The Irrawaddy cuts the district in two from north to south. The town of Bhamo lies in a plain along the left bank of the river, midway between two defiles7, usually spoken of as the first and second defile6, through which the waters rushing down from the region of mountains in the north have cut their way. The river is open all the year round, as far as Bhamo to large river-steamers. But the first or northern defile is always difficult, and when the river is in flood, impassable. Hence Bhamo is the gate of Upper Burma, and the port for the trade which has existed for centuries with Western Yunnan. In a very small way it is the Peshawur of Burma, and for the purpose of raids and such like the Kachin tribes play the part of the Pathans on the north-west frontier of India. The greater part of the district is hilly and covered with forest; and the Kachins, who form quite a third of the population, live in the hills.
[235]
It is said that trade follows the Flag. In this case the reverse is true. The Irrawaddy Flotilla Company had prepared the way for us here. Bhamo had been the northern terminus of their steamers since 1869, and for some time the Government of India had kept a Resident there to protect the trade. But no attempt had been made to navigate9 beyond Bhamo.
In December, 1885, a force was sent up by river to occupy the town, and an officer of the Burma Commission, Captain Cooke, accompanied it, and began to establish a civil administration. No opposition10 was met with. The population of the town was not in a position to resist us. Mixed with the indigenous11 Burmans and Shans was a considerable colony of Chinese traders—some of them Cantonese who had filtered up from the coast, others hardy12 and adventurous13 men from Yunnan, engaged in the jade14 and amber15 and rubber trades in the northern part of the district. These foreigners, although they disliked exceedingly our interference with the opium17 and liquor traffic, and even more our attempts in the interests of the troops to improve their methods of sanitation18, were not actively19 hostile. The peasantry of a mixed Shan-Burman race, who cultivated the level country round and below the town, were peacefully inclined, though shy and timorous21. But the Kachin tribes soon began to show their teeth and to do their best to make things unpleasant. The policy laid down from the first for the guidance of the local officers in their dealings with the Kachins was one of patience and conciliation23. Perhaps too much stress was laid on this. In one case, certainly, the Deputy Commissioner's anxiety to adhere to this policy was carried to an extreme, and caused mischief24.
It will be convenient to take the northern portion of the district first—that part, namely, which begins from 24° 37' N. and goes right up to the Chinese boundary. It now forms a separate charge, known as the Myitkyina district,[236] but at the time we are writing of, was the Mogaung subdivision of the Bhamo district, and contained about 10,000 square miles of country, of which two-thirds were, and still are, forest. The level and valley lands along the Irrawaddy and its tributaries25, mostly on the right bank, are fertile, yielding rice as the main crop; but even now, after twenty years of peace, the area cultivated is very small. It is given in the Burma Gazetteer26 (vol. ii., p. 123) as twenty-eight square miles. The area in the hills tilled, after a primitive27 method, has not been estimated, but as there are between twenty and thirty thousand Kachins who live on its produce, it is probably larger.
Of the wide forest area, part is in the low hill ranges, part in the plains. Twenty-five years ago, when there was not a road, the dense28 undergrowth and bamboo jungle, and in the lower lands the wide seas of elephant-grass, made the passage of men and transport animals most difficult and laborious29.
From a fiscal30 point of view Mogaung was supposed to be the most important part of the Bhamo district. The collection of a royalty31 on jade was farmed in the King's time for about Rs. 50,000, and there was also an income from the rubber-trees, mostly wild, but to a small extent cultivated.
In March, 1886, a force accompanied by Captain Cooke, the Deputy Commissioner, made its way to Mogaung. The Deputy Commissioner reported that the "country was then, for the most part, brought under control and settled administration." This was a figurative and official way of saying that a person of local influence, by name Maung Kala, had been recognized and put in charge as a magistrate32 in the British service.
After a very brief visit the Deputy Commissioner with the troops went back to Bhamo, and left Maung Kala to carry on the government as he best could, without police and with no military support nearer than Bhamo, which is at the least 150 miles from Mogaung, whether the journey is made by water or land. Even a handful of troops, lightly equipped, could not have been sent up in less than a fortnight. There was no telegraph to Mogaung. Maung Kala belonged to a family of great local influence, which had[237] held office for several generations, and was reputed to be of Chinese descent. But whatever his influence, he was sure to make enemies in his endeavours to keep order and to collect revenues, and there was no visible force behind him. His reign16 was short, and he was soon assassinated36.[41]
A Burman official was sent up from Bhamo by the Deputy Commissioner to succeed the murdered man. He soon found that he was not wanted at Mogaung and he retired37 to Sinbo, whence he could at least make a show of controlling the river-side villages. Po Saw, the son of Maung Kala, was then appointed by the people to his father's post, and whatever order or show of government there was in the country was due to him. Subsequently, in consequence of his having summarily executed a pretender who had endeavoured to impose himself on the people, the Deputy Commissioner recognised Po Saw's authority and withdrew the Burman. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the British Government had jurisdiction in Mogaung. No revenue was collected—at least, none was paid into the Bhamo treasury38. In this respect, however, Mogaung was little worse than the southern portion of the district which was administered by the Deputy Commissioner himself, supported by the garrison at Bhamo. In September, 1886, Major Cooke reported: "This district has, I believe, been one of the quietest districts in Upper Burma. The tranquillity39 of the district is in a great measure due to the fact that no real attempt was made to collect the revenue until July or August." Even the tranquillity so purchased was, however, only comparative, and the soldiers had quite enough to do. In the open season of 1886-7 it was not found possible to give men for an effective expedition to the north. Things had to be allowed to take their own course for the time. The Administration had no choice.
[238]
Early in 1887, however, the military police began to arrive from India, and in the spring of that year five companies, mainly Gurkhas, under the command of Lieutenant40 O'Donnell, were posted to Bhamo. This strengthened the hands of the civil administration. It was then too late to start an expedition to Mogaung. But Lieutenant O'Donnell was sent up to Sinbo, a village of some importance on the right bank of the Irrawaddy, just above the first defile. Here a strong stockade41 was built and a Gurkha garrison posted in it. An Assistant Commissioner also, Mr. Twomey, was sent to watch the course of events in the north.
There were three routes by which Mogaung could be reached from Bhamo. One was by going up the Irrawaddy and turning into the Mogaung River, on which lies the town. This was quite possible for a very small force which had not to carry all its supplies and transport. The object, however, was not merely to reach Mogaung, but to go to the jade-mines and explore the country. Since an explorer (Lieutenant Bayfield) made his way to the mines in 1838, no European had visited them. Nothing was accurately42 known of the nature of the country, of the supplies it afforded, or of the numbers and temper of the Kachin tribes which dominated it. All that could be gathered from the Chinese and others showed that there would be much difficulty in all these matters. It was suspected that the Chinese were disposed to magnify the difficulties. Nevertheless it was necessary that the force should be prepared for all emergencies, and should be in every respect self-sufficing. Hence the river route was considered impracticable.
Another way was to land the force at Katha and march up through Mohnyin. Our knowledge of the route between Mohnyin and Mogaung also was imperfect. It was not under our control, and a force passing up would have to take everything with it. The third route was by the left bank of the Irrawaddy. It had this advantage, that although the marching would be difficult, boats could follow the force up the river, could meet it at fixed43[239] points, and could carry a large quantity of the supplies, certainly as far as Sinbo and probably in the smaller craft as far as Mogaung. After much consideration it was decided44 to send the expedition by this route. A fortified45 post was to be established at Mogaung, to be held by the military police, to serve as a base for the advance of the force to the jade-mines and other parts.
Much care was given to the composition and equipment of the force[42] by the General commanding in Upper Burma, Sir George White. It was necessary that it should be prepared for all emergencies; that it should carry with it supplies for the whole time of its absence from Bhamo; that it should be able to move, as occasion required, either by land or water, and be ready to make its own roads and bridges. It must be strong enough to fight its own way and repel47 attacks; and at the same time the numbers of the force were limited by the necessity of carrying its own food and of keeping the transport train from becoming too large.
The Chief Commissioner selected Major Adamson, the Deputy Commissioner at Bhamo, to go with the force. To him was entrusted48 the task of dealing22 with the Kachins and of establishing the authority of the British Government. He had served for thirteen years in Lower Burma, and was known as one of the best officers in the Commission. He fully20 justified49 the confidence placed in him.
