CHAPTER VIII. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

 I have hitherto considered each state as a separate whole, and I have explained the different springs which the people sets in motion, and the different means of action which it employs. But all the states which I have considered as independent are forced to submit, in certain cases, to the supreme¹ authority of the union. The time is now come for me to examine the partial sovereignty which has been conceded to the union, and to cast a rapid glance over the federal constitution.{119}

 

 

 

 

HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

 

Origin of the first union.—Its Weakness.—Congress appeals to the constituent³ Authority.—Interval⁴ of two Years between the Appeal and the Promulgation⁵ of the new Constitution.

The thirteen colonies which simultaneously⁶ threw off the yoke⁷ of England toward the end of the last century, possessed⁸, as I have already observed, the same religion, the same language, the same customs, and almost the same laws; they were struggling against a common enemy; and these reasons were sufficiently⁹ strong to unite them one to another, and to consolidate¹⁰ them into one nation. But as each of them had enjoyed a separate existence, and a government within its own control, the peculiar¹¹ interests and customs which resulted from this system, were opposed to a compact and intimate union, which would have absorbed the individual importance of each in the general importance of all. Hence arose two opposite tendencies, the one prompting the Anglo-Americans to unite, the other to divide their strength. As long as the war with the mother-country lasted, the principle of union was kept alive by necessity; and although the laws which constituted it were defective¹², the common tie subsisted¹³ in spite of their imperfections.{120} But no sooner was peace concluded than the faults of the legislation became manifest, and the state seemed to be suddenly dissolved. Each colony became an independent republic, and assumed an absolute sovereignty. The federal government, condemned¹⁶ to impotence by its constitution, and no longer sustained by the presence of a common danger, saw the outrages¹⁷ offered to its flag by the great nations of Europe, while it was scarcely able to maintain its ground against the Indian tribes, and to pay the interest of the debt which had been contracted during the war of independence. It was already on the verge¹⁹ of destruction, when it officially proclaimed its inability to conduct the government, and appealed to the constituent authority of the nation.{121}

If America ever approached (for however brief a time) that lofty pinnacle²⁰ of glory to which the proud fancy of its inhabitants is wont²¹ to point, it was at the solemn moment at which the power of the nation abdicated²³, as it were, the empire of the land. All ages have furnished the spectacle of a people struggling with energy to win its independence; and the efforts of the Americans in throwing off the English yoke have been considerably²⁴ exaggerated. Separated from their enemies by three thousand miles of ocean, and backed by a powerful ally, the success of the United States may be more justly attributed to their geographical²⁵ position, than to the valor²⁶ of their armies or the patriotism²⁷ of their citizens. It would be ridiculous to compare the American war to the wars of the French revolution, or the efforts of the Americans to those of the French, who, when they were attacked by the whole of Europe, without credit and without allies, were still capable of opposing a twentieth part of their population to their foes²⁸, and of bearing the torch of revolution beyond their frontiers while they stifled²⁹ its devouring³⁰ flame within the bosom³¹ of their country. But it is a novelty in the history of society to see a great people turn a calm and scrutinizing³² eye upon itself when apprised³³ by the legislature that the wheels of government had stopped; to see it carefully examine the extent of the evil, and patiently wait for two whole years until a remedy was discovered, which it voluntarily adopted without having wrung³⁵ a tear or a drop of blood from mankind. At the time when the inadequacy³⁶ of the first constitution was discovered, America possessed the double advantage of that calm which had succeeded the effervescence of the revolution, and of those great men who had led the revolution to a successful issue. The assembly which accepted the task of composing the second constitution was small;{122} but George Washington was its president, and it contained the choicest talents and the noblest hearts which had ever appeared in the New World. This national commission, after long and mature deliberation, offered to the acceptance of the people the body of general laws which still rules the union. All the states adopted it successively.{123} The new federal government commenced its functions in 1789, after an interregnum of two years. The revolution of America terminated when that of France began.

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUMMARY OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

 

Division of Authority between the Federal Government and the States.—The Government of the States is the Rule: the Federal Government the Exception.

The first question which awaited the Americans was intricate, and by no means easy of solution; the object was so to divide the authority of the different states which composed the union, that each of them should continue to govern itself in all that concerned its internal prosperity, while the entire nation, represented by the union, should continue to form a compact body, and to provide for the exigencies³⁹ of the people. It was as impossible to determine beforehand, with any degree of accuracy, the share of authority which each of the two governments was to enjoy, as to foresee all the incidents in the existence of a nation.

The obligations and the claims of the federal government were simple and easily definable, because the union had been formed with the express purpose of meeting the general exigencies of the people; but the claims and obligations of the states were, on the other hand, complicated and various, because those governments penetrated⁴⁰ into all the details of social life. The attributes of the federal government were, therefore, carefully enumerated⁴², and all that was not included among them was declared to constitute a part of the privileges of the several governments of the states. Thus the government of the states remained the rule, and that of the confederation became the exception.{124}

But as it was foreseen, that, in practice, questions might arise as to the exact limits of this exceptional authority, and that it would be dangerous to submit these questions to the decision of the ordinary courts of justice, established in the states by the states themselves, a high federal court was created,{125} which was destined⁴³, among other functions, to maintain the balance of power which had been established by the constitution between the two rival governments.{126}

 

 

 

 

PREROGATIVE⁴⁴ OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

 

Power of declaring War, making Peace, and levying⁴⁶ general Taxes vested in the Federal Government.—What Part of the internal Policy of the Country it may direct.—The Government of the union in some respects more central than the King's Government in the old French monarchy⁴⁷.

The external relations of a people may be compared to those of private individuals, and they cannot be advantageously maintained without the agency of the single head of a government. The exclusive right of making peace and war, of concluding treaties of commerce, of raising armies, and equipping fleets, was therefore granted to the union.{127} The necessity of a national government was less imperiously felt in the conduct of the internal affairs of society; but there are certain general interests which can only be attended to with advantage by a general authority. The union was invested with the power of controlling the monetary⁴⁸ system, of directing the post-office, and of opening the great roads which were to establish communication between the different parts of the country.{128} The independence of the government of each state was formally recognized in its sphere; nevertheless the federal government was authorized⁴⁹ to interfere⁵⁰ in the internal affairs of the states{129} in a few predetermined cases, in which an indiscreet abuse of their independence might compromise the security of the union at large. Thus, while the power of modifying and changing their legislation at pleasure was preserved in all the republics, they were forbidden to enact⁵² ex post facto laws, or to create a class of nobles in their community.{130} Lastly, as it was necessary that the federal government should be able to fulfil its engagements, it was endowed with an unlimited⁵³ power of levying taxes.{131}

In examining the balance of power as established by the federal constitution; in remarking on the one hand the portion of sovereignty which has been reserved to the several states, and on the other the share of power which the union has assumed, it is evident that the federal legislators entertained the clearest and most accurate notions on the nature of the centralisation of government. The United States form not only a republic, but a confederation; nevertheless the authority of the nation is more central than it was in several of the monarchies⁵⁴ of Europe when the American constitution was formed. Take, for instance, the two following examples:—

Thirteen supreme courts of justice existed in France, which, generally speaking, had the right of interpreting the law without appeal; and those provinces, styled pays d'etats, were authorized to refuse their assent⁵⁵ to an impost⁵⁶ which had been levied⁵⁷ by the sovereign who represented the nation.

In the union there is but one tribunal to interpret, as there is one legislature to make the laws; and an impost voted by the representatives of the nation is binding⁵⁸ upon all the citizens.

In these two essential points, therefore, the union exercises more central authority than the French monarchy possessed, although the union is only an assemblage of confederate republics.

In Spain certain provinces had the right of establishing a system of customhouse duties peculiar to themselves, although that privilege belongs, by its very nature, to the national sovereignty. In America the congress alone has the right of regulating the commercial relations of the states. The government of the confederation is therefore more centralized in this respect than the kingdom of Spain. It is true that the power of the crown in France or in Spain was always able to obtain by force whatever the constitution of the country denied, and that the ultimate result was consequently the same; and I am here discussing the theory of the constitution.

 

 

 

 

FEDERAL POWERS.

 

After having settled the limits within which the federal government was to act, the next point was to determine the powers which it was to exert.

 

 

 

 

LEGISLATIVE⁵⁹ POWERS.

 

Division of the legislative Body into two Branches.—Difference in the Manner of forming the two Houses.—The Principle of the Independence of the States predominates in the Formation of the Senate.—The Principle of the Sovereignty of the Nation in the Composition of the House of Representatives.—Singular Effects of the Fact that a Constitution can only be Logical in the early Stages of a Nation.

The plan which had been laid down beforehand for the constitution of the several states was followed, in many points, in the organization of the powers of the union. The federal legislature of the union was composed of a senate and a house of Representatives. A spirit of conciliation⁶¹ prescribed the observance of distinct principles in the formation of each of these two assemblies. I have already shown that two contrary interests were opposed to each other in the establishment of the federal constitution. These two interests had given rise to two opinions. It was the wish of one party to convert the union into a league of independent states, or a sort of congress, at which the representatives of the several peoples would meet to discuss certain points of their common interests. The other party desired to unite the inhabitants of the American colonies into one sole nation, and to establish a government, which should act as the sole representative of the nation, as far as the limited sphere of its authority would permit. The practical consequences of these two theories were exceedingly different.

The question was, whether a league was to be established instead of a national government; whether the majority of the states, instead of a majority of the inhabitants of the union, was to give the law; for every state, the small as well as the great, then retained the character of an independent power, and entered the union upon a footing of perfect equality. If, on the contrary, the inhabitants of the United States were to be considered as belonging to one and the same nation, it was natural that the majority of the citizens of the union should prescribe the law. Of course the lesser⁶² states could not subscribe⁶³ to the application of this doctrine⁶⁴ without, in fact, abdicating⁶⁵ their existence in relation to the sovereignty of the confederation; since they would have passed from the condition of a co-equal and co-legislative authority, to that of an insignificant⁶⁶ fraction of a great people. The former system would have invested them with an excessive authority, the latter would have annulled⁶⁸ their influence altogether. Under these circumstances, the result was, that the strict rules of logic⁶⁰ were evaded⁷⁰, as is usually the case when interests are opposed to arguments. A middle course was hit upon by the legislators, which brought together by force two systems theoretically irreconcilable⁷¹.

The principle of the independence of the states prevailed in the formation of the senate, and that of the sovereignty of the nation predominated in the composition of the house of representatives. It was decided⁷² that each state should send two senators to congress, and a number of representatives proportioned to its population.{132} It results from this arrangement that the state of New York has at the present day forty representatives, and only two senators; the state of Delaware has two senators, and only one representative; the state of Delaware is therefore equal to the state of New York in the senate, while the latter has forty times the influence of the former in the house of representatives. Thus, if the minority of the nation preponderates⁷⁴ in the senate, it may paralyze the decisions of the majority represented in the other house, which is contrary to the spirit of constitutional government.

The facts show how rare and how difficult it is rationally and logically to combine all the several parts of legislation. In the course of time different interests arise, and different principles are sanctioned by the same people; and when a general constitution is to be established, these interests and principles are so many natural obstacles to the rigorous application of any political system, with all its consequences. The early stages of national existence are the only periods at which it is possible to maintain the complete logic of legislation; and when we perceive a nation in the enjoyment⁷⁷ of this advantage, before we hasten to conclude that it is wise, we should do well to remember that it is young. When the federal constitution was formed, the interest of independence for the separate states, and the interest of union for the whole people, were the only two conflicting interests which existed among the Anglo-Americans; and a compromise was necessarily made between them.

It is, however, just to acknowledge that this part of the constitution has not hitherto produced those evils which might have been feared. All the states are young and contiguous; their customs, their ideas, and their wants, are not dissimilar; and the differences which result from their size or inferiority do not suffice to set their interests at variance⁷⁸. The small states have consequently never been induced to league themselves together in the senate to oppose the designs of the larger ones; and indeed there is so irresistible⁷⁹ an authority in the legitimate⁸⁰ expression of the will of a people, that the senate could offer but a feeble opposition⁸¹ to the vote of the majority of the house of representatives.

It must not be forgotten, on the other hand, that it was not in the power of the American legislators to reduce to a single nation the people for whom they were making laws. The object of the federal constitution was not to destroy the independence of the states, but to restrain it. By acknowledging the real authority of these secondary communities (and it was impossible to deprive them of it), they disavowed beforehand the habitual⁸² use of constraint⁸³ in enforcing the decisions of the majority. Upon this principle the introduction of the influence of the states into the mechanism⁸⁴ of the federal government was by no means to be wondered at; since it only attested⁸⁵ the existence of an acknowledged power, which was to be humored, and not forcibly checked.

 

 

 

 

A FARTHER DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The Senate named by the provincial⁸⁶ Legislature—the Representatives, by the People.—Double Election of the Former—Single Election of the Latter.—Term of the different Offices.—Peculiar Functions of each House.

The senate not only differs from the other house in the principle which it represents, but also in the mode of its election, in the term for which it is chosen, and in the nature of its functions. The house of representatives is named by the people, the senate by the legislators of each state; the former is directly elected; the latter is elected by an elected body; the term for which the representatives are chosen is only two years, that of the senators is six. The functions of the house of representatives are purely⁸⁷ legislative, and the only share it takes in the judicial⁸⁸ power is in the impeachment⁸⁹ of public officers. The senate co-operates in the work of legislation, and tries those political offences which the house of representatives submits to its decision. It also acts as the great executive council of the nation; the treaties which are concluded by the president must be ratified⁹⁰ by the senate; and the appointments he may make must be definitively⁹¹ approved by the same body.{133}

 

 

 

 

THE EXECUTIVE POWER.{134}

 

Dependence¹⁸ of the President—He is Elective and Responsible.—He is Free to act in his own Sphere under the Inspection⁹², but not under the Direction, of the Senate.—His Salary fixed⁹³ at his Entry into Office.—Suspensive Veto.

The American legislators undertook a difficult task in attempting to create an executive power dependent on the majority of the people and nevertheless sufficiently strong to act without restraint in its own sphere. It was indispensable to the maintenance of the republican form of government that the representatives of the executive power should be subject to the will of the nation.

The president is an elective magistrate⁹⁴. His honor, his property, his liberty, and his life, are the securities which the people has for the temperate⁹⁵ use of his power. But in the exercise of his authority he cannot be said to be perfectly⁹⁶ independent; the senate takes cognizance of his relations with foreign powers, and of the distribution of public appointments, so that he can neither be bribed⁹⁷, nor can he employ the means of corruption⁹⁸. The legislators of the union acknowledged that the executive power would be incompetent¹⁰⁰ to fulfill¹⁰¹ its task with dignity and utility, unless it enjoyed a greater degree of stability and of strength than had been granted to it in the separate states.

The president is chosen for four years, and he may be re-elected; so that the chances of a prolonged administration may inspire him with hopeful undertakings¹⁰² for the public good, and with the means of carrying them into execution. The president was made the sole representative of the executive power of the union; and care was taken not to render his decisions subordinate to the vote of a council—a dangerous measure, which tends at the same time to clog¹⁰³ the action of the government and to diminish its responsibility. The senate has the right of annulling¹⁰⁴ certain acts of the president; but it cannot compel him to take any steps, nor does it participate in the exercise of the executive power.

The action of the legislature on the executive power may be direct; and we have just shown that the Americans carefully obviated¹⁰⁵ this influence; but it may, on the other hand, be indirect. Public assemblies which have the power of depriving an officer of state of his salary, encroach upon his independence; and as they are free to make the laws, it is to be feared lest they should gradually appropriate to themselves a portion of that authority which the constitution had vested in his hands. This dependence of the executive power is one of the defects inherent in republican constitutions. The Americans have not been able to counteract¹⁰⁷ the tendency which legislative assemblies have to get possession of the government, but they have rendered this propensity¹⁰⁸ less irresistible. The salary of the president is fixed, at the time of his entering upon office, for the whole period of his magistracy. The president is, moreover, provided with a suspensive veto, which allows him to oppose the passing of such laws as might destroy the portion of independence which the constitution awards him. The struggle between the president and the legislature must always be an unequal one, since the latter is certain of bearing down all resistance by persevering¹⁰⁹ in its plans; but the suspensive veto forces it at least to reconsider the matter, and, if the motion be persisted in, it must then be backed by a majority of two-thirds of the whole house. The veto is, in fact, a sort of appeal to the people. The executive power, which, without this security, might have been secretly oppressed, adopts this means of pleading its cause and stating its motives¹¹⁰. But if the legislature is certain of overpowering all resistance by persevering in its plans, I reply, that in the constitutions of all nations, of whatever kind they may be, a certain point exists at which the legislator is obliged to have recourse to the good sense and the virtue¹¹² of his fellow-citizens. This point is more prominent and more discoverable in republics, while it is more remote and more carefully concealed¹¹⁴ in monarchies, but it always exists somewhere. There is no country in the world in which everything can be provided for by the laws, or in which political institutions can prove a substitute for common sense and public morality.

 

 

 

 

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL KING OF FRANCE.

Executive Power in the United States as Limited and as Partial as the Supremacy¹¹⁵ which it Represents.—Executive Power in France as Universal as the Supremacy it Represents.—The King a Branch of the Legislature.—The President the mere¹¹⁶ Executor of the Law.—Other Differences resulting from the Duration of the two Powers.—The President checked in the Exercise of the executive Authority.—The King Independent in its Exercise.—Notwithstanding these Discrepancies¹¹⁷, France is more akin⁴⁵ to a Republic than the union to a Monarchy.—Comparison of the Number of public Officers depending upon the executive Power in the two countries.

The executive power has so important an influence on the destinies of nations that I am inclined to pause for an instant at this portion of my subject, in order more clearly to explain the part it sustains in America. In order to form an accurate idea of the position of the president of the United States, it may not be irrelevant¹¹⁸ to compare it to that of one of the constitutional kings of Europe. In this comparison I shall pay but little attention to the external signs of power, which are more apt to deceive the eye of the observer than to guide his researches. When a monarchy is being gradually transformed into a republic, the executive power retains the titles, the honors, the etiquette¹¹⁹, and even the funds of royalty¹²⁰, long after its authority has disappeared. The English, after having cut off the head of one king, and expelled another from his throne, were accustomed to accost¹²² the successors of those princes upon their knees. On the other hand, when a republic falls under the sway of a single individual, the demeanor¹²³ of the sovereign is simple and unpretending, as if his authority was not yet paramount¹²⁴. When the emperors exercised an unlimited control over the fortunes and the lives of their fellow-citizens, it was customary to call them Caesar in conversation, and they were in the habit of supping without formality at their friends' houses. It is therefore necessary to look below the surface.

The sovereignty of the United States is shared between the union and the states, while in France it is undivided and compact: hence arises the first and the most notable difference which exists between the president of the United States and the king of France. In the United States the executive power is as limited and partial as the sovereignty of the union in whose name it acts; in France it is as universal as the authority of the state. The Americans have a federal, and the French a national government.

The first cause of inferiority results from the nature of things, but it is not the only one; the second in importance is as follows: sovereignty may be defined to be the right of making laws: in France, the king really exercises a portion of the sovereign power, since the laws have no weight till he has given his assent to them; he is moreover the executor of all they ordain¹²⁵. The president is also the executor of the laws, but he does not really co-operate in their formation, since the refusal of his assent does not annul⁶⁷ them. He is therefore merely to be considered as the agent of the sovereign power. But not only does the king of France exercise a portion of the sovereign power, he also contributes to the nomination¹²⁶ of the legislature, which exercises the other portion. He has the privilege of appointing the members of one chamber¹²⁷, and of dissolving the other at his pleasure; whereas the president of the United States has no share in the formation of the legislative body, and cannot dissolve any part of it. The king has the same right of bringing forward measures as the chambers¹²⁸; a right which the president does not possess. The king is represented in each assembly by his ministers, who explain his intentions, support his opinions, and maintain the principles of the government. The president and his ministers are alike excluded from congress; so that his influence and his opinions can only penetrate⁴¹ indirectly¹²⁹ into that great body. The king of France is therefore on an equal footing with the legislature, which can no more act without him, than he can without it. The president exercises an authority inferior to, and depending upon, that of the legislature.

Even in the exercise of the executive power, properly so called, the point upon which his position seems to be almost analogous¹³⁰ to that of the king of France—the president labors¹³¹ under several causes of inferiority. The authority of the king, in France, has, in the first place, the advantage of duration over that of the president: and durability¹³² is one of the chief elements of strength; nothing is either loved or feared but what is likely to endure. The president of the United States is a magistrate elected for four years. The king, in France, is an hereditary¹³³ sovereign.

In the exercise of the executive power the president of the United States is constantly subject to jealous scrutiny¹³⁴. He may make, but he cannot conclude a treaty; he may designate, but he cannot appoint, a public officer.{135} The king of France is absolute in the sphere of the executive power.

The president of the United States is responsible for his actions; but the person of the king is declared inviolable by the French charter.

Nevertheless, the supremacy of public opinion is no less above the head of one than of the other. This power is less definite, less evident, and less sanctioned by the laws in France than in America, but in fact exists. In America it acts by elections and decrees; in France it proceeds by revolutions; but notwithstanding the different constitutions of these two countries, public opinion is the predominant authority in both of them. The fundamental principle of legislation—a principle essentially¹³⁵ republican—is the same in both countries, although its consequences may be different, and its results more or less extensive. Whence I am led to conclude, that France with its king is nearer akin to a republic, than the union with its president is to a monarchy.

In what I have been saying I have only touched upon the main points of distinction; and if I could have entered into details, the contrast would have been rendered still more striking.

I have remarked that the authority of the president in the United States is only exercised within the limits of a partial sovereignty, while that of the king, in France, is undivided. I might have gone on to show that the power of the king's government in France exceeds its natural limits, however extensive they may be, and penetrates¹³⁶ in a thousand different ways into the administration of private interests. Among the examples of this influence may be quoted that which results from the great number of public functionaries¹³⁷, who all derive¹³⁸ their appointments from the government. This number now exceeds all previous limits; it amounts to 138,000{136} nominations¹³⁹, each of which may be considered as an element of power. The president of the United States has not the exclusive right of making any public appointments, and their whole number scarcely exceeds 12,000.{137}

{Those who are desirous of tracing the question respecting the power of the president to remove every executive officer of the government without the sanction of the senate, will find some light upon it by referring to 5th Marshall's Life of Washington, p. 196: 5 Sergeant¹⁴⁰ and Rawle's Reports (Pennsylvania), 451: Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, vol iv., p. 355, contains the debate in the House of Representatives, June 16, 1799, when the question was first mooted¹⁴¹: Report of a committee of the senate in 1822, in Niles's Register of 29th August in that year. It is certainly very extraordinary that such a vast power, and one so extensively affecting the whole administration of the government, should rest on such slight foundations, as an inference from an act of congress, providing that when the secretary of the treasury¹⁴² should be removed by the president, his assistant should discharge the duties of the office. How congress could confer the power, even by a direct act, is not perceived. It must be a necessary implication from the words of the constitution, or it does not exist. It has been repeatedly denied in and out of congress, and must be considered, as yet, an unsettled question.—American Editor.}

 

 

 

 

ACCIDENTAL CAUSES WHICH MAY INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE.

 

External security of the union.—Army of six thousand Men.—Few Ships.—The President has no Opportunity of exercising his great Prerogatives¹⁴³.—In the Prerogatives he exercises he is weak.

If the executive power is feebler in America than in France, the cause is more attributable to the circumstances than to the laws of the country.

It is chiefly in its foreign relations that the executive power of a nation is called upon to exert its skill and vigor¹⁴⁴. If the existence of the union were perpetually threatened, and its chief interest were in daily connexion with those of other powerful nations, the executive government would assume an increased importance in proportion to the measures expected of it, and those which it would carry into effect. The president of the United States is the commander-in-chief of the army, but of an army composed of only six thousand men; he commands the fleet, but the fleet reckons but few sail; he conducts the foreign relations of the union, but the United States are a nation without neighbors. Separated from the rest of the world by the ocean, and too weak as yet to aim at the dominion¹⁴⁵ of the seas, they have no enemies, and their interests rarely come into contact with those of any other nation of the globe.

The practical part of a government must not be judged by the theory of its constitution. The president of the United States is in the possession of almost royal prerogatives, which he has no opportunity of exercising; and those privileges which he can at present use are very circumscribed¹⁴⁶: the laws allow him to possess a degree of influence which circumstances do not permit him to employ.

On the other hand, the great strength of the royal prerogative in France arises from circumstances far more than from the laws. There the executive government is constantly struggling against prodigious¹⁴⁸ obstacles, and exerting all its energies to repress them; so that it increases by the extent of its achievements, and by the importance of the events it controls, without, for that reason, modifying its constitution. If the laws had made it as feeble and as circumscribed as it is in the union, its influence would very soon become much greater.

 

 

 

 

WHY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT REQUIRE THE MAJORITY OF THE TWO HOUSES IN ORDER TO CARRY ON THE GOVERNMENT.

It is an established axiom in Europe that a constitutional king cannot persevere¹⁴⁹ in a system of government which is opposed by the two other branches of the legislature. But several presidents of the United States have been known to lose the majority in the legislative body, without being obliged to abandon the supreme power, and without inflicting¹⁵⁰ a serious evil upon society. I have heard this fact quoted as an instance of the independence and power of executive government in America: a moment's reflection will convince us, on the contrary, that it is a proof of its extreme weakness.

A king in Europe requires the support of the legislature to enable him to perform the duties imposed upon him by the constitution, because those duties are enormous. A constitutional king in Europe is not merely the executor of the law, but the execution of its provisions devolves so completely upon him, that he has the power of paralyzing its influence if it opposes his designs. He requires the assistance of the legislative assemblies to make the law, but those assemblies stand in need of his aid to execute it: these two authorities cannot subsist¹⁴ without each other, and the mechanism of government is stopped as soon as they are at variance.

In America the president cannot prevent any law from being passed, nor can he evade⁶⁹ the obligation of enforcing it. His sincere and zealous¹⁵¹ co-operation is no doubt useful, but it is not indispensable in the carrying on of public affairs. All his important acts are directly or indirectly submitted to the legislature; and where he is independent of it he can do but little. It is therefore his weakness, and not his power, which enables him to remain in opposition to congress. In Europe, harmony must reign² between the crown and the other branches of the legislature, because a collision between them may prove serious; in America, this harmony is not indispensable, because such a collision is impossible.

 

 

 

 

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

 

Dangers of the elective System increase in Proportion to the Extent of the Prerogative.—This System possible in America because no powerful executive Authority is required.—What Circumstances are favorable to the elective System.—Why the Election of the President does not cause a Deviation¹⁵³ from the Principles of the Government.—Influence of the Election of the President on secondary Functionaries.

The dangers of the system of election applied¹⁵⁴ to the head of the executive government of a great people, have been sufficiently exemplified by experience and by history; and the remarks I am about to make refer to America alone. These dangers may be more or less formidable in proportion to the place which the executive power occupies, and to the importance it possesses in the state; and they may vary according to the mode of election, and the circumstances in which the electors are placed. The most weighty argument against the election of a chief-magistrate is, that it offers so splendid a lure¹⁵⁵ to private ambition, and is so apt to inflame¹⁵⁶ men in the pursuit of power, that when legitimate means are wanting, force may not unfrequently seize what right denies.

It is clear that the greater the privileges of the executive authority are, the greater is the temptation; the more the ambition of the candidates is excited, the more warmly are their interests espoused¹⁵⁷ by a throng¹⁵⁸ of partisans¹⁵⁹ who hope to share the power when their patron has won the prize. The dangers of the elective system increase, therefore, in the exact ratio of the influence exercised by the executive power in the affairs of state. The revolutions of Poland are not solely¹⁶⁰ attributable to the elective system in general, but to the fact that the elected magistrate was the head of a powerful monarchy. Before we can discuss the absolute advantages of the elective system, we must make preliminary inquiries¹⁶¹ as to whether the geographical position, the laws, the habits, the manners, and the opinions of the people among whom it is to be introduced, will admit of the establishment of a weak and dependent executive government; for to attempt to render the representative of the state a powerful sovereign, and at the same time elective, is, in my opinion, to entertain two incompatible¹⁶² designs. To reduce hereditary royalty to the condition of an elective authority, the only means that I am acquainted with are to circumscribe¹⁴⁷ its sphere of action beforehand, gradually to diminish its prerogatives, and to accustom¹²¹ the people to live without its protection. Nothing, however, is farther from the designs of the republicans of Europe than this course: as many of them only owe their hatred¹⁶³ of tyranny to the sufferings which they have personally undergone, the extent of the executive power does not excite their hostility¹⁶⁴, and they only attack its origin without perceiving how nearly the two things are connected.

