d
[ Congress was finally decided12 to take this step by the conduct of the powerful State of Virginia, whose legislature offered to serve as mediator13 between the union and South Carolina. Hitherto the latter State had appeared to be entirely14 abandoned, even by the States which had joined in her remonstrances15.]
e
[ This law was passed on March 2, 1833.]
f
[ This bill was brought in by Mr. Clay, and it passed in four days through both Houses of Congress by an immense majority.]
But South Carolina did not consent to leave the union in the enjoyment16 of these scanty17 trophies18 of success: the same national Convention which had annulled19 the tariff bill, met again, and accepted the proffered20 concession21; but at the same time it declared it unabated perseverance22 in the doctrine23 of Nullification: and to prove what it said, it annulled the law investing the President with extraordinary powers, although it was very certain that the clauses of that law would never be carried into effect.
Almost all the controversies24 of which I have been speaking have taken place under the Presidency25 of General Jackson; and it cannot be denied that in the question of the tariff he has supported the claims of the union with vigor26 and with skill. I am, however, of opinion that the conduct of the individual who now represents the Federal Government may be reckoned as one of the dangers which threaten its continuance.
Some persons in Europe have formed an opinion of the possible influence of General Jackson upon the affairs of his country, which appears highly extravagant27 to those who have seen more of the subject. We have been told that General Jackson has won sundry28 battles, that he is an energetic man, prone29 by nature and by habit to the use of force, covetous30 of power, and a despot by taste. All this may perhaps be true; but the inferences which have been drawn31 from these truths are exceedingly erroneous. It has been imagined that General Jackson is bent32 on establishing a dictatorship in America, on introducing a military spirit, and on giving a degree of influence to the central authority which cannot but be dangerous to provincial33 liberties. But in America the time for similar undertakings34, and the age for men of this kind, is not yet come: if General Jackson had entertained a hope of exercising his authority in this manner, he would infallibly have forfeited35 his political station, and compromised his life; accordingly he has not been so imprudent as to make any such attempt.
Far from wishing to extend the federal power, the President belongs to the party which is desirous of limiting that power to the bare and precise letter of the Constitution, and which never puts a construction upon that act favorable to the Government of the union; far from standing36 forth37 as the champion of centralization, General Jackson is the agent of all the jealousies38 of the States; and he was placed in the lofty station he occupies by the passions of the people which are most opposed to the central Government. It is by perpetually flattering these passions that he maintains his station and his popularity. General Jackson is the slave of the majority: he yields to its wishes, its propensities39, and its demands; say rather, that he anticipates and forestalls40 them.
Whenever the governments of the States come into collision with that of the union, the President is generally the first to question his own rights: he almost always outstrips41 the legislature; and when the extent of the federal power is controverted42, he takes part, as it were, against himself; he conceals43 his official interests, and extinguishes his own natural inclinations44. Not indeed that he is naturally weak or hostile to the union; for when the majority decided against the claims of the partisans45 of nullification, he put himself at its head, asserted the doctrines46 which the nation held distinctly and energetically, and was the first to recommend forcible measures; but General Jackson appears to me, if I may use the American expressions, to be a Federalist by taste, and a Republican by calculation.
General Jackson stoops to gain the favor of the majority, but when he feels that his popularity is secure, he overthrows47 all obstacles in the pursuit of the objects which the community approves, or of those which it does not look upon with a jealous eye. He is supported by a power with which his predecessors48 were unacquainted; and he tramples49 on his personal enemies whenever they cross his path with a facility which no former President ever enjoyed; he takes upon himself the responsibility of measures which no one before him would have ventured to attempt: he even treats the national representatives with disdain50 approaching to insult; he puts his veto upon the laws of Congress, and frequently neglects to reply to that powerful body. He is a favorite who sometimes treats his master roughly. The power of General Jackson perpetually increases; but that of the President declines; in his hands the Federal Government is strong, but it will pass enfeebled into the hands of his successor.