Some time before the expedition started, Major Adamson summoned Po Saw from Mogaung to meet him at Sinbo. He came accompanied by many of the chief Shan residents and Chinese merchants. He promised to obey the Deputy Commissioner's orders. The Deputy Commissioner then formally appointed him to be magistrate of Mogaung in his father's room and from the date of his father's death, and paid him a large sum as arrears50 of salary. He was then dismissed, with orders to clear the roads of jungle and collect supplies for the troops. He was instructed also to summon all the Kachin chiefs connected with the jade-mines to meet the representatives of the British Government at Mogaung. All this Po Saw readily promised to perform. Major Adamson went back to Bhamo well pleased with his willingness to help and believing in the loyalty51 of his intentions.
[240]
All preparations having been completed, the expedition marched from Bhamo on the 27th, by the north gate of the town. It was for these parts an unusually large and well-found force, and impressed the townspeople who crowded to witness its departure. It consisted of the following troops: Cheshire Regiment52, 50 rifles, under Captain Armstrong; Kelati-Ghilzai Regiment, 101 rifles, under Lieutenant Morton; Mounted Infantry53, 25 rifles; Bhamo Military Police (Gurkhas), 500 rifles, under Lieutenant O'Donnell;[43] Mountain Battery (Bengal), 2 guns, under Captain Triscott,[44] R.A. Captain Clements was in charge of the commissariat.
The land transport consisted of 350 pack-mules54 with drivers and two elephants, who were sent back after a few marches, as they proved to be useless. A fleet of three steam launches and thirty-three large country boats, with supplies, was sent up by river, with a force of sixty-six Native Infantry, under a native officer, on the launches.
Captain Triscott, R.A., with Lieutenant Williams, R.A., as his staff officer, was in command of the whole force.
A Roman Catholic missionary55 who spoke8 Shan and Kachin accompanied the expedition as interpreter. A survey party to map the country, a forest officer to report on the forests, and Mr. Warry, the Chinese adviser56 to the Chief Commissioner, made the staff complete.
The march up the left bank of the Irrawaddy was difficult. There were two considerable streams, the Taeping and the Molé, affluents57 of the Irrawaddy, to be crossed in the first few marches. These rivers, however, caused comparatively little delay. The track kept as near as possible to the course of the Irrawaddy. Sometimes it crept along close to the river-bank, across numerous spurs separated by small streams flowing into the main river. The ascents59 and descents were very steep, and to make them passable for laden61 animals much jungle-cutting and road-making had to be done. Sometimes the gradients were so steep as to necessitate62 the cutting of zigzag63 paths. At times the animals had to be taken up the steep banks and into the forests in order to find a road.
[241]
On the 2nd of January the camping-ground was on a sandy spit by the river-bank, at a village called Nanti. Here the steam-launches and the thirty-three boats met the land columns. On the 4th the march lay along the side of the first defile, where the river flows between rocky banks. The laden animals found easier going here, as there was no rank vegetation; but it was slow work, as paths had to be cut for them on the steep sides of the beds of dry streams which had frequently to be crossed. On the 4th, after leaving the defile behind, the force debouched on sandy level ground close to the stream, and halted at the village of Manhé, where the column had to cross the Irrawaddy. The headman of Sinbo, with some fourscore men and half as many boats which he had brought down by the Deputy Commissioner's orders, to help in the work, was waiting. Next day was devoted64 to the crossing. At 7 a.m. it began, and by half-past 3 p.m. the last man was landed on the right bank.
The Irrawaddy at this place and at this time of the year is three hundred yards wide, with a current of about two miles an hour. The formation of the river-bed, the broad sloping banks of sand and gravel65, and at places the depth of water close to the side, made the work simple enough, however laborious. The two launches could come alongside the bank, and the artillery66 and infantry, with arms and ammunition67, were taken over in them. Then came the baggage animals, who were made to swim the river in batches68 of four or five at a time. A canoe, with one Burman boatman in the bow, was drawn69 up alongside the bank, with the bow against the stream. Then four or five men, each leading an animal, passed round to the stern of the boat and seated themselves in the canoe holding the animals by their leading-ropes. As soon as[242] they were seated a second boatman took his stand in the stern. The bow was shoved off and the canoe punted across the river by the two boatmen. Thus the animals were swimming up-stream astern of the canoe, and were not in danger of being forced by the current against it. Three hundred and fifty animals swam the river in this manner, and not one was drowned or hurt.
The column was now on the right bank of the Irrawaddy. The next march brought them to Sinbo, where a garrison of military police was already established in a stockade, near to which a large camping-ground had been cleared for the troops. Supplies from Bhamo had been landed and stored, and the commissariat staff was busied in arranging for their transport to Mogaung. The fleet had also arrived before the column. The launches being unable, owing to the shallowness of the river, to get up beyond Sinbo, were sent back to Bhamo.
The next two marches, partly through forests partly across plains cropped here and there with rice, brought the force to the bank of the Mogaung stream. The water was deep and the current ran very strong. The crossing of this little river gave more trouble than the passage of the Irrawaddy. For Po Saw's promises proved false. He had made no preparations and sent down neither men nor boats. However, three or four boats were found at a village higher up the stream. Teak logs were lying about. Rafts were made; and the guns and commissariat stores taken over. There were not enough boats to tow the large number of pack-animals across. Mules and ponies70 were driven into the water in herds71 and forced to make their way to the other bank, which unluckily was very steep with a muddy bottom. Nevertheless they all got over except one, but many were very spent and were brought up the bank with difficulty.
The road now lay on the left, or east, bank of the river, and entered a country of which nothing was known. It was dominated by the Kachin chief of the neighbouring hills, from whom the inhabitants had to purchase protection—in plain English, immunity72, to some small extent, from murder and robbery. As they had been forced at the same time to pay taxes to the Burmese officials,[243] they had suffered much, and many of the villages were deserted73.
The failure of Po Saw to carry out Major Adamson's instructions gave rise to some anxiety. Treachery was feared, and precautions were taken against surprise. The road was now in parts very difficult, over steep forest-covered hills running down close to the Mogaung River, and intersected by many steep ravines. Progress was slow, as the way had to be cleared of bamboo and other undergrowth before the pack-animals could pass. In places on reaching the proposed halting-place it was found to be a small, confined spot, and the ground had to be cleared before the camp could be pitched. A party of Chinese Shans on their way to Mogaung joined the camp at night, and were engaged to accompany the force and help to clear the road, for which they were well paid.
After some sixteen miles of difficult ground, which was covered in two marches, the column struck the river again near Tapaw. Here the headman advised Major Adamson to cross to the right bank again, as the land road to Mogaung was only five or six miles, whereas the river made a detour74 of double that distance, first going north and then coming back to the south-east. There were no boats to be had here. After some consideration Captain Triscott and Major Adamson decided that it was advisable to send to Mogaung and summon Po Saw. They had heard from a Kachin Sawbwa whom they met on the road that the Chinaman who farmed the jade-mine revenue had been murdered, and they were now told at Tapaw that an Englishman had passed down-stream in urgent haste.
Here we must go back to Mr. Warry's movements. It has been said above that Mr. Warry, the adviser on Chinese affairs, had been appointed to go with the expedition. He belonged to the Chinese Consular75 Service, spoke Chinese well, and understood that difficult people as well as an Englishman can. He was on most friendly terms with the Chinese in Burma, and could trust himself to them without fear. It appears that instead of marching with Major Adamson, as it was intended, he had gone by himself with some Chinamen by the river. When the expedition[244] arrived at Sinbo it was found that Warry had gone on in his boat, meaning to travel up the Mogaung stream. His attempt to go ahead of the expedition, if that had been his purpose, was foiled by the refusal of his Chinamen to attempt the ascent60 of the Mogaung until they had learnt that the column had preceded them.
Hence on the 12th of January he was in his boat on the Mogaung, some seven or eight miles in rear of the marching column, when he met Mr. Rimmer, a commander in the Irrawaddy flotilla's service, coming down the stream as fast as his men could paddle. Rimmer had in his boat a Chinaman very badly wounded in the head. It was Lon Pein, who had been at one time the farmer of the jade-mine taxes under the King's Government. Rimmer's story was that he had pushed on to the town of Mogaung alone, for the purpose of examining the waterway. He reached the town on the 19th of January, and having accomplished76 his object was about to return at once when Lon Pein came to him and told him that he feared an attack by Po Saw's men, who sought his life. He implored77 Rimmer to stay and help to defend him until the troops should arrive. The people of the town appeared to be friendly enough. But believing that Lon Pein's life was in danger, he chivalrously78 agreed to stay. He took up his quarters in the Chinaman's house, and they made ready in such manner as they could to resist an attack. Rimmer was armed with a rifle, and Lon Pein, it may be presumed, had fire-arms of some sort. They had not long to wait.
