DRIFT TOWARD SOUTHERN NATIONALIZATION (1850–1860)
Seventy-two years after the adoption1 of the Constitution, called into being to form “a more perfect union,” and eighty-five years after the declaration of independence (a space completely covered by the lives of men still living), a new confederacy of seven Southern states was formed, and the great political fabric3, the exemplar and hope of every lover of freedom throughout the world, was apparently4 hopelessly rent. Of these seven states but two were of the original thirteen—Louisiana and Florida had been purchased by the government of the union; a war had been fought in behalf of Texas; two states, Alabama and Mississippi, lay within original claims of Georgia, but had been ceded5 to the union and organized as Federal territories.
April 11, 1861, found a fully6 organized separate government established for these seven states, with a determination to form a separate nation, most forcibly expressed by the presence of an army at Charleston, South Carolina, which next day was to open fire upon a feebly manned fort, and thus to begin a terrible civil war. The eight other slave states were in a turmoil7 of anxiety, leaning toward their sisters of the farther South through the common sympathy which came of slavery, but drawn8 also to the union through tradition and233 appreciation9 of benefits, and through a realization10 by a great number of persons that their interests in slavery were much less than those of the states which had already seceded12.
The North, in the middle of April, was only emerging from a condition of stupefied amazement13 at a condition which scarcely any of its statesmen, and practically none of the men of every-day life, had thought possible. It was to this crisis that the country had been brought by the conflicting views of the two great and strongly divided sections of the union respecting slavery, and by the national aspirations14 which, however little recognized, were working surely in each section, but upon divergent lines.
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The outward manifestations15 in the history of the separation of the North and the South stand out in strong relief: the Missouri question; the protective tariff16 and South Carolina nullification; the abolition17 attacks which wrought18 the South into a frenzy19 suicidal in character through its impossible demands upon the North for protection; the action of the Southern statesmen in the question of petitions; the passage of a fugitive-slave law which drove the North itself to nullification; the Kansas-Nebraska act and its outcome of civil war in the former territory; the recognition, in the dicta of the supreme20 court in the Dred Scott case, of the South’s contention21 of its constitutional right to carry slavery into the territories, and the stand taken by the North against any further slavery extension. To these visible conflicts were added the unconscious workings of the disruptive forces of a totally distinct social organization. The outward strifes were but the symptoms of a malady23 in the body politic2 of the union which could have but one end, unless the deep, abiding24 cause, slavery, should be removed.135
234 The president and vice-president of the Southern Confederacy, in their elaborate defences written after the war, have endeavored to rest the cause of the struggle wholly on constitutional questions. Stephens, whose book, not even excepting Calhoun’s utterances26, is the ablest exposition of the Southern reading of the Constitution, says: “The struggle or conflict, ... from its rise to its culmination27, was between those who, in whatever state they lived, were for maintaining our Federal system as it was established, and those who were for a consolidation28 of power in the central head.”136 Jefferson Davis is even more explicit29. “The truth remains,” he says, “intact and incontrovertible, that the existence of African servitude was in no wise the cause of the conflict, but only an incident. In the later controversies30 ... its effect in operating as a lever upon the passions, prejudices, or sympathies of mankind was so potent31 that it has been spread like a thick cloud over the whole horizon of historic truth.”137
This is but begging the question. The constitutional view had its weight for the South in 1860 as it had for New England in the Jefferson-Madison period. Jefferson’s iron domination of the national government during his presidency32, a policy hateful to New England, combined with the fear of being overweighted in sectional influence by the western extension through the Louisiana purchase, led to pronounced threats of secession by men of New England, ardently34 desirous of escaping from what Pickering, one of its most prominent men, termed the Virginian supremacy35.138 Exactly the same arguments were used, mutatis mutandis, later by the South.
As we all know, the movement, which never had any real popular support and which had its last spasm36 of life in the Hartford Convention at the close of the War of235 1812, came to naught37. Freed by the fall of Napoleon and the peace with England from the pressure of the upper and nether38 mill-stones which had so ground to pieces our commerce, a prosperity set in which drowned the sporadic39 discontent of the previous twenty years. The fears of the Eastern states no longer loomed40 so high and were as imaginary in fact, and had as slight a basis, as were, in the beginning of the era of discord41, those of the South. Could slavery have been otherwise preserved, the extreme decentralizing ideas of the South would have disappeared with equal ease, and Stephens’ causa causans—“the different and directly opposite views as to the nature of the government of the United States, and where, under our system, ultimate sovereign power or paramount42 authority properly resides,” would have had no more intensity43 of meaning in 1860 than to-day.
Divergence44 of constitutional views, like most questions of government, follow the lines of self-interest; Jefferson’s qualms45 gave way before the great prize of Louisiana; one part of the South was ready in 1832 to go to war on account of a protective tariff; another, Louisiana, was at the same time demanding protection for her special industry. The South thus simply shared in our general human nature, and fought, not for a pure abstraction, as Davis and Stephens, led by Calhoun, would have it, but for the supposed self-interest which its view of the Constitution protected. Its section, its society, could not continue to develop in the union under the Northern reading of the document, and the irrepressible and certain nationalization, so different from its own tendencies, to which the North as a whole was steadily46 moving.
Slavery drove the South into opposition47 to the broad, liberal movement of the age. The French Revolution; the destruction of feudalism by Napoleon; the later popular movements throughout Europe and South America; the liberalizing of Great Britain; the nationalistic ideas of which we have the results in the236 German empire and the kingdom of Italy, and the strong nationalistic feeling developing in the northern part of the union itself had but little reflex action in the South because of slavery and the South’s consequent segregation48 and tendency to a feudalistic nationalization.
II
STATUS OF THE FORTS (OCT. 29, 1860–DEC. 20, 1860)
General Scott, with his memories of 1832, was one of those who appreciated the danger hanging over the country, and, October 29, 1860, he wrote from New York, where he had his headquarters, a letter of great length to the President, which in pompous49 phrases, conceding the right of secession, and embodying50 some absurd ideas, such as allowing “the fragments of the great republic to form themselves into new confederacies, probably four,” as a smaller evil than war, gave it as his “solemn conviction” that there was, from his knowledge of the Southern population, “some danger of an early act of rashness preliminary to secession, viz.: the seizure51 of some or all of the following posts: Forts Jackson and St. Philip on the Mississippi; Morgan below Mobile, all without garrisons53; Pickens, McKee at Pensacola, with an insufficient54 garrison52 for one; Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison; Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, the latter without any; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, with an insufficient garrison.”
He gave it as his opinion that “all these works should be immediately so garrisoned56 as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup57 de main ridiculous.” He did not state the number of men needed, but in a supplementary58 paper the next day (October 30th) said, “There is one (regular) company in Boston, one here (at the Narrows), one at Pittsburg, one at Baton237 Rouge60—in all, five companies only within reach.”139 These five companies, about two hundred and fifty men, were of course absurdly inadequate61 to garrison nine such posts, but, had there been a determination in the President’s mind to prevent seizures62, enough men could have been brought together to hold the more important points.
For Scott’s statement as to the number available was grossly inaccurate63, and but serves to show the parlous64 state of a war department in which the general-in-chief can either be so misinformed or allow himself to remain in ignorance of vital facts. There were but five points in the farther South of primal65 importance: the Mississippi, Mobile, Pensacola, Savannah, and Charleston; two hundred men at each would have been ample to hold the positions for the time being, and, being held, reinforcement in any degree would later have been easy. There was a total of 1048 officers and men at the Northern posts,140 including Leavenworth, Mackinac, Plattsburg, Boston, New York, and Fort Monroe, who could have been drawn upon. There were already 250 men at Charleston, Key West, Pensacola, and Baton59 Rouge. It is safe to say that a thousand men were available. There were also some eight hundred marines at the navy-yards and barracks141 who could have been used in such an emergency. The aggregate66 of the army, June 30, 1860, was 16,006, of which 14,926 were enlisted67 men; and it was in the power of the President to increase this total aggregate to 18,626.142 Recruiting was, in fact, actively68 going on; almost every man at the posts mentioned could, even much after the date of Scott’s paper, have been safely withdrawn69 for the object mentioned and quickly replaced.
