That, of course, must begin with the village, which is the germ from which all self-government that is of any value has always begun, and on the health and vitality1 of which it must always depend. The village organism must be restored to the state in which we found it, and from that be helped and encouraged to grow to greater things.
The whole of the present conception of the village as an appanage of the headman, and the conception of the headman as an official of Government, must be swept away and a new and true conception must be arrived at.
The village is a self-contained organism, and the headman is its representative before Government and its executive head, the real power being in the Council. Powers and responsibility reside in the village as a whole and in no individual. The people must not be ruled, but rule themselves.
Now as to the exact way in which this conception should be carried out it is impossible to say. In each Province—in distinct parts of the same Province—the village system assumed different forms to meet different circumstances. In Madras the village community was in many details different from that in Burma, and in the North-West still more so. Therefore, the particular way in which the conception should be realised would vary greatly. And only by experience could a satisfactory form for each Province be evolved. Neither would it be possible even in Burma to go back to the old form exactly. Events have marched since then, and what was satisfactory thirty or more years ago would not be so now. The villages must not be reconstituted by copying the past; they must be constituted anew, maintaining, however, the spirit of the past and giving scope for evolution in the future.
Therefore, the scheme that I am about to unfold must be taken to be merely tentative and apply only to Burma. The principles are, I think, right; the details must, of course, be discovered by experience. Practice alone would show how far they realised the objective that is to be aimed at—the constitution of a village organism on natural lines that would govern itself without any need for interference and would be able to grow and evolve.
My scheme is as follows:
In every village a Council should be constituted and the headman should be its executive head.
How this Council should be constituted I do not know. I think there should be wards4, each of which should have an elder, representative of the people, but no rigid6 system of election should be laid down. I have found that villages and wards can very often appoint a representative man by general consent, which is much better than by election. That should only occur in case of a dead-lock. The Council should itself define the wards, and it should be allowed to co-opt additional members. All representation by class or religion should be prohibited. The unit is not so many people, but a section of a village—neighbours dwelling7 together and whose interests are thereby8 united. Appointment to the Council should be indefinite; that is to say, an elder should remain an elder until he resigned or until the ward5 turned him out. I don't think they would like continual elections. An election is a bad means to a desired end—that of obtaining the best representative. And in small communities the sense is usually apparent without it.
The headman should be chosen by the Council from among its members and his election confirmed by Government. His appointment should be according to the wish of the Council, that is to say, for life, unless he resigned or the Council turned him out. He should be responsible to the Council. The Council, as representing the village, should be responsible to Government, and it would always be possible for the Deputy Commissioner9 to bring pressure on a recalcitrant10 Council by threatening to suspend the constitution and place the village under an appointed headman for a time if they did not carry out their duties properly.
To this village community should be handed over certain duties, rights, and responsibilities, much what the headman has now, the collection of revenue, etc. All civil, criminal, and revenue cases under certain values and of certain denominations11 should be handed over to them to try; that is to say, that cognisance should be refused by our police and our Courts, so that the parties could go to the Village Council if they liked. There should be no appeal from the decisions of the Council, no advocates should be allowed, and no record should be required. All penalties imposed should be paid into the village fund.
This fund should exist for all villages, and its nucleus12 should be, say, half an anna in the rupee of the revenue collections, to which should be added fines, special rates which the Council should be empowered to impose for specific purposes, and other forms of revenue which would vary from place to place. I think a percentage of the district fund should be given to them. A rate on inhabited houses—a rent on house sites—would be a good way of raising money. The purposes for which the fund could be used would be water-supply, sanitation13, roads, lighting14, watchmen, and so on. Simple account-books would have to be kept, and these accounts would have to be audited15 once a year.
Model schemes for sanitation, village roads, etc., could be made out for each village to live up to as fast as it could.
Further, villages should have the power to carry out irrigation works on their own initiative and under their own control. I consider this a most important proviso, because I know many villages where this could be done by the village, whereas it is not possible to individuals. I also know one recent case in my district where it was done with great success by the headman and elders. I got them a small grant, and I often went to see how the work was getting on, but I never interfered16 in any way, and the result was most satisfactory. There was at first a difficulty about collecting the rates, because there was no legal system under which a man who used the water could be made to pay. However, this also settled itself.
Irrigation works, roads, and bridges are most necessary to many villages, but now, unless Government carry out the work, there is no one to do it. And Government will not carry out small works.
It is by the execution of such works that the village would prosper17 and the village fund grow. Loans should be granted for these purposes by Government, to be repaid out of the profits.
Before our annexation18 all works were executed by the villages, and the considerable irrigation works in many places are evidence of their ability. All this initiative has now been killed. Yet it is a most valuable asset, not only materially, but morally.
As regards this fund, it will, I know, be objected by many people that it will be simply an excuse for peculation19. "Orientals," they say, "cannot be honest, and the funds would be misappropriated right and left."
Exactly this same charge was made when the Co-operative Credit Banks were started. Their history will sufficiently20 refute such an absurdity21. Orientals are just as honest as any other people, and, given a good system, village funds will no more be stolen in India or Burma than municipal funds are in England.
In organising these villages there is another point to be borne in mind. In that desperate struggle after rigid uniformity which distinguishes the Indian Government, every separate hamlet in Burma was put under a separate headman, and thus made a separate organism.
