Some prominence2 has lately been given in England to erroneous views concerning the armament and tactics of cavalry. General von Bernhardi's book contains sound doctrine3 on this subject, and will show to every one who has an open mind and is capable of conviction by reasoned argument how great is the future r?le of cavalry, and how determined4 are the efforts of the great cavalry leaders of Europe to keep abreast5 with the times, and to absorb, for the profit of the arm, every lesson taught by experience, both in peace and war.
In all theories, whether expounded6 by so eminent7 an authority as General von Bernhardi or by others who have not his claims to our attention, there is, of course, a good deal that must remain a matter of opinion, and a question open for free and frank discussion. But I am convinced that some of the reactionary8 views recently aired in England concerning cavalry will, if accepted and adopted, lead first to the deterioration9 and then to the collapse10 of cavalry when next it is called upon to fulfil its mission in war. I therefore recommend not only cavalry officers, but officers of all arms and services, to read and ponder[Pg 8] this book, which provides a strengthening tonic11 for weak minds which may have allowed themselves to be impressed by the dangerous heresies12 to which I have alluded13.
Is there such a thing as the cavalry spirit, and should it be our object to develop this spirit, if it exists, to the utmost, or to suppress it? General von Bernhardt thinks that this spirit exists and should be encouraged, and I agree with him. It is not only possible but necessary to preach the Army spirit, or, in other words, the close comradeship of all arms in battle, and at the same time to develop the highest qualities and the special attributes of each branch. The particular spirit which we seek to encourage is different for each arm. Were we to seek to endow cavalry with the tenacity14 and stiffness of infantry15, or to take from the mounted arm the mobility16 and the cult17 of the offensive which are the breath of its life, we should ruin not only the cavalry, but the Army besides. Those who scoff18 at the spirit, whether of cavalry, of artillery19, or of infantry, are people who have had no practical experience of the actual training of troops in peace, or of the personal leadership in war. Such men are blind guides indeed.
Another reason why I welcome this book is because it supplies a timely answer to schoolmen who see in our South African experiences, some of which they distort and many of which they forget, the acme20 of all military wisdom. It is always a danger when any single campaign is picked out, at the fancy of some pedagogue21, and its lessons recommended as a panacea22. It is by study and meditation23 of the whole of the long history of war, and not by concentration upon single and special phases of it, that we obtain safe guidance[Pg 9] to the principles and practices of an art which is as old as the world.
It is not only the campaigns which we and others have fought which deserve reflection, but also the wars which may lie in front of us. General von Bernhardi does not neglect the lessons of past wars, but he gives the best of reasons for thinking that the wars in South Africa and Manchuria have little in common with the conditions of warfare24 in Europe. We notice, as we read his book, that he has constantly in his mind the enemies whom the German Army must be prepared to meet, their arms, their tactics, and their country, and that he urges his comrades to keep the conditions of probable wars constantly before their eyes.
It passes comprehension that some critics in England should gravely assure us that the war in South Africa should be our chief source of inspiration and guidance, and that it was not abnormal. All wars are abnormal, because there is no such thing as normal war. In applying the lessons of South Africa to the training of cavalry, we should be very foolish if we did not recognise at this late hour that very few of the conditions of South Africa are likely to recur25. I will name only a few of them. The composition and tactics of the Boer forces were as dissimilar from those of European armies as possible. Boer commandos made no difficulty about dispersing26 to the four winds when pressed, and re-uniting again some days or weeks later hundreds of miles from the scene of their last encounter. Such tactics in Europe would lead to the disruption and disbandment of any army that attempted them.
Secondly27, the war in South Africa was one for the conquest and annexation28 of immense districts, and no[Pg 10] settlement was open to us except the complete submission29 of our gallant30 enemy. A campaign with such a serious object in view is the most difficult that can be confided31 to an army if the enemy is brave, enterprising, well-armed, numerous, and animated32 with unconquerable resolve to fight to the bitter end. I am not sure that people in England have ever fully33 grasped this distinctive34 feature of our war with the Dutch Republics. Let me quote the opinion of the late Colonel Count Yorck von Wartenburg on this subject. In his remarkable35 book "Napoleon as a General," Count Yorck declares that if, in the campaign of 1870-71, the absolute conquest and annexation of France had been desired, German procedure would not have been either logical or successful, and that the Germans would have failed as completely as Napoleon failed in Spain. But Count Yorck shows that when plans have a definite and limited object in view—namely, to obtain peace on given conditions—the situation is altered. Count Yorck shows that the German plans in 1870-71 were perfectly36 appropriate to this limited aim, and that they were therefore successful. The very serious task which British policy imposed upon British strategy in South Africa must never be forgotten.
