One of the greatest difficulties, one of the most fertile sources of misunderstanding, controversy5, and error, here presents itself to us at the very threshold of the science—
What is wealth?
Are we rich in proportion to the utilities which we have at our disposal,—that is, in proportion to the wants and desires which we have the means of satisfying? “A man is rich or poor,” says Adam Smith, “according as he possesses a greater or smaller amount of useful commodities which minister to his enjoyments7.”
Are we rich in proportion to the values which we possess,—that is to say, the services which we can command? “Wealth,” says J. B. Say, “is in proportion to Value. It is great if the sum of the value of which it is composed is great—it is small if the value be small.”
The vulgar employ the word Wealth in two senses. Sometimes we hear them say—“The abundance of water is Wealth to such a country.” In this case, they are thinking only of utility. But when one wishes to reckon up his own wealth, he makes what is called an Inventory9, in which only commercial Value is taken into account.
With deference10 to the savants, I believe that the vulgar are [p181] right for once. Wealth is either actual or relative. In the first point of view, we judge of it by our satisfactions. Mankind become richer in proportion as they acquire a greater amount of ease or material prosperity, whatever be the commodities by which it is procured11. But do you wish to know what proportional share each man has in the general prosperity; in other words, his relative wealth? This is simply a relation, which value alone reveals, because value is itself a relation.
Our science has to do with the general welfare and prosperity of men, with the proportion which exists between their Efforts and their Satisfactions,—a proportion which the progressive participation12 of gratuitous utility in the business of production modifies advantageously. You cannot, then, exclude this element from the idea of Wealth. In a scientific point of view, actual or effective wealth is not the sum of values, but the aggregate13 of the utilities, gratuitous and onerous, which are attached to these values. As regards satisfactions,—that is to say, as regards actual results of wealth, we are as much enriched by the value annihilated14 by progress as by that which still subsists16.
In the ordinary transactions of life, we cease to take utility into account, in proportion as that utility becomes gratuitous by the lowering of value. Why? because what is gratuitous is common, and what is common alters in no respect each man’s share or proportion of actual or effective wealth. We do not exchange what is common to all; and as in our every-day transactions we only require to be made acquainted with the proportion which value establishes, we take no account of anything else.
This subject gave rise to a controversy between Ricardo and J. B. Say. Ricardo gave to the word Wealth the sense of Utility—Say, that of Value. The exclusive triumph of one of these champions was impossible, since the word admits of both senses, according as we regard wealth as actual or relative.
But it is necessary to remark, and the more so on account of the great authority of Say in these matters, that if we confound wealth (in the sense of actual or effective prosperity) with value; above all, if we affirm that the one is proportional to the other, we shall be apt to give the science a wrong direction. The works of second-rate Economists17, and those of the Socialists20, show this but too clearly. To set out by concealing21 from view precisely22 that which forms the fairest patrimony23 of the human race, is an unfortunate beginning. It leads us to consider as annihilated that portion of wealth which progress renders common to all, and exposes us to the danger of falling into a petitio principii, and studying [p182] Political Economy backwards,—the end, the design, which it is our object to attain24, being perpetually confounded with the obstacle which impedes25 our efforts.
In truth, but for the existence of obstacles, there could be no such thing as Value, which is the sign, the symptom, the witness, the proof of our native weakness. It reminds us incessantly27 of the decree which went forth28 in the beginning—“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.” With reference to Omnipotence29, the words Effort, Service, and, consequently, Value, have no meaning. As regards ourselves, we live in an atmosphere of utilities, of which utilities the greater part are gratuitous, but there are others which we can acquire only by an onerous title. Obstacles are interposed between these utilities and the wants to which they minister. We are condemned30 either to forego the Utility, or vanquish31 these obstacles by Efforts. Sweat must drop from the brow before bread can be eaten, whether the toil32 be undergone by ourselves or by others for our benefit.
The greater the amount of value we find existing in a country, the greater evidence we have that obstacles have been surmounted34, but the greater evidence we also have that there are obstacles to surmount33. Are we to go so far as to say that these obstacles constitute Wealth, because, apart from them, Value would have no existence?
We may suppose two countries. One of them possesses the means of enjoyment6 to a greater extent than the other with a less amount of Value, because it is favoured by nature, and it has fewer obstacles to overcome. Which is the richer?
