Our cavalry3 keep, as a rule, but little in touch with such matters. The new "Field Service Manual" introduces the idea of offensive and defensive4 screens, but the cavalry lack experience in them. Offensive screening is usually accepted, it appears, at all events, at the outset, as being somewhat similar to reconnaissance duties. Real screening is but seldom practised, as operations only last a short time, and usually end with a cavalry encounter, entailing6 a lapse7 into the usual set piece.
With regard to these exercises, I would point out that defensive screening, combined with natural obstacles, and possibly with the assistance of the other arms, is much more effective than the offensive method, and therefore deserves more attention, and, further, that there is a considerable difference between a reconnaissance and an offensive screen.
In a reconnaissance an advance is made in the direction which the army commander considers to be most important, and it is left to the enemy's cavalry to oppose this advance. In offensive screening, on the other hand, the enemy must be found before he can be attacked and beaten. An advance would naturally not be risked in a direction that would avoid the enemy's cavalry, and thereby8 afford it the opportunity[Pg 230] of approach against the main army. This should be prevented at all costs. An advance must consequently not be made until information has been obtained from patrols or scouts regarding the position and the line of advance of the enemy's cavalry. Then a determined9 attack should be made on the cavalry, the force being concentrated as much as possible for this purpose. It is only after this attack has been successfully carried out that the real screening work begins.
The two main points that should be observed when carrying out such exercises are therefore: (1) no advance should be made until the enemy's line of advance has been discovered; and (2) the forces should be distributed, after the defeat of the enemy, on a broad front, in accordance with the requirements of the screening duties, while the enemy's beaten cavalry must be carefully watched, to prevent its further activity.
With regard to defensive screening, it is necessary above all, first, to occupy with sufficient strength all passages over the natural obstacle that has been selected, and to effect a tactical disposition11 of the forces that will enable them to do a maximum of work with the expenditure12 of a minimum of strength, making the greatest possible use of field entrenchments; secondly13, to so dispose the reserves that they will be quickly available to strengthen any threatened point; and lastly, to arrange a system of communication along the whole screening-line, employing any suitable technical appliances in such a manner that the system will continue to operate even though the enemy's patrol should break through the line. It must be possible also to communicate quickly and safely to the troops in rear, so that any detachments of the enemy that might break through the line may be intercepted14. The cavalry telegraph, in fact any kind of telegraph, is the least sure method of communication, particularly in the enemy's country, owing to the ease with which it can be cut. There must, at any rate, be other means of rapid communication besides the telegraph, such as flag signals or the light-signal.
In screening work, balloons are often very useful for discovering the direction in which the enemy is advancing; they are more suited to stationary15 work, especially behind a protected area, than to active operations. The reconnais[Pg 231]sance and the action of the cavalry could then be based on the information received from the balloons. It will, unfortunately, seldom happen during such man?uvres that a balloon is available, but all the necessary technical appliances for communication should certainly be at hand.
The value of all these exercises, especially in the case of reconnaissance, is largely dependent on the manner in which the enemy is represented. The best plan is, of course, to place real troops at their full strength opposite to one another, but this is scarcely practicable, on account of the expense entailed16. Even the Imperial Man?uvres do not faithfully represent modern armies and distances, but only reproduce portions of great operations on a reduced scale. The fact of the matter is that it is impossible, in time of peace, to set on foot anything approaching the number of men, or to cover anything like the extent of country, necessary to at all correspond with the conditions of modern warfare17. The only feasible plan is to indicate columns of the army, and even large bodies of cavalry, by flagged troops; but it is well to place real troops at the head of these columns, so that they may form the vanguard and may send out the full number of patrols and outposts, at all events to the front. The reconnoitring organs would thus, at any rate to the front, be confronted by an enemy disposed as in real warfare. I need hardly say that both sides should send out these reconnoitring detachments, as far as possible at full strength; no advantage can possibly be derived18 from the exercises if this is not done.
It is also very important to put the divisional cavalry into the field, where possible at full strength, as the difficulties that beset19 the reconnoitring patrols will only then become apparent. This divisional cavalry need only send out a limited number of these patrols, as they are, as a rule, not absolutely necessary in such exercises, but the work of screening should receive careful attention. The division should therefore be surrounded by a screen of security patrols, and all points from which the enemy's patrols might observe the columns should be occupied. If these columns are on the march, the security patrols should advance in "bonds successifs," together with the divisional cavalry, from one line of observation to the next, and thus prevent any possible reconnaissance on the part of the enemy.[Pg 232] If the ground on the line of advance is suited to defensive screening, this method should be adopted, and all the enemy's patrols and despatch20-riders seen should be hunted down. When the hostile reconnoitring patrols have been driven back behind their own screens or outposts, measures should be taken to prevent their re-issue. If the enemy's patrols endeavour to remain for the night in the vicinity of the troops they wish to keep under observation, they should, if possible, be attacked and captured. When operations are being carried on in friendly country, it will be well to ensure the co-operation of the inhabitants in obtaining information regarding the movements of the enemy's troops. There are always old soldiers to be found among the civil population, who would interest themselves in the matter if called upon by the local magistrates21 to assist, and who would certainly do their utmost to help their own countrymen and to hamper22 the enemy. Care should, of course, be taken not to go too far in this direction, as unfortunate consequences might possibly result.
It will also be well to send numerous umpires with the army columns and their vanguards, and with the divisional cavalry, and also along the main roads, whose task it will be to conduct the man?uvres as nearly as possible on the lines of real warfare. Umpires should also be attached to reconnoitring patrols and squadrons, at any rate to those of one side, so that there may be an impartial23 witness of any encounter. The appointment of these umpires would have the further advantage of providing work at the important points for a larger number of officers, who would thus learn more than they would do when simply marching with their units.
When the various portions of the army are to be represented by flags, each flag should be made to represent a company, a battery, or a squadron, but the flags should be so disposed as to oblige patrols to estimate the strength of the columns by their length, as in war there would not often be time or opportunity to count the separate tactical groups of the enemy. Too few flags should not, however, be used, but rather as many as possible, so as to produce the effect of a continuous column on the move, infantry24 and artillery25 being clearly indicated. The detachments of cavalry that would in actual warfare be stationed at different points along[Pg 233] the column might with advantage be represented by real cavalry, who would be able to pursue the enemy's horsemen. Artillery patrols might also relieve the cavalry of this duty, and, in difficult country, march on the flanks of the column, thereby making matters more difficult for the hostile scouts. All measures of this description would greatly assist in giving to man?uvres the character of real warfare, and in increasing the difficulties in the way of the far-too-easy peace-time reconnaissance.
Umpires need not confine themselves to deciding the results of engagements. They might very well draw the attention of patrols that act in a manner incompatible26 with service conditions to the hostile spirit of the population, or, if necessary, bring about real or assumed attacks that would inflict27 such losses or damage on the patrols as they would probably have suffered in war. They can, in short, do much to give the man?uvres a semblance28 of reality.
The r?le of umpire is also a useful training for regimental officers. Regimental and squadron commanders cannot form a correct idea of the possibilities and functions of their reconnoitring detachments unless they have accompanied patrols as umpires.
It is, in my opinion, impossible to go too far in the direction of making conditions resemble as much as possible those of actual warfare, as one of the greatest difficulties to be faced consists in sustaining the interest of the troops and the semblance of reality.
Goethe, in his "Wilhelm Meister," remarks how rare it is to find among men "any kind of creative imagination." Nothing, indeed, is more difficult than to take a keen interest in hypothetical conditions. This truth applies particularly to soldiers, and the difficulty is one from which most peace exercises suffer.
Some very powerful incentive29 is required to induce troops to really enter into the conditions presupposed by the general idea of the man?uvres. They must continually imagine the existence of real warfare, with all its exactions and influences, and they must act consistently according to the spirit of purely30 imaginative conditions. It is during the reconnoitring exercises of the cavalry that the men's powers of imagination are most heavily taxed, and that most mistakes and unnatural31 situations result in consequence. Even the[Pg 234] officers display a lack of imagination in their inability to conform to service conditions, to appreciate the difficulties and dangers of any situation, and to take them into account when making their dispositions32, and in their general conduct.
During the last decade, reconnaissance at our smaller field-training exercises and man?uvres has suffered greatly from red-tape methods and the consciousness of peace conditions. I refer mainly to the transmission service. Times without number, single horsemen arrive with messages from points behind the enemy or his outposts, so that the messenger must ride right through the enemy, thus entailing the certain loss of the report. It should be unnecessary to point out that the best messages are quite useless if they do not reach their destination.
It is a vital mistake in our army, and one to which I have frequently drawn33 attention, that these single orderlies are sent with messages, and that even for long distances. Granting that the improbable might happen, and they were successful in finding their way without maps, often at night and in foggy weather, through a strange country, single horsemen would, in the enemy's country, be often captured or fall a prey34 to the hostile population. In spite of all this, every one is opposed to sending a patrol with a message, and, when it is done, the patrol's strength is cut down most unwarrantably. I am afraid that only bitter experience will teach us the folly35 of this procedure.
It also frequently happens that technical appliances for transmission are use in a most illegitimate manner. Telegraph-lines belonging to both sides have before now actually been laid peacefully side by side, and had their respective termini within the cantonment area of the opposing armies. Until quite lately, telegraphic messages were often sent through the enemy's lines.
In these exercises both sides, as a rule, find considerable difficulty in remembering the assumed hostility36 of the population, and in making corresponding dispositions. When selecting quarters, this point is frequently forgotten, and patrols spend the night in villages in hostile country, and in close proximity37 to the enemy's cantonments, where escape, in time of war, would be practically out of the question. On such occasions the prospect38 of comfortable quarters,[Pg 235] where the horses can be well cared for, has probably more influence on the patrol leader's plans than military exigencies39, and the protective measures taken would probably prove correspondingly inefficient40. The exercises should therefore be so arranged that the patrols and, if possible, the reconnoitring squadrons of both sides, advance into the enemy's country, thus placing themselves in difficult situations; and the umpires should have instructions to interfere41 immediately if anything were done that would entail5 serious consequences in war time, as the lesson that should be learnt is how to act in the enemy's country.
Particular stress should be laid on the method of writing reports. If instruction in this direction is to bear fruit, all the details as to contents, time and place of despatch, and any other important points must be thoroughly42 discussed. Our cavalry still suffers from bad habits contracted during peace training. It has not learnt to reconnoitre on a large scale, and consequently pays too much attention to details of the drill-ground, while it is unable properly to distinguish between strategical exploration and tactical reconnaissance. Even in larger exercises, where stress should be laid on ascertaining43 merely the strategical dispositions of the enemy, the tendency is always to report in detail, and as often as possible, while the relative importance of such reports is seldom assessed at its right value.
The question of economising strength is often entirely44 neglected, especially in the case of reconnoitring squadrons, just as it is with forces of all arms during man?uvres. The force is unwarrantably weakened by making too many detachments, and is then called upon to perform tactical evolutions which it cannot possibly carry out satisfactorily. The commander must learn to husband his force, even though his sphere of reconnaissance may be large. He must arrange the strength of his distant patrols according to the importance of the mission upon which they are despatched, and must reduce the number of close patrols to a minimum, while being particularly careful to draw in his patrols at the right time. He must, on the other hand, realise the value of fighting as a means to the attainment46 of his object. It appears to me that there is some confusion of thought as to the use of engagements, particularly in reconnaissance work.
Formerly47, the idea prevailed that cunning and speed were[Pg 236] the important features of reconnaissance, and that the enemy's scouts should, if possible, be avoided. Now, however, the new "Field Service Manual" enunciates48 the principle that even patrols should attack the enemy's cavalry wherever met with. It is rightly represented that by pushing back the enemy's patrols and other reconnoitring organs his reconnaissance is hampered49, whilst our own service of transmission is assisted, and that only by a ubiquitous offensive can an appreciable50 moral superiority be attained51.
I should certainly be the last to oppose the idea of bold, self-confident, offensive tactics; but the question is whether such tactics would always be sound policy. In reconnaissance work, the first object of an engagement is to facilitate scouting52; the second, to inflict losses on the enemy. Although the "Field Service Manual" is undoubtedly53 correct in principle, it should not be taken too literally54, especially when the attainment of the object in view—viz. to obtain information regarding the enemy—might depend on the result of a fight. If any doubt exists regarding the result, it may be better to abstain55 from attack; while, if it is evident that a victory can only be gained at so heavy a loss as to adversely56 affect further reconnaissance, an engagement should, if possible, be avoided. Every effort should be made to render the tactical conditions as favourable57 as possible. A fight on foot is to be avoided, as entailing waste of time and considerable loss. A defensive action dismounted should only be undertaken when there is a defile58 to be held that cannot be turned. Mobility59, on the other hand, must be exploited in every possible way, in order that, if a fight is to be brought on, it may take place under the most favourable circumstances. In such a case, if an enemy is encountered who is either weaker or only slightly superior in strength, and who is known to be without support, he should always be boldly attacked. Stratagems60, or creeping up to the enemy and avoiding his outposts and patrols, should only be resorted to when it is necessary to avoid discovery in order to attain45 the object in view. During training great stress should be laid on a proper appreciation61 of these principles, as our cavalry still lacks sound traditions with regard to reconnaissance work.
