CHAPTER V. OF THE LAW OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION.

 § 1. The phenomena¹ of nature exist in two distinct relations to one another; that of simultaneity, and that of succession. Every phenomenon is related, in an uniform manner, to some phenomena that coexist with it, and to some that have preceded and will follow it.

 

Of the uniformities which exist among synchronous² phenomena, the most important, on every account, are the laws of number; and next to them those of space, or, in other words, of extension and figure. The laws of number are common to synchronous and successive phenomena. That two and two make four, is equally true whether the second two follow the first two or accompany them. It is as true of days and years as of feet and inches. The laws of extension and figure (in other words, the theorems of geometry, from its lowest to its highest branches) are, on the contrary, laws of simultaneous phenomena only. The various parts of space, and of the objects which are said to fill space, coexist; and the unvarying laws which are the subject of the science of geometry, are an expression of the mode of their coexistence.

 

This is a class of laws, or in other words, of uniformities, for the comprehension and proof of which it is not necessary to suppose any lapse³ of time, any variety of facts or events succeeding one another. If all the objects in the universe were unchangeably fixed⁴, and had remained in that condition from eternity⁵, the propositions of geometry would still be true of those objects. All things which possess extension, or, in other words, which fill space, are subject to geometrical laws. Possessing extension, they possess figure; possessing figure, they must possess some figure in particular, and have all the properties which geometry assigns to that figure. If one body be [Pg 361]a sphere and another a cylinder⁶, of equal height and diameter, the one will be exactly two-thirds of the other, let the nature and quality of the material be what it will. Again, each body, and each point of a body, must occupy some place or position among other bodies; and the position of two bodies relatively⁷ to each other, of whatever nature the bodies be, may be unerringly inferred from the position of each of them relatively to any third body.

 

In the laws of number, then, and in those of space, we recognise in the most unqualified manner, the rigorous universality of which we are in quest. Those laws have been in all ages the type of certainty, the standard of comparison for all inferior degrees of evidence. Their invariability is so perfect, that it renders us unable even to conceive any exception to them; and philosophers have been led, though (as I have endeavoured to show) erroneously, to consider their evidence as lying not in experience, but in the original constitution of the intellect. If therefore, from the laws of space and number, we were able to deduce uniformities of any other description, this would be conclusive⁸ evidence to us that those other uniformities possessed⁹ the same rigorous certainty. But this we cannot do. From laws of space and number alone, nothing can be deduced but laws of space and number.

 

Of all truths relating to phenomena, the most valuable to us are those which relate to the order of their succession. On a knowledge of these is founded every reasonable anticipation¹⁰ of future facts, and whatever power we possess of influencing those facts to our advantage. Even the laws of geometry are chiefly of practical importance to us as being a portion of the premises¹² from which the order of the succession of phenomena may be inferred. Inasmuch as the motion of bodies, the action of forces, and the propagation of influences of all sorts, take place in certain lines and over definite spaces, the properties of those lines and spaces are an important part of the laws to which those phenomena are themselves subject. Again, motions, forces or other influences, and times, are numerable quantities; and the properties of number are applicable to them as to all other things. But though the laws of number [Pg 362]and space are important elements in the ascertainment¹⁴ of uniformities of succession, they can do nothing towards it when taken by themselves. They can only be made instrumental to that purpose when we combine with them additional premises, expressive¹⁵ of uniformities of succession already known. By taking, for instance, as premises these propositions, that bodies acted upon by an instantaneous force move with uniform velocity¹⁷ in straight lines; that bodies acted upon by a continuous force move with accelerated velocity in straight lines; and that bodies acted upon by two forces in different directions move in the diagonal of a parallelogram, whose sides represent the direction and quantity of those forces; we may by combining these truths with propositions relating to the properties of straight lines and of parallelograms, (as that a triangle is half a parallelogram of the same base and altitude,) deduce another important uniformity of succession, viz., that a body moving round a centre of force describes areas proportional to the times. But unless there had been laws of succession in our premises, there could have been no truths of succession in our conclusions. A similar remark might be extended to every other class of phenomena really peculiar¹⁸; and, had it been attended to, would have prevented many chimerical¹⁹ attempts at demonstrations²⁰ of the indemonstrable, and explanations which do not explain.

 

It is not, therefore, enough for us that the laws of space, which are only laws of simultaneous phenomena, and the laws of number, which though true of successive phenomena do not relate to their succession, possess the rigorous certainty and universality of which we are in search. We must endeavour to find some law of succession which has those same attributes, and is therefore fit to be made the foundation of processes for discovering, and of a test for verifying, all other uniformities of succession. This fundamental law must resemble the truths of geometry in their most remarkable²¹ peculiarity²², that of never being, in any instance whatever, defeated or suspended by any change of circumstances.

 

Now among all those uniformities in the succession of phenomena, which common observation is sufficient to bring [Pg 363]to light, there are very few which have any, even apparent, pretension²³ to this rigorous indefeasibility: and of those few, one only has been found capable of completely sustaining it. In that one, however, we recognise a law which is universal also in another sense; it is coextensive with the entire field of successive phenomena, all instances whatever of succession being examples of it. This law is the Law of Causation. The truth that every fact which has a beginning has a cause, is coextensive with human experience.

 

This generalization²⁴ may appear to some minds not to amount to much, since after all it asserts only this: "it is a law; that every event depends on some law:" "it is a law, that there is a law for everything." We must not, however, conclude that the generality of the principle is merely verbal; it will be found on inspection²⁶ to be no vague or unmeaning assertion, but a most important and really fundamental truth.

 

§ 2. The notion of Cause being the root of the whole theory of Induction²⁷, it is indispensable that this idea should, at the very outset of our inquiry²⁸, be, with the utmost practicable degree of precision, fixed and determined²⁹. If, indeed, it were necessary for the purpose of inductive logic³⁰ that the strife³¹ should be quelled³², which has so long raged among the different schools of metaphysicians, respecting the origin and analysis of our idea of causation; the promulgation³³, or at least the general reception, of a true theory of induction, might be considered desperate for a long time to come. But the science of the Investigation³⁴ of Truth by means of Evidence, is happily independent of many of the controversies³⁵ which perplex the science of the ultimate constitution of the human mind, and is under no necessity of pushing the analysis of mental phenomena to that extreme limit which alone ought to satisfy a metaphysician.

 

I premise¹¹, then, that when in the course of this inquiry I speak of the cause of any phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon; I make no research into the ultimate or ontological cause of anything. To adopt a distinction familiar in the writings of the Scotch³⁶ metaphysicians, [Pg 364]and especially of Reid, the causes with which I concern myself are not efficient, but physical causes. They are causes in that sense alone, in which one physical fact is said to be the cause of another. Of the efficient causes of phenomena, or whether any such causes exist at all, I am not called upon to give an opinion. The notion of causation is deemed, by the schools of metaphysics most in vogue³⁸ at the present moment, to imply a mysterious and most powerful tie, such as cannot, or at least does not, exist between any physical fact and that other physical fact on which it is invariably consequent, and which is popularly termed its cause: and thence is deduced the supposed necessity of ascending³⁹ higher, into the essences and inherent constitution of things, to find the true cause, the cause which is not only followed by, but actually produces, the effect. No such necessity exists for the purposes of the present inquiry, nor will any such doctrine⁴⁰ be found in the following pages. The only notion of a cause, which the theory of induction requires, is such a notion as can be gained from experience. The Law of Causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar of inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it; independently of all consideration respecting the ultimate mode of production of phenomena, and of every other question regarding the nature of "Things in themselves."

 

Between the phenomena, then, which exist at any instant, and the phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant, there is an invariable order of succession; and, as we said in speaking of the general uniformity of the course of nature, this web is composed of separate fibres; this collective order is made up of particular sequences, obtaining invariably among the separate parts. To certain facts, certain facts always do, and, as we believe, will continue to, succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the cause; the invariable consequent, the effect. And the universality of the law of causation consists in this, that every consequent is connected in this manner with some particular antecedent, or set of antecedents. [Pg 365]Let the fact be what it may, if it has begun to exist, it was preceded by some fact or facts, with which it is invariably connected. For every event there exists some combination of objects or events, some given concurrence⁴¹ of circumstances, positive and negative, the occurrence of which is always followed by that phenomenon. We may not have found out what this concurrence of circumstances may be; but we never doubt that there is such a one, and that it never occurs without having the phenomenon in question as its effect or consequence. On the universality of this truth depends the possibility of reducing the inductive process to rules. The undoubted assurance we have that there is a law to be found if we only knew how to find it, will be seen presently to be the source from which the canons of the Inductive Logic derive⁴² their validity.

 

§ 3. It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent, that this invariable sequence subsists⁴⁴. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of all of them being requisite⁴⁵ to produce, that is, to be certain of being followed by, the consequent. In such cases it is very common to single out one only of the antecedents under the denomination⁴⁶ of Cause, calling the others merely Conditions. Thus, if a person eats of a particular dish, and dies in consequence, that is, would not have died if he had not eaten of it, people would be apt to say that eating of that dish was the cause of his death. There needs not, however, be any invariable connexion between eating of the dish and death; but there certainly is, among the circumstances which took place, some combination or other on which death is invariably consequent: as, for instance, the act of eating of the dish, combined with a particular bodily constitution, a particular state of present health, and perhaps even a certain state of the atmosphere; the whole of which circumstances perhaps constituted in this particular case the conditions of the phenomenon, or, in other words, the set of antecedents which determined it, and but for which it would not have happened. The real Cause, is the whole of these [Pg 366]antecedents; and we have, philosophically⁴⁷ speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others. What, in the case we have supposed, disguises the incorrectness of the expression, is this: that the various conditions, except the single one of eating the food, were not events (that is, instantaneous changes, or successions of instantaneous changes) but states, possessing more or less of permanency; and might therefore have preceded the effect by an indefinite length of duration, for want of the event which was requisite to complete the required concurrence of conditions: while as soon as that event, eating the food, occurs, no other cause is waited for, but the effect begins immediately to take place: and hence the appearance is presented of a more immediate⁴⁹ and close connexion between the effect and that one antecedent, than between the effect and the remaining conditions. But though we may think proper to give the name of cause to that one condition, the fulfilment of which completes the tale, and brings about the effect without further delay; this condition has really no closer relation to the effect than any of the other conditions has. The production of the consequent required that they should all exist immediately previous, though not that they should all begin to exist immediately previous. The statement of the cause is incomplete, unless in some shape or other we introduce all the conditions. A man takes mercury, goes out of doors, and catches cold. We say, perhaps, that the cause of his taking cold was exposure to the air. It is clear, however, that his having taken mercury may have been a necessary condition of catching⁵⁰ cold; and though it might consist with usage to say that the cause of his attack was exposure to the air, to be accurate we ought to say that the cause was exposure to the air while under the effect of mercury.

 

If we do not, when aiming at accuracy, enumerate⁵¹ all the conditions, it is only because some of them will in most cases be understood without being expressed, or because for the purpose in view they may without detriment⁵² be overlooked. For example, when we say, the cause of a man's death was [Pg 367]that his foot slipped in climbing a ladder, we omit as a thing unnecessary to be stated the circumstance of his weight, though quite as indispensable a condition of the effect which took place. When we say that the assent⁵³ of the crown to a bill makes it law, we mean that the assent, being never given until all the other conditions are fulfilled, makes up the sum of the conditions, though no one now regards it as the principal one. When the decision of a legislative⁵⁴ assembly has been determined by the casting vote of the chairman, we sometimes say that this one person was the cause of all the effects which resulted from the enactment⁵⁵. Yet we do not really suppose that his single vote contributed more to the result than that of any other person who voted in the affirmative; but, for the purpose we have in view, which is to insist on his individual responsibility, the part which any other person had in the transaction is not material.

 

In all these instances the fact which was dignified⁵⁶ with the name of cause, was the one condition which came last into existence. But it must not be supposed that in the employment of the term this or any other rule is always adhered to. Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions, than the capricious manner in which we select from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause. However numerous the conditions may be, there is hardly any of them which may not, according to the purpose of our immediate discourse⁵⁷, obtain that nominal⁵⁸ pre-eminence. This will be seen by analysing the conditions of some one familiar phenomenon. For example, a stone thrown into water falls to the bottom. What are the conditions of this event? In the first place there must be a stone, and water, and the stone must be thrown into the water; but these suppositions forming part of the enunciation⁵⁹ of the phenomenon itself, to include them also among the conditions would be a vicious tautology⁶⁰; and this class of conditions, therefore, have never received the name of cause from any but the Aristotelians, by whom they were called the material cause, [Pg 368]causa materialis. The next condition is, there must be an earth: and accordingly it is often said, that the fall of a stone is caused by the earth; or by a power or property of the earth, or a force exerted by the earth, all of which are merely roundabout ways of saying that it is caused by the earth; or, lastly, the earth's attraction; which also is only a technical mode of saying that the earth causes the motion, with the additional particularity that the motion is towards the earth, which is not a character of the cause, but of the effect. Let us now pass to another condition. It is not enough that the earth should exist; the body must be within that distance from it, in which the earth's attraction preponderates⁶¹ over that of any other body. Accordingly we may say, and the expression would be confessedly correct, that the cause of the stone's falling is its being within the sphere of the earth's attraction. We proceed to a further condition. The stone is immersed in water: it is therefore a condition of its reaching the ground, that its specific gravity exceed that of the surrounding fluid, or in other words that it surpass in weight an equal volume of water. Accordingly any one would be acknowledged to speak correctly who said, that the cause of the stone's going to the bottom is its exceeding in specific gravity the fluid in which it is immersed.

