Natural weakness of the judiciary power in confederations—Legislators ought to strive as much as possible to bring private individuals, and not States, before the Federal Courts—How the Americans have succeeded in this—Direct prosecution1 of private individuals in the Federal Courts—Indirect prosecution of the States which violate the laws of the union—The decrees of the Supreme2 Court enervate3 but do not destroy the provincial4 laws.
I have shown what the privileges of the Federal courts are, and it is no less important to point out the manner in which they are exercised. The irresistible5 authority of justice in countries in which the sovereignty in undivided is derived7 from the fact that the tribunals of those countries represent the entire nation at issue with the individual against whom their decree is directed, and the idea of power is thus introduced to corroborate8 the idea of right. But this is not always the case in countries in which the sovereignty is divided; in them the judicial9 power is more frequently opposed to a fraction of the nation than to an isolated10 individual, and its moral authority and physical strength are consequently diminished. In federal States the power of the judge is naturally decreased, and that of the justiciable parties is augmented11. The aim of the legislator in confederate States ought therefore to be to render the position of the courts of justice analogous12 to that which they occupy in countries where the sovereignty is undivided; in other words, his efforts ought constantly to tend to maintain the judicial power of the confederation as the representative of the nation, and the justiciable party as the representative of an individual interest.
Every government, whatever may be its constitution, requires the means of constraining13 its subjects to discharge their obligations, and of protecting its privileges from their assaults. As far as the direct action of the Government on the community is concerned, the Constitution of the United States contrived14, by a master-stroke of policy, that the federal courts, acting15 in the name of the laws, should only take cognizance of parties in an individual capacity. For, as it had been declared that the union consisted of one and the same people within the limits laid down by the Constitution, the inference was that the Government created by this Constitution, and acting within these limits, was invested with all the privileges of a national government, one of the principal of which is the right of transmitting its injunctions directly to the private citizen. When, for instance, the union votes an impost16, it does not apply to the States for the levying17 of it, but to every American citizen in proportion to his assessment18. The Supreme Court, which is empowered to enforce the execution of this law of the union, exerts its influence not upon a refractory19 State, but upon the private taxpayer20; and, like the judicial power of other nations, it is opposed to the person of an individual. It is to be observed that the union chose its own antagonist21; and as that antagonist is feeble, he is naturally worsted.
But the difficulty increases when the proceedings22 are not brought forward by but against the union. The Constitution recognizes the legislative24 power of the States; and a law so enacted25 may impair26 the privileges of the union, in which case a collision in unavoidable between that body and the State which has passed the law: and it only remains27 to select the least dangerous remedy, which is very clearly deducible from the general principles I have before established. *k
k
[ See Chapter VI. on "Judicial Power in America."]
It may be conceived that, in the case under consideration, the union might have used the State before a Federal court, which would have annulled29 the act, and by this means it would have adopted a natural course of proceeding23; but the judicial power would have been placed in open hostility30 to the State, and it was desirable to avoid this predicament as much as possible. The Americans hold that it is nearly impossible that a new law should not impair the interests of some private individual by its provisions: these private interests are assumed by the American legislators as the ground of attack against such measures as may be prejudicial to the union, and it is to these cases that the protection of the Supreme Court is extended.
Suppose a State vends31 a certain portion of its territory to a company, and that a year afterwards it passes a law by which the territory is otherwise disposed of, and that clause of the Constitution which prohibits laws impairing33 the obligation of contracts violated. When the purchaser under the second act appears to take possession, the possessor under the first act brings his action before the tribunals of the union, and causes the title of the claimant to be pronounced null and void. *l Thus, in point of fact, the judicial power of the union is contesting the claims of the sovereignty of a State; but it only acts indirectly34 and upon a special application of detail: it attacks the law in its consequences, not in its principle, and it rather weakens than destroys it.
l
[ See Kent's "Commentaries," vol. i. p. 387.]
The last hypothesis that remained was that each State formed a corporation enjoying a separate existence and distinct civil rights, and that it could therefore sue or be sued before a tribunal. Thus a State could bring an action against another State. In this instance the union was not called upon to contest a provincial law, but to try a suit in which a State was a party. This suit was perfectly35 similar to any other cause, except that the quality of the parties was different; and here the danger pointed36 out at the beginning of this chapter exists with less chance of being avoided. The inherent disadvantage of the very essence of Federal constitutions is that they engender37 parties in the bosom38 of the nation which present powerful obstacles to the free course of justice.