Thirdly, we did not possess any means for remounting our cavalry with trained horses, such as we are endeavouring to secure by our new system of cavalry dep?ts and reserve regiments37. After the capture, in rear of the army, of the great convoy38 by De Wet, our horses were on short commons, and consequently lost condition and never completely recovered it.
Lastly, owing to the wholesale39 and repeated release of prisoners who had been captured and who subsequently appeared again in the field against us, we were called upon to fight, not, as is stated, 86,000 or 87,[Pg 11]000 men, but something like double that number or more, with this additional disadvantage, that the enemy possessed40 on his second or third appearance against us considerable experience of our methods, and a certain additional seasoned fitness.
Nevertheless we are now invited to throw away our cold steel as useless lumber41 owing to some alleged42 failures of the cavalry in South Africa. Were we to do so, we should invert43 the r?le of cavalry, turn it into a defensive44 arm, and make it a prey45 to the first foreign cavalry that it meets, for good cavalry can always compel a dismounted force of mounted riflemen to mount and ride away, and when such riflemen are caught on their horses they have power neither of offence nor of defence and are lost. If, in European warfare, such mounted riflemen were to separate and scatter46, the enemy would be well pleased, for he could then reconnoitre and report every movement and make his plans in all security. In South Africa the mounted riflemen were the hostile army itself, and when they had dispersed47 there was nothing left to reconnoitre; but when and where will these conditions recur?
Even in South Africa, grave though were the disadvantages under which our cavalry laboured from short commons and overwork, the Boer mounted riflemen acknowledged on many occasions the moral force of the cold steel, and gave way before it. The action at Zand River in May, 1900, was a case in point, and I only quote a personal experience because the venerable maxim48 that an ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory has still a good deal to be said for it. The r?le of the Cavalry Division on the day to which I refer was to bring pressure to bear on the right flank of the Boer army in order to enable Lord Roberts to[Pg 12] advance across the river and attack the main Boer forces. Having crossed the river to the west of the Boers, we determined, with the inner or easterly brigade, to seize an important kopje lying on the right flank of the Boer position, and, pivoting49 upon this, to throw two brigades against the right flank and rear of the enemy.
The Boers told off a strong force of picked mounted riflemen to oppose this movement, which they expected. The kopje was seized by the inner brigade, and the brigade next to it made some progress; but the Boer mounted riflemen attacked the flank brigade to the extreme west, and began to drive it back. I galloped50 from the kopje to the outer brigade with the thought that either every idea which I had ever formed in my life as to the efficacy of shock action against mounted riflemen was utterly51 erroneous, or that this was the moment to show that it was not. On reaching the outer brigade I ordered it to mount and form for attack. All ranks were at once electrified52 into extraordinary enthusiasm and energy. The Boers realised what was coming. Their fire became wild, and the bullets began to fly over our heads. Directly the advance began, the Boers hesitated, and many rushed to their horses. We pressed forward with all the very moderate speed of tired horses, whereupon the whole Boer force retired53 in the utmost confusion and disorder54, losing in a quarter of an hour more ground than they had won during three or four hours of fighting. A cavalry which could perform service like this; which held back, against great numerical odds55, the Dutch forces at Colesberg; which relieved Kimberley; which directly made possible the victory at Paardeberg by enclosing Kronje in his entrenchments; which captured Bloemfontein,[Pg 13] Kroonstadt, and Barberton, and took part successfully in all the phases of the long guerilla war and in countless56 drives, can afford to regard with equanimity57 the attacks of those who have never led, trained, nor understood the arm to which I am proud to have belonged.
I have already, in an introduction to another book by General von Bernhardi, expressed my high sense of the general soundness of his teaching. Were I to do full justice to the merits of this new work, I should be compelled to make long extracts and to repeat matter which every reader will perhaps do better to search for and select for himself. But I would invite particular attention to the General's remarks on the subjects of reconnaissance, the cavalry fight, the combination of fire and shock, the divisional cavalry, the r?le of the strategical cavalry, training, and organisation58. The masterly summary of the qualifications which should be possessed by squadron and patrol leaders is, in particular, an extremely valuable contribution to the study of a most important subject.