 

Thus we see that each and every condition of the phenomenon may be taken in its turn, and, with equal propriety⁶² in common parlance⁶³, but with equal impropriety in scientific discourse, may be spoken of as if it were the entire cause. And in practice, that particular condition is usually styled the cause, whose share in the matter is superficially the most conspicuous⁶⁴, or whose requisiteness to the production of the effect we happen to be insisting on at the moment. So great is the force of this last consideration, that it sometimes induces us to give the name of cause even to one of the negative conditions. We say, for example, The army was surprised because the sentinel was off his post. But since the sentinel's absence was not what created the enemy, or put the soldiers asleep, how did it cause them to be surprised? All that is really meant is, that the event would not have happened if he had [Pg 369]been at his duty. His being off his post was no producing cause, but the mere²⁵ absence of a preventing cause: it was simply equivalent to his non-existence. From nothing, from a mere negation⁶⁵, no consequences can proceed. All effects are connected, by the law of causation, with some set of positive conditions; negative ones, it is true, being almost always required in addition. In other words, every fact or phenomenon which has a beginning, invariably arises when some certain combination of positive facts exists, provided certain other positive facts do not exist.

 

There is, no doubt, a tendency (which our first example, that of death from taking a particular food, sufficiently⁶⁶ illustrates) to associate the idea of causation with the proximate antecedent event, rather than with any of the antecedent states, or permanent facts, which may happen also to be conditions of the phenomenon; the reason being that the event not only exists, but begins to exist immediately previous; while the other conditions may have pre-existed for an indefinite time. And this tendency shows itself very visibly in the different logical fictions which are resorted to, even by men of science, to avoid the necessity of giving the name of cause to anything which had existed for an indeterminate length of time before the effect. Thus, rather than say that the earth causes the fall of bodies, they ascribe it to a force exerted by the earth, or an attraction by the earth, abstractions which they can represent to themselves as exhausted⁶⁷ by each effort, and therefore constituting at each successive instant a fresh fact, simultaneous with, or only immediately preceding, the effect. Inasmuch as the coming of the circumstance which completes the assemblage of conditions, is a change or event, it thence happens that an event is always the antecedent in closest apparent proximity⁶⁸ to the consequent: and this may account for the illusion which disposes us to look upon the proximate event as standing⁶⁹ more peculiarly in the position of a cause than any of the antecedent states. But even this peculiarity, of being in closer proximity to the effect than any other of its conditions, is, as we have already seen, far from being necessary to the common notion of a cause; with which notion, on the contrary, any one of the [Pg 370]conditions, either positive or negative, is found, on occasion, completely to accord.[14]

 

The cause, then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies⁷⁰ of every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows. The negative [Pg 371]conditions, however, of any phenomenon, a special enumeration⁷¹ of which would generally be very prolix⁷², may be all summed up under one head, namely, the absence of preventing or counteracting⁷⁴ causes. The convenience of this mode of expression is mainly grounded on the fact, that the effects of any cause in counteracting another cause may in most cases be, with strict scientific exactness, regarded as a mere extension of its own proper and separate effects. If gravity retards⁷⁶ the upward motion of a projectile⁷⁷, and deflects⁷⁸ it into a parabolic trajectory⁷⁹, it produces, in so doing, the very same kind of effect, and even [Pg 372](as mathematicians⁸⁰ know) the same quantity of effect, as it does in its ordinary operation of causing the fall of bodies when simply deprived of their support. If an alkaline solution mixed with an acid destroys its sourness, and prevents it from reddening vegetable blues⁸¹, it is because the specific effect of the alkali is to combine with the acid, and form a compound with totally different qualities. This property, which causes of all descriptions possess, of preventing the effects of other causes by virtue⁸² (for the most part) of the same laws according to which they produce their own,[15] enables us, by establishing [Pg 373]the general axiom that all causes are liable to be counteracted⁸³ in their effects by one another, to dispense⁸⁴ with the consideration of negative conditions entirely⁸⁵, and limit the notion of cause to the assemblage of the positive conditions of the phenomenon: one negative condition invariably understood, and the same in all instances (namely, the absence of counteracting causes) being sufficient, along with the sum of the positive conditions, to make up the whole set of circumstances on which the phenomenon is dependent.

 

§ 4. Among the positive conditions, as we have seen that there are some to which, in common parlance, the term cause is more readily and frequently awarded, so there are others to which it is, in ordinary circumstances, refused. In most cases of causation a distinction is commonly drawn⁸⁶ between something which acts, and some other thing which is acted upon; between an agent and a patient. Both of these, it would be universally allowed, are conditions of the phenomenon; but it would be thought absurd to call the latter the cause, that title being reserved for the former. The distinction, however, vanishes on examination, or rather is found to be only verbal; arising from an incident of mere expression, namely, that the object said to be acted upon, and which is considered as the scene in which the effect takes place, is commonly included in the phrase by which the effect is spoken of, so that if it were also reckoned as part of the cause, the seeming incongruity⁸⁷ would arise of its being supposed to cause itself. In the instance which we have already had, of falling bodies, the question was thus put: What is the cause which makes a stone fall? and if the answer had been "the stone itself," the expression would have been in apparent contradiction to the meaning of the word cause. The stone, therefore, is conceived as the patient, and the earth (or, according to the common and most unphilosophical practice, some occult quality of the earth) is represented as the agent or cause. But that there is nothing fundamental in the distinction may be seen from this, that it is quite possible to conceive the stone as causing its own fall, provided the language employed be such as to save [Pg 374]the mere verbal incongruity. We might say that the stone moves towards the earth by the properties of the matter composing it; and according to this mode of presenting the phenomenon, the stone itself might without impropriety be called the agent; though, to save the established doctrine of the inactivity of matter, men usually prefer here also to ascribe the effect to an occult quality, and say that the cause is not the stone itself, but the weight or gravitation of the stone.

 

Those who have contended for a radical⁸⁸ distinction between agent and patient, have generally conceived the agent as that which causes some state of, or some change in the state of, another object which is called the patient. But a little reflection will show that the licence we assume of speaking of phenomena as states of the various objects which take part in them, (an artifice⁸⁹ of which so much use has been made by some philosophers, Brown in particular, for the apparent explanation of phenomena,) is simply a sort of logical fiction, useful sometimes as one among several modes of expression, but which should never be supposed to be the enunciation of a scientific truth. Even those attributes of an object which might seem with greatest propriety to be called states of the object itself, its sensible qualities, its colour, hardness, shape, and the like, are in reality (as no one has pointed⁹⁰ out more clearly than Brown himself) phenomena of causation, in which the substance is distinctly the agent, or producing cause, the patient being our own organs, and those of other sentient⁹¹ beings. What we call states of objects, are always sequences into which the objects enter, generally as antecedents or causes; and things are never more active than in the production of those phenomena in which they are said to be acted upon. Thus, in the example of a stone falling to the earth, according to the theory of gravitation the stone is as much an agent as the earth, which not only attracts, but is itself attracted by, the stone. In the case of a sensation produced in our organs, the laws of our organization, and even those of our minds, are as directly operative in determining the effect produced, as the [Pg 375]laws of the outward object. Though we call prussic acid the agent of a person's death, the whole of the vital and organic properties of the patient are as actively⁹² instrumental as the poison, in the chain of effects which so rapidly terminates his sentient existence. In the process of education, we may call the teacher the agent, and the scholar only the material acted upon; yet in truth all the facts which pre-existed in the scholar's mind exert either co-operating or counteracting agencies in relation to the teacher's efforts. It is not light alone which is the agent in vision, but light coupled with the active properties of the eye and brain, and with those of the visible object. The distinction between agent and patient is merely verbal: patients are always agents; in a great proportion, indeed, of all natural phenomena, they are so to such a degree as to react forcibly on the causes which acted upon them: and even when this is not the case, they contribute, in the same manner as any of the other conditions, to the production of the effect of which they are vulgarly treated as the mere theatre. All the positive conditions of a phenomenon are alike agents, alike active; and in any expression of the cause which professes⁹⁴ to be complete, none of them can with reason be excluded, except such as have already been implied in the words used for describing the effect; nor by including even these would there be incurred⁹⁵ any but a merely verbal impropriety.

 

§ 5. It now remains⁹⁶ to advert⁹⁷ to a distinction which is of first-rate importance both for clearing up the notion of cause, and for obviating⁹⁸ a very specious⁹⁹ objection often made against the view which we have taken of the subject.

 

When we define the cause of anything (in the only sense in which the present inquiry has any concern with causes) to be "the antecedent which it invariably follows," we do not use this phrase as exactly synonymous with "the antecedent which it invariably has followed in our past experience." Such a mode of conceiving causation would be liable to the objection very plausibly¹⁰⁰ urged by Dr. Reid, namely, that according to this doctrine night must be the cause of day, and day the [Pg 376]cause of night; since these phenomena have invariably succeeded one another from the beginning of the world. But it is necessary to our using the word cause, that we should believe not only that the antecedent always has been followed by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution of things[16] endures, it always will be so. And this would not be true of day and night. We do not believe that night will be followed by day under all imaginable circumstances, but only that it will be so provided the sun rises above the horizon. If the sun ceased to rise, which, for aught we know, may be perfectly¹⁰¹ compatible with the general laws of matter, night would be, or might be, eternal. On the other hand, if the sun is above the horizon, his light not extinct, and no opaque¹⁰² body between us and him, we believe firmly that unless a change takes place in the properties of matter, this combination of antecedents will be followed by the consequent, day; that if the combination of antecedents could be indefinitely prolonged, it would be always day; and that if the same combination had always existed, it would always have been day, quite independently of night as a previous condition. Therefore is it that we do not call night the cause, nor even a condition, of day. The existence of the sun (or some such luminous¹⁰³ body), and there being no opaque medium in a straight line[17] between that body and the part of the earth where we are situated¹⁰⁴, are the sole conditions; and the union of these, without the addition of any superfluous¹⁰⁵ circumstance, constitutes the cause. This is what writers mean when they say that the notion of cause [Pg 377]involves the idea of necessity. If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the term necessity, it is unconditionalness. That which is necessary, that which must be, means that which will be, whatever supposition we may make in regard to all other things. The succession of day and night evidently is not necessary in this sense. It is conditional¹⁰⁷ on the occurrence of other antecedents. That which will be followed by a given consequent when, and only when, some third circumstance also exists, is not the cause, even though no case should ever have occurred in which the phenomenon took place without it.

 

Invariable sequence, therefore, is not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional¹⁰⁶. There are sequences, as uniform in past experience as any others whatever, which yet we do not regard as cases of causation, but as conjunctions in some sort accidental. Such, to an accurate thinker, is that of day and night. The one might have existed for any length of time, and the other not have followed the sooner for its existence; it follows only if certain other antecedents exist; and where those antecedents existed, it would follow in any case. No one, probably, ever called night the cause of day; mankind must so soon have arrived at the very obvious generalization, that the state of general illumination which we call day would follow from the presence of a sufficiently luminous body, whether darkness had preceded or not.

 

We may define, therefore, the cause of a phenomenon, to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariably and unconditionally¹⁰⁸ consequent. Or if we adopt the convenient modification¹¹⁰ of the meaning of the word cause, which confines it to the assemblage of positive conditions without the negative, then instead of "unconditionally," we must say, "subject to no other than negative conditions."

 

To some it may appear, that the sequence between night and day being invariable in our experience, we have as much ground in this case as experience can give in any case, for recognising the two phenomena as cause and effect; and that [Pg 378]to say that more is necessary—to require a belief that the succession is unconditional, or in other words that it would be invariable under all changes of circumstances, is to acknowledge in causation an element of belief not derived¹¹¹ from experience. The answer to this is, that it is experience itself which teaches us that one uniformity of sequence is conditional and another unconditional. When we judge that the succession of night and day is a derivative¹¹² sequence, depending on something else, we proceed on grounds of experience. It is the evidence of experience which convinces us that day could equally exist without being followed by night, and that night could equally exist without being followed by day. To say that these beliefs are "not generated by our mere observation of sequence,"[18] is to forget that twice in every twenty-four hours, when the sky is clear, we have an experimentum crucis that the cause of day is the sun. We have an experimental knowledge of the sun which justifies¹¹³ us on experimental grounds in concluding, that if the sun were always above the horizon there would be day, though there had been no night, and that if the sun were always below the horizon there would be night, though there had been no day. We thus know from experience that the succession of night and day is not unconditional. Let me add, that the antecedent which is only conditionally¹⁰⁹ invariable, is not the invariable antecedent. Though a fact may, in experience, have always been followed by another fact, yet if the remainder of our experience teaches us that it might not always be so followed, or if the experience itself is such as leaves room for a possibility that the known cases may not correctly represent all possible cases, the hitherto invariable antecedent is not accounted the cause; but why? Because we are not sure that it is the invariable antecedent.

 

Such cases of sequence as that of day and night not only do not contradict the doctrine which resolves causation into invariable sequence, but are necessarily implied in that doctrine. It is evident, that from a limited number of unconditional [Pg 379]sequences, there will result a much greater number of conditional ones. Certain causes being given, that is, certain antecedents which are unconditionally followed by certain consequents; the mere coexistence of these causes will give rise to an unlimited¹¹⁴ number of additional uniformities. If two causes exist together, the effects of both will exist together; and if many causes coexist, these causes (by what we shall term hereafter the intermixture of their laws) will give rise to new effects, accompanying or succeeding one another in some particular order, which order will be invariable while the causes continue to coexist, but no longer. The motion of the earth in a given orbit round the sun, is a series of changes which follow one another as antecedents and consequents, and will continue to do so while the sun's attraction, and the force with which the earth tends to advance in a direct line through space, continue to coexist in the same quantities as at present. But vary either of these causes, and this particular succession of motions would cease to take place. The series of the earth's motions, therefore, though a case of sequence invariable within the limits of human experience, is not a case of causation. It is not unconditional.

