In aristocracies rulers sometimes endeavor to corrupt1 the people—In democracies rulers frequently show themselves to be corrupt—In the former their vices are directly prejudicial to the morality of the people—In the latter their indirect influence is still more pernicious.
A distinction must be made, when the aristocratic and the democratic principles mutually inveigh5 against each other, as tending to facilitate corruption. In aristocratic governments the individuals who are placed at the head of affairs are rich men, who are solely6 desirous of power. In democracies statesmen are poor, and they have their fortunes to make. The consequence is that in aristocratic States the rulers are rarely accessible to corruption, and have very little craving7 for money; whilst the reverse is the case in democratic nations.
But in aristocracies, as those who are desirous of arriving at the head of affairs are possessed8 of considerable wealth, and as the number of persons by whose assistance they may rise is comparatively small, the government is, if I may use the expression, put up to a sort of auction9. In democracies, on the contrary, those who are covetous10 of power are very seldom wealthy, and the number of citizens who confer that power is extremely great. Perhaps in democracies the number of men who might be bought is by no means smaller, but buyers are rarely to be met with; and, besides, it would be necessary to buy so many persons at once that the attempt is rendered nugatory11.
Many of the men who have been in the administration in France during the last forty years have been accused of making their fortunes at the expense of the State or of its allies; a reproach which was rarely addressed to the public characters of the ancient monarchy12. But in France the practice of bribing14 electors is almost unknown, whilst it is notoriously and publicly carried on in England. In the United States I never heard a man accused of spending his wealth in corrupting15 the populace; but I have often heard the probity16 of public officers questioned; still more frequently have I heard their success attributed to low intrigues17 and immoral19 practices.
If, then, the men who conduct the government of an aristocracy sometimes endeavor to corrupt the people, the heads of a democracy are themselves corrupt. In the former case the morality of the people is directly assailed20; in the latter an indirect influence is exercised upon the people which is still more to be dreaded21.
As the rulers of democratic nations are almost always exposed to the suspicion of dishonorable conduct, they in some measure lend the authority of the Government to the base practices of which they are accused. They thus afford an example which must prove discouraging to the struggles of virtuous23 independence, and must foster the secret calculations of a vicious ambition. If it be asserted that evil passions are displayed in all ranks of society, that they ascend24 the throne by hereditary25 right, and that despicable characters are to be met with at the head of aristocratic nations as well as in the sphere of a democracy, this objection has but little weight in my estimation. The corruption of men who have casually26 risen to power has a coarse and vulgar infection in it which renders it contagious27 to the multitude. On the contrary, there is a kind of aristocratic refinement28 and an air of grandeur29 in the depravity of the great, which frequently prevent it from spreading abroad.
The people can never penetrate30 into the perplexing labyrinth31 of court intrigue18, and it will always have difficulty in detecting the turpitude32 which lurks33 under elegant manners, refined tastes, and graceful34 language. But to pillage35 the public purse, and to vend36 the favors of the State, are arts which the meanest villain37 may comprehend, and hope to practice in his turn.
In reality it is far less prejudicial to witness the immorality38 of the great than to witness that immorality which leads to greatness. In a democracy private citizens see a man of their own rank in life, who rises from that obscure position, and who becomes possessed of riches and of power in a few years; the spectacle excites their surprise and their envy, and they are led to inquire how the person who was yesterday their equal is to-day their ruler. To attribute his rise to his talents or his virtues39 is unpleasant; for it is tacitly to acknowledge that they are themselves less virtuous and less talented than he was. They are therefore led (and not unfrequently their conjecture40 is a correct one) to impute41 his success mainly to some one of his defects; and an odious42 mixture is thus formed of the ideas of turpitude and power, unworthiness and success, utility and dishonor.
Efforts Of Which A Democracy Is Capable
The union has only had one struggle hitherto for its existence—Enthusiasm at the commencement of the war—Indifference towards its close—Difficulty of establishing military conscription or impressment of seamen43 in America—Why a democratic people is less capable of sustained effort than another.