The General does not always agree with the Regulations of his own Army, and he is specially59 in conflict with them when he recommends raids by cavalry corps60 against the enemy's communications. My opinion upon this point is that every plan should be subordinate to what I consider a primary necessity—namely, the absolute and complete overthrow61 of the hostile cavalry. So long as that cavalry remains62 intact with its morale63 unshaken, all our enterprises must of necessity be paralysed. The successful cavalry fight confers upon the victor the command of ground, just in the same way that successful naval64 action carries[Pg 14] with it command at sea. For effective enterprises in either sphere command is absolutely necessary, and can only be obtained by successful battle, whether on land or sea.
I agree generally with the German Regulations when they suggest that raids against communications should not divert cavalry from their true battle objective, and consequently I must venture to differ from the author on this point, though I do not approve of all that the German Regulations say concerning the employment of cavalry in battle. The opinion which I hold and have often expressed is that the true r?le of cavalry on the battlefield is to reconnoitre, to deceive, and finally to support. If the enemy's cavalry has been overthrown65, the r?le of reconnaissance will have been rendered easier. In the r?les of deception66 and support, such an immense and fruitful field of usefulness and enterprise is laid open to a cavalry division which has thought out and practised these r?les in its peace training and is accustomed to act in large bodies dismounted, that I cannot bring myself to believe that any equivalent for such manifest advantages can be found even in the most successful raid against the enemy's communications by mounted troops.
I entirely67 agree with General von Bernhardi's conclusion that very important duties will fall to the lot of the divisional cavalry in war, and that the fulfilment of these duties has become more difficult of late years. The necessity for, and the value of, divisional cavalry are often not properly appreciated. What the strategical cavalry is to the Army in the greater sphere, the divisional cavalry is to the division in the lesser68.
Most cavalry soldiers of good judgment69 will agree[Pg 15] with the lucid70 arguments of the author on the subject of cavalry armament. It is suggested to us, by critics of the cavalry, that the lance is an impediment to dismounted action. If this difficulty ever existed, it has been overcome by the method of carrying the lance which has been adopted and practised with marked success for the past two years. It is also objected by the same critics that a thin bamboo pole, carried by the side of a mounted man, will hinder him in reconnaissance and reveal his position to the enemy. The mere71 statement of this argument absolves72 me from the duty of replying to it.
General von Bernhardi very wisely says that it is not a question whether cavalrymen should fight mounted or dismounted, but whether they are prepared and determined to take their share in the decision of an encounter and to employ the whole of their strength and mobility to this end. In our training during the last few years I have endeavoured to impress upon all ranks that when the enemy's cavalry is overthrown, our cavalry will find more opportunities of using the rifle than the cold steel, and that dismounted attacks will be more frequent than charges with the arme blanche. By no means do I rule out as impossible, or even unlikely, attacks by great bodies of mounted men against other arms on the battlefield. But I believe that such opportunities will occur comparatively rarely, and that undue73 prominence should not be accorded to them in our peace training, to the detriment74 of much more solid advantages which may be gained by other means.
I think that every one who reads this book will understand that the sphere of action of cavalry is steadily75 widening, and is, at the same time, making increased demands as the years go on upon all ranks[Pg 16] of the arm. Those who wish to recall what cavalry has done in the past, should read and reread "The Achievements of Cavalry," by Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, one of the very few soldiers in the Army who has taken part as a combatant in European warfare. Sir Evelyn Wood's war record probably surpasses that of any other officer in the Army. His knowledge of horses and his horsemanship are second to none, and though seventy-two years of age, he is still one of the hardest and straightest riders to hounds in England. It should be a constant encouragement to the cavalry that such an experienced and sagacious leader should entertain such a firm faith in the destinies of an arm with which he is so thoroughly76 conversant77.
A few words in conclusion. We hear it said, and see it written, that we ought not to accept any guidance from military Europe, because our own experience of war has been so considerable that we can learn nothing from Europe which we do not know better ourselves. The truth is, that since the Crimean War we have had little or no experience of the kind of effort which will be required of us when next we meet the trained army of a European Power. In deluding78 ourselves with the false notion that our campaigns of the last fifty years represent the sum of military wisdom, we merely expose our ignorance and conceit79, and do our utmost not only to cause disaster, but to invite it.