 

This distinction between the relations of succession which so far as we know are unconditional, and those relations, whether of succession or of coexistence, which, like the earth's motions, or the succession of day and night, depend on the existence or on the coexistence of other antecedent facts—corresponds to the great division which Dr. Whewell and other writers have made of the field of science, into the investigation of what they term the Laws of Phenomena, and the investigation of causes; a phraseology, as I conceive, not philosophically sustainable, inasmuch as the ascertainment of causes, such causes as the human faculties¹¹⁵ can ascertain¹³, namely, causes which are themselves phenomena, is, therefore, merely the ascertainment of other and more universal Laws of Phenomena. And let me here observe, that Dr. Whewell, and in some degree even Sir John Herschel, seem to have misunderstood the meaning of those writers who, like [Pg 380]M. Comte, limit the sphere of scientific investigation to Laws of Phenomena, and speak of the inquiry into causes as vain and futile¹¹⁶. The causes which M. Comte designates as inaccessible¹¹⁷, are efficient causes. The investigation of physical, as opposed to efficient, causes (including the study of all the active forces in Nature, considered as facts of observation) is as important a part of M. Comte's conception of science as of Dr. Whewell's. His objection to the word cause is a mere matter of nomenclature, in which, as a matter of nomenclature, I consider him to be entirely wrong. "Those," it is justly remarked by Mr. Bailey,[19] "who, like M. Comte, object to designate events as causes, are objecting without any real ground to a mere but extremely convenient generalization, to a very useful common name, the employment of which involves, or needs involve, no particular theory." To which it may be added, that by rejecting this form of expression, M. Comte leaves himself without any term for marking a distinction which, however incorrectly expressed, is not only real, but is one of the fundamental distinctions in science; indeed it is on this alone, as we shall hereafter find, that the possibility rests of framing a rigorous Canon of Induction. And as things left without a name are apt to be forgotten, a Canon of that description is not one of the many benefits which the philosophy of Induction has received from M. Comte's great powers.

 

§ 6. Does a cause always stand with its effect in the relation of antecedent and consequent? Do we not often say of two simultaneous facts that they are cause and effect—as when we say that fire is the cause of warmth, the sun and moisture the cause of vegetation, and the like? Since a cause does not necessarily perish because its effect has been produced, the two things do very generally coexist; and there are some appearances, and some common expressions, seeming to imply not only that causes may, but that they must, be contemporaneous with their effects. Cessante causa cessat et [Pg 381]effectus, has been a dogma of the schools: the necessity for the continued existence of the cause in order to the continuance of the effect, seems to have been once a generally received doctrine. Kepler's numerous attempts to account for the motions of the heavenly bodies on mechanical principles, were rendered abortive¹¹⁸ by his always supposing that the agency which set those bodies in motion must continue to operate in order to keep up the motion which it at first produced. Yet there were at all times many familiar instances of the continuance of effects, long after their causes had ceased. A coup⁹³ de soleil gives a person a brain fever: will the fever go off as soon as he is moved out of the sunshine? A sword is run through his body: must the sword remain in his body in order that he may continue dead? A ploughshare once made, remains a ploughshare, without any continuance of heating and hammering, and even after the man who heated and hammered it has been gathered to his fathers. On the other hand, the pressure which forces up the mercury in an exhausted tube must be continued in order to sustain it in the tube. This (it may be replied) is because another force is acting⁷⁵ without intermission, the force of gravity, which would restore it to its level, unless counterpoised by a force equally constant. But again; a tight bandage causes pain, which pain will sometimes go off as soon as the bandage is removed. The illumination which the sun diffuses¹¹⁹ over the earth ceases when the sun goes down.

 

There is, therefore, a distinction to be drawn. The conditions which are necessary for the first production of a phenomenon, are occasionally also necessary for its continuance; though more commonly its continuance requires no condition except negative ones. Most things, once produced, continue as they are, until something changes or destroys them; but some require the permanent presence of the agencies which produced them at first. These may, if we please, be considered as instantaneous phenomena, requiring to be renewed at each instant by the cause by which they were at first generated. Accordingly, the illumination of any given point of space has always been looked upon as an instantaneous fact, which [Pg 382]perishes and is perpetually renewed as long as the necessary conditions subsist⁴³. If we adopt this language we avoid the necessity of admitting that the continuance of the cause is ever required to maintain the effect. We may say, it is not required to maintain, but to reproduce, the effect, or else to counteract⁷³ some force tending to destroy it. And this may be a convenient phraseology. But it is only a phraseology. The fact remains, that in some cases (though these are a minority) the continuance of the conditions which produced an effect is necessary to the continuance of the effect.

 

As to the ulterior question, whether it is strictly¹²⁰ necessary that the cause, or assemblage of conditions, should precede, by ever so short an instant, the production of the effect, (a question raised and argued with much ingenuity¹²¹ by Sir John Herschel in an Essay already quoted,[20]) the inquiry is of no consequence for our present purpose. There certainly are cases in which the effect follows without any interval¹²² perceptible by our faculties: and when there is an interval, we cannot tell by how many intermediate links imperceptible to us that interval may really be filled up. But even granting that an effect may commence simultaneously¹²³ with its cause, the view I have taken of causation is in no way practically affected¹²⁴. Whether the cause and its effect be necessarily successive or not, the beginning of a phenomenon is what implies a cause, and causation is the law of the succession of phenomena. If these axioms be granted, we can afford, though I see no necessity for doing so, to drop the words antecedent and consequent as applied¹²⁵ to cause and effect. I have no objection to define a cause, the assemblage of phenomena, which occurring, some other phenomenon invariably commences, or has its origin. Whether the effect coincides in point of time with, or immediately follows, the hindmost of its conditions, is immaterial. At all events it does not precede it; and when we are in doubt, between two coexistent phenomena, which is cause and which effect, we rightly deem the question solved if we can ascertain which of them preceded the other.

 

§ 7. It continually happens that several different phenomena, which are not in the slightest degree dependent or conditional on one another, are found all to depend, as the phrase is, on one and the same agent; in other words, one and the same phenomenon is seen to be followed by several sorts of effects quite heterogeneous¹²⁶, but which go on simultaneously one with another; provided, of course, that all other conditions requisite for each of them also exist. Thus, the sun produces the celestial¹²⁷ motions, it produces daylight, and it produces heat. The earth causes the fall of heavy bodies, and it also, in its capacity of a great magnet, causes the phenomena of the magnetic needle. A crystal of galena causes the sensations of hardness, of weight, of cubical form, of grey colour, and many others between which we can trace no interdependence. The purpose to which the phraseology of Properties and Powers is specially³⁷ adapted, is the expression of this sort of cases. When the same phenomenon is followed (either subject or not to the presence of other conditions) by effects of different and dissimilar orders, it is usual to say that each different sort of effect is produced by a different property of the cause. Thus we distinguish the attractive or gravitative property of the earth, and its magnetic property: the gravitative, luminiferous, and calorific properties of the sun: the colour, shape, weight, and hardness of a crystal. These are mere phrases, which explain nothing, and add nothing to our knowledge of the subject; but, considered as abstract names denoting the connexion between the different effects produced and the object which produces them, they are a very powerful instrument of abridgment¹²⁸, and of that acceleration¹²⁹ of the process of thought which abridgment accomplishes.

 

This class of considerations leads to a conception which we shall find to be of great importance, that of a Permanent Cause, or original natural agent. There exist in nature a number of permanent causes, which have subsisted¹³⁰ ever since the human race has been in existence, and for an indefinite and probably an enormous length of time previous. The sun, the earth, and planets, with their various constituents¹³¹, air, water, and other distinguishable substances, whether simple or [Pg 384]compound, of which nature is made up, are such Permanent Causes. These have existed, and the effects or consequences which they were fitted to produce have taken place (as often as the other conditions of the production met,) from the very beginning of our experience. But we can give no account of the origin of the Permanent Causes themselves. Why these particular natural agents existed originally and no others, or why they are commingled¹³² in such and such proportions, and distributed in such and such a manner throughout space, is a question we cannot answer. More than this: we can discover nothing regular in the distribution itself; we can reduce it to no uniformity, to no law. There are no means by which, from the distribution of these causes or agents in one part of space, we could conjecture¹³³ whether a similar distribution prevails in another. The coexistence, therefore, of Primeval Causes, ranks, to us, among merely casual concurrences¹³⁴: and all those sequences or coexistences among the effects of several such causes, which, though invariable while those causes coexist, would, if the coexistence terminated, terminate along with it, we do not class as cases of causation, or laws of nature: we can only calculate on finding these sequences or coexistences where we know by direct evidence, that the natural agents on the properties of which they ultimately depend, are distributed in the requisite manner. These Permanent Causes are not always objects; they are sometimes events, that is to say, periodical cycles of events, that being the only mode in which events can possess the property of permanence. Not only, for instance, is the earth itself a permanent cause, or primitive¹³⁵ natural agent, but the earth's rotation¹³⁶ is so too: it is a cause which has produced, from the earliest period, (by the aid of other necessary conditions,) the succession of day and night, the ebb¹³⁷ and flow of the sea, and many other effects, while, as we can assign no cause (except conjecturally) for the rotation itself, it is entitled to be ranked as a primeval cause. It is, however, only the origin of the rotation which is mysterious to us: once begun, its continuance is accounted for by the first law of motion (that of the permanence of rectilinear motion [Pg 385]once impressed) combined with the gravitation of the parts of the earth towards one another.

 

All phenomena without exception which begin to exist, that is, all except the primeval causes, are effects either immediate or remote of those primitive facts, or of some combination of them. There is no Thing produced, no event happening, in the known universe, which is not connected by an uniformity, or invariable sequence, with some one or more of the phenomena which preceded it; insomuch that it will happen again as often as those phenomena occur again, and as no other phenomenon having the character of a counteracting cause shall coexist. These antecedent phenomena, again, were connected in a similar manner with some that preceded them; and so on, until we reach, as the ultimate step attainable¹³⁸ by us, either the properties of some one primeval cause, or the conjunction of several. The whole of the phenomena of nature were therefore the necessary, or in other words, the unconditional, consequences of some former collocation of the Permanent Causes.

 

The state of the whole universe at any instant, we believe to be the consequence of its state at the previous instant; insomuch that one who knew all the agents which exist at the present moment, their collocation in space, and all their properties, in other words, the laws of their agency, could predict the whole subsequent history of the universe, at least unless some new volition¹³⁹ of a power capable of controlling the universe should supervene.[21] And if any particular state of the [Pg 386]entire universe could ever recur¹⁴⁰ a second time, all subsequent states would return too, and history would, like a circulating decimal of many figures, periodically repeat itself:—

 

Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna....

Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera qu? vehat Argo

Delectos heroas; erunt quoque altera bella,

Atque iterum ad Trojam magnus mittetur Achilles.

And though things do not really revolve¹⁴¹ in this eternal round, the whole series of events in the history of the universe, past and future, is not the less capable, in its own nature, of being constructed à priori by any one whom we can suppose acquainted with the original distribution of all natural agents, and with the whole of their properties, that is, the laws of succession existing between them and their effects: saving the far more than human powers of combination and calculation which would be required, even in one possessing the data, for the actual performance of the task.

 

§ 8. Since everything which occurs is determined by laws of causation and collocations of the original causes, it follows that the coexistences which are observable among effects cannot be themselves the subject of any similar set of laws, distinct from laws of causation. Uniformities there are, as well of coexistence as of succession, among effects; but these must in all cases be a mere result either of the identity or of the coexistence of their causes: if the causes did not coexist, neither could the effects. And these causes being also effects of prior causes, and these of others, until we reach the primeval causes, it follows that (except in the case of effects which can be traced immediately or remotely to one and the [Pg 387]same cause) the coexistences of phenomena can in no case be universal, unless the coexistences of the primeval causes to which the effects are ultimately traceable, can be reduced to an universal law: but we have seen that they cannot. There are, accordingly, no original and independent, in other words no unconditional, uniformities of coexistence, between effects of different causes; if they coexist, it is only because the causes have casually¹⁴² coexisted. The only independent and unconditional coexistences which are sufficiently invariable to have any claim to the character of laws, are between different and mutually independent effects of the same cause; in other words, between different properties of the same natural agent. This portion of the Laws of Nature will be treated of in the latter part of the present Book, under the name of the Specific Properties of Kinds.

 

§ 9. It is proper in this place to advert to a rather ancient doctrine respecting causation, which has been revived during the last few years in many quarters, and at present gives more signs of life than any other theory of causation at variance¹⁴⁴ with that set forth¹⁴⁵ in the preceding pages.

 

According to the theory in question, Mind, or, to speak more precisely¹⁴⁶, Will, is the only cause of phenomena. The type of Causation, as well as the exclusive source from which we derive the idea, is our own voluntary agency. Here, and here only (it is said) we have direct evidence of causation. We know that we can move our bodies. Respecting the phenomena of inanimate nature, we have no other direct knowledge than that of antecedence¹⁴⁷ and sequence. But in the case of our voluntary actions, it is affirmed that we are conscious of power, before we have experience of results. An act of volition, whether followed by an effect or not, is accompanied by a consciousness of effort, "of force exerted, of power in action, which is necessarily causal, or causative." This feeling of energy or force, inherent in an act of will, is knowledge à priori; assurance, prior to experience, that we have the power of causing effects. Volition, therefore, it is asserted, is something more than an unconditional antecedent; [Pg 388]it is a cause, in a different sense from that in which physical phenomena are said to cause one another: it is an Efficient Cause. From this the transition is easy to the further doctrine, that Volition is the sole Efficient Cause of all phenomena. "It is inconceivable that dead force could continue unsupported for a moment beyond its creation. We cannot even conceive of change or phenomena without the energy of a mind." "The word action" itself, says another writer of the same school, "has no real significance except when applied to the doings of an intelligent agent. Let any one conceive, if he can, of any power, energy, or force, inherent in a lump of matter." Phenomena may have the semblance¹⁴⁸ of being produced by physical causes, but they are in reality produced, say these writers, by the immediate agency of mind. All things which do not proceed from a human (or, I suppose, an animal) will, proceed, they say, directly from divine will. The earth is not moved by the combination of a centripetal¹⁴⁹ and a projectile force; this is but a mode of speaking, which serves to facilitate our conceptions. It is moved by the direct volition of an omnipotent¹⁵⁰ Being, in a path coinciding with that which we deduce from the hypothesis of these two forces.

 

As I have so often observed, the general question of the existence of Efficient Causes does not fall within the limits of our subject: but a theory which represents them as capable of being subjects of human knowledge, and which passes off as efficient causes what are only physical or phenomenal causes, belongs as much to Logic as to Metaphysics, and is a fit subject for discussion here.