238 Scott’s inaccurate report gave Buchanan additional reason for the inaction which was his basic thought. He says, in his apologia, that “to have attempted to distribute these five companies in the eight forts of the cotton states and Fortress70 Monroe in Virginia, would have been a confession71 of weakness.... It could have had no effect in preventing secession, but must have done much to provoke it.”143 The first part of this statement would have been true had these five companies been the only force available; the second, on the supposition that the President meant that any attempt with a force reasonably large would have provoked secession, was a short-sighted view. To garrison the forts could not have been more obnoxious72 than to put them in a state of defence. At any time before the secession of a state they could have been garrisoned without bringing on actual conflict. The statesmen of the South were well aware that an attack upon an armed force of the United States, before secession, must place them irretrievably in the wrong. South Carolina did not secede11 until December 20th. To resist the sending of troops before this date to any of these forts would have been unqualified treason, and for this no one in the South was prepared. The safety of the secession movement, the extension of sympathy throughout the South, rested very greatly upon strict compliance73 with the forms of law and with the theories of the Constitution held by that section. At least one ardent33 secessionist, Judge Longstreet, recognized this when he appealed to South-Carolinians to refrain from any act of war; “let the first shot,” he said, “come from the enemy. Burn that precept74 into your hearts.”144 It was impossible that the Southern leaders should place themselves, or allow their people to place them, in the attitude of waging war against the union while even in their own view their states still239 remained within it. There was, too, still a very large union sentiment in the South, though finally swept into the vortex by the principle of going with the state, which would not have been averse75 to a determined76 action on the part of the President and might have upheld it, as in 1833. Such vigor77 would have given this sentiment a working basis, through the evidence that the Federal authority was to be upheld; and it would have caused a pause even in the least thoughtful of the secessionists had they felt that their coast strongholds were to be held and all their ports to be in the hands of the enemy. In the dearth78 of manufactures in the South, the holding of their ports was an essential to Southern military success. Their closure by blockade was equally an essential to the success of the North. The strategy of the situation was of the clearest and most palpable, and with their coast forts in union hands warlike action on the part of the South is not conceivable. One can thus understand the importance of spreading the reiterated79 statements of “intense excitement” and “danger of attack” in the event of reinforcement; statements which, in the circumstances, must be regarded, if the phrase may be used, in the nature of a gigantic and successful “bluff80.”
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The military property of the United States at Charleston consisted of the armory81, covering a few acres, where were stored twenty-two thousand muskets83 and a considerable number of old, heavy guns, and of three forts named for South-Carolinians of union-wide fame. The smallest of these, Castle Pinckney, was a round, brick structure, in excellent condition, on a small island directly east of the town and distant from the wharves84 but half a mile. It completely commanded the town, and had a formidable armament of four forty-two-pounders, fourteen twenty-four-pounders, and four eight-inch sea-coast howitzers. The powder of the arsenal85 was here stored. The only garrison was an ordnance86 sergeant87,240 who, with his family, looked after the harbor light which was in the fort.
Almost due east again, and three miles distant, was Fort Moultrie, on the south end of Sullivan’s Island, a low sand-spit forming the north side of the harbor entrance. The work had an area of one and a half acres, and mounted fifty-five guns in barbette. The drifting sands had piled themselves even with the parapet, and the work was in such condition as to be indefensible against a land attack. The whole was but of a piece with the long-continued neglect arising from many years of peace and the optimistic temperament88 of a people who never believe that war can occur until it is upon them; it was the natural outcome of the almost entire absence of governmental system and forethought of the time. The fort was garrisoned by two companies, comprising sixty-four enlisted men and eight officers, of the First regiment89 of artillery90; the surgeon, band, a hospital steward91, and an ordnance sergeant brought the total up to eighty-four.
Almost south of Moultrie was Cummings Point, on Morris Island, forming the southern side of the harbor entrance. Nearly midway between this point and Moultrie, but a half-mile within the line joining them, and distant three and a half miles from the nearest part of the city, was Fort Sumter, begun in 1829, and after thirty-one years not yet finished. Built on a shoal covered at most stages of the tide, it rose directly out of the water, with two tiers of casemates, and surmounted92 by a third tier of guns in barbette. In plan it was very like the transverse section of the ordinary American house, the apex93 of the two sides representing the lines of the roof, looking toward Moultrie. It was intended for a garrison of six hundred and fifty men and an armament of one hundred and forty-six guns, of which seventy-eight were on hand.
On a report made in July by Captain J. G. Foster, repairs241 on Moultrie were begun September 14th, and next day upon Sumter, some two hundred and fifty men being employed. The sand about the walls of Moultrie was removed, a wet ditch dug, a glacis formed, the guardhouse pierced with loop-holes, and the four field-guns placed in position for flank attack.
At the end of October, Captain Foster, foreseeing events, requested the issue of arms to the workmen to protect property, and the Secretary of War approved the issue of forty muskets, if it should meet the concurrence94 of the commanding officer. Colonel Gardner, in reply, November 5th, doubted the expediency95, as most of the laborers96 were foreigners, indifferent to which side they took, and wisely advised, instead, filling up “at once” the two companies at Moultrie with recruits and sending two companies from Fort Monroe to the two other forts.145 The requisition was thus held in abeyance97, and the muskets remained at the arsenal. When, only two days later, Gardner, urged by the repeated solicitations of his officers, directed the transfer of musket82 ammunition98 to Moultrie, the loading of the schooner99 was objected to by the owner of the wharf100, and the military store-keeper, under apparently very inadequate pressure, returned the stores to the arsenal. A permit, given by the mayor of Charleston next day, for the removal was very properly declined by Gardner, on the ground that the city authorities could not control his actions.146
The affair, however, cost Gardner his command, by a process described by the Assistant Secretary of State, Trescot: “I received a telegram from Charleston, saying that intense excitement prevailed, ... and that, if the removal was by orders of the Department of War, it ought to be revoked101, otherwise collision was inevitable102. Knowing the Cabinet were then in session, I went over to the White House.... I took Governor Floyd aside, and he was242 joined, I think, by Messrs. Cobb and Toucey, and showed them the telegram. Governor Floyd replied, ‘Telegraph back at once; say that you have seen me, that no such orders have been issued, and none such will be issued, under any circumstances.’” Floyd, a day or so later, gave Trescot “his impressions of the folly103 of Colonel Gardner’s conduct, and his final determination to remove him and supply his place with Major Robert Anderson, in whose discretion104, coolness, and judgment105 he put great confidence. He also determined to send Colonel Ben. Huger to take charge of the arsenal, believing that his high reputation, his close association with many of the most influential106 people in Charleston, and the fact of his being a Carolinian, would satisfy the state of the intention of the government.”147
That Floyd himself was in an uncertain state of mind is shown by his willingness to begin and continue the work upon the forts; that his mental state did not permit logical action is clear from his temper and attitude regarding the transfer of musket ammunition November 7th, though but the week before (October 31st) he had authorized107 the transfer of the muskets themselves.
Major Fitz-John Porter, of the adjutant-general’s office, later the able and ill-treated general, was sent to Charleston to inspect the conditions. His report, made November 11th, revealed the military inefficiency108 almost inseparable from a post so neglected and ill-manned, and subject to the lazy peace conditions of the period. He said: “The unguarded state of the fort invites attack, if such design exists, and much discretion and prudence109 are required on the part of the commander to restore the proper security without exciting a community prompt to misconstrue actions of authority. I think this can be effected by a proper commander without checking in the slightest the progress of the engineer in completing the243 works of defence.” Major Porter continues with a most significant phrase, “All could have been easily arranged a few weeks since, when the danger was foreseen by the present commander.”148
November 15th, Anderson was ordered to the command. A Kentuckian by birth, his wife a Georgian, his views in sympathy with those of General Scott, he appeared to be and, as results proved, was in many respects particularly fitted for the post; by November 23d he was able to report that in two weeks the outer defences of Moultrie would be finished and the guns mounted, and that Sumter was ready for the comfortable accommodation of one company, and, indeed, for the temporary reception of its proper garrison. “This,” he said, “is the key to the entrance to this harbor; its guns command this work [Moultrie] and could drive out its occupants. It should be garrisoned at once.... So important do I consider the holding of Castle Pinckney by the government that I recommend, if the troops asked for cannot be sent at once, that I be authorized to place an engineer detachment [of an officer and thirty workmen] ... to make the repairs needed there.... If my force was not so very small, I would not hesitate to send a detachment at once to garrison that work. Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney must be garrisoned immediately if the government determines to keep command of this harbor.”
Anderson proceeded to give advice which sane110 judgment and every sentiment of national honor demanded. After mentioning his anxiety to avoid collision with the citizens of South Carolina, he said: “Nothing, however, will be better calculated to prevent bloodshed than our being found in such an attitude that it would be madness and folly to attack us. There is not so much feverish111 excitement as there was last week, but that there is a settled determination to leave the union, and obtain244 possession of this work, is apparent to all.... The clouds are threatening, and the storm may break upon us at any moment. I do, then, most earnestly entreat112 that a reinforcement be immediately sent to this garrison, and that at least two companies be sent at the same time to Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney.” Anderson also stated his belief that as soon as the people of South Carolina learned that he had demanded reinforcements they would occupy Pinckney and attack Moultrie; and therefore it was vitally important to embark113 the troops in war steamers and designate them for other duty as a blind.149 Captain Foster, November 24th, reported the whole of the barbette tier of Sumter ready for its armament and as presenting an excellent appearance of preparation and strength equal to seventy per cent. of its efficiency when finished.150 He said, November 30th, “I think more troops should have been sent here to guard the forts, and I believe that no serious demonstration114 on the part of the populace would have met such a course.”151
The work on the forts was, of course, well known to the people of Charleston, and that at Moultrie, at least, subject to daily inspection115 by many visitors. There was still no restriction116 “upon any intercourse117 with Charleston, many of whose citizens were temporary residents of Sullivan’s Island. The activity about the fort drew to it a large number of visitors daily, and the position of the garrison and the probable action of the state in regard to the forts were constant subjects of discussion. There was as yet no unfriendly feeling manifested, and the social intercourse between the garrison and their friends in Charleston was uninterrupted. But as the days went on the feeling assumed a more definite shape, and found expression in many ways.... It was openly announced, both to the commanding officer and to his officers, that as soon as the state seceded a demand for245 the delivery of the forts would be made, and, if resisted, they would be taken.... Meantime, all of the able-bodied men in Charleston were enrolled119, military companies were formed everywhere, and drilling went on by night and day, and with the impression among them that they were to attack Fort Moultrie.”152 November 28th and December 1st, Anderson again pressed for troops or for ships of war in the harbor;153 but his last request was anticipated in a letter of the same date, when he was informed by the War Department, “from information thought to be reliable, that an attack will not be made on your command, and the Secretary has only to refer to his conversation with you and to caution you that, should his convictions unhappily prove untrue, your actions must be such as to be free from the charge of initiating120 a collision. If attacked, you are of course expected to defend the trust committed to you to the best of your ability.”154
A demand being made by the adjutant of a South Carolina regiment on the engineer officer at Moultrie for a list of his workmen, “as it was desired to enroll118 the men upon them for military duty,”155 Anderson asked for instructions. The War Department replied, December 14th, “If the state authorities demand any of Captain Foster’s workmen on the ground of their being enrolled into the service of the state, ... you will, after fully satisfying yourself that the men are subject to enrolment, and have been properly enrolled, ... cause them to be delivered up or suffer them to depart.” Banality121 could go no further, and Anderson, December 18th, informed the department that, as he understood it, “the South Carolina authorities sought to enroll as a part of their army intended to act against the forces of the United States men who are employed by and in the pay of that government, and246 could not, as I conceived, be enrolled by South Carolina ‘under the laws of the United States and of the state of South Carolina.’” No answer was vouchsafed122 to this, and the request was not complied with.
Anderson’s repeated statements of the necessity of the occupancy of Sumter, without which his own position was untenable, led to the despatch123 of Major Buell, a Kentuckian, and later a major-general of United States volunteers, with verbal instructions, which, however, on Buell’s own motion, and with the thought that Anderson should have written evidence, were reduced, December 11th, to writing. This memorandum124 is of such importance that it must be given in full.
“You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this state shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. He has therefore carefully abstained125 from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt, by violence, to obtain possession of the public works or interfere126 with their occupancy. But as the counsels and acts of rash and impulsive127 persons may possibly disappoint those expectations of the government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency128. He has therefore directed me verbally to give you such instructions. You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression129; and for that reason you are not without evident and imminent130 necessity to take up any position which could be construed131 in the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in the harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last247 extremity132. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of, any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility133, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible134 evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.”156
These instructions did not come to the President’s knowledge until December 21st, though a despatch from Washington, December 13th, published in the Charleston Courier, announced Major Buell’s visit; when made known to the President, he directed them to be modified, ordering that if “attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity and make the best terms in your power.”157
December 3d, Anderson placed Lieutenant135 Jefferson C. Davis with thirty men in Castle Pinckney, and began work there. Action upon a request for arms for the workmen at Sumter and Pinckney was deferred136 by the War Department “for the present,” but Captain Foster going to the arsenal, December 17th, for two gins for hoisting137, “to the transmission of which there was no objection,” arranged with the store-keeper that the old order of the Ordnance Department of November 1st, for forty muskets, should be complied with, which was done. “Intense excitement” as usual was reported the next day to have occurred; there was the reiteration138 of great danger of “violent demonstration” from a military official of the state who called upon Foster, and who stated that Colonel Huger had informed the governor that no arms should be removed. Foster declined to return the arms, stating that he knew nothing of Huger’s pledge, but was248 willing to refer the matter to Washington. Trescot was informed by telegraph that “not a moment’s time should be lost.” The Secretary of War was aroused in the depths of the night, and the result was a telegraphic order from Floyd himself to “return [the arms] instantly.”158 The go-between Assistant Secretary of State, so busily engaged with affairs not his own, received from the aide-de-camp of Governor Pickens the telegram: “The Governor says he is glad of your despatch, for otherwise there would have been imminent danger. Earnestly urge that there be no transfer of troops from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter and inform Secretary of War.”159 Captain Foster, explaining to the War Department, December 20, 1860, says, “when in town to see General Schnierle and allay140 any excitement relative to the muskets, I found to my surprise that there was no excitement except with a very few who had been active in the matter, and the majority of the gentlemen whom I met had not even heard of it.”160
Pickens, the new governor of South Carolina, December 17th, the day after his inauguration141, and before the state had passed the ordinance142 of secession, made a demand on the President for the delivery of Fort Sumter. The letter, drawn in the most offensive terms, and marked “strictly143 confidential144,” urged that all work be stopped and that no more troops be ordered. It continued: “It is not improbable that, under orders from the commandant, or, perhaps, from the commander-in-chief of the army, the alteration145 and defences of the posts are progressing without the knowledge of yourself or the Secretary of War. The arsenal in the city of Charleston, with the public arms, I am informed, was turned over very properly to the keeping and defence of the state force at249 the urgent request of the Governor of South Carolina. I would most respectfully, and from a sincere devotion to the public peace, request that you would allow me to send a small force, not exceeding twenty-five men and an officer, to take possession of Fort Sumter immediately, in order to give a feeling of safety to the community.”161
The ever-ready Trescot arranged an interview December 20th with the President for the delivery of the letter. The President stated that he would give an answer the next day. In the mean time Trescot, seeing the difficulties to which it led, consulted both Senators Davis and Slidell, who thought the demand “could do nothing but mischief”; and on consultation146 with two of the South Carolina delegation147 in Washington, Governor Pickens was advised by telegraph to withdraw the letter, which was done. Trescot’s letter to Governor Pickens, returning that of the latter, after mentioning all that had been done by the executive to refrain from injuring the sensibilities of South Carolina, said: The President’s “course had been violently denounced by the Northern press, and an effort was being made to institute a Congressional investigation148. At that moment he could not have gone to the extent of action you desired, and I felt confident that, if forced to answer your letter then, he would have taken such ground as would have prevented his even approaching it hereafter; ... you had all the advantage of knowing the truth, without the disadvantage of having it put on record.... I was also perfectly149 satisfied that the status of the garrison would not be disturbed.... I have had this morning an interview with Governor Floyd, the Secretary of War; ... while I cannot even here venture into details, which are too confidential to be risked in any way, I am prepared to say ... that nothing will be done which will either do you injury or properly create alarm.”162
250 The President’s painful weakness is but too clear in the fact that he had not only given his confidence so largely to such a man, whose position and attitude he knew, but saw nothing derogatory in such a letter as that of Governor Pickens, and could draft a reply (December 20th) in which, while stating that no authority had been given to Governor Gist150 to guard the Charleston arsenal, he said: “I deeply regret to observe that you seem entirely151 to have misapprehended my position, which I supposed had been clearly stated in my message. I have incurred152, and shall incur153, any reasonable risk ... to prevent a collision.... Hence I have declined for the present to reinforce these forts, relying upon the honor of the South-Carolinians that they will not be assaulted whilst they remain in their present condition; but that commissioners155 will be sent by the convention to treat with Congress on the subject.”163
December 18th the President sent Caleb Cushing with a letter to Governor Pickens, with the idea of inducing the authorities and people of South Carolina to await the action of Congress and the development of opinion in the North as to the recommendation of his message. Governor Pickens told Cushing, December 20th, the day of the passage of the ordinance of secession, that he would make no reply to the letter, and stated “very candidly156 that there was no hope for the union, and that, as far as he was concerned, he intended to maintain the separate independence of South Carolina.”164
III
THE FORT SUMTER CRISIS (DEC. 2, 1860–JAN. 8, 1861)
The question of the United States forts was now uppermost, and upon the action regarding them hung war or251 peace. Three commissioners—Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr—were appointed by South Carolina to lay the ordinance of secession before the President and Congress, and were empowered as agents of the state to treat for the delivery of the forts and other real estate, for the apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all the property of the United States.165
In apprehension157 of the occupation of Sumter by Anderson, a patrol by two small steamers, the Nina and General Clinch158, was established, with orders to prevent such action at all hazards and seize Fort Sumter if it should be attempted. A Lieutenant-Colonel Green was sent to Fort Monroe to observe any movements; and one Norris, at Norfolk, was employed to give information of any action at the Norfolk navy-yard. A committee of prominent men was sent to Fort Sumter, who thoroughly159 inspected the works and reported upon them.
Meantime, Major Anderson had been preparing, with great caution and foresight160, to move his command. For some ten days the officers had been apprised161 that it was advisable to send the families of the men to the unoccupied barracks on James’ Island, known as Fort Johnson, a mile and a quarter west of Sumter. The work of mounting guns at Sumter had been discontinued for three days, and the elevating-screws and pintle-bolts sent to Moultrie so that the guns should not be used if the South-Carolinians should anticipate his action, and also to give the impression that occupancy of the fort was not designed. All stores and provisions at Fort Moultrie which could be carried, and personal belongings162, except what the men could carry in their knapsacks, were loaded as for Fort Johnson in the two small sailing-vessels164 which were to carry the women and children.
Christmas Day had been fixed165 for the transfer, but252 heavy rains prevented. The delay might have had other consequences, for, curiously166 enough, on the morning of December 26th, Colonel R. B. Rhett, Jr., waited upon the governor, with a private warning letter from Washington to the effect that Anderson was about to seize Sumter, and urged the governor to secure it.166
All was made ready on December 26th, and the quartermaster who was to have charge of the little flotilla, loaded with “everything in the household line from boxes and barrels of provisions to cages of canary-birds,” was directed to go to Fort Johnson, but not to land anything. Upon a signal of two guns from Moultrie he was to go to Sumter on the plea that he had to report to Anderson that he could not find accommodations. Five pulling-boats in customary use were available for the transportation of the men. Only one officer had been thus far informed, and the men had no suspicion where they were to go when they fell in at retreat roll-call with packed knapsacks and filled cartridge-boxes, carried at parade under a general standing168 order. So little was the movement suspected that Captain Doubleday, second in command, came at sunset to Anderson in the midst of the officers to invite the major to tea. He was then informed of Anderson’s intentions, and was directed to have his company in readiness in twenty minutes, an order met by an “eager obedience169.” Part of this time was taken in arranging for the safety of Mrs. Doubleday in the village outside of the fort, whither the families of the other officers were also sent. The men were ready promptly170, and the first detachment of twenty, led by Anderson himself, marched over the quarter of a mile of sand to the landing-place with the good-fortune of encountering, no one.
Anderson went in the leading boat. Lieutenant Meade, the engineer in charge of the works at Castle253 Pinckney, had charge of the second, and Captain Doubleday of the third. When half-way across, Doubleday’s boat came unexpectedly in the path of one of the patrol boats, the General Clinch, which was towing a schooner to sea. The men were ordered to take off their coats and cover their muskets. The steamer stopped, but in the twilight171, and with the resemblance of the boat and its load of men to the usual parties of workmen, suspicion was not aroused, and the steamer resumed her way without questioning. She had been anxiously watched from Moultrie, and had she interfered172 would have been fired upon by a thirty-two-pounder, two of which had been loaded with that intent. Captain Foster, with Assistant Surgeon Crawford, a Mr. Moall, four non-commissioned officers, and seven privates, had been left at Moultrie to spike173 the guns, burn the gun-carriages, and hew174 down the flag-staff.167
On reaching Sumter, the workmen, some hundred and fifty, swarmed175 to the wharf, some feebly cheering, many angrily demanding the reason for the presence of the soldiers; many of the workmen wore the secession cockade; the malecontents (a number of whom shortly returned to Charleston) quickly gave way before the bayonets of Doubleday’s men, who at once occupied the main entrance and guard-room; sentries176 were posted and the fort was under military control. Boats were now sent back for Captain Seymour’s company, which arrived without interference, and the whole force, except the few detailed177 to remain at Moultrie, was in Sumter before eight o’clock, at which hour Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General, reporting that he had “just completed, by the blessing178 of God, the removal to this fort of all my garrison.... The step which I have taken was, in my opinion, necessary to prevent the effusion of blood.”168 On the firing of the signal-guns at Moultrie, Lieutenant254 Hall left the west side of the bay with the two lighters179 carrying the men’s families and stores, and reached Sumter under sail.
With the help of the engineer’s workmen at Moultrie, the boats were loaded during the night with part of the impedimenta of every sort which had to be left in the first crossing, and reached Sumter in the early dawn. The following day, December 27th, was passed like the preceding night, in transferring ammunition and other stores to Sumter; but a month and a half’s supply of provisions, some fuel, and personal effects had to be left. All the guns at Moultrie were spiked180, and the carriages of those bearing on Sumter burned, the smoke from these bearing to Charleston the first indication of what had happened. At fifteen minutes before noon the command and one hundred and fifty workmen were formed in a square near the flag-staff of Sumter; the chaplain offered a prayer expressing gratitude181 for their safe arrival, and prayed that the flag might never be dishonored, but soon float again over the whole country, a peaceful and prosperous nation. “When the prayer was finished, Major Anderson, who had been kneeling, arose, the battalion182 presented arms, the band played the national air, and the flag went to the head of the flag-staff, amid the loud and earnest huzzas of the command.”169
SERGEANT HART NAILING THE COLORS TO THE FLAG-STAFF, FORT SUMTER
Intense excitement in Charleston was the natural outcome of Anderson’s action, and the morning of the 27th the governor sent his aide-de-camp, Colonel Pettigrew, accompanied by Major Capers183, with a peremptory184 demand that Anderson should return with his garrison to Moultrie, to which Anderson replied, “Make my compliments to the governor and say to him that I decline to accede185 to his request; I cannot and will not go back.” The governor’s messenger mentioned that when Governor Pickens came into office he found an understanding255 between his predecessor186 (Gist) and the President, by which the status in the harbor was to remain unchanged. Anderson stated “that he knew nothing of it; that he could get no information or positive orders from Washington; ... that he had reason to believe that [the state troops] meant to land and attack him from the north; that the desire of the governor to have the matter settled peaceably and without bloodshed was precisely187 his own object in transferring his command; ... that he did it upon his own responsibility alone,” as safety required it, “and as he had the right to do.” He added that, “In this controversy188 between the North and the South, my sympathies are entirely with the South,” but that a sense of duty to his trust was first.170 The immediate55 result was the occupancy by the state forces, December 27th, of Pinckney and Moultrie; the seizure, December 30th, of the unoccupied barracks known as Fort Johnson, and of the arsenal, with its ordnance and ordnance stores, valued at four hundred thousand dollars.
The news of Anderson’s dramatic, bold, and self-reliant act, one for which the country owes a debt to the memory of this upright and excellent commander, brought consternation189 to the President and Secretary of War, who learned it through the indefatigable190 Trescot, who had, on the 26th, arranged for the three commissioners of South Carolina an interview with the President for December 27th, at one o’clock. The news of the morning brought a complete change of circumstances. A telegram to Wigfall was brought by him to the commissioners and to the Secretary of War, who at once went to the commissioners. Trescot was present, and could not believe in an “act not only without orders but in the face of orders.” Floyd at once telegraphed, asking an explanation of the report. “It is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement.” A telegram256 in reply from Anderson assured him of the truth, and a written report gave as reasons that “many things convinced me that the authorities of the state designed to proceed to a hostile act. Under this impression I could not hesitate that it was my solemn duty to move my command from a fort which we could not have held probably longer than forty-eight or sixty hours to this one where my power of resistance is increased to a very great degree.”171
[In January a futile191 attempt to relieve Fort Sumter was made by sending from New York two hundred troops in an unarmed steamer, The Star of the West, which was fired upon by the secessionists in Fort Moultrie, and, receiving no support from Fort Sumter, returned to New York.]
IV
THE FALL OF FORT SUMTER (APRIL, 1861)
Lamon’s172 officiousness resulted in giving both to Anderson and to the Confederate authorities an impression that Sumter would surely be evacuated192; hence Beauregard, March 26th, wrote to Anderson offering facilities for removal, but asking his word of honor that the fort would be left without any preparation for its destruction or injury. This demand deeply wounded Anderson, and he resented it in a letter of the same date, saying, “If I can only be permitted to leave on the pledge you mention, I shall never, so help me God, leave this fort alive.”173 Beauregard hastened to state that he had only alluded194 to the “pledge” on account of the “high source” from which the rumors195 appeared to come, and257 made a full amend196, which re-established their usual relations.
Anderson had informed Fox that, by placing the command on a short allowance, he could make the provisions last until after April 10th; but not receiving instructions from the War Department that it was desirable to do so, it had not been done.174 He had already reported, March 31st, that his last barrel of flour had been issued two days before.175
Anderson’s little command, as he explained to Washington April 1st, would now face starvation should the daily supply of fresh meat and vegetables, still allowed from Charleston, be cut off. Being in daily expectation, since the return of Colonel Lamon to Washington, of receiving orders to vacate the post, he had, to the great disadvantage of the food supply, kept the engineer laborers as long as he could. He now asked permission to send them from Sumter; but the request, referred to Montgomery April 2d by Beauregard, was refused, unless all the garrison should go.176
April 1st an ice-laden schooner bound for Savannah entered Charleston harbor by mistake, and was fired upon by a Morris Island battery. Again the Sumter batteries were manned and a consultation held, at which five of the eight officers declared in favor of opening fire, but no action was taken by Anderson beyond sending an officer to the offending battery, from which word was returned by its commanding officer that he was simply carrying out his orders to fire upon any vessel163 carrying the United States colors which attempted to enter.
On April 4th Anderson assembled his officers, and for the first time made known to them the orders of January 10th and February 23d, directing him to act strictly on the defensive198. As Lieutenant Talbot had just been promoted captain and ordered to Washington, Anderson258 determined to send by him his despatches. In order to arrange for his departure, Talbot, April 4th, accompanied Lieutenant Snyder, under a white flag, to call the attention of the governor to the fact that the schooner fired upon had not been warned by one of their own vessels, as had been arranged. It developed that the guard-vessel on duty had come in on account of heavy weather, and the commanding officer was consequently dismissed. The request to allow Talbot to proceed brought out the fact that orders had been received from Montgomery not to allow any portion of the garrison to leave the fort unless all should go177—which, however, Beauregard construed, for the benefit of Talbot, to apply more particularly to laborers and enlisted men178—and also that the following telegram from Commissioner154 Crawford had reached Charleston April 1st: “I am authorized to say that this government will not undertake to supply Sumter without notice to you. My opinion is that the President has not the courage to execute the order agreed upon in Cabinet for the evacuation of the fort, but that he intends to shift the responsibility upon Major Anderson by suffering him to be starved out. Would it not be well to aid in this by cutting off all supplies?”179 Beauregard had, the same day, sent the message to the Confederate Secretary of War, with the remark, “Batteries here ready to open Wednesday or Thursday. What instructions?”
CHARLESTON HARBOR
April, 1861
The knowledge of these telegrams called from Anderson, April 5th, a pathetic despatch to the War Department: “I cannot but think Mr. Crawford has misunderstood what he has heard in Washington, as I cannot think the government could abandon, without instructions and without advice, a command which has tried to do all its duty to our country.” He ended a fervent199 appeal for this act of justice with, “Unless we receive supplies259 I shall be compelled to stay here without food or to abandon this post very early next week.”180 “At this time,” says Doubleday, “the seeming indifference200 of the politicians to our fate made us feel like orphan201 children of the Republic, deserted202 by both the State and Federal administration.”181
Two days later Anderson received a letter of April 4th from the Secretary of War, informing him of the government’s purpose to send the Fox expedition, and hoping that he would be able to sustain himself until the 11th or 12th.182 The same day he was informed by the Confederate authorities that the supply of provisions had been stopped, and late that evening that no mails coming or going would be allowed to pass. The fort was to be “completely isolated203.” This action was undoubtedly204 taken at this moment in consequence of a telegram from Washington sent Magrath April 6th, as follows: “Positively determined not to withdraw Anderson. Supplies go immediately, supported by naval205 force under Stringham if their landing be resisted.” This telegram, signed “A Friend,” was, as later became known, from James E. Harvey, who was about to go as United States minister to Portugal. It was sent to Montgomery, and had its full effect.183
Just before the reception of the information regarding the stoppage of mails, Anderson had posted his acknowledgment of the War Department’s letter of the 4th and a report by Foster to the chief-engineer of the army; both letters were opened by the Confederate authorities, and gave full confirmation207 of the accuracy of the telegram from “A Friend.” Anderson said that “the resumption of work yesterday (Sunday) at various points on Morris Island, and the vigorous prosecution208 of it this261 morning, ... shows that they have either received some news from Washington which has put them on the qui vive, or that they have received orders from Montgomery to commence operations here. I fear” that Fox’s attempt “cannot fail to be disastrous209 to all concerned.... We have not oil enough to keep a light in lanterns for one night. The boats will have therefore to rely at night entirely upon other marks. I ought to have been informed that this expedition was to come. Colonel Lamon’s remark convinced me that the idea merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox would not be carried out. We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly210 say that my heart is not in the war which I see is to be thus commenced.”184
As shown by despatches which Anderson had no means of sending, and carried north, eight guard-boats and signal-vessels were on duty out far beyond the bar; a fourth gun had been added to the new battery on Sullivan’s Island, which had until the 8th been masked by a house now torn down, and which bore directly upon any boat attempting to land stores on the left bank. There was bread enough to last, using half-rations, until dinner-time Friday (12th). Anderson reported the command in fine spirits. It was evident that a hostile force was expected. The iron-clad floating battery appeared the morning of the 11th at the west end of Sullivan’s Island. Anderson, in ignorance that his own intercepted211 letter and Harvey’s telegram had given them all they needed to know, said: “Had they been in possession of the information contained in your letter of the 4th instant they could not have made better arrangements than these they have made and are making to thwart212 the contemplated213 scheme.”185
Chew, who, as mentioned, had been selected as the messenger to carry to Charleston the notice of the President’s262 intention to attempt to provision Sumter, left Washington Saturday, April 6th, at 6 P.M., in company with Captain Talbot, and reached Charleston forty-eight hours later; finding no action taken against Sumter, he delivered a copy of his memorandum to the governor, who called General Beauregard into the consultation. Captain Talbot’s request to join the garrison at Sumter was referred to Beauregard, and peremptorily214 refused, Beauregard remarking that the instructions from Montgomery required that no communication whatever should be permitted with Anderson except to convey an order for the evacuation of the fort.186 The return of the envoys215 to Washington was much delayed by disarrangement of trains by order of Beauregard, who also held all telegrams from Chew to Lincoln.187
Sumter now mounted fifty-nine guns, twenty-seven of the heaviest of which were in barbette (the upper and open tier). In the lowest tier there were also twenty-seven, four of which were forty-two-pounders and the remainder thirty-two’s. The ports of the second (or middle tier), eight feet square, were closed by a three-foot brick wall, laid in cement and backed in twenty-seven of the more exposed by two feet of sand kept in place by planks216 or barrels. On the parade were one 10-inch and four 8-inch guns, mounted as howitzers, the former to throw shells into Charleston, the latter into the batteries on Cummings Point. The guns bearing upon the three batteries on the west end of Sullivan’s Island were ten thirty-two-pounders; on Fort Moultrie, two forty-three-pounders. Five guns bore upon the mortar217 battery at Fort Johnson. Seven hundred cartridges218 had been made up, material of every kind, even the woollen shirts of the men, being used.188
Bearing upon Fort Sumter there were on Sullivan’s Island three 8-inch, two thirty-two-pounders, and six twenty-four-pounders263 in Fort Moultrie; two thirty-two-pounders and two twenty-four-pounders in the new enfilade battery; one 9-inch, two forty-two-pounders, and two thirty-two-pounders at the Point and aboard the floating battery, and six 10-inch mortars219; on Morris Island, two forty-two-pounders, one twelve-pounder Blakely rifle, three 8-inch guns, and seven 10-inch mortars; at Fort Johnson, one twenty-four-pounder and four 10-inch mortars; at Mount Pleasant, one 10-inch mortar: a total of twenty-seven guns and eighteen mortars.189 The latter were particularly to be feared, as mortar fire under the conditions of a fixed target and perfectly established distances is extremely accurate. The interior of the fort was thus as vulnerable as the exterior220.