Or, to put a stronger case, let us suppose the same people at different periods of their history. The obstacles to be overcome are the same at both periods. But, now-a-days, they surmount these obstacles with so much greater facility; they execute, for instance, the work of transport, of tillage, of manufactures, at so much less an expense of effort that values are considerably35 reduced. There are two courses, then, which a people in such a situation may take,—they may content themselves with the same amount of enjoyments as formerly,—progress in that case resolving itself simply into the attainment36 of additional leisure; and, in such circumstances, should we be authorized37 to say that the Wealth of the society had retrograded because it is possessed38 of a smaller amount of value? Or, they may devote the efforts which progress and improvement have rendered disposable to the increase and extension of their enjoyments; but should we be warranted to conclude that, because the amount of values had remained [p183] stationary39, the wealth of the society had remained stationary also? It is to this result, however, that we tend if we confound the two things, Riches and Value.
Political Economists may here find themselves in a dilemma40. Are we to measure wealth by Satisfactions realized, or by Values created?
Were no obstacles interposed between utilities and desires, there would be neither efforts, nor services, nor Values in our case, any more than in that of God and nature. In such circumstances, were wealth estimated by the satisfactions realized, mankind, like nature, would be in possession of infinite riches; but, if estimated by the values created, they would be deprived of wealth altogether. An economist18 who adopted the first view might pronounce us infinitely41 rich,—another, who adopted the second view, might pronounce us infinitely poor.
The infinite, it is true, is in no respect an attribute of humanity. But mankind direct their exertions43 to certain ends; they make efforts, they have tendencies, they gravitate towards progressive Wealth or progressive Poverty. Now, how could Economists make themselves mutually intelligible44 if this successive diminution45 of effort in relation to result, of labour to be undergone or to be remunerated; in a word, if this successive diminution of Value were considered by some of them as a progress towards Wealth, and by others as a descent towards Poverty?
Did the difficulty, indeed, concern only Economists, we might say, let them settle the matter among themselves. But legislators and governments have every day to introduce measures which exercise a serious influence on human affairs; and in what condition should we be if these measures were taken in the absence of that light which enables us to distinguish Riches from Poverty?
I affirm that the theory which defines Wealth as Value is only the glorification46 of Obstacles. Its syllogism47 is this: “Wealth is in proportion to Value, value to efforts, efforts to obstacles; ergo, wealth is in proportion to obstacles.” I affirm also that, by reason of the division of labour, which includes the case of every one who exercises a trade or profession, the illusion thus created is very difficult to be got rid of. We all of us see that the services which we render are called forth by some obstacle, some want, some suffering,—those of the physician by disease, those of the agricultural labourer by hunger, those of the manufacturer of clothing by cold, those of the carrier by distance, those of the advocate by injustice48, those of the soldier by danger to his country. There is not, in fact, a single obstacle, the disappearance49 of which does not [p184] prove very inopportune and very troublesome to somebody, or which does not even appear fatal in a public point of view, because it seems to dry up a source of employment, of services, of values, of wealth. Very few Economists have been able to preserve themselves entirely50 from this illusion; and if the science shall ever succeed in dispelling51 it, its practical mission will have been fulfilled. For I venture to make a third affirmation—namely, that our official practice is saturated52 with this theory, and that when governments believe it to be their duty to favour certain classes, certain professions, or certain manufactures, they have no other mode of accomplishing their object than by setting up Obstacles, in order to give to particular branches of industry additional development, in order to enlarge artificially the circle of services to which the community is forced to have recourse,—and thus to increase Value, falsely assumed as synonymous with Wealth.
And, in fact, it is quite true that such legislation is useful to the classes which are favoured by it—they exult53 in it—congratulate each other upon it,—and what is the consequence? Why this, that the same favours are successively accorded to all other classes.
What more natural than to confound Utility with Value, and Value with Riches! The science has never encountered a snare54 which she has less suspected. For what has happened? At every step of progress the reasoning has been this: “The obstacle is diminished, then effort is lessened55, then value is lessened, then utility is lessened, then wealth is lessened,—then we are the most unfortunate people in the world to have taken it into our heads to invent and exchange, to have five fingers in place of three, and two hands in place of one; and then it is necessary to engage government, which is in possession of force, to take order with this abuse.”
This Political Economy à rebours—this Political Economy read backwards—is the staple56 of many of our journals, and the life of legislative57 assemblies. It has misled the candid58 and philanthropic Sismondi, and we find it very logically set forth in the work of M. de Saint-Chamans.
“There are two kinds of national wealth,” he tells us. “If we have regard only to useful products with reference to their quantity, their abundance, we have to do with a species of wealth which procures59 enjoyments to society, and which I shall denominate the Wealth of enjoyment.
“If we regard products with reference to their exchangeable Value, or simply with reference to their value, we have to do with [p185] a species of Wealth which procures values to society, and which I call the Wealth of value.
“It is this last species of Wealth which forms the special subject of Political Economy, and it is with it, above all, that governments have to do.”
This being so, how are Economists and Statesmen to proceed? The first are to point out the means of increasing this species of riches, this wealth of value; the second to set about adopting these means.
But this kind of wealth bears proportion to efforts, and efforts bear proportion to obstacles. Political Economy, then, is to teach, and Government to contrive60, how to multiply obstacles. M. de Saint-Chamans does not flinch61 in the least from this consequence.
Does exchange facilitate our acquiring more of the wealth of enjoyment with less of the wealth of value? We must, then, counteract62 this tendency of exchange.39
Is there any portion of gratuitous Utility which we can replace by onerous Utility; for example, by prohibiting the use of a tool or a machine? We must not fail to do so; for it is very evident, he says, that if machinery63 augments64 the wealth of enjoyment, it diminishes the wealth of value. “Let us bless the obstacles which the dearness and scarcity65 of fuel in this country has opposed to the multiplication66 of steam-engines.”40
Has nature favoured us in any particular respect? It is our misfortune; for, by that means, we are deprived of the opportunity of exerting ourselves. “I avow67 that I could desire to see manufactured by manual labour, forced exertion42, and the sweat of the brow, things that are now produced without trouble and spontaneously.”41
What a misfortune, then, is it for us that we are not obliged to manufacture the water which we drink! It would have been a fine opportunity of producing the wealth of value. Happily we take our revenge upon wine. “Discover the secret of drawing wine from springs in the earth as abundantly as you draw water, and you will soon see that this fine order of things will ruin a fourth part of France.”42
According to the ideas which this Economist sets forth with such na?veté, there are many methods, and very simple methods too, of obliging men to create what he terms the wealth of value.
The first is to deprive them of what they have. “If taxation68 [p186] lays held of money where it is plentiful69, to distribute it where it is scarce, it is useful, and far from being a loss, it is a gain, to the state.”43
The second is to dissipate what you take. “Luxury and prodigality70, which are so hurtful to individual fortunes, benefit public wealth. You teach me a fine moral lesson, it may be said—I have no such pretension—my business is with Political Economy, and not with morals. You seek the means of rendering71 nations richer, and I preach up luxury.”44
A more prompt method still is to destroy the wealth which you take from the tax-payer by good sweeping72 wars. “If you grant me that the expenditure73 of prodigals74 is as productive as any other, and that the expenditure of governments is equally productive, . . . you will no longer be astonished at the wealth of England after so expensive a war.”45
But, as tending to promote the creation of this Wealth of value, all these means—taxes, luxury, wars—must hide their diminished heads before an expedient75 infinitely more efficacious—namely, conflagration76.
“To build is a great source of wealth, because it supplies revenues to proprietors77, who furnish the materials, to workmen, and to divers78 classes of artisans and artists. Melon cites Sir William Petty, who regards, as a national profit, the labour employed in rebuilding the streets of London after the great fire which consumed two-thirds of the city, and he estimates it (the profit!) at a million sterling79 per annum (in money of 1666) during four years, and this without the least injury having been done to other branches of trade. Without regarding this pecuniary80 estimate of profit as quite accurate,” adds M. de Saint-Chamans, “it is certain at least that this event had no detrimental81 effect upon the wealth of England at that period. . . . The result stated by Sir W. Petty is not impossible, seeing that the necessity of rebuilding London must have created a large amount of new revenues.”46
All Economists, who set out by confounding wealth with value, must infallibly arrive at the same conclusions, if they are logical; but they are not logical; for on the road of absurdity82 men of any common sense always sooner or later stop short. M. de Saint-Chamans seems himself to recede83 a little before the consequences of his principle, when it lands him in a eulogium on conflagration. We see that he hesitates, and contents himself with a negative panegyric84. He should have carried out his principle to [p187] its logical conclusions, and told us roundly what he so clearly indicates.