I here warn the reader that I speak of a government which implicitly44 follows the real desires of a people, and not of a government which simply commands in its name. Nothing is so irresistible45 as a tyrannical power commanding in the name of the people, because, whilst it exercises that moral influence which belongs to the decision of the majority, it acts at the same time with the promptitude and the tenacity46 of a single man.
It is difficult to say what degree of exertion47 a democratic government may be capable of making a crisis in the history of the nation. But no great democratic republic has hitherto existed in the world. To style the oligarchy48 which ruled over France in 1793 by that name would be to offer an insult to the republican form of government. The United States afford the first example of the kind.
The American union has now subsisted49 for half a century, in the course of which time its existence has only once been attacked, namely, during the War of Independence. At the commencement of that long war, various occurrences took place which betokened51 an extraordinary zeal52 for the service of the country. *p But as the contest was prolonged, symptoms of private egotism began to show themselves. No money was poured into the public treasury53; few recruits could be raised to join the army; the people wished to acquire independence, but was very ill-disposed to undergo the privations by which alone it could be obtained. "Tax laws," says Hamilton in the "Federalist" (No. 12), "have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed and the treasuries55 of the States have remained empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity56 of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly57 of attempting them."
p
[ One of the most singular of these occurrences was the resolution which the Americans took of temporarily abandoning the use of tea. Those who know that men usually cling more to their habits than to their life will doubtless admire this great though obscure sacrifice which was made by a whole people.]
The United States have not had any serious war to carry on ever since that period. In order, therefore, to appreciate the sacrifices which democratic nations may impose upon themselves, we must wait until the American people is obliged to put half its entire income at the disposal of the Government, as was done by the English; or until it sends forth58 a twentieth part of its population to the field of battle, as was done by France. *q
q
[ [The Civil War showed that when the necessity arose the American people, both in the North and in the South, are capable of making the most enormous sacrifices, both in money and in men.]]
In America the use of conscription is unknown, and men are induced to enlist59 by bounties60. The notions and habits of the people of the United States are so opposed to compulsory61 enlistment62 that I do not imagine it can ever be sanctioned by the laws. What is termed the conscription in France is assuredly the heaviest tax upon the population of that country; yet how could a great continental63 war be carried on without it? The Americans have not adopted the British impressment of seamen, and they have nothing which corresponds to the French system of maritime64 conscription; the navy, as well as the merchant service, is supplied by voluntary service. But it is not easy to conceive how a people can sustain a great maritime war without having recourse to one or the other of these two systems. Indeed, the union, which has fought with some honor upon the seas, has never possessed a very numerous fleet, and the equipment of the small number of American vessels65 has always been excessively expensive.
I have heard American statesmen confess that the union will have great difficulty in maintaining its rank on the seas without adopting the system of impressment or of maritime conscription; but the difficulty is to induce the people, which exercises the supreme66 authority, to submit to impressment or any compulsory system.
It is incontestable that in times of danger a free people displays far more energy than one which is not so. But I incline to believe that this is more especially the case in those free nations in which the democratic element preponderates67. Democracy appears to me to be much better adapted for the peaceful conduct of society, or for an occasional effort of remarkable68 vigor69, than for the hardy70 and prolonged endurance of the storms which beset71 the political existence of nations. The reason is very evident; it is enthusiasm which prompts men to expose themselves to dangers and privations, but they will not support them long without reflection. There is more calculation, even in the impulses of bravery, than is generally attributed to them; and although the first efforts are suggested by passion, perseverance72 is maintained by a distinct regard of the purpose in view. A portion of what we value is exposed, in order to save the remainder.
But it is this distinct perception of the future, founded upon a sound judgment73 and an enlightened experience, which is most frequently wanting in democracies. The populace is more apt to feel than to reason; and if its present sufferings are great, it is to be feared that the still greater sufferings attendant upon defeat will be forgotten.
Another cause tends to render the efforts of a democratic government less persevering74 than those of an aristocracy. Not only are the lower classes less awakened75 than the higher orders to the good or evil chances of the future, but they are liable to suffer far more acutely from present privations. The noble exposes his life, indeed, but the chance of glory is equal to the chance of harm. If he sacrifices a large portion of his income to the State, he deprives himself for a time of the pleasures of affluence76; but to the poor man death is embellished77 by no pomp or renown78, and the imposts which are irksome to the rich are fatal to him.