At midnight of the 10th a body of ruffians besieged79 the house with more vigour80 even than the police led by the Home Secretary against the house in Sidney Street. The house was of the kind usual in the country, raised on piles with a floor none too closely fitted. The assailants got underneath81 and fired through the floor, and thrust spears wherever they could find an opening. Early in the fight Lon Pein fell wounded in the head, and never recovered consciousness. Rimmer's rifle was shot in two, and his knee was grazed by a ball. However, he continued to hold out until dawn, when the assailants made off. Next day he managed to find his boat and, with the assistance of some town's-people, to carry Lon Pein to it. The inhabitants expressed their sympathy and regret, but did not explain their failure to help him. Po Saw, it appeared, had left Mogaung the day before, but Rimmer believed that Lon Pein had good cause for holding him responsible for the attack.
Kachin women and children of the upper Irrawaddy.
[245]
Warry persuaded Rimmer to return with him to the protection of the troops, and they joined the column on the 13th, before it left Tapaw, and entered Mogaung with it on the 14th of January. Evidently there was mischief on foot. The leaders of the expedition, on hearing the story, decided that before advancing further it would be wise to make Po Saw show his hand. The difficulty was to get a trustworthy man to carry a message to Mogaung. There was a Mussulman, a native of India, who had come up as an interpreter, with the force, Safdar Ali by name. He might have been a descendant of Sinbad the Sailor, for he had led a life of travel and adventure. He had traded in jade, and was familiar with many parts of the country. He spoke Burmese, Shan, and Kachin, in addition to his native Hindustani, and he had taken wives of the daughters of Heth in most of the bigger places. In consequence, or in spite, of these alliances he was on good terms with the people about, and could obtain intelligence of local affairs. Safdar Ali volunteered to take a letter to Po Saw, and with a native to show him the shortest road, he departed.
Meanwhile Captain Triscott and Major Adamson, with some Mounted Infantry, had gone out to examine the track, and found that for four or five miles it crossed a rice plain cut up by numerous muddy ditches which the baggage animals could not get over. Beyond this rice-ground rose some hills, at the foot of which was a morass82, which the column would find very difficult to pass. They turned back to the camp, therefore, to collect labour to make the road passable. Safdar Ali, on his way back from Mogaung, overtook them, and reported that Po Saw had disappeared after the Chinaman's murder, and had gone, it was said, to raise the Kachins nearest to Mogaung. This was not cheering news, as Po Saw's influence with the Kachins had been relied upon as the means of establishing peaceable relations with them.
However, the other officials of the town had been helpful;[246] boats had been sent down to Tapaw, and before the day ended, the nakan, or deputy magistrate, attended by the Kyaung Tagas and Payatagas (builders of monasteries83 and pagodas84), arrived to pay their respects. They were reprimanded by Major Adamson for their neglect, and were directed to take steps at once to make the road passable. The poor men were evidently in fear and trembling, dreading85 the vengeance86 of Po Saw on the one hand and the wrath87 of the British Government on the other. However, the march next day was made without great difficulty: the ditches were filled up or bridged. The swamp proved a greater obstacle. Luckily there was an abundance of elephant-grass hard by. This was cut, and being spread thickly on the surface of the swamp, made a passable road.
After climbing the hill, the pagodas and monasteries of Mogaung became visible; and when the level ground round the town was reached, a number of the chief people were seen, who had come out to meet the British force and make their submission88. On reaching the gates a conference was held with these, while the town was reconnoitred by the soldiers for a suitable camping-place.
The burgesses were evidently suffering from great fears. They dreaded89 the Kachins, to raise whom was the design of Po Saw. Under these circumstances it comforted them to learn that the British had come to stay, and that their town would not be left again without an English officer and a sufficient garrison. Major Adamson then proclaimed the offer of a reward of 1,000 rupees for the discovery and arrest of the murderer of Lon Pein, the Chinaman. He told them to have no fear of the British soldiers, and assured them that if the Myo-?k Po Saw would return to his duty even now, he would be forgiven and restored to office. By this time, a good site having been found on a sand-bank at the upper end of the town, the whole column marched through the main street, that all might see its strength, and established the camp there.
Mogaung[45] was once the capital of a considerable Shan principality. In 1888 it could count only about three hundred houses. Standing90 on the bank at the confluence91 of two streams, it is washed by water on two sides. On the other two sides it was defended by a teak palisade in bad repair. The town is well planned, being, like Rangoon and Mandalay, laid out in squares, with brick-paved roads at right angles to each other, one main road, likewise paved, running through the middle. Many pagodas, substantial structures of brick, and large and handsome monasteries of teak, ornament92 the inside of the town and also the spaces outside the walls. A Buddhist93 bishop94, with jurisdiction over the whole of the north part of the Bhamo district, had his seat at Mogaung in 1887-8.
[247]
In the centre of the town were some very good houses belonging to the wealthier residents, and at the upper end the Chinese—who formed, as they do now, a large and important class of the inhabitants—had their quarters and their temple. Most of the trade in jade and rubber was in their hands, and their houses were as uncleanly here as in other towns of Burma. One of their chief employments was the manufacture of arrack, which they sold to the town's-people. The shops in their quarter reeked95 of it. Whatever the Indian Temperance Society may think, we cannot be accused of introducing alcohol or the vice33 of drunkenness into these regions. Orders were at once issued against selling liquor to the British soldiers. These orders were treated with indifference96 until a Chinaman was caught in the act. He was promptly97 flogged, and there were no more cases of the kind. Another race found at Mogaung was the cross-breeds between Chinese and Shans. "We noticed," says Major Adamson (short account, p. 27), "very many Chinese Shans.... They are strange, wild-looking people, as a rule rather short in size, but often strong and wiry. They are invariably dressed in a blue cotton jacket and loose blue Chinese trousers, and they wear their hair in a sort of long tail behind, more or less after the fashion of Chinese. They are each armed with a long sword, and as a rule each carries a bag, in which he keeps his eating utensils99, food, and blanket."
In the river in front of Mogaung is an island, where the boats which bring jade and rubber from the north, and all sorts of miscellaneous merchandise from Bhamo,[248] were moored100. A small bamboo bridge gave connection with the mainland. "The island is looked upon as a place of safety in the event of the Kachins attacking the town. Many of the villagers keep their valuables in boats for protection, and some women and children go nightly to sleep in the boats, where they consider they are safer than in their houses (ibid., p. 28)."
It was Major Adamson's duty to get into touch with the people, and procure101 the necessary intelligence concerning local politics and conditions. There was a man of influence in the town called Shwè Gya, who had been appointed by Major Cooke to be the nakan, or deputy, when Maung Kala was recognized as Myo-?k. He could not get on with Po Saw when that person succeeded to power, and retired into private life. Shwè Gya was a man of some note and of strong individuality. He was a cross-breed between a Kachin father and an Assamese mother. But he had adopted the dress, habits, and religion of the Burmese Shans. He had been a soldier at one time, and understood Kachin tactics well. Being able to appreciate the power of the English, he threw in his lot with them. This man Major Adamson took into his confidence, and found him most useful and most loyal.
It was necessary for Adamson to be open to all comers and at all times. As this was not possible within the camp, he moved his quarters to a rest-house in the town, taking a small British guard for his protection. On Sunday, the 15th, his mind was relieved by learning that Po Saw had returned. A Durbar was arranged, to which all the notables were summoned. The officers of the force being present, Major Adamson received Po Saw formally, and after explaining the objects of the expedition and the general policy of the British Government, namely the establishment of peace and the encouragement of trade, he censured102 the Myo-?k for his conduct, and called on him to explain it. Po Saw alleged103 that fear of being called to account for Lon Pein's murder had been the reason of his flight. Major Adamson accepted the excuse, and restored him to office. At the same time he assured the people that no one should be prosecuted104 for offences against the British Government committed before the arrival of[249] the expedition, except those who had been parties to the murder of the Chinaman.
O'Donnell and his police, who had fallen behind the column owing to the boats with their supplies having been delayed, had now arrived, and the work of building a fort for their occupation was begun. A site was chosen on a piece of ground in the middle of the town, bounded on one side by the river, of which the banks were very steep and formed a natural defence, leaving the other sides to be protected by palisades.
