The fall of Vicksburg, though a terrible blow to the South, was not a sudden one: to all intelligent eyes it had for some weeks been impending5; but that Lee could be defeated seemed a thing impossible. Because so long unconquered, it had come to be accepted that he was unconquerable.
Hooker soon recovered from the daze6 into which he had been thrown at Chancellorsville. His confidence in himself was not broken by his misfortune. Instead of, like Burnside, manfully shouldering most of the responsibility of his failure, Hooker vehemently8 accused his307 lieutenants9 of misconduct, and faced the new situation with as much resolution as if he had the prestige of a victor. The Army of the Potomac, never down in heart except for a moment, plucked up courage forthwith and girded itself for new encounters.
The South, meanwhile, was still rejoicing over Chancellorsville, for the cloud on the southwestern horizon was at first no bigger than a man’s hand. Longstreet joined Lee from Suffolk with two divisions, swelling12 the Army of Northern Virginia to eighty thousand or more. Never before had it been so numerous, so well appointed, or in such good heart. The numerical advantage which the Federals had heretofore enjoyed was at this time nearly gone, because thousands of enlistments expired which could not immediately be made good; volunteering had nearly ceased, and the new schemes for recruiting were not yet effective.
Lee took the initiative early in June,243 full of the sense of the advantage to be gained from a campaign on Northern soil. War-worn Virginia was to receive a respite13; Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, as well as Washington, might be terrorized, and perhaps captured. If only the good-fortune so far enjoyed would continue, the union’s military strength might be completely wrecked14, hesitating Europe won over to recognition, and the cause of the South made secure.
With these fine and not at all extravagant15 anticipations16, Lee put in motion his three great corps17 under the lieutenant10-generals Ewell (Jackson’s successor), Longstreet, and A. P. Hill. Longstreet was ill at ease. Vicksburg, now in great danger, he thought could only be saved by reinforcing Bragg and advancing rapidly on Cincinnati, in which case Grant might be drawn18 north. Notwithstanding Longstreet’s urgency, Lee persisted.244 Ewell,308 pouring suddenly down the Shenandoah Valley, “gobbled up,” as Lincoln put it, Milroy and his whole command of some four thousand, June 13th, and presently from Maryland invaded Pennsylvania. Longstreet was close behind: while the head of Ewell’s column had been nearing the Potomac, A. P. Hill, who had remained at Fredericksburg to watch Hooker, as yet inactive on Stafford Heights, broke camp and followed northwestward. Ewell seized Chambersburg a few days later, then appeared at Carlisle, and even shook Harrisburg with his cannon19. The North had, indeed, cause for alarm; the farmers of the invaded region were in a panic. “Emergency men,” enlisted20 for three months, gathered from New York, Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania to the threatened points. The great coast cities were face to face with a menace hitherto unexperienced. Were they really about to be sacked? What was to be done?
There was no indecision either at Washington or in the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln’s horse-sense, sometimes tripping, but oftener adequate to deal with unparalleled burdens, homely21, terse22, and unerring in its expression, was at its best in these days. To Hooker, meditating23 movements along and across the Rappahannock, he wrote: “I would not take any risk of being entangled24 upon the river like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs in front and rear without a fair chance to gore25 one way or kick the other.”245 And again: “If the head of Lee’s army is at Martinsburg (near the Potomac), and the tail of it on the plank-road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?” “Fret26 him and fret him,” was the President’s injunction to Hooker, regarding the advance of Lee. Well-poised, good-humored, constant, Lincoln gave no counsel to Hooker in these days that was not sound.
309 Indeed, at this time, Hooker needed little admonition. Alert and resourceful, he no sooner detected the movement of Lee than he suggested an advance upon Richmond, which was thus left unguarded. Lee, of course, had contemplated27 the possibility of such a move, and, with a nod toward Washington, had joked about “swapping28 queens.” The idea, which Hooker did not press, being disapproved29, Hooker, turning toward Lee, proceeded to “fret him and fret him,” his conduct comparing well with his brilliant management at the opening of the campaign of Chancellorsville. The cavalry30, greatly improved by him, under Pleasonton, with divisions commanded by Buford, Duffie, and Gregg, was serviceable as never before, matching well the troopers of Stuart at Brandy Station, Aldie, and Middleburg. Screened on his left flank by his cavalry, as, on the other hand, Lee was screened by a similar body on his right, Hooker marched in columns parallel to those of his foe31 and farther east, yet always interposing between the enemy and Washington. As June drew to its end the Confederate advance was near Harrisburg, but the Federals were not caught napping. Hooker stood at Frederick, in Maryland, his corps stretched on either hand to cover Washington and Baltimore, touching32 hands one with the other, and all confronting the foe.