The cavalry soldier must not be misled by these appeals of ignorance to vanity. Let him continue to study profoundly the training, tactics, and organisation of the best foreign cavalry. Let him reflect long and deeply upon the opinions of such acknowledged[Pg 17] authorities as Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood and General von Bernhardi. Let him keep himself abreast with every change in the tendencies of cavalry abroad, so that he may help us to assimilate the best of foreign customs to our own. Finally, let him realise the great intellectual and physical strain that modern war will impose upon the cavalry, and let him preserve the mens sana in corpore sano, that equable balance between study and action, which alone will enable him to rise superior to every difficulty in the great and honourable80 calling to which he belongs.
J.D.P. French.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
cavalry
|
|
| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
prominence
|
|
| n.突出；显著；杰出；重要 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
doctrine
|
|
| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
determined
|
|
| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
abreast
|
|
| adv.并排地；跟上(时代)的步伐，与…并进地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
expounded
|
|
| 论述，详细讲解( expound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
eminent
|
|
| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
reactionary
|
|
| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
deterioration
|
|
| n.退化；恶化；变坏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
collapse
|
|
| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
tonic
|
|
| n./adj.滋补品，补药，强身的，健体的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
heresies
|
|
| n.异端邪说，异教( heresy的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
alluded
|
|
| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
tenacity
|
|
| n.坚韧 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
infantry
|
|
| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
mobility
|
|
| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
cult
|
|
| n.异教，邪教；时尚，狂热的崇拜 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
scoff
|
|
| n.嘲笑，笑柄，愚弄；v.嘲笑，嘲弄，愚弄，狼吞虎咽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
artillery
|
|
| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
acme
|
|
| n.顶点，极点 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
pedagogue
|
|
| n.教师 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
panacea
|
|
| n.万灵药；治百病的灵药 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
meditation
|
|
| n.熟虑，（尤指宗教的）默想，沉思，（pl.）冥想录 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
warfare
|
|
| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
recur
|
|
| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
dispersing
|
|
| adj. 分散的 动词disperse的现在分词形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
secondly
|
|
| adv.第二，其次 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
annexation
|
|
| n.吞并，合并 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
submission
|
|
| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
gallant
|
|
| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
confided
|
|
| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
animated
|
|
| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
distinctive
|
|
| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
perfectly
|
|
| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
regiments
|
|
| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
convoy
|
|
| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
wholesale
|
|
| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
possessed
|
|
| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
lumber
|
|
| n.木材，木料；v.以破旧东西堆满；伐木；笨重移动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
alleged
|
|
| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
invert
|
|
| vt.使反转，使颠倒，使转化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
defensive
|
|
| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
prey
|
|
| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
scatter
|
|
| vt.撒，驱散，散开；散布/播；vi.分散，消散 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
dispersed
|
|
| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
maxim
|
|
| n.格言，箴言 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
pivoting
|
|
| n.绕轴旋转，绕公共法线旋转v.（似）在枢轴上转动( pivot的现在分词 )；把…放在枢轴上；以…为核心，围绕（主旨）展开 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
galloped
|
|
| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
utterly
|
|
| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
electrified
|
|
| v.使电气化( electrify的过去式和过去分词 )；使兴奋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
retired
|
|
| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
disorder
|
|
| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
odds
|
|
| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
countless
|
|
| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
equanimity
|
|
| n.沉着，镇定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
organisation
|
|
| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
specially
|
|
| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
corps
|
|
| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
overthrow
|
|
| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
morale
|
|
| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
naval
|
|
| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
overthrown
|
|
| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
deception
|
|
| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
lesser
|
|
| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
lucid
|
|
| adj.明白易懂的，清晰的，头脑清楚的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
absolves
|
|
| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的第三人称单数 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
undue
|
|
| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
detriment
|
|
| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
steadily
|
|
| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
thoroughly
|
|
| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
conversant
|
|
| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
deluding
|
|
| v.欺骗，哄骗( delude的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
conceit
|
|
| n.自负，自高自大 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
honourable
|
|
| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |