§ 2. For the purposes of the present inquiry, Induction may be defined, the operation of discovering and proving general propositions. It is true that (as already shown) the process of indirectly13 ascertaining15 individual facts, is as truly inductive as that by which we establish general truths. But it is not a different kind of induction; it is a form of the very same process: since, on the one hand, generals are but collections of particulars, definite in kind but indefinite in number; and on the other hand, whenever the evidence which we derive16 from observation of known cases justifies17 us in drawing an inference respecting even one unknown case, we should on the same evidence be justified18 in drawing a similar inference with respect to a whole class of cases. The inference either does not hold at all, or it holds in all cases of a certain description; in all cases which, in certain definable respects, resemble those we have observed.
If these remarks are just; if the principles and rules of inference are the same whether we infer general propositions or individual facts; it follows that a complete logic of the sciences would be also a complete logic of practical business and common life. Since there is no case of legitimate inference from experience, in which the conclusion may not legitimately19 be a general proposition; an analysis of the process by which general truths are arrived at, is virtually an analysis of all induction whatever. Whether we are inquiring into a scientific principle or into an individual fact, and whether we proceed by experiment or by ratiocination20, every step in the train of inferences is essentially inductive, and the legitimacy21 of the induction depends in both cases on the same conditions.
True it is that in the case of the practical inquirer, who is endeavouring to ascertain14 facts not for the purposes of science but for those of business, such for instance as the advocate or the judge, the chief difficulty is one in which the principles of induction will afford him no assistance. It lies not in making his inductions, but in the selection of them; in choosing from [Pg 315]among all general propositions ascertained22 to be true, those which furnish marks by which he may trace whether the given subject possesses or not the predicate in question. In arguing a doubtful question of fact before a jury, the general propositions or principles to which the advocate appeals are mostly, in themselves, sufficiently23 trite24, and assented25 to as soon as stated: his skill lies in bringing his case under those propositions or principles; in calling to mind such of the known or received maxims26 of probability as admit of application to the case in hand, and selecting from among them those best adapted to his object. Success is here dependent on natural or acquired sagacity, aided by knowledge of the particular subject, and of subjects allied27 with it. Invention, though it can be cultivated, cannot be reduced to rule; there is no science which will enable a man to bethink himself of that which will suit his purpose.
But when he has thought of something, science can tell him whether that which he has thought of will suit his purpose or not. The inquirer or arguer must be guided by his own knowledge and sagacity in the choice of the inductions out of which he will construct his argument. But the validity of the argument when constructed, depends on principles and must be tried by tests which are the same for all descriptions of inquiries28, whether the result be to give A an estate, or to enrich science with a new general truth. In the one case and in the other, the senses, or testimony29, must decide on the individual facts; the rules of the syllogism will determine whether, those facts being supposed correct, the case really falls within the formul? of the different inductions under which it has been successively brought; and finally, the legitimacy of the inductions themselves must be decided30 by other rules, and these it is now our purpose to investigate. If this third part of the operation be, in many of the questions of practical life, not the most, but the least arduous31 portion of it, we have seen that this is also the case in some great departments of the field of science; in all those which are principally deductive, and most of all in mathematics; where the inductions themselves are few in number, and so obvious and elementary that they seem to stand in no need of the evidence of experience, while to combine them so as to [Pg 316]prove a given theorem or solve a problem, may call for the utmost powers of invention and contrivance with which our species is gifted.