I am strangely mistaken if the Federal Government of the United States be not constantly losing strength, retiring gradually from public affairs, and narrowing its circle of action more and more. It is naturally feeble, but it now abandons even its pretensions51 to strength. On the other hand, I thought that I remarked a more lively sense of independence, and a more decided attachment52 to provincial government in the States. The union is to subsist53, but to subsist as a shadow; it is to be strong in certain cases, and weak in all others; in time of warfare54, it is to be able to concentrate all the forces of the nation and all the resources of the country in its hands; and in time of peace its existence is to be scarcely perceptible: as if this alternate debility and vigor were natural or possible.
I do not foresee anything for the present which may be able to check this general impulse of public opinion; the causes in which it originated do not cease to operate with the same effect. The change will therefore go on, and it may be predicted that, unless some extraordinary event occurs, the Government of the union will grow weaker and weaker every day.
I think, however, that the period is still remote at which the federal power will be entirely extinguished by its inability to protect itself and to maintain peace in the country. The union is sanctioned by the manners and desires of the people; its results are palpable, its benefits visible. When it is perceived that the weakness of the Federal Government compromises the existence of the union, I do not doubt that a reaction will take place with a view to increase its strength.
The Government of the United States is, of all the federal governments which have hitherto been established, the one which is most naturally destined55 to act. As long as it is only indirectly56 assailed57 by the interpretation58 of its laws, and as long as its substance is not seriously altered, a change of opinion, an internal crisis, or a war, may restore all the vigor which it requires. The point which I have been most anxious to put in a clear light is simply this: Many people, especially in France, imagine that a change in opinion is going on in the United States, which is favorable to a centralization of power in the hands of the President and the Congress. I hold that a contrary tendency may distinctly be observed. So far is the Federal Government from acquiring strength, and from threatening the sovereignty of the States, as it grows older, that I maintain it to be growing weaker and weaker, and that the sovereignty of the union alone is in danger. Such are the facts which the present time discloses. The future conceals the final result of this tendency, and the events which may check, retard59, or accelerate the changes I have described; but I do not affect to be able to remove the veil which hides them from our sight.
Of The Republican Institutions Of The United States, And What Their Chances Of Duration Are
The union is accidental—The Republican institutions have more prospect60 of permanence—A republic for the present the natural state of the Anglo-Americans—Reason of this—In order to destroy it, all the laws must be changed at the same time, and a great alteration61 take place in manners—Difficulties experienced by the Americans in creating an aristocracy.
The dismemberment of the union, by the introduction of war into the heart of those States which are now confederate, with standing armies, a dictatorship, and a heavy taxation62, might, eventually, compromise the fate of the republican institutions. But we ought not to confound the future prospects63 of the republic with those of the union. The union is an accident, which will only last as long as circumstances are favorable to its existence; but a republican form of government seems to me to be the natural state of the Americans; which nothing but the continued action of hostile causes, always acting64 in the same direction, could change into a monarchy65. The union exists principally in the law which formed it; one revolution, one change in public opinion, might destroy it forever; but the republic has a much deeper foundation to rest upon.
What is understood by a republican government in the United States is the slow and quiet action of society upon itself. It is a regular state of things really founded upon the enlightened will of the people. It is a conciliatory government under which resolutions are allowed time to ripen66; and in which they are deliberately67 discussed, and executed with mature judgment68. The republicans in the United States set a high value upon morality, respect religious belief, and acknowledge the existence of rights. They profess69 to think that a people ought to be moral, religious, and temperate70, in proportion as it is free. What is called the republic in the United States, is the tranquil71 rule of the majority, which, after having had time to examine itself, and to give proof of its existence, is the common source of all the powers of the State. But the power of the majority is not of itself unlimited72. In the moral world humanity, justice, and reason enjoy an undisputed supremacy73; in the political world vested rights are treated with no less deference74. The majority recognizes these two barriers; and if it now and then overstep them, it is because, like individuals, it has passions, and, like them, it is prone to do what is wrong, whilst it discerns what is right.