* * * * *
Lee’s previous campaign had shown with what disregard of military rules he could act, a recklessness up to this time justified33 by good luck and the ineptitude34 of his adversaries35. Still contemptuous of risks, he made just here an audacious move which was to result unfortunately.246 He ordered, or perhaps suffered, Stuart, whom as he drew toward the Potomac he had held close on his right flank, to undertake with the cavalry a raid around the Federal310 army, after the precedents36 of the Peninsular and Second Bull Run campaigns. Casting loose from his chief, June 25th, Stuart sallied out eastward37 and penetrated38 close to the neighborhood of Washington. He did no harm beyond making a few small captures and causing a useless scare; on the other hand, he suffered terrible fatigue40, his exhausted41 men falling asleep almost by squadrons in their saddles. He could get no news from his friends, nor could he find Ewell’s corps, which he had hoped to meet. Quite worn out with hardship, he did not become available to Lee until the late afternoon of July 2d. A critical battle might have had a different issue247 had the Confederate cavalry been in its proper place. It was almost a chance, through a scout42 of Longstreet’s, that Lee, at Chambersburg, all uncertain of the Federal movement, heard at last that his enemy was close at hand and threatening his communications. At once he withdrew Ewell southward, so that he might face the danger with his three divisions together.
Meantime a most critical change came about in the camp of his foes43. Hooker, on ill terms with Halleck, and engaged in controversy44 with him over Halleck’s refusal to authorize45 the withdrawal of the garrison46 of Harper’s Ferry, rather petulantly47 asked to be relieved of command, and the President complied at once. Such promptness was to be expected. Hooker had been doing well; but he had done just as well before Chancellorsville; he was generally distrusted; his best subordinates were outspoken48 as to his lamentable50 record. The unsparing critic of Burnside had now to take his own medicine. A battle with Lee could not be ventured upon under a commander who could not keep on good terms with the administration, had there been nothing else. It was perilous51 swapping of horses in the midst of the stream,311 but Lincoln was forced to do it. Some cried out for the restoration of McClellan, and others for that of Frémont. The appointment fell to George Gordon Meade, commander of the Fifth Corps, who, with soldierly dignity, obeyed orders, assuming the burden June 28th, with a pledge to do his best.
Meade, a West-Pointer of 1835,248 was a man of ripe experience, thoroughly53 trained in war. He had first risen leading a brigade of the Pennsylvania reserves at Mechanicsville, just a year earlier. The good name then won he confirmed at Antietam, and still more at Fredericksburg. He was tall and spare, with an eagle face which no one that saw it can forget, a perfect horseman, and, though irascible, possessed54 of strong and manly55 character. In that momentous56 hour the best men were doubtful on what footing they stood. When Lincoln’s messenger, with a solemn countenance57, handed to Meade the appointment, he took it to be an order for his arrest. Placed in command, he hesitated not a moment, building his strategy upon the foundation laid by his predecessor58.
Meade had with him in the field seven corps of infantry59: the First, commanded temporarily by Doubleday; the Second, by Hancock, recently promoted; the Third, by Sickles60; the Fifth, his own corps, now turned over to Sykes; the Sixth, Sedgwick, fortunately not displaced, though so unjustly censured61 for his noble work on May 3d; the Eleventh, Howard; and the Twelfth, Slocum. The excellent cavalry divisions were under Buford, Kilpatrick, and Gregg; and in the lower places capable young officers—Custer, Merritt, Farnsworth, Devin, Gamble—were pushing into notice. Of field-guns there were three hundred and forty. It was a fault of the union organization that corps, divisions, and brigades were too small, bringing about, among other evils, too large a number of general and staff officers.249 The Confederates312 here were wiser. Lee faced Meade’s seven corps with but three, and two hundred and ninety-three guns; but each Confederate corps was nearly or quite twice as large as a union corps; divisions and brigades were in the same relative proportion. The Army of the Potomac numbered 88,289 effectives; the Army of Northern Virginia, 75,000.250
POSITION OF FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, JUNE 30, 1863
(Federal: hollow bars, Confederate: solid bars)
Meade at once chose and caused to be surveyed a position on Pipe Creek62, just south of the Maryland line, as a field suitable to be held should the enemy come that way. He marched, however, northwestward cautiously, his corps in touch but spread wide apart, ready for battle and protecting as ever the capital and cities of the coast.251 His especial reliance in this hour of need was John F. Reynolds, hand in hand with whom he had proceeded in313 his career from the day when, as fellow-brigadiers, they repulsed63 A. P. Hill at Beaver64 Dam Creek. This man he trusted completely and loved much. He warmly approved Hooker’s action in committing to Reynolds the left wing nearest the enemy, made up of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps. This made Reynolds second in command. Meade, commander-in-chief, retained the centre and right. So the armies hovered65, each uncertain of the other’s exact whereabouts, during the last days of June.