High Rank Of The Supreme Court Amongst The Great Powers Of State No nation ever constituted so great a judicial power as the Americans—Extent of its prerogative—Its political influence—The tranquillity39 and the very existence of the union depend on the discretion40 of the seven Federal Judges.
When we have successively examined in detail the organization of the Supreme Court, and the entire prerogatives41 which it exercises, we shall readily admit that a more imposing42 judicial power was never constituted by any people. The Supreme Court is placed at the head of all known tribunals, both by the nature of its rights and the class of justiciable parties which it controls.
In all the civilized43 countries of Europe the Government has always shown the greatest repugnance44 to allow the cases to which it was itself a party to be decided45 by the ordinary course of justice. This repugnance naturally attains46 its utmost height in an absolute Government; and, on the other hand, the privileges of the courts of justice are extended with the increasing liberties of the people: but no European nation has at present held that all judicial controversies47, without regard to their origin, can be decided by the judges of common law.
In America this theory has been actually put in practice, and the Supreme Court of the United States is the sole tribunal of the nation. Its power extends to all the cases arising under laws and treaties made by the executive and legislative authorities, to all cases of admiralty and maritime48 jurisdiction49, and in general to all points which affect the law of nations. It may even be affirmed that, although its constitution is essentially50 judicial, its prerogatives are almost entirely51 political. Its sole object is to enforce the execution of the laws of the union; and the union only regulates the relations of the Government with the citizens, and of the nation with Foreign Powers: the relations of citizens amongst themselves are almost exclusively regulated by the sovereignty of the States.
A second and still greater cause of the preponderance of this court may be adduced. In the nations of Europe the courts of justice are only called upon to try the controversies of private individuals; but the Supreme Court of the United States summons sovereign powers to its bar. When the clerk of the court advances on the steps of the tribunal, and simply says, "The State of New York versus52 the State of Ohio," it is impossible not to feel that the Court which he addresses is no ordinary body; and when it is recollected53 that one of these parties represents one million, and the other two millions of men, one is struck by the responsibility of the seven judges whose decision is about to satisfy or to disappoint so large a number of their fellow-citizens.
The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of the union are vested in the hands of the seven judges. Without their active co-operation the Constitution would be a dead letter: the Executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative powers; the Legislature demands their protection from the designs of the Executive; they defend the union from the disobedience of the States, the States from the exaggerated claims of the union, the public interest against the interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting56 innovations of democracy. Their power is enormous, but it is clothed in the authority of public opinion. They are the all-powerful guardians57 of a people which respects law, but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular contempt. The force of public opinion is the most intractable of agents, because its exact limits cannot be defined; and it is not less dangerous to exceed than to remain below the boundary prescribed.
The Federal judges must not only be good citizens, and men possessed58 of that information and integrity which are indispensable to magistrates59, but they must be statesmen—politicians, not unread in the signs of the times, not afraid to brave the obstacles which can be subdued61, nor slow to turn aside such encroaching elements as may threaten the supremacy62 of the union and the obedience55 which is due to the laws.
The President, who exercises a limited power, may err32 without causing great mischief63 in the State. Congress may decide amiss without destroying the union, because the electoral body in which Congress originates may cause it to retract64 its decision by changing its members. But if the Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent men or bad citizens, the union may be plunged66 into anarchy67 or civil war.
The real cause of this danger, however, does not lie in the constitution of the tribunal, but in the very nature of Federal Governments. We have observed that in confederate peoples it is especially necessary to consolidate68 the judicial authority, because in no other nations do those independent persons who are able to cope with the social body exist in greater power or in a better condition to resist the physical strength of the Government. But the more a power requires to be strengthened, the more extensive and independent it must be made; and the dangers which its abuse may create are heightened by its independence and its strength. The source of the evil is not, therefore, in the constitution of the power, but in the constitution of those States which render its existence necessary.
In What Respects The Federal Constitution Is Superior To That Of The States
In what respects the Constitution of the union can be compared to that of the States—Superiority of the Constitution of the union attributable to the wisdom of the Federal legislators—Legislature of the union less dependent on the people than that of the States—Executive power more independent in its sphere—Judicial power less subjected to the inclinations70 of the majority—Practical consequence of these facts—The dangers inherent in a democratic government eluded71 by the Federal legislators, and increased by the legislators of the States.
The Federal Constitution differs essentially from that of the States in the ends which it is intended to accomplish, but in the means by which these ends are promoted a greater analogy exists between them. The objects of the Governments are different, but their forms are the same; and in this special point of view there is some advantage in comparing them together.
I am of opinion that the Federal Constitution is superior to all the Constitutions of the States, for several reasons.
The present Constitution of the union was formed at a later period than those of the majority of the States, and it may have derived some ameliorations from past experience. But we shall be led to acknowledge that this is only a secondary cause of its superiority, when we recollect54 that eleven new States *n have been added to the American Confederation since the promulgation72 of the Federal Constitution, and that these new republics have always rather exaggerated than avoided the defects which existed in the former Constitutions.
n
[ [The number of States has now risen to 46 (1874), besides the District of Columbia.]]
The chief cause of the superiority of the Federal Constitution lay in the character of the legislators who composed it. At the time when it was formed the dangers of the Confederation were imminent73, and its ruin seemed inevitable74. In this extremity75 the people chose the men who most deserved the esteem76, rather than those who had gained the affections, of the country. I have already observed that distinguished77 as almost all the legislators of the union were for their intelligence, they were still more so for their patriotism78. They had all been nurtured79 at a time when the spirit of liberty was braced80 by a continual struggle against a powerful and predominant authority. When the contest was terminated, whilst the excited passions of the populace persisted in warring with dangers which had ceased to threaten them, these men stopped short in their career; they cast a calmer and more penetrating81 look upon the country which was now their own; they perceived that the war of independence was definitely ended, and that the only dangers which America had to fear were those which might result from the abuse of the freedom she had won. They had the courage to say what they believed to be true, because they were animated82 by a warm and sincere love of liberty; and they ventured to propose restrictions83, because they were resolutely84 opposed to destruction. *o
o
[ At this time Alexander Hamilton, who was one of the principal founders85 of the Constitution, ventured to express the following sentiments in "The Federalist," No. 71:—
"There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy86 of the Executive to a prevailing87 current, either in the community or in the Legislature, as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which government was instituted as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The Republican principle demands that the deliberative sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust88 the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance89 to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests. It is a just observation, that the people commonly intend the public good. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator90 who should pretend that they always reason right about the means of promoting it. They know from experience that they sometimes err; and the wonder is that they so seldom err as they do, beset91, as they continually are, by the wiles92 of parasites93 and sycophants94; by the snares95 of the ambitious, the avaricious96, the desperate; by the artifices97 of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it. When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance98 with their inclinations, it is the duty of persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion99, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate100 reflection. Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured101 lasting102 monuments of their gratitude103 to the men who had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril104 of their displeasure."]
The greater number of the Constitutions of the States assign one year for the duration of the House of Representatives, and two years for that of the Senate; so that members of the legislative body are constantly and narrowly tied down by the slightest desires of their constituents105. The legislators of the union were of opinion that this excessive dependence69 of the Legislature tended to alter the nature of the main consequences of the representative system, since it vested the source, not only of authority, but of government, in the people. They increased the length of the time for which the representatives were returned, in order to give them freer scope for the exercise of their own judgment106.
The Federal Constitution, as well as the Constitutions of the different States, divided the legislative body into two branches. But in the States these two branches were composed of the same elements, and elected in the same manner. The consequence was that the passions and inclinations of the populace were as rapidly and as energetically represented in one chamber107 as in the other, and that laws were made with all the characteristics of violence and precipitation. By the Federal Constitution the two houses originate in like manner in the choice of the people; but the conditions of eligibility108 and the mode of election were changed, to the end that, if, as is the case in certain nations, one branch of the Legislature represents the same interests as the other, it may at least represent a superior degree of intelligence and discretion. A mature age was made one of the conditions of the senatorial dignity, and the Upper House was chosen by an elected assembly of a limited number of members.
To concentrate the whole social force in the hands of the legislative body is the natural tendency of democracies; for as this is the power which emanates109 the most directly from the people, it is made to participate most fully110 in the preponderating111 authority of the multitude, and it is naturally led to monopolize112 every species of influence. This concentration is at once prejudicial to a well-conducted administration, and favorable to the despotism of the majority. The legislators of the States frequently yielded to these democratic propensities113, which were invariably and courageously114 resisted by the founders of the union.
In the States the executive power is vested in the hands of a magistrate60, who is apparently115 placed upon a level with the Legislature, but who is in reality nothing more than the blind agent and the passive instrument of its decisions. He can derive6 no influence from the duration of his functions, which terminate with the revolving116 year, or from the exercise of prerogatives which can scarcely be said to exist. The Legislature can condemn117 him to inaction by intrusting the execution of the laws to special committees of its own members, and can annul28 his temporary dignity by depriving him of his salary. The Federal Constitution vests all the privileges and all the responsibility of the executive power in a single individual. The duration of the Presidency118 is fixed119 at four years; the salary of the individual who fills that office cannot be altered during the term of his functions; he is protected by a body of official dependents, and armed with a suspensive veto. In short, every effort was made to confer a strong and independent position upon the executive authority within the limits which had been prescribed to it.
In the Constitutions of all the States the judicial power is that which remains the most independent of the legislative authority; nevertheless, in all the States the Legislature has reserved to itself the right of regulating the emoluments120 of the judges, a practice which necessarily subjects these magistrates to its immediate121 influence. In some States the judges are only temporarily appointed, which deprives them of a great portion of their power and their freedom. In others the legislative and judicial powers are entirely confounded; thus the Senate of New York, for instance, constitutes in certain cases the Superior Court of the State. The Federal Constitution, on the other hand, carefully separates the judicial authority from all external influences; and it provides for the independence of the judges, by declaring that their salary shall not be altered, and that their functions shall be inalienable.
The practical consequences of these different systems may easily be perceived. An attentive122 observer will soon remark that the business of the union is incomparably better conducted than that of any individual State. The conduct of the Federal Government is more fair and more temperate123 than that of the States, its designs are more fraught124 with wisdom, its projects are more durable125 and more skilfully126 combined, its measures are put into execution with more vigor127 and consistency128.
I recapitulate129 the substance of this chapter in a few words: The existence of democracies is threatened by two dangers, viz., the complete subjection of the legislative body to the caprices of the electoral body, and the concentration of all the powers of the Government in the legislative authority. The growth of these evils has been encouraged by the policy of the legislators of the States, but it has been resisted by the legislators of the union by every means which lay within their control.
Characteristics Which Distinguish The Federal Constitution Of The United States Of America From All Other Federal Constitutions American union appears to resemble all other confederations—Nevertheless its effects are different—Reason of this—Distinctions between the union and all other confederations—The American Government not a federal but an imperfect national Government.
The United States of America do not afford either the first or the only instance of confederate States, several of which have existed in modern Europe, without adverting130 to those of antiquity131. Switzerland, the Germanic Empire, and the Republic of the United Provinces either have been or still are confederations. In studying the constitutions of these different countries, the politician is surprised to observe that the powers with which they invested the Federal Government are nearly identical with the privileges awarded by the American Constitution to the Government of the United States. They confer upon the central power the same rights of making peace and war, of raising money and troops, and of providing for the general exigencies132 and the common interests of the nation. Nevertheless the Federal Government of these different peoples has always been as remarkable133 for its weakness and inefficiency134 as that of the union is for its vigorous and enterprising spirit. Again, the first American Confederation perished through the excessive weakness of its Government; and this weak Government was, notwithstanding, in possession of rights even more extensive than those of the Federal Government of the present day. But the more recent Constitution of the United States contains certain principles which exercise a most important influence, although they do not at once strike the observer.
This Constitution, which may at first sight be confounded with the federal constitutions which preceded it, rests upon a novel theory, which may be considered as a great invention in modern political science. In all the confederations which had been formed before the American Constitution of 1789 the allied135 States agreed to obey the injunctions of a Federal Government; but they reserved to themselves the right of ordaining136 and enforcing the execution of the laws of the union. The American States which combined in 1789 agreed that the Federal Government should not only dictate137 the laws, but that it should execute it own enactments138. In both cases the right is the same, but the exercise of the right is different; and this alteration139 produced the most momentous140 consequences.
In all the confederations which had been formed before the American union the Federal Government demanded its supplies at the hands of the separate Governments; and if the measure it prescribed was onerous141 to any one of those bodies means were found to evade142 its claims: if the State was powerful, it had recourse to arms; if it was weak, it connived143 at the resistance which the law of the union, its sovereign, met with, and resorted to inaction under the plea of inability. Under these circumstances one of the two alternatives has invariably occurred; either the most preponderant of the allied peoples has assumed the privileges of the Federal authority and ruled all the States in its name, *p or the Federal Government has been abandoned by its natural supporters, anarchy has arisen between the confederates, and the union has lost all powers of action. *q
p
[ This was the case in Greece, when Philip undertook to execute the decree of the Amphictyons; in the Low Countries, where the province of Holland always gave the law; and, in our own time, in the Germanic Confederation, in which Austria and Prussia assume a great degree of influence over the whole country, in the name of the Diet.]
q
[ Such has always been the situation of the Swiss Confederation, which would have perished ages ago but for the mutual144 jealousies145 of its neighbors.]
In America the subjects of the union are not States, but private citizens: the national Government levies146 a tax, not upon the State of Massachusetts, but upon each inhabitant of Massachusetts. All former confederate governments presided over communities, but that of the union rules individuals; its force is not borrowed, but self-derived; and it is served by its own civil and military officers, by its own army, and its own courts of justice. It cannot be doubted that the spirit of the nation, the passions of the multitude, and the provincial prejudices of each State tend singularly to diminish the authority of a Federal authority thus constituted, and to facilitate the means of resistance to its mandates147; but the comparative weakness of a restricted sovereignty is an evil inherent in the Federal system. In America, each State has fewer opportunities of resistance and fewer temptations to non-compliance; nor can such a design be put in execution (if indeed it be entertained) without an open violation148 of the laws of the union, a direct interruption of the ordinary course of justice, and a bold declaration of revolt; in a word, without taking a decisive step which men hesitate to adopt.
In all former confederations the privileges of the union furnished more elements of discord149 than of power, since they multiplied the claims of the nation without augmenting150 the means of enforcing them: and in accordance with this fact it may be remarked that the real weakness of federal governments has almost always been in the exact ratio of their nominal151 power. Such is not the case in the American union, in which, as in ordinary governments, the Federal Government has the means of enforcing all it is empowered to demand.
The human understanding more easily invents new things than new words, and we are thence constrained152 to employ a multitude of improper153 and inadequate154 expressions. When several nations form a permanent league and establish a supreme authority, which, although it has not the same influence over the members of the community as a national government, acts upon each of the Confederate States in a body, this Government, which is so essentially different from all others, is denominated a Federal one. Another form of society is afterwards discovered, in which several peoples are fused into one and the same nation with regard to certain common interests, although they remain distinct, or at least only confederate, with regard to all their other concerns. In this case the central power acts directly upon those whom it governs, whom it rules, and whom it judges, in the same manner, as, but in a more limited circle than, a national government. Here the term Federal Government is clearly no longer applicable to a state of things which must be styled an incomplete national Government: a form of government has been found out which is neither exactly national nor federal; but no further progress has been made, and the new word which will one day designate this novel invention does not yet exist.
The absence of this new species of confederation has been the cause which has brought all unions to Civil War, to subjection, or to a stagnant155 apathy156, and the peoples which formed these leagues have been either too dull to discern, or too pusillanimous157 to apply this great remedy. The American Confederation perished by the same defects.
But the Confederate States of America had been long accustomed to form a portion of one empire before they had won their independence; they had not contracted the habit of governing themselves, and their national prejudices had not taken deep root in their minds. Superior to the rest of the world in political knowledge, and sharing that knowledge equally amongst themselves, they were little agitated158 by the passions which generally oppose the extension of federal authority in a nation, and those passions were checked by the wisdom of the chief citizens. The Americans applied159 the remedy with prudent65 firmness as soon as they were conscious of the evil; they amended160 their laws, and they saved their country.
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prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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enervate
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| v.使虚弱，使无力 | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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derive
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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corroborate
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| v.支持，证实，确定 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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isolated
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Augmented
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| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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constraining
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| 强迫( constrain的现在分词 )； 强使； 限制； 约束 | |
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contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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acting
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impost
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levying
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| 征（兵）( levy的现在分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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assessment
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refractory
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taxpayer
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antagonist
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proceedings
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proceeding
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legislative
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enacted
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impair
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remains
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annul
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annulled
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hostility
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vends
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err
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impairing
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| v.损害，削弱( impair的现在分词 ) | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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36
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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37
engender
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| v.产生，引起 | |
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38
bosom
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| n.胸，胸部；胸怀；内心；adj.亲密的 | |
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39
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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40
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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41
prerogatives
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| n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 )；特权；大主教法庭；总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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42
imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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44
repugnance
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| n.嫌恶 | |
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45
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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46
attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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47
controversies
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| 争论 | |
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48
maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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49
jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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50
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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51
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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52
versus
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| prep.以…为对手，对；与…相比之下 | |
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53
recollected
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| adj.冷静的；镇定的；被回忆起的；沉思默想的v.记起，想起( recollect的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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54
recollect
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| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
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55
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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56
fleeting
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| adj.短暂的，飞逝的 | |
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57
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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58
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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59
magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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60
magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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61
subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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62
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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63
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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64
retract
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| vt.缩回，撤回收回，取消 | |
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65
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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66
plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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67
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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68
consolidate
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| v.使加固，使加强；(把...)联为一体，合并 | |
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69
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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70
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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71
eluded
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| v.（尤指机敏地）避开( elude的过去式和过去分词 )；逃避；躲避；使达不到 | |
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72
promulgation
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| n.颁布 | |
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73
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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74
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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75
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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76
esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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77
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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78
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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79
nurtured
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| 养育( nurture的过去式和过去分词 )； 培育； 滋长； 助长 | |
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80
braced
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| adj.拉牢的v.支住( brace的过去式和过去分词 )；撑牢；使自己站稳；振作起来 | |
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81
penetrating
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|
| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
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82
animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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83
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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84
resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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85
founders
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| n.创始人( founder的名词复数 ) | |
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86
pliancy
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| n.柔软，柔顺 | |
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87
prevailing
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| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
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88
entrust
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| v.信赖，信托，交托 | |
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89
complaisance
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| n.彬彬有礼，殷勤，柔顺 | |
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90
adulator
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| n.好奉承的人 | |
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91
beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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92
wiles
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| n.（旨在欺骗或吸引人的）诡计，花招；欺骗，欺诈( wile的名词复数 ) | |
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93
parasites
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| 寄生物( parasite的名词复数 )； 靠他人为生的人； 诸虫 | |
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94
sycophants
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| n.谄媚者，拍马屁者( sycophant的名词复数 ) | |
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95
snares
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| n.陷阱( snare的名词复数 )；圈套；诱人遭受失败（丢脸、损失等）的东西；诱惑物v.用罗网捕捉，诱陷，陷害( snare的第三人称单数 ) | |
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96
avaricious
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| adj.贪婪的，贪心的 | |
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97
artifices
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| n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 )；诡计；巧妙办法；虚伪行为 | |
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98
variance
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| n.矛盾，不同 | |
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99
delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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100
sedate
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| adj.沉着的，镇静的，安静的 | |
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101
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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102
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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103
gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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104
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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105
constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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106
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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107
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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108
eligibility
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| n.合格，资格 | |
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109
emanates
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| v.从…处传出，传出( emanate的第三人称单数 )；产生，表现，显示 | |
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110
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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111
preponderating
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| v.超过，胜过( preponderate的现在分词 ) | |
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112
monopolize
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| v.垄断，独占，专营 | |
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113
propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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114
courageously
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| ad.勇敢地，无畏地 | |
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115
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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116
revolving
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| adj.旋转的，轮转式的；循环的v.（使）旋转( revolve的现在分词 )；细想 | |
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117
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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118
presidency
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| n.总统(校长，总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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119
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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120
emoluments
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| n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 ) | |
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121
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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122
attentive
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| adj.注意的，专心的；关心(别人)的，殷勤的 | |
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123
temperate
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| adj.温和的，温带的，自我克制的，不过分的 | |
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124
fraught
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| adj.充满…的，伴有(危险等)的；忧虑的 | |
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125
durable
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| adj.持久的，耐久的 | |
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126
skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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127
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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128
consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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129
recapitulate
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| v.节述要旨，择要说明 | |
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130
adverting
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| 引起注意（advert的现在分词形式） | |
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131
antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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132
exigencies
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| n.急切需要 | |
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133
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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134
inefficiency
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| n.无效率，无能；无效率事例 | |
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135
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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136
ordaining
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| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的现在分词 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
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137
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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138
enactments
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| n.演出( enactment的名词复数 )；展现；规定；通过 | |
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139
alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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140
momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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141
onerous
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| adj.繁重的 | |
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142
evade
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| vt.逃避，回避；避开，躲避 | |
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143
connived
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| v.密谋 ( connive的过去式和过去分词 )；搞阴谋；默许；纵容 | |
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144
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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145
jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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146
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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147
mandates
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| 托管（mandate的第三人称单数形式） | |
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148
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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149
discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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150
augmenting
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| 使扩张 | |
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151
nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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152
constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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153
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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154
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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155
stagnant
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| adj.不流动的，停滞的，不景气的 | |
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156
apathy
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| n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡 | |
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157
pusillanimous
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| adj.懦弱的，胆怯的 | |
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158
agitated
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| adj.被鼓动的，不安的 | |
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159
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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160
Amended
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| adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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