If I have contributed in ever so slight a degree towards an understanding of the mental state or attitude we call fanaticism6, for the purpose of guarding against the catastrophes8 it begets9, I shall have achieved my purpose. It is unfortunately inevitable10 that a discussion which involves current opinions and beliefs must necessarily encounter strong prejudices and opposition11, but it is less on this account that this little work is likely to fail than for the reason to which Hume attributed the failure which attended the publication of his "Treatise12 of Human Nature," which he described as his guilt13 "of a very usual indiscretion, in going to the press too early." A circumstance which prevented that "unfortunate literary attempt from reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur14 among the zealots."
Needless to say, I have relied for my interpretation15 of human notions and ideas, and the conduct which results from them, very largely upon the works of past and contemporary writers; and my indebtedness to those with whom I differ no less than those with whom I agree is but very inadequately16 acknowledged in my references to the works of some of them.
The earlier portions of the essay are devoted chiefly to an examination of moral ideas, the latter portions more exclusively to the facts of nature and of mind from which they derive17 their meaning. Throughout I have attempted to keep the argument as free as possible from the thin air of philosophical18 and scholastic19 dialectic, and as far as possible in terms of common usage and thought. With this end in view, and for the sake of brevity, the authors to whose works I have referred most frequently have been selected either because they are better known or because their opinions are more widely held than in the case of others. But in any case no claim to exhaustive or even adequate treatment can be made for so slight a review of so vast a subject.
The first problem which I have attempted to deal with is one which confronts all moralists. It consists in the difficulty of deriving20 ethical21 notions from notions which are not ethical, or of deducing the moral law from the facts of experience and of nature. The attempt to escape from this difficulty often takes the form of adopting[Pg vii] a theory by which the whole world is divided into two unrelated worlds, a world of values and a physical world of mechanical sequences. In order to bring these two independent and self-consistent systems within the same reality and to weld them together, God is postulated22. God is necessary, it is argued, to prove the objectivity of morality. That is to say, that since moral values are eternally valid23, independently of man's capacity to be conscious of them, they can only have existence in the one eternal mind.[2]
The purpose of this essay is to offer a different solution. As this question of the status of moral values is of great importance to the moral argument, a preliminary examination of the ground may be helpful.
The predication of value to an object which elicits24 moral approbation25 is not, as most Theistic writers stubbornly maintain, an implicit26 acknowledgment of the objectivity of the goodness predicated, it is merely the act of appreciating the subject or valuer's attitude in relation to the object (the relationship may be purely27 hypothetical), but it may, and usually does, invite a similar attitude on the part of any number of subjects.[3] The relation of subject to object[Pg viii]—this also applies to all relations—may belong to objective reality, but not the moral worth we ascribe to the object as a result of that relationship. This distinction is important and involves, necessarily, a discrimination (not always made) between the treatment of knowledge and of value. Hume, by denying the objective character of the relations and connexions of nature equally with moral judgment28, in his interpretation of individual experience, treated moral judgment and knowledge of natural science in an identical manner. In the following discussion truth, to which I have denied relativity, is accorded a position altogether distinct from value. Appreciation29 of truth and interest in knowing is treated as a value, but not truth itself to which subjectivity30 is denied. The method I have adopted of treating this fundamental point may perhaps be made clearer by a simple illustration. Let us take any particular moral judgment, for example, "A [a conscious individual] is good." The assertion implies that A is the habitual31 doer of desirable actions, or is benevolently32 disposed towards the valuer, Society at large, or God, according to the valuer's idea of goodness. In any case A's conduct or his attitude must have evoked33 approbation by reason of its effect (emotional or material) upon the valuer or those with whom he is in sympathy. The valuer might attempt to refute this definition by maintaining that A's habitual conduct does him the greatest injury, but that his predication of good[Pg ix] in respect of A is the assertion of an objective fact. In spite of such an objection, I would reply that the moral judgment may indeed be intended to imply certain definite objective qualities or properties because the valuer considers these desirable, and chooses arbitrarily to define "good" as containing those definite properties, or because in the community to which he addresses himself they are customarily so defined. The veracity34, however, of the moral judgment, considered as a statement of fact, can only be tested after an agreement has been reached as to the content of the symbol "good." It has then been given a meaning which alone it does not possess. The validity of moral judgment, when it is not merely the expression of individual attitude, will therefore always depend upon the criterion of conduct previously35 adopted. In this way it is held that a moral judgment differs from a statement of fact, which is valid irrespective of the existence of any mind capable of apprehending36 that fact.
In the last two chapters, where an examination of psychological processes has been necessary, I have experienced no slight difficulty in finding appropriate terms by which to distinguish certain conceptions which are in some respects new. An inapt terminology37 and the misuse38 of terms is so grave a fault, and so habitually39 results in errors, obscurity, and confusion, that it may not be superfluous40 to call attention to the terms that are more liable to misinterpretation and in many[Pg x] ways least satisfactory. For this purpose it will be necessary to give the briefest possible account of the use to which they are put, while their more precise definition will be left to the chapters in which they occur.
The psychic41 life and the mental activity of human beings is conditioned by three factors. The first, heredity, denotes the accumulation of experiences and consequent structural42 modifications43 acquired by the race during the process of its adjustment to its environment; the manifestation44 of the result of this experience in behaviour is called instinct. The second is the result of the habits and acquirements of the individual from the moment of conception to the end of his existence: this, together with the first, produces what we call character. The third, those external influences operating upon the individual, we refer to as environment.