OPENING OF BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, JULY 1, 8 A.M.
On July 1st, though Stuart for the moment was out of the campaign, the Federal cavalry was on hand. Buford’s division, thrown out from the Federal left, moved well forward north of the town of Gettysburg, and were met by Heth’s division of Hill’s corps, marching forward, it is said, with no more hostile purpose at the time than that of getting shoes.252 Buford held his line valiantly66, being presently joined by Reynolds. The two, from the cupola of the seminary near by, studied the prospect67 hurriedly. A stand must be made then and there, and the First Corps, close at hand, was presently in support of the bold horsemen, who, dismounted, were with their carbines blocking the advance of the hostile infantry.
The most irreparable and lamentable loss of the entire battle now occurred at the very outset. Reynolds fell dead at the front, leaving the left divisions without a leader in the most critical hour. Heth’s advance was roughly handled; one brigade was mostly captured, Doubleday nodding, with a pleasant “Good-morning, I314 am glad to see you,” to its commander, his old West Point chum Archer68, as the latter was passed to the rear among the prisoners.253 There were still other captures and much fighting; but Ewell was fast arriving by the roads from the north; and although Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, came up from the south at the same time, the heavier Confederate battalions69 could not be held. Barlow, thrown out far forward into Ewell’s path, was at once badly wounded, whereupon his division was repulsed. The Eleventh Corps in general gave way before Ewell’s rush, rolling back disordered through the town, where large numbers were captured. Fortunately, on the high crest71 of Cemetery72 Hill, Howard had stationed in reserve the division of Steinwehr. What broken brigades and regiments74, fleeing through the town, could reach this point were forthwith rallied and reorganized. Thus, at mid-day of July 1st, things were hopeful for Lee. The First Corps, its flank exposed by the retirement75 of the Eleventh Corps, fell back fighting through Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill during the afternoon. Lee swept the Federals from the town and the fields and ridges77 beyond. Had Ewell stormed Cemetery Hill at once, Lee might have won a great success.
One of the first marks of a capacity for leadership is the power to choose men, and Meade now showed this conspicuously78. He had lost Reynolds, his main dependence79, a loss that no doubt affected80 greatly the fortunes of the first day’s battle; he replaced Reynolds with a young officer whom it was necessary to push over the heads of several seniors; but a better selection could not have been made. Of the splendid captains whom the long agony of the Army of the Potomac was slowly evolving, probably the best as an all-round soldier was Winfield Scott Hancock. Since his West Point training, finished in 1844,254 he had had wide and thorough military experience,315 climbing laboriously81 from colonel to corps commander, winning out from each grade to the next higher through faithful and able service. He could deal with figures; was diligent82 over papers and office drudgery83; he was a patient drill-master—all these, and at the same time so dashing and magnetic in the field that he early earned the title “The Superb.”255 His vigor84, moreover, was tempered by judgment85.
BEGINNING OF INFANTRY ENGAGEMENT, JULY 1, 10 A.M.
Hancock it was whom Meade now sent forward from Taneytown, thirteen miles away, when he was anxiously gathering86 in his host, to lead the hard-pressed left wing; he was to judge whether the position should be held, as Reynolds had thought, or a retirement attempted toward the surveyed lines of Pipe Creek. The apparition87 on Cemetery Hill, just before four o’clock, July 1st, of Hancock upon his sweating charger, was equal to a reinforcement by an army corps. Fugitives88 halted; fragments of formations were welded into proper battle-lines. In the respite given by Ewell, so ill-timed for Lee, the shattered First and Eleventh corps found breathing-space and plucked up heart. At six o’clock they were joined by the Twelfth Corps, that of the steadfast89 Slocum. Hancock, now feeling that there were troops enough for the present, and resolute90 leaders, galloped91 back to report to his chief. Upon his report Meade concentrated everything toward Cemetery Hill, the troops plodding92 through the moonlit night. Meade himself reached the field an hour past midnight, gaunt and hollow-eyed through want of sleep,256 but clear in mind and stout93 of heart. At dawn316 of July 2d the Second Corps, at the head of which Gibbon had taken Hancock’s place, and the Third Corps, Sickles, were at hand. At noon arrived the Fifth, and soon after the Sixth, Sedgwick having marched his men thirty-four miles in eighteen hours.