 

To my apprehension¹⁵¹, a volition is not an efficient, but simply a physical, cause. Our will causes our bodily actions in the same sense, and in no other, in which cold causes ice, or a spark causes an explosion of gunpowder¹⁵². The volition, a state of our mind, is the antecedent; the motion of our limbs in conformity¹⁵³ to the volition, is the consequent. This sequence I conceive to be not a subject of direct consciousness, in the sense intended by the theory. The antecedent, indeed, and the consequent, are subjects of consciousness. But the connexion between them is a subject of experience. I cannot [Pg 389]admit that our consciousness of the volition contains in itself any à priori knowledge that the muscular motion will follow. If our nerves of motion were paralysed, or our muscles stiff and inflexible¹⁵⁴, and had been so all our lives, I do not see the slightest ground for supposing that we should ever (unless by information from other people) have known anything of volition as a physical power, or been conscious of any tendency in feelings of our mind to produce motions of our body, or of other bodies. I will not undertake to say whether we should in that case have had the physical feeling which I suppose is meant when these writers speak of "consciousness of effort:" I see no reason why we should not; since that physical feeling is probably a state of nervous sensation beginning and ending in the brain, without involving the motory apparatus¹⁵⁵: but we certainly should not have designated it by any term equivalent to effort, since effort implies consciously aiming at an end, which we should not only in that case have had no reason to do, but could not even have had the idea of doing. If conscious at all of this peculiar sensation, we should have been conscious of it, I conceive, only as a kind of uneasiness, accompanying our feelings of desire.

 

It is well argued by Sir William Hamilton against the theory in question, that it "is refuted by the consideration, that between the overt¹⁵⁶ fact of corporeal¹⁵⁷ movement of which we are cognisant, and the internal act of mental determination of which we are also cognisant, there intervenes a numerous series of intermediate agencies of which we have no knowledge; and, consequently, that we can have no consciousness of any causal connexion between the extreme links of this chain, the volition to move and the limb moving, as this hypothesis asserts. No one is immediately conscious, for example, of moving his arm through his volition. Previously¹⁵⁸ to this ultimate movement, muscles, nerves, a multitude of solid and fluid parts, must be set in motion by the will, but of this motion we know, from consciousness, absolutely nothing. A person struck with paralysis¹⁵⁹ is conscious of no inability in his limb to fulfil the determinations of his will; and it is only after having willed, and finding that his limbs do not obey his [Pg 390]volition, that he learns by this experience, that the external movement does not follow the internal act. But as the paralytic¹⁶⁰ learns after the volition that his limbs do not obey his mind; so it is only after volition that the man in health learns, that his limbs do obey the mandates¹⁶¹ of his will."[22]

 

Those against whom I am contending have never produced, and do not pretend to produce, any positive evidence[23] that the power of our will to move our bodies would be known to us independently of experience. What they have to say on the subject is, that the production of physical events by a will seems to carry its own explanation with it, while the action of matter upon matter seems to require something else to explain it; and is even, according to them, "inconceivable" [Pg 391]on any other supposition than that some will intervenes between the apparent cause and its apparent effect. They thus rest their case on an appeal to the inherent laws of our conceptive faculty¹⁶²; mistaking, as I apprehend¹⁶³, for the laws of that faculty its acquired habits, grounded on the spontaneous tendencies of its uncultured state. The succession between the will to move a limb and the actual motion, is one of the most direct and instantaneous of all sequences which come under our observation, and is familiar to every moment's experience from our earliest infancy¹⁶⁴; more familiar than any succession of events exterior¹⁶⁵ to our bodies, and especially more so than any other case of the apparent origination (as distinguished¹⁶⁶ from the mere communication) of motion. Now, it is the natural tendency of the mind to be always attempting to facilitate its conception of unfamiliar¹⁶⁷ facts by assimilating them to others which are familiar. Accordingly, our voluntary acts, being the most familiar to us of all cases of causation, are, in the infancy and early youth of the human race, spontaneously taken as the type of causation in general, and all phenomena are supposed to be directly produced by the will of some sentient being. This original Fetichism I shall not characterize in the words of Hume, or of any follower¹⁶⁸ of Hume, but in those of a religious metaphysician, Dr. Reid, in order more effectually to show the unanimity¹⁶⁹ which exists on the subject among all competent thinkers.

 

"When we turn our attention to external objects, and begin to exercise our rational faculties about them, we find that there are some motions and changes in them which we have power to produce, and that there are many which must have some other cause. Either the objects must have life and active power, as we have, or they must be moved or changed by something that has life and active power, as external objects are moved by us.

 

"Our first thoughts seem to be, that the objects in which we perceive such motion have understanding and active power as we have. 'Savages¹⁷⁰,' says the Abbé Raynal, 'wherever they see motion which they cannot account for, there they suppose a soul.' All men may be considered as savages in this respect, [Pg 392]until they are capable of instruction, and of using their faculties in a more perfect manner than savages do.

 

"The Abbé Raynal's observation is sufficiently confirmed, both from fact, and from the structure of all languages.

 

"Rude nations do really believe sun, moon, and stars, earth, sea, and air, fountains, and lakes, to have understanding and active power. To pay homage¹⁷¹ to them, and implore¹⁷² their favour, is a kind of idolatry natural to savages.

 

"All languages carry in their structure the marks of their being formed when this belief prevailed. The distinction of verbs and participles into active and passive, which is found in all languages, must have been originally intended to distinguish what is really active from what is merely passive; and in all languages, we find active verbs applied to those objects, in which, according to the Abbé Raynal's observation, savages suppose a soul.

 

"Thus we say the sun rises and sets, and comes to the meridian¹⁷³, the moon changes, the sea ebbs¹⁷⁴ and flows, the winds blow. Languages were formed by men who believed these objects to have life and active power in themselves. It was therefore proper and natural to express their motions and changes by active verbs.

 

"There is no surer way of tracing the sentiments of nations before they have records, than by the structure of their language, which, notwithstanding the changes produced in it by time, will always retain some signatures of the thoughts of those by whom it was invented. When we find the same sentiments indicated in the structure of all languages, those sentiments must have been common to the human species when languages were invented.

 

"When a few, of superior intellectual abilities, find leisure for speculation¹⁷⁵, they begin to philosophize, and soon discover, that many of those objects which at first they believed to be intelligent and active are really lifeless and passive. This is a very important discovery. It elevates the mind, emancipates¹⁷⁶ from many vulgar superstitions¹⁷⁷, and invites to further discoveries of the same kind.

 

"As philosophy advances, life and activity in natural [Pg 393]objects retires, and leaves them dead and inactive. Instead of moving voluntarily, we find them to be moved necessarily; instead of acting, we find them to be acted upon; and Nature appears as one great machine, where one wheel is turned by another, that by a third; and how far this necessary succession may reach, the philosopher does not know."[24]

 

There is, then, a spontaneous tendency of the intellect to account to itself for all cases of causation by assimilating them to the intentional¹⁷⁸ acts of voluntary agents like itself. This is the instinctive¹⁷⁹ philosophy of the human mind in its earliest stage, before it has become familiar with any other invariable sequences than those between its own volitions or those of other human beings and their voluntary acts. As the notion of fixed laws of succession among external phenomena gradually establishes itself, the propensity¹⁸⁰ to refer all phenomena to voluntary agency slowly gives way before it. The suggestions, however, of daily life continuing to be more powerful than those of scientific thought, the original instinctive philosophy maintains its ground in the mind, underneath¹⁸¹ the growths obtained by cultivation¹⁸², and keeps up a constant resistance to their throwing their roots deep into the soil. The theory against which I am contending derives¹⁸³ its nourishment¹⁸⁴ from that substratum. Its strength does not lie in argument, but in its affinity¹⁸⁵ to an obstinate¹⁸⁶ tendency of the infancy of the human mind.

 

That this tendency, however, is not the result of an inherent mental law, is proved by superabundant evidence. The history of science, from its earliest dawn, shows that mankind have not been unanimous in thinking either that the action of matter upon matter was not conceivable, or that the action of mind upon matter was. To some thinkers, and some schools of thinkers, both in ancient and in modern times, this last has appeared much more inconceivable than the former. Sequences entirely physical and material, as soon as they had become sufficiently familiar to the human mind, came to be thought perfectly natural, and were regarded not only as needing no explanation themselves, but as being capable of [Pg 394]affording it to others, and even of serving as the ultimate explanation of things in general.

 

One of the ablest recent supporters of the Volitional¹⁸⁷ theory has furnished an explanation, at once historically true and philosophically acute, of the failure of the Greek philosophers in physical inquiry, in which, as I conceive, he unconsciously depicts¹⁸⁸ his own state of mind. "Their stumbling-block was one as to the nature of the evidence they had to expect for their conviction.... They had not seized the idea that they must not expect to understand the processes of outward causes, but only their results: and consequently, the whole physical philosophy of the Greeks was an attempt to identify mentally the effect with its cause, to feel after some not only necessary but natural connexion, where they meant by natural that which would per se carry some presumption¹⁸⁹ to their own mind.... They wanted to see some reason why the physical antecedent should produce this particular consequent, and their only attempts were in directions where they could find such reasons."[25] In other words, they were not content merely to know that one phenomenon was always followed by another; they thought that they had not attained¹⁹⁰ the true aim of science, unless they could perceive something in the nature of the one phenomenon from which it might have been known or presumed previous to trial that it would be followed by the other: just what the writer, who has so clearly pointed out their error, thinks that he perceives in the nature of the phenomenon Volition. And to complete the statement of the case, he should have added that these early speculators not only made this their aim, but were quite satisfied with their success in it; not only sought for causes which should carry in their mere statement evidence of their efficiency, but fully¹⁹¹ believed that they had found such causes. The reviewer can see plainly that this was an error, because he does not believe that there exist any relations between material phenomena which can account for their producing one another: but the very fact of the persistency¹⁹² [Pg 395]of the Greeks in this error, shows that their minds were in a very different state: they were able to derive from the assimilation of physical facts to other physical facts, the kind of mental satisfaction which we connect with the word explanation, and which the reviewer would have us think can only be found in referring phenomena to a will. When Thales and Hippo held that moisture was the universal cause, and external element, of which all other things were but the infinitely¹⁹³ various sensible manifestations¹⁹⁴; when Anaximenes predicated the same thing of air, Pythagoras of numbers, and the like, they all thought that they had found a real explanation; and were content to rest in this explanation as ultimate. The ordinary sequences of the external universe appeared to them, no less than to their critic, to be inconceivable without the supposition of some universal agency to connect the antecedents with the consequents; but they did not think that Volition, exerted by minds, was the only agency which fulfilled this requirement. Moisture, or air, or numbers, carried to their minds a precisely similar impression of making intelligible¹⁹⁵ what was otherwise inconceivable, and gave the same full satisfaction to the demands of their conceptive faculty.

 

It was not the Greeks alone, who "wanted to see some reason why the physical antecedent should produce this particular consequent," some connexion "which would per se carry some presumption to their own mind." Among modern philosophers, Leibnitz laid it down as a self-evident principle that all physical causes without exception must contain in their own nature something which makes it intelligible that they should be able to produce the effects which they do produce. Far from admitting Volition as the only kind of cause which carried internal evidence of its own power, and as the real bond of connexion between physical antecedents and their consequents, he demanded some naturally and per se efficient physical antecedent as the bond of connexion between Volition itself and its effects. He distinctly refused to admit the will of God as a sufficient explanation of anything except miracles; and insisted upon finding something that would [Pg 396]account better for the phenomena of nature than a mere reference to divine volition.[26]

 

Again, and conversely, the action of mind upon matter (which, we are now told, not only needs no explanation itself, but is the explanation of all other effects), has appeared to some thinkers to be itself the grand inconceivability. It was to get over this very difficulty that the Cartesians invented the system of Occasional Causes. They could not conceive that thoughts in a mind could produce movements in a body, or that bodily movements could produce thoughts. They could see no necessary connexion, no relation à priori, between a motion and a thought. And as the Cartesians, more than any other school of philosophical⁴⁸ speculation before or since, made their own minds the measure of all things, and refused, on principle, to believe that Nature had done what they were unable to see any reason why she must do, they affirmed it to be impossible that a material and a mental fact could be causes one of another. They regarded them as mere Occasions on which the real agent, God, thought fit to exert his power as a Cause. When a man wills to move his foot, it is not his will that moves it, but God (they said) moves it on the occasion of his will. God, according to this system, is the only efficient cause, not qua mind, or qua endowed with volition, but qua omnipotent. This hypothesis was, as I said, originally suggested by the supposed inconceivability of any real mutual¹⁴³ action between Mind and Matter: but it was afterwards extended to the action of Matter upon Matter, for on a nicer examination they found this inconceivable too, and therefore, according to their logic, impossible. The deus ex machina was ultimately called in to produce a spark on the occasion of a flint and steel coming together, or to break an egg on the occasion of its falling on the ground.

 

All this, undoubtedly¹⁹⁶, shows that it is the disposition¹⁹⁷ of mankind in general, not to be satisfied with knowing that one fact is invariably antecedent and another consequent, but to look out for something which may seem to explain their being so. But we also see that this demand may be completely satisfied [Pg 397]by an agency purely¹⁹⁸ physical, provided it be much more familiar than that which it is invoked¹⁹⁹ to explain. To Thales and Anaximenes, it appeared inconceivable that the antecedents which we see in nature, should produce the consequents; but perfectly natural that water, or air, should produce them. The writers whom I oppose declare this inconceivable, but can conceive that mind, or volition, is per se an efficient cause: while the Cartesians could not conceive even that, but peremptorily²⁰⁰ declared that no mode of production of any fact whatever was conceivable, except the direct agency of an omnipotent being. Thus giving additional proof of what finds new confirmation²⁰¹ in every stage of the history of science: that both what persons can, and what they cannot, conceive, is very much an affair of accident, and depends altogether on their experience, and their habits of thought; that by cultivating the requisite associations of ideas, people may make themselves unable to conceive any given thing; and may make themselves able to conceive most things, however inconceivable these may at first appear: and the same facts in each person's mental history which determine what is or is not conceivable to him, determine also which among the various sequences in nature will appear to him so natural and plausible²⁰², as to need no other proof of their existence; to be evident by their own light, independent equally of experience and of explanation.

 

By what rule is any one to decide between one theory of this description and another? The theorists do not direct us to any external evidence; they appeal each to his own subjective²⁰³ feelings. One says, the succession C, B, appears to me more natural, conceivable, and credible²⁰⁴ per se, than the succession A, B; you are therefore mistaken in thinking that B depends upon A; I am certain, though I can give no other evidence of it, that C comes in between A and B, and is the real and only cause of B. The other answers—the successions C, B, and A, B, appear to me equally natural and conceivable, or the latter more so than the former: A is quite capable of producing B without any other intervention²⁰⁵. A third agrees with the first in being unable to conceive that A can produce B, but finds the sequence D, B, still more natural than C, B, or of nearer kin¹⁶ to the subject matter, and prefers his D theory [Pg 398]to the C theory. It is plain that there is no universal law operating here, except the law that each person's conceptions are governed and limited by his individual experience and habits of thought. We are warranted in saying of all three, what each of them already believes of the other two, namely, that they exalt²⁰⁶ into an original law of the human intellect and of outward nature, one particular sequence of phenomena, which appears to them more natural and more conceivable than other sequences, only because it is more familiar. And from this judgment²⁰⁷ I am unable to except the theory, that Volition is an Efficient Cause.

 

I am unwilling²⁰⁸ to leave the subject without adverting²⁰⁹ to the additional fallacy contained in the corollary from this theory; in the inference that because Volition is an efficient cause, therefore it is the only cause, and the direct agent in producing even what is apparently²¹⁰ produced by something else. Volitions are not known to produce anything directly except nervous action, for the will influences even the muscles only through the nerves. Though it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient, and not merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the peculiar phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that efficient cause; are we therefore to say, with these writers, that since we know of no other efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there is no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A more outrageous²¹¹ stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among the infinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, a particular mode of action of certain nerves, which has for its cause, and as we are now supposing for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; and because this is the only efficient cause of which we are conscious, being the only one of which in the nature of the case we can be conscious, since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify²¹² us in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind of efficient cause with that one eminently²¹³ special, narrow, and peculiarly human or animal, phenomenon? The nearest parallel to this specimen²¹⁴ of generalization is suggested [Pg 399]by the recently revived controversy²¹⁵ on the old subject of Plurality of Worlds, in which the contending parties have been so conspicuously²¹⁶ successful in overthrowing²¹⁷ one another. Here also we have experience only of a single case, that of the world in which we live, but that this is inhabited we know absolutely, and without possibility of doubt. Now if on this evidence any one were to infer that every heavenly body without exception, sun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed star or nebula²¹⁸, is inhabited, and must be so from the inherent constitution of things, his inference would exactly resemble that of the writers who conclude that because volition is the efficient cause of our own bodily motions, it must be the efficient cause of everything else in the universe. It is true there are cases in which, with acknowledged propriety, we generalize from a single instance to a multitude of instances. But they must be instances which resemble the one known instance, and not such as have no circumstance in common with it except that of being instances. I have, for example, no direct evidence that any creature is alive except myself: yet I attribute, with full assurance, life and sensation to other human beings and animals. But I do not conclude that all other things are alive merely because I am. I ascribe to certain other creatures a life like my own, because they manifest it by the same sort of indications by which mine is manifested. I find that their phenomena and mine conform to the same laws, and it is for this reason that I believe both to arise from a similar cause. Accordingly I do not extend the conclusion beyond the grounds for it. Earth, fire, mountains, trees, are remarkable agencies, but their phenomena do not conform to the same laws as my actions do, and I therefore do not believe earth or fire, mountains or trees, to possess animal life. But the supporters of the Volition Theory ask us to infer that volition causes everything, for no reason except that it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far from being a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws bearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whether of inorganic²¹⁹ or of organic nature.

1 phenomena   

n.现象

参考例句：

• Ade couldn't relate the phenomena with any theory he knew.艾德无法用他所知道的任何理论来解释这种现象。
• The object of these experiments was to find the connection,if any,between the two phenomena.这些实验的目的就是探索这两种现象之间的联系，如果存在着任何联系的话。

2 synchronous   

adj.同步的

参考例句：

• The message can be used only with synchronous operations.消息只能与同步操作一起使用。
• Synchronous machines do not easily fall out of step under normal conditions.在正常情况下，同步电机不易失去同步。

3 lapse   

n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效

参考例句：

• The incident was being seen as a serious security lapse.这一事故被看作是一次严重的安全疏忽。
• I had a lapse of memory.我记错了。

4 fixed   

adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的

参考例句：

• Have you two fixed on a date for the wedding yet?你们俩选定婚期了吗？
• Once the aim is fixed,we should not change it arbitrarily.目标一旦确定，我们就不应该随意改变。

5 eternity   

n.不朽，来世；永恒，无穷

参考例句：

• The dull play seemed to last an eternity.这场乏味的剧似乎演个没完没了。
• Finally,Ying Tai and Shan Bo could be together for all of eternity.英台和山伯终能双宿双飞，永世相随。

6 cylinder   

n.圆筒，柱(面)，汽缸

参考例句：

• What's the volume of this cylinder?这个圆筒的体积有多少？
• The cylinder is getting too much gas and not enough air.汽缸里汽油太多而空气不足。

7 relatively   

adv.比较...地，相对地

参考例句：

• The rabbit is a relatively recent introduction in Australia.兔子是相对较新引入澳大利亚的物种。
• The operation was relatively painless.手术相对来说不痛。

8 conclusive   

adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的

参考例句：

• They produced some fairly conclusive evidence.他们提供了一些相当确凿的证据。
• Franklin did not believe that the French tests were conclusive.富兰克林不相信这个法国人的实验是结论性的。

9 possessed   

adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的

参考例句：

• He flew out of the room like a man possessed.他像着了魔似地猛然冲出房门。
• He behaved like someone possessed.他行为举止像是魔怔了。

10 anticipation   

n.预期，预料，期望

参考例句：

• We waited at the station in anticipation of her arrival.我们在车站等着，期待她的到来。
• The animals grew restless as if in anticipation of an earthquake.各种动物都变得焦躁不安，像是感到了地震即将发生。

11 premise   

n.前提；v.提论，预述

参考例句：

• Let me premise my argument with a bit of history.让我引述一些史实作为我立论的前提。
• We can deduce a conclusion from the premise.我们可以从这个前提推出结论。

12 premises   

n.建筑物，房屋

参考例句：

• According to the rules,no alcohol can be consumed on the premises.按照规定，场内不准饮酒。
• All repairs are done on the premises and not put out.全部修缮都在家里进行，不用送到外面去做。

13 ascertain   

vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清

参考例句：

• It's difficult to ascertain the coal deposits.煤储量很难探明。
• We must ascertain the responsibility in light of different situtations.我们必须根据不同情况判定责任。

14 ascertainment   

n.探查，发现，确认

参考例句：

• Part 1 introduces the ascertainment of key stuff in state-owned commercial banks. 第1部分介绍了国有商业银行核心员工的界定。 来自互联网
• IV The judicial ascertainment and criminal liability of involuntary dangerous crime. 过失危险犯的司法认定及刑事责任。 来自互联网

15 expressive   

adj.表现的，表达…的，富于表情的

参考例句：

• Black English can be more expressive than standard English.黑人所使用的英语可能比正式英语更有表现力。
• He had a mobile,expressive,animated face.他有一张多变的，富于表情的，生动活泼的脸。

16 kin   

n.家族，亲属，血缘关系；adj.亲属关系的，同类的

参考例句：

• He comes of good kin.他出身好。
• She has gone to live with her husband's kin.她住到丈夫的亲戚家里去了。

17 velocity   

n.速度，速率

参考例句：

• Einstein's theory links energy with mass and velocity of light.爱因斯坦的理论把能量同质量和光速联系起来。
• The velocity of light is about 300000 kilometres per second.光速约为每秒300000公里。

18 peculiar   

adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的

参考例句：

• He walks in a peculiar fashion.他走路的样子很奇特。
• He looked at me with a very peculiar expression.他用一种很奇怪的表情看着我。

19 chimerical   

adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的

参考例句：

• His Utopia is not a chimerical commonwealth but a practical improvement on what already exists.他的乌托邦不是空想的联邦，而是对那些已经存在的联邦事实上的改进。
• Most interpret the information from the victims as chimerical thinking.大多数来自于受害者的解释是被当作空想。

20 demonstrations   

证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威

参考例句：

• Lectures will be interspersed with practical demonstrations. 讲课中将不时插入实际示范。
• The new military government has banned strikes and demonstrations. 新的军人政府禁止罢工和示威活动。

21 remarkable   

adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的

参考例句：

• She has made remarkable headway in her writing skills.她在写作技巧方面有了长足进步。
• These cars are remarkable for the quietness of their engines.这些汽车因发动机没有噪音而不同凡响。

22 peculiarity   

n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖

参考例句：

• Each country has its own peculiarity.每个国家都有自己的独特之处。
• The peculiarity of this shop is its day and nigth service.这家商店的特点是昼夜服务。

23 pretension   

n.要求；自命，自称；自负

参考例句：

• I make no pretension to skill as an artist,but I enjoy painting.我并不自命有画家的技巧，但我喜欢绘画。
• His action is a satire on his boastful pretension.他的行动是对他自我卖弄的一个讽刺。

24 generalization   

n.普遍性，一般性，概括

参考例句：

• This sweeping generalization is the law of conservation of energy.这一透彻的概括就是能量守恒定律。
• The evaluation of conduct involves some amount of generalization.对操行的评价会含有一些泛泛之论。

25 mere   

adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过

参考例句：

• That is a mere repetition of what you said before.那不过是重复了你以前讲的话。
• It's a mere waste of time waiting any longer.再等下去纯粹是浪费时间。

26 inspection   

n.检查，审查，检阅

参考例句：

• On random inspection the meat was found to be bad.经抽查，发现肉变质了。
• The soldiers lined up for their daily inspection by their officers.士兵们列队接受军官的日常检阅。

27 induction   

n.感应，感应现象

参考例句：

• His induction as a teacher was a turning point in his life.他就任教师工作是他一生的转折点。
• The magnetic signals are sensed by induction coils.磁信号由感应线圈所检测。

28 inquiry   

n.打听，询问，调查，查问

参考例句：

• Many parents have been pressing for an inquiry into the problem.许多家长迫切要求调查这个问题。
• The field of inquiry has narrowed down to five persons.调查的范围已经缩小到只剩5个人了。

29 determined   

adj.坚定的；有决心的

参考例句：

• I have determined on going to Tibet after graduation.我已决定毕业后去西藏。
• He determined to view the rooms behind the office.他决定查看一下办公室后面的房间。

30 logic   

n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性

参考例句：

• What sort of logic is that?这是什么逻辑？
• I don't follow the logic of your argument.我不明白你的论点逻辑性何在。

31 strife   

n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争

参考例句：

• We do not intend to be drawn into the internal strife.我们不想卷入内乱之中。
• Money is a major cause of strife in many marriages.金钱是造成很多婚姻不和的一个主要原因。

32 quelled   

v.（用武力）制止，结束，镇压( quell的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• Thanks to Kao Sung-nien's skill, the turmoil had been quelled. 亏高松年有本领，弹压下去。 来自汉英文学 - 围城
• Mr. Atkinson was duly quelled. 阿特金森先生被及时地将了一军。 来自辞典例句

33 promulgation   

n.颁布

参考例句：

• The new law comes into force from the day of its promulgation. 新法律自公布之日起生效。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Article 118 These Regulations shall come into effect from the day of their promulgation. 第一百一十八条本条例自公布之日起实施。 来自经济法规部分

34 investigation   

n.调查，调查研究

参考例句：

• In an investigation,a new fact became known, which told against him.在调查中新发现了一件对他不利的事实。
• He drew the conclusion by building on his own investigation.他根据自己的调查研究作出结论。

35 controversies   

争论

参考例句：

• We offer no comment on these controversies here. 对于这些争议，我们在这里不作任何评论。 来自英汉非文学 - 历史
• The controversies surrounding population growth are unlikely to subside soon. 围绕着人口增长问题的争论看来不会很快平息。 来自辞典例句

36 scotch   

n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的

参考例句：

• Facts will eventually scotch these rumours.这种谣言在事实面前将不攻自破。
• Italy was full of fine views and virtually empty of Scotch whiskey.意大利多的是美景，真正缺的是苏格兰威士忌。

37 specially   

adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地

参考例句：

• They are specially packaged so that they stack easily.它们经过特别包装以便于堆放。
• The machine was designed specially for demolishing old buildings.这种机器是专为拆毁旧楼房而设计的。

38 Vogue   

n.时髦，时尚；adj.流行的

参考例句：

• Flowery carpets became the vogue.花卉地毯变成了时髦货。
• Short hair came back into vogue about ten years ago.大约十年前短发又开始流行起来了。

39 ascending   

adj.上升的，向上的

参考例句：

• Now draw or trace ten dinosaurs in ascending order of size.现在按照体型由小到大的顺序画出或是临摹出10只恐龙。

40 doctrine   

n.教义；主义；学说

参考例句：

• He was impelled to proclaim his doctrine.他不得不宣扬他的教义。
• The council met to consider changes to doctrine.宗教议会开会考虑更改教义。

41 concurrence   

n.同意；并发

参考例句：

• There is a concurrence of opinion between them.他们的想法一致。
• The concurrence of their disappearances had to be more than coincidental.他们同时失踪肯定不仅仅是巧合。

42 derive   

v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自

参考例句：

• We derive our sustenance from the land.我们从土地获取食物。
• We shall derive much benefit from reading good novels.我们将从优秀小说中获得很大好处。

43 subsist   

vi.生存，存在，供养

参考例句：

• We are unable to subsist without air and water.没有空气和水我们就活不下去。
• He could subsist on bark and grass roots in the isolated island.在荒岛上他只能靠树皮和草根维持生命。

44 subsists   

v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• This plant subsists in water holes only during the rainy season. 这种植物只有雨季在水坑里出现。 来自辞典例句
• The hinge is that the enterprise subsists on suiting the development of data communication. 适应数据通信的发展是通信企业生存的关键。 来自互联网

45 requisite   

adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品

参考例句：

• He hasn't got the requisite qualifications for the job.他不具备这工作所需的资格。
• Food and air are requisite for life.食物和空气是生命的必需品。

46 denomination   

n.命名，取名，(度量衡、货币等的)单位

参考例句：

• The firm is still operating under another denomination.这家公司改用了名称仍在继续营业。
• Litre is a metric denomination.升是公制单位。

47 philosophically   

adv.哲学上；富有哲理性地；贤明地；冷静地

参考例句：

• He added philosophically that one should adapt oneself to the changed conditions. 他富于哲理地补充说，一个人应该适应变化了的情况。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Harry took his rejection philosophically. 哈里达观地看待自己被拒的事。 来自《简明英汉词典》

48 philosophical   

adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的

参考例句：

• The teacher couldn't answer the philosophical problem.老师不能解答这个哲学问题。
• She is very philosophical about her bad luck.她对自己的不幸看得很开。

49 immediate   

adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的

参考例句：

• His immediate neighbours felt it their duty to call.他的近邻认为他们有责任去拜访。
• We declared ourselves for the immediate convocation of the meeting.我们主张立即召开这个会议。

50 catching   

adj.易传染的，有魅力的，迷人的，接住

参考例句：

• There are those who think eczema is catching.有人就是认为湿疹会传染。
• Enthusiasm is very catching.热情非常富有感染力。

51 enumerate   

v.列举，计算，枚举，数

参考例句：

• The heroic deeds of the people's soldiers are too numerous to enumerate.人民子弟兵的英雄事迹举不胜举。
• Its applications are too varied to enumerate.它的用途不胜枚举。

52 detriment   

n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源

参考例句：

• Smoking is a detriment to one's health.吸烟危害健康。
• His lack of education is a serious detriment to his career.他的未受教育对他的事业是一种严重的妨碍。

53 assent   

v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可

参考例句：

• I cannot assent to what you ask.我不能应允你的要求。
• The new bill passed by Parliament has received Royal Assent.议会所通过的新方案已获国王批准。

54 legislative   

n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的

参考例句：

• Congress is the legislative branch of the U.S. government.国会是美国政府的立法部门。
• Today's hearing was just the first step in the legislative process.今天的听证会只是展开立法程序的第一步。

55 enactment   

n.演出，担任…角色；制订，通过

参考例句：

• Enactment refers to action.演出指行为的表演。
• We support the call for the enactment of a Bill of Rights.我们支持要求通过《权利法案》的呼声。

56 dignified   

a.可敬的，高贵的

参考例句：

• Throughout his trial he maintained a dignified silence. 在整个审讯过程中，他始终沉默以保持尊严。
• He always strikes such a dignified pose before his girlfriend. 他总是在女友面前摆出这种庄严的姿态。

57 discourse   

n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述

参考例句：

• We'll discourse on the subject tonight.我们今晚要谈论这个问题。
• He fell into discourse with the customers who were drinking at the counter.他和站在柜台旁的酒客谈了起来。

58 nominal   

adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的

参考例句：

• The king was only the nominal head of the state. 国王只是这个国家名义上的元首。
• The charge of the box lunch was nominal.午餐盒饭收费很少。

59 enunciation   

n.清晰的发音；表明，宣言；口齿

参考例句：

• He is always willing to enunciate his opinions on the subject of politics. 他总是愿意对政治问题发表意见。> enunciation / I9nQnsI5eIFn; I9nQnsI`eFEn/ n [C, U]。 来自辞典例句
• Be good at communicating,sense of responsibility,the work is careful,the enunciation is clear. 善于沟通，责任心强，工作细致，口齿清晰。 来自互联网

60 tautology   

n.无谓的重复；恒真命题

参考例句：

• Modern logicians regard it as little more than tautology.现代的逻辑学家仅仅把它看作同义反复。
• What's the first excellence in a lawyer? Tautology. What the second? Tautology.律师最擅长的是什么？是同义反复。其次呢？同义反复。再其次呢？同义反复。

61 preponderates   

v.超过，胜过( preponderate的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• This reason preponderates over all others. 这个理由较所有其他理由重要。 来自辞典例句

62 propriety   

n.正当行为；正当；适当

参考例句：

• We hesitated at the propriety of the method.我们对这种办法是否适用拿不定主意。
• The sensitive matter was handled with great propriety.这件机密的事处理得极为适当。

63 parlance   

n.说法；语调

参考例句：

• The term "meta directory" came into industry parlance two years ago.两年前，商业界开始用“元目录”这个术语。
• The phrase is common diplomatic parlance for spying.这种说法是指代间谍行为的常用外交辞令。

64 conspicuous   

adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的

参考例句：

• It is conspicuous that smoking is harmful to health.很明显，抽烟对健康有害。
• Its colouring makes it highly conspicuous.它的色彩使它非常惹人注目。

65 negation   

n.否定；否认

参考例句：

• No reasonable negation can be offered.没有合理的反对意见可以提出。
• The author boxed the compass of negation in his article.该作者在文章中依次探讨了各种反面的意见。

66 sufficiently   

adv.足够地，充分地

参考例句：

• It turned out he had not insured the house sufficiently.原来他没有给房屋投足保险。
• The new policy was sufficiently elastic to accommodate both views.新政策充分灵活地适用两种观点。

67 exhausted   

adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的

参考例句：

• It was a long haul home and we arrived exhausted.搬运回家的这段路程特别长，到家时我们已筋疲力尽。
• Jenny was exhausted by the hustle of city life.珍妮被城市生活的忙乱弄得筋疲力尽。

68 proximity   

n.接近，邻近

参考例句：

• Marriages in proximity of blood are forbidden by the law.法律规定禁止近亲结婚。
• Their house is in close proximity to ours.他们的房子很接近我们的。

69 standing   

n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的

参考例句：

• After the earthquake only a few houses were left standing.地震过后只有几幢房屋还立着。
• They're standing out against any change in the law.他们坚决反对对法律做任何修改。

70 contingencies   

n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一

参考例句：

• We must consider all possible contingencies. 我们必须考虑一切可能发生的事。
• We must be prepared for all contingencies. 我们要作好各种准备，以防意外。 来自辞典例句

71 enumeration   

n.计数，列举；细目；详表；点查

参考例句：

• Predictive Categoriesinclude six categories of prediction, namely Enumeration, Advance Labeling, Reporting,Recapitulation, Hypotheticality, and Question. 其中预设种类又包括列举(Enumeration)、提前标示(Advance Labeling)、转述(Reporting)、回顾(Recapitulation)、假设(Hypotheticality)和提问(Question)。 来自互联网
• Here we describe a systematic procedure which is basically "enumeration" in nature. 这里介绍一个本质上是属于“枚举法”的系统程序。 来自辞典例句

72 prolix   

adj.罗嗦的；冗长的

参考例句：

• Too much speaking makes it a little prolix.说那么多，有些罗嗦了。
• Her style is tediously prolix.她的文章冗长而乏味。

73 counteract   

vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消

参考例句：

• The doctor gave him some medicine to counteract the effect of the poison.医生给他些药解毒。
• Our work calls for mutual support.We shouldn't counteract each other's efforts.工作要互相支持，不要互相拆台。

74 counteracting   

对抗，抵消( counteract的现在分词 )

参考例句：

• The turmoil, he said, was "counteracting the course of global civilization. " 这次骚乱，他指出，“阻碍了世界文明的进程”。
• But he notes that there are counteracting forces as well. 但是他也指出还有一些抵消因素。

75 acting   

n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的

参考例句：

• Ignore her,she's just acting.别理她，她只是假装的。
• During the seventies,her acting career was in eclipse.在七十年代，她的表演生涯黯然失色。

76 retards   

使减速( retard的第三人称单数 )； 妨碍； 阻止； 推迟

参考例句：

• Cold weather retards the growth of the crops. 寒冷的天气妨碍作物的生长。
• Lack of science and education retards social progress. 缺乏科学和教育会妨碍社会进步。

77 projectile   

n.投射物，发射体；adj.向前开进的；推进的；抛掷的

参考例句：

• The vertical and horizontal motions of a projectile can be treated independently.抛射体的竖直方向和水平方向的运动能够分开来处理。
• Have you altered the plans of the projectile as the telegram suggests?你已经按照电报的要求修改炮弹图样了吗?

78 deflects   

（使）偏斜， （使）偏离， （使）转向( deflect的第三人称单数 )

参考例句：

• This love is so bright that it deflects all darkness. 这个爱如此光明而可以照亮黑暗。
• Level 3-Deflects 15% of damage taken onto a 600 AoE. 三级-将15%的所受伤害反弹给600范围内的所有敌方单位。

79 trajectory   

n.弹道，轨道

参考例句：

• It is not difficult to sketch the subsequent trajectory.很容易描绘出它们最终的轨迹。
• The path followed by a projectile is called its trajectory.抛物体所循的路径称为它的轨道。

80 mathematicians   

数学家( mathematician的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• Do you suppose our mathematicians are unequal to that? 你以为我们的数学家做不到这一点吗？ 来自英汉文学
• Mathematicians can solve problems with two variables. 数学家们可以用两个变数来解决问题。 来自哲学部分

81 blues   

n.抑郁，沮丧；布鲁斯音乐

参考例句：

• She was in the back of a smoky bar singing the blues.她在烟雾弥漫的酒吧深处唱着布鲁斯歌曲。
• He was in the blues on account of his failure in business.他因事业失败而意志消沉。

82 virtue   

n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力

参考例句：

• He was considered to be a paragon of virtue.他被认为是品德尽善尽美的典范。
• You need to decorate your mind with virtue.你应该用德行美化心灵。

83 counteracted   

对抗，抵消( counteract的过去式 )

参考例句：

• This can be counteracted only by very effective insulation. 这只能用非常有效的绝缘来防止。
• The effect of his preaching was counteracted by the looseness of his behavior. 他讲道的效果被他放荡的生活所抵消了。

84 dispense   

vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施

参考例句：

• Let us dispense the food.咱们来分发这食物。
• The charity has been given a large sum of money to dispense as it sees fit.这个慈善机构获得一大笔钱，可自行适当分配。

85 entirely   

ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The fire was entirely caused by their neglect of duty. 那场火灾完全是由于他们失职而引起的。
• His life was entirely given up to the educational work. 他的一生统统献给了教育工作。

86 drawn   

v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的

参考例句：

• All the characters in the story are drawn from life.故事中的所有人物都取材于生活。
• Her gaze was drawn irresistibly to the scene outside.她的目光禁不住被外面的风景所吸引。

87 incongruity   

n.不协调，不一致

参考例句：

• She smiled at the incongruity of the question.面对这样突兀的问题，她笑了。
• When the particular outstrips the general,we are faced with an incongruity.当特别是超过了总的来讲，我们正面临着一个不协调。

88 radical   

n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的

参考例句：

• The patient got a radical cure in the hospital.病人在医院得到了根治。
• She is radical in her demands.她的要求十分偏激。

89 artifice   

n.妙计，高明的手段；狡诈，诡计

参考例句：

• The use of mirrors in a room is an artifice to make the room look larger.利用镜子装饰房间是使房间显得大一点的巧妙办法。
• He displayed a great deal of artifice in decorating his new house.他在布置新房子中表现出富有的技巧。

90 pointed   

adj.尖的，直截了当的

参考例句：

• He gave me a very sharp pointed pencil.他给我一支削得非常尖的铅笔。
• She wished to show Mrs.John Dashwood by this pointed invitation to her brother.她想通过对达茨伍德夫人提出直截了当的邀请向她的哥哥表示出来。

91 sentient   

adj.有知觉的，知悉的；adv.有感觉能力地

参考例句：

• The living knew themselves just sentient puppets on God's stage.生还者认识到，他们不过是上帝的舞台上有知觉的木偶而已。
• It teaches us to love all sentient beings equally.它教导我们应该平等爱护一切众生。

92 actively   

adv.积极地，勤奋地

参考例句：

• During this period all the students were actively participating.在这节课中所有的学生都积极参加。
• We are actively intervening to settle a quarrel.我们正在积极调解争执。

93 coup   

n.政变；突然而成功的行动

参考例句：

• The monarch was ousted by a military coup.那君主被军事政变者废黜了。
• That government was overthrown in a military coup three years ago.那个政府在3年前的军事政变中被推翻。

94 professes   

声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉

参考例句：

• She still professes her innocence. 她仍然声称自己无辜。
• He professes himself to be sad but doesn't look it. 他自称感到悲伤，但外表却看不出来。

95 incurred   

[医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式

参考例句：

• She had incurred the wrath of her father by marrying without his consent 她未经父亲同意就结婚，使父亲震怒。
• We will reimburse any expenses incurred. 我们将付还所有相关费用。

96 remains   

n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹

参考例句：

• He ate the remains of food hungrily.他狼吞虎咽地吃剩余的食物。
• The remains of the meal were fed to the dog.残羹剩饭喂狗了。

97 advert   

vi.注意，留意，言及；n.广告

参考例句：

• The advert featured a dolphin swimming around a goldfish bowl.该广告的內容为一条在金鱼缸里游动的海豚。
• Please advert to the contents below.I believe you won't be disappointed.敬请留意后面的内容。相信您一定不会失望的。

98 obviating   

v.避免，消除（贫困、不方便等）( obviate的现在分词 )

参考例句：

• Citigroup posted a net loss in 2008, obviating a percentage comparison. 花旗集团净亏损在2008年，排除的百分比比较。 来自互联网
• Objective To observe the curative effect of heavy-oxygen-enriched water (HOEW) on obviating acute high altitude reaction. 目的研究富氧水对急性高原反应的预防作用。 来自互联网

99 specious   

adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地

参考例句：

• Such talk is actually specious and groundless.这些话实际上毫无根据，似是而非的。
• It is unlikely that the Duke was convinced by such specious arguments.公爵不太可能相信这种似是而非的论点。

100 plausibly   

似真地

参考例句：

• The case was presented very plausibly. 案情的申述似很可信。
• He argued very plausibly for its acceptance. 他为使之认可辩解得头头是道。

101 perfectly   

adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地

参考例句：

• The witnesses were each perfectly certain of what they said.证人们个个对自己所说的话十分肯定。
• Everything that we're doing is all perfectly above board.我们做的每件事情都是光明正大的。

102 opaque   

adj.不透光的；不反光的，不传导的；晦涩的

参考例句：

• The windows are of opaque glass.这些窗户装着不透明玻璃。
• Their intentions remained opaque.他们的意图仍然令人费解。

103 luminous   

adj.发光的，发亮的；光明的；明白易懂的；有启发的

参考例句：

• There are luminous knobs on all the doors in my house.我家所有门上都安有夜光把手。
• Most clocks and watches in this shop are in luminous paint.这家商店出售的大多数钟表都涂了发光漆。

104 situated   

adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的

参考例句：

• The village is situated at the margin of a forest.村子位于森林的边缘。
• She is awkwardly situated.她的处境困难。

105 superfluous   

adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的

参考例句：

• She fined away superfluous matter in the design. 她删去了这图案中多余的东西。
• That request seemed superfluous when I wrote it.我这样写的时候觉得这个请求似乎是多此一举。

106 unconditional   

adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的

参考例句：

• The victorious army demanded unconditional surrender.胜方要求敌人无条件投降。
• My love for all my children is unconditional.我对自己所有孩子的爱都是无条件的。

107 conditional   

adj.条件的，带有条件的

参考例句：

• My agreement is conditional on your help.你肯帮助我才同意。
• There are two forms of most-favored-nation treatment:conditional and unconditional.最惠国待遇有两种形式:有条件的和无条件的。

108 unconditionally   

adv.无条件地

参考例句：

• All foreign troops must be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally. 所有外国军队必须立即无条件地撤出。
• It makes things very awkward to have your girls going back unconditionally just now! 你们现在是无条件上工，真糟糕！ 来自子夜部分

109 conditionally   

adv. 有条件地

参考例句：

• We will provide necessary English training to the new employees conditionally. 公司将为员工提供必要的英语培训。
• China should conditionally support and participate in the coordination. 我国对此宜持有条件支持并参与的立场。

110 modification   

n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻

参考例句：

• The law,in its present form,is unjust;it needs modification.现行的法律是不公正的，它需要修改。
• The design requires considerable modification.这个设计需要作大的修改。

111 derived   

vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取

参考例句：

• Many English words are derived from Latin and Greek. 英语很多词源出于拉丁文和希腊文。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He derived his enthusiasm for literature from his father. 他对文学的爱好是受他父亲的影响。 来自《简明英汉词典》

112 derivative   

n.派(衍)生物；adj.非独创性的，模仿他人的

参考例句：

• His paintings are really quite derivative.他的画实在没有创意。
• Derivative works are far more complicated.派生作品更加复杂。

113 justifies   

证明…有理( justify的第三人称单数 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护）

参考例句：

• Their frequency of use both justifies and requires the memorization. 频繁的使用需要记忆，也促进了记忆。 来自About Face 3交互设计精髓
• In my judgement the present end justifies the means. 照我的意见，只要目的正当，手段是可以不计较的。

114 unlimited   

adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的

参考例句：

• They flew over the unlimited reaches of the Arctic.他们飞过了茫茫无边的北极上空。
• There is no safety in unlimited technological hubris.在技术方面自以为是会很危险。

115 faculties   

n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院

参考例句：

• Although he's ninety, his mental faculties remain unimpaired. 他虽年届九旬，但头脑仍然清晰。
• All your faculties have come into play in your work. 在你的工作中，你的全部才能已起到了作用。 来自《简明英汉词典》

116 futile   

adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的

参考例句：

• They were killed,to the last man,in a futile attack.因为进攻失败，他们全部被杀，无一幸免。
• Their efforts to revive him were futile.他们对他抢救无效。

117 inaccessible   

adj.达不到的，难接近的

参考例句：

• This novel seems to me among the most inaccessible.这本书对我来说是最难懂的小说之一。
• The top of Mount Everest is the most inaccessible place in the world.珠穆朗玛峰是世界上最难到达的地方。

118 abortive   

adj.不成功的，发育不全的

参考例句：

• We had to abandon our abortive attempts.我们的尝试没有成功，不得不放弃。
• Somehow the whole abortive affair got into the FBI files.这件早已夭折的案子不知怎么就进了联邦调查局的档案。

119 diffuses   

（使光）模糊，漫射，漫散( diffuse的第三人称单数 )； （使）扩散； （使）弥漫； （使）传播

参考例句：

• A gas in solution diffuses from region of greater to one of less concentration. 溶液中的气体由浓度较高的区域向浓度较低的区域扩散。
• The sun diffuses light and heat. 太阳发出光和热。

120 strictly   

adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地

参考例句：

• His doctor is dieting him strictly.他的医生严格规定他的饮食。
• The guests were seated strictly in order of precedence.客人严格按照地位高低就座。

121 ingenuity   

n.别出心裁；善于发明创造

参考例句：

• The boy showed ingenuity in making toys.那个小男孩做玩具很有创造力。
• I admire your ingenuity and perseverance.我钦佩你的别出心裁和毅力。

122 interval   

n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息

参考例句：

• The interval between the two trees measures 40 feet.这两棵树的间隔是40英尺。
• There was a long interval before he anwsered the telephone.隔了好久他才回了电话。

123 simultaneously   

adv.同时发生地，同时进行地

参考例句：

• The radar beam can track a number of targets almost simultaneously.雷达波几乎可以同时追着多个目标。
• The Windows allow a computer user to execute multiple programs simultaneously.Windows允许计算机用户同时运行多个程序。

124 affected   

adj.不自然的，假装的

参考例句：

• She showed an affected interest in our subject.她假装对我们的课题感到兴趣。
• His manners are affected.他的态度不自然。

125 applied   

adj.应用的；v.应用，适用

参考例句：

• She plans to take a course in applied linguistics.她打算学习应用语言学课程。
• This cream is best applied to the face at night.这种乳霜最好晚上擦脸用。

126 heterogeneous   

adj.庞杂的；异类的

参考例句：

• There is a heterogeneous mass of papers in the teacher's office.老师的办公室里堆满了大批不同的论文。
• America has a very heterogeneous population.美国人口是由不同种族组成的。

127 celestial   

adj.天体的；天上的

参考例句：

• The rosy light yet beamed like a celestial dawn.玫瑰色的红光依然象天上的朝霞一样绚丽。
• Gravity governs the motions of celestial bodies.万有引力控制着天体的运动。

128 abridgment   

n.删节，节本

参考例句：

• An abridgment of the book has been published for young readers.他们为年轻读者出版了这本书的节本。
• This abridgment provides a concise presentation of this masterpiece of Buddhist literature.这个删节本提供了简明介绍佛教文学的杰作。

129 acceleration   

n.加速，加速度

参考例句：

• All spacemen must be able to bear acceleration.所有太空人都应能承受加速度。
• He has also called for an acceleration of political reforms.他同时呼吁加快政治改革的步伐。

130 subsisted   

v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• Before liberation he subsisted on wild potatoes. 解放前他靠吃野薯度日。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》
• Survivors of the air crash subsisted on wild fruits. 空难事件的幸存者以野果维持生命。 来自辞典例句

131 constituents   

n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素

参考例句：

• She has the full support of her constituents. 她得到本区选民的全力支持。
• Hydrogen and oxygen are the constituents of water. 氢和氧是水的主要成分。 来自《简明英汉词典》

132 commingled   

v.混合，掺和，合并( commingle的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• Tears commingled with the blood from the cut on his face. 眼泪和他脸上伤口流的血混在一起了。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• Fact is inextricably commingled with fiction. 事实与虚构混杂难分。 来自《简明英汉词典》

133 conjecture   

n./v.推测，猜测

参考例句：

• She felt it no use to conjecture his motives.她觉得猜想他的动机是没有用的。
• This conjecture is not supported by any real evidence.这种推测未被任何确切的证据所证实。

134 concurrences   

n.同意，一致( concurrence的名词复数 )；同时发生或出现

参考例句：

135 primitive   

adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物

参考例句：

• It is a primitive instinct to flee a place of danger.逃离危险的地方是一种原始本能。
• His book describes the march of the civilization of a primitive society.他的著作描述了一个原始社会的开化过程。

136 rotation   

n.旋转；循环，轮流

参考例句：

• Crop rotation helps prevent soil erosion.农作物轮作有助于防止水土流失。
• The workers in this workshop do day and night shifts in weekly rotation.这个车间的工人上白班和上夜班每周轮换一次。

137 ebb   

vi.衰退，减退；n.处于低潮，处于衰退状态

参考例句：

• The flood and ebb tides alternates with each other.涨潮和落潮交替更迭。
• They swam till the tide began to ebb.他们一直游到开始退潮。

138 attainable   

a.可达到的，可获得的

参考例句：

• They set the limits of performance attainable. 它们确定着可达到的运行限度。
• If objectives are to be meaningful to people, they must be clear, attainable, actionable, and verifiable. 如果目标对人们是具有意义的，则目标必须是清晰的，能达到的，可以行动的，以及可供检验的。

139 volition   

n.意志；决意

参考例句：

• We like to think that everything we do and everything we think is a product of our volition.我们常常认为我们所做和所想的一切都出自自己的意愿。
• Makin said Mr Coombes had gone to the police of his own volition.梅金说库姆斯先生是主动去投案的。

140 recur   

vi.复发，重现，再发生

参考例句：

• Economic crises recur periodically.经济危机周期性地发生。
• Of course,many problems recur at various periods.当然，有许多问题会在不同的时期反复提出。

141 revolve   

vi.(使)旋转；循环出现

参考例句：

• The planets revolve around the sun.行星绕着太阳运转。
• The wheels began to revolve slowly.车轮开始慢慢转动。

142 casually   

adv.漠不关心地，无动于衷地，不负责任地

参考例句：

• She remarked casually that she was changing her job.她当时漫不经心地说要换工作。
• I casually mentioned that I might be interested in working abroad.我不经意地提到我可能会对出国工作感兴趣。

143 mutual   

adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的

参考例句：

• We must pull together for mutual interest.我们必须为相互的利益而通力合作。
• Mutual interests tied us together.相互的利害关系把我们联系在一起。

144 variance   

n.矛盾，不同

参考例句：

• The question of woman suffrage sets them at variance. 妇女参政的问题使他们发生争执。
• It is unnatural for brothers to be at variance. 兄弟之间不睦是不近人情的。

145 forth   

adv.向前；向外，往外

参考例句：

• The wind moved the trees gently back and forth.风吹得树轻轻地来回摇晃。
• He gave forth a series of works in rapid succession.他很快连续发表了一系列的作品。

146 precisely   

adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地

参考例句：

• It's precisely that sort of slick sales-talk that I mistrust.我不相信的正是那种油腔滑调的推销宣传。
• The man adjusted very precisely.那个人调得很准。

147 antecedence   

n.居先，优先

参考例句：

• Creative thinking is the antecedence of design.创新性设计，必须有创新性思维。
• Electric power is antecedence to the development of the national economic.国家经济的发展，电力是先行。

148 semblance   

n.外貌，外表

参考例句：

• Her semblance of anger frightened the children.她生气的样子使孩子们感到害怕。
• Those clouds have the semblance of a large head.那些云的形状像一个巨大的人头。

149 centripetal   

adj.向心的

参考例句：

• After some treatment of centripetal force,he deduces Kepler's third law.在向心力的一些论述之后，他推出了开普勒的第三定律。
• It is called the centripetal acceleration.这叫做向心加速度。

150 omnipotent   

adj.全能的，万能的

参考例句：

• When we are omnipotent we shall have no more need of science.我们达到万能以后就不需要科学了。
• Money is not omnipotent,but we can't survive without money.金钱不是万能的，但是没有金钱我们却无法生存。

151 apprehension   

n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑

参考例句：

• There were still areas of doubt and her apprehension grew.有些地方仍然存疑，于是她越来越担心。
• She is a girl of weak apprehension.她是一个理解力很差的女孩。

152 gunpowder   

n.火药

参考例句：

• Gunpowder was introduced into Europe during the first half of the 14th century.在14世纪上半叶，火药传入欧洲。
• This statement has a strong smell of gunpowder.这是一篇充满火药味的声明。

153 conformity   

n.一致，遵从，顺从

参考例句：

• Was his action in conformity with the law?他的行动是否合法？
• The plan was made in conformity with his views.计划仍按他的意见制定。

154 inflexible   

adj.不可改变的，不受影响的，不屈服的

参考例句：

• Charles was a man of settled habits and inflexible routine.查尔斯是一个恪守习惯、生活规律不容打乱的人。
• The new plastic is completely inflexible.这种新塑料是完全不可弯曲的。

155 apparatus   

n.装置，器械；器具，设备

参考例句：

• The school's audio apparatus includes films and records.学校的视听设备包括放映机和录音机。
• They had a very refined apparatus.他们有一套非常精良的设备。

156 overt   

adj.公开的，明显的，公然的

参考例句：

• His opponent's intention is quite overt.他的对手的意图很明显。
• We should learn to fight with enemy in an overt and covert way.我们应学会同敌人做公开和隐蔽的斗争。

157 corporeal   

adj.肉体的，身体的；物质的

参考例句：

• The body is the corporeal habitation of the soul.身体为灵魂之有形寓所。
• He is very religious;corporeal world has little interest for him.他虔信宗教，对物质上的享受不感兴趣。

158 previously   

adv.以前，先前（地）

参考例句：

• The bicycle tyre blew out at a previously damaged point.自行车胎在以前损坏过的地方又爆开了。
• Let me digress for a moment and explain what had happened previously.让我岔开一会儿，解释原先发生了什么。

159 paralysis   

n.麻痹(症)；瘫痪(症)

参考例句：

• The paralysis affects his right leg and he can only walk with difficulty.他右腿瘫痪步履维艰。
• The paralysis affects his right leg and he can only walk with difficulty.他右腿瘫痪步履维艰。