This relative impotence of democratic republics is, perhaps, the greatest obstacle to the foundation of a republic of this kind in Europe. In order that such a State should subsist50 in one country of the Old World, it would be necessary that similar institutions should be introduced into all the other nations.
I am of opinion that a democratic government tends in the end to increase the real strength of society; but it can never combine, upon a single point and at a given time, so much power as an aristocracy or a monarchy. If a democratic country remained during a whole century subject to a republican government, it would probably at the end of that period be more populous79 and more prosperous than the neighboring despotic States. But it would have incurred80 the risk of being conquered much oftener than they would in that lapse81 of years.
Self-Control Of The American Democracy
The American people acquiesces82 slowly, or frequently does not acquiesce83, in what is beneficial to its interests—The faults of the American democracy are for the most part reparable.
The difficulty which a democracy has in conquering the passions and in subduing84 the exigencies85 of the moment, with a view to the future, is conspicuous86 in the most trivial occurrences of the United States. The people, which is surrounded by flatterers, has great difficulty in surmounting87 its inclinations88, and whenever it is solicited90 to undergo a privation or any kind of inconvenience, even to attain91 an end which is sanctioned by its own rational conviction, it almost always refuses to comply at first. The deference92 of the Americans to the laws has been very justly applauded; but it must be added that in America the legislation is made by the people and for the people. Consequently, in the United States the law favors those classes which are most interested in evading93 it elsewhere. It may therefore be supposed that an offensive law, which should not be acknowledged to be one of immediate94 utility, would either not be enacted95 or would not be obeyed.
In America there is no law against fraudulent bankruptcies96; not because they are few, but because there are a great number of bankruptcies. The dread22 of being prosecuted97 as a bankrupt acts with more intensity98 upon the mind of the majority of the people than the fear of being involved in losses or ruin by the failure of other parties, and a sort of guilty tolerance99 is extended by the public conscience to an offence which everyone condemns100 in his individual capacity. In the new States of the Southwest the citizens generally take justice into their own hands, and murders are of very frequent occurrence. This arises from the rude manners and the ignorance of the inhabitants of those deserts, who do not perceive the utility of investing the law with adequate force, and who prefer duels101 to prosecutions102.
Someone observed to me one day, in Philadelphia, that almost all crimes in America are caused by the abuse of intoxicating103 liquors, which the lower classes can procure104 in great abundance, from their excessive cheapness. "How comes it," said I, "that you do not put a duty upon brandy?" "Our legislators," rejoined my informant, "have frequently thought of this expedient105; but the task of putting it in operation is a difficult one; a revolt might be apprehended106, and the members who should vote for a law of this kind would be sure of losing their seats." "Whence I am to infer," replied I, "that the drinking population constitutes the majority in your country, and that temperance is somewhat unpopular."
When these things are pointed54 out to the American statesmen, they content themselves with assuring you that time will operate the necessary change, and that the experience of evil will teach the people its true interests. This is frequently true, although a democracy is more liable to error than a monarch13 or a body of nobles; the chances of its regaining107 the right path when once it has acknowledged its mistake, are greater also; because it is rarely embarrassed by internal interests, which conflict with those of the majority, and resist the authority of reason. But a democracy can only obtain truth as the result of experience, and many nations may forfeit108 their existence whilst they are awaiting the consequences of their errors.
The great privilege of the Americans does not simply consist in their being more enlightened than other nations, but in their being able to repair the faults they may commit. To which it must be added, that a democracy cannot derive109 substantial benefit from past experience, unless it be arrived at a certain pitch of knowledge and civilization. There are tribes and peoples whose education has been so vicious, and whose character presents so strange a mixture of passion, of ignorance, and of erroneous notions upon all subjects, that they are unable to discern the causes of their own wretchedness, and they fall a sacrifice to ills with which they are unacquainted.