Two parallel ridges, their crests94 separated by an interval95 of not quite a mile, extend at Gettysburg north and south. The more westerly of these, called, from the Lutheran College there, Seminary Ridge76, was the scene of the first attack on July 1st, but on the second day became the main Confederate position. The eastern ridge, terminated at its northern end by the town cemetery, close to which Howard so fortunately stationed Steinwehr on the first day, became the Federal stronghold. Cemetery Ridge was really shaped like a fishhook, its line curving eastward to the abrupt96 and wooded Culp’s Hill, the barb97 of the hook. At the curve the ridge was steep and rough with ledges98 and bowlders; as it ran southward its height diminished until, after a mile or so, it rose again into two marked elevations—Round Top, six hundred feet high, with a spur, Little Round Top, just north.
POSITION, JULY 1, 3 P.M.
On the morning of July 2d the Federals lay along this317 ridge in order as follows: at the extreme right, on Culp’s Hill (the fishhook’s barb), the Twelfth Corps, Slocum; at the bend, near the cemetery, the Eleventh Corps, Howard, reinforced from other bodies; on their left the First, now under Newton, and the Second, Gibbon. The First and Second corps formed, as it were, the shank of the hook, which the Third, Sickles, was expected to prolong. The Fifth, on arriving, took place behind the Third; and the Sixth, when it appeared from the east, helped to make secure the trains and sent aid elsewhere. The convex formation presently proved to be of incalculable value, enabling Meade to strengthen rapidly any threatened point. Fronting their foe, the Confederates lay in a parallel concave line, Ewell close at the curve and in the town, and A. P. Hill on Seminary Ridge; this line Longstreet prolonged southward, his right flank opposed to Round Top. The concave formation was an embarrassment99 to Lee—no reinforcements could reach threatened points without making a wide circuit.
FIRST CORPS, SEMINARY RIDGE, 3.30 P.M., JULY 1, 1863
(From a print of the time)
When Meade, supposing that Sickles had prolonged with the Third Corps the southward-stretching line, reviewed the field, he found the Third Corps thrown out far in advance, to the Emmittsburg road, which here passed along a dominating ridge; the break in the continuity of his line filled the general with alarm, but it was too late to change. Whether or not Sickles blundered will not be argued here. Meade condemned100; other good authorities have approved, among them Sheridan, who regarded as just Sickles’ claim that the line marked out by Meade was untenable.257
What happened here will presently be told.
Lee, too, was out of harmony with Longstreet, his well-tried second; and the first matter in dispute was the expediency101 of fighting at all at Gettysburg. When Longstreet, coming from Chambersburg, took in the situation,318 he urged upon Lee, bent102 upon his battle, a turning of the Federal left as better strategy, by which the Confederates might interpose between Meade and Washington and compel Meade to make the attack. Longstreet held Lee to be perfect in defensive103 warfare104; on the offensive, however, he thought him “over-combative” and liable to rashness.258 Lee rejected the advice with a touch of irritation105; and when Longstreet, acquiescing106, made a second suggestion—namely, for a tactical turning of the Federal left instead of a direct assault—Lee pronounced for the assault in a manner so peremptory107 that Longstreet could say no more. From first to last at Gettysburg, Longstreet was ill at ease, in spite of which his blows fell like those from the hammer of a war-god. The friends of Lee have denounced him for a sluggishness108 and insubordination that, as they claim, lost for them the battle.259 His defence of himself is earnest and pathetic, of great weight as coming from one of the most able and manful figures on either side in the Civil War.
Of Longstreet’s three divisions, only one, that of McLaws, was on hand with all its brigades on the forenoon of July 2d. At noon arrived Law, completing Hood39’s division. Pickett’s division was still behind; but in mid-afternoon, without waiting for him, Longstreet attacked—Hood, with all possible energy, striking Sickles in his far-advanced position and working dangerously around his flank toward the Round Tops. Longstreet’s generals, Hood and afterward109 Law (Hood falling wounded in the first attack), though men of courage and dash, assaulted only after having filed written protests, feeling sure that the position could be easily turned and319 gained with little fighting. But Lee had been peremptory, and no choice was left.260
POSITION, JULY 2, 2.30 P.M.
Gouverneur K. Warren, then chief-engineer of the Army of the Potomac, despatched by Meade to the left during the afternoon, found the Round Tops undefended. They were plainly the key to the Federal position, offering points which, if seized by the enemy, would make possible an enfilading of the Federal line. Troops of the Twelfth320 Corps, at first stationed there, had been withdrawn110 and their places not supplied. There was not a moment to lose. Even as he stood, Warren beheld111 in the opposite woods the gleam of arms from Longstreet’s swift advance. Leaping down from ledge52 to ledge, he met a brigade of the Fifth Corps, just arrived and marching to the aid of Sickles. These he diverted to the eyrie he had so lately left; a battery, too, was dragged up over the rocks, and none too soon. At that very moment the men of Hood charged out of the valley, and the height was held only by the most obstinate112 combat.