Thus no greater error could be made during reconnaissance exercises than to attach the most importance to en[Pg 237]counters between the main bodies, but this mistake is unfortunately frequently committed. It is on the exercise grounds that these mass engagements can and should be learnt. During reconnaissance exercises, however, the strategical conduct of detached columns, and, above all, the handling of reconnaissance organs, should receive most attention. These matters would, of course, be largely influenced by the result of the main action between the masses of the cavalry on either side, and this should be made clear to all concerned; but the manner in which such an engagement is actually conducted by the main bodies is of lesser62 moment, and all attention should not be centred in it.
It is, however, essential that the exercises should be so planned that the mass of cavalry does not advance in close formation in one group, and that the reconnoitring organs are not obliged to carry on the prescribed reconnaissances throughout the man?uvres within the area originally allotted63 to them, as would usually be the case where the armies, or their cavalry divisions, advance directly towards one another. This entails64 but a very elementary form of reconnaissance, and is mainly of use as an exercise in co-operation between the different units. The real difficulties only commence when, during the course of the man?uvres, the detached columns of the cavalry have to act in concert; when they endeavour to co-operate after one of them has come into collision with the enemy; when, perhaps, the areas allotted to reconnoitring squadrons have been changed; or a success achieved by the cavalry of one side or the other produces entirely new conditions, to which the reconnaissance organs have to adapt themselves independently. These are moments that call for great powers of judgment65 on the part of the officers, and for skill and resourcefulness on the part of the men, and they are consequently very valuable for instructional purposes. The relief of the reconnaissance organs, hitherto never practised, but highly important, also presents many difficulties of a practical nature. An attempt should be made when arranging exercises to bring about situations of this nature, which will be of great service to the troops, and afford an opportunity of bringing to light cavalry talent among the officers. Though such talent is often to be found amongst the best horsemen or instructors,[Pg 238] such is not always the case, and every effort must be made to discover and foster it.
The cavalry service is no place for mediocrities, and it is important that the directors of the exercises should be fully10 qualified66 to carry out their task, and be free from all dependence67 upon Regulation or prejudice. The personal equation plays a greater part in the cavalry than in any other arm, yet in no other arm is it, as a rule, so indifferently solved.
I should like, in conclusion, to draw attention to two more points.
First, I would insist on not more maps being distributed among the troops at these exercises than would actually be available in an enemy's country. The fact of being the whole time in one's own country, where the inhabitants are ready to give any information required, renders the work very much easier, and if, perhaps, in addition, every man has a map, the difficulties that would crop up in time of war are not adequately represented.
The second point is of equal importance, though of quite a different nature. The movement of large bodies of cavalry in time of war entails considerable difficulties in the way of transport, and it would be well if these could, somehow, be made apparent during the exercises. The expense might certainly be heavy, but would be well justified68, for it is in the cavalry, more than any other troops, that the drag of a transport column is most felt.
END
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1
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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remarkably
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| ad.不同寻常地，相当地 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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entailing
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| 使…成为必要( entail的现在分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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lapse
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| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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hamper
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| vt.妨碍，束缚，限制；n.(有盖的)大篮子 | |
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impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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semblance
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| n.外貌，外表 | |
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incentive
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| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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proximity
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| n.接近，邻近 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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exigencies
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| n.急切需要 | |
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inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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41
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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42
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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ascertaining
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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45
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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46
attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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47
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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48
enunciates
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| n.（清晰地）发音( enunciate的名词复数 )；确切地说明v.（清晰地）发音( enunciate的第三人称单数 )；确切地说明 | |
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49
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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50
appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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51
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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52
scouting
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| 守候活动，童子军的活动 | |
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53
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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54
literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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55
abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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56
adversely
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| ad.有害地 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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58
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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stratagems
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| n.诡计，计谋( stratagem的名词复数 )；花招 | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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62
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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63
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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entails
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| 使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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