Hitherto no citizen has shown any disposition¹⁶⁵ to expose his honor and his life, in order to become the president of the United States; because the power of that office is temporary, limited, and subordinate. The prize of fortune must be great to encourage adventurers in so desperate a game. No candidate has as yet been able to arouse the dangerous enthusiasm or the passionate¹⁶⁶ sympathies of the people in his favor, for the very simple reason, that when he is at the head of the government he has but little power, but little wealth, and but little glory to share among his friends; and his influence in the state is too small for the success or the ruin of a faction¹⁶⁷ to depend upon the elevation¹⁶⁸ of an individual to power.

The great advantage of hereditary monarchies is, that as the private interest of a family is always intimately connected with the interests of the state, the executive government is never suspended for a single instant; and if the affairs of a monarchy are not better conducted than those of a republic, at least there is always some one to conduct them, well or ill, according to his capacity. In elective states, on the contrary, the wheels of government cease to act, as it were of their own accord, at the approach of an election, and even for some time previous to that event. The laws may indeed accelerate the operation of the election, which may be conducted with such simplicity¹⁶⁹ and rapidity that the seat of power will never be left vacant; but, notwithstanding these precautions, a break necessarily occurs in the minds of the people.

At the approach of an election the head of the executive government is wholly occupied by the coming struggle; his future plans are doubtful; he can undertake nothing new, and he will only prosecute¹⁷⁰ with indifference¹⁷¹ those designs which another will perhaps terminate. "I am so near the time of my retirement¹⁷² from office," said President Jefferson on the 21st of January, 1809 (six weeks before the election), "that I feel no passion, I take no part, I express no sentiment. It appears to me just to leave to my successor the commencement of those measures which he will have to prosecute, and for which he will be responsible."

On the other hand, the eyes of the nation are centred on a single point; all are watching the gradual birth of so important an event. The wider the influence of the executive power extends, the greater and the more necessary is its constant action, the more fatal is the term of suspense¹⁷³; and a nation which is accustomed to the government, or, still more, one used to the administrative¹⁷⁴ protection of a powerful executive authority, would be infallibly convulsed by an election of this kind. In the United States the action of the government may be slackened with impunity¹⁷⁵, because it is always weak and circumscribed.

One of the principal vices¹⁷⁶ of the elective system is, that it always introduces a certain degree of instability into the internal and external policy of the state. But this disadvantage is less sensibly felt if the share of power vested in the elected magistrate is small. In Rome the principles of the government underwent no variation, although the consuls¹⁷⁷ were changed every year, because the senate, which was an hereditary assembly, possessed the directing authority. If the elective system were adopted in Europe, the condition of most of the monarchical¹⁷⁸ states would be changed at every new election. In America the president exercises a certain influence on state affairs, but he does not conduct them; the preponderating¹⁷⁹ power is vested in the representatives of the whole nation. The political maxims¹⁸⁰ of the country depend therefore on the mass of the people, not on the president alone; and consequently in America the elective system has no very prejudicial influence on the fixed principles of the government. But the want of fixed principles is an evil so inherent in the elective system, that it is still extremely perceptible in the narrow sphere to which the authority of the president extends.

The Americans have admitted that the head of the executive power, who has to bear the whole responsibility of the duties he is called upon to fulfil, ought to be empowered to choose his own agents, and to remove them at pleasure: the legislative bodies watch the conduct of the president more than they direct it. The consequence of this arrangement is, that at every new election the fate of all the federal public officers is in suspense. Mr. Quincy Adams, on his entry into office, discharged the majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his predecessor¹⁸²; and I am not aware that General Jackson allowed a single removeable functionary¹⁸³ employed in the federal service to retain his place beyond the first year which succeeded his election. It is sometimes made a subject of complaint, that in the constitutional monarchies of Europe the fate of the humbler servants of an administration depends upon that of the ministers. But in elective governments this evil is far greater. In a constitutional monarchy successive ministers are rapidly formed; but as the principal representative of the executive power does not change, the spirit of innovation is kept within bounds; the changes which take place are in the details rather than in the principles of the administrative system; but to substitute one system for another, as is done in America every four years by law, is to cause a sort of revolution. As to the misfortunes which may fall upon individuals in consequence of this state of things, it must be allowed that the uncertain situation of the public officers is less fraught¹⁸⁴ with evil consequences in America than elsewhere. It is so easy to acquire an independent position in the United States, that the public officer who loses his place may be deprived of the comforts of life, but not of the means of subsistence.

I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that the dangers of the elective system applied to the head of the state, are augmented¹⁸⁵ or decreased by the peculiar circumstances of the people which adopts it. However the functions of the executive power may be restricted, it must always exercise a great influence upon the foreign policy of the country, for a negotiation¹⁸⁷ cannot be opened or successfully carried on otherwise than by a single agent. The more precarious¹⁸⁸ and the more perilous¹⁹⁰ the position of a people becomes, the more absolute is the want of a fixed and consistent external policy, and the more dangerous does the elective system of the chief magistrate become. The policy of the Americans in relation to the whole world is exceedingly simple; and it may almost be said that no country stands in need of them, nor do they require the co-operation of any other people. Their independence is never threatened. In their present condition, therefore, the functions of the executive power are no less limited by circumstances, than by the laws; and the president may frequently change his line of policy without involving the state in difficulty or destruction.

Whatever the prerogatives of the executive power may be, the period which immediately precedes an election, and the moment of its duration, must always be considered as a national crisis, which is perilous in proportion to the internal embarrassments¹⁹² and the external dangers of the country. Few of the nations of Europe could escape the calamities¹⁹³ of anarchy¹⁹⁴ or of conquest, every time they might have to elect a new sovereign. In America society is so constituted that it can stand without assistance upon its own basis; nothing is to be feared from the pressure of external dangers; and the election of the president is a cause of agitation¹⁹⁵, but not of ruin.

 

 

 

 

MODE OF ELECTION.

 

Skill of the American Legislators shown in the Mode of Election adopted by them.—Creation of a special electoral Body.—Separate Votes of these Electors.—Case in which the House of Representatives is called upon to choose the President.—Results of the twelve Elections which have taken Place since the Constitution has been established.

Beside the dangers which are inherent in the system, many other difficulties may arise from the mode of election, which may be obviated by the precaution of the legislator. When a people met in arms on some public spot to choose its head, it was exposed to all the chances of civil war resulting from so martial¹⁹⁶ a mode of proceeding¹⁹⁷, beside the dangers of the elective system in itself. The Polish laws, which subjected the election of the sovereign to the veto of a single individual, suggested the murder of that individual, or prepared the way to anarchy.

In the examination of the institutions, and the political as well as the social condition of the United States, we are struck by the admirable harmony of the gifts of fortune and the efforts of man. That nation possessed two of the main causes of internal peace; it was a new country, but it was inhabited by a people grown old in the exercise of freedom. America had no hostile neighbors to dread¹⁹⁸; and the American legislators, profiting by these favorable circumstances, created a weak and subordinate executive power, which could without danger be made elective.

It then only remained for them to choose the least dangerous of the various modes of election; and the rules which they laid down upon this point admirably complete the securities which the physical and political constitution of the country already afforded. Their object was to find the mode of election which would best express the choice of the people with the least possible excitement and suspense. It was admitted in the first place that the simple majority should be decisive; but the difficulty was to obtain this majority without an interval of delay which it was most important to avoid. It rarely happens that an individual can at once collect the majority of the suffrages¹⁹⁹ of a great people; and this difficulty is enhanced in a republic of confederate states, where local influences are apt to preponderate⁷³. The means by which it was proposed to obviate¹⁰⁶ this second obstacle was to delegate the electoral powers of the nation to a body of representatives. The mode of election rendered a majority more probable; for the fewer the electors are, the greater is the chance of their coming to a final decision. It also offered an additional probability of a judicious²⁰⁰ choice. It then remained to be decided whether this right of election was to be intrusted to the legislative body, the habitual representative assembly of the nation, or whether an electoral assembly should be formed for the express purpose of proceeding to the nomination of a president. The Americans chose the latter alternative, from a belief that the individuals who were returned to make the laws were incompetent to represent the wishes of the nation in the election of its chief magistrate; and that as they are chosen for more than a year, the constituency they represented might have changed its opinion in that time. It was thought that if the legislature was empowered to elect the head of the executive power, its members would, for some time before the election, be exposed to the manoeuvres of corruption, and the tricks of intrigue²⁰¹; whereas, the special electors would, like a jury, remain mixed up with the crowd till the day of action, when they would appear for the sole purpose of giving their votes.

It was therefore established that every state should name a certain number of electors,{138} who in their turn should elect the president; and as it had been observed that the assemblies to which the choice of a chief magistrate had been intrusted in elective countries, inevitably²⁰² became the centres of passion and of cabal²⁰³; that they sometimes usurped²⁰⁴ an authority which did not belong to them: and that their proceedings²⁰⁵, or the uncertainty²⁰⁶ which resulted from them, were sometimes prolonged so much as to endanger the welfare of the state, it was determined⁵¹ that the electors should all vote upon the same day, without being convoked²⁰⁷ to the same place.{139} This double election rendered a majority probable, though not certain; for it was possible that as many differences might exist between the electors as between their constituents²⁰⁸. In this case it was necessary to have recourse to one of three measures; either to appoint new electors, or to consult a second time those already appointed, or to defer²⁰⁹ the election to another authority. The first two of these alternatives, independently of the uncertainty of their results, were likely to delay the final decision, and to perpetuate²¹⁰ an agitation which must always be accompanied with danger. The third expedient²¹¹ was therefore adopted, and it was agreed that the votes should be transmitted sealed to the president of the senate, and that they should be opened and counted in the presence of the senate and the house of representatives. If none of the candidates has a majority, the house of representatives then proceeds immediately to elect the president; but with the condition that it must fix upon one of the three candidates who have the highest numbers.{140}

Thus it is only in case of an event which cannot often happen, and which can never be foreseen, that the election is intrusted to the ordinary representatives of the nation; and even then they are obliged to choose a citizen who has already been designated by a powerful minority of the special electors. It is by this happy expedient that the respect due to the popular voice is combined with the utmost celerity of execution and those precautions which the peace of the country demands. But the decision of the question by the house of representatives does not necessarily offer an immediate¹⁹¹ solution of the difficulty, for the majority of that assembly may still be doubtful, and in this case the constitution prescribes no remedy. Nevertheless, by restricting the number of candidates to three, and by referring the matter to the judgment²¹² of an enlightened public body, it has smoothed all the obstacles{141} which are not inherent in the elective system.

In the forty years which have elapsed since the promulgation of the federal constitution, the United States have twelve times chosen a president. Ten of these elections took place simultaneously by the votes of the special electors in the different states. The house of representatives has only twice exercised its conditional²¹³ privilege of deciding in cases of uncertainty: the first time was at the election of Mr. Jefferson in 1801; the second was in 1825, when Mr. John Quincy Adams was chosen.

 

 

 

 

CRISIS OF THE ELECTION.

 

The election may be considered as a national Crisis.—Why?—Passions of the People.—Anxiety of the President.—Calm which succeeds the Agitation of the Election.

I have shown what the circumstances are which favored the adoption²¹⁴ of the elective system in the United States, and what precautions were taken by the legislators to obviate its dangers. The Americans are accustomed to all kinds of elections; and they know by experience the utmost degree of excitement which is compatible with security. The vast extent of the country, and the dissemination²¹⁵ of the inhabitants, render a collision between parties less probable and less dangerous there than elsewhere. The political circumstances under which the elections have hitherto been carried on, have presented no real embarrassments to the nation.

Nevertheless, the epoch²¹⁶ of the election of a president of the United States may be considered as a crisis in the affairs of the nation. The influence which he exercises on public business is no doubt feeble and indirect; but the choice of the president, which is of small importance to each individual citizen, concerns the citizens collectively; and however trifling²¹⁷ an interest may be, it assumes a great degree of importance as soon as it becomes general. The president possesses but few means of rewarding his supporters in comparison to the kings of Europe; but the places which are at his disposal are sufficiently numerous to interest, directly or indirectly, several thousand electors in his success. Moreover, political parties in the United States, as well as elsewhere, are led to rally around an individual, in order to acquire a more tangible²¹⁸ shape in the eyes of the crowd, and the name of the candidate for the presidency²¹⁹ is put forth²²⁰ as the symbol and personification of their theories. For these reasons parties are strongly interested in gaining the election, not so much with a view to the triumph of their principles under the auspices²²¹ of the president elected, as to show, by the majority which returned him, the strength of the supporters of those principles.

For a long while before the appointed time is at hand, the election becomes the most important and the all-engrossing topic of discussion. The ardor²²² of faction is redoubled; and all the artificial passions which the imagination can create in the bosom of a happy and peaceful land are agitated²²³ and brought to light. The president, on the other hand, is absorbed by the cares of self-defence. He no longer governs for the interest of the state, but for that of his re-election; he does homage²²⁴ to the majority, and instead of checking its passions, as his duty commands him to do, he frequently courts its worst caprices. As the election draws near, the activity of intrigue and the agitation of the populace increase; the citizens are divided into several camps, each of which assumes the name of its favorite candidate; the whole nation glows with feverish²²⁵ excitement; the election is the daily theme of the public papers, the subject of private conversation, the end of every thought and every action, the sole interest of the present. As soon as the choice is determined, this ardor is dispelled²²⁶; and as a calmer season returns, the current of the state, which has nearly broken its banks, sinks to its usual level; but who can refrain from astonishment²²⁷ at the causes of the storm?

 

 

 

 

RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

 

When the Head of the executive Power is re-eligible, it is the State which is the Source of Intrigue and Corruption.—The desire of being re-elected, the chief Aim of a President of the United States.—Disadvantage of the System peculiar to America.—The natural Evil of Democracy is that it subordinates all Authority to the slightest Desires of the Majority.—The Re-election of the President encourages this Evil.

It may be asked whether the legislators of the United States did right or wrong in allowing the re-election of the president. It seems at first sight contrary to all reason to prevent the head of the executive power from being elected a second time. The influence which the talents and the character of a single individual may exercise upon the fate of a whole people, especially in critical circumstances or arduous²²⁸ times, is well known: a law preventing the re-election of the chief magistrate would deprive the citizens of the surest pledge of the prosperity and the security of the commonwealth²²⁹; and, by a singular inconsistency, a man would be excluded from the government at the very time when he had shown his ability in conducting its affairs.

But if these arguments are strong, perhaps still more powerful reasons may be advanced against them. Intrigue and corruption are the natural defects of elective government; but when the head of the state can be re-elected, these evils rise to a great height, and compromise the very existence of the country. When a simple candidate seeks to rise by intrigue, his manoeuvres must necessarily be limited to a narrow sphere; but when the chief magistrate enters the lists, he borrows the strength of the government for his own purposes. In the former case the feeble resources of an individual are in action; in the latter, the state itself, with all its immense influence, is busied in the work of corruption and cabal. The private citizen, who employs the most immoral²³¹ practices to acquire power, can only act in a manner indirectly prejudicial to the public prosperity. But if the representative of the executive descends²³³ into the lists, the cares of government dwindle²³⁴ into second-rate importance, and the success of his election is his first concern. All laws and negotiations²³⁵ are then to him nothing more than electioneering schemes; places become the reward of services rendered, not to the nation, but to its chief; and the influence of the government, if not injurious to the country, is at least no longer beneficial to the community for which it was created.

It is impossible to consider the ordinary course of affairs in the United States without perceiving that the desire of being re-elected is the chief aim of the president; that his whole administration, and even his most indifferent measures, tend to this object; and that, as the crisis approaches, his personal interest takes the place of his interest in the public good. The principle of re-eligibility²³⁶ renders the corrupt⁹⁹ influence of elective governments still more extensive and pernicious. It tends to degrade the political morality of the people, and to substitute adroitness²³⁷ for patriotism.

In America it exercises a still more fatal influence on the sources of national existence. Every government seems to be afflicted²³⁸ by some evil inherent in its nature, and the genius of the legislator is shown in eluding²³⁹ its attacks. A state may survive the influence of a host of bad laws, and the mischief²⁴⁰ they cause is frequently exaggerated; but a law which encourages the growth of the canker within must prove fatal in the end, although its bad consequences may not be immediately perceived.

The principle of destruction in absolute monarchies lies in the excessive and unreasonable²⁴¹ extension of the prerogative of the crown; and a measure tending to remove the constitutional provisions which counterbalance this influence would be radically²⁴² bad, even if its consequences should long appear to be imperceptible. By a parity²⁴³ of reasoning, in countries governed by a democracy, where the people is perpetually drawing all authority to itself, the laws which increase or accelerate its action are the direct assailants of the very principle of the government.

The greatest proof of the ability of the American legislators is, that they clearly discerned this truth, and that they had the courage to act up to it. They conceived that a certain authority above the body of the people was necessary, which should enjoy a degree of independence, without however being entirely²⁴⁴ beyond the popular control; an authority which would be forced to comply with the permanent determinations of the majority, but which would be able to resist its caprices, and to refuse its most dangerous demands. To this end they centred the whole executive power of the nation in a single arm; they granted extensive prerogatives to the president, and they armed him with the veto to resist the encroachments of the legislature.

But by introducing the principle of re-election, they partly destroyed their work; and they rendered the president but little inclined to exert the great power they had invested in his hands. If ineligible²⁴⁵ a second time, the president would be far from independent of the people, for his responsibility would not be lessened²⁴⁶; but the favor of the people would not be so necessary to him as to induce him to court it by humoring its desires. If re-eligible (and this is more especially true at the present day, when political morality is relaxed, and when great men are rare), the president of the United States becomes an easy tool in the hands of the majority. He adopts its likings and its animosities, he hastens to anticipate its wishes, he forestalls²⁴⁷ its complaints, he yields to its idlest cravings, and instead of guiding it, as the legislature intended that he should do, he is ever ready to follow its bidding. Thus, in order not to deprive the state of the talents of an individual, those talents have been rendered almost useless, and to reserve an expedient for extraordinary perils²⁴⁸ the country has been exposed to daily dangers.

{The question of the propriety²⁴⁹ of leaving the president re-eligible, is one of that class which probably must for ever remain undecided. The author himself, at page 125, gives a strong reason for re-eligibility, "so that the chance of a prolonged administration may inspire him with hopeful undertakings for the public good, and with the means of carrying them into execution,"—considerations of great weight. There is an important fact bearing upon this question, which should be stated in connexion with it. President Washington established the practice of declining a third election, and every one of his successors, either from a sense of its propriety or from apprehensions²⁵⁰ of the force of public opinion, has followed the example. So that it has become as much a part of the constitution, that no citizen can be a third time elected president, as if it were expressed in that instrument in words. This may perhaps be considered a fair adjustment of objections on either side. Those against a continued and perpetual re-eligibility are certainly met: while the arguments in favor of an opportunity to prolong an administration under circumstances that may justify²⁵¹ it, are allowed their due weight. One effect of this practical interpolation of the constitution unquestionably is, to increase the chances of a president's being once re-elected; as men will be more disposed to acquiesce²⁵² in a measure that thus practically excludes the individual from ever again entering the field of competition.—American Editor}

 

 

 

 

FEDERAL COURTS.{142}

 

Political Importance of the Judiciary in the United States.—Difficulty of treating this Subject.—Utility of judicial Power in Confederations—What Tribunals could be introduced into the union.—Necessity of establishing federal Courts of Justice.—Organization of the national Judiciary.—The Supreme Court.—In what it differs from all known Tribunals.

I have inquired into the legislative and executive power of the union, and the judicial power now remains²⁵³ to be examined; but in this place I cannot conceal¹¹³ my fears from the reader. Judicial institutions exercise a great influence on the condition of the Anglo-Americans, and they occupy a prominent place among what are properly called political institutions: in this respect they are peculiarly deserving of our attention. But I am at a loss to explain the political action of the American tribunals without entering into some technical details on their constitution and their forms of proceeding; and I know not how to descend²³² to these minutiae²⁵⁴ without wearying the curiosity of the reader by the natural aridity²⁵⁵ of the subject, or without risking to fall into obscurity through a desire to be succinct²⁵⁶. I can scarcely hope to escape these various evils; for if I appear too prolix²⁵⁷ to a man of the world, a lawyer may on the other hand complain of my brevity. But these are the natural disadvantages of my subject, and more especially of the point which I am about to discuss.

The great difficulty was, not to devise the constitution of the federal government, but to find out a method of enforcing its laws. Governments have in general but two means of overcoming the opposition of the people they govern, viz., the physical force which is at their own disposal, and the moral force which they derive from the decisions of the courts of justice.

A government which should have no other means of exacting²⁵⁸ obedience²⁶⁰ than open war, must be very near its ruin; for one of two alternatives would then probably occur: if its authority was small, and its character temperate, it would not resort to violence till the last extremity²⁶¹, and it would connive²⁶² at a number of partial acts of insubordination, in which case the state would gradually fall into anarchy; if it was enterprising and powerful, it would perpetually have recourse to its physical strength, and would speedily degenerate²⁶³ into a military despotism. So that its activity would not be less prejudicial to the community than its inaction.

The great end of justice is to substitute the notion of right for that of violence; and to place a legal barrier between the power of the government and the use of physical force. The authority which is awarded to the intervention²⁶⁴ of a court of justice by the general opinion of mankind is so surprisingly great, that it clings to the mere formalities of justice, and gives a bodily influence to the shadow of the law. The moral force which courts of justice possess renders the introduction of physical force exceedingly rare, and it is very frequently substituted for it; but if the latter proves to be indispensable, its power is doubled by the association of the idea of law.

A federal government stands in greater need of the support of judicial institutions than any other, because it is naturally weak, and opposed to formidable opposition.{143} If it were always obliged to resort to violence in the first instance, it could not fulfil its task. The union, therefore, required a national judiciary to enforce the obedience of the citizens to the laws, and to repel²⁶⁵ the attacks which might be directed against them. The question then remained what tribunals were to exercise these privileges; were they to be intrusted to the courts of justice which were already organized in every state? or was it necessary to create federal courts? It may easily be proved that the union could not adapt the judicial power of the state to its wants. The separation of the judiciary from the administrative power of the state, no doubt affects the security of every citizen, and the liberty of all. But it is no less important to the existence of the nation that these several powers should have the same origin, should follow the same principles, and act in the same sphere; in a word, that they should be correlative and homogeneous. No one, I presume, ever suggested the advantage of trying offences committed in France, by a foreign court of justice, in order to ensure the impartiality²⁶⁶ of the judges. The Americans form one people in relation to their federal government; but in the bosom of this people divers²⁶⁸ political bodies have been allowed to subsist, which are dependent on the national government in a few points, and independent in all the rest—which have all a distinct origin, maxims peculiar to themselves, and special means of carrying on their affairs. To intrust the execution of the laws of the union to tribunals instituted by these political bodies, would be to allow foreign judges to preside over the nation. Nay²⁶⁹ more, not only is each state foreign to the union at large, but it is in perpetual opposition to the common interests, since whatever authority the union loses turns to the advantage of the states. Thus to enforce the laws of the union by means of the tribunals of the states, would be to allow not only foreign, but partial judges to preside over the nation.

But the number, still more than the mere character, of the tribunals of the states rendered them unfit for the service of the nation. When the federal constitution was formed, there were already thirteen courts of justice in the United States which decided causes without appeal. That number is now increased to twenty-four. To suppose that a state can subsist, when its fundamental laws may be subjected to four-and-twenty different interpretations²⁷⁰ at the same time, is to advance a proposition alike contrary to reason and to experience.

The American legislators therefore agreed to create a federal judiciary power to apply the laws of the union, and to determine certain questions affecting general interests, which were carefully determined beforehand. The entire judicial power of the union was centred in one tribunal, which was denominated the supreme court of the United States. But, to facilitate the expedition of business, inferior courts were appended to it, which were empowered to decide causes of small importance without appeal, and with appeal causes of more magnitude. The members of the supreme court are named neither by the people nor the legislature, but by the president of the United States, acting²⁵⁹ with the advice of the senate. In order to render them independent of the other authorities, their office was made inalienable; and it was determined that their salary, when once fixed, should not be altered by the legislature.{144} It was easy to proclaim the principle of a federal judiciary, but difficulties multiplied when the extent of its jurisdiction²⁷² was to be determined.

 

 

 

 

MEANS OF DETERMINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS.

 

Difficulty of determining the Jurisdiction of separate courts of Justice in Confederation.—The Courts of the union obtained the Right of fixing their own Jurisdiction.—In what Respect this Rule attacks the Portion of Sovereignty reserved to the several States.—The Sovereignty of these States restricted by the Laws, and the Interpretation²⁷¹ of the Laws.—Consequently, the Danger of the several States is more apparent than real.

As the constitution of the United States recognized two distinct powers, in presence of each other, represented in a judicial point of view by two distinct classes of courts of justice, the utmost care which could be taken in defining their separate jurisdictions²⁷³ would have been insufficient²⁷⁴ to prevent frequent collisions between those tribunals. The question then arose, to whom the right of deciding the competency of each court was to be referred.

In nations which constitute a single body politic⁷⁶, when a question is debated between two courts relating to their mutual²⁷⁵ jurisdiction, a third tribunal is generally within reach to decide the difference; and this is effected without difficulty, because in these nations the questions of judicial competency have no connexion with the privileges of the national supremacy. But it was impossible to create an arbiter²⁷⁶ between a superior court of the union and the superior court of a separate state, which would not belong to one of these two classes. It was therefore necessary to allow one of these courts to judge its own cause, and to take or to retain cognizance of the point which was contested. To grant this privilege to the different courts of the states, would have been to destroy the sovereignty of the union de facto, after having established it de jure; for the interpretation of the constitution would soon have restored that portion of independence to the states of which the terms of that act deprived them. The object of the creation of a federal tribunal was to prevent the courts of the states from deciding questions affecting the national interests in their own department, and so to form a uniform body of jurisprudence for the interpretation of the laws of the union. This end would not have been accomplished²⁷⁷ if the courts of the several states had been competent to decide upon cases in their separate capacities, from which they were obliged to abstain²⁷⁸ as federal tribunals. The supreme court of the United States was therefore invested with the right of determining all questions of jurisdiction.{145}

This was a severe blow upon the independence of the states, which was thus restricted not only by the laws, but by the interpretation of them; by one limit which was known, and by another which was dubious²⁷⁹; by a rule which was certain, and a rule which was arbitrary. It is true the constitution had laid down the precise limits of the federal supremacy, but whenever this supremacy is contested by one of the states, a federal tribunal decides the question. Nevertheless, the dangers with which the independence of the states was threatened by this mode of proceeding are less serious than they appear to be. We shall see hereafter that in America the real strength of the country is vested in the provincial far more than in the federal government. The federal judges are conscious of the relative weakness of the power in whose name they act, and they are more inclined to abandon a right of jurisdiction in cases where it is justly their own, than to assert a privilege to which they have no legal claim.

 

 

 

 

DIFFERENT CASES OF JURISDICTION.

 

The Matter and the Party are the first Conditions of the federal Jurisdiction.—Suits in which Ambassadors are engaged.—Suits of the union.—Of a separate State.—By whom tried.—Causes resulting from the Laws of the union.—Why judged by the federal Tribunal.—Causes relating to the Non-performance of Contracts tried by the federal Courts.—Consequences of this Arrangement.

After having appointed the means of fixing the competency of the federal courts, the legislators of the union defined the cases which should come within their jurisdiction. It was established, on the one hand, that certain parties must always be brought before the federal courts, without any regard to the special nature of the cause; and, on the other, that certain causes must always be brought before the same courts, without any regard to the quality of the parties in the suit. These distinctions were therefore admitted to be the bases of the federal jurisdiction.