From the valley, meantime, came up a tumult113 of arms which, as the sun threw its rays aslant114, spread wider and louder. Longstreet and A. P. Hill threw in upon the Third Corps every man available; while, on the other hand, Meade poured in to its support division after division from the Fifth, and at last from the Second and Twelfth.261 About six o’clock Sickles fell wounded; by sunset his line was everywhere forced back, though not in rout115. By dusk the Confederates had mastered all resistance in the valley. But the line once reached which Meade had originally designed, running north from Little Round Top to Cemetery Ridge, retreat went no farther. That line was not crossed by foot of foe. When night fell the Round Tops were held firmly, while troops from the Sixth Corps guarded the union left. Nearer the centre stood the Third and Fifth, much shattered but still defiant116. In a way, what had happened was but a rectification117 of Meade’s line: the Confederates, indeed, had won ground, but the losses they had inflicted118 were no more appalling119 than those they had received.
Meantime, fighting no less determined120 and sanguinary had taken place at the cemetery and Culp’s Hill. Lee’s plan contemplated a simultaneous attack at the north and south; but Ewell, at the north, was late in his321 advance, and the intended effect of distracting the Federals was wellnigh lost. The Louisiana brigade dashed itself in vain against the height just above the town. The Stonewall division fared better; for, the Federal defenders121 being for the most part withdrawn, they seized intrenchments on Culp’s Hill, penetrating122 far—for Meade a most critical advance, since they came within thirty rods of the Baltimore turnpike, where lay his trains and reserve ammunition123. The South has always believed that, had Stonewall Jackson been there, the Federal rear would have been reached, and rout and capture made certain.
For both sides it had been a day of terrible experiences, and for the Federals the outlook was perhaps more gloomy than for their foes. On each flank the Confederates had gained an advantage, and Lee probably felt a hopefulness which the circumstances did not really justify124. Meade gathered his generals at midnight in council. It was in a little room, but ten or twelve feet square, a group dust-covered and sweat-stained, the strong faces sternly earnest. Some sat on the bed; some stood; Warren, wounded, stretched out on the floor, was overcome by sleep. There was no vote but to fight it out on the morrow. In this Meade acquiesced125, carefully planning for a retreat, however, should the need arise. To Gibbon, commanding the Second Corps, placed between the wings, he said: “Your turn will come to-morrow. To-day he has struck the flanks; next, it will be the centre.”262
Lee was drawn on by the success of the first day to fight again on the second; his success on the second induced him to try for the third time; but he had exhausted his good-fortune. At earliest dawn of July 3, 1863, began a wrestle126 for the possession of Culp’s Hill, Ewell heavily reinforcing the Stonewall division which had won footing there the night before, and the Twelfth322 Corps as stubbornly struggling for the ground it had lost. It was a fight of six hours, in which the extreme northern wings of the two armies only were concerned. The Federals won, at a heavy sacrifice of life.
POSITION, JULY 3, IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON
Elsewhere the armies rested, an ominous127 silence at last reigning128 on the trampled129 and bloody field under the mid-day sun. Meade and his soldiers knew that it portended130 danger, and with a sure intuition the army chief was watching with especial care the centre, as yet unassailed. On the Confederate side, the unhappy Longstreet, at odds131 with his chief as to the wisdom of the campaign from the start, and disapproving132 both its strategy and tactics, was now in deeper gloom than ever. Lee had determined to assault the Federal centre, and by a cruel323 turn of fate the blow must be struck by the reluctant Longstreet. Of the three great Confederate corps, it was only in Longstreet’s that a force remained as yet unwrung by the fearful agonies of the last two days. Pickett’s division, solidly Virginian, and in the eyes of Lee a Tenth Legion in its valor133, as yet had done nothing, and was to bear the brunt of the attack. “What troops do you design for the assault?” Longstreet had asked. Lee, having indicated Pickett’s division of five thousand, with auxiliary134 divisions, making an entire number in the charging column of fifteen thousand, the Georgian burst out: “I have been a soldier from the ground up. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads135, companies, regiments, armies, and should know as well as any one what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.”263
But Lee was unmoved. Confident of success, he despatched Stuart, arrived at last after his raid, so long and futile136, around beyond the Federal right. When the union centre should be broken and Meade thrown into retreat, Stuart was to seize its only practicable route for retreat, the Baltimore pike, and make the defeat decisive.
