispersed
|
|
| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
cavalry
|
|
| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
warfare
|
|
| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
anarchy
|
|
| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
brigandage
|
|
| n.抢劫；盗窃；土匪；强盗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
infinitely
|
|
| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
harassing
|
|
| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
garrisons
|
|
| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
subjugation
|
|
| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
eastward
|
|
| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
preservation
|
|
| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
destitute
|
|
| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
dense
|
|
| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
brigands
|
|
| n.土匪，强盗( brigand的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
systematic
|
|
| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
disorder
|
|
| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
professing
|
|
| 声称( profess的现在分词 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
Buddhist
|
|
| adj./n.佛教的，佛教徒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
Christian
|
|
| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
tinge
|
|
| vt.(较淡)着色于，染色；使带有…气息；n.淡淡色彩，些微的气息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
generosity
|
|
| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
professed
|
|
| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
prospered
|
|
| 成功，兴旺( prosper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
hereditary
|
|
| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
merge
|
|
| v.(使)结合，(使)合并，(使)合为一体 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
binding
|
|
| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
veins
|
|
| n.纹理；矿脉( vein的名词复数 )；静脉；叶脉；纹理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
demised
|
|
| v.遗赠（demise的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
intrigue
|
|
| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
aspirants
|
|
| n.有志向或渴望获得…的人( aspirant的名词复数 )v.渴望的，有抱负的，追求名誉或地位的( aspirant的第三人称单数 )；有志向或渴望获得…的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
enjoyment
|
|
| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
remitted
|
|
| v.免除（债务），宽恕( remit的过去式和过去分词 )；使某事缓和；寄回，传送 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
inclination
|
|
| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
pillaged
|
|
| v.抢劫，掠夺( pillage的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
militia
|
|
| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
fixed
|
|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
taxation
|
|
| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
refinement
|
|
| n.文雅；高尚；精美；精制；精炼 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
impartiality
|
|
| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
arbitration
|
|
| n.调停，仲裁 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
nought
|
|
| n.／adj.无，零 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
cultivation
|
|
| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
migration
|
|
| n.迁移，移居，（鸟类等的）迁徙 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
planks
|
|
| （厚）木板( plank的名词复数 )； 政纲条目，政策要点 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
contractors
|
|
| n.（建筑、监造中的）承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
helping
|
|
| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
magistrate
|
|
| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
unbearable
|
|
| adj.不能容忍的；忍受不住的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
tyrant
|
|
| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
socialist
|
|
| n.社会主义者；adj.社会主义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
incompetent
|
|
| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
deposition
|
|
| n.免职，罢官；作证；沉淀；沉淀物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
narrative
|
|
| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
rapacity
|
|
| n.贪婪，贪心，劫掠的欲望 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
hierarchy
|
|
| n.等级制度；统治集团，领导层 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
seizure
|
|
| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
leisurely
|
|
| adj.悠闲的；从容的，慢慢的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
administrators
|
|
| n.管理者( administrator的名词复数 )；有管理（或行政）才能的人；（由遗嘱检验法庭指定的）遗产管理人；奉派暂管主教教区的牧师 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
commissioner
|
|
| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
jurisdiction
|
|
| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
hesitation
|
|
| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
advisers
|
|
| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
superfluous
|
|
| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
applied
|
|
| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
ruby
|
|
| n.红宝石，红宝石色 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
outwards
|
|
| adj.外面的，公开的，向外的；adv.向外；n.外形 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
vengeance
|
|
| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
despatch
|
|
| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
mischievous
|
|
| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
retired
|
|
| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
retirement
|
|
| n.退休，退职 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
statute
|
|
| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
gaols
|
|
| 监狱，拘留所( gaol的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
machinery
|
|
| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
frankly
|
|
| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
elastic
|
|
| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
injustice
|
|
| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
proceedings
|
|
| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
penal
|
|
| adj.刑罚的；刑法上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
magistrates
|
|
| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
heinous
|
|
| adj.可憎的，十恶不赦的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
undue
|
|
| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
infliction
|
|
| n.（强加于人身的）痛苦，刑罚 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
confirmation
|
|
| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
aggrieved
|
|
| adj.愤愤不平的，受委屈的；悲痛的；（在合法权利方面）受侵害的v.令委屈，令苦恼，侵害( aggrieve的过去式)；令委屈，令苦恼，侵害( aggrieve的过去式和过去分词) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
demurred
|
|
| v.表示异议，反对( demur的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
levied
|
|
| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
excise
|
|
| n.(国产)货物税；vt.切除，删去 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
opium
|
|
| n.鸦片；adj.鸦片的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
intoxicating
|
|
| a. 醉人的,使人兴奋的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
specially
|
|
| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
exempted
|
|
| 使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
restrictions
|
|
| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
annexation
|
|
| n.吞并，合并 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
commissioners
|
|
| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
indigenous
|
|
| adj.土产的，土生土长的，本地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
assessment
|
|
| n.评价；评估；对财产的估价，被估定的金额 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
inaccessible
|
|
| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
nominal
|
|
| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
judicial
|
|
| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
administrative
|
|
| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
prospects
|
|
| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
patriotism
|
|
| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
pillaging
|
|
| v.抢劫，掠夺( pillage的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
insurgents
|
|
| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
paramount
|
|
| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
obstinate
|
|
| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
scattered
|
|
| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
levies
|
|
| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
batches
|
|
| 一批( batch的名词复数 )； 一炉； （食物、药物等的）一批生产的量； 成批作业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
undertaking
|
|
| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
tardily
|
|
| adv.缓慢 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
battalion
|
|
| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
battalions
|
|
| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
pacification
|
|
| n. 讲和，绥靖，平定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
fatigue
|
|
| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
invalided
|
|
| 使伤残（invalid的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
infantry
|
|
| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
ammunition
|
|
| n.军火，弹药 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
pony
|
|
| adj.小型的；n.小马 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
ponies
|
|
| 矮种马，小型马( pony的名词复数 )； ￡25 25 英镑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
regiments
|
|
| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
corps
|
|
| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
supervision
|
|
| n.监督，管理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
wholesome
|
|
| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
pacified
|
|
| 使（某人）安静( pacify的过去式和过去分词 )； 息怒； 抚慰； 在（有战争的地区、国家等）实现和平 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |