In the first place, however, if the dangers incident to popular power may be thought to be in some degree lessened6 by this indirect management, so also are its benefits; and the latter effect is much more certain than the former. To enable the system to work as desired, it must be carried into effect in the spirit in which it is planned; the electors must use the suffrage in the manner supposed by the theory, that is, each of them must not ask himself who the member of Parliament should be, but only whom he would best like to choose one for him. It is evident that the advantages which indirect is supposed to have over direct election require this disposition7 of mind in the voter, and will only be realized by his taking the doctrine8 au serieux, that his sole business is to choose the choosers, not the member himself. The supposition must be, that he will not occupy his thoughts with political opinions and measures or political men, but will be guided by his personal respect for some private individual, to whom he will give a general power of attorney to act for him. Now if the primary electors adopt this view of their position, one of the principal uses of giving them a vote at all is defeated; the political function to which they are called fails of developing public spirit and political intelligence, of making public affairs an object of interest to their feelings and of exercise to their faculties9. The supposition, moreover, involves inconsistent conditions; for if the voter feels no interest in the final result, how or why can he be expected to feel any in the process which leads to it? To wish to have a particular individual for his representative in Parliament is possible to a person of a very moderate degree of virtue10 and intelligence, and to wish to choose an elector who will elect that individual is a natural consequence; but for a person who does not care who is elected, or feels bound to put that consideration in abeyance11, to take any interest whatever in merely naming the worthiest13 person to elect another according to his own judgment14, implies a zeal15 for what is right in the abstract, an habitual16 principle of duty for the sake of duty, which is possible only to persons of a rather high grade of cultivation17, who, by the very possession of it, show that they may be, and deserve to be, trusted with political power in a more direct shape. Of all public functions which it is possible to confer on the poorer members of the community, this surely is the least calculated to kindle18 their feelings, and holds out least natural inducement to care for it, other than a virtuous19 determination to discharge conscientiously20 whatever duty one has to perform; and if the mass of electors cared enough about political affairs to set any value on so limited a participation21 in them, they would not be likely to be satisfied without one much more extensive.
In the next place, admitting that a person who, from his narrow range of cultivation, can not judge well of the qualifications of a candidate for Parliament, may be a sufficient judge of the honesty and general capacity of somebody whom he may depute to choose a member of Parliament for him, I may remark, that if the voter acquiesces22 in this estimate of his capabilities23, and really wishes to have the choice made for him by a person in whom he places reliance, there is no need of any constitutional provision for the purpose; he has only to ask this confidential24 person privately25 what candidate he had better vote for. In that case the two modes of election coincide in their result, and every advantage of indirect election is obtained under direct. The systems only diverge26 in their operation if we suppose that the voter would prefer to use his own judgment in the choice of a representative, and only lets another choose for him because the law does not allow him a more direct mode of action. But if this be his state of mind; if his will does not go along with the limitation which the law imposes, and he desires to make a direct choice, he can do so notwithstanding the law. He has only to choose as elector a known partisan27 of the candidate he prefers, or some one who will pledge himself to vote for that candidate. And this is so much the natural working of election by two stages, that, except in a condition of complete political indifference28, it can scarcely be expected to act otherwise. It is in this way that the election of the President of the United States practically operates. Nominally29, the election is indirect; the population at large does not vote for the President; it votes for electors who choose the President. But the electors are always chosen under an express engagement to vote for a particular candidate; nor does a citizen ever vote for an elector because of any preference for the man; he votes for the Breckinridge ticket or the Lincoln ticket. It must be remembered that the electors are not chosen in order that they may search the country and find the fittest person in it to be President or to be a member of Parliament. There would be something to be said for the practice if this were so; but it is not so, nor ever will be, until mankind in general are of opinion, with Plato, that the proper person to be intrusted with power is the person most unwilling30 to accept it. The electors are to make choice of one of those who have offered themselves as candidates, and those who choose the electors already know who these are. If there is any political activity in the country, all electors who care to vote at all have made up their minds which of these candidates they would like to have, and will make that the sole consideration in giving their vote. The partisans31 of each candidate will have their list of electors ready, all pledged to vote for that individual; and the only question practically asked of the primary elector will be, which of these lists he will support.
The case in which election by two stages answers well in practice is when the electors are not chosen solely32 as electors, but have other important functions to discharge, which precludes33 their being selected solely as delegates to give a particular vote. This combination of circumstances exemplifies itself in another American institution, the Senate of the United States. That assembly, the Upper House, as it were, of Congress, is considered to represent not the people directly, but the States as such, and to be the guardian34 of that portion of their sovereign rights which they have not alienated35. As the internal sovereignty of each state is, by the nature of an equal federation36, equally sacred whatever be the size or importance of the state, each returns to the Senate the same number of members (two), whether it be little Delaware or the "Empire State" of New York. These members are not chosen by the population, but by the State Legislatures, themselves elected by the people of each state; but as the whole ordinary business of a legislative37 assembly, internal legislation and the control of the executive, devolves upon these bodies, they are elected with a view to those objects more than to the other; and in naming two persons to represent the state in the federal Senate they for the most part exercise their own judgment, with only that general reference to public opinion necessary in all acts of the government of a democracy. The elections thus made have proved eminently38 successful, and are conspicuously39 the best of all the elections in the United States, the Senate invariably consisting of the most distinguished40 men among those who have made themselves sufficiently41 known in public life. After such an example, it can not be said that indirect popular election is never advantageous42. Under certain conditions it is the very best system that can be adopted. But those conditions are hardly to be obtained in practice except in a federal government like that of the United States, where the election can be intrusted to local bodies whose other functions extend to the most important concerns of the nation. The only bodies in any analogous43 position which exist, or are likely to exist, in this country, are the municipalities, or any other boards which have been or may be created for similar local purposes. Few persons, however, would think it any improvement in our Parliamentary constitution if the members for the City of London were chosen by the aldermen and Common Council, and those for the borough44 of Marylebone avowedly45, as they already are virtually, by the vestries of the component46 parishes. Even if those bodies, considered merely as local boards, were far less objectionable than they are, the qualities that would fit them for the limited and peculiar47 duties of municipal or parochial ?dileship are no guaranty of any special fitness to judge of the comparative qualifications of candidates for a seat in Parliament. They probably would not fulfill48 this duty any better than it is fulfilled by the inhabitants voting directly; while, on the other hand, if fitness for electing members of Parliament had to be taken into consideration in selecting persons for the office of vestrymen or town councillors, many of those who are fittest for that more limited duty would inevitably49 be excluded from it, if only by the necessity there would be of choosing persons whose sentiments in general politics agreed with those of the voters who elected them. The mere12 indirect political influence of town-councils has already led to a considerable perversion50 of municipal elections from their intended purpose, by making them a matter of party politics. If it were part of the duty of a man's book-keeper or steward51 to choose his physician, he would not be likely to have a better medical attendant than if he chose one for himself, while he would be restricted in his choice of a steward or book-keeper to such as might, without too great danger to his health, be intrusted with the other office.
It appears, therefore, that every benefit of indirect election which is attainable52 at all is attainable under direct; that such of the benefits expected from it as would not be obtained under direct election will just as much fail to be obtained under indirect; while the latter has considerable disadvantages peculiar to itself. The mere fact that it is an additional and superfluous53 wheel in the machinery54 is no trifling55 objection. Its decided56 inferiority as a means of cultivating public spirit and political intelligence has already been dwelt upon; and if it had any effective operation at all—that is, if the primary electors did to any extent leave to their nominees57 the selection of their Parliamentary representative, the voter would be prevented from identifying himself with his member of Parliament, and the member would feel a much less active sense of responsibility to his constituents. In addition to all this, the comparatively small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of Parliament would reside, could not but afford great additional facilities to intrigue58, and to every form of corruption59 compatible with the station in life of the electors. The constituencies would universally be reduced, in point of conveniences for bribery61, to the condition of the small boroughs62 at present. It would be sufficient to gain over a small number of persons to be certain of being returned. If it be said that the electors would be responsible to those who elected them, the answer is obvious, that, holding no permanent office or position in the public eye, they would risk nothing by a corrupt60 vote except what they would care little for, not to be appointed electors again: and the main reliance must still be on the penalties for bribery, the insufficiency of which reliance, in small constituencies, experience has made notorious to all the world. The evil would be exactly proportional to the amount of discretion63 left to the chosen electors. The only case in which they would probably be afraid to employ their vote for the promotion64 of their personal interest would be when they were elected under an express pledge, as mere delegates, to carry, as it were, the votes of their constituents to the hustings65. The moment the double stage of election began to have any effect, it would begin to have a bad effect. And this we shall find true of the principle of indirect election however applied66, except in circumstances similar to those of the election of senators in the United States.
It is unnecessary, as far as England is concerned, to say more in opposition67 to a scheme which has no foundation in any of the national traditions. An apology may even be expected for saying so much against a political expedient68 which perhaps could not, in this country, muster69 a single adherent70. But a conception so plausible at the first glance, and for which there are so many precedents71 in history, might perhaps, in the general chaos72 of political opinions, rise again to the surface, and be brought forward on occasions when it might be seductive to some minds; and it could not, therefore, even if English readers were alone to be considered, be passed altogether in silence.
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1
suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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gusts
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| 一阵强风( gust的名词复数 )； （怒、笑等的）爆发； （感情的）迸发； 发作 | |
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constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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abeyance
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| n.搁置，缓办，中止，产权未定 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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worthiest
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| 应得某事物( worthy的最高级 )； 值得做某事； 可尊敬的； 有（某人或事物）的典型特征 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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kindle
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| v.点燃，着火 | |
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virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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conscientiously
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| adv.凭良心地；认真地，负责尽职地；老老实实 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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acquiesces
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的第三人称单数 ) | |
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capabilities
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| n.能力( capability的名词复数 )；可能；容量；[复数]潜在能力 | |
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confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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privately
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| adv.以私人的身份，悄悄地，私下地 | |
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diverge
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| v.分叉，分歧，离题，使...岔开，使转向 | |
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partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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precludes
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| v.阻止( preclude的第三人称单数 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
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guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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alienated
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| adj.感到孤独的，不合群的v.使疏远( alienate的过去式和过去分词 )；使不友好；转让；让渡（财产等） | |
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federation
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| n.同盟，联邦，联合，联盟，联合会 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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conspicuously
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| ad.明显地，惹人注目地 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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42
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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44
borough
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| n.享有自治权的市镇；(英)自治市镇 | |
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45
avowedly
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| adv.公然地 | |
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46
component
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| n.组成部分，成分，元件；adj.组成的，合成的 | |
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47
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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48
fulfill
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| vt.履行，实现，完成；满足，使满意 | |
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49
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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50
perversion
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| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
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51
steward
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| n.乘务员，服务员；看管人；膳食管理员 | |
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52
attainable
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| a.可达到的，可获得的 | |
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53
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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54
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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57
nominees
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| n.被提名者，被任命者( nominee的名词复数 ) | |
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58
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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60
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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bribery
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| n.贿络行为，行贿，受贿 | |
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boroughs
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| （尤指大伦敦的）行政区( borough的名词复数 )； 议会中有代表的市镇 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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hustings
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| n.竞选活动 | |
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66
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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69
muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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adherent
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| n.信徒，追随者，拥护者 | |
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71
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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