The mornings now were very cold and foggy, the thermometer falling to 45° or 50°. About nine o'clock the fog cleared off, and the climate was delightful105. The soldiers were naturally eager to move. They were eating up their stores, and if the Kachins meant mischief the less time they had to prepare it, the better. A council of war was held. Major Adamson wished to wait until the Kachins had had time to arrive. His instructions were to avoid hostilities106 with the Kachin chiefs if possible. Po Saw had not summoned them to meet him as he had been ordered; the letters from the British Representative were only now reaching them. The Chinese, through Mr. Warry, also strongly urged delay. Moreover, nothing was yet known about the road to the jade-mines; and as it was found that, contrary to expectation, paddy for the transport animals could be procured107 from the villages in the neighbourhood, the arguments against delay lost some of their force. The council decided, after discussion, to halt for ten days.
During the next few days the chief work was the collection of materials for the fort and its construction, which was rapidly pushed on by Captain O'Donnell. Houses were also put in hand for the officers who were to remain in Mogaung, namely the Commandant of military police, the Assistant Commissioner, and a surgeon. Surveys were made of the neighbouring country, information about the roads and villages collected, and in short every preparation made for the advance.
On the 22nd of January, Shwè Gya reported to Major Adamson that the Myo-?k Po Saw had disappeared once more. His conduct since his reinstatement had not been[250] good. It was decided to capture him if possible, and keep him a prisoner. He was reported to be in a village about five miles away. Taking fifty men and some mounted police, under the command of Captain Armstrong, of the Cheshire Regiment, Adamson descended108 on the village, surrounded it, and searched every house. There was no trace of Po Saw; but a man known to be in his service, and another who was recognized to be Bo Ti, his right-hand man, were made prisoners.
The final disappearance109 of Po Saw upset Major Adamson's plans. It was idle to expect that the influential110 Kachin chiefs would now come in. It was necessary to appoint a man to carry on the duties of the Myo-?k. Shwè Gya was the best man, but he was not a Shan and the people would not have accepted him. With the consent of the townsfolk another member of Maung Kala's family was chosen and placed in authority, with Shwè Gya as the deputy and real working man. All this was done in public, and explained to the people. At this time some letters of a friendly tone came in, with presents from some Kachin chiefs whose hills were on the road to the jade-mines.
The time had come now for an advance. The fort was ready for occupation, and was defended by a substantial bamboo palisade, Captain O'Donnell, with all his police except a detachment of seventy-five, who formed part of the expeditionary force, were left to garrison it. Mr. Twomey, Assistant Commissioner, was placed in administrative111 charge, and orders were left for the despatch112 of Bo Ti and the other prisoner to Bhamo. On the 26th of January the march began. The troops forming the column under Captain Triscott's command were:—
Khelati Ghilzai Regiment 100 rifles
Gurkha Military Police 75 "
Cheshire Regiment 50 "
Bengal Mountain Battery 2 guns.
Yawgin with Crossbow.
(Mountains north of Myit Kyina.)
Kachin Women.
(Northern Irrawaddy.)
[251]
A field-hospital, under Surgeon-Major Barron, and a train of transport animals with provisions and commissariat stores for seven days, completed his equipment. Mr. Warry, a survey party, a forest officer, the Roman Catholic priest who acted as interpreter, Safdar Ali, and the new Myo-?k, Poh Myah, with Shwè Gya, the deputy, and some armed followers113, accompanied Major Adamson. Supplies were forwarded up by river to Kamaing, the first principal halting-place, thirty-three miles from Mogaung.
Before the force left a reconnoitring party had been sent up to Kamaing, and had reported the road to be very difficult. The report was not found to be exaggerated. Marching through elephant-grass and thick forest, which hid everything except the immediate114 neighbourhood, a hardly visible path, obstructed115 often by huge fallen trees; camping-grounds which had to be laboriously116 cleared of elephant-grass[46] and undergrowth, before standing-room could be found for the animals or resting-place for the men, with sometimes heavy rain which drenched117 every one, made the march anything but pleasant. All hardships, however, were born with cheerfulness; and as the country was new and unexplored, and there was a chance of a fight at any time, the men were full of spirit. They and their officers were true soldiers.
On the 30th the stream on the opposite bank of which lay Kamaing was reached. It ran deep, and the banks were precipitous. Fortunately, it was only about the width of a cricket pitch. Trees were felled and elephant-grass cut, and with the aid of a big trunk found sticking up in the bed of the river, a bridge was made, over which the whole force, laden animals and all, safely crossed. "Kamaing," writes Major Adamson, "is splendidly situated118 on a small hill, close to the river, at the point where its two main branches unite, the larger branch, the Nampoung, coming from the Indawgyi Lake in the south-west" (ibid., p. 40). It had been a flourishing town, as the still remaining monasteries and pagodas proved. These religious buildings were, however, deserted, the last monk119 having died a year before. Of the whole town only a few houses remained. The place had shared the fate of all this country in the Kachin rebellion of 1883. There were still a few shops, however, where Manchester goods could be bought, and articles of food for daily use were to be had. Country spirits and opium were also on sale.
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Here letters came in from the two brothers who ruled the hills in which the jade-mines are situated. They were called Kansi Naung and Kansi Hla. Their tone was friendly, though they wrote with the hope of preventing the advance of our people from Mogaung. Answers were sent by mounted messengers, saying that the force was already at Kamaing and would continue its march next day, and assuring the Sawbwas of our peaceable intentions.
Starting from Kamaing on the 31st of January, the bank of the Indaw River was reached after some of the most difficult marches made during the expedition. The path was passable for men but not for a long line of laden animals. It was very swampy120, with tall elephant-grass on each side, which had been set on fire to make the track passable. The men had to force their way through the charred121 stalks, and as there was a heavy fog at the time "the faces and clothes of the whole column were speedily as black as if they had been down a coal-mine." (Short account, p. 36.) For some distance every yard of the road had to be made by cutting down the tall, coarse grass and spreading it on the surface of the swamp until it would bear the weight of the animals. So they made their way, always through the tall grass, until the Indaw River was struck. Here it was decided to form a defensible camp, in which all superfluous122 animals, stores, and tents should be left, with a sufficient garrison to guard them, while the main body pushed on to the jade-mines. After their experience of the country, it was held to be dangerous to move with the whole train if there was any likelihood of fighting. Two days were occupied in preparing this camp, in getting some portion of the road cleared in advance, and in holding communication with a neighbouring Kachin Sawbwa.
On the 3rd of February the reduced column, in light fighting order, left Kamaing with seven days' provisions, loaded on some hundred and twenty-five mules. Each man carried two days' rations34 besides. Everything that could be done without, including tents, was left in the camp. It was as well, for the road continued difficult, and every bit of ground at the halting-places for the night had to be cleared. The march was sometimes in the bed of a stream sometimes through dense cane123 jungle growing in swamp. Hard work in deep mud, from which all sorts of noxious124 vapours rose, caused the men to sweat profusely125, and exhausted126 the animals. Fortunately, through the medium of Shwè Gya, Major Adamson persuaded some of the Kachin villagers to approach him, and their services were hired for road clearing.
Bhamo Battalion127 drawn up for inspection128.
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On the 6th messengers from the jade-mine Sawbwas, Kansi Naung and Kansi Hla, were met, carrying letters for the Deputy Commissioner. The letters were quite friendly in tone, and invited the British force to halt on the bank of the Uyu River, where there were grass and water in plenty. Major Adamson was much relieved to get this communication, as it seemed to give promise of a peaceable visit to the mines.
The road ascended129 now through forest and thick bamboo undergrowth, and was very fatiguing130. For the first time men were met carrying down loads of jade stone. The watershed131 between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy was crossed, and the road then descended into an open plateau, out of the dense and dismal132 forest through which our march of seven miles had been. From 7 a.m. till 2 p.m. we had been steadily133 marching, but we had only been able to accomplish seven miles. Heavy rain fell that night and turned the camping-ground into a bog134, and made the road for next day (February 6th) very heavy. The mud and water reached to the bellies135 of the mules, and in places the column was forced to leave the path and cut a new way through the forest. The Namthein, an affluent58 of the Uyu, had to be crossed several times, the water being up to a man's knee and the bed of the stream 50 yards broad.
At midday the weary force encamped on a tongue of land at the junction136 of the Namthein and Uyu Rivers. The camp was on a lovely spot. It faced southwards, and commanded a view of the junction of the two streams. On the right was the Uyu, a beautiful stream of from 75 to 100 yards from bank to bank, "as clear as crystal, and alive with fish, which kept rising to the surface in the evening, like trout137 in an English stream. The bed was generally rocky, full of large water-worn boulders138; but for a short distance above[254] our camp there was a very deep pool under the opposite bank, while the shore on our side was sandy and gravelly, and sloped very gradually towards the deep part.... The spot which we selected for a camp was a beautiful triangular139 piece of ground, covered with short grass and a few bushes on the northern portion, and with a long tongue of shingle140 and sand stretching southwards to the place where the streams met."