Meade, meantime, had managed warily137 and well. At his centre stood Hancock, his best lieutenant. There were massed the First and Second corps, with reserve troops at hand ready to pour in at the word, with batteries bearing upon front and flank, every approach guarded, every man and horse on the alert. The provost guards, and in the rear of all a regiment73 of cavalry, formed in line behind, had orders to shoot any faint-hearts who, in the crisis, should turn from the foe to flee.264 At one o’clock two signal-guns were heard on Seminary Ridge, upon which followed a terrible cannonade, appalling but only slightly harmful, for the waiting ranks found cover from324 the missiles. Feeling sure that this was a prelude138 to something more serious, the Federal chief relaxed his fire to spare his ammunition. It was understood on the other side that the Federal guns were silenced; and that moment having been appointed as the time for the onset139, Pickett inquired of Longstreet if he should go forward. Longstreet, convinced that the charge must fail, made no reply, though the question was repeated. “I shall go forward,” said Pickett, to which his general bowed his head. Instantly was heard the footbeat of the fifteen thousand, and the heavy-hearted Longstreet, mounting his horse, rode out to behold140 the sacrifice. He has recorded that the column passed him down the slope high-hearted, buoyant, hopeful, Pickett riding gracefully141, like a holiday soldier, with cap set jauntily142 on his long, auburn locks.265
The silence of the Federal guns had been for a purpose. As Pickett’s men appeared there was a sudden reopening of their tumult; a deadly sequence from round-shot to canister, and thence to the Minié-balls of the infantry. The defenders now saw before them, as they peered through the battle smoke from their shelter, a solid wedge of men, the division of Pickett, flanked by masses on the right and left commanded by Pettigrew and Wilcox. The column approached, and visibly melted away. Of Pickett’s commanders of brigades every one went down, and their men lay literally143 in heaps beside them.
“A thousand fell where Kemper led;
A thousand died where Garnett bled;
In blinding flame and strangling smoke
The remnant through the batteries broke,
And crossed the line with Armistead.”
A hundred or so, led by Armistead, his cap held aloft on his sword-point, actually penetrated the Federal line and325 reached the “clump of trees” just beyond, holding for a few moments a battery. Pettigrew and Trimble, just north, struggled also for a footing. But the foothold was only for a moment; on front and flank the Federals converged144, and the tide rolled slowly and heavily rearward. For the South all hope of victory was gone.
ATTACK OF PICKETT’S AND ANDERSON’S DIVISION
(From a print of the time)
As the broken and diminished multitude fell back to Seminary Ridge, Lee rode out to meet them. He was alone, his staff being all absent, in that supreme145 moment, on desperate errands. His face was calm and resolute, his voice confident but sympathetic as he exclaimed, “It was all my fault; now help me to do what I can to save what is left.” It casts a light on his character that even in that hour he chided a young officer near for chastising146 his horse: “Don’t whip him, captain. I’ve got just such another foolish horse myself, and whipping does no good.”266 Longstreet declares Lee said again that night, about the bivouac-fire: “It was all my fault. You ought not to have made that last attack”; and that still again Lee wrote to him at a later time, “If I had only taken your advice, even on the 3d, and moved around the Federal left, how different all might have been!”267
Longstreet also records that he fully7 expected a counter-stroke at once, and looked to his batteries, only to find the ammunition exhausted; but they were his only reliance for defence. The Federal cavalry, at that moment attacking his right, occupied troops who might otherwise have been brought to the centre.
Should there have been a counter-stroke? Hancock, lying wounded almost to death in an ambulance, reasoned that, because he had been struck by a tenpenny nail, the Confederate ammunition must be exhausted; he had strength to dictate147 an approval if the charge should be326 ordered.268 Lincoln always felt that it should have been made, and lamented148 that he did not go to Gettysburg himself and push matters on the field, as the crisis required.269 We can surmise149 what Grant would have done had he instead of Meade, as the sun lowered, looked across the valley from Cemetery Ridge. But the case may be put strongly for Meade: with his best lieutenants dead or wounded, worn out himself, whom else could he trust? And, in the disorder70 of his line, how could he tell how far his own army had been shattered in the desperate fights, or what was Lee’s condition? It was only prudent150 to let well enough alone. Nevertheless, a little of such imprudence as his adversary151 was constantly showing might perhaps have led to Lee’s complete destruction.270 During the three fearful days the Federals had lost 3155 killed, 14,529 wounded, 5365 missing—a total of about 23,000; the Confederates, 3903 killed, 18,735 wounded, 5425 missing—a total of about 28,000.271
As it was, Lee stood defiantly152 on Seminary Ridge full twenty-four hours longer. Then, gathering his army about him, and calling in the cavalry which, during Pickett’s charge, was receiving severe punishment on its own account at the hands of Gregg and his division, he slowly withdrew. Practically undisturbed, he crossed the Potomac, followed with great deliberation by the army that had conquered but failed to crush.