Ambassadors are the representatives of nations in a state of amity²⁸⁰ with the union, and whatever concerns these personages concerns in some degree the whole union. When I an ambassador is a party in a suit, that suit affects the welfare of the nation, and a federal tribunal is naturally called upon to decide it.

The union itself may be involved in legal proceedings, and in this case it would be alike contrary to the customs of all nations, and to common sense, to appeal to a tribunal representing any other sovereignty than its own; the federal courts, therefore, take cognizance of these affairs.

When two parties belonging to two different states are engaged in a suit, the case cannot with propriety be brought before a court of either state. The surest expedient is to select a tribunal like that of the union, which can excite the suspicions of neither party, and which offers the most natural as well as the most certain remedy.

When the two parties are not private individuals, but states, an important political consideration is added to the same motive¹¹¹ of equity²⁸¹. The quality of the parties, in this case, gives a national importance to all their disputes; and the most trifling litigation of the states may be said to involve the peace of the whole union.{146}

The nature of the cause frequently prescribes the rule of competency. Thus all the questions which concern maritime²⁸² commerce evidently fall under the cognizance of the federal tribunals.{147} Almost all these questions are connected with the interpretation of the law of nations; and in this respect they essentially interest the union in relation to foreign powers. Moreover, as the sea is not included within the limits of any peculiar jurisdiction, the national courts can only hear causes which originate in maritime affairs.

The constitution comprises under one head almost all the cases which by their very nature come within the limits of the federal courts. The rule which it lays down is simple, but pregnant with an entire system of ideas, and with a vast multitude of facts. It declares that the judicial power of the supreme court shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the laws of the United States.

Two examples will put the intentions of the legislator in the clearest light:—

The constitution prohibits the states from making laws on the value and circulation of money: if, notwithstanding this prohibition²⁸³, a state passes a law of this kind, with which the interested parties refuse to comply because it is contrary to the constitution, the case must come before a federal court, because it arises under the laws of the United States. Again, if difficulties arise in the levying of import duties which have been voted by congress, the federal court must decide the case, because it arises under the interpretation of a law of the United States.

This rule is in perfect accordance with the fundamental principles of the federal constitution. The union as it was established in 1789, possesses, it is true, a limited supremacy; but it was intended that within its limits it should form one and the same people.{148} Within those limits the union is sovereign. When this point is established and admitted, the inference is easy; for if it be acknowledged that the United States constitute one and the same people within the bounds prescribed by their constitution, it is impossible to refuse them the rights which belong to other nations. But it has been allowed, from the origin of society, that every nation has the right of deciding by its own courts those questions which concern the execution of its own laws. To this it is answered, that the union is in so singular a position, that in relation to some matters it constitutes a people, and that in relation to all the rest it is a nonentity²⁸⁴. But the inference to be drawn²⁸⁵ is, that in the laws relating to these matters the union possesses all the rights of absolute sovereignty. The difficulty is to know what these matters are; and when once it is resolved (and we have shown how it was resolved, in speaking of the means of determining the jurisdiction of the federal courts), no farther doubt can arise; for as soon as it is established that a suit is federal, that is to say, that it belongs to the share of sovereignty reserved by the constitution to the union, the natural consequence is that it should come within the jurisdiction of a federal court.

Whenever the laws of the United States are attacked, or whenever they are resorted to in self-defence, the federal courts must be appealed to. Thus the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the union extends and narrows its limits exactly in the same ratio as the sovereignty of the union augments²⁸⁶ or decreases. We have shown that the principal aim of the legislators of 1789 was to divide the sovereign authority into two parts. In the one they placed the control of all the general interests of the union, in the other the control of the special interest of its component²⁸⁷ states. Their chief solicitude²⁸⁸ was to arm the federal government with sufficient power to enable it to resist, within its sphere, the encroachments of the several states. As for these communities, the principle of independence within certain limits of their own was adopted in their behalf; and they were concealed from the inspection, and protected from the control, of the central government. In speaking of the division of the authority, I observed that this latter principle had not always been held sacred, since the states are prevented from passing certain laws, which apparently²⁸⁹ belong to their own particular sphere of interest. When a state of the union passes a law of this kind, the citizens who are injured by its execution can appeal to the federal courts.

{The remark of the author, that whenever the laws of the United States are attacked, or whenever they are resorted to in self-defence, the federal courts must be appealed to, which is more strongly expressed in the original, is erroneous and calculated to mislead on a point of some importance. By the grant of power to the courts of the United States to decide certain cases, the powers of the state courts are not suspended, but are exercised concurrently²⁹⁰, subject to an appeal to the courts of the United States. But if the decision of the state court is in favor of the right, title, or privilege claimed under the constitution, a treaty, or under a law of congress, no appeal lies to the federal courts. The appeal is given only when the decision is against the claimant under the treaty or law. See 3d Cranch, 268. 1 Wheaton, 304.—American Editor.}

Thus the jurisdiction of the general courts extends not only to all the cases which arise under the laws of the union, but also to those which arise under laws made by the several states in opposition to the constitution. The states are prohibited from making ex-post-facto laws in criminal cases; and any person condemned by virtue of a law of this kind can appeal to the judicial power of the union. The states are likewise prohibited from making laws which may have a tendency to impair²⁹¹ the obligations of contracts.{149} If a citizen thinks that an obligation of this kind is impaired²⁹² by a law passed in his state, he may refuse to obey it, and may appeal to the federal courts.{150}

This provision appears to me to be the most serious attack upon the independence of the states. The rights awarded to the federal government for purposes of obvious national importance are definite and easily comprehensible; but those with which this last clause invests it are not either clearly appreciable²⁹³ or accurately²⁹⁴ defined. For there are vast numbers of political laws which influence the obligations of contracts, which may thus furnish an easy pretext²⁹⁵ for the aggressions of the central authority.

{The fears of the author respecting the danger to the independence of the states of that provision of the constitution, which gives to the federal courts the authority of deciding when a state law impairs²⁹⁶ the obligation of a contract, are deemed quite unfounded. The citizens of every state have a deep interest in preserving the obligation of the contracts entered into by them in other states: indeed without such a controlling power, "commerce among several states" could not exist. The existence of this common arbiter is of the last importance to the continuance of the union itself, for if there were no peaceable means of enforcing the obligations of contracts, independent of all state authority, the states themselves would inevitably come in collision in their efforts to protect their respective citizens from the consequences of the legislation of another state.

M. De Tocqueville's observation, that the rights with which the clause in question invests the federal government "are not clearly appreciable or accurately defined," proceeds upon a mistaken view of the clause itself. It relates to the obligation of a contract, and forbids any act by which that obligation is impaired. To American lawyers, this seems to be as precise and definite as any rule can be made by human language. The distinction between the right to the fruits of a contract, and the time, tribunal, and manner, in which that right is to be enforced, seems very palpable. At all events, since the decision of the supreme court of the United States in those cases in which this clause has been discussed, no difficulty is found, practically, in understanding the exact limits of the prohibition.

The next observation of the author, that "there are vast numbers of political laws which influence the obligations of contracts, which may thus furnish an easy pretext for the aggressions of the central authority," is rather obscure. Is it intended that political laws may be passed by the central authority, influencing the obligation of a contract, and thus the contracts themselves be destroyed? The answer to this would be, that the question would not arise under the clause forbidding laws impairing²⁹⁷ the obligation of contracts, for that clause applies only to the states and not to the federal government.

If it be intended, that the states may find it necessary to pass political laws, which affect contracts, and that under the pretence²⁹⁸ of vindicating²⁹⁹ the obligation of contracts, the central authority may make aggressions on the states and annul their political laws:—the answer is, that the motive to the adoption of the clause was to reach laws of every description, political as well as all others, and that it was the abuse by the states of what may be called political laws, viz.: acts confiscating³⁰⁰ demands of foreign creditors³⁰¹, that gave rise to the prohibition. The settled doctrine now is, that states may pass laws in respect to the making of contracts, may prescribe what contracts shall be made, and how, but that they cannot impair any that are already made.

The writer of this note is unwilling³⁰² to dismiss the subject, without remarking upon what he must think a fundamental error of the author, which is exhibited in the passage commented on, as well as in other passages:—and that is, in supposing the judiciary of the United States, and particularly the supreme court, to be a part of the political federal government, and as the ready instrument to execute its designs upon the state authorities. Although the judges are in form commissioned by the United States, yet, in fact, they are appointed by the delegates of the state, in the senate of the United States, concurrently with, and acting upon, the nomination of the president. If the legislature of each state in the union were to elect a judge of the supreme court, he would not be less a political officer of the United States than he now is. In truth, the judiciary have no political duties to perform; they are arbiters³⁰³ chosen by the federal and state governments, jointly³⁰⁴, and when appointed, as independent of the one as of the other. They cannot be removed without the consent of the states represented in the senate, and they can be removed without the consent of the president, and against his wishes. Such is the theory of the constitution. And it has been felt practically, in the rejection³⁰⁵ by the senate of persons nominated as judges, by a president of the same political party with a majority of the senators. Two instances of this kind occurred during the administration of Mr. Jefferson.

If it be alleged³⁰⁶ that they are exposed to the influence of the executive of the United States, by the expectation of offices in his gift, the answer is, that judges of state courts are equally exposed to the same influence—that all state officers, from the highest to the lowest, are in the same predicament; and that this circumstance does not, therefore, deprive them of the character of impartial²⁶⁷ and independent arbiters.

These observations receive confirmation³⁰⁷ from every recent decision of the supreme court of the United States, in which certain laws of individual states have been sustained, in cases where, to say the least, it was very questionable³⁰⁸ whether they did not infringe³⁰⁹ the provisions of the constitution, and where a disposition to construe³¹⁰ those previsions broadly and extensively, would have found very plausible³¹¹ grounds to indulge itself in annulling the state laws referred to. See the cases of City of New York vs. Miln, 11th Peters, 103; Briscoe vs. the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, ib., 257; Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, ib., 420.—American Ed.}

 

 

 

 

PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS.

 

Natural Weakness of the judiciary Power in Confederations.—Legislators ought to strive as much as possible to bring private Individuals, and not States, before the federal Courts.—How the Americans have succeeded in this.—Direct Prosecutions³¹³ of private Individuals in the federal Courts.—Indirect Prosecution³¹² in the States which violate the Laws of the union.—The Decrees of the Supreme Court enervate³¹⁴ but do not destroy the provincial Laws.

I have shown what the privileges of the federal courts are, and it is no less important to point out the manner in which they are exercised. The irresistible authority of justice in countries in which the sovereignty is undivided, is derived³¹⁵ from the fact that the tribunals of those countries represent the entire nation at issue with the individual against whom their decree is directed; and the idea of power is thus introduced to corroborate³¹⁶ the idea of right. But this is not always the case in countries in which the sovereignty is divided: in them the judicial power is more frequently opposed to a fraction of the nation than to an isolated³¹⁷ individual, and its moral authority and physical strength are consequently diminished. In federal states the power of the judge is naturally decreased, and that of the justiciable parties is augmented. The aim of the legislator in confederate states ought therefore to be, to render the position of the courts of justice analogous to that which they occupy in countries where the sovereignty is undivided; in other words, his efforts ought constantly to tend to maintain the judicial power of the confederation as the representative of the nation, and the justiciable party as the representative of an individual interest.

Every government, whatever may be its constitution, requires the means of constraining³¹⁸ its subjects to discharge their obligations, and of protecting its privileges from their assaults. As far as the direct action of the government on the community is concerned, the constitution of the United States contrived³¹⁹, by a master-stroke of policy, that the federal courts, acting in the name of the laws, should only take cognizance of parties in an individual capacity. For, as it had been declared that the union consisted of one and the same people within the limits laid down by the constitution, the inference was that the government created by this constitution, and acting within these limits, was invested with all the privileges of a national government, one of the principal of which is the right of transmitting its injunctions directly to the private citizen. When, for instance, the union votes an impost, it does not apply to the states for the levying of it, but to every American citizen, in proportion to his assessment³²⁰. The supreme court, which is empowered to enforce the execution of this law of the union, exerts its influence not upon a refractory³²¹ state, but upon the private taxpayer³²²; and, like the judicial power of other nations, it is opposed to the person of an individual. It is to be observed that the union chose its own antagonist³²³; and as that antagonist is feeble, he is naturally worsted.

But the difficulty increases when the proceedings are not brought forward by but against the union. The constitution recognizes the legislative power of the state; and a law so enacted³²⁴ may impair the privileges of the union, in which case a collision is unavoidable between that body and the state which had passed the law; and it only remains to select the least dangerous remedy, which is very clearly deducible from the general principles I have before established.{151}

It may be conceived that, in the case under consideration, the union might have sued the state before a federal court, which would have annulled the act; and by this means it would have adopted a natural course of proceeding: but the judicial power would have been placed in open hostility to the state, and it was desirable to avoid this predicament as much as possible. The Americans hold that it is nearly impossible that a new law should not impair the interests of some private individuals by its provisions: these private interests are assumed by the American legislators as the ground of attack against such measures as may be prejudicial to the union, and it is to these cases that the protection of the supreme court is extended.

Suppose a state vends³²⁵ a certain portion of its territory to a company, and that a year afterwards it passes a law by which the territory is otherwise disposed of, and that clause of the constitution, which prohibits laws impairing the obligation of contracts, is violated. When the purchaser under the second act appears to take possession, the possessor under the first act brings his action before the tribunals of the union, and causes the title of the claimant to be pronounced null and void.{152} This, in point of fact, the judicial power of the union is contesting the claims of the sovereignty of a state; but it only acts indirectly and upon a special application of detail: it attacks the law in its consequences, not in its principle, and it rather weakens than destroys it.

The last hypothesis that remained was that each state formed a corporation enjoying a separate existence and distinct civil rights, and that it could therefore sue or be sued before a tribunal. Thus a state could bring an action against another state. In this instance, the union was not called upon to contest a provincial law, but to try a suit in which a state was a party. This suit was perfectly similar to any other cause, except that the quality of the parties was different; and here the danger pointed¹⁸¹ out at the beginning of this chapter exists with less chance of being avoided. The inherent disadvantage of the very essence of federal constitutions is, that they engender³²⁷ parties in the bosom of the nation which present powerful obstacles to the free course of justice.

 

 

 

 

HIGH RANK OF THE SUPREME COURTS AMONG THE GREAT POWERS OF STATE.

 

No Nation ever constituted so great a judicial Power as the Americans. Extent of its Prerogative.—Its political Influence.—The Tranquillity³²⁹ and the very Existence of the union depend on the Discretion³³⁰ of the seven federal Judges.

When we have successfully examined in detail the organization of the supreme court, and the entire prerogatives which it exercises, we shall readily admit that a more imposing³³¹ judicial power was never constituted by any people. The supreme court is placed at the head of all known tribunals, both by the nature of its rights and the class of justiciable parties which it controls.

In all the civilized³³² countries of Europe, the government has always shown the greatest repugnance³³³ to allow the cases to which it was itself a party to be decided by the ordinary course of justice. This repugnance naturally attains³³⁴ its utmost height in an absolute government; and, on the other hand, the privileges of the courts of justice are extended with the increasing liberties of the people; but no European nation has at present held that all judicial controversies³³⁶, without regard to their origin, can be decided by the judges of common law.

In America this theory has been actually put in practice; and the supreme court of the United States is the sole tribunal of the nation. Its power extends to all the cases arising under laws and treaties made by the executive and legislative authorities, to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and in general to all points which affect the law of nations. It may even be affirmed that, although its constitution is essentially judicial, its prerogatives are almost entirely political. Its sole object is to enforce the execution of the laws of the union; and the union only regulates the relations of the government with the citizens, and of the nation with foreign powers: the relations of citizens among themselves are almost exclusively regulated by the sovereignty of the states.

A second and still greater cause of the preponderance of this court may be adduced. In the nations of Europe the courts of justice are only called upon to try the controversies of private individuals; but the supreme court of the United States summons sovereign powers to its bar. When the clerk of the court advances on the steps of the tribunal, and simply says, "The state of New York versus³³⁷ the state of Ohio," it is impossible not to feel that the court which he addresses is no ordinary body; and when it is recollected³³⁸ that one of these parties represents one million, and the other two millions of men, one is struck by the responsibility of the seven judges whose decision is about to satisfy or to disappoint so large a number of their fellow-citizens.

The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the union, are invested in the hands of the seven judges. Without their active co-operation the constitution would be a dead letter: the executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative powers; the legislature demands their protection from the designs of the executive; they defend the union from the disobedience of the states, the states from the exaggerated claims of the union, the public interest against the interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting³⁴⁰ innovations of democracy. Their power is enormous, but it is clothed in the authority of public opinion. They are the all-powerful guardians³⁴¹ of a people which respects law; but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular contempt. The force of public opinion is the most intractable of agents, because its exact limits cannot be defined; and it is not less dangerous to exceed, than to remain below the boundary prescribed.

The federal judges must not only be good citizens, and men possessed of that information and integrity which are indispensable to magistrates³⁴², but they must be statesmen—politicians, not unread in the signs of the times, not afraid to brave the obstacles which can be subdued³⁴³, nor slow to turn aside such encroaching elements as may threaten the supremacy of the union and the obedience which is due to the laws.

The president, who exercises a limited power, may err³⁷ without causing great mischief in the state. Congress may decide amiss without destroying the union, because the electoral body in which congress originates may cause it to retract³⁴⁵ its decision by changing its members. But if the supreme court is ever composed of imprudent men or bad citizens, the union may be plunged³⁴⁷ into anarchy or civil war.

The real cause of this danger, however, does not lie in the constitution of the tribunal, but in the very nature of federal governments. We have observed that in confederate peoples it is especially necessary to consolidate the judicial authority, because in no other nations do those independent persons who are able to cope with the social body, exist, in greater power or in a better condition to resist the physical strength of the government. But the more a power requires to be strengthened, the more extensive and independent it must be made; and the dangers which its abuse may create are heightened by its independence and its strength. The source of the evil is not, therefore, in the constitution of the power, but in the constitution of those states which renders its existence necessary.

 

 

 

 

IN WHAT RESPECTS THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE STATES.

In what respects the Constitution of the union can be compared to that of the States.—Superiority of the Constitution of the union attributable to the Wisdom of the federal Legislators.—Legislature of the union less dependent on the People than that of the States.—Executive Power more independent in its Sphere.—Judicial Power less subjected to the Inclinations³⁴⁸ of the Majority.—Practical Consequences of these Facts.—The Dangers inherent in a democratic Government eluded³⁵⁰ by the federal Legislators, and increased by the Legislators of the States.

The federal constitution differs essentially from that of the states in the ends which it is intended to accomplish; but in the means by which these ends are promoted, a greater analogy exists between them. The objects of the governments are different, but their forms are the same; and in this special point of view there is some advantage in comparing them together.

I am of opinion that the federal constitution is superior to all the constitutions of the states, for several reasons.

The present constitution of the union was formed at a later period than those of the majority of the states, and it may have derived some melioration from past experience. But we shall be led to acknowledge that this is only a secondary cause of its superiority, when we recollect³³⁹ that eleven new states have been added to the American confederation since the promulgation of the federal constitution, and that these new republics have always rather exaggerated than avoided the defects which existed in the former constitutions.

The chief cause of the superiority of the federal constitution lay in the character of the legislators who composed it. At the time when it was formed the dangers of the confederation were imminent³⁵¹, and its ruin seemed inevitable³⁵². In this extremity the people chose the men who most deserved the esteem³⁵³, rather than those who had gained the affections of the country. I have already observed, that distinguished³⁵⁴ as almost all the legislators of the union were for their intelligence, they were still more so for their patriotism. They had all been nurtured³⁵⁵ at a time when the spirit of liberty was braced³⁵⁶ by a continual struggle against a powerful and predominant authority. When the contest was terminated, while the excited passions of the populace persisted in warring with dangers which had ceased to threaten them, these men stopped short in their career; they cast a calmer and more penetrating³⁵⁷ look upon the country which was now their own; they perceived that the war of independence was definitely ended, and that the only dangers which America had to fear were those which might result from the abuse of the freedom she had won. They had the courage to say what they believed to be true, because they were animated³⁵⁸ by a warm and sincere love of liberty; and they ventured to propose restrictions³⁶⁰, because they were resolutely³⁶¹ opposed to destruction.{153}

The greater number of the constitutions of the states assign one year for the duration of the house of representatives, and two years for that of the senate; so that members of the legislative body are constantly and narrowly tied down by the slightest desires of their constituents. The legislators of the union were of opinion that this excessive dependence of the legislature tended to alter the nature of the main consequences of the representative system, since it vested the source not only of authority, but of government, in the people. They increased the length of the time for which the representatives were returned, in order to give them freer scope for the exercise of their own judgment.

The federal constitution, as well as the constitutions of the different states, divided the legislative body into two branches. But in the states these two branches were composed of the same elements and elected in the same manner. The consequence was that the passions and inclinations of the populace were as rapidly and as energetically represented in one chamber as in the other, and that laws were made with all the characteristics of violence and precipitation. By the federal constitution the two houses originate in like manner in the choice of the people; but the conditions of eligibility and the mode of election were changed, to the end that if, as is the case in certain nations, one branch of the legislature represents the same interests as the other, it may at least represent a superior degree of intelligence and discretion. A mature age was made one of the conditions of the senatorial dignity, and the upper house was chosen by an elected assembly of a limited number of members.

To concentrate the whole social force in the hands of the legislative body is the natural tendency of democracies; for as this is the power which emanates³⁶² the most directly from the people, it is made to participate most fully³⁴ in the preponderating authority of the multitude, and it is naturally led to monopolise every species of influence. This concentration is at once prejudicial to a well-conducted administration, and favorable to the despotism of the majority. The legislators of the states frequently yielded to these democratic propensities³⁶³, which were invariably and courageously³⁶⁴ resisted by the founders³⁶⁵ of the union.

In the states the executive power is vested in the hands of a magistrate, who is apparently placed upon a level with the legislature, but who is in reality nothing more than the blind agent and the passive instrument of its decisions. He can derive no influence from the duration of his functions, which terminate with the revolving³⁶⁶ year, or from the exercise of prerogatives which can scarcely be said to exist. The legislature can condemn¹⁵ him to inaction by intrusting the execution of the laws to special committees of its own members, and can annul his temporary dignity by depriving him of his salary. The federal constitution vests all the privileges and all the responsibility of the executive power in a single individual. The duration of the presidency is fixed at four years; the salary of the individual who fills that office cannot be altered during the term of his functions; he is protected by a body of official dependents, and armed with a suspensive veto. In short, every effort was made to confer a strong and independent position upon the executive authority, within the limits which had been prescribed to it.

In the constitution of all the states the judicial power is that which remains the most independent of the legislative authority: nevertheless, in all the states the legislature has reserved to itself the right of regulating the emoluments³⁶⁷ of the judges, a practice which necessarily subjects these magistrates to its immediate influence. In some states the judges are only temporarily appointed, which deprives them of a great portion of their power and their freedom. In others the legislative and judicial powers are entirely confounded: thus the senate of New York, for instance, constitutes in certain cases the superior court of the state. The federal constitution, on the other hand, carefully separates the judicial authority from all external influences: and it provides for the independence of the judges, by declaring that their salary shall not be altered, and that their functions shall be inalienable.

{It is not universally correct, as supposed by the author, that the state legislatures can deprive their governor of his salary at pleasure. In the constitution of New York it is provided, that the governor "shall receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the term for which he shall have been elected;" and similar provisions are believed to exist in other states. Nor is the remark strictly³⁶⁸ correct, that the federal constitution "provides for the independence of the judges, by declaring that their salary shall not be altered." The provision of the constitution is, that they shall, "at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."—American Editor.}

The practical consequences of these different systems may easily be perceived. An attentive³⁶⁹ observer will soon remark that the business of the union is incomparably better conducted than that of any individual state. The conduct of the federal government is more fair and more temperate than that of the states; its designs are more fraught with wisdom, its projects are more durable³⁷⁰ and more skilfully³⁷¹ combined, its measures are put into execution with more vigor and consistency²³⁰.

I recapitulate³⁷² the substance of this chapter in a few words:—

The existence of democracies is threatened by two dangers, viz.: the complete subjection of the legislative body to the caprices of the electoral body; and the concentration of all the powers of the government in the legislative authority.

The growth of these evils has been encouraged by the policy of the legislators of the states; but it has been resisted by the legislators of the union by every means which lay within their control.

 

 

 

 

CHARACTERISTICS WHICH DISTINGUISH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM ALL OTHER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.

American union appears to resemble all other Confederations.—Nevertheless its Effects are different.—Reason of this.—Distinctions between the union and all other Confederations.—The American Government not a Federal, but an imperfect National Government.

The United States of America do not afford either the first or the only instance of confederate states, several of which have existed in modern Europe, without adverting³⁷³ to those of antiquity³⁷⁴. Switzerland, the Germanic empire, and the republic of the United Provinces, either have been or still are confederations. In studying the constitutions of these different countries, the politician is surprised to observe that the powers with which they invested the federal government are nearly identical with the privileges awarded by the American constitution to the government of the United States. They confer upon the central power the same rights of making peace and war, of raising money and troops, and of providing for the general exigencies and the common interests of the nation. Nevertheless the federal government of these different people has always been as remarkable³⁷⁵ for its weakness and inefficiency³⁷⁶ as that of the union is for its vigorous and enterprising spirit. Again, the first American confederation perished through the excessive weakness of its government; and this weak government was, notwithstanding, in possession of rights even more extensive than those of the federal government of the present day. But the more recent constitution of the United States contains certain principles which exercise a most important influence, although they do not at once strike the observer.

This constitution, which may at first sight be confounded with the federal constitutions which preceded it, rests upon a novel theory, which may be considered as a great invention in modern political science. In all the confederations which had been formed before the American constitution of 1789, the allied³⁷⁷ states agreed to obey the injunctions of a federal government: but they reserved to themselves the right of ordaining³⁷⁸ and enforcing the execution of the laws of the union. The American states which combined in 1789 agreed that the federal government should not only dictate³⁷⁹ the laws, but it should execute its own enactments³⁸⁰. In both cases the right is the same, but the exercise of the right is different; and this alteration³⁸¹ produced the most momentous³⁸² consequences.

In all the confederations which have been formed before the American union, the federal government demanded its supplies at the hands of the separate governments; and if the measure it prescribed was onerous³⁸³ to any one of those bodies, means were found to evade its claims: if the state was powerful, it had recourse to arms; if it was weak, it connived³⁸⁴ at the resistance which the law of the union, its sovereign, met with, and resorted to inaction under the plea of inability. Under these circumstances one of two alternatives has invariably occurred: either the most preponderant of the allied peoples has assumed the privileges of the federal authority, and ruled all the other states in its name,{154} or the federal government has been abandoned by its natural supporters, anarchy has arisen between the confederates, and the union has lost all power of action.{155}

In America the subjects of the union are not states, but private citizens: the national government levies³⁸⁵ a tax, not upon the state of Massachusetts, but upon each inhabitant of Massachusetts. All former confederate governments presided over communities, but that of the union rules individuals; its force is not borrowed, but self-derived; and it is served by its own civil and military officers, by its own army, and its own courts of justice. It cannot be doubted that the spirit of the nation, the passions of the multitude, and the provincial prejudices of each state, tend singularly to diminish the authority of a federal authority thus constituted, and to facilitate the means of resistance to its mandates³⁸⁶; but the comparative weakness of a restricted sovereignty is an evil inherent in the federal system. In America, each state has fewer opportunities of resistance, and fewer temptations to non-compliance; nor can such a design be put in execution (if indeed it be entertained), without an open violation³⁸⁷ of the laws of the union, a direct interruption of the ordinary course of justice, and a bold declaration of revolt; in a word, without a decisive step, which men hesitate to adopt.

In all former confederations, the privileges of the union furnished more elements of discord³⁸⁸ than of power, since they multiplied the claims of the nation without augmenting³⁸⁹ the means of enforcing them: and in accordance with this fact it may be remarked, that the real weakness of federal governments has almost always been in the exact ratio of their nominal³⁹⁰ power. Such is not the case with the American union, in which, as in ordinary governments, the federal government has the means of enforcing all it is empowered to demand.

The human understanding more easily invents new things than new words, and we are thence constrained³⁹¹ to employ a multitude of improper³⁹² and inadequate³⁹³ expressions. When several nations form a permanent league, and establish a supreme authority, which, although it has not the same influence over the members of the community as a national government, acts upon each of the confederate states in a body, this government, which is so essentially different from all others, is denominated a federal one. Another form of society is afterward³²⁶ discovered, in which several peoples are fused into one and the same nation with regard to certain common interests, although they remain distinct, or at least only confederate, with regard to all their other concerns. In this case the central power acts directly upon those whom it governs, whom it rules, and whom it judges, in the same manner as, but in a more limited circle than, a national government. Here the term of federal government is clearly no longer applicable to a state of things which must be styled an incomplete national government: a form of government has been found out which is neither exactly national nor federal; but no farther progress has been made, and the new word which will one day designate this novel invention does not yet exist.

The absence of this new species of confederation has been the cause which has brought all unions to civil war, to subjection, or to a stagnant³⁹⁴ apathy³⁹⁵; and the peoples which formed these leagues have been either too dull to discern, or too pusillanimous³⁹⁶ to apply this great remedy. The American confederation perished by the same defects.

But the confederate states of America had been long accustomed to form a portion of one empire before they had won their independence: they had not contracted the habit of governing themselves, and their national prejudices had not taken deep root in their minds. Superior to the rest of the world in political knowledge, and sharing that knowledge equally among themselves, they were little agitated by the passions which generally oppose the extension of federal authority in a nation, and those passions were checked by the wisdom of the chief citizens.

The Americans applied the remedy with prudent³⁴⁶ firmness as soon as they were conscious of the evil; they amended³⁹⁷ their laws, and they saved their country.

 

 

 

 

ADVANTAGES OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IN GENERAL, AND ITS SPECIAL UTILITY IN AMERICA.

Happiness and Freedom of small Nations.—Power of Great Nations.—Great Empires favorable to the Growth of Civilisation³⁹⁸.—Strength often the first Element of national Prosperity.—Aim of the federal System to unite the twofold Advantages resulting from a small and from a large Territory.—Advantages derived by the United States from this System.—The Law adapts itself to the Exigencies of the Population; Population does not conform to the Exigencies of the Law.—Activity, Melioration, Love, and Enjoyment of Freedom in the American Communities.—Public Spirit of the union the abstract of provincial Patriotism.—Principles and Things circulate freely over the Territory of the United States.—The union is happy and free as a little Nation, and respected as a great Empire.

In small nations the scrutiny of society penetrates into every part, and the spirit of improvement enters into the most trifling details; as the ambition of the people is necessarily checked by its weakness, all the efforts and resources of the citizens are turned to the internal benefit of the community, and are not likely to evaporate in the fleeting breath of glory. The desires of every individual are limited, because extraordinary faculties³⁹⁹ are rarely to be met with. The gifts of an equal fortune render the various conditions of life uniform; and the manners of the inhabitants are orderly and simple. Thus, if we estimate the gradations of popular morality and enlightenment, we shall generally find that in small nations there are more persons in easy circumstances, a more numerous population, and a more tranquil³²⁸ state of society than in great empires.

When tyranny is established in the bosom of a small nation, it is more galling⁴⁰⁰ than elsewhere, because, as it acts within a narrow circle, every point of that circle is subject to its direct influence. It supplies the place of those great designs which it cannot entertain, by a violent or an exasperating⁴⁰¹ interference in a multitude of minute details; and it leaves the political world to which it properly belongs, to meddle⁴⁰² with the arrangements of domestic life. Tastes as well as actions are to be regulated at its pleasure; and the families of the citizens as well as the affairs of the state are to be governed by its decisions. This invasion of rights occurs, however, but seldom, and freedom is in truth the natural state of small communities. The temptations which the government offers to ambition are too weak, and the resources of private individuals are too slender, for the sovereign power easily to fall within the grasp of a single citizen: and should such an event have occurred, the subjects of the state can without difficulty overthrow⁴⁰³ the tyrant⁴⁰⁴ and his oppression by a simultaneous effort.

Small nations have therefore ever been the cradles of political liberty: and the fact that many of them have lost their immunities⁴⁰⁵ by extending their dominion, shows that the freedom they enjoyed was more a consequence of their inferior size than of the character of the people.

The history of the world affords no instance of a great nation retaining the form of a republican government for a long series of years,{156} and this had led to the conclusion that such a state of things is impracticable. For my own part, I cannot but censure⁴⁰⁶ the imprudence of attempting to limit the possible, and to judge the future, on the part of a being who is hourly deceived by the most palpable realities of life, and who is constantly taken by surprise in the circumstances with which he is most familiar. But it may be advanced with confidence that the existence of a great republic will always be exposed to far greater perils than that of a small one.

All the passions which are most fatal to republican institutions spread with an increasing territory, while the virtues⁴⁰⁷ which maintain their dignity do not augment¹⁸⁶ in the same proportion. The ambition of the citizens increases with the power of the state; the strength of parties, with the importance of the ends they have in view; but that devotion to the common weal, which is the surest check on destructive passions, is not stronger in a large than in a small republic. It might, indeed, be proved without difficulty that it is less powerful and less sincere. The arrogance⁴⁰⁸ of wealth and the dejection of wretchedness, capital cities of unwonted extent, a lax morality, a vulgar egotism, and a great confusion of interests, are the dangers which almost invariably arise from the magnitude of states. But several of these evils are scarcely prejudicial to a monarchy, and some of them contribute to maintain its existence. In monarchical states the strength of the government is its own; it may use, but it does not depend on, the community: and the authority of the prince is proportioned to the prosperity of the nation: but the only security which a republican government possesses against these evils lies in the support of the majority. This support is not, however, proportionably greater in a large republic than it is in a small one; and thus while the means of attack perpetually increase both in number and in influence, the power of resistance remains the same; or it may rather be said to diminish, since the propensities and interests of the people are diversified⁴⁰⁹ by the increase of the population, and the difficulty of forming a compact majority is constantly augmented. It has been observed, moreover, that the intensity⁴¹⁰ of human passions is heightened, not only by the importance of the end which they propose to attain³³⁵, but by the multitude of individuals who are animated by them at the same time. Every one has had occasion to remark that his emotions in the midst of a sympathizing crowd are far greater than those which he would have felt in solitude⁴¹¹. In great republics the impetus⁴¹² of political passion is irresistible, not only because it aims at gigantic purposes, but because it is felt and shared by millions of men at the same time.

It may therefore be asserted as a general proposition, that nothing is more opposed to the well-being⁴¹³ and the freedom of man than vast empires. Nevertheless it is important to acknowledge the peculiar advantages of great states. For the very reason which renders the desire of power more intense in these communities than among ordinary men, the love of glory is also more prominent in the hearts of a class of citizens, who regard the applause of a great people as a reward worthy⁴¹⁴ of their exertions⁴¹⁵, and an elevating encouragement to man. If we would learn why it is that great nations contribute more powerfully to the spread of human improvement than small states, we shall discover an adequate cause in the rapid and energetic circulation of ideas, and in those great cities which are the intellectual centres where all the rays of human genius are reflected and combined. To this it may be added that most important discoveries demand a display of national power which the government of a small state is unable to make; in great nations the government entertains a greater number of general notions, and is more completely disengaged from the routine of precedent⁴¹⁶ and the egotism of local prejudice; its designs are conceived with more talent, and executed with more boldness.

In time of peace the well-being of small nations is undoubtedly⁴¹⁷ more general and more complete; but they are apt to suffer more acutely from the calamities of war than those great empires whose distant frontiers may for ages avert⁴¹⁸ the presence of the danger from the mass of the people, which is more frequently afflicted than ruined by the evil.

But in this matter, as in many others, the argument derived from the necessity of the case predominates over all others. If none but small nations existed, I do not doubt that mankind would be more happy and more free; but the existence of great nations is unavoidable.

This consideration introduces the element of physical strength as a condition of national prosperity.

It profits a people but little to be affluent⁴¹⁹ and free, if it is perpetually exposed to be pillaged⁴²⁰ or subjugated⁴²¹; the number of its manufactures and the extent of its commerce are of small advantage, if another nation has the empire of the seas and gives the law in all the markets of the globe. Small nations are often impoverished⁴²², not because they are small, but because they are weak; and great empires prosper³⁸ less because they are great than because they are strong. Physical strength is therefore one of the first conditions of the happiness and even of the existence of nations. Hence it occurs, that unless very peculiar circumstances intervene, small nations are always united to large empires in the end, either by force or by their own consent; yet I am unacquainted with a more deplorable spectacle than that of a people unable either to defend or to maintain its independence.

The federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from the greater and the lesser extent of nations; and a single glance over the United States of America suffices to discover the advantages which they have derived from its adoption.

In great centralized nations the legislator is obliged to impart a character of uniformity to the laws, which does not always suit the diversity of customs and of districts; as he takes no cognizance of special cases, he can only proceed upon general principles; and the population is obliged to conform to the exigencies of the legislation, since the legislation cannot adapt itself to the exigencies and customs of the population; which is the cause of endless trouble and misery⁴²³. This disadvantage does not exist in confederations; congress regulates the principal measures of the national government, and all the details of the administration are reserved to the provincial legislatures. It is impossible to imaging how much this division of sovereignty contributes to the well-being of each of the states which compose the union. In these small communities, which are never agitated by the desire of aggrandizement⁴²⁴ or the cares of self-defence, all public authority and private energy is employed in internal melioration. The central government of each state, which is in immediate juxtaposition⁴²⁵ to the citizens, is daily apprised of the wants which arise in society; and new projects are proposed every year, which are discussed either at town-meetings or by the legislature of the state, and which are transmitted by the press to stimulate⁴²⁶ the zeal¹⁵² and to excite the interest of the citizens. This spirit of melioration is constantly alive in the American republics, without compromising their tranquillity; the ambition of power yields to the less refined and less dangerous love of comfort. It is generally believed in America that the existence and the permanence of the republican form of government in the New World depend upon the existence and the permanence of the federal system; and it is not unusual to attribute a large share of the misfortunes which have befallen the new states of South America to the injudicious erection of great republics, instead of a divided and confederate sovereignty.

It is incontestably true that the love and the habits of republican government in the United States were engendered⁴²⁷ in the townships and in the provincial assemblies. In a small state, like that of Connecticut for instance, where cutting a canal or laying down a road is a momentous political question, where the state has no army to pay and no wars to carry on, and where much wealth and much honor cannot be bestowed⁴²⁸ upon the chief citizens, no form of government can be more natural or more appropriate than that of a republic. But it is this same republican spirit, it is these manners and customs of a free people, which are engendered and nurtured in the different states, to be afterward applied to the country at large. The public spirit of the union is, so to speak, nothing more than an abstract of the patriotic⁴²⁹ zeal of the provinces. Every citizen of the United States transfuses⁴³⁰ his attachment⁴³¹ to his little republic into the common store of American patriotism. In defending the union, he defends the increasing prosperity of his own district, the right of conducting its affairs, and the hope of causing measures of improvement to be adopted which may be favorable to his own interests; and these are motives which are wont to stir men more readily than the general interests of the country and the glory of the nation.

On the other hand, if the temper and the manners of the inhabitants especially fitted them to promote the welfare of a great republic, the federal system smoothed the obstacles which they might have encountered. The confederation of all the American states presents none of the ordinary disadvantages resulting from great agglomerations⁴³² of men. The union is a great republic in extent, but the paucity⁴³³ of objects for which its government provides assimilates it to a small state. Its acts are important, but they are rare. As the sovereignty of the union is limited and incomplete, its exercise is not incompatible with liberty; for it does not excite those insatiable desires of fame and power which have proved so fatal to great republics. As there is no common centre to the country, vast capital cities, colossal⁴³⁴ wealth, abject⁴³⁵ poverty, and sudden revolutions are alike unknown; and political passion, instead of spreading over the land like a torrent⁴³⁶ of desolation, spends its strength against the interests and the individual passions of every state.

Nevertheless, all commodities and ideas circulate throughout the union as freely as in a country inhabited by one people. Nothing checks the spirit of enterprise. The government avails itself of the assistance of all who have talents or knowledge to serve it. Within the frontiers of the union the profoundest peace prevails, as within the heart of some great empire; abroad, it ranks with the most powerful nations of the earth: two thousand miles of coast are open to the commerce of the world; and as it possesses the keys of the globe, its flag is respected in the most remote seas. The union is as happy and as free as a small people, and as glorious and as strong as a great nation.

 

 

 

 

WHY THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IS NOT ADAPTED TO ALL PEOPLES, AND HOW THE ANGLO-AMERICANS WERE ENABLED TO ADOPT IT.

Every federal System contains defects which baffle the efforts of the Legislator.—The federal System is complex.—It demands a daily Exercise of Discretion on the Part of the Citizens.—Practical knowledge of the Government common among the Americans.—Relative weakness of the Government of the union another defect inherent in the federal System.—The Americans have diminished without remedying it.—The Sovereignty of the separate States apparently weaker, but really stronger, than that of the union.—Why.—Natural causes of union must exist between confederate Peoples beside the Laws.—What these Causes are among the Anglo-Americans.—Maine and Georgia, separated by a Distance of a thousand Miles, more naturally united than Normandy and Britany.—War, the main Peril¹⁸⁹ of Confederations.—This proved even by the Example of the United States.—The union has no great Wars to fear.—Why.—Dangers to which Europeans would be exposed if they adopted the federal System of the Americans.

When a legislator succeeds, after persevering efforts, in exercising an indirect influence upon the destiny of nations, his genius is lauded⁴³⁷ by mankind, while in point of fact, the geographical position of the country which he is unable to change, a social condition which arose without his co-operation, manners and opinions which he cannot trace to their source, and an origin with which he is unacquainted, exercise so irresistible an influence over the courses of society, that he is himself borne away by the current, after an ineffectual resistance. Like the navigator, he may direct the vessel⁴³⁸ which bears him along, but he can neither change its structure, nor raise the winds, nor lull⁴³⁹ the waters which swell⁴⁴⁰ beneath him.

I have shown the advantages which the Americans derive from their federal system; it remains for me to point out the circumstances which render that system practicable, as its benefits are not to be enjoyed by all nations. The incidental defects of the federal system which originate in the laws may be corrected by the skill of the legislator, but there are farther evils inherent in the system which cannot be counteracted⁴⁴¹ by the peoples which adopt it. These nations must therefore find the strength necessary to support the natural imperfections of the government.

The most prominent evil of all federal systems is the very complex nature of the means they employ. Two sovereignties are necessarily in the presence of each other. The legislator may simplify and equalize the action of these two sovereignties, by limiting each of them to a sphere of authority accurately defined; but he cannot combine them into one, or prevent them from running into collision at certain points. The federal system therefore rests upon a theory which is necessarily complicated, and which demands the daily exercise of a considerable share of discretion on the part of those it governs.

A proposition must be plain to be adopted by the understanding of a people. A false notion, which is clear and precise, will always meet with a greater number of adherents⁴⁴² in the world than a true principle which is obscure or involved. Hence it arises that parties, which are like small communities in the heart of the nation, invariably adopt some principle or some name as a symbol, which very inadequately⁴⁴³ represents the end they have in view, and the means which are at their disposal, but without which they could neither act nor subsist. The governments which are founded upon a single principle or a single feeling which is easily defined, are perhaps not the best, but they are unquestionably the strongest and the most durable in the world.

In examining the constitution of the United States, which is the most perfect federal constitution that ever existed, one is startled, on the other hand, at the variety of information and the excellence⁴⁴⁴ of discretion which it presupposes in the people whom it is meant to govern. The government of the union depends entirely upon legal fictions; the union is an ideal notion which only exists in the mind, and whose limits and extent can only be discerned by the understanding.

When once the general theory is comprehended, numerous difficulties remain to be solved in its application; for the sovereignty of the union is so involved in that of the states, that it is impossible to distinguish its boundaries at the first glance. The whole structure of the government is artificial and conventional; and it would be ill-adapted to a people which has not long been accustomed to conduct its own affairs, or to one in which the science of politics has not descended⁴⁴⁵ to the humblest classes of society. I have never been more struck by the good sense and the practical judgment of the Americans than in the ingenious devices by which they elude³⁴⁹ the numberless difficulties resulting from their federal constitution. I scarcely ever met with a plain American citizen who could not distinguish, with surprising facility, the obligations created by the laws of congress from those created by the laws of his own state; and who, after having discriminated⁴⁴⁶ between the matters which come under the cognizance of the union, and those which the local legislature is competent to regulate, could not point out the exact limit of the several jurisdictions of the federal courts and the tribunals of the state.

The constitution of the United States is like those exquisite⁴⁴⁷ productions of human industry which ensure wealth and renown⁴⁴⁸ to their inventors, but which are profitless in any other hands. This truth is exemplified by the condition of Mexico at the present time. The Mexicans were desirous of establishing a federal system, and they took the federal constitution of their neighbors the Anglo-Americans as their model, and copied it with considerable accuracy.{157} But although they had borrowed the letter of the law, they were unable to create or to introduce the spirit and the sense which gave it life. They were involved in ceaseless embarrassments between the mechanism of their double government; the sovereignty of the states and that of the union perpetually exceeded their respective privileges, and entered into collision; and to the present day Mexico is alternately the victim of anarchy and the slave of military despotism.

The second and the most fatal of all the defects I have alluded⁴⁴⁹ to, and that which I believe to be inherent in the federal system, is the relative weakness of the government of the union. The principle upon which all confederations rest is that of a divided sovereignty. The legislator may render this partition less perceptible, he may even conceal it for a time from the public eye, but he cannot prevent it from existing; and a divided sovereignty must always be less powerful than an entire supremacy. The reader has seen in the remarks I have made on the constitution of the United States, that the Americans have displayed singular ingenuity⁴⁵⁰ in combining the restriction³⁵⁹ of the power of the union within the narrow limits of the federal government, with the semblance⁴⁵¹, and to a certain extent with the force of a national government. By this means the legislators of the union have succeeded in diminishing, though not in counteracting⁴⁵², the natural danger of confederations.

It has been remarked that the American government does not apply itself to the states, but that it immediately transmits its injunctions to the citizens, and compels them as isolated individuals to comply with its demands. But if the federal law were to clash with the interests and prejudices of a state, it might be feared that all the citizens of that state would conceive themselves to be interested in the cause of a single individual who should refuse to obey. If all the citizens of the state were aggrieved⁴⁵³ at the same time and in the same manner by the authority of the union, the federal government would vainly attempt to subdue³⁴⁴ them individually; they would instinctively⁴⁵⁵ unite in the common defence, and they would derive a ready-prepared organization from the share of sovereignty which the institution of their state allows them to enjoy. Fiction would give way to reality, and an organized portion of the territory might then contest the central authority.

The same observation holds good with regard to the federal jurisdiction. If the courts of the union violated an important law of a state in a private case, the real, if not the apparent contest would arise between the aggrieved state, represented by a citizen, and the union, represented by its courts of justice.{158}

He would have but a partial knowledge of the world who should imagine that it is possible, by the aid of legal fictions, to prevent men from finding out and employing those means of gratifying their passions which have been left open to them; and it may be doubted whether the American legislators, when they rendered a collision between the two sovereignties less probable, destroyed the causes of such a misfortune. But it may even be affirmed that they were unable to ensure the preponderance of the federal element in a case of this kind. The union is possessed of money and of troops, but the affections and the prejudices of the people are in the bosom of the states. The sovereignty of the union is an abstract being, which is connected with but few external objects; the sovereignty of the states is hourly perceptible, easily understood, constantly active; and if the former is of recent creation, the latter is coeval⁴⁵⁶ with the people itself. The sovereignty of the union is factitious, that of the states is natural, and derives⁴⁵⁷ its existence from its own simple influence, like the authority of a parent. The supreme power of the nation affects only a few of the chief interests of society; it represents an immense but remote country, and claims a feeling of patriotism which is vague and ill-defined; but the authority of the states controls every individual citizen at every hour and in all circumstances; it protects his property, his freedom, and his life; and when we recollect the traditions, the customs, the prejudices of local and familiar attachment with which it is connected, we cannot doubt the superiority of a power which is interwoven with every circumstance that renders the love of one's native country instinctive⁴⁵⁴ to the human heart.

Since legislators are unable to obviate such dangerous collisions as occur between the two sovereignties which co-exist in the federal system, their first object must be, not only to dissuade⁴⁵⁸ the confederate states from warfare⁴⁵⁹, but to encourage such institutions as may promote the maintenance of peace. Hence it results that the federal compact cannot be lasting⁴⁶⁰ unless there exists in the communities which are leagued together, a certain number of inducements to union which render their common dependance agreeable, and the task of the government light; and that system cannot succeed without the presence of favorable circumstances added to the influence of good laws. All the people which have ever formed a confederation have been held together by a certain number of common interests, which served as the intellectual ties of association.

But the sentiments and the principles of man must be taken into consideration as well as his immediate interest. A certain uniformity of civilisation is not less necessary to the durability of a confederation, than a uniformity of interests in the states which compose it. In Switzerland the difference which exists between the canton of Uri and the canton of Vaud is equal to that between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries; and, properly speaking, Switzerland has never possessed a federal government. The union between these two cantons only subsists⁴⁶¹ upon the map; and their discrepancies would soon be perceived if an attempt were made by a central authority to prescribe the same laws to the whole territory.

One of the circumstances which most powerfully contribute to support the federal government in America, is that the states have not only similar interests, a common origin, and a common tongue, but that they are also arrived at the same stage of civilisation; which almost always renders a union feasible. I do not know of any European nation, how small soever it may be, which does not present less uniformity in its different provinces than the American people, which occupies a territory as extensive as one half of Europe. The distance from the state of Maine to that of Georgia is reckoned at about one thousand miles; but the difference between the civilisation of Maine and that of Georgia is slighter than the difference between the habits of Normandy and those of Britany. Maine and Georgia, which are placed at the opposite extremities⁴⁶² of a great empire, are consequently in the natural possession of more real inducements to form a confederation than Normandy and Britany, which are only separated by a bridge.

The geographical position of the country contributed to increase the facilities which the American legislators derived from the manners and customs of the inhabitants; and it is to this circumstance that the adoption and the maintenance of the federal system are mainly attributable.

The most important occurrence which can mark the annals of a people is the breaking out of a war. In war a people struggle with the energy of a single man against foreign nations, in the defence of its very existence. The skill of a government, the good sense of the community, and the natural fondness which men entertain for their country, may suffice to maintain peace in the interior of a district, and to favor its internal prosperity; but a nation can only carry on a great war at the cost of more numerous and more painful sacrifices; and to suppose that a great number of men will of their own accord comply with the exigencies of the state, is to betray an ignorance of mankind. All the peoples which have been obliged to sustain a long and serious warfare have consequently been led to augment the power of their government. Those which have not succeeded in this attempt have been subjugated. A long war almost always places nations in the wretched alternative of being abandoned to ruin by defeat, or to despotism by success. War therefore renders the symptoms of the weakness of a government most palpable and most alarming; and I have shown that the inherent defect of federal governments is that of being weak.

The federal system is not only deficient⁴⁶³ in every kind of centralized administration, but the central government itself is imperfectly organized, which is invariably an influential⁴⁶⁴ cause of inferiority when the nation is opposed to other countries which are themselves governed by a single authority. In the federal constitution of the United States, by which the central government possesses more real force, this evil is still extremely sensible. An example will illustrate⁴⁶⁵ the case to the reader.

The constitution confers upon congress the right of "calling forth militia⁴⁶⁶ to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;" and another article declares that the president of the United States is the commander-in-chief of the militia. In the war of 1812, the president ordered the militia of the northern states to march to the frontiers; but Connecticut and Massachusetts, whose interests were impaired by the war, refused to obey the command. They argued that the constitution authorizes⁴⁶⁷ the federal government to call forth the militia in cases of insurrection or invasion, but that, in the present instance, there was neither invasion nor insurrection. They added, that the same constitution which conferred upon the union the right of calling forth the militia, reserved to the states that of naming the officers; and that consequently (as they understood the clause) no officer of the union had any right to command the militia, even during war, except the president in person: and in this case they were ordered to join an army commanded by another individual. These absurd and pernicious doctrines⁴⁶⁸ received the sanction not only of the governors and legislative bodies, but also of the courts of justice in both states; and the federal government was constrained to raise elsewhere the troops which it required.{159}

The only safeguard which the American union, with all the relative perfection of its laws, possesses against the dissolution which would be produced by a great war, lies in its probable exemption⁴⁶⁹ from that calamity⁴⁷⁰. Placed in the centre of an immense continent, which offers a boundless⁴⁷¹ field for human industry, the union is almost as much insulated from the world as if its frontiers were girt by the ocean. Canada contains only a million of inhabitants, and its population is divided into two inimical nations. The rigor⁷⁵ of the climate limits the extension of its territory, and shuts up its ports during the six months of winter. From Canada to the Gulf⁴⁷² of Mexico a few savage⁴⁷³ tribes are to be met with, which retire, perishing in their retreat, before six thousand soldiers. To the south, the union has a point of contact with the empire of Mexico; and it is thence that serious hostilities⁴⁷⁴ may one day be expected to arise. But for a long while to come, the uncivilized state of the Mexican community, the depravity of its morals, and its extreme poverty, will prevent that country from ranking high among nations. As for the powers of Europe, they are too distant to be formidable.{160}

The great advantage of the United States does not, then, consist in a federal constitution which allows them to carry on great wars, but in a geographical position, which renders such enterprises improbable.

No one can be more inclined than I am myself to appreciate the advantages of the federal system, which I hold to be one of the combinations most favorable to the prosperity and freedom of man. I envy the lot of those nations which have been enabled to adopt it; but I cannot believe that any confederate peoples could maintain a long or an equal contest with a nation of similar strength in which the government should be centralised. A people which should divide its sovereignty into fractional powers, in the presence of the great military monarchies of Europe, would, in my opinion, by that very act, abdicate²² its power, and perhaps its existence and its name. But such is the admirable position of the New World, that man has no other enemy than himself; and that in order to be happy and to be free, it suffices to seek the gifts of prosperity and the knowledge of freedom.

 

1 supreme   

adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的

参考例句：

• It was the supreme moment in his life.那是他一生中最重要的时刻。
• He handed up the indictment to the supreme court.他把起诉书送交最高法院。

2 reign   

n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势

参考例句：

• The reign of Queen Elizabeth lapped over into the seventeenth century.伊丽莎白王朝延至17世纪。
• The reign of Zhu Yuanzhang lasted about 31 years.朱元璋统治了大约三十一年。

3 constituent   

n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的

参考例句：

• Sugar is the main constituent of candy.食糖是糖果的主要成分。
• Fibre is a natural constituent of a healthy diet.纤维是健康饮食的天然组成部分。

4 interval   

n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息

参考例句：

• The interval between the two trees measures 40 feet.这两棵树的间隔是40英尺。
• There was a long interval before he anwsered the telephone.隔了好久他才回了电话。

5 promulgation   

n.颁布

参考例句：

• The new law comes into force from the day of its promulgation. 新法律自公布之日起生效。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Article 118 These Regulations shall come into effect from the day of their promulgation. 第一百一十八条本条例自公布之日起实施。 来自经济法规部分

6 simultaneously   

adv.同时发生地，同时进行地

参考例句：

• The radar beam can track a number of targets almost simultaneously.雷达波几乎可以同时追着多个目标。
• The Windows allow a computer user to execute multiple programs simultaneously.Windows允许计算机用户同时运行多个程序。

7 yoke   

n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶

参考例句：

• An ass and an ox,fastened to the same yoke,were drawing a wagon.驴子和公牛一起套在轭上拉车。
• The defeated army passed under the yoke.败军在轭门下通过。

8 possessed   

adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的

参考例句：

• He flew out of the room like a man possessed.他像着了魔似地猛然冲出房门。
• He behaved like someone possessed.他行为举止像是魔怔了。

9 sufficiently   

adv.足够地，充分地

参考例句：

• It turned out he had not insured the house sufficiently.原来他没有给房屋投足保险。
• The new policy was sufficiently elastic to accommodate both views.新政策充分灵活地适用两种观点。

10 consolidate   

v.使加固，使加强；(把...)联为一体，合并

参考例句：

• The two banks will consolidate in July next year. 这两家银行明年7月将合并。
• The government hoped to consolidate ten states to form three new ones.政府希望把十个州合并成三个新的州。

11 peculiar   

adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的

参考例句：

• He walks in a peculiar fashion.他走路的样子很奇特。
• He looked at me with a very peculiar expression.他用一种很奇怪的表情看着我。

12 defective   

adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的

参考例句：

• The firm had received bad publicity over a defective product. 该公司因为一件次品而受到媒体攻击。
• If the goods prove defective, the customer has the right to compensation. 如果货品证明有缺陷， 顾客有权索赔。

13 subsisted   

v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• Before liberation he subsisted on wild potatoes. 解放前他靠吃野薯度日。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• Survivors of the air crash subsisted on wild fruits. 空难事件的幸存者以野果维持生命。 来自辞典例句

14 subsist   

vi.生存，存在，供养

参考例句：

• We are unable to subsist without air and water.没有空气和水我们就活不下去。
• He could subsist on bark and grass roots in the isolated island.在荒岛上他只能靠树皮和草根维持生命。

15 condemn   

vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑

参考例句：

• Some praise him,whereas others condemn him.有些人赞扬他，而有些人谴责他。
• We mustn't condemn him on mere suppositions.我们不可全凭臆测来指责他。

16 condemned   

adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词

参考例句：

• He condemned the hypocrisy of those politicians who do one thing and say another. 他谴责了那些说一套做一套的政客的虚伪。
• The policy has been condemned as a regressive step. 这项政策被认为是一种倒退而受到谴责。

17 outrages   

引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• People are seeking retribution for the latest terrorist outrages. 人们在设法对恐怖分子最近的暴行进行严惩。
• He [She] is not allowed to commit any outrages. 不能任其胡作非为。

18 dependence   

n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属

参考例句：

• Doctors keep trying to break her dependence of the drug.医生们尽力使她戒除毒瘾。
• He was freed from financial dependence on his parents.他在经济上摆脱了对父母的依赖。

19 verge   

n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临

参考例句：

• The country's economy is on the verge of collapse.国家的经济已到了崩溃的边缘。
• She was on the verge of bursting into tears.她快要哭出来了。

20 pinnacle   

n.尖塔，尖顶，山峰；(喻)顶峰

参考例句：

• Now he is at the very pinnacle of his career.现在他正值事业中的顶峰时期。
• It represents the pinnacle of intellectual capability.它代表了智能的顶峰。

21 wont   

adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯

参考例句：

• He was wont to say that children are lazy.他常常说小孩子们懒惰。
• It is his wont to get up early.早起是他的习惯。

22 abdicate   

v.让位，辞职，放弃

参考例句：

• The reason I wnat to abdicate is to try something different.我辞职是因为我想尝试些不一样的东西。
• Yuan Shikai forced emperor to abdicate and hand over power to him.袁世凯逼迫皇帝逊位，把政权交给了他。

23 abdicated   

放弃（职责、权力等）( abdicate的过去式和过去分词 )； 退位，逊位

参考例句：

• He abdicated in favour of his son. 他把王位让给了儿子。
• King Edward Ⅷ abdicated in 1936 to marry a commoner. 国王爱德华八世于1936年退位与一个平民结婚。

24 considerably   

adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上

参考例句：

• The economic situation has changed considerably.经济形势已发生了相当大的变化。
• The gap has narrowed considerably.分歧大大缩小了。

25 geographical   

adj.地理的；地区(性)的

参考例句：

• The current survey will have a wider geographical spread.当前的调查将在更广泛的地域范围內进行。
• These birds have a wide geographical distribution.这些鸟的地理分布很广。

26 valor   

n.勇气，英勇

参考例句：

• Fortitude is distinct from valor.坚韧不拔有别于勇猛。
• Frequently banality is the better parts of valor.老生常谈往往比大胆打破常规更为人称道。

27 patriotism   

n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义

参考例句：

• His new book is a demonstration of his patriotism.他写的新书是他的爱国精神的证明。
• They obtained money under the false pretenses of patriotism.他们以虚伪的爱国主义为借口获得金钱。

28 foes   

敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• They steadily pushed their foes before them. 他们不停地追击敌人。
• She had fought many battles, vanquished many foes. 她身经百战，挫败过很多对手。

29 stifled   

（使）窒息， （使）窒闷( stifle的过去式和过去分词 )； 镇压，遏制； 堵

参考例句：

• The gas stifled them. 煤气使他们窒息。
• The rebellion was stifled. 叛乱被镇压了。

30 devouring   

吞没( devour的现在分词 )； 耗尽； 津津有味地看； 狼吞虎咽地吃光

参考例句：

• The hungry boy was devouring his dinner. 那饥饿的孩子狼吞虎咽地吃饭。
• He is devouring novel after novel. 他一味贪看小说。

31 bosom   

n.胸，胸部；胸怀；内心；adj.亲密的

参考例句：

• She drew a little book from her bosom.她从怀里取出一本小册子。
• A dark jealousy stirred in his bosom.他内心生出一阵恶毒的嫉妒。

32 scrutinizing   

v.仔细检查，详审( scrutinize的现在分词 )

参考例句：

• His grandfather's stern eyes were scrutinizing him, and Chueh-hui felt his face reddening. 祖父的严厉的眼光射在他的脸上。 来自汉英文学 - 家（1-26） - 家（1-26）
• The machine hushed, extraction and injection nozzles poised, scrutinizing its targets. 机器“嘘”地一声静了下来，输入输出管道各就各位，检查着它的目标。 来自互联网

33 apprised   

v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价

参考例句：

• We were fully apprised of the situation. 我们完全获悉当时的情况。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• I have apprised him of your arrival. 我已经告诉他你要来。 来自《现代英汉综合大词典》

34 fully   

adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地

参考例句：

• The doctor asked me to breathe in,then to breathe out fully.医生让我先吸气，然后全部呼出。
• They soon became fully integrated into the local community.他们很快就完全融入了当地人的圈子。

35 wrung   

绞( wring的过去式和过去分词 )； 握紧（尤指别人的手）； 把（湿衣服）拧干； 绞掉（水）

参考例句：

• He has wrung the words from their true meaning. 他曲解这些字的真正意义。
• He wrung my hand warmly. 他热情地紧握我的手。

36 inadequacy   

n.无法胜任，信心不足

参考例句：

• the inadequacy of our resources 我们的资源的贫乏
• The failure is due to the inadequacy of preparations. 这次失败是由于准备不足造成的。

37 err   

vi.犯错误，出差错

参考例句：

• He did not err by a hair's breadth in his calculation.他的计算结果一丝不差。
• The arrows err not from their aim.箭无虚发。

38 prosper   

v.成功，兴隆，昌盛；使成功，使昌隆，繁荣

参考例句：

• With her at the wheel,the company began to prosper.有了她当主管，公司开始兴旺起来。
• It is my earnest wish that this company will continue to prosper.我真诚希望这家公司会继续兴旺发达。

39 exigencies   

n.急切需要

参考例句：

• Many people are forced by exigencies of circumstance to take some part in them. 许多人由于境况所逼又不得不在某种程度上参与这种活动。
• The people had to accept the harsh exigencies of war. 人们要承受战乱的严酷现实。

40 penetrated   

adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式

参考例句：

• The knife had penetrated his chest. 刀子刺入了他的胸膛。
• They penetrated into territory where no man had ever gone before. 他们已进入先前没人去过的地区。

41 penetrate   

v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解

参考例句：

• Western ideas penetrate slowly through the East.西方观念逐渐传入东方。
• The sunshine could not penetrate where the trees were thickest.阳光不能透入树木最浓密的地方。

42 enumerated   

v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• A spokesperson enumerated the strikers' demands. 发言人列数罢工者的要求。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He enumerated the capitals of the 50 states. 他列举了50个州的首府。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

43 destined   

adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的

参考例句：

• It was destined that they would marry.他们结婚是缘分。
• The shipment is destined for America.这批货物将运往美国。

44 prerogative   

n.特权

参考例句：

• It is within his prerogative to do so.他是有权这样做的。
• Making such decisions is not the sole prerogative of managers.作这类决定并不是管理者的专有特权。

45 akin   

adj.同族的，类似的

参考例句：

• She painted flowers and birds pictures akin to those of earlier feminine painters.她画一些同早期女画家类似的花鸟画。
• Listening to his life story is akin to reading a good adventure novel.听他的人生故事犹如阅读一本精彩的冒险小说。

46 levying   

征（兵）( levy的现在分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税

参考例句：

• The high tax will be given levying to the foreign country car. 对外国汽车要予以征收高税。
• Levying estate income tax are considered to be goods tax. 遗产税是在财产所有者死亡后所征收的税。

47 monarchy   

n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国

参考例句：

• The monarchy in England plays an important role in British culture.英格兰的君主政体在英国文化中起重要作用。
• The power of the monarchy in Britain today is more symbolical than real.今日英国君主的权力多为象徵性的，无甚实际意义。

48 monetary   

adj.货币的，钱的；通货的；金融的；财政的

参考例句：

• The monetary system of some countries used to be based on gold.过去有些国家的货币制度是金本位制的。
• Education in the wilderness is not a matter of monetary means.荒凉地区的教育不是钱财问题。

49 authorized   

a.委任的，许可的

参考例句：

• An administrative order is valid if authorized by a statute.如果一个行政命令得到一个法规的认可那么这个命令就是有效的。

50 interfere   

v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰

参考例句：

• If we interfere, it may do more harm than good.如果我们干预的话，可能弊多利少。
• When others interfere in the affair,it always makes troubles. 别人一卷入这一事件，棘手的事情就来了。

51 determined   

adj.坚定的；有决心的

参考例句：

• I have determined on going to Tibet after graduation.我已决定毕业后去西藏。
• He determined to view the rooms behind the office.他决定查看一下办公室后面的房间。

52 enact   

vt.制定(法律)；上演，扮演

参考例句：

• The U.S. Congress has exclusive authority to enact federal legislation.美国国会是唯一有权颁布联邦法律的。
• For example,a country can enact laws and economic policies to attract foreign investment fairly quickly.例如一个国家可以很快颁布吸引外资的法令和经济政策。

53 unlimited   

adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的

参考例句：

• They flew over the unlimited reaches of the Arctic.他们飞过了茫茫无边的北极上空。
• There is no safety in unlimited technological hubris.在技术方面自以为是会很危险。

54 monarchies   

n. 君主政体, 君主国, 君主政治

参考例句：

• It cleared away a number of monarchies. 它清除了好几个君主政体。
• Nowadays, there are few monarchies left in the world. 现在世界上君主制的国家已经很少了。

55 assent   

v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可

参考例句：

• I cannot assent to what you ask.我不能应允你的要求。
• The new bill passed by Parliament has received Royal Assent.议会所通过的新方案已获国王批准。

56 impost   

n.进口税，关税

参考例句：

• Exemption from wharfage dues and any export tax,duty,impost and fees.免除任何码头费及任何出口税、关税、进口税费。
• In the situation of zollverein,the basic principles of impost reformation are the same.作者认为，在单边、多边或者在关税同盟的情况下，关税改革的基本原则都是一样的。

57 levied   

征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税

参考例句：

• Taxes should be levied more on the rich than on the poor. 向富人征收的税应该比穷人的多。
• Heavy fines were levied on motoring offenders. 违规驾车者会遭到重罚。

58 binding   

有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的

参考例句：

• The contract was not signed and has no binding force. 合同没有签署因而没有约束力。
• Both sides have agreed that the arbitration will be binding. 双方都赞同仲裁具有约束力。

59 legislative   

n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的

参考例句：

• Congress is the legislative branch of the U.S. government.国会是美国政府的立法部门。
• Today's hearing was just the first step in the legislative process.今天的听证会只是展开立法程序的第一步。

60 logic   

n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性

参考例句：

• What sort of logic is that?这是什么逻辑？
• I don't follow the logic of your argument.我不明白你的论点逻辑性何在。

61 conciliation   

n.调解，调停

参考例句：

• By conciliation,cooperation is established.通过调解，友好合作关系得以确立。
• Their attempts at conciliation had failed and both sides were once again in dispute.他们进行调停的努力失败了，双方再次陷入争吵。

62 lesser   

adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地

参考例句：

• Kept some of the lesser players out.不让那些次要的球员参加联赛。
• She has also been affected,but to a lesser degree.她也受到波及，但程度较轻。

63 subscribe   

vi.(to)订阅，订购；同意；vt.捐助，赞助

参考例句：

• I heartily subscribe to that sentiment.我十分赞同那个观点。
• The magazine is trying to get more readers to subscribe.该杂志正大力发展新订户。

64 doctrine   

n.教义；主义；学说

参考例句：

• He was impelled to proclaim his doctrine.他不得不宣扬他的教义。
• The council met to consider changes to doctrine.宗教议会开会考虑更改教义。

65 abdicating   

放弃（职责、权力等）( abdicate的现在分词 )； 退位，逊位

参考例句：

• It is merely claimed that this is abdicating to save itself. 他仅仅把这称之为是人的高傲为了自我救赎而退出了王座。
• A complete hands-off approach is abdicating your business responsibility. 彻底的不闻不问意味着你对自己事业责任的放弃。

66 insignificant   

adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的

参考例句：

• In winter the effect was found to be insignificant.在冬季，这种作用是不明显的。
• This problem was insignificant compared to others she faced.这一问题与她面临的其他问题比较起来算不得什么。

67 annul   

v.宣告…无效，取消，废止

参考例句：

• They have the power to alter or annul inappropriate decisions of their own standing committees.他们有权改变或者撤销本级人民代表大会常务委员会不适当的决定。
• The courts later found grounds to annul the results,after the king urged them to sort out the "mess".在国王敦促法庭收拾烂摊子后，法庭随后宣布废除选举结果。

68 annulled   

v.宣告无效( annul的过去式和过去分词 )；取消；使消失；抹去

参考例句：

• Their marriage was annulled after just six months. 他们的婚姻仅过半年就宣告取消。
• Many laws made by the former regime have been annulled. 前政权制定的许多法律被宣布无效。 来自《简明英汉词典》

69 evade   

vt.逃避，回避；避开，躲避

参考例句：

• He tried to evade the embarrassing question.他企图回避这令人难堪的问题。
• You are in charge of the job.How could you evade the issue?你是负责人，你怎么能对这个问题不置可否？

70 evaded   

逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出

参考例句：

• For two weeks they evaded the press. 他们有两周一直避而不见记者。
• The lion evaded the hunter. 那狮子躲开了猎人。

71 irreconcilable   

adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的

参考例句：

• These practices are irreconcilable with the law of the Church.这种做法与教规是相悖的。
• These old concepts are irreconcilable with modern life.这些陈旧的观念与现代生活格格不入。

72 decided   

adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的

参考例句：

• This gave them a decided advantage over their opponents.这使他们比对手具有明显的优势。
• There is a decided difference between British and Chinese way of greeting.英国人和中国人打招呼的方式有很明显的区别。

73 preponderate   

v.数目超过；占优势

参考例句：

• Christians preponderate in the population of that part of the country.基督教徒在该国那一地区的人口中居多。
• Oaks and maples preponderate in our woods.在我们的森林中，橡树与枫树占多数。

74 preponderates   

v.超过，胜过( preponderate的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• This reason preponderates over all others. 这个理由较所有其他理由重要。 来自辞典例句

75 rigor   

n.严酷，严格，严厉

参考例句：

• Their analysis lacks rigor.他们的分析缺乏严谨性。||The crime will be treated with the full rigor of the law.这一罪行会严格依法审理。

76 politic   

adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政

参考例句：

• He was too politic to quarrel with so important a personage.他很聪明，不会与这么重要的人争吵。
• The politic man tried not to offend people.那个精明的人尽量不得罪人。

77 enjoyment   

n.乐趣；享有；享用

参考例句：

• Your company adds to the enjoyment of our visit. 有您的陪同，我们这次访问更加愉快了。
• After each joke the old man cackled his enjoyment.每逢讲完一个笑话，这老人就呵呵笑着表示他的高兴。

78 variance   

n.矛盾，不同

参考例句：

• The question of woman suffrage sets them at variance. 妇女参政的问题使他们发生争执。
• It is unnatural for brothers to be at variance. 兄弟之间不睦是不近人情的。

79 irresistible   

adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的

参考例句：

• The wheel of history rolls forward with an irresistible force.历史车轮滚滚向前，势不可挡。
• She saw an irresistible skirt in the store window.她看见商店的橱窗里有一条叫人着迷的裙子。

80 legitimate   

adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法

参考例句：

• Sickness is a legitimate reason for asking for leave.生病是请假的一个正当的理由。
• That's a perfectly legitimate fear.怀有这种恐惧完全在情理之中。

81 opposition   

n.反对，敌对

参考例句：

• The party leader is facing opposition in his own backyard.该党领袖在自己的党內遇到了反对。
• The police tried to break down the prisoner's opposition.警察设法制住了那个囚犯的反抗。

82 habitual   

adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的

参考例句：

• He is a habitual criminal.他是一个惯犯。
• They are habitual visitors to our house.他们是我家的常客。

83 constraint   

n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物

参考例句：

• The boy felt constraint in her presence.那男孩在她面前感到局促不安。
• The lack of capital is major constraint on activities in the informal sector.资本短缺也是影响非正规部门生产经营的一个重要制约因素。

84 mechanism   

n.机械装置；机构，结构

参考例句：

• The bones and muscles are parts of the mechanism of the body.骨骼和肌肉是人体的组成部件。
• The mechanism of the machine is very complicated.这台机器的结构是非常复杂的。

85 attested   

adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓

参考例句：

• The handwriting expert attested to the genuineness of the signature. 笔迹专家作证该签名无讹。 来自《现代英汉综合大词典》
• Witnesses attested his account. 几名证人都证实了他的陈述是真实的。 来自《简明英汉词典》

86 provincial   

adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人

参考例句：

• City dwellers think country folk have provincial attitudes.城里人以为乡下人思想迂腐。
• Two leading cadres came down from the provincial capital yesterday.昨天从省里下来了两位领导干部。

87 purely   

adv.纯粹地，完全地

参考例句：

• I helped him purely and simply out of friendship.我帮他纯粹是出于友情。
• This disproves the theory that children are purely imitative.这证明认为儿童只会单纯地模仿的理论是站不住脚的。

88 judicial   

adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的

参考例句：

• He is a man with a judicial mind.他是个公正的人。
• Tom takes judicial proceedings against his father.汤姆对他的父亲正式提出诉讼。

89 impeachment   

n.弹劾；控告；怀疑

参考例句：

• Impeachment is considered a drastic measure in the United States.在美国，弹劾被视为一种非常激烈的措施。
• The verdict resulting from his impeachment destroyed his political career.他遭弹劾后得到的判决毁了他的政治生涯。

90 ratified   

v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• The treaty was declared invalid because it had not been ratified. 条约没有得到批准，因此被宣布无效。
• The treaty was ratified by all the member states. 这个条约得到了所有成员国的批准。

91 definitively   

adv.决定性地，最后地

参考例句：

• None of the three super-states could be definitively conquered even by the other two in combination. 三个超级国家中的任何一国都不可能被任何两国的联盟所绝对打败。 来自英汉文学
• Therefore, nothing can ever be definitively proved with a photograph. 因此，没有什么可以明确了一张照片。 来自互联网

92 inspection   

n.检查，审查，检阅

参考例句：

• On random inspection the meat was found to be bad.经抽查，发现肉变质了。
• The soldiers lined up for their daily inspection by their officers.士兵们列队接受军官的日常检阅。

93 fixed   

adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的

参考例句：

• Have you two fixed on a date for the wedding yet?你们俩选定婚期了吗？
• Once the aim is fixed,we should not change it arbitrarily.目标一旦确定，我们就不应该随意改变。

94 magistrate   

n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官

参考例句：

• The magistrate committed him to prison for a month.法官判处他一个月监禁。
• John was fined 1000 dollars by the magistrate.约翰被地方法官罚款1000美元。

95 temperate   

adj.温和的，温带的，自我克制的，不过分的

参考例句：

• Asia extends across the frigid,temperate and tropical zones.亚洲地跨寒、温、热三带。
• Great Britain has a temperate climate.英国气候温和。

96 perfectly   

adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The witnesses were each perfectly certain of what they said.证人们个个对自己所说的话十分肯定。
• Everything that we're doing is all perfectly above board.我们做的每件事情都是光明正大的。

97 bribed   

v.贿赂( bribe的过去式和过去分词 )；向（某人）行贿，贿赂

参考例句：

• They bribed him with costly presents. 他们用贵重的礼物贿赂他。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• He bribed himself onto the committee. 他暗通关节，钻营投机挤进了委员会。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

98 corruption   

n.腐败，堕落，贪污

参考例句：

• The people asked the government to hit out against corruption and theft.人民要求政府严惩贪污盗窃。
• The old man reviled against corruption.那老人痛斥了贪污舞弊。

99 corrupt   

v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的

参考例句：

• The newspaper alleged the mayor's corrupt practices.那家报纸断言市长有舞弊行为。
• This judge is corrupt.这个法官贪污。

100 incompetent   

adj.无能力的，不能胜任的

参考例句：

• He is utterly incompetent at his job.他完全不能胜任他的工作。
• He is incompetent at working with his hands.他动手能力不行。

101 fulfill   

vt.履行，实现，完成；满足，使满意

参考例句：

• If you make a promise you should fulfill it.如果你许诺了，你就要履行你的诺言。
• This company should be able to fulfill our requirements.这家公司应该能够满足我们的要求。

102 undertakings   

企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务

参考例句：

• The principle of diligence and frugality applies to all undertakings. 勤俭节约的原则适用于一切事业。
• Such undertakings require the precise planning and foresight of military operations. 此举要求军事上战役中所需要的准确布置和预见。

103 clog   

vt.塞满，阻塞；n.[常pl.]木屐

参考例句：

• In cotton and wool processing,short length fibers may clog sewers.在棉毛生产中，短纤维可能堵塞下水管道。
• These streets often clog during the rush hour.这几条大街在交通高峰时间常常发生交通堵塞。

104 annulling   

v.宣告无效( annul的现在分词 )；取消；使消失；抹去

参考例句：

• Cancellation: Voiding a debt by annulling or paying it. 撤销，解除[债务]:以取消或偿付的办法使一笔债务失效。 来自互联网

105 obviated   

v.避免，消除（贫困、不方便等）( obviate的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

106 obviate   

v.除去，排除，避免，预防

参考例句：

• Improved public transportation would obviate the need tor everyone to have their own car.公共交通的改善消除了每人都要有车的必要性。
• This deferral would obviate pressure on the rouble exchange rate.这一延期将消除卢布汇率面临的压力。

107 counteract   

vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消

参考例句：

• The doctor gave him some medicine to counteract the effect of the poison.医生给他些药解毒。
• Our work calls for mutual support.We shouldn't counteract each other's efforts.工作要互相支持，不要互相拆台。

108 propensity   

n.倾向；习性

参考例句：

• He has a propensity for drinking too much alcohol.他有酗酒的倾向。
• She hasn't reckoned on his propensity for violence.她不曾料到他有暴力倾向。

109 persevering   

a.坚忍不拔的

参考例句：

• They will only triumph by persevering in their struggle against natural calamities. 他们只有坚持与自然灾害搏斗，才能取得胜利。
• Success belongs to the persevering. 胜利属于不屈不挠的人。

110 motives   

n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• to impeach sb's motives 怀疑某人的动机
• His motives are unclear. 他的用意不明。

111 motive   

n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的

参考例句：

• The police could not find a motive for the murder.警察不能找到谋杀的动机。
• He had some motive in telling this fable.他讲这寓言故事是有用意的。

112 virtue   

n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力

参考例句：

• He was considered to be a paragon of virtue.他被认为是品德尽善尽美的典范。
• You need to decorate your mind with virtue.你应该用德行美化心灵。

113 conceal   

v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽

参考例句：

• He had to conceal his identity to escape the police.为了躲避警方，他只好隐瞒身份。
• He could hardly conceal his joy at his departure.他几乎掩饰不住临行时的喜悦。

114 concealed   

a.隐藏的，隐蔽的

参考例句：

• The paintings were concealed beneath a thick layer of plaster. 那些画被隐藏在厚厚的灰泥层下面。
• I think he had a gun concealed about his person. 我认为他当时身上藏有一支枪。

115 supremacy   

n.至上；至高权力

参考例句：

• No one could challenge her supremacy in gymnastics.她是最优秀的体操运动员，无人能胜过她。
• Theoretically,she holds supremacy as the head of the state.从理论上说，她作为国家的最高元首拥有至高无上的权力。

116 mere   

adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过

参考例句：

• That is a mere repetition of what you said before.那不过是重复了你以前讲的话。
• It's a mere waste of time waiting any longer.再等下去纯粹是浪费时间。

117 discrepancies   

n.差异，不符合（之处），不一致（之处）( discrepancy的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• wide discrepancies in prices quoted for the work 这项工作的报价出入很大
• When both versions of the story were collated,major discrepancies were found. 在将这个故事的两个版本对照后，找出了主要的不符之处。 来自《简明英汉词典》

118 irrelevant   

adj.不恰当的，无关系的，不相干的

参考例句：

• That is completely irrelevant to the subject under discussion.这跟讨论的主题完全不相关。
• A question about arithmetic is irrelevant in a music lesson.在音乐课上，一个数学的问题是风马牛不相及的。

119 etiquette   

n.礼仪，礼节；规矩

参考例句：

• The rules of etiquette are not so strict nowadays.如今的礼仪规则已不那么严格了。
• According to etiquette,you should stand up to meet a guest.按照礼节你应该站起来接待客人。

120 royalty   

n.皇家，皇族

参考例句：

• She claims to be descended from royalty.她声称她是皇室后裔。
• I waited on tables，and even catered to royalty at the Royal Albert Hall.我做过服务生， 甚至在皇家阿伯特大厅侍奉过皇室的人。

121 accustom   

vt.使适应，使习惯

参考例句：

• It took him a while to accustom himself to the idea.他过了一段时间才习惯这个想法。
• It'shouldn't take long to accustom your students to working in groups.你的学生应该很快就会习惯分组学习的。

122 accost   

v.向人搭话，打招呼

参考例句：

• He ruminated on his defenses before he should accost her father.他在与她父亲搭话前，仔细地考虑着他的防范措施。
• They have been assigned to accost strangers and extract secrets from them.他们被指派去与生疏人搭讪从并从他们那里套出奥秘。

123 demeanor   

n.行为；风度

参考例句：

• She is quiet in her demeanor.她举止文静。
• The old soldier never lost his military demeanor.那个老军人从来没有失去军人风度。

124 paramount   

a.最重要的，最高权力的

参考例句：

• My paramount object is to save the Union and destroy slavery.我的最高目标是拯救美国，摧毁奴隶制度。
• Nitrogen is of paramount importance to life on earth.氮对地球上的生命至关重要。

125 ordain   

vi.颁发命令；vt.命令，授以圣职，注定，任命

参考例句：

• The church's ruling body voted to ordain women as priests.该教会的管理机构投票通过接纳女性为牧师。
• The essence of management refers to its internal inevitable ordain quality,and is also called ultimate attribute.管理的本质是指管理自身内在的必然的规定性，即根本属性。

126 nomination   

n.提名，任命，提名权

参考例句：

• John is favourite to get the nomination for club president.约翰最有希望被提名为俱乐部主席。
• Few people pronounced for his nomination.很少人表示赞成他的提名。

127 chamber   

n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所

参考例句：

• For many,the dentist's surgery remains a torture chamber.对许多人来说，牙医的治疗室一直是间受刑室。
• The chamber was ablaze with light.会议厅里灯火辉煌。

128 chambers   

n.房间( chamber的名词复数 )；（议会的）议院；卧室；会议厅

参考例句：

• The body will be removed into one of the cold storage chambers. 尸体将被移到一个冷冻间里。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Mr Chambers's readable book concentrates on the middle passage: the time Ransome spent in Russia. Chambers先生的这本值得一看的书重点在中间：Ransome在俄国的那几年。 来自互联网

129 indirectly   

adv.间接地，不直接了当地

参考例句：

• I heard the news indirectly.这消息我是间接听来的。
• They were approached indirectly through an intermediary.通过一位中间人，他们进行了间接接触。

130 analogous   

adj.相似的；类似的

参考例句：

• The two situations are roughly analogous.两种情況大致相似。
• The company is in a position closely analogous to that of its main rival.该公司与主要竞争对手的处境极为相似。

131 labors   

v.努力争取(for)( labor的第三人称单数 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转

参考例句：

• He was tiresome in contending for the value of his own labors. 他老为他自己劳动的价值而争强斗胜，令人生厌。 来自辞典例句
• Farm labors used to hire themselves out for the summer. 农业劳动者夏季常去当雇工。 来自辞典例句

132 durability   

n.经久性，耐用性

参考例句：

• Nylons have the virtue of durability.尼龙丝袜有耐穿的优点。

133 hereditary   

adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的

参考例句：

• The Queen of England is a hereditary ruler.英国女王是世袭的统治者。
• In men,hair loss is hereditary.男性脱发属于遗传。

134 scrutiny   

n.详细检查，仔细观察

参考例句：

• His work looks all right,but it will not bear scrutiny.他的工作似乎很好，但是经不起仔细检查。
• Few wives in their forties can weather such a scrutiny.很少年过四十的妻子经得起这么仔细的观察。

135 essentially   

adv.本质上，实质上，基本上

参考例句：

• Really great men are essentially modest.真正的伟人大都很谦虚。
• She is an essentially selfish person.她本质上是个自私自利的人。

136 penetrates   

v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 )；刺入；了解；渗透

参考例句：

• This is a telescope that penetrates to the remote parts of the universe. 这是一架能看到宇宙中遥远地方的望远镜。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The dust is so fine that it easily penetrates all the buildings. 尘土极细，能极轻易地钻入一切建筑物。 来自辞典例句

137 functionaries   

n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• The Indian transmitters were court functionaries, not missionaries. 印度文化的传递者都是朝廷的官员而不是传教士。 来自辞典例句
• All government institutions functionaries must implement state laws, decrees and policies. 所有政府机关极其工作人员都必须认真执行国家的法律，法规和政策。 来自互联网

138 derive   

v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自

参考例句：

• We derive our sustenance from the land.我们从土地获取食物。
• We shall derive much benefit from reading good novels.我们将从优秀小说中获得很大好处。

139 nominations   

n.提名，任命( nomination的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• Nominations are invited for the post of party chairman. 为党主席职位征集候选人。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Much coverage surrounded his abortive bids for the 1960,1964, and 1968 Republican Presidential nominations. 许多消息报道都围绕着1960年、1964年和1968年他为争取提名为共和党总统候选人所做努力的失败。 来自辞典例句

140 sergeant   

n.警官，中士

参考例句：

• His elder brother is a sergeant.他哥哥是个警官。
• How many stripes are there on the sleeve of a sergeant?陆军中士的袖子上有多少条纹？

141 mooted   

adj.未决定的，有争议的，有疑问的v.提出…供讨论( moot的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• The is sue was mooted on the Senate floor. 该问题在参院被提出讨论。 来自辞典例句
• The question mooted in the board meeting is still a moot point. 那个在董事会上（提出讨论）的问题仍（未决的）。 来自互联网

142 treasury   

n.宝库；国库，金库；文库

参考例句：

• The Treasury was opposed in principle to the proposals.财政部原则上反对这些提案。
• This book is a treasury of useful information.这本书是有价值的信息宝库。

143 prerogatives   

n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 )；特权；大主教法庭；总督委任组成的法庭

参考例句：

• The tsar protected his personal prerogatives. 沙皇维护了自己的私人特权。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Congressmen may be reluctant to vote for legislation that infringes the traditional prerogatives of the states. 美国国会议员可能不情愿投票拥护侵犯各州传统特权的立法。 来自英汉非文学 - 环境法 - 环境法

144 vigor   

n.活力，精力，元气

参考例句：

• The choir sang the words out with great vigor.合唱团以极大的热情唱出了歌词。
• She didn't want to be reminded of her beauty or her former vigor.现在，她不愿人们提起她昔日的美丽和以前的精力充沛。

145 dominion   

n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图

参考例句：

• Alexander held dominion over a vast area.亚历山大曾统治过辽阔的地域。
• In the affluent society,the authorities are hardly forced to justify their dominion.在富裕社会里，当局几乎无需证明其统治之合理。

146 circumscribed   

adj.[医]局限的：受限制或限于有限空间的v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；划定…范围；限制；限定

参考例句：

• The power of the monarchy was circumscribed by the new law. 君主统治的权力受到了新法律的制约。
• His activities have been severely circumscribed since his illness. 自生病以来他的行动一直受到严格的限制。 来自《简明英汉词典》

147 circumscribe   

v.在...周围划线，限制，约束

参考例句：

• Please circumscribe the words which are wrongly spelled.请将拼错的词圈出来。
• The principal has requested all teachers to circumscribe failures in red on the report cards.这项规定要求，所有老师均要在报告卡用红笔上标出错误所在。

148 prodigious   

adj.惊人的，奇妙的；异常的；巨大的；庞大的

参考例句：

• This business generates cash in prodigious amounts.这种业务收益丰厚。
• He impressed all who met him with his prodigious memory.他惊人的记忆力让所有见过他的人都印象深刻。

149 persevere   

v.坚持，坚忍，不屈不挠

参考例句：

• They are determined to persevere in the fight.他们决心坚持战斗。
• It is strength of character enabled him to persevere.他那坚强的性格使他能够坚持不懈。

150 inflicting   

把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 )

参考例句：

• He was charged with maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm. 他被控蓄意严重伤害他人身体。
• It's impossible to do research without inflicting some pain on animals. 搞研究不让动物遭点罪是不可能的。

151 zealous   

adj.狂热的，热心的

参考例句：

• She made zealous efforts to clean up the classroom.她非常热心地努力清扫教室。
• She is a zealous supporter of our cause.她是我们事业的热心支持者。

152 zeal   

n.热心，热情，热忱

参考例句：

• Revolutionary zeal caught them up,and they joined the army.革命热情激励他们，于是他们从军了。
• They worked with great zeal to finish the project.他们热情高涨地工作，以期完成这个项目。

153 deviation   

n.背离，偏离；偏差，偏向；离题

参考例句：

• Deviation from this rule are very rare.很少有违反这条规则的。
• Any deviation from the party's faith is seen as betrayal.任何对党的信仰的偏离被视作背叛。

154 applied   

adj.应用的；v.应用，适用

参考例句：

• She plans to take a course in applied linguistics.她打算学习应用语言学课程。
• This cream is best applied to the face at night.这种乳霜最好晚上擦脸用。

155 lure   

n.吸引人的东西，诱惑物；vt.引诱，吸引

参考例句：

• Life in big cities is a lure for many country boys.大城市的生活吸引着许多乡下小伙子。
• He couldn't resist the lure of money.他不能抵制金钱的诱惑。

156 inflame   

v.使燃烧；使极度激动；使发炎

参考例句：

• Our lack of response seemed to inflame the colonel.由于我们没有反应,好象惹恼了那个上校。
• Chemical agents manufactured by our immune system inflame our cells and tissues,causing our nose to run and our throat to swell.我们的免疫系统产生的化学物质导致我们的细胞和组织发炎，导致我们流鼻水和我们的喉咙膨胀。

157 espoused   

v.（决定）支持，拥护（目标、主张等）( espouse的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• They espoused the notion of equal opportunity for all in education. 他们赞同在教育方面人人机会均等的观念。
• The ideas she espoused were incomprehensible to me. 她所支持的意见令我难以理解。 来自《简明英汉词典》

158 throng   

n.人群，群众；v.拥挤，群集

参考例句：

• A patient throng was waiting in silence.一大群耐心的人在静静地等着。
• The crowds thronged into the mall.人群涌进大厅。

159 partisans   

游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙

参考例句：

• Every movement has its partisans. 每一运动都有热情的支持者。
• He was rescued by some Italian partisans. 他被几名意大利游击队员所救。

160 solely   

adv.仅仅，唯一地

参考例句：

• Success should not be measured solely by educational achievement.成功与否不应只用学业成绩来衡量。
• The town depends almost solely on the tourist trade.这座城市几乎完全靠旅游业维持。

161 inquiries   

n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听

参考例句：

• He was released on bail pending further inquiries. 他获得保释，等候进一步调查。
• I have failed to reach them by postal inquiries. 我未能通过邮政查询与他们取得联系。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

162 incompatible   

adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的

参考例句：

• His plan is incompatible with my intent.他的计划与我的意图不相符。
• Speed and safety are not necessarily incompatible.速度和安全未必不相容。

163 hatred   

n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨

参考例句：

• He looked at me with hatred in his eyes.他以憎恨的眼光望着我。
• The old man was seized with burning hatred for the fascists.老人对法西斯主义者充满了仇恨。

164 hostility   

n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争

参考例句：

• There is open hostility between the two leaders.两位领导人表现出公开的敌意。
• His hostility to your plan is well known.他对你的计划所持的敌意是众所周知的。

165 disposition   

n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署

参考例句：

• He has made a good disposition of his property.他已对财产作了妥善处理。
• He has a cheerful disposition.他性情开朗。

166 passionate   

adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的

参考例句：

• He is said to be the most passionate man.据说他是最有激情的人。
• He is very passionate about the project.他对那个项目非常热心。

167 faction   

n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争

参考例句：

• Faction and self-interest appear to be the norm.派系之争和自私自利看来非常普遍。
• I now understood clearly that I was caught between the king and the Bunam's faction.我现在完全明白自己已陷入困境，在国王与布纳姆集团之间左右为难。

168 elevation   

n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高

参考例句：

• The house is at an elevation of 2,000 metres.那幢房子位于海拔两千米的高处。
• His elevation to the position of General Manager was announced yesterday.昨天宣布他晋升总经理职位。

169 simplicity   

n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯

参考例句：

• She dressed with elegant simplicity.她穿着朴素高雅。
• The beauty of this plan is its simplicity.简明扼要是这个计划的一大特点。

170 prosecute   

vt.告发；进行；vi.告发，起诉，作检察官

参考例句：

• I am trying my best to prosecute my duties.我正在尽力履行我的职责。
• Is there enough evidence to prosecute?有没有起诉的足够证据？

171 indifference   

n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎

参考例句：

• I was disappointed by his indifference more than somewhat.他的漠不关心使我很失望。
• He feigned indifference to criticism of his work.他假装毫不在意别人批评他的作品。

172 retirement   

n.退休，退职

参考例句：

• She wanted to enjoy her retirement without being beset by financial worries.她想享受退休生活而不必为金钱担忧。
• I have to put everything away for my retirement.我必须把一切都积蓄起来以便退休后用。

173 suspense   

n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑

参考例句：

• The suspense was unbearable.这样提心吊胆的状况实在叫人受不了。
• The director used ingenious devices to keep the audience in suspense.导演用巧妙手法引起观众的悬念。

174 administrative   

adj.行政的，管理的

参考例句：

• The administrative burden must be lifted from local government.必须解除地方政府的行政负担。
• He regarded all these administrative details as beneath his notice.他认为行政管理上的这些琐事都不值一顾。

175 impunity   

n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除

参考例句：

• You will not escape with impunity.你不可能逃脱惩罚。
• The impunity what compulsory insurance sets does not include escapement.交强险规定的免责范围不包括逃逸。

176 vices   

缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳

参考例句：

• In spite of his vices, he was loved by all. 尽管他有缺点，还是受到大家的爱戴。
• He vituperated from the pulpit the vices of the court. 他在教堂的讲坛上责骂宫廷的罪恶。

177 consuls   

领事( consul的名词复数 )； （古罗马共和国时期）执政官 （古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长，同时共有两位，每年选举一次）

参考例句：

• American consuls warned that millions more were preparing to leave war-ravaged districts. 美国驻外领事们预告，还有几百万人正在准备离开战争破坏的地区。
• The legionaries, on their victorious return, refused any longer to obey the consuls. 军团士兵在凯旋归国时，不肯服从执政官的命令。

178 monarchical   

adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic

参考例句：

• The Declaration represented a repudiation of the pre-Revolutionary monarchical regime. 这一宣言代表了对大革命前的君主政体的批判。
• The monarchical period established an essential background for the writing prophets of the Bible. 王国时期为圣经的写作先知建立了基本的背景。

179 preponderating   

v.超过，胜过( preponderate的现在分词 )

参考例句：

180 maxims   

n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• Courts also draw freely on traditional maxims of construction. 法院也自由吸收传统的解释准则。 来自英汉非文学 - 行政法
• There are variant formulations of some of the maxims. 有些准则有多种表达方式。 来自辞典例句

181 pointed   

adj.尖的，直截了当的

参考例句：

• He gave me a very sharp pointed pencil.他给我一支削得非常尖的铅笔。
• She wished to show Mrs.John Dashwood by this pointed invitation to her brother.她想通过对达茨伍德夫人提出直截了当的邀请向她的哥哥表示出来。

182 predecessor   

n.前辈，前任

参考例句：

• It will share the fate of its predecessor.它将遭受与前者同样的命运。
• The new ambassador is more mature than his predecessor.新大使比他的前任更成熟一些。

183 functionary   

n.官员；公职人员

参考例句：

• No functionary may support or cover up unfair competition acts.国家官员不得支持、包庇不正当竞争行为。
• " Emigrant," said the functionary,"I am going to send you on to Paris,under an escort."“ 外逃分子，”那官员说，“我要把你送到巴黎去，还派人护送。”

184 fraught   

adj.充满…的，伴有(危险等)的；忧虑的

参考例句：

• The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions.未来数月将充满重大的决定。
• There's no need to look so fraught!用不着那么愁眉苦脸的！

185 Augmented   

adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式

参考例句：

• 'scientists won't be replaced," he claims, "but they will be augmented." 他宣称：“科学家不会被取代；相反，他们会被拓展。” 来自英汉非文学 - 科学史
• The impact of the report was augmented by its timing. 由于发表的时间选得好，这篇报导的影响更大了。

186 augment   

vt.(使)增大，增加，增长，扩张

参考例句：

• They hit upon another idea to augment their income.他们又想出一个增加收入的办法。
• The government's first concern was to augment the army and auxiliary forces.政府首先关心的是增强军队和辅助的力量。

187 negotiation   

n.谈判，协商

参考例句：

• They closed the deal in sugar after a week of negotiation.经过一星期的谈判，他们的食糖生意成交了。
• The negotiation dragged on until July.谈判一直拖到7月份。

188 precarious   

adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的

参考例句：

• Our financial situation had become precarious.我们的财务状况已变得不稳定了。
• He earned a precarious living as an artist.作为一个艺术家，他过得是朝不保夕的生活。

189 peril   

n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物

参考例句：

• The refugees were in peril of death from hunger.难民有饿死的危险。
• The embankment is in great peril.河堤岌岌可危。

190 perilous   

adj.危险的，冒险的

参考例句：

• The journey through the jungle was perilous.穿过丛林的旅行充满了危险。
• We have been carried in safety through a perilous crisis.历经一连串危机，我们如今已安然无恙。

191 immediate   

adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的

参考例句：

• His immediate neighbours felt it their duty to call.他的近邻认为他们有责任去拜访。
• We declared ourselves for the immediate convocation of the meeting.我们主张立即召开这个会议。

192 embarrassments   

n.尴尬( embarrassment的名词复数 )；难堪；局促不安；令人难堪或耻辱的事

参考例句：

• But there have been many embarrassments along the way. 但是一路走来已经是窘境不断。 来自互联网
• The embarrassments don't stop there. 让人难受的事情还没完。 来自互联网

193 calamities   

n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事

参考例句：

• They will only triumph by persevering in their struggle against natural calamities. 他们只有坚持与自然灾害搏斗，才能取得胜利。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• One moment's false security can bring a century of calamities. 图一时之苟安，贻百年之大患。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

194 anarchy   

n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序

参考例句：

• There would be anarchy if we had no police.要是没有警察，社会就会无法无天。
• The country was thrown into a state of anarchy.这国家那时一下子陷入无政府状态。

195 agitation   

n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动

参考例句：

• Small shopkeepers carried on a long agitation against the big department stores.小店主们长期以来一直在煽动人们反对大型百货商店。
• These materials require constant agitation to keep them in suspension.这些药剂要经常搅动以保持悬浮状态。

196 martial   

adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的

参考例句：

• The sound of martial music is always inspiring.军乐声总是鼓舞人心的。
• The officer was convicted of desertion at a court martial.这名军官在军事法庭上被判犯了擅离职守罪。

197 proceeding   

n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报

参考例句：

• This train is now proceeding from Paris to London.这次列车从巴黎开往伦敦。
• The work is proceeding briskly.工作很有生气地进展着。

198 dread   

vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧

参考例句：

• We all dread to think what will happen if the company closes.我们都不敢去想一旦公司关门我们该怎么办。
• Her heart was relieved of its blankest dread.她极度恐惧的心理消除了。

199 suffrages   

（政治性选举的）选举权，投票权( suffrage的名词复数 )

参考例句：

200 judicious   

adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的

参考例句：

• We should listen to the judicious opinion of that old man.我们应该听取那位老人明智的意见。
• A judicious parent encourages his children to make their own decisions.贤明的父亲鼓励儿女自作抉择。

201 intrigue   

vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋

参考例句：

• Court officials will intrigue against the royal family.法院官员将密谋反对皇室。
• The royal palace was filled with intrigue.皇宫中充满了勾心斗角。

202 inevitably   

adv.不可避免地；必然发生地

参考例句：

• In the way you go on,you are inevitably coming apart.照你们这样下去，毫无疑问是会散伙的。
• Technological changes will inevitably lead to unemployment.技术变革必然会导致失业。

203 cabal   

n.政治阴谋小集团

参考例句：

• He had been chosen by a secret government cabal.他已被一个秘密的政府阴谋集团选中。
• The illegal aspects of the cabal's governance are glaring and ubiquitous.黑暗势力的非法统治是显而易见的并无处不在。

204 usurped   

篡夺，霸占( usurp的过去式和过去分词 )； 盗用； 篡夺，篡权

参考例句：

• That magazine usurped copyrighted material. 那杂志盗用了版权为他人所有的素材。
• The expression'social engineering'has been usurped by the Utopianist without a shadow of light. “社会工程”这个词已被乌托邦主义者毫无理由地盗用了。

205 proceedings   

n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报

参考例句：

• He was released on bail pending committal proceedings. 他交保获释正在候审。
• to initiate legal proceedings against sb 对某人提起诉讼

206 uncertainty   

n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物

参考例句：

• Her comments will add to the uncertainty of the situation.她的批评将会使局势更加不稳定。
• After six weeks of uncertainty,the strain was beginning to take its toll.6个星期的忐忑不安后，压力开始产生影响了。

207 convoked   

v.召集，召开（会议）( convoke的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• The mayor convoked a committee to discuss the beautification of the city. 市长召集了一次委员会，讨论城市的美化问题。 来自互联网

208 constituents   

n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素

参考例句：

• She has the full support of her constituents. 她得到本区选民的全力支持。
• Hydrogen and oxygen are the constituents of water. 氢和氧是水的主要成分。 来自《简明英汉词典》

209 defer   

vt.推迟，拖延；vi.(to)遵从，听从，服从

参考例句：

• We wish to defer our decision until next week.我们希望推迟到下星期再作出决定。
• We will defer to whatever the committee decides.我们遵从委员会作出的任何决定。

210 perpetuate   

v.使永存，使永记不忘

参考例句：

• This monument was built to perpetuate the memory of the national hero.这个纪念碑建造的意义在于纪念民族英雄永垂不朽。
• We must perpetuate the system.我们必须将此制度永久保持。

211 expedient   

adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计

参考例句：

• The government found it expedient to relax censorship a little.政府发现略微放宽审查是可取的。
• Every kind of expedient was devised by our friends.我们的朋友想出了各种各样的应急办法。

212 judgment   

n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见

参考例句：

• The chairman flatters himself on his judgment of people.主席自认为他审视人比别人高明。
• He's a man of excellent judgment.他眼力过人。

213 conditional   

adj.条件的，带有条件的

参考例句：

• My agreement is conditional on your help.你肯帮助我才同意。
• There are two forms of most-favored-nation treatment:conditional and unconditional.最惠国待遇有两种形式:有条件的和无条件的。

214 adoption   

n.采用，采纳，通过；收养

参考例句：

• An adoption agency had sent the boys to two different families.一个收养机构把他们送给两个不同的家庭。
• The adoption of this policy would relieve them of a tremendous burden.采取这一政策会给他们解除一个巨大的负担。

215 dissemination   

传播,宣传,传染(病毒)

参考例句：

• The dissemination of error does people great harm. 谬种流传，误人不浅。
• He was fully bent upon the dissemination of Chinese culture all over the world. 他一心致力于向全世界传播中国文化。

216 epoch   

n.(新)时代；历元

参考例句：

• The epoch of revolution creates great figures.革命时代造就伟大的人物。
• We're at the end of the historical epoch,and at the dawn of another.我们正处在一个历史时代的末期，另一个历史时代的开端。

217 trifling   

adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的

参考例句：

• They quarreled over a trifling matter.他们为这种微不足道的事情争吵。
• So far Europe has no doubt, gained a real conveniency,though surely a very trifling one.直到现在为止,欧洲无疑地已经获得了实在的便利，不过那确是一种微不足道的便利。

218 tangible   

adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的

参考例句：

• The policy has not yet brought any tangible benefits.这项政策还没有带来任何实质性的好处。
• There is no tangible proof.没有确凿的证据。

219 presidency   

n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期)

参考例句：

• Roosevelt was elected four times to the presidency of the United States.罗斯福连续当选四届美国总统。
• Two candidates are emerging as contestants for the presidency.两位候选人最终成为总统职位竞争者。

220 forth   

adv.向前；向外，往外

参考例句：

• The wind moved the trees gently back and forth.风吹得树轻轻地来回摇晃。
• He gave forth a series of works in rapid succession.他很快连续发表了一系列的作品。

221 auspices   

n.资助，赞助

参考例句：

• The association is under the auspices of Word Bank.这个组织是在世界银行的赞助下办的。
• The examination was held under the auspices of the government.这次考试是由政府主办的。

222 ardor   

n.热情，狂热

参考例句：

• His political ardor led him into many arguments.他的政治狂热使他多次卷入争论中。
• He took up his pursuit with ardor.他满腔热忱地从事工作。

223 agitated   

adj.被鼓动的，不安的

参考例句：

• His answers were all mixed up,so agitated was he.他是那样心神不定，回答全乱了。
• She was agitated because her train was an hour late.她乘坐的火车晚点一个小时，她十分焦虑。

224 homage   

n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬

参考例句：

• We pay homage to the genius of Shakespeare.我们对莎士比亚的天才表示敬仰。
• The soldiers swore to pay their homage to the Queen.士兵们宣誓效忠于女王陛下。

225 feverish   

adj.发烧的，狂热的，兴奋的

参考例句：

• He is too feverish to rest.他兴奋得安静不下来。
• They worked with feverish haste to finish the job.为了完成此事他们以狂热的速度工作着。

226 dispelled   

v.驱散，赶跑( dispel的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• His speech dispelled any fears about his health. 他的发言消除了人们对他身体健康的担心。
• The sun soon dispelled the thick fog. 太阳很快驱散了浓雾。 来自《简明英汉词典》

227 astonishment   

n.惊奇，惊异

参考例句：

• They heard him give a loud shout of astonishment.他们听见他惊奇地大叫一声。
• I was filled with astonishment at her strange action.我对她的奇怪举动不胜惊异。

228 arduous   

adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的

参考例句：

• We must have patience in doing arduous work.我们做艰苦的工作要有耐性。
• The task was more arduous than he had calculated.这项任务比他所估计的要艰巨得多。

229 commonwealth   

n.共和国，联邦，共同体

参考例句：

• He is the chairman of the commonwealth of artists.他是艺术家协会的主席。
• Most of the members of the Commonwealth are nonwhite.英联邦的许多成员国不是白人国家。

230 consistency   

n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度

参考例句：

• Your behaviour lacks consistency.你的行为缺乏一贯性。
• We appreciate the consistency and stability in China and in Chinese politics.我们赞赏中国及其政策的连续性和稳定性。

231 immoral   

adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的

参考例句：

• She was questioned about his immoral conduct toward her.她被询问过有关他对她的不道德行为的情况。
• It is my belief that nuclear weapons are immoral.我相信使核武器是不邪恶的。

232 descend   

vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降

参考例句：

• I hope the grace of God would descend on me.我期望上帝的恩惠。
• We're not going to descend to such methods.我们不会沦落到使用这种手段。

233 descends   

v.下来( descend的第三人称单数 )；下去；下降；下斜

参考例句：

• This festival descends from a religious rite. 这个节日起源于宗教仪式。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The path descends steeply to the village. 小路陡直而下直到村子。 来自《简明英汉词典》

234 dwindle   

v.逐渐变小（或减少）

参考例句：

• The factory's workforce has dwindled from over 4,000 to a few hundred.工厂雇员总数已经从4,000多人减少到几百人。
• He is struggling to come to terms with his dwindling authority.他正努力适应自己权力被削弱这一局面。

235 negotiations   

协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过

参考例句：

• negotiations for a durable peace 为持久和平而进行的谈判
• Negotiations have failed to establish any middle ground. 谈判未能达成任何妥协。

236 eligibility   

n.合格，资格

参考例句：

• What are the eligibility requirements? 病人被选参加试验的要求是什么？ 来自英汉非文学 - 生命科学 - 回顾与展望
• Eligibility for HINARI access is based on gross national income (GNI). 进入HINARI获取计划是依据国民总收入来评定的。

237 adroitness   

参考例句：

• He showed similar adroitness and persistence in strategic arm control. 在战略武器方面，他显示出了同样的机敏和执著。 来自辞典例句
• He turned his large car with some adroitness and drove away. 他熟练地把他那辆大车子调了个头，开走了。 来自辞典例句

238 afflicted   

使受痛苦，折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• About 40% of the country's population is afflicted with the disease. 全国40%左右的人口患有这种疾病。
• A terrible restlessness that was like to hunger afflicted Martin Eden. 一阵可怕的、跟饥饿差不多的不安情绪折磨着马丁·伊登。

239 eluding   

v.（尤指机敏地）避开( elude的现在分词 )；逃避；躲避；使达不到

参考例句：

• He saw no way of eluding Featherstone's stupid demand. 费瑟斯通的愚蠢要求使他走投无路。 来自辞典例句
• The fox succeeded in eluding the hunters. 这狐狸成功地避过了猎手。 来自辞典例句

240 mischief   

n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹

参考例句：

• Nobody took notice of the mischief of the matter. 没有人注意到这件事情所带来的危害。
• He seems to intend mischief.看来他想捣蛋。

241 unreasonable   

adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的

参考例句：

• I know that they made the most unreasonable demands on you.我知道他们对你提出了最不合理的要求。
• They spend an unreasonable amount of money on clothes.他们花在衣服上的钱太多了。

242 radically   

ad.根本地，本质地

参考例句：

• I think we may have to rethink our policies fairly radically. 我认为我们可能要对我们的政策进行根本的反思。
• The health service must be radically reformed. 公共医疗卫生服务必须进行彻底改革。

243 parity   

n.平价，等价，比价，对等

参考例句：

• The two currencies have now reached parity.这两种货币现已达到同等价值。
• Women have yet to achieve wage or occupational parity in many fields.女性在很多领域还没能争取到薪金、职位方面的平等。

244 entirely   

ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The fire was entirely caused by their neglect of duty. 那场火灾完全是由于他们失职而引起的。
• His life was entirely given up to the educational work. 他的一生统统献给了教育工作。

245 ineligible   

adj.无资格的，不适当的

参考例句：

• The new rules have made thousands more people ineligible for legal aid.新规定使另外数千人不符合接受法律援助的资格。
• The country had been declared ineligible for World Bank lending.这个国家已被宣布没有资格获得世界银行的贷款。

246 lessened   

减少的，减弱的

参考例句：

• Listening to the speech through an interpreter lessened its impact somewhat. 演讲辞通过翻译的嘴说出来，多少削弱了演讲的力量。
• The flight to suburbia lessened the number of middle-class families living within the city. 随着迁往郊外的风行，住在城内的中产家庭减少了。

247 forestalls   

v.先发制人，预先阻止( forestall的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• Sadly, widespread use of condoms by American forces forestalls any improvement in the French bloodline. 悲哀的是，被美国士兵海量使用的避孕套对法国纯正血统的传承造成了一定的影响。 来自互联网

248 perils   

极大危险( peril的名词复数 )； 危险的事（或环境）

参考例句：

• The commander bade his men be undaunted in the face of perils. 指挥员命令他的战士要临危不惧。
• With how many more perils and disasters would he load himself? 他还要再冒多少风险和遭受多少灾难？

249 propriety   

n.正当行为；正当；适当

参考例句：

• We hesitated at the propriety of the method.我们对这种办法是否适用拿不定主意。
• The sensitive matter was handled with great propriety.这件机密的事处理得极为适当。

250 apprehensions   

疑惧

参考例句：

• He stood in a mixture of desire and apprehensions. 他怀着渴望和恐惧交加的心情伫立着。
• But subsequent cases have removed many of these apprehensions. 然而，随后的案例又消除了许多类似的忧虑。

251 justify   

vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护

参考例句：

• He tried to justify his absence with lame excuses.他想用站不住脚的借口为自己的缺席辩解。
• Can you justify your rude behavior to me?你能向我证明你的粗野行为是有道理的吗？

252 acquiesce   

vi.默许，顺从，同意

参考例句：

• Her parents will never acquiesce in such an unsuitable marriage.她的父母决不会答应这门不相宜的婚事。
• He is so independent that he will never acquiesce.他很有主见，所以绝不会顺从。

253 remains   

n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹

参考例句：

• He ate the remains of food hungrily.他狼吞虎咽地吃剩余的食物。
• The remains of the meal were fed to the dog.残羹剩饭喂狗了。

254 minutiae   

n.微小的细节，细枝末节；（常复数）细节，小事( minutia的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• the minutiae of the contract 合同细节
• He had memorized the many minutiae of the legal code. 他们讨论旅行的所有细节。 来自《简明英汉词典》

255 aridity   

n.干旱，乏味；干燥性；荒芜

参考例句：

• The name Sahara conjures up images of a desert of aridity. "撒哈拉"这个名字使人想起干旱的沙漠情景。 来自辞典例句
• The name conjures up images of a desert of aridity. “撒哈拉”这个名字使人想起“干旱”的沙漠情景。 来自互联网

256 succinct   

adj.简明的，简洁的

参考例句：

• The last paragraph is a succinct summary.最后这段话概括性很强。
• A succinct style lends vigour to writing.措辞简练使文笔有力。

257 prolix   

adj.罗嗦的；冗长的

参考例句：

• Too much speaking makes it a little prolix.说那么多，有些罗嗦了。
• Her style is tediously prolix.她的文章冗长而乏味。

258 exacting   

adj.苛求的，要求严格的

参考例句：

• He must remember the letters and symbols with exacting precision.他必须以严格的精度记住每个字母和符号。
• The public has been more exacting in its demands as time has passed.随着时间的推移，公众的要求更趋严格。

259 acting   

n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的

参考例句：

• Ignore her,she's just acting.别理她，她只是假装的。
• During the seventies,her acting career was in eclipse.在七十年代，她的表演生涯黯然失色。

260 obedience   

n.服从，顺从

参考例句：

• Society has a right to expect obedience of the law.社会有权要求人人遵守法律。
• Soldiers act in obedience to the orders of their superior officers.士兵们遵照上级军官的命令行动。

261 extremity   

n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度

参考例句：

• I hope you will help them in their extremity.我希望你能帮助在穷途末路的他们。
• What shall we do in this extremity?在这种极其困难的情况下我们该怎么办呢？

262 connive   

v.纵容；密谋

参考例句：

• They connive children excessively which will bring a negative effect on theirs character.他们过分纵容孩子，这对孩子的性格有不良影响。
• Senior politicians connived to ensure that he was not released.几位资深政治家串通起来确保他不会获释。

263 degenerate   

v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者

参考例句：

• He didn't let riches and luxury make him degenerate.他不因财富和奢华而自甘堕落。
• Will too much freedom make them degenerate?太多的自由会令他们堕落吗？

264 intervention   

n.介入，干涉，干预

参考例句：

• The government's intervention in this dispute will not help.政府对这场争论的干预不会起作用。
• Many people felt he would be hostile to the idea of foreign intervention.许多人觉得他会反对外来干预。

265 repel   

v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥

参考例句：

• A country must have the will to repel any invader.一个国家得有决心击退任何入侵者。
• Particles with similar electric charges repel each other.电荷同性的分子互相排斥。

266 impartiality   

n. 公平, 无私, 不偏

参考例句：

• He shows impartiality and detachment. 他表现得不偏不倚，超然事外。
• Impartiality is essential to a judge. 公平是当法官所必需的。

267 impartial   

adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的

参考例句：

• He gave an impartial view of the state of affairs in Ireland.他对爱尔兰的事态发表了公正的看法。
• Careers officers offer impartial advice to all pupils.就业指导员向所有学生提供公正无私的建议。

268 divers   

adj.不同的；种种的

参考例句：

• He chose divers of them,who were asked to accompany him.他选择他们当中的几个人，要他们和他作伴。
• Two divers work together while a standby diver remains on the surface.两名潜水员协同工作，同时有一名候补潜水员留在水面上。

269 nay   

adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者

参考例句：

• He was grateful for and proud of his son's remarkable,nay,unique performance.他为儿子出色的，不，应该是独一无二的表演心怀感激和骄傲。
• Long essays,nay,whole books have been written on this.许多长篇大论的文章，不，应该说是整部整部的书都是关于这件事的。

270 interpretations   

n.解释( interpretation的名词复数 )；表演；演绎；理解

参考例句：

• This passage is open to a variety of interpretations. 这篇文章可以有各种不同的解释。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The involved and abstruse passage makes several interpretations possible. 这段艰涩的文字可以作出好几种解释。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

271 interpretation   

n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理

参考例句：

• His statement admits of one interpretation only.他的话只有一种解释。
• Analysis and interpretation is a very personal thing.分析与说明是个很主观的事情。

272 jurisdiction   

n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权

参考例句：

• It doesn't lie within my jurisdiction to set you free.我无权将你释放。
• Changzhou is under the jurisdiction of Jiangsu Province.常州隶属江苏省。

273 jurisdictions   

司法权( jurisdiction的名词复数 )； 裁判权； 管辖区域； 管辖范围

参考例句：

• Butler entreated him to remember the act abolishing the heritable jurisdictions. 巴特勒提醒他注意废除世袭审判权的国会法令。
• James I personally adjudicated between the two jurisdictions. 詹姆士一世亲自裁定双方纠纷。

274 insufficient   

adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的

参考例句：

• There was insufficient evidence to convict him.没有足够证据给他定罪。
• In their day scientific knowledge was insufficient to settle the matter.在他们的时代，科学知识还不能足以解决这些问题。

275 mutual   

adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的

参考例句：

• We must pull together for mutual interest.我们必须为相互的利益而通力合作。
• Mutual interests tied us together.相互的利害关系把我们联系在一起。

276 arbiter   

n.仲裁人，公断人

参考例句：

• Andrew was the arbiter of the disagreement.安德鲁是那场纠纷的仲裁人。
• Experiment is the final arbiter in science.实验是科学的最后仲裁者。

277 accomplished   

adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的

参考例句：

• Thanks to your help,we accomplished the task ahead of schedule.亏得你们帮忙,我们才提前完成了任务。
• Removal of excess heat is accomplished by means of a radiator.通过散热器完成多余热量的排出。

278 abstain   

v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免

参考例句：

• His doctor ordered him to abstain from beer and wine.他的医生嘱咐他戒酒。
• Three Conservative MPs abstained in the vote.三位保守党下院议员投了弃权票。

279 dubious   

adj.怀疑的，无把握的；有问题的，靠不住的

参考例句：

• What he said yesterday was dubious.他昨天说的话很含糊。
• He uses some dubious shifts to get money.他用一些可疑的手段去赚钱。

280 amity   

n.友好关系

参考例句：

• He lives in amity with his neighbours.他和他的邻居相处得很和睦。
• They parted in amity.他们很友好地分别了。

281 equity   

n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票

参考例句：

• They shared the work of the house with equity.他们公平地分担家务。
• To capture his equity,Murphy must either sell or refinance.要获得资产净值，墨菲必须出售或者重新融资。

282 maritime   

adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的

参考例句：

• Many maritime people are fishermen.许多居于海滨的人是渔夫。
• The temperature change in winter is less in maritime areas.冬季沿海的温差较小。

283 prohibition   

n.禁止；禁令，禁律

参考例句：

• The prohibition against drunken driving will save many lives.禁止酒后开车将会减少许多死亡事故。
• They voted in favour of the prohibition of smoking in public areas.他们投票赞成禁止在公共场所吸烟。

284 nonentity   

n.无足轻重的人

参考例句：

• She was written off then as a political nonentity.她当时被认定是成不了气候的政坛小人物。
• How could such a nonentity become chairman of the company? 这样的庸才怎么能当公司的董事长？

285 drawn   

v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的

参考例句：

• All the characters in the story are drawn from life.故事中的所有人物都取材于生活。
• Her gaze was drawn irresistibly to the scene outside.她的目光禁不住被外面的风景所吸引。

286 augments   

增加，提高，扩大( augment的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• He augments his income by teaching in the evening. 他通过晚上教书来增加收入。
• Neostigmine augments the motor activity of the small and large bowel. 新斯的明增强小肠和大肠的运动功能。

287 component   

n.组成部分，成分，元件；adj.组成的，合成的

参考例句：

• Each component is carefully checked before assembly.每个零件在装配前都经过仔细检查。
• Blade and handle are the component parts of a knife.刀身和刀柄是一把刀的组成部分。

288 solicitude   

n.焦虑

参考例句：

• Your solicitude was a great consolation to me.你对我的关怀给了我莫大的安慰。
• He is full of tender solicitude towards my sister.他对我妹妹满心牵挂。

289 apparently   

adv.显然地；表面上，似乎

参考例句：

• An apparently blind alley leads suddenly into an open space.山穷水尽，豁然开朗。
• He was apparently much surprised at the news.他对那个消息显然感到十分惊异。

290 concurrently   

adv.同时地

参考例句：

• He was given two twelve month sentences to run concurrently. 他两罪均判12个月监禁，同期执行。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He was given two prison sentences, to run concurrently. 他两罪均判监禁，同期执行。 来自辞典例句

291 impair   

v.损害，损伤；削弱，减少

参考例句：

• Loud noise can impair your hearing.巨大的噪音有损听觉。
• It can not impair the intellectual vigor of the young.这不能磨灭青年人思想活力。

292 impaired   

adj.受损的；出毛病的；有（身体或智力）缺陷的v.损害，削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• Much reading has impaired his vision. 大量读书损害了他的视力。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• His hearing is somewhat impaired. 他的听觉已受到一定程度的损害。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

293 appreciable   

adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的

参考例句：

• There is no appreciable distinction between the twins.在这对孪生子之间看不出有什么明显的差别。
• We bought an appreciable piece of property.我们买下的资产有增值的潜力。

294 accurately   

adv.准确地，精确地

参考例句：

• It is hard to hit the ball accurately.准确地击中球很难。
• Now scientists can forecast the weather accurately.现在科学家们能准确地预报天气。

295 pretext   

n.借口，托词

参考例句：

• He used his headache as a pretext for not going to school.他借口头疼而不去上学。
• He didn't attend that meeting under the pretext of sickness.他以生病为借口，没参加那个会议。

296 impairs   

v.损害，削弱( impair的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• Smoking impairs our health. 吸烟会损害我们的健康。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Almost anything that impairs liver function can cause hepatitis. 任何有损于肝功能的因素，几乎都会引起肝炎。 来自辞典例句

297 impairing   

v.损害，削弱( impair的现在分词 )

参考例句：

• Carbon monoxide is definitely capable of impairing cardiovascular function. 一氧化碳确实能损害心血管机能。 来自辞典例句
• Could it be effected without impairing his reputation as well as his fortune? 他能否不损害他的声誉和财富而办到这一点呢？ 来自辞典例句

298 pretence   

n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰

参考例句：

• The government abandoned any pretence of reform. 政府不再装模作样地进行改革。
• He made a pretence of being happy at the party.晚会上他假装很高兴。

299 vindicating   

v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的现在分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护

参考例句：

• Protesters vowed to hold commemorative activities until Beijing's verdict vindicating the crackdown was overturned. 示威者誓言除非中国政府平反六四，否则一直都会举行悼念活动。 来自互联网

300 confiscating   

没收（confiscate的现在分词形式）

参考例句：

• There was Mame by my side confiscating my intellects and attention. 有玛米坐在我身边，害得我心不在焉。
• Intimidate book sellers by confiscating books deemed unfavourable to the Barisan government. 充公被视为对国阵不利的书籍，威胁书商。

301 creditors   

n.债权人，债主( creditor的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• They agreed to repay their creditors over a period of three years. 他们同意3年内向债主还清欠款。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Creditors could obtain a writ for the arrest of their debtors. 债权人可以获得逮捕债务人的令状。 来自《简明英汉词典》

302 unwilling   

adj.不情愿的

参考例句：

• The natives were unwilling to be bent by colonial power.土著居民不愿受殖民势力的摆布。
• His tightfisted employer was unwilling to give him a raise.他那吝啬的雇主不肯给他加薪。

303 arbiters   

仲裁人，裁决者( arbiter的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• In the forensicfield, the final arbiters of quality are the courts. 在法医学领域，质量的最后仲裁者是法庭。
• They are, increasingly, arbiters of which types of borrowers get credit. 它们正越来越多地充当决定哪几种借款人可获得信贷的裁决人角色。

304 jointly   

ad.联合地，共同地

参考例句：

• Tenants are jointly and severally liable for payment of the rent. 租金由承租人共同且分别承担。
• She owns the house jointly with her husband. 她和丈夫共同拥有这所房子。

305 rejection   

n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃

参考例句：

• He decided not to approach her for fear of rejection.他因怕遭拒绝决定不再去找她。
• The rejection plunged her into the dark depths of despair.遭到拒绝使她陷入了绝望的深渊。

306 alleged   

a.被指控的，嫌疑的

参考例句：

• It was alleged that he had taken bribes while in office. 他被指称在任时收受贿赂。
• alleged irregularities in the election campaign 被指称竞选运动中的不正当行为

307 confirmation   

n.证实，确认，批准

参考例句：

• We are waiting for confirmation of the news.我们正在等待证实那个消息。
• We need confirmation in writing before we can send your order out.给你们发送订购的货物之前，我们需要书面确认。

308 questionable   

adj.可疑的，有问题的

参考例句：

• There are still a few questionable points in the case.这个案件还有几个疑点。
• Your argument is based on a set of questionable assumptions.你的论证建立在一套有问题的假设上。

309 infringe   

v.违反，触犯，侵害

参考例句：

• The jury ruled that he had infringed no rules.陪审团裁决他没有违反任何规定。
• He occasionally infringe the law by parking near a junction.他因偶尔将车停放在交叉口附近而违反规定。

310 construe   

v.翻译，解释

参考例句：

• He had tried to construe a passage from Homer.他曾尝试注释荷马著作的一段文字。
• You can construe what he said in a number of different ways.他的话可以有好几种解释。

311 plausible   

adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的

参考例句：

• His story sounded plausible.他说的那番话似乎是真实的。
• Her story sounded perfectly plausible.她的说辞听起来言之有理。

312 prosecution   

n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营

参考例句：

• The Smiths brought a prosecution against the organizers.史密斯家对组织者们提出起诉。
• He attempts to rebut the assertion made by the prosecution witness.他试图反驳原告方证人所作的断言。

313 prosecutions   

起诉( prosecution的名词复数 )； 原告； 实施； 从事

参考例句：

• It is the duty of the Attorney-General to institute prosecutions. 检察总长负责提起公诉。
• Since World War II, the government has been active in its antitrust prosecutions. 第二次世界大战以来，政府积极地进行着反对托拉斯的检举活动。 来自英汉非文学 - 政府文件

314 enervate   

v.使虚弱，使无力

参考例句：

• A hot climate enervate people who are not used to it.热的气候使不习惯于热的人衰弱无力。
• Bessie was the kind of girl that could enhance your performance as easily as she could enervate it.贝西能轻而易举地提高你的比赛成绩，同样也能轻而易举地使你无力回天。

315 derived   

vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取

参考例句：

• Many English words are derived from Latin and Greek. 英语很多词源出于拉丁文和希腊文。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He derived his enthusiasm for literature from his father. 他对文学的爱好是受他父亲的影响。 来自《简明英汉词典》

316 corroborate   

v.支持，证实，确定

参考例句：

• He looked at me anxiously,as if he hoped I'd corroborate this.他神色不安地看着我，仿佛他希望我证实地的话。
• It appeared that what he said went to corroborate my account.看来他所说的和我叙述的相符。

317 isolated   

adj.与世隔绝的

参考例句：

• His bad behaviour was just an isolated incident. 他的不良行为只是个别事件。
• Patients with the disease should be isolated. 这种病的患者应予以隔离。

318 constraining   

强迫( constrain的现在分词 )； 强使； 限制； 约束

参考例句：

• He was constraining his mind not to wander from the task. 他克制着不让思想在工作时开小差。
• The most constraining resource in all of these cases is venture capital. 在所有这些情况下最受限制的资源便是投入资本。

319 contrived   

adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的

参考例句：

• There was nothing contrived or calculated about what he said.他说的话里没有任何蓄意捏造的成分。
• The plot seems contrived.情节看起来不真实。

320 assessment   

n.评价；评估；对财产的估价，被估定的金额

参考例句：

• This is a very perceptive assessment of the situation.这是一个对该情况的极富洞察力的评价。
• What is your assessment of the situation?你对时局的看法如何？

321 refractory   

adj.倔强的，难驾驭的

参考例句：

• He is a very refractory child.他是一个很倔强的孩子。
• Silicate minerals are characteristically refractory and difficult to break down.硅酸盐矿物的特点是耐熔和难以分离。

322 taxpayer   

n.纳税人

参考例句：

• The new scheme will run off with a lot of the taxpayer's money.这项新计划将用去纳税人许多钱。
• The taxpayer are unfavourably disposed towards the recent tax increase.纳税者对最近的增加税收十分反感。

323 antagonist   

n.敌人，对抗者，对手

参考例句：

• His antagonist in the debate was quicker than he.在辩论中他的对手比他反应快。
• The thing is to know the nature of your antagonist.要紧的是要了解你的对手的特性。

324 enacted   

制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• legislation enacted by parliament 由议会通过的法律
• Outside in the little lobby another scene was begin enacted. 外面的小休息室里又是另一番景象。 来自英汉文学 - 嘉莉妹妹

325 vends   

v.出售（尤指土地等财产）( vend的第三人称单数 )；（尤指在公共场所）贩卖；发表（意见，言论）；声明

参考例句：

• He vends his own secret medicines, so he keeps away from the doors of the druggists. 他出售他自己的秘药，因而他总是避开药店的大门。 来自辞典例句
• The vet in the vest vends vanilla and vegetables in the van. 穿背心的兽医在篷车里叫卖香草和蔬菜。 来自互联网

326 afterward   

adv.后来；以后

参考例句：

• Let's go to the theatre first and eat afterward. 让我们先去看戏，然后吃饭。
• Afterward,the boy became a very famous artist.后来，这男孩成为一个很有名的艺术家。

327 engender   

v.产生，引起

参考例句：

• A policy like that tends to engender a sense of acceptance,and the research literature suggests this leads to greater innovation.一个能够使员工产生认同感的政策，研究表明这会走向更伟大的创新。
• The sense of injustice they engender is a threat to economic and political security.它们造成的不公平感是对经济和政治安全的威胁。

328 tranquil   

adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的

参考例句：

• The boy disturbed the tranquil surface of the pond with a stick. 那男孩用棍子打破了平静的池面。
• The tranquil beauty of the village scenery is unique. 这乡村景色的宁静是绝无仅有的。

329 tranquillity   

n. 平静, 安静

参考例句：

• The phenomenon was so striking and disturbing that his philosophical tranquillity vanished. 这个令人惶惑不安的现象，扰乱了他的旷达宁静的心境。
• My value for domestic tranquillity should much exceed theirs. 我应该远比他们重视家庭的平静生活。

330 discretion   

n.谨慎；随意处理

参考例句：

• You must show discretion in choosing your friend.你择友时必须慎重。
• Please use your best discretion to handle the matter.请慎重处理此事。

331 imposing   

adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的

参考例句：

• The fortress is an imposing building.这座城堡是一座宏伟的建筑。
• He has lost his imposing appearance.他已失去堂堂仪表。

332 civilized   

a.有教养的，文雅的

参考例句：

• Racism is abhorrent to a civilized society. 文明社会憎恶种族主义。
• rising crime in our so-called civilized societies 在我们所谓文明社会中日益增多的犯罪行为

333 repugnance   

n.嫌恶

参考例句：

• He fought down a feelings of repugnance.他抑制住了厌恶感。
• She had a repugnance to the person with whom she spoke.她看不惯这个和她谈话的人。

334 attains   

（通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况）

参考例句：

• This is the period at which the body attains maturity. 这是身体发育成熟的时期。
• The temperature a star attains is determined by its mass. 恒星所达到的温度取决于它的质量。

335 attain   

vt.达到，获得，完成

参考例句：

• I used the scientific method to attain this end. 我用科学的方法来达到这一目的。
• His painstaking to attain his goal in life is praiseworthy. 他为实现人生目标所下的苦功是值得称赞的。

336 controversies   

争论

参考例句：

• We offer no comment on these controversies here. 对于这些争议，我们在这里不作任何评论。 来自英汉非文学 - 历史
• The controversies surrounding population growth are unlikely to subside soon. 围绕着人口增长问题的争论看来不会很快平息。 来自辞典例句

337 versus   

prep.以…为对手，对；与…相比之下

参考例句：

• The big match tonight is England versus Spain.今晚的大赛是英格兰对西班牙。
• The most exciting game was Harvard versus Yale.最富紧张刺激的球赛是哈佛队对耶鲁队。

338 recollected   

adj.冷静的；镇定的；被回忆起的；沉思默想的v.记起，想起( recollect的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• I recollected that she had red hair. 我记得她有一头红发。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• His efforts, the Duke recollected many years later, were distinctly half-hearted. 据公爵许多年之后的回忆，他当时明显只是敷衍了事。 来自辞典例句

339 recollect   

v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得

参考例句：

• He tried to recollect things and drown himself in them.他极力回想过去的事情而沉浸于回忆之中。
• She could not recollect being there.她回想不起曾经到过那儿。

340 fleeting   

adj.短暂的，飞逝的

参考例句：

• The girls caught only a fleeting glimpse of the driver.女孩们只匆匆瞥了一眼司机。
• Knowing the life fleeting,she set herself to enjoy if as best as she could.她知道这种日子转瞬即逝，于是让自已尽情地享受。

341 guardians   

监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者

参考例句：

• Farmers should be guardians of the countryside. 农民应是乡村的保卫者。
• The police are guardians of law and order. 警察是法律和秩序的护卫者。

342 magistrates   

地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• to come up before the magistrates 在地方法院出庭
• He was summoned to appear before the magistrates. 他被传唤在地方法院出庭。

343 subdued   

adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词

参考例句：

• He seemed a bit subdued to me. 我觉得他当时有点闷闷不乐。
• I felt strangely subdued when it was all over. 一切都结束的时候，我却有一种奇怪的压抑感。

344 subdue   

vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制

参考例句：

• She tried to subdue her anger.她尽力压制自己的怒火。
• He forced himself to subdue and overcome his fears.他强迫自己克制并战胜恐惧心理。

345 retract   

vt.缩回，撤回收回，取消

参考例句：

• The criminals should stop on the precipice, retract from the wrong path and not go any further.犯罪分子应当迷途知返，悬崖勒马，不要在错误的道路上继续走下去。
• I don't want to speak rashly now and later have to retract my statements.我不想现在说些轻率的话，然后又要收回自己说过的话。

346 prudent   

adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的

参考例句：

• A prudent traveller never disparages his own country.聪明的旅行者从不贬低自己的国家。
• You must school yourself to be modest and prudent.你要学会谦虚谨慎。

347 plunged   

v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降

参考例句：

• The train derailed and plunged into the river. 火车脱轨栽进了河里。
• She lost her balance and plunged 100 feet to her death. 她没有站稳，从100英尺的高处跌下摔死了。

348 inclinations   

倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡

参考例句：

• She has artistic inclinations. 她有艺术爱好。
• I've no inclinations towards life as a doctor. 我的志趣不是行医。

349 elude   

v.躲避，困惑

参考例句：

• If you chase it,it will elude you.如果你追逐着它， 它会躲避你。
• I had dared and baffled his fury.I must elude his sorrow.我曾经面对过他的愤怒，并且把它挫败了；现在我必须躲避他的悲哀。

350 eluded   

v.（尤指机敏地）避开( elude的过去式和过去分词 )；逃避；躲避；使达不到

参考例句：

• The sly fox nimbly eluded the dogs. 那只狡猾的狐狸灵活地躲避开那群狗。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• The criminal eluded the police. 那个罪犯甩掉了警察的追捕。 来自《现代英汉综合大词典》

351 imminent   

adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的

参考例句：

• The black clounds show that a storm is imminent.乌云预示暴风雨即将来临。
• The country is in imminent danger.国难当头。

352 inevitable   

adj.不可避免的，必然发生的

参考例句：

• Mary was wearing her inevitable large hat.玛丽戴着她总是戴的那顶大帽子。
• The defeat had inevitable consequences for British policy.战败对英国政策不可避免地产生了影响。

353 esteem   

n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作

参考例句：

• I did not esteem him to be worthy of trust.我认为他不值得信赖。
• The veteran worker ranks high in public love and esteem.那位老工人深受大伙的爱戴。

354 distinguished   

adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的

参考例句：

• Elephants are distinguished from other animals by their long noses.大象以其长长的鼻子显示出与其他动物的不同。
• A banquet was given in honor of the distinguished guests.宴会是为了向贵宾们致敬而举行的。

355 nurtured   

养育( nurture的过去式和过去分词 )； 培育； 滋长； 助长

参考例句：

• She is looking fondly at the plants he had nurtured. 她深情地看着他培育的植物。
• Any latter-day Einstein would still be spotted and nurtured. 任何一个未来的爱因斯坦都会被发现并受到培养。

356 braced   

adj.拉牢的v.支住( brace的过去式和过去分词 )；撑牢；使自己站稳；振作起来

参考例句：

• They braced up the old house with balks of timber. 他们用梁木加固旧房子。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The house has a wooden frame which is braced with brick. 这幢房子是木结构的砖瓦房。 来自《简明英汉词典》

357 penetrating   

adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的

参考例句：

• He had an extraordinarily penetrating gaze. 他的目光有股异乎寻常的洞察力。
• He examined the man with a penetrating gaze. 他以锐利的目光仔细观察了那个人。

358 animated   

adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的

参考例句：

• His observations gave rise to an animated and lively discussion.他的言论引起了一场气氛热烈而活跃的讨论。
• We had an animated discussion over current events last evening.昨天晚上我们热烈地讨论时事。

359 restriction   

n.限制，约束

参考例句：

• The park is open to the public without restriction.这个公园对公众开放，没有任何限制。
• The 30 mph speed restriction applies in all built-up areas.每小时限速30英里适用于所有建筑物聚集区。

360 restrictions   

约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则）

参考例句：

• I found the restrictions irksome. 我对那些限制感到很烦。
• a snaggle of restrictions 杂乱无章的种种限制

361 resolutely   

adj.坚决地，果断地

参考例句：

• He resolutely adhered to what he had said at the meeting. 他坚持他在会上所说的话。
• He grumbles at his lot instead of resolutely facing his difficulties. 他不是果敢地去面对困难，而是抱怨自己运气不佳。

362 emanates   

v.从…处传出，传出( emanate的第三人称单数 )；产生，表现，显示

参考例句：

• He emanates power and confidence. 他表现出力量和信心。
• He emanates sympathy. 他流露出同情。 来自辞典例句

363 propensities   

n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• This paper regarded AFT as a criterion to estimate slagging propensities. 文中以灰熔点作为判断煤灰结渣倾向的标准。 来自互联网
• Our results demonstrate that different types of authoritarian regime face different propensities to develop toward democracy. 本文研究结果显示，不同的威权主义政体所面对的民主发展倾向是不同的。 来自互联网

364 courageously   

ad.勇敢地，无畏地

参考例句：

• Under the correct leadership of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, the army and civilians in flooded areas fought the floods courageously, reducing the losses to the minimum. 在中共中央、国务院的正确领导下，灾区广大军民奋勇抗洪，把灾害的损失减少到了最低限度。
• He fought death courageously though his life was draining away. 他虽然生命垂危，但仍然勇敢地与死亡作斗争。

365 founders   

n.创始人( founder的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• He was one of the founders of the university's medical faculty. 他是该大学医学院的创建人之一。 来自辞典例句
• The founders of our religion made this a cornerstone of morality. 我们宗教的创始人把这看作是道德的基石。 来自辞典例句

366 revolving   

adj.旋转的，轮转式的；循环的v.（使）旋转( revolve的现在分词 )；细想

参考例句：

• The theatre has a revolving stage. 剧院有一个旋转舞台。
• The company became a revolving-door workplace. 这家公司成了工作的中转站。

367 emoluments   

n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• The emoluments of this profession is not satisfactory. 此行业的报酬不令人满意。 来自辞典例句
• Emoluments connected with this position include free education for the children. 与这职务有关的酬劳包括为子女提供免费教育。 来自互联网

368 strictly   

adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地

参考例句：

• His doctor is dieting him strictly.他的医生严格规定他的饮食。
• The guests were seated strictly in order of precedence.客人严格按照地位高低就座。

369 attentive   

adj.注意的，专心的；关心(别人)的，殷勤的

参考例句：

• She was very attentive to her guests.她对客人招待得十分周到。
• The speaker likes to have an attentive audience.演讲者喜欢注意力集中的听众。

370 durable   

adj.持久的，耐久的

参考例句：

• This raincoat is made of very durable material.这件雨衣是用非常耐用的料子做的。
• They frequently require more major durable purchases.他们经常需要购买耐用消费品。

371 skilfully   

adv. (美skillfully)熟练地

参考例句：

• Hall skilfully weaves the historical research into a gripping narrative. 霍尔巧妙地把历史研究揉进了扣人心弦的故事叙述。
• Enthusiasm alone won't do. You've got to work skilfully. 不能光靠傻劲儿，得找窍门。

372 recapitulate   

v.节述要旨，择要说明

参考例句：

• Let's recapitulate the main ideas.让我们来概括一下要点。
• It will be helpful to recapitulate them.在这里将其简要重述一下也是有帮助的。

373 adverting   

引起注意（advert的现在分词形式）

参考例句：

• He set up several adverting consultancy business in the UK. 他在英国建立了好几家广告咨询公司。
• NOTES: 1. The trust unit must be responsible for the adverting content of legalization and authenticity. 附注：1。刊户对所刊登广告内容的合法性、真实性负责。

374 antiquity   

n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹

参考例句：

• The museum contains the remains of Chinese antiquity.博物馆藏有中国古代的遗物。
• There are many legends about the heroes of antiquity.有许多关于古代英雄的传说。

375 remarkable   

adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的

参考例句：

• She has made remarkable headway in her writing skills.她在写作技巧方面有了长足进步。
• These cars are remarkable for the quietness of their engines.这些汽车因发动机没有噪音而不同凡响。

376 inefficiency   

n.无效率，无能；无效率事例

参考例句：

• Conflict between management and workers makes for inefficiency in the workplace. 资方与工人之间的冲突使得工厂生产效率很低。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• This type of inefficiency arises because workers and management are ill-equipped. 出现此种低效率是因为工人与管理层都能力不足。 来自《简明英汉词典》

377 allied   

adj.协约国的；同盟国的

参考例句：

• Britain was allied with the United States many times in history.历史上英国曾多次与美国结盟。
• Allied forces sustained heavy losses in the first few weeks of the campaign.同盟国在最初几周内遭受了巨大的损失。

378 ordaining   

v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的现在分词 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定

参考例句：

379 dictate   

v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令

参考例句：

• It took him a long time to dictate this letter.口述这封信花了他很长时间。
• What right have you to dictate to others?你有什么资格向别人发号施令？

380 enactments   

n.演出( enactment的名词复数 )；展现；规定；通过

参考例句：

• The enactments specified in Part 3 of Schedule 5 are repealed. 附表５第３部指明的成文法则现予废除。 来自互联网
• On and after April 1st the new enactments shall be enforced. 从4月1日起实施新法令。 来自互联网

381 alteration   

n.变更，改变；蚀变

参考例句：

• The shirt needs alteration.这件衬衣需要改一改。
• He easily perceived there was an alteration in my countenance.他立刻看出我的脸色和往常有些不同。

382 momentous   

adj.重要的，重大的

参考例句：

• I am deeply honoured to be invited to this momentous occasion.能应邀出席如此重要的场合，我深感荣幸。
• The momentous news was that war had begun.重大的新闻是战争已经开始。

383 onerous   

adj.繁重的

参考例句：

• My household duties were not particularly onerous.我的家务活并不繁重。
• This obligation sometimes proves onerous.这一义务有时被证明是艰巨的。

384 connived   

v.密谋 ( connive的过去式和过去分词 )；搞阴谋；默许；纵容

参考例句：

• Her brother is believed to have connived at her murder. 据信她的哥哥没有制止对她的谋杀。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The jailer connived at the escape from prison. 狱吏纵容犯人的逃狱。 来自辞典例句

385 levies   

（部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队

参考例句：

• At that time, taxes and levies were as many as the hairs on an ox. 那时，苛捐杂税多如牛毛。
• Variable levies can insulate farmers and consumers from world markets. 差价进口税可以把农民和消费者与世界市场隔离开来。

386 mandates   

托管（mandate的第三人称单数形式）

参考例句：

• Individual mandates would require all people to purchase health insurance. 个人托管要求所有人都要购买健康保险。
• While I agree with those benefits, I'm not a supporter of mandates. 我同意上述好处，我不是授权软件的支持者。

387 violation   

n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯

参考例句：

• He roared that was a violation of the rules.他大声说，那是违反规则的。
• He was fined 200 dollars for violation of traffic regulation.他因违反交通规则被罚款200美元。

388 discord   

n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐

参考例句：

• These two answers are in discord.这两个答案不一样。
• The discord of his music was hard on the ear.他演奏的不和谐音很刺耳。

389 augmenting   

使扩张

参考例句：

• My business was now constantly augmenting, and my circumstances growing daily easier. 现在，我的业务不断扩大，我的境况日益安逸。
• I spent a penitential weekend augmenting the green acceptable. 我临时唯有利用周末在每顶绿帽子上加一点红色上去，以免男性来宾不肯戴上。

390 nominal   

adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的

参考例句：

• The king was only the nominal head of the state. 国王只是这个国家名义上的元首。
• The charge of the box lunch was nominal.午餐盒饭收费很少。

391 constrained   

adj.束缚的,节制的

参考例句：

• The evidence was so compelling that he felt constrained to accept it. 证据是那样的令人折服，他觉得不得不接受。
• I feel constrained to write and ask for your forgiveness. 我不得不写信请你原谅。

392 improper   

adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的

参考例句：

• Short trousers are improper at a dance.舞会上穿短裤不成体统。
• Laughing and joking are improper at a funeral.葬礼时大笑和开玩笑是不合适的。

393 inadequate   

adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的

参考例句：

• The supply is inadequate to meet the demand.供不应求。
• She was inadequate to the demands that were made on her.她还无力满足对她提出的各项要求。

394 stagnant   

adj.不流动的，停滞的，不景气的

参考例句：

• Due to low investment,industrial output has remained stagnant.由于投资少，工业生产一直停滞不前。
• Their national economy is stagnant.他们的国家经济停滞不前。

395 apathy   

n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡

参考例句：

• He was sunk in apathy after his failure.他失败后心恢意冷。
• She heard the story with apathy.她听了这个故事无动于衷。

396 pusillanimous   

adj.懦弱的，胆怯的

参考例句：

• The authorities have been too pusillanimous in merely condemning the violence.当局对暴行只是进行了谴责，真是太胆小怕事了。
• The pusillanimous man would not defend his own family.软弱无力的人不会保卫他自己的家。

397 Amended   

adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词

参考例句：

• He asked to see the amended version. 他要求看修订本。
• He amended his speech by making some additions and deletions. 他对讲稿作了些增删修改。

398 civilisation   

n.文明，文化，开化，教化

参考例句：

• Energy and ideas are the twin bases of our civilisation.能源和思想是我们文明的两大基石。
• This opera is one of the cultural totems of Western civilisation.这部歌剧是西方文明的文化标志物之一。

399 faculties   

n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院

参考例句：

• Although he's ninety, his mental faculties remain unimpaired. 他虽年届九旬，但头脑仍然清晰。
• All your faculties have come into play in your work. 在你的工作中，你的全部才能已起到了作用。 来自《简明英汉词典》

400 galling   

adj.难堪的,使烦恼的,使焦躁的

参考例句：

• It was galling to have to apologize to a man she hated. 令人恼火的是得向她憎恶的男人道歉。
• The insolence in the fellow's eye was galling. 这家伙的傲慢目光令人恼怒。 来自英汉文学 - 嘉莉妹妹

401 exasperating   

adj. 激怒的 动词exasperate的现在分词形式

参考例句：

• Our team's failure is very exasperating. 我们队失败了，真是气死人。
• It is really exasperating that he has not turned up when the train is about to leave. 火车快开了， 他还不来，实在急人。

402 meddle   

v.干预，干涉，插手

参考例句：

• I hope he doesn't try to meddle in my affairs.我希望他不来干预我的事情。
• Do not meddle in things that do not concern you.别参与和自己无关的事。

403 overthrow   

v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆

参考例句：

• After the overthrow of the government,the country was in chaos.政府被推翻后，这个国家处于混乱中。
• The overthrow of his plans left him much discouraged.他的计划的失败使得他很气馁。

404 tyrant   

n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人

参考例句：

• The country was ruled by a despotic tyrant.该国处在一个专制暴君的统治之下。
• The tyrant was deaf to the entreaties of the slaves.暴君听不到奴隶们的哀鸣。

405 immunities   

免除，豁免( immunity的名词复数 )； 免疫力

参考例句：

• Supplying nutrients and immunities to my baby? 为我的宝贝提供营养物质和免疫物质？
• And these provide immunities against the a host of infections and diseases. 这些物质可提高婴儿的免疫力，使之免受病毒感染和疾病侵袭。

406 censure   

v./n.责备；非难；责难

参考例句：

• You must not censure him until you know the whole story.在弄清全部事实真相前不要谴责他。
• His dishonest behaviour came under severe censure.他的不诚实行为受到了严厉指责。

407 virtues   

美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处

参考例句：

• Doctors often extol the virtues of eating less fat. 医生常常宣扬少吃脂肪的好处。
• She delivered a homily on the virtues of family life. 她进行了一场家庭生活美德方面的说教。

408 arrogance   

n.傲慢，自大

参考例句：

• His arrogance comes out in every speech he makes.他每次讲话都表现得骄傲自大。
• Arrogance arrested his progress.骄傲阻碍了他的进步。

409 diversified   

adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域

参考例句：

• The college biology department has diversified by adding new courses in biotechnology. 该学院生物系通过增加生物技术方面的新课程而变得多样化。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Take grain as the key link, develop a diversified economy and ensure an all-round development. 以粮为纲，多种经营，全面发展。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

410 intensity   

n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度

参考例句：

• I didn't realize the intensity of people's feelings on this issue.我没有意识到这一问题能引起群情激奋。
• The strike is growing in intensity.罢工日益加剧。

411 solitude   

n. 孤独; 独居,荒僻之地,幽静的地方

参考例句：

• People need a chance to reflect on spiritual matters in solitude. 人们需要独处的机会来反思精神上的事情。
• They searched for a place where they could live in solitude. 他们寻找一个可以过隐居生活的地方。

412 impetus   

n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力

参考例句：

• This is the primary impetus behind the economic recovery.这是促使经济复苏的主要动力。
• Her speech gave an impetus to my ideas.她的讲话激发了我的思绪。

413 well-being   

n.安康，安乐，幸福

参考例句：

• He always has the well-being of the masses at heart.他总是把群众的疾苦挂在心上。
• My concern for their well-being was misunderstood as interference.我关心他们的幸福，却被误解为多管闲事。

414 worthy   

adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的

参考例句：

• I did not esteem him to be worthy of trust.我认为他不值得信赖。
• There occurred nothing that was worthy to be mentioned.没有值得一提的事发生。

415 exertions   

n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使

参考例句：

• As long as they lived, exertions would not be necessary to her. 只要他们活着，是不需要她吃苦的。 来自辞典例句
• She failed to unlock the safe in spite of all her exertions. 她虽然费尽力气，仍未能将那保险箱的锁打开。 来自辞典例句

416 precedent   

n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的

参考例句：

• Is there a precedent for what you want me to do?你要我做的事有前例可援吗？
• This is a wonderful achievement without precedent in Chinese history.这是中国历史上亘古未有的奇绩。

417 undoubtedly   

adv.确实地，无疑地

参考例句：

• It is undoubtedly she who has said that.这话明明是她说的。
• He is undoubtedly the pride of China.毫无疑问他是中国的骄傲。

418 avert   

v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等)

参考例句：

• He managed to avert suspicion.他设法避嫌。
• I would do what I could to avert it.我会尽力去避免发生这种情况。

419 affluent   

adj.富裕的，富有的，丰富的，富饶的

参考例句：

• He hails from an affluent background.他出身于一个富有的家庭。
• His parents were very affluent.他的父母很富裕。

420 pillaged   

v.抢劫，掠夺( pillage的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• They are to be pillaged and terrorised in Hitler's fury and revenge. 在希特勒的狂怒和报复下，他们还遭到掠夺和恐怖统治。 来自辞典例句
• They villages were pillaged and their crops destroyed. 他们的村子被抢，他们的庄稼被毁。 来自辞典例句

421 subjugated   

v.征服，降伏( subjugate的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• The prince had appeared and subjugated the poor little handmaid. 王子出现了，这使穷苦的小丫头不胜仰慕。 来自辞典例句
• As we know, rule over subjugated peoples is incompatible with the gentile constitution. 我们知道，对被征服者的统治，是和氏族制度不相容的。 来自英汉非文学 - 家庭、私有制和国家的起源

422 impoverished   

adj.穷困的，无力的，用尽了的v.使（某人）贫穷( impoverish的过去式和过去分词 )；使（某物）贫瘠或恶化

参考例句：

• the impoverished areas of the city 这个城市的贫民区
• They were impoverished by a prolonged spell of unemployment. 他们因长期失业而一贫如洗。 来自《简明英汉词典》

423 misery   

n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦

参考例句：

• Business depression usually causes misery among the working class.商业不景气常使工薪阶层受苦。
• He has rescued me from the mire of misery.他把我从苦海里救了出来。

424 aggrandizement   

n.增大，强化，扩大

参考例句：

• Her sole aim is personal aggrandizement. 她唯一的目的就是扩大个人权势。
• His sole aim is personal aggrandizement. 他唯一的目标就是要扩充个人的权势。 来自辞典例句

425 juxtaposition   

n.毗邻，并置，并列

参考例句：

• The juxtaposition of these two remarks was startling.这两句话连在一起使人听了震惊。
• It is the result of the juxtaposition of contrasting colors.这是并列对比色的结果。

426 stimulate   

vt.刺激，使兴奋；激励，使…振奋

参考例句：

• Your encouragement will stimulate me to further efforts.你的鼓励会激发我进一步努力。
• Success will stimulate the people for fresh efforts.成功能鼓舞人们去作新的努力。

427 engendered   

v.产生（某形势或状况），造成，引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• The issue engendered controversy. 这个问题引起了争论。
• The meeting engendered several quarrels. 这次会议发生了几次争吵。 来自《简明英汉词典》

428 bestowed   

赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• It was a title bestowed upon him by the king. 那是国王赐给他的头衔。
• He considered himself unworthy of the honour they had bestowed on him. 他认为自己不配得到大家赋予他的荣誉。

429 patriotic   

adj.爱国的，有爱国心的

参考例句：

• His speech was full of patriotic sentiments.他的演说充满了爱国之情。
• The old man is a patriotic overseas Chinese.这位老人是一位爱国华侨。

430 transfuses   

v.输（血或别的液体）( transfuse的第三人称单数 )；渗透；使…被灌输或传达

参考例句：

• The treatment by transfuses blood repeatedly, the adrenal cortex hormone primarily, partial blood transfusion safe reliable. 治疗以反复输血、肾上腺皮质激素为主，成分输血安全可靠。 来自互联网

431 attachment   

n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附

参考例句：

• She has a great attachment to her sister.她十分依恋她的姐姐。
• She's on attachment to the Ministry of Defense.她现在隶属于国防部。

432 agglomerations   

n.成团，结块（agglomeration的复数形式）

参考例句：

• Shandong Peninsula Agglomerations are the most developed region of Shandong Province. 山东半岛城市群是山东省经济最发达的地区。 来自互联网
• Homogeneous mixing and moistening without the formation of agglomerations or wet spots. 均一的混合和湿度，没有球团或者滴水斑点的产生。 来自互联网

433 paucity   

n.小量，缺乏

参考例句：

• The paucity of fruit was caused by the drought.水果缺乏是由于干旱造成的。
• The results are often unsatisfactory because of the paucity of cells.因细胞稀少，结果常令人不满意。

434 colossal   

adj.异常的，庞大的

参考例句：

• There has been a colossal waste of public money.一直存在巨大的公款浪费。
• Some of the tall buildings in that city are colossal.那座城市里的一些高层建筑很庞大。

435 abject   

adj.极可怜的，卑屈的

参考例句：

• This policy has turned out to be an abject failure.这一政策最后以惨败而告终。
• He had been obliged to offer an abject apology to Mr.Alleyne for his impertinence.他不得不低声下气，为他的无礼举动向艾莱恩先生请罪。

436 torrent   

n.激流，洪流；爆发，(话语等的)连发

参考例句：

• The torrent scoured a channel down the hillside. 急流沿着山坡冲出了一条沟。
• Her pent-up anger was released in a torrent of words.她压抑的愤怒以滔滔不绝的话爆发了出来。

437 lauded   

v.称赞，赞美( laud的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• They lauded the former president as a hero. 他们颂扬前总统为英雄。 来自辞典例句
• The nervy feats of the mountaineers were lauded. 登山者有勇气的壮举受到赞美。 来自辞典例句

438 vessel   

n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管

参考例句：

• The vessel is fully loaded with cargo for Shanghai.这艘船满载货物驶往上海。
• You should put the water into a vessel.你应该把水装入容器中。

439 lull   

v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇

参考例句：

• The drug put Simpson in a lull for thirty minutes.药物使辛普森安静了30分钟。
• Ground fighting flared up again after a two-week lull.经过两个星期的平静之后，地面战又突然爆发了。

440 swell   

vi.膨胀，肿胀；增长，增强

参考例句：

• The waves had taken on a deep swell.海浪汹涌。
• His injured wrist began to swell.他那受伤的手腕开始肿了。

441 counteracted   

对抗，抵消( counteract的过去式 )

参考例句：

• This can be counteracted only by very effective insulation. 这只能用非常有效的绝缘来防止。
• The effect of his preaching was counteracted by the looseness of his behavior. 他讲道的效果被他放荡的生活所抵消了。

442 adherents   

n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙

参考例句：

• He is a leader with many adherents. 他是个有众多追随者的领袖。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• The proposal is gaining more and more adherents. 该建议得到越来越多的支持者。 来自《简明英汉词典》

443 inadequately   

ad.不够地；不够好地

参考例句：

• As one kind of building materials, wood is inadequately sturdy. 作为一种建筑材料，木材不够结实。
• Oneself is supported inadequately by the money that he earns. 他挣的钱不够养活自己。

444 excellence   

n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德

参考例句：

• His art has reached a high degree of excellence.他的艺术已达到炉火纯青的地步。
• My performance is far below excellence.我的表演离优秀还差得远呢。

445 descended   

a.为...后裔的，出身于...的

参考例句：

• A mood of melancholy descended on us. 一种悲伤的情绪袭上我们的心头。
• The path descended the hill in a series of zigzags. 小路呈连续的之字形顺着山坡蜿蜒而下。

446 discriminated   

分别，辨别，区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 )； 歧视，有差别地对待

参考例句：

• His great size discriminated him from his followers. 他的宽广身材使他不同于他的部下。
• Should be a person that has second liver virus discriminated against? 一个患有乙肝病毒的人是不是就应该被人歧视？

447 exquisite   

adj.精美的；敏锐的；剧烈的，感觉强烈的

参考例句：

• I was admiring the exquisite workmanship in the mosaic.我当时正在欣赏镶嵌画的精致做工。
• I still remember the exquisite pleasure I experienced in Bali.我依然记得在巴厘岛所经历的那种剧烈的快感。

448 renown   

n.声誉，名望

参考例句：

• His renown has spread throughout the country.他的名声已传遍全国。
• She used to be a singer of some renown.她曾是位小有名气的歌手。

449 alluded   

提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• In your remarks you alluded to a certain sinister design. 在你的谈话中，你提到了某个阴谋。
• She also alluded to her rival's past marital troubles. 她还影射了对手过去的婚姻问题。

450 ingenuity   

n.别出心裁；善于发明创造

参考例句：

• The boy showed ingenuity in making toys.那个小男孩做玩具很有创造力。
• I admire your ingenuity and perseverance.我钦佩你的别出心裁和毅力。

451 semblance   

n.外貌，外表

参考例句：

• Her semblance of anger frightened the children.她生气的样子使孩子们感到害怕。
• Those clouds have the semblance of a large head.那些云的形状像一个巨大的人头。

452 counteracting   

对抗，抵消( counteract的现在分词 )

参考例句：

• The turmoil, he said, was "counteracting the course of global civilization. " 这次骚乱，他指出，“阻碍了世界文明的进程”。
• But he notes that there are counteracting forces as well. 但是他也指出还有一些抵消因素。

453 aggrieved   

adj.愤愤不平的，受委屈的；悲痛的；（在合法权利方面）受侵害的v.令委屈，令苦恼，侵害( aggrieve的过去式)；令委屈，令苦恼，侵害( aggrieve的过去式和过去分词)

参考例句：

• He felt aggrieved at not being chosen for the team. 他因没被选到队里感到愤愤不平。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• She is the aggrieved person whose fiance&1& did not show up for their wedding. 她很委屈，她的未婚夫未出现在他们的婚礼上。 来自《简明英汉词典》

454 instinctive   

adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的

参考例句：

• He tried to conceal his instinctive revulsion at the idea.他试图饰盖自己对这一想法本能的厌恶。
• Animals have an instinctive fear of fire.动物本能地怕火。

455 instinctively   

adv.本能地

参考例句：

• As he leaned towards her she instinctively recoiled. 他向她靠近，她本能地往后缩。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He knew instinctively where he would find her. 他本能地知道在哪儿能找到她。 来自《简明英汉词典》

456 coeval   

adj.同时代的；n.同时代的人或事物

参考例句：

• Analysis has proved that this document is coeval with that one.这份文件经分析证明与那一份是同一个时代的。
• He believes that cooking and humanity are coeval.他相信烹饪和人类是同时代的。

457 derives   

v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取

参考例句：

• English derives in the main from the common Germanic stock. 英语主要源于日耳曼语系。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He derives his income from freelance work. 他以自由职业获取收入。 来自《简明英汉词典》

458 dissuade   

v.劝阻，阻止

参考例句：

• You'd better dissuade him from doing that.你最好劝阻他别那样干。
• I tried to dissuade her from investing her money in stocks and shares.我曾设法劝她不要投资于股票交易。

459 warfare   

n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突

参考例句：

• He addressed the audience on the subject of atomic warfare.他向听众演讲有关原子战争的问题。
• Their struggle consists mainly in peasant guerrilla warfare.他们的斗争主要是农民游击战。

460 lasting   

adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持

参考例句：

• The lasting war debased the value of the dollar.持久的战争使美元贬值。
• We hope for a lasting settlement of all these troubles.我们希望这些纠纷能获得永久的解决。

461 subsists   

v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• This plant subsists in water holes only during the rainy season. 这种植物只有雨季在水坑里出现。 来自辞典例句
• The hinge is that the enterprise subsists on suiting the development of data communication. 适应数据通信的发展是通信企业生存的关键。 来自互联网

462 extremities   

n.端点( extremity的名词复数 )；尽头；手和足；极窘迫的境地

参考例句：

• She was most noticeable, I thought, in respect of her extremities. 我觉得她那副穷极可怜的样子实在太惹人注目。 来自辞典例句
• Winters may be quite cool at the northwestern extremities. 西北边区的冬天也可能会相当凉。 来自辞典例句

463 deficient   

adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的

参考例句：

• The crops are suffering from deficient rain.庄稼因雨量不足而遭受损害。
• I always have been deficient in selfconfidence and decision.我向来缺乏自信和果断。

464 influential   

adj.有影响的，有权势的

参考例句：

• He always tries to get in with the most influential people.他总是试图巴结最有影响的人物。
• He is a very influential man in the government.他在政府中是个很有影响的人物。

465 illustrate   

v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图

参考例句：

• The company's bank statements illustrate its success.这家公司的银行报表说明了它的成功。
• This diagram will illustrate what I mean.这个图表可说明我的意思。

466 militia   

n.民兵，民兵组织

参考例句：

• First came the PLA men,then the people's militia.人民解放军走在前面，其次是民兵。
• There's a building guarded by the local militia at the corner of the street.街道拐角处有一幢由当地民兵团守卫的大楼。

467 authorizes   

授权，批准，委托( authorize的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• The dictionary authorizes the two spellings 'traveler' and 'traveller'. 字典裁定traveler和traveller两种拼法都对。
• The dictionary authorizes the two spellings "honor" and "honour.". 字典裁定 honor 及 honour 两种拼法均可。

468 doctrines   

n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明

参考例句：

• To modern eyes, such doctrines appear harsh, even cruel. 从现代的角度看，这样的教义显得苛刻，甚至残酷。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• His doctrines have seduced many into error. 他的学说把许多人诱入歧途。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

469 exemption   

n.豁免，免税额，免除

参考例句：

• You may be able to apply for exemption from local taxes.你可能符合资格申请免除地方税。
• These goods are subject to exemption from tax.这些货物可以免税。

470 calamity   

n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件

参考例句：

• Even a greater natural calamity cannot daunt us. 再大的自然灾害也压不垮我们。
• The attack on Pearl Harbor was a crushing calamity.偷袭珍珠港(对美军来说)是一场毁灭性的灾难。

471 boundless   

adj.无限的；无边无际的；巨大的

参考例句：

• The boundless woods were sleeping in the deep repose of nature.无边无际的森林在大自然静寂的怀抱中酣睡着。
• His gratitude and devotion to the Party was boundless.他对党无限感激、无限忠诚。

472 gulf   

n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂

参考例句：

• The gulf between the two leaders cannot be bridged.两位领导人之间的鸿沟难以跨越。
• There is a gulf between the two cities.这两座城市间有个海湾。

473 savage   

adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人

参考例句：

• The poor man received a savage beating from the thugs.那可怜的人遭到暴徒的痛打。
• He has a savage temper.他脾气粗暴。

474 hostilities   

n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事

参考例句：

• Mexico called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. 墨西哥要求立即停止敌对行动。
• All the old hostilities resurfaced when they met again. 他们再次碰面时，过去的种种敌意又都冒了出来。