But the demagogues of Europe have made strange discoveries. A republic is not, according to them, the rule of the majority, as has hitherto been thought, but the rule of those who are strenuous75 partisans of the majority. It is not the people who preponderates76 in this kind of government, but those who are best versed77 in the good qualities of the people. A happy distinction, which allows men to act in the name of nations without consulting them, and to claim their gratitude78 whilst their rights are spurned79. A republican government, moreover, is the only one which claims the right of doing whatever it chooses, and despising what men have hitherto respected, from the highest moral obligations to the vulgar rules of common-sense. It had been supposed, until our time, that despotism was odious80, under whatever form it appeared. But it is a discovery of modern days that there are such things as legitimate81 tyranny and holy injustice82, provided they are exercised in the name of the people.
The ideas which the Americans have adopted respecting the republican form of government, render it easy for them to live under it, and insure its duration. If, in their country, this form be often practically bad, at least it is theoretically good; and, in the end, the people always acts in conformity83 to it.
It was impossible at the foundation of the States, and it would still be difficult, to establish a central administration in America. The inhabitants are dispersed84 over too great a space, and separated by too many natural obstacles, for one man to undertake to direct the details of their existence. America is therefore pre-eminently the country of provincial and municipal government. To this cause, which was plainly felt by all the Europeans of the New World, the Anglo-Americans added several others peculiar85 to themselves.
At the time of the settlement of the North American colonies, municipal liberty had already penetrated86 into the laws as well as the manners of the English; and the emigrants87 adopted it, not only as a necessary thing, but as a benefit which they knew how to appreciate. We have already seen the manner in which the colonies were founded: every province, and almost every district, was peopled separately by men who were strangers to each other, or who associated with very different purposes. The English settlers in the United States, therefore, early perceived that they were divided into a great number of small and distinct communities which belonged to no common centre; and that it was needful for each of these little communities to take care of its own affairs, since there did not appear to be any central authority which was naturally bound and easily enabled to provide for them. Thus, the nature of the country, the manner in which the British colonies were founded, the habits of the first emigrants, in short everything, united to promote, in an extraordinary degree, municipal and provincial liberties.
In the United States, therefore, the mass of the institutions of the country is essentially88 republican; and in order permanently89 to destroy the laws which form the basis of the republic, it would be necessary to abolish all the laws at once. At the present day it would be even more difficult for a party to succeed in founding a monarchy in the United States than for a set of men to proclaim that France should henceforward be a republic. Royalty90 would not find a system of legislation prepared for it beforehand; and a monarchy would then exist, really surrounded by republican institutions. The monarchical91 principle would likewise have great difficulty in penetrating92 into the manners of the Americans.
In the United States, the sovereignty of the people is not an isolated93 doctrine bearing no relation to the prevailing94 manners and ideas of the people: it may, on the contrary, be regarded as the last link of a chain of opinions which binds95 the whole Anglo-American world. That Providence96 has given to every human being the degree of reason necessary to direct himself in the affairs which interest him exclusively—such is the grand maxim97 upon which civil and political society rests in the United States. The father of a family applies it to his children; the master to his servants; the township to its officers; the province to its townships; the State to its provinces; the union to the States; and when extended to the nation, it becomes the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people.
Thus, in the United States, the fundamental principle of the republic is the same which governs the greater part of human actions; republican notions insinuate98 themselves into all the ideas, opinions, and habits of the Americans, whilst they are formerly99 recognized by the legislation: and before this legislation can be altered the whole community must undergo very serious changes. In the United States, even the religion of most of the citizens is republican, since it submits the truths of the other world to private judgment: as in politics the care of its temporal interests is abandoned to the good sense of the people. Thus every man is allowed freely to take that road which he thinks will lead him to heaven; just as the law permits every citizen to have the right of choosing his government.
It is evident that nothing but a long series of events, all having the same tendency, can substitute for this combination of laws, opinions, and manners, a mass of opposite opinions, manners, and laws.
If republican principles are to perish in America, they can only yield after a laborious100 social process, often interrupted, and as often resumed; they will have many apparent revivals101, and will not become totally extinct until an entirely new people shall have succeeded to that which now exists. Now, it must be admitted that there is no symptom or presage102 of the approach of such a revolution. There is nothing more striking to a person newly arrived in the United States, than the kind of tumultuous agitation103 in which he finds political society. The laws are incessantly104 changing, and at first sight it seems impossible that a people so variable in its desires should avoid adopting, within a short space of time, a completely new form of government. Such apprehensions105 are, however, premature106; the instability which affects political institutions is of two kinds, which ought not to be confounded: the first, which modifies secondary laws, is not incompatible107 with a very settled state of society; the other shakes the very foundations of the Constitution, and attacks the fundamental principles of legislation; this species of instability is always followed by troubles and revolutions, and the nation which suffers under it is in a state of violent transition.