Governor Pickens at once sent to Montgomery a telegram reporting the visit of the President’s messenger. A lengthy221 discussion ensued in the Confederate Cabinet. Toombs, the Secretary of State, said: “The firing upon that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen; and I do not feel competent to advise you.”190 In the state of Southern feeling, however, the only thing possible was for Secretary Walker to order Beauregard, April 10th, “If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who communicated to you the intention of the Washington government to supply Sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation, and if this is refused proceed, in such manner as you may determine, to reduce it.”191 Beauregard answered the same day, “The demand will be made to-morrow at twelve o’clock.” To this came reply from Montgomery, “Unless there are special reasons connected with your own condition, it is considered proper that you should make the demand at an earlier date.” Beauregard replied (all these of the same date, the 10th), “The264 reasons are special for twelve o’clock.”192 These imperative222 “reasons” proved to be shortness of powder, then on its way, and which arrived from Augusta, Georgia, that evening,193 and the placing of a new rifled twelve-pounder.
Shortly after noon, April 11th, a boat bearing a white flag and three officers, the senior being Colonel James Chesnut, recently a United States senator, pushed off from a Charleston wharf and arrived at Sumter at half-past three. The officers being conducted to Anderson, a demand for the evacuation of the work was delivered. The officers of the fort were summoned, and after an hour’s discussion it was determined, without dissent223, to refuse the demand, and a written refusal was sent, in which Anderson regretted that his sense of honor and his obligations to his government prevented his compliance.194 Anderson accompanied the messengers as far as the main gate, where he asked, “Will General Beauregard open his batteries without further notice to me?” Colonel Chesnut replied, “I think not,” adding, “No, I can say to you that he will not, without giving you further notice.” On this Anderson unwisely remarked that he would be starved out anyway in a few days if Beauregard did not batter197 him to pieces with his guns. Chesnut asked if he might report this to Beauregard. Anderson declined to give it such character, but said it was the fact.195
This information, telegraphed to Montgomery, elicited224 the reply: “Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter. If Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate193, and agree that in the mean time he will not use his guns against us unless ours should be employed against Sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or265 its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable.”196
A second note from Beauregard was presented that night, and after a conference with his officers of three hours, in which the question of food was the main consideration, Anderson replied, “I will, if provided with proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant ... should I not receive prior to that time controlling instructions from my government or additional supplies.” The terms of the reply were considered by the messengers “manifestly futile,” and at 3.20 A.M. of the 12th the following note was handed by Beauregard’s aides, Chesnut and Lee, to Anderson: “By authority of Brigadier-General Beauregard, commanding the provisional forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time.”197
Meantime Fox, intrusted with the general charge of the relief expedition, was sent by the President, March 30th, to New York, with verbal instructions to prepare for the voyage but to make no binding225 engagements. Not having received the written authority expected, he returned to Washington April 2d, and on the 4th the final decision was reached, and Fox was informed that a messenger would be sent to the authorities at Charleston to notify them of the President’s action. Fox mentioned to the President that he would have but nine days to charter vessels and reach Charleston, six hundred and thirty-two miles distant. He arrived at New York April 5th, bearing an order from General Scott to Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Scott (son-in-law and aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief), embracing all his wants and directing Colonel Scott to give in his name all necessary instructions. Colonel Scott ridiculed226 the idea of relief,266 and his indifference caused the loss of half a day of precious time, besides furnishing recruits who, Fox complained, were “totally unfit” for the service they were sent on.198
Fox at once engaged the large steamer Baltic for troops and stores, and, after great difficulty, obtained three tugs227, the Uncle Ben, Freeborn, and Yankee, the last fitted to throw hot water. The Pocahontas, Pawnee, and the revenue-cutter Harriet Lane, as already mentioned, were to be a part of the force, which thus, with the Powhatan, included four armed vessels, the last being of considerable power. The Pawnee, Commander Rowan, sailed from Washington the 9th; the Pocahontas, Captain Gillis, from Norfolk the 10th; the Harriet Lane, Captain Faunce, from New York the 8th; the Baltic, Captain Fletcher, the 9th. The Powhatan was already far on her way to Pensacola.
The Baltic arrived at the rendezvous228, ten miles east of Charleston bar, at 3 A.M. of the 12th, and found there the Harriet Lane; at six the Pawnee arrived; the Powhatan was not visible. The Baltic, followed by the Harriet Lane, stood in toward the land, where heavy guns were heard and the smoke and shells from the batteries which had opened that morning on Sumter were distinctly visible. Fox stood out to inform Rowan, of the Pawnee. Rowan asked for a pilot, declaring his intention of going in and sharing the fate of his brethren of the army. Fox went aboard the Pawnee and informed him that he would answer for it that the government did not expect such a sacrifice, having settled maturely upon the policy in instructions to Captain Mercer and himself. The Nashville, from New York, and a number of merchant vessels off the bar, gave the appearance of the presence of a large naval fleet.
The weather continued very bad, with a heavy sea.267 No tugboats had arrived; the tug206 Freeborn did not leave New York; the Uncle Ben was driven into Wilmington by the gale229; the Yankee did not arrive off Charleston bar until April 15th, too late for any service; neither the Pawnee nor the Harriet Lane had boats or men to carry supplies; the Baltic stood out to the rendezvous and signalled all night for the expected Powhatan. The next morning, the 13th, was thick and foggy, with a heavy ground-swell, and the Baltic, feeling her way in, touched on Rattlesnake Shoal, but without damage; a great volume of black smoke was seen from Sumter. No tugboats had yet arrived, and a schooner near by, loaded with ice, was seized and preparations made to load her for entering the following night. Going aboard the Pawnee, Fox now learned that a note from Captain Mercer of the Powhatan mentioned that he had been detached by superior authority and that the ship had gone elsewhere; though Fox had left New York two days later than the Powhatan, he had no intimation of the change. At 2 P.M., April 13th, the Pocahontas arrived, and the squadron, powerless for relief, through the absence of the Powhatan and the tugs, was obliged to witness the progress of the bombardment.199
“About 4 A.M. on the twelfth,” says Doubleday, “I was awakened230 by some one groping about my room in the dark and calling out my name.” This was Anderson, who had come to inform his second in command of the information just received of the intention of the Confederates to open fire an hour later.200 At 4.30, the Confederates being able to make out the outline of the fort, a gun at Fort Johnson was fired as the signal to open; the first shotted gun was then fired from Morris Island by Edmund Ruffin, an aged139 secessionist from Virginia, who had long, in pamphlet and speech, advocated268 separation from the union. The fire from the batteries at once became general.
The fort began its return at seven o’clock. All the officers and men, including the engineers, had been divided into three reliefs of two hours each, and the forty-three workmen yet remaining all volunteered for duty. It was, however, an absurdly meagre force to work such a number of guns and to be pitted against the surrounding batteries, manned by more than six thousand men. The number of cartridges was so reduced by the middle of the day, though the six needles available were kept steadily at work in making cartridge-bags, that the firing had to slacken and be confined to the six guns bearing toward Moultrie and the batteries on the west end of Sullivan’s Island. The mortar fire had become very accurate, so that, when the 13-inch shells “came down in a vertical231 direction and buried themselves in the parade-ground, their explosion shook the fort like an earthquake.”201 The horizontal fire also grew in accuracy, and Anderson, to save his men, withdrew them from the barbette guns and used those of the lower tiers only. Unfortunately, these were of too light a caliber232 to be effective against the Morris Island batteries, the shot rebounding233 without effect from the face of the iron-clad battery there, as well as from the floating iron-clad battery moored234 behind the sea-wall at Sullivan’s Island. The withdrawal235 of the men from the heavier battery could only be justified236 by the already foregone result, and no doubt this was in Anderson’s mind. The garrison was reduced to pork and water, and, however willing, it could not with such meagre food withstand the strain of the heavy labor25 of working the guns; to add to the difficulties, the guns, strange to say, were not provided with breech-sights, and these had to be improvised237 with notched238 sticks.202
The shells from the batteries set fire to the barracks269 three times during the day, and the precision of the vertical fire was such that the four 8-inch and one 10-inch columbiad, planted in the parade, could not be used. Half the shells fired from the seventeen mortars engaged came within, or exploded above, the parapet of the fort, and only about ten buried themselves in the soft earth of the parade without exploding. Two of the barbette guns were struck by the fire from Moultrie, which also damaged greatly the roof of the barracks and the stair towers. None of the shot came through. The day closed stormy and with a high tide, without any material damage to the strength of the fort. Throughout the night the Confederate batteries threw shell every ten or fifteen minutes. The garrison was occupied until midnight in making cartridge-bags, for which all the extra clothing was cut up and all the coarse paper and extra hospital sheets used.203
At daylight, April 13th, all the batteries again opened, and the new twelve-pounder Blakely rifle, which had arrived but four days before from abroad,204 caused the wounding of a sergeant and three men by the fragments thrown off from the interior of the wall by its deep penetration239. An engineer employed was severely240 wounded by a fragment of shell. Hot shot now became frequent, and at nine o’clock the officers’ quarters were set afire. As it was evident the fire would soon surround the magazine, every one not at the guns was employed to get out powder; but only fifty barrels could be removed to the casements241, when it became necessary from the spread of the flames to close the magazine. The whole range of the officers’ quarters was soon in flames, and the clouds of smoke and cinders242 sent into the casements set on fire many of the men’s beds and boxes, making the retention243 of the powder so dangerous that all but five barrels were thrown into the sea.205
270 By eleven o’clock the fire and smoke were driven by the wind in such masses into the point where the men had taken refuge that suffocation244 appeared imminent. “The roaring and crackling of the flames, the dense245 masses of whirling smoke, the bursting of the enemy’s shells, and our own, which were exploding in the burning rooms, the crashing of the shot and the sound of masonry246 falling in every direction made the fort a pandemonium247.... There was a tower at each angle of the fort. One of these, containing great quantities of shells, ... was almost completely shattered by successive explosions. The massive wooden gates, studded with iron nails, were burned, and the wall built behind them was now a heap of débris, so that the main entrance was wide open for an assaulting party.”206
But however great the apparent damage and the discomfort248 and danger while the fire lasted, the firing could have been resumed “as soon as the walls cooled sufficiently249 to open the magazines, and then, having blown down the wall projecting above the parapet, so as to get rid of the flying bricks, and built up the main gates with stones and rubbish, the fort would actually have been in a more defensible condition than when the action commenced.”207
But want of men, want of food, and want of powder together made a force majeure against which further strife22 was useless; and when, about 1 P.M., the flag-staff was shot away, though the flag was at once flown from an improvised staff, a boat was sent from the commanding officer at Morris Island, bringing Colonel (Ex-Senator) Wigfall and a companion bearing a white flag, to inquire if the fort had surrendered.
Being allowed entrance, Major Anderson was sought for, and Wigfall, using Beauregard’s name, offered Anderson his own terms. Wigfall exhibited a white handkerchief271 from the parapet, and this being noticed brought from Beauregard himself Colonel Chesnut, Colonel Roger A. Pryor, Colonel William Porcher Miles, and Captain Lee, followed soon by Beauregard’s adjutant-general, Jones, Ex-Governor Manning, and Colonel Alston. It transpired250 that Wigfall had not seen Beauregard for two days, and that his visit was wholly unauthorized. The proper authorities, however, being now at hand, arrangements were concluded at 7 P.M., Anderson surrendering (after some correspondence), with permission to salute251 the flag as it was hauled down, to march out with colors flying and drums beating and with arms and private baggage.208
Noticing the disappearance252 of the colors, a flag of truce253 was sent in from the squadron outside, and arrangements made for carrying the garrison north. Next morning, Sunday, April 14th, with a salute of fifty guns, the flag was finally hauled down. It had been Anderson’s intention to fire a hundred guns, but a lamentable254 accident occurred in the premature255 discharge of one, by which one man was killed, another mortally wounded, and four others seriously injured. This accident delayed the departure until 4 P.M., when the little company of some eighty men, accompanied by the forty laborers,209 marched out of the gate with their flags flying and drums beating. The steamer Isabel carried Anderson and his men to the Baltic, and at nightfall they were on their way north.
April 15th, the day after the surrender, the President issued his proclamation calling “forth the militia256 of the several states of the union” to the number of seventy-five thousand men, in order to suppress “combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial257 proceedings258 or by the powers vested in the marshals by law,” and “to cause the laws to be duly272 executed.” Congress was called to convene259 July 4th. An immediate effect of the proclamation was the secession of Virginia, April 17th, the conservative elements of the state convention, although in the majority, being overwhelmed by the enthusiasm and impetus260 of the secession attack. Another prompt result was the formation of the northwestern counties into what is now West Virginia.
Fox’s expedition, however abortive261 in a physical sense, did much more than attempt to succor262 Sumter; it was the instrument through which the fort was held to the accomplishment263 of the fateful mistake of the Confederacy in striking the first blow. It prevented the voluntary yielding of the fort, and was an exhibition of the intention of the government to hold its own. It was thus elemental in its effects. Had Anderson withdrawn and hauled down his flag without a shot from the South, it would have been for the Federal government to strike the first blow of war; and its call for men would have met with a different response to that which came from the electric impulse which the firing upon the flag caused to vibrate through the North. This expectation was the basis of Lincoln’s determination. Almost alone, unmovable by Cabinet or War Department, he saw with the certainty of the seer what holding Sumter meant, and continued on the unchangeable way which from the first he had taken. In his letter of sympathy to Fox, May 1st, he said: “You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, even if it should fail, and it is no small consolation264 now to feel that our anticipation265 is justified by the result.”210
The enthusiastic response of the North to the proclamation was witness to the truth of Lincoln’s view, as well as to the North’s determination that the offended273 dignity of the union should be avenged266, its strongholds regained267, its boundaries made intact, and that the United States be proved to be a nation. It was for this the union fought; the freeing of the blacks was but a natural and necessary incident. The assault upon Sumter was the knife driven by the hand of the South itself into the vitals of slavery.
SYNOPSIS268 OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS, CHIEFLY
MILITARY, BETWEEN THE BOMBARDMENT
OF FORT SUMTER, 1861, AND THE BATTLE
OF THE MONITOR AND THE
MERRIMAC, 1862
1861. President Lincoln calls for seventy-five thousand militia to suppress the rebellion of the Southern States. Secession of Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and North Carolina. Formal division of Western Virginia from Virginia. The Massachusetts militia attacked in Baltimore. The Congress of the Confederate States assembles at Montgomery and is later transferred to Richmond. The first battle of Bull Run results in a Federal repulse269. Battle of Wilson’s Creek270. Repulse of the Federals at Ball’s Bluff. McClellan succeeds Scott as commander-in-chief of the Federal armies. The Federals gain possession of Port Royal. The Confederate commissioners, Mason and Slidell, are intercepted on the British steamer Trent.
1862. Surrender of the Confederate commissioners, Mason and Slidell, to the British government. The Federals capture Roanoke Island. Fort Henry and Fort Donelson surrender to General Grant. Federal victory at Pea Ridge167. Engagement between the Monitor and the Merrimac. The French declare war against Mexico.
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1
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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3
fabric
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| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
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4
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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5
ceded
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| v.让给，割让，放弃( cede的过去式 ) | |
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6
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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turmoil
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| n.骚乱，混乱，动乱 | |
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8
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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10
realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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11
secede
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| v.退出，脱离 | |
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seceded
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| v.脱离，退出( secede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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13
amazement
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| n.惊奇，惊讶 | |
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14
aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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15
manifestations
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| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
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16
tariff
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| n.关税，税率；(旅馆、饭店等)价目表，收费表 | |
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17
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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18
wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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19
frenzy
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| n.疯狂，狂热，极度的激动 | |
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20
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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21
contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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22
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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23
malady
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| n.病，疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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abiding
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| adj.永久的，持久的，不变的 | |
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25
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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26
utterances
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| n.发声( utterance的名词复数 )；说话方式；语调；言论 | |
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27
culmination
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| n.顶点；最高潮 | |
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consolidation
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| n.合并,巩固 | |
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29
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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30
controversies
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| 争论 | |
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31
potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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32
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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33
ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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34
ardently
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| adv.热心地，热烈地 | |
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35
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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36
spasm
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| n.痉挛，抽搐；一阵发作 | |
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37
naught
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| n.无，零 [=nought] | |
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38
nether
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| adj.下部的，下面的；n.阴间；下层社会 | |
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sporadic
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| adj.偶尔发生的 [反]regular；分散的 | |
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40
loomed
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| v.隐约出现，阴森地逼近( loom的过去式和过去分词 )；隐约出现，阴森地逼近 | |
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41
discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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42
paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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43
intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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44
divergence
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| n.分歧，岔开 | |
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45
qualms
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| n.不安；内疚 | |
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46
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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47
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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48
segregation
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| n.隔离，种族隔离 | |
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49
pompous
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| adj.傲慢的，自大的；夸大的；豪华的 | |
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50
embodying
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| v.表现( embody的现在分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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51
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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52
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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53
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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54
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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55
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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56
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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57
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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58
supplementary
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| adj.补充的，附加的 | |
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59
baton
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| n.乐队用指挥杖 | |
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60
rouge
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| n.胭脂，口红唇膏；v.(在…上)擦口红 | |
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61
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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62
seizures
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| n.起获( seizure的名词复数 )；没收；充公；起获的赃物 | |
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63
inaccurate
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| adj.错误的，不正确的，不准确的 | |
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64
parlous
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| adj.危险的，不确定的，难对付的 | |
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65
primal
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| adj.原始的；最重要的 | |
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66
aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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67
enlisted
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| adj.应募入伍的v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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68
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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69
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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70
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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71
confession
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| n.自白，供认，承认 | |
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72
obnoxious
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| adj.极恼人的，讨人厌的，可憎的 | |
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73
compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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74
precept
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| n.戒律；格言 | |
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75
averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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76
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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77
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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78
dearth
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| n.缺乏，粮食不足，饥谨 | |
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79
reiterated
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| 反复地说，重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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bluff
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| v.虚张声势，用假象骗人；n.虚张声势，欺骗 | |
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81
armory
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| n.纹章，兵工厂，军械库 | |
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82
musket
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| n.滑膛枪 | |
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83
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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84
wharves
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| n.码头，停泊处( wharf的名词复数 ) | |
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85
arsenal
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| n.兵工厂，军械库 | |
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ordnance
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| n.大炮，军械 | |
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sergeant
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| n.警官，中士 | |
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temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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91
steward
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| n.乘务员，服务员；看管人；膳食管理员 | |
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surmounted
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| 战胜( surmount的过去式和过去分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
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apex
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| n.顶点，最高点 | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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96
laborers
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| n.体力劳动者，工人( laborer的名词复数 )；（熟练工人的）辅助工 | |
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abeyance
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| n.搁置，缓办，中止，产权未定 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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schooner
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| n.纵帆船 | |
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wharf
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| n.码头，停泊处 | |
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101
revoked
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| adj.[法]取消的v.撤销，取消，废除( revoke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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102
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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103
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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inefficiency
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| n.无效率，无能；无效率事例 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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sane
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| adj.心智健全的，神志清醒的，明智的，稳健的 | |
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feverish
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| adj.发烧的，狂热的，兴奋的 | |
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112
entreat
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| v.恳求，恳请 | |
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embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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117
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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118
enroll
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| v.招收；登记；入学；参军；成为会员（英)enrol | |
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enrolled
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| adj.入学登记了的v.[亦作enrol]( enroll的过去式和过去分词 )；登记，招收，使入伍（或入会、入学等），参加，成为成员；记入名册；卷起，包起 | |
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120
initiating
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| v.开始( initiate的现在分词 )；传授；发起；接纳新成员 | |
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121
banality
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| n.陈腐；平庸；陈词滥调 | |
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122
vouchsafed
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| v.给予，赐予( vouchsafe的过去式和过去分词 )；允诺 | |
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123
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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124
memorandum
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| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
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125
abstained
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| v.戒（尤指酒），戒除( abstain的过去式和过去分词 )；弃权（不投票） | |
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126
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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127
impulsive
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| adj.冲动的，刺激的；有推动力的 | |
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128
contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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129
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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130
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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131
construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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132
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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133
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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134
tangible
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| adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的 | |
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135
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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136
deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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137
hoisting
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| 起重，提升 | |
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138
reiteration
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| n. 重覆, 反覆, 重说 | |
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139
aged
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| adj.年老的，陈年的 | |
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140
allay
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| v.消除，减轻(恐惧、怀疑等) | |
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141
inauguration
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| n.开幕、就职典礼 | |
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142
ordinance
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| n.法令；条令；条例 | |
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143
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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144
confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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145
alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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146
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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147
delegation
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| n.代表团；派遣 | |
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148
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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149
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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150
gist
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| n.要旨；梗概 | |
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151
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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152
incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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153
incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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154
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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155
commissioners
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| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
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156
candidly
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| adv.坦率地，直率而诚恳地 | |
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157
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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158
clinch
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| v.敲弯，钉牢；确定；扭住对方 [参]clench | |
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159
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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160
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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161
apprised
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
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162
belongings
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| n.私人物品，私人财物 | |
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163
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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164
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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165
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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166
curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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167
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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168
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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169
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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170
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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171
twilight
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| n.暮光，黄昏；暮年，晚期，衰落时期 | |
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172
interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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173
spike
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| n.长钉，钉鞋；v.以大钉钉牢，使...失效 | |
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174
hew
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| v.砍；伐；削 | |
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175
swarmed
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| 密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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176
sentries
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| 哨兵，步兵( sentry的名词复数 ) | |
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177
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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178
blessing
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| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
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179
lighters
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| n.打火机，点火器( lighter的名词复数 ) | |
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180
spiked
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| adj.有穗的；成锥形的；有尖顶的 | |
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181
gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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182
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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183
capers
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| n.开玩笑( caper的名词复数 )；刺山柑v.跳跃，雀跃( caper的第三人称单数 ) | |
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184
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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185
accede
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| v.应允，同意 | |
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186
predecessor
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| n.前辈，前任 | |
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187
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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188
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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189
consternation
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| n.大为吃惊，惊骇 | |
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190
indefatigable
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| adj.不知疲倦的，不屈不挠的 | |
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191
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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192
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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193
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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194
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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195
rumors
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| n.传闻( rumor的名词复数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷v.传闻( rumor的第三人称单数 )；[古]名誉；咕哝；[古]喧嚷 | |
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196
amend
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| vt.修改，修订，改进；n.[pl.]赔罪，赔偿 | |
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197
batter
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| v.接连重击；磨损；n.牛奶面糊；击球员 | |
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198
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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199
fervent
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| adj.热的，热烈的，热情的 | |
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200
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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201
orphan
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| n.孤儿；adj.无父母的 | |
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202
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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203
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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204
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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205
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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206
tug
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| v.用力拖(或拉)；苦干；n.拖；苦干；拖船 | |
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207
confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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208
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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209
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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210
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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211
intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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212
thwart
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| v.阻挠，妨碍，反对；adj.横(断的) | |
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213
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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214
peremptorily
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| adv.紧急地，不容分说地，专横地 | |
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215
envoys
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| 使节( envoy的名词复数 )； 公使； 谈判代表； 使节身份 | |
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216
planks
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| （厚）木板( plank的名词复数 )； 政纲条目，政策要点 | |
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217
mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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218
cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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219
mortars
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| n.迫击炮( mortar的名词复数 )；砂浆；房产；研钵 | |
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220
exterior
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| adj.外部的，外在的；表面的 | |
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221
lengthy
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| adj.漫长的，冗长的 | |
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222
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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223
dissent
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| n./v.不同意，持异议 | |
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224
elicited
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| 引出，探出( elicit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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225
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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226
ridiculed
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| v.嘲笑，嘲弄，奚落( ridicule的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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227
tugs
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| n.猛拉( tug的名词复数 )；猛拖；拖船v.用力拉，使劲拉，猛扯( tug的第三人称单数 ) | |
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228
rendezvous
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| n.约会，约会地点，汇合点；vi.汇合，集合；vt.使汇合，使在汇合地点相遇 | |
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229
gale
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| n.大风，强风，一阵闹声（尤指笑声等） | |
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230
awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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231
vertical
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| adj.垂直的，顶点的，纵向的；n.垂直物，垂直的位置 | |
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232
caliber
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| n.能力；水准 | |
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233
rebounding
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| 蹦跳运动 | |
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234
moored
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| adj. 系泊的 动词moor的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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235
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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236
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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237
improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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238
notched
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| a.有凹口的，有缺口的 | |
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239
penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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240
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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241
casements
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| n.窗扉( casement的名词复数 ) | |
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242
cinders
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| n.煤渣( cinder的名词复数 )；炭渣；煤渣路；煤渣跑道 | |
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243
retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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244
suffocation
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| n.窒息 | |
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245
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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246
masonry
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| n.砖土建筑；砖石 | |
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pandemonium
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| n.喧嚣，大混乱 | |
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248
discomfort
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| n.不舒服，不安，难过，困难，不方便 | |
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249
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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transpired
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| （事实，秘密等）被人知道( transpire的过去式和过去分词 )； 泄露； 显露； 发生 | |
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251
salute
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| vi.行礼，致意，问候，放礼炮；vt.向…致意，迎接，赞扬；n.招呼，敬礼，礼炮 | |
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252
disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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253
truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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255
premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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256
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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258
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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259
convene
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| v.集合，召集，召唤，聚集，集合 | |
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260
impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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261
abortive
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| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
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262
succor
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| n.援助，帮助；v.给予帮助 | |
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263
accomplishment
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| n.完成，成就，（pl.）造诣，技能 | |
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264
consolation
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| n.安慰，慰问 | |
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265
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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266
avenged
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| v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的过去式和过去分词 )；为…报复 | |
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267
regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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268
synopsis
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| n.提要，梗概 | |
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269
repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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creek
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| n.小溪，小河，小湾 | |
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