I have crossed vast tracts110 of country that were formerly111 inhabited by powerful Indian nations which are now extinct; I have myself passed some time in the midst of mutilated tribes, which witness the daily decline of their numerical strength and of the glory of their independence; and I have heard these Indians themselves anticipate the impending112 doom113 of their race. Every European can perceive means which would rescue these unfortunate beings from inevitable114 destruction. They alone are insensible to the expedient; they feel the woe115 which year after year heaps upon their heads, but they will perish to a man without accepting the remedy. It would be necessary to employ force to induce them to submit to the protection and the constraint116 of civilization.
The incessant117 revolutions which have convulsed the South American provinces for the last quarter of a century have frequently been adverted118 to with astonishment119, and expectations have been expressed that those nations would speedily return to their natural state. But can it be affirmed that the turmoil120 of revolution is not actually the most natural state of the South American Spaniards at the present time? In that country society is plunged121 into difficulties from which all its efforts are insufficient122 to rescue it. The inhabitants of that fair portion of the Western Hemisphere seem obstinately123 bent124 on pursuing the work of inward havoc125. If they fall into a momentary126 repose127 from the effects of exhaustion128, that repose prepares them for a fresh state of frenzy129. When I consider their condition, which alternates between misery130 and crime, I should be inclined to believe that despotism itself would be a benefit to them, if it were possible that the words despotism and benefit could ever be united in my mind.
Conduct Of Foreign Affairs By The American Democracy
Direction given to the foreign policy of the United States by Washington and Jefferson—Almost all the defects inherent in democratic institutions are brought to light in the conduct of foreign affairs—Their advantages are less perceptible.
We have seen that the Federal Constitution entrusts131 the permanent direction of the external interests of the nation to the President and the Senate, *r which tends in some degree to detach the general foreign policy of the union from the control of the people. It cannot therefore be asserted with truth that the external affairs of State are conducted by the democracy.
r
[ "The President," says the Constitution, Art. II, sect132. 2, Section 2, "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur133." The reader is reminded that the senators are returned for a term of six years, and that they are chosen by the legislature of each State.]
The policy of America owes its rise to Washington, and after him to Jefferson, who established those principles which it observes at the present day. Washington said in the admirable letter which he addressed to his fellow-citizens, and which may be looked upon as his political bequest134 to the country: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies135, the causes of which are essentially136 foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate137 ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes138 of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance139; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously140 respected; when belligerent141 nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation142; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar143 a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle144 our peace and prosperity in the toils145 of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer146 clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim147 no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it; therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense; but in my opinion it is unnecessary, and would be unwise, to extend them. Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, in a respectable defensive148 posture149, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." In a previous part of the same letter Washington makes the following admirable and just remark: "The nation which indulges towards another an habitual150 hatred151 or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."
The political conduct of Washington was always guided by these maxims152. He succeeded in maintaining his country in a state of peace whilst all the other nations of the globe were at war; and he laid it down as a fundamental doctrine153, that the true interest of the Americans consisted in a perfect neutrality with regard to the internal dissensions of the European Powers.
Jefferson went still further, and he introduced a maxim into the policy of the union, which affirms that "the Americans ought never to solicit89 any privileges from foreign nations, in order not to be obliged to grant similar privileges themselves."
These two principles, which were so plain and so just as to be adapted to the capacity of the populace, have greatly simplified the foreign policy of the United States. As the union takes no part in the affairs of Europe, it has, properly speaking, no foreign interests to discuss, since it has at present no powerful neighbors on the American continent. The country is as much removed from the passions of the Old World by its position as by the line of policy which it has chosen, and it is neither called upon to repudiate154 nor to espouse155 the conflicting interests of Europe; whilst the dissensions of the New World are still concealed156 within the bosom157 of the future.
The union is free from all pre-existing obligations, and it is consequently enabled to profit by the experience of the old nations of Europe, without being obliged, as they are, to make the best of the past, and to adapt it to their present circumstances; or to accept that immense inheritance which they derive from their forefathers—an inheritance of glory mingled158 with calamities159, and of alliances conflicting with national antipathies160. The foreign policy of the United States is reduced by its very nature to await the chances of the future history of the nation, and for the present it consists more in abstaining161 from interference than in exerting its activity.