If we would reflect upon the mental life of humanity we must consider the individual mind in relation to the world of mankind. In considering the individual mind I have adopted the terms objective mind and subjective45 mind to denote two aspects of mind. The words "objective" and "subjective" in conjunction with mind are used in a special sense which has to be defined. The world of men has been considered as the psychic environment of the individual mind, and I have introduced a term to denote the power of aggregations46 of human thoughts and impulses. It has been viewed as an aspect of the universal[Pg xi] process underlying47 the conative disposition48 and will-to-power of all living beings, and on account of the mode of its operation it has been termed "cosmic suggestion." The term is not intended to imply that the psychic forces of the human mind can be "given off" and have separate existence, like the "odylic fluid" of the early Mesmerists. The power is that of collective minds; suggestion an effect of its activity, not a derived49 essence. It must be understood that these three terms are provisional, and will be discarded if, in the course of time, better ones suggest themselves.
Finally, I would crave50 the indulgence of my readers to say a few words about the philosophy of egoism. There is a view of egoism—the principle of self-interest—as distinguished51 from altruism52, which is seen in opposition to asceticism53 and mysticism, a view which prompted Lecky when he wrote: "Taking human nature with all its defects, the influence of an enlightened self-interest first of all upon the actions and afterwards upon the character of mankind, is shown to be sufficient to construct the whole edifice55 of civilization; and if that principle were withdrawn56, all would crumble57 in the dust.... When, therefore, the ascetic54, proclaiming the utter depravity of mankind, seeks to extirpate58 his most natural passions, to crush the expansion of his faculties59, to destroy the versatility60 of his tastes, and to arrest the flow and impulse of his nature, he is striking at the very force and energy of[Pg xii] civilization." How infinitely61 preferable is the spirit of enlightened egoism to the blind altruism of the fanatic7! The egoism that enhances rather than dims the love of others. It is only through the realization62 of community of interests and aims that like thought will result in like conduct. It is a recognition of this principle of systematic63 integration64 of interests and their concomitant obligations, starting from egoism, in the sense of a realization of the relation of self to environment, and then through successive stages of widening appreciation of the full contents of environment to the identification of the self with the community, which alone leads to State or National morality, and will lead, ultimately it may be hoped, to the morality of a community of all nations—that is, a world morality. It is for this reason that we say that the end and aim of a true ethical system is to find the interests of mankind in the interests of the individual.
And now, as we stand on the threshold of a new era—a new world in search of its soul—what better precept65 can we have than the simple words of the great thinker who, three hundred years ago, also stood on the threshold of a new world of thought?
"Il suffit de bien juger pour bien faire, et de juger le mieux qu'on puisse, pour faire aussi tout66 son mieux, c'est-à-dire, pour acquérir toutes les vertus, et ensemble67 tous les autres[Pg xiii] biens, qu'on puisse acquérir; et lorsqu'on est certain que cela est, on ne saurait manquer d'être content."—Descartes, "Discours de la Méthode."
G. P. R.
Hinton St. Mary, Dorset
January 1, 1919
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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fanaticism
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| n.狂热，盲信 | |
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fanatic
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| n.狂热者，入迷者；adj.狂热入迷的 | |
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catastrophes
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| n.灾祸( catastrophe的名词复数 )；灾难；不幸事件；困难 | |
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begets
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| v.为…之生父( beget的第三人称单数 )；产生，引起 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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murmur
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| n.低语，低声的怨言；v.低语，低声而言 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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inadequately
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| ad.不够地；不够好地 | |
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derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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scholastic
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| adj.学校的，学院的，学术上的 | |
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deriving
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| v.得到( derive的现在分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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postulated
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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elicits
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| 引出，探出( elicit的第三人称单数 ) | |
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approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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implicit
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| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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subjectivity
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| n.主观性（主观主义） | |
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habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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benevolently
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| adv.仁慈地，行善地 | |
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evoked
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| [医]诱发的 | |
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veracity
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| n.诚实 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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apprehending
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的现在分词 )； 理解 | |
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terminology
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| n.术语；专有名词 | |
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misuse
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| n.误用，滥用；vt.误用，滥用 | |
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habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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psychic
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| n.对超自然力敏感的人；adj.有超自然力的 | |
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structural
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| adj.构造的，组织的，建筑（用）的 | |
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modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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46
aggregations
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| n.聚集( aggregation的名词复数 )；集成；集结；聚集体 | |
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underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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50
crave
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| vt.渴望得到，迫切需要，恳求，请求 | |
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51
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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52
altruism
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| n.利他主义，不自私 | |
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asceticism
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| n.禁欲主义 | |
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ascetic
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| adj.禁欲的；严肃的 | |
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55
edifice
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| n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室) | |
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56
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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crumble
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| vi.碎裂，崩溃；vt.弄碎，摧毁 | |
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extirpate
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| v.除尽，灭绝 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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versatility
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| n.多才多艺，多样性，多功能 | |
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61
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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integration
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| n.一体化，联合，结合 | |
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precept
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| n.戒律；格言 | |
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tout
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| v.推销，招徕；兜售；吹捧，劝诱 | |
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ensemble
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| n.合奏(唱)组；全套服装；整体，总效果 | |
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