In this pleasant place came a further letter to the leaders of the expedition from Kansi Naung, saying that he had given orders that the English should be treated well, and promising141 to come himself with presents.
Next day, however, brought only disappointment. A letter came from Kansi Naung saying that illness prevented him from keeping his promise. Other signs indicated that all was not right, and Shwè Gya, who had been hopeful hitherto, lost heart. The military leaders were for good reasons in favour of immediate action. Major Adamson, however, took the responsibility of giving Kansi Naung more time, and wrote to him peremptorily142, saying that they could not wait, and that he must come in. On the 8th of February news came that Kansi Naung was at a village on the opposite side of the river, not a mile off. Shwè Gya was asked to go across to see him. But he declined, saying that he knew Kachins were on his track to murder him.[47] From two men who came across from the Sawbwa's camp, one of whom Major Adamson had met in Mogaung, it was learnt that emissaries from Po Saw had arrived, and were urging the Kachin chief not to visit the British.
The right course was now clear. Adamson told the men publicly to go back to Kansi Naung and tell him that if he did not appear before ten o'clock next day the column would advance to the jade-mines by force if necessary. Later in the day the polyglot143 and polygamous interpreter, Safdar Ali, volunteered to go to the Kachin camp to see if he could influence the Kachins, or at any rate find out what was in their minds. His offer was accepted. At the same time all was made ready for a fight. Next day (February 9th) Safdar Ali returned with a message from Kansi Naung that the Sawbwa would come, but that ten o'clock was too early for him.
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Captain Triscott fixed the advancing or attacking force at one hundred rifles and one gun; the rest were not more than sufficient to defend the camp. The numbers of possible enemies might be large, and if the advance was opposed the camp also would probably be assailed144. By nine o'clock the men had fallen in and were waiting for the order to march, when a large party appeared on the opposite side of the river. The leading man carried a fine pair of elephant tusks145. It was evidently a friendly visit, and proved to be Kansi Naung with twelve other chiefs. The troops drawn up for a hostile advance were at once turned into a guard of honour. The military and civil leaders sat in chairs in front of the hut in which they had sheltered, and the Kachin Sawbwas on their arrival were seated on the ground in front of them. The tusks were presented and all the chiefs made their submission. Major Adamson assured them, Shwè Gya interpreting, that the British Government would respect their rights in the mines. They were warned against listening to Po Saw, who had been dismissed from the British service. Presents were given to each of them, and they were dismissed.
On their departure the troops immediately fell in and started for the jade-mines, which were reached after an uneventful march on a rough forest path, which rose to an altitude of fifteen hundred feet. There was not much to see. "A collection of about fifty houses and what appeared to be a large quarry146, while all over the place were blocks of white stone of all sizes, some of which were tinged147 or streaked148 with green." The main object of the expedition, to obtain the submission of the Kachin chiefs and assert the authority of the Government and its right to the revenue from the mines, had been attained149. As no water was to be had, and there were no rations for the men, the force, after a short rest, marched back to camp. Everything had gone well during their absence from the camp. But disquieting150 letters had come from Mogaung, telling of a Kachin assault on the stockade.
It remained now to explore the Indaw country. Taking only a small party from the camp, Adamson went in boats[256] up the Indaw River to the lake, a very fine piece of water, about sixteen miles long from north to south by six broad. He found the country round it to be naturally fertile and bearing marks of much former prosperity. But it had been the scene of the Kachin rebellion of 1883, which had its rising here, and here also the rebels had made their last stand. It had been devastated151 with all the ruthlessness of an Asiatic conqueror152. It bore the marks of recent prosperity and a thick population. Good roads still united the ruined villages; nearly every little stream was crossed by solid teak bridges; sites of old villages still showed gardens of mango, jack98, tamarind, and other fruit trees growing amongst monasteries and pagodas all absolutely deserted, amidst great stretches of splendid rice plains showing signs of recent cultivation153. Yet only one small patch of land, about ten acres under tillage, and only in a few places some poor huts which, surrounded by double and treble stockades154, showed the conditions under which the few surviving peasants lived.
It was hoped that with unlimited155 rice plains, a magnificent lake swarming156 with fish, a Government that would enforce peace, with open water communications and in the near future a railroad, this beautiful country would recover prosperity. All that can be said after a generation has passed is that "it is only beginning to recover from the devastation157 caused by the Kachin rising of 1883" (Burma Gazetteer, vol ii., p. 120, edit. 1908). So much easier is it to destroy than to restore.
The Indawgyi country being now explored, the party rejoined the main body at the Sakaw camp, and the force set out on its return march to Mogaung. They had left Mogaung on the 27th of January, and had marched for four weeks through jungles and marshes158 most favourable159 to a savage160 enemy skilled in ambuscade. Yet not a shot had been fired. Po Saw, however, had been busy with the Kachins. Mogaung had been attacked on the 3rd of February, and the report of this had reached Major Adamson. They were prepared, therefore, for hostilities, and before they reached Mogaung, on the 24th of February, they were attacked and lost several men.
The state of affairs at Mogaung was not very reassuring161.[257] The people were in much alarm. Women and children were sleeping in the boats. The road was unsafe, and communication with the Irrawaddy was interrupted. The last boats, four in number, which left the town with the mails and some prisoners under a guard, had been fired on by Kachins; and a boatman and one of the Gurkha police were hit. No Chinese boat had ventured up the river for three weeks. The resident Chinese were putting their temple in order of defence, and every one expected that there would be fighting.
The expeditionary force had, however, to return to Bhamo. They had accomplished the work for which they had been detached. Major Adamson also was obliged to resume the charge of his district, which had been left more or less during his absence to a subordinate officer.[48] Mogaung, the town and the subdivision, were placed in the hands of Mr. Twomey, the Assistant Commissioner, supported by Captain O'Donnell and the military police, who were quite able to defend the stockade and the town, but were not strong enough to keep the country around in order, if the Kachins came down.
The arrangement was that Captain Triscott should march back by the land route through Mohnyin to Katha and open up the country which had not been explored. It had been intended originally to send a small force up from Katha to meet him. This proved impracticable, but a party of military police had occupied Mohnyin. Accordingly the expeditionary force marched back by this route. They were opposed several times by bodies of Kachins, who had fortified themselves in positions across the road. These enemies, however, were easily dislodged by the guns, and a junction with the military police was effected at Mohnyin. The rest of the return march was made without incident.
It was hardly to be expected in any case that Major Adamson's expedition should result in the immediate establishment of peace in the Mogaung country and in placing our relations with the Kachins on a friendly footing. To secure the submission of a wild people divided into as many tribes as there are hills in their country, and to bring them under a civilized162 system of government, is not the work of a few weeks. But it was hoped that more than a beginning had been made, and that time and the residence of British officers at Mogaung would do the rest.
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Some untoward163 events had occurred to render this hope vain. The conduct of Po Saw in leaving Mogaung and taking refuge with the Kachins was the main cause of the difficulties which began to be felt early in 1888. If Major Adamson had been successful in capturing Po Saw when he made Bo Ti a prisoner, and if Bo Ti had been securely detained, much of the trouble which followed during the subsequent years 1888 and 1889, and even later, would have been avoided. Unfortunately the advantage accruing164 from Bo Ti's capture was soon to be lost. He was sent down to Bhamo and confined in the jail there. The jail, like other buildings in Upper Burma, was made of wood. It had a stout165 teak palisade round it, secure enough if the guard had been trustworthy. It happened that just at that time an attempt had been made to assassinate35 the Colonel commanding in Bhamo. While he was dressing166 for mess his body-servant crept up behind him as he stood at the glass and stabbed him in the back. The servant, a native of India, was arrested at once and locked up, pending167 trial, in the same jail with Bo Ti. These two conspired168 to escape. They scooped169 away the ground from the base of some of the big teak posts which formed the palisade and contrived170 to loosen them. The guard being either asleep or in collusion with them, they got away.
Bo Ti soon made his escape felt by our people at Mogaung. He joined Po Saw somewhere in the Kachin Hills, probably at Thama, and helped to raise the tribes. The influence of both these men over the Kachins was very great. In Po Saw's case it was probably more hereditary171 than personal. He was descended from the former ruling family, and with the Kachins as well as with the Burmans a drop of royal blood counts for much. Personally Po Saw seems to have been a treacherous172 and cowardly character. Bo Ti, on the contrary, was a bold leader and had some military capacity. The two together[259] were powerful for mischief; and it would have saved much hard work to our men and many lives if they had been shot in the beginning. However, there they were, and they had to be reckoned with. The assault on Mogaung and the attack on the column returning from the jade-mines (vide p. 256) were, in fact, the work of Po Saw.