Now it may be that occasionally the village was too large, and a division was needed, but in many other cases the disintegration22 of long-established units was severely23 felt. Several hamlets may have one interest in common. They may be grouped round a small irrigation work, or along a stream, or have a fishery in common, or be in other matters of great use to each other. If run as separate organisms there is bound to be strife24, each trying for his own benefit. If allowed to remain one organism they will be not only more peaceful, but stronger, and better able to manage their affairs. Thus the rigid formul? of Government in this matter as in others should give place to common sense.
Further: in future, villages should be allowed to coalesce25 if mutual26 interests attract them. Two or three villages if allowed to combine would carry out works that one could not do.
I see no great difficulty in Burma in thus restoring the organism of village life. It would require mainly tact27 on the part of the District Officer and ability to let alone. His tendency now is always to interfere3 if he can. His rule should be never to interfere if he can help it. When things go wrong persistently28 it will probably be found that there is something amiss with the way the village is organised, and that it requires some slight modification29. If a horse can't draw a cart it is better to see what is wrong with the horse or the cart than try to move them both along by turning the wheels round yourself. You won't get far that way. The more you push the more the horse will jib. And Village Councils will be very willing horses if let alone and the cart be not too cumbersome30 or the hill they have to climb too steep. But they must be left alone. Read the history of municipal institutions in England and note the principles. They are universal.
Once the village communities are strong and healthy, a further step could be made by instituting a township or sub-divisional Council, and later a District Council.
For these I am not prepared to offer any suggestions. It would require a very careful study of local conditions and of the people, a wide experience gained from the working of the resuscitated31 villages, to know how these should be constituted and what powers and responsibilities should be entrusted32 to them. I think a sound analogy might be obtained from a study of English counties—not so much perhaps as they are now, but as they were—in spirit, not in law.
After the village organism was established, perhaps in order to its proper establishment, a local Government Board would have to be created. This would have to be in time entirely33 native to the Province. It is, I think, essential that it should be so. What its relations with the District Officer would be I do not know. I foresee difficulties. It is essential for good order in the district that there be no one between the head and the people. Nevertheless, I don't think he could establish and work the village organism himself. I think he would be too tempted34 to interfere; and, moreover, there would have to be a certain co-ordination between the systems in various districts. They need not be the same in detail, but the idea should be the same. That is because eventually they must coalesce into bigger organisms. But a District Officer with a strong personality would, I think, be liable to impress that personality on the village, and as it must be self-governing that might create difficulties. For as the villages increased the District Officer would decrease. Gradually his powers would devolve on the local organisms. There would thus be a certain rivalry35 between the District Officer and the local organisms, which, if the officer were the head of both, might result in injury to the latter. Perhaps some such relation as exists between the Land Records Department and the District Officer would be possible. The Land Records has its own organisation36, which works independently of the district but in harmony with it. All this, however, is not a matter which can be thought out. It will have to be worked out, and a correct system can only come little by little, experience showing how modifications37 should be made. I do not see any great difficulty provided there are common sense and unity2 of aim on both sides.
And from districts—when they had settled down into distinct organisms more or less self-governing—representatives, not delegates, could be sent to a Provincial38 Council. Then you would have a real Council, one representative of the people because proceeding39 from the people, not less surely because not directly. I am not sure that direct election such as is practised in England and America, for instance, does cause representation of the people. In England, at all events, it is not so now. The only power the people have now is to choose between the delegates of two or more parties. Beyond this they have no voice nor choice. They cannot find any expression for their own wishes. Their member may be, probably is, a man they never heard of before the "Party" sent him to contest the seat. There is, in fact, in England to-day no real representation of the people at all. By people, of course, I mean the people as a whole, including all classes. But under some such scheme as I have sketched40 out for Burma there would be real representation of the people, of localities as a whole, units; local men acquainted with the local conditions would be chosen and not pleaders, and the locality would hold them responsible. Thus the opinion of such a Council would represent the wishes of the people; it could be depended on, and to it could considerable powers be delegated permanently41. It would, in fact, in time constitute a Provincial Government in federal relations with the other Provincial Governments. That is the only possible way that a real government can be built up.
And it must always be remembered that the basis is the Village. On the health of the Village all other things depend; from the healthy working of the Village all things may proceed. It is the first but not last word in local self-government.
A very integral part of any self-government is Education, and to that I come in the next chapter.
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1
vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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wards
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| 区( ward的名词复数 )； 病房； 受监护的未成年者； 被人照顾或控制的状态 | |
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ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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dwelling
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| n.住宅，住所，寓所 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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recalcitrant
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| adj.倔强的 | |
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denominations
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| n.宗派( denomination的名词复数 )；教派；面额；名称 | |
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nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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sanitation
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| n.公共卫生，环境卫生，卫生设备 | |
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lighting
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| n.照明，光线的明暗，舞台灯光 | |
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audited
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| v.审计，查账( audit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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prosper
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| v.成功，兴隆，昌盛；使成功，使昌隆，繁荣 | |
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annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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peculation
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| n.侵吞公款[公物] | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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disintegration
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| n.分散，解体 | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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coalesce
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| v.联合，结合，合并 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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tact
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| n.机敏，圆滑，得体 | |
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persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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cumbersome
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| adj.笨重的，不便携带的 | |
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resuscitated
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| v.使（某人或某物）恢复知觉，苏醒( resuscitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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rivalry
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| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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