Lincoln’s disappointment was never greater than over the lame49 outcome of Gettysburg. “We had them within our grasp,” he cried. “We had only to stretch forth11 our hands and they were ours, and nothing I could say or do327 could make the army move. Our army held the War in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it.” The honor that fell to Meade for his splendid service was deserved. While the criticism was violent he asked to be relieved. But the better nature of the North made itself evident at last, and he was retained. It was felt that he had served his country most nobly, and, though possibly falling short of the highest, deserved to be forever cherished among the immortals153.
SYNOPSIS154 OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS, CHIEFLY
MILITARY, BETWEEN THE BATTLES OF
GETTYSBURG AND VICKSBURG, 1863,
AND APPOMATTOX, 1865
1863. Surrender of Port Hudson. Conscription riots in New York. The Confederate cavalry leader, General Morgan, makes a raid into Indiana. Confederate victory at Chickamauga. Federal victories of Chattanooga, Lookout155 Mountain, and Missionary156 Ridge. Admission of Nevada into the union. The Archduke Maximilian, of Austria, lands at Vera Cruz and assumes the crown of Mexico, with the support of French troops.
1864. The Red River expedition. Grant supersedes157 Halleck as commander-in-chief of the Federal armies. Storming of Fort Pillow by the Confederates. General Sherman begins his march on Atlanta. Battle of the Wilderness158. Battle of Spottsylvania Court-house. Second battle of Cold Harbor. Siege of Petersburg. Sinking of the Confederate cruiser Alabama by the Kearsarge. Confederate raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Federal naval159 victory of Mobile Bay. The Federals occupy Atlanta. Battle of Winchester and Cedar160 Creek. Abraham Lincoln re-elected President. Federal occupation of Savannah.
1865. The Federals capture Fort Fisher. General Sherman328 occupies Charleston. Organization of the Freedmen’s Bureau. Battle of Five Forks. Occupation of Petersburg and Richmond by the Federals, April 3rd. Surrender of General Lee at Appomattox Court-House, April 9th. Assassination161 of Abraham Lincoln, April 14th. Andrew Johnson succeeds to the Presidency162. Capture of Jefferson Davis in Georgia. End of the Civil War. Proclamation of amnesty. The Thirteenth Amendment163, abolishing slavery in the United States, becomes a part of the Constitution.
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1
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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2
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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renewal
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| adj.(契约)延期，续订，更新，复活，重来 | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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daze
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| v.(使)茫然，(使)发昏 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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vehemently
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| adv. 热烈地 | |
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lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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swelling
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| n.肿胀 | |
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respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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15
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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anticipations
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| 预期( anticipation的名词复数 )； 预测； （信托财产收益的）预支； 预期的事物 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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18
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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20
enlisted
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| adj.应募入伍的v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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21
homely
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| adj.家常的，简朴的；不漂亮的 | |
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22
terse
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| adj.(说话，文笔)精炼的，简明的 | |
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23
meditating
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| a.沉思的，冥想的 | |
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24
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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25
gore
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| n.凝血，血污；v.（动物）用角撞伤，用牙刺破；缝以补裆；顶 | |
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26
fret
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| v.(使)烦恼；(使)焦急；(使)腐蚀，(使)磨损 | |
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27
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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28
swapping
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| 交换，交换技术 | |
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29
disapproved
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| v.不赞成( disapprove的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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30
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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31
foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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32
touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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33
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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34
ineptitude
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| n.不适当；愚笨，愚昧的言行 | |
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35
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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36
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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37
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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38
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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39
hood
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| n.头巾，兜帽，覆盖；v.罩上，以头巾覆盖 | |
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40
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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41
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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42
scout
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| n.童子军，侦察员；v.侦察，搜索 | |
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43
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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44
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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45
authorize
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| v.授权，委任；批准，认可 | |
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46
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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47
petulantly
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48
outspoken
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| adj.直言无讳的，坦率的，坦白无隐的 | |
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49
lame
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| adj.跛的，(辩解、论据等)无说服力的 | |
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50
lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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51
perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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52
ledge
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| n.壁架，架状突出物；岩架，岩礁 | |
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53
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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54
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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55
manly
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| adj.有男子气概的；adv.男子般地，果断地 | |
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56
momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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57
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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58
predecessor
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| n.前辈，前任 | |
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59
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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60
sickles
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| n.镰刀( sickle的名词复数 ) | |
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61
censured
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| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的过去式 ) | |
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62
creek
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| n.小溪，小河，小湾 | |
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63
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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64
beaver
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| n.海狸，河狸 | |
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65
hovered
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| 鸟( hover的过去式和过去分词 )； 靠近（某事物）； （人）徘徊； 犹豫 | |
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66
valiantly
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| adv.勇敢地，英勇地；雄赳赳 | |
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67
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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68
archer
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| n.射手，弓箭手 | |
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69
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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70
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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71
crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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72
cemetery
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| n.坟墓，墓地，坟场 | |
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73
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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74
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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75
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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76
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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77
ridges