For a short time after Major Adamson left with the expeditionary force there were no disturbances173. But signs and rumours174 of Po Saw's activity were frequent. The attempts to stop the column on its way from Mogaung to Mohnyin were organized or instigated175 by him. In the latter half of April the rumours began to take shape, and the Kachins were said to be on the warpath. In the third week of April the headman of a group of villages in the rice plain south of Mogaung reported to the Assistant Commissioner that Bo Ti and three chiefs of the Ithi Kachin tribe had ordered him to join a party which they were organizing for an assault on Mogaung. If he refused, they threatened to destroy the village of Taungbaw in which he lived. They required him to meet them at a given place to settle details. At this time Mr. Twomey, owing to an accidental wound, had taken leave, and Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, a young soldier who had been appointed to the Commission, held his place. The headman proposed that a strong party should be sent from Mogaung to ambush176 Bo Ti and his friends when they came to the trysting-place. This proposal seemed to Lieutenant Eliott to be treacherous dealing which a British officer ought not to countenance177, and he refused to join in it; a piece of high-minded chivalry178 somewhat misplaced under the circumstances. The headman having been advised by Lieutenant Eliott not to keep the appointment with Bo Ti lest treachery should be intended, left the fort.
Early next morning he ran in to report that before dawn Bo Ti, with some hundreds of men, had come to Taungbaw and were stockading themselves in the village. Taungbaw is four or five miles from Mogaung. Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, taking the mounted men and a company of Gurkhas, started at once for the scene of action, ordering reinforcements to follow. They met fugitives179 who confirmed[260] the headman's report, and said that Bo Ti was in strong force and was fortifying180 his position. Taungbaw is on a small hill rising abruptly181 from the plain, detached and about 400 yards distant from the main ridge46, and about the same distance from a village called Zédi, which was occupied by friendlies, Burmese and Shan peasants, from the plain. Bo Ti had been too busy in strengthening his position to pay attention to the movements of these people.
When O'Donnell and his men were about six thousand paces from the hill, a signal shot was fired by the enemy's outpost. Advancing to within 400 yards, our men delivered several volleys. Each volley was answered by a Kachin cheer. Evidently they meant to make a stand. At this moment the reinforcements from Mogaung came up and it was decided to attack the Kachin position. The hill was steep and covered with thick bamboo jungle, very difficult to get through. The enemy could not be seen. Dividing his men into three parties, O'Donnell sent the mounted men round the left flank to form up in rear of the hills. Part of his infantry were sent round the right flank and told to get well under the hill. The remainder, led by the two British officers, then worked round the right flank, which seemed to offer the best openings for an ascent. As they crossed a narrow causeway in a paddy-field and a small bridge they drew the Kachin fire.
On coming into touch with the first party it was told to go farther on round the hill. The order was then given to advance with fixed bayonets. The bamboo jungle prevented the men from getting on fast. A heavy fire was kept up by the Kachins, but owing to the steepness of the ascent the bullets flew high and there were no casualties. Beyond the bamboo jungle was the village stockade, which was within 30 yards of Bo Ti's position. But when the Kachins saw the Gurkhas forcing their way through this stockade, they did not wait for the bayonet, but after firing a few shots bolted down the hill, our men chasing them.
At the bottom the mounted men took up the running, and it was a case of every man for himself, Unfortunately when the firing began some of the Mounted Infantry ponies were scared and broke away. Owing to this mischance the pursuit was less effective than it should have been. Even[261] so the affair was well managed and gave a lesson to the Kachins, who left eighteen dead near the village and on the line of flight, and several prisoners were also taken. The friendly villagers lay low during the fight. When it was all over they came to the front and began mutilating the dead in a barbarous fashion, and were driven off with difficulty and not without force.
Some anxiety was felt by Captain O'Donnell and Mr. Eliott lest Po Saw, learning that the greater part of the garrison had gone out, should attack the Mogaung stockade. Only sixty-six men, some of them sick, had been left in the fort—enough, perhaps, to hold it, but not to defend the town. Fortunately no attempt was made by Po Saw. At the time of the fight he was on his way to the jade-mines. He had attempted, as it was learnt afterwards, to come to Bo Ti's assistance, but he could not reach the scene of the fight in time.
The next month showed constant activity on the part of Po Saw and Bo Ti and their Kachin allies. Frequent attacks were made on boats going down or up the Mogaung River. It became necessary to send them in convoys182 with police guards. Villages near Mogaung were raided, and early in May Nanpapa, near Sinbo, was attacked, many villagers killed or carried away, and the village destroyed. Po Saw himself took up a position at Kamaing, where he could harass183 the traders on the route to the jade-mines and Indawgyi, and from which he could also threaten Mogaung. It was not possible for Captain O'Donnell to drive him away or to act on the offensive at any distance from the fort. Hence the enemy became more daring.
On the 21st of May, under cover of night, a large body of Shans, under Bo Ti, got into the town and took up positions within the low brick-wall enclosures of the pagodas, which, as has been described, were scattered184 about in and outside the town. The garrison, under Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, turned out against them. A really good fight followed, in which the enemy lost forty-nine men killed and many wounded, and were driven in confusion out of the town. They were nearly all Shans, some of whom had come from the Uyu country beyond[262] the jade-mines. The garrison lost twenty-three men killed and wounded. The Gurkhas were gallantly186 led, and behaved grandly, and on that day the Mogaung Levy187 won a name for itself.
The situation at Mogaung caused some anxiety. The garrison was too weak. Its strength was now only two hundred and ninety-two men, many of whom were sick, not enough to allow a force to leave the post for a day. Two hundred men were ordered up from Bhamo, and with that addition the garrison would be able to hold their own, but it would not suffice to enable them to punish the Kachins. Bo Ti was occupying a place called Nyaungbintha, in the midst of the Ithi tribe of Kachins, by whom he was strongly backed. At Kamaing on the north was Po Saw, supported by the Thama Sawbwa of the Lepei tribe, who appeared to be most hostile. There could be no permanent peace until the strength of these tribes should be broken.
At the earnest request of the Chief Commissioner two mountain-guns, with the necessary equipment, were given to the Mogaung Levy. There was some not unnatural188 reluctance189 on the part of the military authorities in India to trust an irregular force with artillery. But the excellent conduct of the men in the late fights, and the proved capacity of the gallant185 young soldier commanding them, overcame their unwillingness190. It was impossible to allow Captain O'Donnell to attack stockades and to turn large bodies of the enemy out of strong positions without artillery. With only one British officer, or at the most two, a chance shot or a bamboo spike191 might deprive the force of its commander and cause a disaster. The Chief Commissioner pressed this argument, and asked to be allowed to raise the garrison of Mogaung to ten companies. Sanction was given in October.
It took time, however, to raise and train the additional companies of Gurkhas; and in any case the expeditions which the conduct of the Kachins had rendered necessary could not have been undertaken until the rains had passed. In the meanwhile, until the guns and reinforcements reached them, the Mogaung officers were instructed to concentrate their men in Mogaung, not to attempt to occupy outposts; to move about patrols of fifty men when the weather permitted[263] it; to strike at the enemy when they saw a good opening and could inflict192 real punishment; while leaving always enough men in the fort to defend it and the town. They were forbidden to make small and hasty expeditions into the Kachin Hills in order to retaliate193 on raiders. These restrictions194 were galling195, no doubt, to Captain O'Donnell and to the Assistant Commissioner, Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, who was a keen soldier as well as a promising administrator196. The Chief Commissioner, however, could not risk a catastrophe197. Moreover, he held that spasmodic action of this sort, while exposing small parties of our men to much risk, only embittered198 the wild hill-men without impressing them with our strength, and was transient in its effects. The plan of subsidizing those chiefs who were not in arms against us, and could help to guard the trade routes or carry the mails, was recommended.
Present needs having been provided for, a plan of operations to be undertaken during the coming open season was framed by the Chief Commissioner, in consultation199 with Sir George White, and early in November it was sanctioned by the Government of India. Four separate operations were to be undertaken.