160 paralytic   

adj. 瘫痪的 n. 瘫痪病人

参考例句：

• She was completely paralytic last night.她昨天晚上喝得酩酊大醉。
• She rose and hobbled to me on her paralytic legs and kissed me.她站起来，拖着她那麻痹的双腿一瘸一拐地走到我身边，吻了吻我。

161 mandates   

托管（mandate的第三人称单数形式）

参考例句：

• Individual mandates would require all people to purchase health insurance. 个人托管要求所有人都要购买健康保险。
• While I agree with those benefits, I'm not a supporter of mandates. 我同意上述好处，我不是授权软件的支持者。

162 faculty   

n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员

参考例句：

• He has a great faculty for learning foreign languages.他有学习外语的天赋。
• He has the faculty of saying the right thing at the right time.他有在恰当的时候说恰当的话的才智。

163 apprehend   

vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑

参考例句：

• I apprehend no worsening of the situation.我不担心局势会恶化。
• Police have not apprehended her killer.警察还未抓获谋杀她的凶手。

164 infancy   

n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期

参考例句：

• He came to England in his infancy.他幼年时期来到英国。
• Their research is only in its infancy.他们的研究处于初级阶段。

165 exterior   

adj.外部的，外在的；表面的

参考例句：

• The seed has a hard exterior covering.这种子外壳很硬。
• We are painting the exterior wall of the house.我们正在给房子的外墙涂漆。

166 distinguished   

adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的

参考例句：

• Elephants are distinguished from other animals by their long noses.大象以其长长的鼻子显示出与其他动物的不同。
• A banquet was given in honor of the distinguished guests.宴会是为了向贵宾们致敬而举行的。

167 unfamiliar   

adj.陌生的，不熟悉的

参考例句：

• I am unfamiliar with the place and the people here.我在这儿人地生疏。
• The man seemed unfamiliar to me.这人很面生。

168 follower   

n.跟随者；随员；门徒；信徒

参考例句：

• He is a faithful follower of his home football team.他是他家乡足球队的忠实拥护者。
• Alexander is a pious follower of the faith.亚历山大是个虔诚的信徒。

169 unanimity   

n.全体一致，一致同意

参考例句：

• These discussions have led to a remarkable unanimity.这些讨论导致引人注目的一致意见。
• There is no unanimity of opinion as to the best one.没有一个公认的最好意见。

170 savages   

未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• There're some savages living in the forest. 森林里居住着一些野人。
• That's an island inhabited by savages. 那是一个野蛮人居住的岛屿。

171 homage   

n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬

参考例句：

• We pay homage to the genius of Shakespeare.我们对莎士比亚的天才表示敬仰。
• The soldiers swore to pay their homage to the Queen.士兵们宣誓效忠于女王陛下。

172 implore   

vt.乞求，恳求，哀求

参考例句：

• I implore you to write. At least tell me you're alive.请给我音讯，让我知道你还活着。
• Please implore someone else's help in a crisis.危险时请向别人求助。

173 meridian   

adj.子午线的；全盛期的

参考例句：

• All places on the same meridian have the same longitude.在同一子午线上的地方都有相同的经度。
• He is now at the meridian of his intellectual power.他现在正值智力全盛期。

174 ebbs   

退潮( ebb的名词复数 )； 落潮； 衰退

参考例句：

• When the tide ebbs it's a rock pool inhabited by crustaceans. 退潮时，它便成为甲壳动物居住的岩石区潮水潭。
• The new Russia steadily ebbs away drive out of Moscow. 驶离莫斯科愈来愈远以后，俄罗斯崭新的景象也逐渐消失。

175 speculation   

n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机

参考例句：

• Her mind is occupied with speculation.她的头脑忙于思考。
• There is widespread speculation that he is going to resign.人们普遍推测他要辞职。

176 emancipates   

vt.解放（emancipate的第三人称单数形式）

参考例句：

• Then it enlarges us and emancipates us and empowers us. 这样才能扩大我们视野和解放我们，使我们得力量。 来自互联网
• Focuses emancipates the mind in the innovation service society form. 着眼于创新服务社会形式解放思想。 来自互联网

177 superstitions   

迷信，迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• Old superstitions seem incredible to educated people. 旧的迷信对于受过教育的人来说是不可思议的。
• Do away with all fetishes and superstitions. 破除一切盲目崇拜和迷信。

178 intentional   

adj.故意的，有意（识）的

参考例句：

• Let me assure you that it was not intentional.我向你保证那不是故意的。
• His insult was intentional.他的侮辱是有意的。

179 instinctive   

adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的

参考例句：

• He tried to conceal his instinctive revulsion at the idea.他试图饰盖自己对这一想法本能的厌恶。
• Animals have an instinctive fear of fire.动物本能地怕火。

180 propensity   

n.倾向；习性

参考例句：

• He has a propensity for drinking too much alcohol.他有酗酒的倾向。
• She hasn't reckoned on his propensity for violence.她不曾料到他有暴力倾向。

181 underneath   

adj.在...下面，在...底下；adv.在下面

参考例句：

• Working underneath the car is always a messy job.在汽车底下工作是件脏活。
• She wore a coat with a dress underneath.她穿着一件大衣，里面套着一条连衣裙。

182 cultivation   

n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成

参考例句：

• The cultivation in good taste is our main objective.培养高雅情趣是我们的主要目标。
• The land is not fertile enough to repay cultivation.这块土地不够肥沃，不值得耕种。

183 derives   

v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取

参考例句：

• English derives in the main from the common Germanic stock. 英语主要源于日耳曼语系。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• He derives his income from freelance work. 他以自由职业获取收入。 来自《简明英汉词典》

184 nourishment   

n.食物，营养品；营养情况

参考例句：

• Lack of proper nourishment reduces their power to resist disease.营养不良降低了他们抵抗疾病的能力。
• He ventured that plants draw part of their nourishment from the air.他大胆提出植物从空气中吸收部分养分的观点。

185 affinity   

n.亲和力，密切关系

参考例句：

• I felt a great affinity with the people of the Highlands.我被苏格兰高地人民深深地吸引。
• It's important that you share an affinity with your husband.和丈夫有共同的爱好是十分重要的。

186 obstinate   

adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的

参考例句：

• She's too obstinate to let anyone help her.她太倔强了，不会让任何人帮她的。
• The trader was obstinate in the negotiation.这个商人在谈判中拗强固执。

187 volitional   

adj.意志的，凭意志的，有意志的

参考例句：

• The image consists in our rational,volitional,affective faculties,and in our bodies.神的形象存在于我们的理性、意志，和情感的能力中，也存在于我们的身体内。
• The endurance of setbacks is a standard mat can evaluate the volitional character of a person.挫折承受能力是衡量人的意志品质的一个重要指标。

188 depicts   

描绘，描画( depict的第三人称单数 )； 描述

参考例句：

• The book vividly depicts French society of the 1930s. 这本书生动地描绘了20 世纪30 年代的法国社会。
• He depicts the sordid and vulgar sides of life exclusively. 他只描写人生肮脏和庸俗的一面。

189 presumption   

n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定

参考例句：

• Please pardon my presumption in writing to you.请原谅我很冒昧地写信给你。
• I don't think that's a false presumption.我认为那并不是错误的推测。

190 attained   

（通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况）

参考例句：

• She has attained the degree of Master of Arts. 她已获得文学硕士学位。
• Lu Hsun attained a high position in the republic of letters. 鲁迅在文坛上获得崇高的地位。

191 fully   

adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地

参考例句：

• The doctor asked me to breathe in,then to breathe out fully.医生让我先吸气，然后全部呼出。
• They soon became fully integrated into the local community.他们很快就完全融入了当地人的圈子。

192 persistency   

n. 坚持(余辉, 时间常数)

参考例句：

• I was nettled by her persistency. 我被她的固执惹恼了。
• We should stick to and develop the heritage of persistency. 我们应坚持和发扬坚忍不拔的传统。

193 infinitely   

adv.无限地，无穷地

参考例句：

• There is an infinitely bright future ahead of us.我们有无限光明的前途。
• The universe is infinitely large.宇宙是无限大的。

194 manifestations   

n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式）

参考例句：

• These were manifestations of the darker side of his character. 这些是他性格阴暗面的表现。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• To be wordly-wise and play safe is one of the manifestations of liberalism. 明哲保身是自由主义的表现之一。 来自《现代汉英综合大词典》

195 intelligible   

adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的

参考例句：

• This report would be intelligible only to an expert in computing.只有计算机运算专家才能看懂这份报告。
• His argument was barely intelligible.他的论点不易理解。

196 undoubtedly   

adv.确实地，无疑地

参考例句：

• It is undoubtedly she who has said that.这话明明是她说的。
• He is undoubtedly the pride of China.毫无疑问他是中国的骄傲。

197 disposition   

n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署

参考例句：

• He has made a good disposition of his property.他已对财产作了妥善处理。
• He has a cheerful disposition.他性情开朗。

198 purely   

adv.纯粹地，完全地

参考例句：

• I helped him purely and simply out of friendship.我帮他纯粹是出于友情。
• This disproves the theory that children are purely imitative.这证明认为儿童只会单纯地模仿的理论是站不住脚的。

199 invoked   

v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求

参考例句：

• It is unlikely that libel laws will be invoked. 不大可能诉诸诽谤法。
• She had invoked the law in her own defence. 她援引法律为自己辩护。 来自《简明英汉词典》

200 peremptorily   

adv.紧急地，不容分说地，专横地

参考例句：

• She peremptorily rejected the request. 她断然拒绝了请求。
• Their propaganda was peremptorily switched to an anti-Western line. 他们的宣传断然地转而持反对西方的路线。 来自辞典例句

201 confirmation   

n.证实，确认，批准

参考例句：

• We are waiting for confirmation of the news.我们正在等待证实那个消息。
• We need confirmation in writing before we can send your order out.给你们发送订购的货物之前，我们需要书面确认。

202 plausible   

adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的

参考例句：

• His story sounded plausible.他说的那番话似乎是真实的。
• Her story sounded perfectly plausible.她的说辞听起来言之有理。

203 subjective   

a.主观(上)的，个人的

参考例句：

• The way they interpreted their past was highly subjective. 他们解释其过去的方式太主观。
• A literary critic should not be too subjective in his approach. 文学评论家的看法不应太主观。

204 credible   

adj.可信任的，可靠的

参考例句：

• The news report is hardly credible.这则新闻报道令人难以置信。
• Is there a credible alternative to the nuclear deterrent?是否有可以取代核威慑力量的可靠办法？

205 intervention   

n.介入，干涉，干预

参考例句：

• The government's intervention in this dispute will not help.政府对这场争论的干预不会起作用。
• Many people felt he would be hostile to the idea of foreign intervention.许多人觉得他会反对外来干预。

206 exalt   

v.赞扬，歌颂，晋升，提升

参考例句：

• She thanked the President to exalt her.她感谢总统提拔她。
• His work exalts all those virtues that we,as Americans,are taught to hold dear.他的作品颂扬了所有那些身为美国人应该珍视的美德。

207 judgment   

n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见

参考例句：

• The chairman flatters himself on his judgment of people.主席自认为他审视人比别人高明。
• He's a man of excellent judgment.他眼力过人。

208 unwilling   

adj.不情愿的

参考例句：

• The natives were unwilling to be bent by colonial power.土著居民不愿受殖民势力的摆布。
• His tightfisted employer was unwilling to give him a raise.他那吝啬的雇主不肯给他加薪。

209 adverting   

引起注意（advert的现在分词形式）

参考例句：

• He set up several adverting consultancy business in the UK. 他在英国建立了好几家广告咨询公司。
• NOTES: 1. The trust unit must be responsible for the adverting content of legalization and authenticity. 附注：1。刊户对所刊登广告内容的合法性、真实性负责。

210 apparently   

adv.显然地；表面上，似乎

参考例句：

• An apparently blind alley leads suddenly into an open space.山穷水尽，豁然开朗。
• He was apparently much surprised at the news.他对那个消息显然感到十分惊异。

211 outrageous   

adj.无理的，令人不能容忍的

参考例句：

• Her outrageous behaviour at the party offended everyone.她在聚会上的无礼行为触怒了每一个人。
• Charges for local telephone calls are particularly outrageous.本地电话资费贵得出奇。

212 justify   

vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护

参考例句：

• He tried to justify his absence with lame excuses.他想用站不住脚的借口为自己的缺席辩解。
• Can you justify your rude behavior to me?你能向我证明你的粗野行为是有道理的吗？

213 eminently   

adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地

参考例句：

• She seems eminently suitable for the job. 她看来非常适合这个工作。
• It was an eminently respectable boarding school. 这是所非常好的寄宿学校。 来自《简明英汉词典》

214 specimen   

n.样本，标本

参考例句：

• You'll need tweezers to hold up the specimen.你要用镊子来夹这标本。
• This specimen is richly variegated in colour.这件标本上有很多颜色。

215 controversy   

n.争论，辩论，争吵

参考例句：

• That is a fact beyond controversy.那是一个无可争论的事实。
• We ran the risk of becoming the butt of every controversy.我们要冒使自己在所有的纷争中都成为众矢之的的风险。

216 conspicuously   

ad.明显地，惹人注目地

参考例句：

• France remained a conspicuously uneasy country. 法国依然是个明显不太平的国家。
• She figured conspicuously in the public debate on the issue. 她在该问题的公开辩论中很引人注目。

217 overthrowing   

v.打倒，推翻( overthrow的现在分词 )；使终止

参考例句：

• They succeeded in overthrowing the fascist dictatorship. 他们成功推翻了法西斯独裁统治。 来自《简明英汉词典》
• I always delight in overthrowing those kinds of schemes. 我一向喜欢戳穿人家的诡计。 来自辞典例句

218 nebula   

n.星云，喷雾剂

参考例句：

• A powerful telescope can resolve a nebula into stars.一架高性能的望远镜能从星云中分辨出星球来。
• A nebula is really a discrete mass of innumerous stars.一团星云实际上是无数星体不连续的集合体。

219 inorganic   

adj.无生物的；无机的

参考例句：

• The fundamentals of inorganic chemistry are very important.无机化学的基础很重要。
• This chemical plant recently bought a large quantity of inorganic salt.这家化工厂又买进了大量的无机盐。