It is therefore very difficult to ascertain162, at present, what degree of sagacity the American democracy will display in the conduct of the foreign policy of the country; and upon this point its adversaries163, as well as its advocates, must suspend their judgment. As for myself I have no hesitation164 in avowing165 my conviction, that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles. Experience, instruction, and habit may almost always succeed in creating a species of practical discretion166 in democracies, and that science of the daily occurrences of life which is called good sense. Good sense may suffice to direct the ordinary course of society; and amongst a people whose education has been provided for, the advantages of democratic liberty in the internal affairs of the country may more than compensate167 for the evils inherent in a democratic government. But such is not always the case in the mutual4 relations of foreign nations.
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties168 in which it is deficient169. Democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of the State; it tends to diffuse170 a moderate independence; it promotes the growth of public spirit, and fortifies171 the respect which is entertained for law in all classes of society; and these are advantages which only exercise an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking172, to persevere173 in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy174, and it will not await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or to an aristocracy; and they are precisely175 the means by which an individual people attains176 to a predominant position.
If, on the contrary, we observe the natural defects of aristocracy, we shall find that their influence is comparatively innoxious in the direction of the external affairs of a State. The capital fault of which aristocratic bodies may be accused is that they are more apt to contrive177 their own advantage than that of the mass of the people. In foreign politics it is rare for the interest of the aristocracy to be in any way distinct from that of the people.
The propensity178 which democracies have to obey the impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of prudence179, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary caprice, was very clearly seen in America on the breaking out of the French Revolution. It was then as evident to the simplest capacity as it is at the present time that the interest of the Americans forbade them to take any part in the contest which was about to deluge180 Europe with blood, but which could by no means injure the welfare of their own country. Nevertheless the sympathies of the people declared themselves with so much violence in behalf of France that nothing but the inflexible181 character of Washington, and the immense popularity which he enjoyed, could have prevented the Americans from declaring war against England. And even then, the exertions182 which the austere183 reason of that great man made to repress the generous but imprudent passions of his fellow-citizens, very nearly deprived him of the sole recompense which he had ever claimed—that of his country's love. The majority then reprobated the line of policy which he adopted, and which has since been unanimously approved by the nation. *s If the Constitution and the favor of the public had not entrusted184 the direction of the foreign affairs of the country to Washington, it is certain that the American nation would at that time have taken the very measures which it now condemns.
s
[ See the fifth volume of Marshall's "Life of Washington." In a government constituted like that of the United States, he says, "it is impossible for the chief magistrate185, however firm he may be, to oppose for any length of time the torrent186 of popular opinion; and the prevalent opinion of that day seemed to incline to war. In fact, in the session of Congress held at the time, it was frequently seen that Washington had lost the majority in the House of Representatives." The violence of the language used against him in public was extreme, and in a political meeting they did not scruple187 to compare him indirectly188 to the treacherous189 Arnold. "By the opposition," says Marshall, "the friends of the administration were declared to be an aristocratic and corrupt faction190, who, from a desire to introduce monarchy, were hostile to France and under the influence of Britain; that they were a paper nobility, whose extreme sensibility at every measure which threatened the funds, induced a tame submission191 to injuries and insults, which the interests and honor of the nation required them to resist."]
Almost all the nations which have ever exercised a powerful influence upon the destinies of the world by conceiving, following up, and executing vast designs—from the Romans to the English—have been governed by aristocratic institutions. Nor will this be a subject of wonder when we recollect192 that nothing in the world has so absolute a fixity of purpose as an aristocracy. The mass of the people may be led astray by ignorance or passion; the mind of a king may be biased193, and his perseverance in his designs may be shaken—besides which a king is not immortal—but an aristocratic body is too numerous to be led astray by the blandishments of intrigue, and yet not numerous enough to yield readily to the intoxicating influence of unreflecting passion: it has the energy of a firm and enlightened individual, added to the power which it derives194 from perpetuity.
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1 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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2 corruption | |
n.腐败,堕落,贪污 | |
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3 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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4 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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5 inveigh | |
v.痛骂 | |
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6 solely | |
adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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7 craving | |
n.渴望,热望 | |
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8 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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9 auction | |
n.拍卖;拍卖会;vt.拍卖 | |
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10 covetous | |
adj.贪婪的,贪心的 | |
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11 nugatory | |
adj.琐碎的,无价值的 | |
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12 monarchy | |
n.君主,最高统治者;君主政体,君主国 | |
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13 monarch | |
n.帝王,君主,最高统治者 | |
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14 bribing | |
贿赂 | |
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15 corrupting | |
(使)败坏( corrupt的现在分词 ); (使)腐化; 引起(计算机文件等的)错误; 破坏 | |
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16 probity | |
n.刚直;廉洁,正直 | |
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17 intrigues | |
n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 );神秘气氛;引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 );激起…的好奇心 | |
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18 intrigue | |
vt.激起兴趣,迷住;vi.耍阴谋;n.阴谋,密谋 | |
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19 immoral | |
adj.不道德的,淫荡的,荒淫的,有伤风化的 | |
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20 assailed | |
v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 );困扰;质问;毅然应对 | |
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21 dreaded | |
adj.令人畏惧的;害怕的v.害怕,恐惧,担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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22 dread | |
vt.担忧,忧虑;惧怕,不敢;n.担忧,畏惧 | |
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23 virtuous | |
adj.有品德的,善良的,贞洁的,有效力的 | |
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24 ascend | |
vi.渐渐上升,升高;vt.攀登,登上 | |
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25 hereditary | |
adj.遗传的,遗传性的,可继承的,世袭的 | |
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26 casually | |
adv.漠不关心地,无动于衷地,不负责任地 | |
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27 contagious | |
adj.传染性的,有感染力的 | |
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28 refinement | |
n.文雅;高尚;精美;精制;精炼 | |
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29 grandeur | |
n.伟大,崇高,宏伟,庄严,豪华 | |
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30 penetrate | |
v.透(渗)入;刺入,刺穿;洞察,了解 | |
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31 labyrinth | |
n.迷宫;难解的事物;迷路 | |
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32 turpitude | |
n.可耻;邪恶 | |
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33 lurks | |
n.潜在,潜伏;(lurk的复数形式)vi.潜伏,埋伏(lurk的第三人称单数形式) | |
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34 graceful | |
adj.优美的,优雅的;得体的 | |
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35 pillage | |
v.抢劫;掠夺;n.抢劫,掠夺;掠夺物 | |
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36 vend | |
v.公开表明观点,出售,贩卖 | |
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37 villain | |
n.反派演员,反面人物;恶棍;问题的起因 | |
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38 immorality | |
n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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39 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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40 conjecture | |
n./v.推测,猜测 | |
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41 impute | |
v.归咎于 | |
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42 odious | |
adj.可憎的,讨厌的 | |
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43 seamen | |
n.海员 | |
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44 implicitly | |
adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
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45 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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46 tenacity | |
n.坚韧 | |
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47 exertion | |
n.尽力,努力 | |
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48 oligarchy | |
n.寡头政治 | |
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49 subsisted | |
v.(靠很少的钱或食物)维持生活,生存下去( subsist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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50 subsist | |
vi.生存,存在,供养 | |
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51 betokened | |
v.预示,表示( betoken的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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53 treasury | |
n.宝库;国库,金库;文库 | |
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54 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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55 treasuries | |
n.(政府的)财政部( treasury的名词复数 );国库,金库 | |
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56 scarcity | |
n.缺乏,不足,萧条 | |
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57 folly | |
n.愚笨,愚蠢,蠢事,蠢行,傻话 | |
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58 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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59 enlist | |
vt.谋取(支持等),赢得;征募;vi.入伍 | |
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60 bounties | |
(由政府提供的)奖金( bounty的名词复数 ); 赏金; 慷慨; 大方 | |
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61 compulsory | |
n.强制的,必修的;规定的,义务的 | |
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62 enlistment | |
n.应征入伍,获得,取得 | |
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63 continental | |
adj.大陆的,大陆性的,欧洲大陆的 | |
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64 maritime | |
adj.海的,海事的,航海的,近海的,沿海的 | |
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65 vessels | |
n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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66 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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67 preponderates | |
v.超过,胜过( preponderate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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68 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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69 vigor | |
n.活力,精力,元气 | |
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70 hardy | |
adj.勇敢的,果断的,吃苦的;耐寒的 | |
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71 beset | |
v.镶嵌;困扰,包围 | |
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72 perseverance | |
n.坚持不懈,不屈不挠 | |
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73 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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74 persevering | |
a.坚忍不拔的 | |
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75 awakened | |
v.(使)醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 );(使)觉醒;弄醒;(使)意识到 | |
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76 affluence | |
n.充裕,富足 | |
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77 embellished | |
v.美化( embellish的过去式和过去分词 );装饰;修饰;润色 | |
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78 renown | |
n.声誉,名望 | |
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79 populous | |
adj.人口稠密的,人口众多的 | |
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80 incurred | |
[医]招致的,遭受的; incur的过去式 | |
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81 lapse | |
n.过失,流逝,失效,抛弃信仰,间隔;vi.堕落,停止,失效,流逝;vt.使失效 | |
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82 acquiesces | |
v.默认,默许( acquiesce的第三人称单数 ) | |
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83 acquiesce | |
vi.默许,顺从,同意 | |
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84 subduing | |
征服( subdue的现在分词 ); 克制; 制服; 色变暗 | |
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85 exigencies | |
n.急切需要 | |
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86 conspicuous | |
adj.明眼的,惹人注目的;炫耀的,摆阔气的 | |
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87 surmounting | |
战胜( surmount的现在分词 ); 克服(困难); 居于…之上; 在…顶上 | |
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88 inclinations | |
倾向( inclination的名词复数 ); 倾斜; 爱好; 斜坡 | |
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89 solicit | |
vi.勾引;乞求;vt.请求,乞求;招揽(生意) | |
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90 solicited | |
v.恳求( solicit的过去式和过去分词 );(指娼妇)拉客;索求;征求 | |
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91 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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92 deference | |
n.尊重,顺从;敬意 | |
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93 evading | |
逃避( evade的现在分词 ); 避开; 回避; 想不出 | |
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94 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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95 enacted | |
制定(法律),通过(法案)( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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96 bankruptcies | |
n.破产( bankruptcy的名词复数 );倒闭;彻底失败;(名誉等的)完全丧失 | |
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97 prosecuted | |
a.被起诉的 | |
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98 intensity | |
n.强烈,剧烈;强度;烈度 | |
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99 tolerance | |
n.宽容;容忍,忍受;耐药力;公差 | |
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100 condemns | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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101 duels | |
n.两男子的决斗( duel的名词复数 );竞争,斗争 | |
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102 prosecutions | |
起诉( prosecution的名词复数 ); 原告; 实施; 从事 | |
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103 intoxicating | |
a. 醉人的,使人兴奋的 | |
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104 procure | |
vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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105 expedient | |
adj.有用的,有利的;n.紧急的办法,权宜之计 | |
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106 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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107 regaining | |
复得( regain的现在分词 ); 赢回; 重回; 复至某地 | |
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108 forfeit | |
vt.丧失;n.罚金,罚款,没收物 | |
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109 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
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110 tracts | |
大片土地( tract的名词复数 ); 地带; (体内的)道; (尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的)短文 | |
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111 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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112 impending | |
a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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113 doom | |
n.厄运,劫数;v.注定,命定 | |
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114 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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115 woe | |
n.悲哀,苦痛,不幸,困难;int.用来表达悲伤或惊慌 | |
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116 constraint | |
n.(on)约束,限制;限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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117 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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118 adverted | |
引起注意(advert的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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119 astonishment | |
n.惊奇,惊异 | |
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120 turmoil | |
n.骚乱,混乱,动乱 | |
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121 plunged | |
v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 );暴跌;骤降;突降 | |
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122 insufficient | |
adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
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123 obstinately | |
ad.固执地,顽固地 | |
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124 bent | |
n.爱好,癖好;adj.弯的;决心的,一心的 | |
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125 havoc | |
n.大破坏,浩劫,大混乱,大杂乱 | |
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126 momentary | |
adj.片刻的,瞬息的;短暂的 | |
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127 repose | |
v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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128 exhaustion | |
n.耗尽枯竭,疲惫,筋疲力尽,竭尽,详尽无遗的论述 | |
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129 frenzy | |
n.疯狂,狂热,极度的激动 | |
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130 misery | |
n.痛苦,苦恼,苦难;悲惨的境遇,贫苦 | |
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131 entrusts | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的第三人称单数 ) | |
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132 sect | |
n.派别,宗教,学派,派系 | |
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133 concur | |
v.同意,意见一致,互助,同时发生 | |
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134 bequest | |
n.遗赠;遗产,遗物 | |
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135 controversies | |
争论 | |
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136 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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137 implicate | |
vt.使牵连其中,涉嫌 | |
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138 vicissitudes | |
n.变迁,世事变化;变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 );盛衰兴废 | |
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139 annoyance | |
n.恼怒,生气,烦恼 | |
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140 scrupulously | |
adv.一丝不苟地;小心翼翼地,多顾虑地 | |
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141 belligerent | |
adj.好战的,挑起战争的;n.交战国,交战者 | |
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142 provocation | |
n.激怒,刺激,挑拨,挑衅的事物,激怒的原因 | |
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143 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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144 entangle | |
vt.缠住,套住;卷入,连累 | |
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145 toils | |
网 | |
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146 steer | |
vt.驾驶,为…操舵;引导;vi.驾驶 | |
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147 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
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148 defensive | |
adj.防御的;防卫的;防守的 | |
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149 posture | |
n.姿势,姿态,心态,态度;v.作出某种姿势 | |
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150 habitual | |
adj.习惯性的;通常的,惯常的 | |
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151 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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152 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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153 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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154 repudiate | |
v.拒绝,拒付,拒绝履行 | |
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155 espouse | |
v.支持,赞成,嫁娶 | |
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156 concealed | |
a.隐藏的,隐蔽的 | |
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157 bosom | |
n.胸,胸部;胸怀;内心;adj.亲密的 | |
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158 mingled | |
混合,混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 ); 混进,与…交往[联系] | |
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159 calamities | |
n.灾祸,灾难( calamity的名词复数 );不幸之事 | |
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160 antipathies | |
反感( antipathy的名词复数 ); 引起反感的事物; 憎恶的对象; (在本性、倾向等方面的)不相容 | |
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161 abstaining | |
戒(尤指酒),戒除( abstain的现在分词 ); 弃权(不投票) | |
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162 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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163 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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164 hesitation | |
n.犹豫,踌躇 | |
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165 avowing | |
v.公开声明,承认( avow的现在分词 ) | |
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166 discretion | |
n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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167 compensate | |
vt.补偿,赔偿;酬报 vi.弥补;补偿;抵消 | |
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168 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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169 deficient | |
adj.不足的,不充份的,有缺陷的 | |
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170 diffuse | |
v.扩散;传播;adj.冗长的;四散的,弥漫的 | |
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171 fortifies | |
筑防御工事于( fortify的第三人称单数 ); 筑堡于; 增强; 强化(食品) | |
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172 undertaking | |
n.保证,许诺,事业 | |
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173 persevere | |
v.坚持,坚忍,不屈不挠 | |
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174 secrecy | |
n.秘密,保密,隐蔽 | |
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175 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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176 attains | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的第三人称单数 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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177 contrive | |
vt.谋划,策划;设法做到;设计,想出 | |
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178 propensity | |
n.倾向;习性 | |
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179 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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180 deluge | |
n./vt.洪水,暴雨,使泛滥 | |
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181 inflexible | |
adj.不可改变的,不受影响的,不屈服的 | |
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182 exertions | |
n.努力( exertion的名词复数 );费力;(能力、权力等的)运用;行使 | |
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183 austere | |
adj.艰苦的;朴素的,朴实无华的;严峻的 | |
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184 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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185 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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186 torrent | |
n.激流,洪流;爆发,(话语等的)连发 | |
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187 scruple | |
n./v.顾忌,迟疑 | |
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188 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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189 treacherous | |
adj.不可靠的,有暗藏的危险的;adj.背叛的,背信弃义的 | |
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190 faction | |
n.宗派,小集团;派别;派系斗争 | |
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191 submission | |
n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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192 recollect | |
v.回忆,想起,记起,忆起,记得 | |
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193 biased | |
a.有偏见的 | |
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194 derives | |
v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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