1. Against the Lepei tribe north of Mogaung, the leading chief being the Sawbwa of Thama, Po Saw's main supporter.
2. Against the Ithi tribe south of Mogaung, who were under the Sawbwa of Panga.
3. Against the Sana Kachins of the Lataung tribe, who had raided near Mogaung in May.
4. Against the Makau and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Sinbo, who were responsible for the destructive attack on Nanpapa in May, and for another in August on trading boats at Hlegyomaw on the Mogaung River.
The control of these operations was taken by Sir George White at the Chief Commissioner's request, the military police in the subdivision being placed at his disposal. While the necessary preparations were being made, letters of the nature of an ultimatum200 were sent to the Sawbwas of Thama and Panga and other tribal201 chiefs, requiring them to make formal submission to the subdivisional officer at[264] Mogaung, to pay for the damage done by them to traders, and to surrender Po Saw and Bo Ti, who had lately added to their crimes the murders of Shwè Gya, the best friend the British Administration had in Mogaung, and of the loyal headman of Kamaing who had always helped us.
On the 7th of January, 1889, the force[49] detailed202 for these expeditions left Mogaung under command of Captain O'Donnell.[50] The first step was to occupy Kamaing, after a very slight opposition by the Thama Sawbwa's men, and to establish a permanent military police post there. Unfortunately smallpox203 broke out amongst the Gurkhas of the Levy, and Captain O'Donnell found it necessary to halt at Kamaing until the 15th of February, and thus a whole month of the most favourable season for military operations was lost.
On the 15th of February, the men's health having been restored, the force fell to work with energy, and engagement rapidly followed engagement. On the 16th of February three villages were taken after some resistance. On the 17th the Kachins were encountered on a strongly stockaded position, which was taken and destroyed. On the 19th Thama itself was taken. The enemy here showed more fight. Three men of the Hampshires received gunshot wounds, and two officers and eleven men were injured by bamboo spikes204.
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Captain O'Donnell's report gives the following account of this engagement, which shows the nature of the fighting in these expeditions:—
"My guide, who had done splendidly up to this, lost me four valuable hours in finding the road. He struck it at last, and after a severe climb of 4? miles, we came out near the village of Thama. On arriving at the crest205 of the hill Lieutenant Eliott, Assistant Commissioner, received a letter, stuck in a stick on the road, from Thama Sawbwa, in which he said we might come and burn his village, he would do nothing but hide in the jungle, &c. This put us on our guard, and we went on cautiously over the crest, and then saw what appeared to me through my glasses, a garden paling. I examined it well, but found nothing suspicious about it. However, I ordered the advance with all caution. The Hants were in front, the Gurkhas forming flanking parties in rear. When about sixty yards from the place we could not make out that it was more than a paling, when suddenly we were saluted206 by a volley from many guns. Three Hants men fell under this badly wounded, but the remainder walked off the road into the jungle and poured in some very steady volleys. The Gurkhas were quickly up on the right flank, and the guns were brought up and two rounds fired at the stockade, and then with a wild cheer it was rushed and taken, the rebels not waiting....
"Blood was found here. I went on, leaving the rear-guard to bring on the wounded. We came before a second stockade; we were again saluted, but no casualties occurred, and one round from a gun and another charge made us masters of this also. In this charge much damage was done us, two officers and eleven rank-and-file being spiked207 by bamboo spikes. Captain Macdonald and I were both spiked through the foot. After this no more opposition was met with and Thama was entered and destroyed. A search in the jungle was made, but nothing found. After the sick had been attended to I returned to camp, meeting no opposition en route."
On the 21st of February a place called Muklon was assaulted and taken. Here Lieutenant Hawker, of the Hampshire Regiment, fell badly wounded—spiked in the[266] thigh208. He was sent down to Bhamo, where he died of the wound. By the 9th of March the operations against the Lepei tribe had been completed, all their villages or stockades taken, and large quantities of grain captured. Our losses amounted to twenty-one officers and men killed and wounded. The Kachin loss is not known; it was probably very small, as they made no firm stand.
After little more than a day's rest Captain O'Donnell moved out again, this time against the Ithi tribe to the south of Mogaung. He established a post at Nyaungbintha, in the centre of their territory. By the 28th of March ten villages of this tribe had been taken with very little fighting. The village of Waranaung, of which the chief had been loyal in every respect since the occupation of Mogaung, was carefully preserved from injury.
On the 4th of April a move was made against Sana, which fell without an effort.
The column now turned south to Sinbo, and from that base moved out to punish the villages concerned in the barbarous raids on Nanpapa and Hlegyomaw. The villages concerned having been taken after some resistance, the task assigned to Captain O'Donnell was completed on the 4th of May.
In these four expeditions our casualties amounted to one officer and three men killed, and five officers and thirty men (including followers) wounded. The column was engaged with Kachins thirty-two times, and took forty-six stockades. Owing to the loss of a month by the sickness at Kamaing, the work was more hurried than the Chief Commissioner had designed. The results, however, were very good, and had been obtained with more ease and less bloodshed than had been expected. By the occupation of Kamaing, the trade route to the jade-mines was opened and made safe. The Marip tribe who dominate the jade-mines, and the Sassum tribe who adjoin the amber-mines, were freed from Po Saw's pressure and their loyalty assured. Villages from the Kachin tribes came in by scores to make formal submission to the Assistant Commissioner at Mogaung. Of the Thama Sawbwa's villages only Thama and two others held out; the Ithi tribe, the Kachins round Sinbo, and the Lakun tribe south of the Ithi country all[267] submitted. In short, the peace of the district was secured and the authority of the Government established.
From the number of casualties it might be inferred that the service was one of little danger. The inference would be wholly wrong. The column was engaged in bush or jungle fighting with the enemy almost every day, and if our casualties were not greater it was due as well to the precautions taken by the leader and to his skilful209 tactics as to the failure of the Kachins to defend their stockades. The heaviest part of the work fell on the Gurkhas of the Mogaung Levy (military police), who furnished the flanking parties. Without them the force must have lost heavily. "The flanking done by the Gurkhas was splendid indeed, and it is entirely210 owing to their jungle work that I had not more casualties."[51] The column marched over six hundred and fifty miles, fighting continually, and the men's clothes and boots were torn to pieces. It was a fine display of patient endurance, courage, and persistence211, in face of great difficulties, by officers and men. The Commander, Captain O'Donnell, was one of the soldiers to whom the Administration of Burma in those days owed so much. And he was greatly assisted by Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, to whom fell the difficult duty of providing good guides and correct information.
Captain O'Donnell concluded his report on the results of the operations with a notice of Lieutenant W. Hawker, of the Hants Regiment. "He was spiked through the thigh while gallantly leading his men in a charge at Mukton on the 15th of March, 1889. He was attached to the Mogaung Levy for these operations. He was senior to Lieutenant Benson, and might have taken command of the levy from that officer." But he showed "a sincere spirit in the welfare of the service" in refusing to supersede212 Lieutenant Benson, who belonged to the Indian Army and knew the men and their language. "He volunteered to take charge of the transport on the line of march, and this he did until Captain Macdonald was wounded. He was commanding the Hants men when he received his death-wound."