Experience shows that these two kinds of legislative108 instability have no necessary connection; for they have been found united or separate, according to times and circumstances. The first is common in the United States, but not the second: the Americans often change their laws, but the foundation of the Constitution is respected.
In our days the republican principle rules in America, as the monarchical principle did in France under Louis XIV. The French of that period were not only friends of the monarchy, but they thought it impossible to put anything in its place; they received it as we receive the rays of the sun and the return of the seasons. Amongst them the royal power had neither advocates nor opponents. In like manner does the republican government exist in America, without contention109 or opposition110; without proofs and arguments, by a tacit agreement, a sort of consensus111 universalis. It is, however, my opinion that by changing their administrative112 forms as often as they do, the inhabitants of the United States compromise the future stability of their government.
It may be apprehended that men, perpetually thwarted113 in their designs by the mutability of the legislation, will learn to look upon republican institutions as an inconvenient114 form of society; the evil resulting from the instability of the secondary enactments115 might then raise a doubt as to the nature of the fundamental principles of the Constitution, and indirectly bring about a revolution; but this epoch116 is still very remote.
It may, however, be foreseen even now, that when the Americans lose their republican institutions they will speedily arrive at a despotic government, without a long interval117 of limited monarchy. Montesquieu remarked, that nothing is more absolute than the authority of a prince who immediately succeeds a republic, since the powers which had fearlessly been intrusted to an elected magistrate119 are then transferred to a hereditary120 sovereign. This is true in general, but it is more peculiarly applicable to a democratic republic. In the United States, the magistrates121 are not elected by a particular class of citizens, but by the majority of the nation; they are the immediate118 representatives of the passions of the multitude; and as they are wholly dependent upon its pleasure, they excite neither hatred122 nor fear: hence, as I have already shown, very little care has been taken to limit their influence, and they are left in possession of a vast deal of arbitrary power. This state of things has engendered123 habits which would outlive itself; the American magistrate would retain his power, but he would cease to be responsible for the exercise of it; and it is impossible to say what bounds could then be set to tyranny.
Some of our European politicians expect to see an aristocracy arise in America, and they already predict the exact period at which it will be able to assume the reins124 of government. I have previously125 observed, and I repeat my assertion, that the present tendency of American society appears to me to become more and more democratic. Nevertheless, I do not assert that the Americans will not, at some future time, restrict the circle of political rights in their country, or confiscate126 those rights to the advantage of a single individual; but I cannot imagine that they will ever bestow127 the exclusive exercise of them upon a privileged class of citizens, or, in other words, that they will ever found an aristocracy.
An aristocratic body is composed of a certain number of citizens who, without being very far removed from the mass of the people, are, nevertheless, permanently stationed above it: a body which it is easy to touch and difficult to strike; with which the people are in daily contact, but with which they can never combine. Nothing can be imagined more contrary to nature and to the secret propensities of the human heart than a subjection of this kind; and men who are left to follow their own bent will always prefer the arbitrary power of a king to the regular administration of an aristocracy. Aristocratic institutions cannot subsist without laying down the inequality of men as a fundamental principle, as a part and parcel of the legislation, affecting the condition of the human family as much as it affects that of society; but these are things so repugnant to natural equity128 that they can only be extorted129 from men by constraint130.
I do not think a single people can be quoted, since human society began to exist, which has, by its own free will and by its own exertions131, created an aristocracy within its own bosom132. All the aristocracies of the Middle Ages were founded by military conquest; the conqueror133 was the noble, the vanquished134 became the serf. Inequality was then imposed by force; and after it had been introduced into the manners of the country it maintained its own authority, and was sanctioned by the legislation. Communities have existed which were aristocratic from their earliest origin, owing to circumstances anterior135 to that event, and which became more democratic in each succeeding age. Such was the destiny of the Romans, and of the barbarians136 after them. But a people, having taken its rise in civilization and democracy, which should gradually establish an inequality of conditions, until it arrived at inviolable privileges and exclusive castes, would be a novelty in the world; and nothing intimates that America is likely to furnish so singular an example.
Reflection On The Causes Of The Commercial Prosperity Of The Of The United States
The Americans destined by Nature to be a great maritime137 people—Extent of their coasts—Depth of their ports—Size of their rivers—The commercial superiority of the Anglo-Americans less attributable, however, to physical circumstances than to moral and intellectual causes—Reason of this opinion—Future destiny of the Anglo-Americans as a commercial nation—The dissolution of the union would not check the maritime vigor of the States—Reason of this—Anglo-Americans will naturally supply the wants of the inhabitants of South America—They will become, like the English, the factors of a great portion of the world.
The coast of the United States, from the Bay of Fundy to the Sabine River in the Gulf138 of Mexico, is more than two thousand miles in extent. These shores form an unbroken line, and they are all subject to the same government. No nation in the world possesses vaster, deeper, or more secure ports for shipping139 than the Americans.
The inhabitants of the United States constitute a great civilized140 people, which fortune has placed in the midst of an uncultivated country at a distance of three thousand miles from the central point of civilization. America consequently stands in daily need of European trade. The Americans will, no doubt, ultimately succeed in producing or manufacturing at home most of the articles which they require; but the two continents can never be independent of each other, so numerous are the natural ties which exist between their wants, their ideas, their habits, and their manners.
The union produces peculiar commodities which are now become necessary to us, but which cannot be cultivated, or can only be raised at an enormous expense, upon the soil of Europe. The Americans only consume a small portion of this produce, and they are willing to sell us the rest. Europe is therefore the market of America, as America is the market of Europe; and maritime commerce is no less necessary to enable the inhabitants of the United States to transport their raw materials to the ports of Europe, than it is to enable us to supply them with our manufactured produce. The United States were therefore necessarily reduced to the alternative of increasing the business of other maritime nations to a great extent, if they had themselves declined to enter into commerce, as the Spaniards of Mexico have hitherto done; or, in the second place, of becoming one of the first trading powers of the globe.
The Anglo-Americans have always displayed a very decided taste for the sea. The Declaration of Independence broke the commercial restrictions141 which united them to England, and gave a fresh and powerful stimulus142 to their maritime genius. Ever since that time, the shipping of the union has increased in almost the same rapid proportion as the number of its inhabitants. The Americans themselves now transport to their own shores nine-tenths of the European produce which they consume. *g And they also bring three-quarters of the exports of the New World to the European consumer. *h The ships of the United States fill the docks of Havre and of Liverpool; whilst the number of English and French vessels143 which are to be seen at New York is comparatively small. *i
g
[ The total value of goods imported during the year which ended on September 30, 1832, was $101,129,266. The value of the cargoes144 of foreign vessels did not amount to $10,731,039, or about one-tenth of the entire sum.]
h
[ The value of goods exported during the same year amounted to $87,176,943; the value of goods exported by foreign vessels amounted to $21,036,183, or about one quarter of the whole sum. (Williams's "Register," 1833, p. 398.)]
i
[ The tonnage of the vessels which entered all the ports of the union in the years 1829, 1830, and 1831, amounted to 3,307,719 tons, of which 544,571 tons were foreign vessels; they stood, therefore, to the American vessels in a ratio of about 16 to 100. ("National Calendar," 1833, p. 304.) The tonnage of the English vessels which entered the ports of London, Liverpool, and Hull145, in the years 1820, 1826, and 1831, amounted to 443,800 tons. The foreign vessels which entered the same ports during the same years amounted to 159,431 tons. The ratio between them was, therefore, about 36 to 100. ("Companion to the Almanac," 1834, p. 169.) In the year 1832 the ratio between the foreign and British ships which entered the ports of Great Britain was 29 to 100. [These statements relate to a condition of affairs which has ceased to exist; the Civil War and the heavy taxation of the United States entirely altered the trade and navigation of the country.]]
Thus, not only does the American merchant face the competition of his own countrymen, but he even supports that of foreign nations in their own ports with success. This is readily explained by the fact that the vessels of the United States can cross the seas at a cheaper rate than any other vessels in the world. As long as the mercantile shipping of the United States preserves this superiority, it will not only retain what it has acquired, but it will constantly increase in prosperity.
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1 militia | |
n.民兵,民兵组织 | |
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2 suppliant | |
adj.哀恳的;n.恳求者,哀求者 | |
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3 tariff | |
n.关税,税率;(旅馆、饭店等)价目表,收费表 | |
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4 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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5 fiscal | |
adj.财政的,会计的,国库的,国库岁入的 | |
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6 impost | |
n.进口税,关税 | |
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7 conceal | |
v.隐藏,隐瞒,隐蔽 | |
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8 expedient | |
adj.有用的,有利的;n.紧急的办法,权宜之计 | |
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9 Vogue | |
n.时髦,时尚;adj.流行的 | |
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10 inflexible | |
adj.不可改变的,不受影响的,不屈服的 | |
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11 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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12 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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13 mediator | |
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14 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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15 remonstrances | |
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16 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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17 scanty | |
adj.缺乏的,仅有的,节省的,狭小的,不够的 | |
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18 trophies | |
n.(为竞赛获胜者颁发的)奖品( trophy的名词复数 );奖杯;(尤指狩猎或战争中获得的)纪念品;(用于比赛或赛跑名称)奖 | |
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19 annulled | |
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20 proffered | |
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21 concession | |
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22 perseverance | |
n.坚持不懈,不屈不挠 | |
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23 doctrine | |
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24 controversies | |
争论 | |
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25 presidency | |
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26 vigor | |
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27 extravagant | |
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28 sundry | |
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29 prone | |
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30 covetous | |
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31 drawn | |
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32 bent | |
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33 provincial | |
adj.省的,地方的;n.外省人,乡下人 | |
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34 undertakings | |
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35 forfeited | |
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36 standing | |
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37 forth | |
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38 jealousies | |
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39 propensities | |
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40 forestalls | |
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41 outstrips | |
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43 conceals | |
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44 inclinations | |
倾向( inclination的名词复数 ); 倾斜; 爱好; 斜坡 | |
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45 partisans | |
游击队员( partisan的名词复数 ); 党人; 党羽; 帮伙 | |
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46 doctrines | |
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47 overthrows | |
n.推翻,终止,结束( overthrow的名词复数 )v.打倒,推翻( overthrow的第三人称单数 );使终止 | |
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48 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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49 tramples | |
踩( trample的第三人称单数 ); 践踏; 无视; 侵犯 | |
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50 disdain | |
n.鄙视,轻视;v.轻视,鄙视,不屑 | |
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51 pretensions | |
自称( pretension的名词复数 ); 自命不凡; 要求; 权力 | |
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52 attachment | |
n.附属物,附件;依恋;依附 | |
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53 subsist | |
vi.生存,存在,供养 | |
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54 warfare | |
n.战争(状态);斗争;冲突 | |
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55 destined | |
adj.命中注定的;(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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56 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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57 assailed | |
v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 );困扰;质问;毅然应对 | |
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58 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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59 retard | |
n.阻止,延迟;vt.妨碍,延迟,使减速 | |
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60 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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61 alteration | |
n.变更,改变;蚀变 | |
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62 taxation | |
n.征税,税收,税金 | |
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63 prospects | |
n.希望,前途(恒为复数) | |
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64 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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65 monarchy | |
n.君主,最高统治者;君主政体,君主国 | |
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66 ripen | |
vt.使成熟;vi.成熟 | |
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67 deliberately | |
adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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68 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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69 profess | |
v.声称,冒称,以...为业,正式接受入教,表明信仰 | |
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70 temperate | |
adj.温和的,温带的,自我克制的,不过分的 | |
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71 tranquil | |
adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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72 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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73 supremacy | |
n.至上;至高权力 | |
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74 deference | |
n.尊重,顺从;敬意 | |
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75 strenuous | |
adj.奋发的,使劲的;紧张的;热烈的,狂热的 | |
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76 preponderates | |
v.超过,胜过( preponderate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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77 versed | |
adj. 精通,熟练 | |
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78 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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79 spurned | |
v.一脚踢开,拒绝接受( spurn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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80 odious | |
adj.可憎的,讨厌的 | |
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81 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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82 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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83 conformity | |
n.一致,遵从,顺从 | |
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84 dispersed | |
adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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85 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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86 penetrated | |
adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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87 emigrants | |
n.(从本国移往他国的)移民( emigrant的名词复数 ) | |
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88 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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89 permanently | |
adv.永恒地,永久地,固定不变地 | |
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90 royalty | |
n.皇家,皇族 | |
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91 monarchical | |
adj. 国王的,帝王的,君主的,拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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92 penetrating | |
adj.(声音)响亮的,尖锐的adj.(气味)刺激的adj.(思想)敏锐的,有洞察力的 | |
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93 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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94 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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95 binds | |
v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 );装订;捆绑;(用长布条)缠绕 | |
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96 providence | |
n.深谋远虑,天道,天意;远见;节约;上帝 | |
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97 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
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98 insinuate | |
vt.含沙射影地说,暗示 | |
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99 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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100 laborious | |
adj.吃力的,努力的,不流畅 | |
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101 revivals | |
n.复活( revival的名词复数 );再生;复兴;(老戏多年后)重新上演 | |
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102 presage | |
n.预感,不祥感;v.预示 | |
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103 agitation | |
n.搅动;搅拌;鼓动,煽动 | |
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104 incessantly | |
ad.不停地 | |
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105 apprehensions | |
疑惧 | |
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106 premature | |
adj.比预期时间早的;不成熟的,仓促的 | |
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107 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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108 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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109 contention | |
n.争论,争辩,论战;论点,主张 | |
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110 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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111 consensus | |
n.(意见等的)一致,一致同意,共识 | |
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112 administrative | |
adj.行政的,管理的 | |
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113 thwarted | |
阻挠( thwart的过去式和过去分词 ); 使受挫折; 挫败; 横过 | |
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114 inconvenient | |
adj.不方便的,令人感到麻烦的 | |
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115 enactments | |
n.演出( enactment的名词复数 );展现;规定;通过 | |
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116 epoch | |
n.(新)时代;历元 | |
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117 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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118 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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119 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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120 hereditary | |
adj.遗传的,遗传性的,可继承的,世袭的 | |
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121 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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122 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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123 engendered | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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124 reins | |
感情,激情; 缰( rein的名词复数 ); 控制手段; 掌管; (成人带着幼儿走路以防其走失时用的)保护带 | |
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125 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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126 confiscate | |
v.没收(私人财产),把…充公 | |
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127 bestow | |
v.把…赠与,把…授予;花费 | |
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128 equity | |
n.公正,公平,(无固定利息的)股票 | |
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129 extorted | |
v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 );曲解 | |
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130 constraint | |
n.(on)约束,限制;限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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131 exertions | |
n.努力( exertion的名词复数 );费力;(能力、权力等的)运用;行使 | |
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132 bosom | |
n.胸,胸部;胸怀;内心;adj.亲密的 | |
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133 conqueror | |
n.征服者,胜利者 | |
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134 vanquished | |
v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 );战胜;克服;抑制 | |
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135 anterior | |
adj.较早的;在前的 | |
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136 barbarians | |
n.野蛮人( barbarian的名词复数 );外国人;粗野的人;无教养的人 | |
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137 maritime | |
adj.海的,海事的,航海的,近海的,沿海的 | |
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138 gulf | |
n.海湾;深渊,鸿沟;分歧,隔阂 | |
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139 shipping | |
n.船运(发货,运输,乘船) | |
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140 civilized | |
a.有教养的,文雅的 | |
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141 restrictions | |
约束( restriction的名词复数 ); 管制; 制约因素; 带限制性的条件(或规则) | |
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142 stimulus | |
n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物 | |
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143 vessels | |
n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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144 cargoes | |
n.(船或飞机装载的)货物( cargo的名词复数 );大量,重负 | |
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145 hull | |
n.船身;(果、实等的)外壳;vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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