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| n.脊( ridge的名词复数 )；山脊；脊状突起；大气层的)高压脊 | |
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78
conspicuously
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| ad.明显地，惹人注目地 | |
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79
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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80
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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81
laboriously
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| adv.艰苦地；费力地；辛勤地；（文体等）佶屈聱牙地 | |
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82
diligent
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| adj.勤勉的，勤奋的 | |
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83
drudgery
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| n.苦工，重活，单调乏味的工作 | |
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84
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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85
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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86
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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87
apparition
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| n.幽灵，神奇的现象 | |
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88
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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89
steadfast
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| adj.固定的，不变的，不动摇的；忠实的；坚贞不移的 | |
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90
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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91
galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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92
plodding
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| a.proceeding in a slow or dull way | |
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94
crests
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| v.到达山顶（或浪峰）( crest的第三人称单数 )；到达洪峰，达到顶点 | |
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95
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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96
abrupt
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| adj.突然的，意外的；唐突的，鲁莽的 | |
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97
barb
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| n.（鱼钩等的）倒钩，倒刺 | |
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98
ledges
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| n.（墙壁，悬崖等）突出的狭长部分( ledge的名词复数 )；（平窄的）壁架；横档；（尤指）窗台 | |
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99
embarrassment
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| n.尴尬；使人为难的人(事物)；障碍；窘迫 | |
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100
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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101
expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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102
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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103
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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104
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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105
irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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106
acquiescing
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的现在分词 ) | |
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107
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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108
sluggishness
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| 不振，萧条，呆滞；惰性；滞性；惯性 | |
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109
afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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110
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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111
beheld
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| v.看，注视( behold的过去式和过去分词 )；瞧；看呀；（叙述中用于引出某人意外的出现）哎哟 | |
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112
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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113
tumult
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| n.喧哗；激动，混乱；吵闹 | |
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114
aslant
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| adv.倾斜地；adj.斜的 | |
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115
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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116
defiant
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| adj.无礼的，挑战的 | |
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117
rectification
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| n. 改正, 改订, 矫正 | |
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118
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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119
appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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120
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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121
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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122
penetrating
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| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
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123
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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124
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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acquiesced
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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wrestle
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| vi.摔跤，角力；搏斗；全力对付 | |
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ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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reigning
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| adj.统治的，起支配作用的 | |
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129
trampled
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| 踩( trample的过去式和过去分词 )； 践踏； 无视； 侵犯 | |
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portended
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| v.预示( portend的过去式和过去分词 )；预兆；给…以警告；预告 | |
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odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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disapproving
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| adj.不满的，反对的v.不赞成( disapprove的现在分词 ) | |
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133
valor
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| n.勇气，英勇 | |
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auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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squads
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| n.（军队中的）班( squad的名词复数 )；（暗杀）小组；体育运动的运动（代表）队；（对付某类犯罪活动的）警察队伍 | |
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136
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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warily
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| adv.留心地 | |
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138
prelude
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| n.序言，前兆，序曲 | |
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139
onset
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| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
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140
behold
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| v.看，注视，看到 | |
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141
gracefully
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| ad.大大方方地；优美地 | |
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jauntily
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| adv.心满意足地；洋洋得意地；高兴地；活泼地 | |
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literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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converged
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| v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的过去式 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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chastising
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| v.严惩（某人）（尤指责打）( chastise的现在分词 ) | |
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dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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lamented
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| adj.被哀悼的，令人遗憾的v.（为…）哀悼，痛哭，悲伤( lament的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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149
surmise
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| v./n.猜想，推测 | |
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150
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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151
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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152
defiantly
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| adv.挑战地，大胆对抗地 | |
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153
immortals
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| 不朽的人物( immortal的名词复数 )； 永生不朽者 | |
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synopsis
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| n.提要，梗概 | |
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lookout
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| n.注意，前途，瞭望台 | |
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156
missionary
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| adj.教会的，传教(士)的；n.传教士 | |
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157
supersedes
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| 取代，接替( supersede的第三人称单数 ) | |
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158
wilderness
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| n.杳无人烟的一片陆地、水等，荒漠 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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cedar
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| n.雪松，香柏(木) | |
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161
assassination
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| n.暗杀；暗杀事件 | |
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162
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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amendment
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| n.改正，修正，改善，修正案 | |
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