If the identity of the logical processes which prove particular facts and those which establish general scientific truths, required any additional confirmation32, it would be sufficient to consider that in many branches of science, single facts have to be proved, as well as principles; facts as completely individual as any that are debated in a court of justice; but which are proved in the same manner as the other truths of the science, and without disturbing in any degree the homogeneity of its method. A remarkable33 example of this is afforded by astronomy. The individual facts on which that science grounds its most important deductions34, such facts as the magnitudes of the bodies of the solar system, their distances from one another, the figure of the earth, and its rotation35, are scarcely any of them accessible to our means of direct observation: they are proved indirectly, by the aid of inductions founded on other facts which we can more easily reach. For example, the distance of the moon from the earth was determined36 by a very circuitous37 process. The share which direct observation had in the work consisted in ascertaining, at one and the same instant, the zenith distances of the moon, as seen from two points very remote from one another on the earth's surface. The ascertainment38 of these angular distances ascertained their supplements; and since the angle at the earth's centre subtended by the distance between the two places of observation was deducible by spherical39 trigonometry from the latitude40 and longitude41 of those places, the angle at the moon subtended by the same line became the fourth angle of a quadrilateral of which the other three angles were known. The four angles being thus ascertained, and two sides of the quadrilateral being radii42 of the earth; the two remaining sides and the diagonal, or in other words, the moon's distance from the two places of observation and from the centre of the earth, could be ascertained, at least in terms of the earth's radius43, from elementary theorems of geometry. At each step in this demonstration44 we take in a [Pg 317]new induction, represented, in the aggregate45 of its results, by a general proposition.
Not only is the process by which an individual astronomical46 fact was thus ascertained, exactly similar to those by which the same science establishes its general truths, but also (as we have shown to be the case in all legitimate reasoning) a general proposition might have been concluded instead of a single fact. In strictness, indeed, the result of the reasoning is a general proposition; a theorem respecting the distance, not of the moon in particular, but of any inaccessible47 object: showing in what relation that distance stands to certain other quantities. And although the moon is almost the only heavenly body the distance of which from the earth can really be thus ascertained, this is merely owing to the accidental circumstances of the other heavenly bodies, which render them incapable48 of affording such data as the application of the theorem requires; for the theorem itself is as true of them as it is of the moon.[1]
We shall fall into no error, then, if in treating of Induction, we limit our attention to the establishment of general propositions. The principles and rules of Induction as directed to this end, are the principles and rules of all Induction; and the logic of Science is the universal Logic, applicable to all inquiries in which man can engage.
点击收听单词发音
1 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
2 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
3 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
4 induction | |
n.感应,感应现象 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
5 inductions | |
归纳(法)( induction的名词复数 ); (电或磁的)感应; 就职; 吸入 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
6 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
7 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
8 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
9 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
10 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
11 syllogism | |
n.演绎法,三段论法 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
12 habitual | |
adj.习惯性的;通常的,惯常的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
13 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
14 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
15 ascertaining | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
16 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
17 justifies | |
证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 ); 为…辩护; 对…作出解释; 为…辩解(或辩护) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
18 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
19 legitimately | |
ad.合法地;正当地,合理地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
20 ratiocination | |
n.推理;推断 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
21 legitimacy | |
n.合法,正当 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
22 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
23 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
24 trite | |
adj.陈腐的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
25 assented | |
同意,赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
26 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
27 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
28 inquiries | |
n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 );疑问;探究;打听 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
29 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
30 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
31 arduous | |
adj.艰苦的,费力的,陡峭的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
32 confirmation | |
n.证实,确认,批准 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
33 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
34 deductions | |
扣除( deduction的名词复数 ); 结论; 扣除的量; 推演 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
35 rotation | |
n.旋转;循环,轮流 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
36 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
37 circuitous | |
adj.迂回的路的,迂曲的,绕行的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
38 ascertainment | |
n.探查,发现,确认 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
39 spherical | |
adj.球形的;球面的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
40 latitude | |
n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
41 longitude | |
n.经线,经度 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
42 radii | |
n.半径;半径(距离)( radius的名词复数 );用半径度量的圆形面积;半径范围;桡骨 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
43 radius | |
n.半径,半径范围;有效航程,范围,界限 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
44 demonstration | |
n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
45 aggregate | |
adj.总计的,集合的;n.总数;v.合计;集合 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
46 astronomical | |
adj.天文学的,(数字)极大的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
47 inaccessible | |
adj.达不到的,难接近的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
48 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
欢迎访问英文小说网 |