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1
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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2
vex
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| vt.使烦恼，使苦恼 | |
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3
jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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4
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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5
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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6
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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7
defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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8
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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9
navigate
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| v.航行，飞行；导航，领航 | |
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10
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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11
indigenous
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| adj.土产的，土生土长的，本地的 | |
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12
hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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13
adventurous
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| adj.爱冒险的；惊心动魄的，惊险的，刺激的 | |
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14
jade
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| n.玉石；碧玉；翡翠 | |
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15
amber
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| n.琥珀；琥珀色；adj.琥珀制的 | |
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16
reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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17
opium
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| n.鸦片；adj.鸦片的 | |
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18
sanitation
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| n.公共卫生，环境卫生，卫生设备 | |
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19
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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20
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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21
timorous
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| adj.胆怯的，胆小的 | |
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22
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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23
conciliation
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| n.调解，调停 | |
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24
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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25
tributaries
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| n. 支流 | |
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26
gazetteer
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| n.地名索引 | |
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27
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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28
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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29
laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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30
fiscal
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| adj.财政的，会计的，国库的，国库岁入的 | |
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31
royalty
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| n.皇家，皇族 | |
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32
magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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33
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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34
rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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35
assassinate
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| vt.暗杀，行刺，中伤 | |
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36
assassinated
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| v.暗杀( assassinate的过去式和过去分词 )；中伤；诋毁；破坏 | |
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37
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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38
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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39
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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40
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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41
stockade
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| n.栅栏，围栏；v.用栅栏防护 | |
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42
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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43
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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44
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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45
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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46
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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47
repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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48
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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49
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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50
arrears
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| n.到期未付之债，拖欠的款项；待做的工作 | |
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51
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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52
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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53
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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54
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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55
missionary
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| adj.教会的，传教(士)的；n.传教士 | |
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56
adviser
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| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
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57
affluents
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| n.富裕的，富足的( affluent的名词复数 ) | |
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58
affluent
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| adj.富裕的，富有的，丰富的，富饶的 | |
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59
ascents
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| n.上升( ascent的名词复数 )；（身份、地位等的）提高；上坡路；攀登 | |
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60
ascent
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| n.(声望或地位)提高；上升，升高；登高 | |
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61
laden
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| adj.装满了的；充满了的；负了重担的；苦恼的 | |
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62
necessitate
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| v.使成为必要，需要 | |
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63
zigzag
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| n.曲折，之字形；adj.曲折的，锯齿形的；adv.曲折地，成锯齿形地；vt.使曲折；vi.曲折前行 | |
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64
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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65
gravel
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| n.砂跞；砂砾层；结石 | |
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66
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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67
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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68
batches
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| 一批( batch的名词复数 )； 一炉； （食物、药物等的）一批生产的量； 成批作业 | |
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69
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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70
ponies
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| 矮种马，小型马( pony的名词复数 )； ￡25 25 英镑 | |
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71
herds
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| 兽群( herd的名词复数 )； 牧群； 人群； 群众 | |
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72
immunity
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| n.优惠；免除；豁免，豁免权 | |
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73
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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74
detour
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| n.绕行的路，迂回路；v.迂回，绕道 | |
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75
consular
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| a.领事的 | |
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76
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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77
implored
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| 恳求或乞求（某人）( implore的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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78
chivalrously
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| adv.象骑士一样地 | |
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79
besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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80
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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81
underneath
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| adj.在...下面，在...底下；adv.在下面 | |
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82
morass
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| n.沼泽，困境 | |
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83
monasteries
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| 修道院( monastery的名词复数 ) | |
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84
pagodas
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| 塔，宝塔( pagoda的名词复数 ) | |
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85
dreading
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| v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的现在分词 ) | |
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86
vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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87
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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88
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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89
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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90
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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91
confluence
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| n.汇合，聚集 | |
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92
ornament
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| v.装饰，美化；n.装饰，装饰物 | |
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93
Buddhist
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| adj./n.佛教的，佛教徒 | |
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bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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95
reeked
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| v.发出浓烈的臭气( reek的过去式和过去分词 )；散发臭气；发出难闻的气味 (of sth)；明显带有（令人不快或生疑的跡象） | |
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96
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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97
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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98
jack
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| n.插座，千斤顶，男人；v.抬起，提醒，扛举；n.（Jake）杰克 | |
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99
utensils
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| 器具，用具，器皿( utensil的名词复数 )； 器物 | |
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100
moored
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| adj. 系泊的 动词moor的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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101
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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102
censured
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| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的过去式 ) | |
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103
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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104
prosecuted
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| a.被起诉的 | |
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105
delightful
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| adj.令人高兴的，使人快乐的 | |
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106
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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107
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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108
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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109
disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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110
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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111
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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112
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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113
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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114
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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115
obstructed
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| 阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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116
laboriously
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| adv.艰苦地；费力地；辛勤地；（文体等）佶屈聱牙地 | |
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117
drenched
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| adj.湿透的；充满的v.使湿透( drench的过去式和过去分词 )；在某人（某物）上大量使用（某液体） | |
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118
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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119
monk
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| n.和尚，僧侣，修道士 | |
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120
swampy
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| adj.沼泽的，湿地的 | |
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121
charred
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| v.把…烧成炭( char的过去式)；烧焦 | |
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122
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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123
cane
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| n.手杖，细长的茎，藤条；v.以杖击，以藤编制的 | |
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124
noxious
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| adj.有害的，有毒的；使道德败坏的，讨厌的 | |
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125
profusely
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| ad.abundantly | |
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126
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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127
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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128
inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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129
ascended
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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130
fatiguing
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| a.使人劳累的 | |
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131
watershed
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| n.转折点，分水岭，分界线 | |
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132
dismal
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| adj.阴沉的，凄凉的，令人忧郁的，差劲的 | |
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133
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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134
bog
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| n.沼泽；室...陷入泥淖 | |
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135
bellies
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| n.肚子( belly的名词复数 )；腹部；（物体的）圆形或凸起部份；腹部…形的 | |
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136
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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137
trout
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| n.鳟鱼；鲑鱼(属) | |
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138
boulders
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| n.卵石( boulder的名词复数 )；巨砾；（受水或天气侵蚀而成的）巨石；漂砾 | |
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139
triangular
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| adj.三角（形）的，三者间的 | |
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140
shingle
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| n.木瓦板；小招牌(尤指医生或律师挂的营业招牌)；v.用木瓦板盖（屋顶）；把（女子头发）剪短 | |
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141
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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142
peremptorily
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| adv.紧急地，不容分说地，专横地 | |
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143
polyglot
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| adj.通晓数种语言的；n.通晓多种语言的人 | |
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144
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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145
tusks
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| n.（象等动物的）长牙( tusk的名词复数 )；獠牙；尖形物；尖头 | |
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146
quarry
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| n.采石场；v.采石；费力地找 | |
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147
tinged
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| v.（使）发丁丁声( ting的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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148
streaked
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| adj.有条斑纹的，不安的v.快速移动( streak的过去式和过去分词 )；使布满条纹 | |
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149
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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150
disquieting
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| adj.令人不安的，令人不平静的v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的现在分词 ) | |
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151
devastated
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| v.彻底破坏( devastate的过去式和过去分词)；摧毁；毁灭；在感情上（精神上、财务上等）压垮adj.毁坏的；极为震惊的 | |
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152
conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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153
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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154
stockades
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| n.（防御用的）栅栏，围桩( stockade的名词复数 ) | |
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155
unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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156
swarming
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| 密集( swarm的现在分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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157
devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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158
marshes
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| n.沼泽，湿地( marsh的名词复数 ) | |
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159
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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160
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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161
reassuring
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| a.使人消除恐惧和疑虑的，使人放心的 | |
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162
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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163
untoward
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| adj.不利的，不幸的，困难重重的 | |
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164
accruing
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| v.增加( accrue的现在分词 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累 | |
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166
dressing
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| n.(食物)调料；包扎伤口的用品，敷料 | |
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167
pending
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| prep.直到，等待…期间；adj.待定的；迫近的 | |
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168
conspired
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| 密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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169
scooped
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| v.抢先报道( scoop的过去式和过去分词 )；（敏捷地）抱起；抢先获得；用铲[勺]等挖（洞等） | |
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170
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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171
hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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172
treacherous
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| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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173
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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174
rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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175
instigated
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| v.使（某事物）开始或发生，鼓动( instigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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176
ambush
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| n.埋伏(地点)；伏兵；v.埋伏；伏击 | |
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177
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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178
chivalry
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| n.骑士气概，侠义；（男人）对女人彬彬有礼，献殷勤 | |
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179
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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180
fortifying
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| 筑防御工事于( fortify的现在分词 )； 筑堡于； 增强； 强化（食品） | |
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181
abruptly
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| adv.突然地，出其不意地 | |
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182
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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183
harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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184
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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185
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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186
gallantly
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| adv. 漂亮地，勇敢地，献殷勤地 | |
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187
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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188
unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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189
reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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190
unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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191
spike
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| n.长钉，钉鞋；v.以大钉钉牢，使...失效 | |
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192
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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193
retaliate
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| v.报复，反击 | |
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194
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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195
galling
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| adj.难堪的,使烦恼的,使焦躁的 | |
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196
administrator
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| n.经营管理者，行政官员 | |
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197
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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198
embittered
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| v.使怨恨，激怒( embitter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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199
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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200
ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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201
tribal
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| adj.部族的，种族的 | |
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202
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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203
smallpox
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| n.天花 | |
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204
spikes
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| n.穗( spike的名词复数 )；跑鞋；（防滑）鞋钉；尖状物v.加烈酒于( spike的第三人称单数 )；偷偷地给某人的饮料加入（更多）酒精（ 或药物）；把尖状物钉入；打乱某人的计划 | |
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205
crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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206
saluted
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| v.欢迎，致敬( salute的过去式和过去分词 )；赞扬，赞颂 | |
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207
spiked
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| adj.有穗的；成锥形的；有尖顶的 | |
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208
thigh
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| n.大腿；股骨 | |
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209
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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210
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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211
persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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212
supersede
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| v.替代；充任 | |
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