Of all our Economists, M. de Sismondi has succumbed85 to the difficulty now under consideration in the manner most to be regretted. Like M. de Saint-Chamans, he set out with the idea that value forms an element of wealth; and, like him, he has built upon this datum86 a Political Economy à rebours, denouncing everything which tends to diminish value. Sismondi, like Saint-Chamans, exalts87 obstacles, proscribes88 machinery, anathematizes exchange, competition, and liberty, extols89 luxury and taxation, and arrives at length at this conclusion, that the more we possess the poorer we become.47
From beginning to end of his work, however, M. de Sismondi seems to have a lurking90 consciousness that he is mistaken, and that a dark veil may have interposed itself between his mind and the truth. He does not venture, like M. de Saint-Chamans, to announce roughly and bluntly the consequences of his principle—he hesitates, and is troubled. He asks himself sometimes if it is possible that all men from the beginning of the world have been in error, and on the road to self-destruction, in seeking to diminish the proportion which Effort bears to Satisfaction,—that is to say, value. At once the friend and the enemy of liberty, he fears it, since the abundance which depreciates91 value leads to universal poverty, and yet he knows not how to set about the destruction of this fatal liberty. He thus arrives at the confines of socialism and artificial organization, and insinuates92 that government and science should regulate and control everything. Then he sees the danger of the advice he is giving, retracts93 it, and ends by falling into despair, exclaiming—“Liberty leads to the abyss of poverty—Constraint is as impossible as it is useless—there is no escape.” In truth and reality, there is none, if Value be Riches; in other words, if the obstacle to prosperity be prosperity itself,—that is to say, if Evil be Good.
The latest writer, as far as I know, who has stirred this question [p188] is M. Proudhon. It made the fortune of his book, Des Contradictions économiques. Never was there a finer opportunity of seizing a paradox94 by the forelock, and snapping his fingers at science. Never was there a fairer occasion of asking—“Do you see in the increase of value a good or an evil? Quidquid dixeris argumentabor.” Just think what a treat!48
“I call upon any earnest Economist to explain to me, otherwise than by varying and repeating the question, why value diminishes in proportion as production increases, and vice4 versa. . . . In technical phrase, value in use and value in exchange, although necessary to each other, are in an inverse95 ratio to each other. . . . . Value in use and value in exchange remain, then, fatally enchained, although in their own nature they tend to exclude each other.”
“For this contradiction, which is inherent in the notion of value, no cause can be assigned, nor is any explanation of it possible. . . From the data, that man has need of a great variety of commodities, and that he must provide them by his labour, the necessary conclusion is, that there exists an antagonism96 between value in use and value in exchange, and from this antagonism a contradiction arises at the very threshold of Political Economy. No amount of intelligence, no agency, divine or human, can make it otherwise. In place, then, of beating about for a useless explanation, let us content ourselves with pointing out clearly the necessity of the contradiction.”
We know that the grand discovery of M. Proudhon is, that everything is at once true and false, good and bad, legitimate97 and illegitimate, that there exits no principle which is not self-contradictory98, and that contradiction lurks99 not only in erroneous theories, but in the very essence of things,—“it is the pure expression of necessity, the peculiar100 law of existence,” etc.; so that it is inevitable101, and would be incurable102, rationally, but for progression, and, practically, but for the Banque du Peuple. Nature is a contradiction, liberty a contradiction, competition a contradiction, property a contradiction,—value, credit, monopoly, community, all contradictions. When M. Proudhon achieved this wonderful discovery his heart must have leaped for joy; for since contradiction is everywhere and in everything, he can never want something to gainsay103, which for him is the supreme104 good. He said to me one day, “I should rather like to go to heaven, but I [p189] fear that everybody there will be of one mind, and I should find nobody to argue with.”
We must confess that the subject of Value gave him an excellent opportunity of indulging his taste. But, with great deference to him, the contradictions and paradoxes105 to which the word Value has given rise are to be found in the false theories which have been constructed, and not at all, as he would have us believe, in the nature of things.
Theorists have set out, in the first instance, by confounding Value with Utility,—that is to say, evil with good; for utility is the desired result, and value springs from the obstacle which is interposed between the desire and the result. This was their first error, and, when they perceived the consequences of it, they thought to obviate106 the difficulty by imagining a distinction between value in use and value in exchange—an unwieldy tautology107, which had the great fault of attaching the same word—Value—to two opposite phenomena108.
But if, putting aside these subtilties, we adhere strictly109 to facts, what do we perceive? Nothing, assuredly, but what is quite natural and consistent.
A man, we shall suppose, works exclusively for himself. If he acquire skill, if his force and intelligence are developed, if nature becomes more liberal, or if he learns how to make nature co-operate better in his work, he obtains more wealth with less trouble. Where is the contradiction, and what is there in this to excite so much wonder?
Well, then, in place of remaining an isolated110 being, suppose this man to have relations with his fellow-men. They exchange; and I repeat my observation,—in proportion as they acquire skill, experience, force, and intelligence,—in proportion as nature (become more liberal or brought more into subjection) lends them more efficacious co-operation, they obtain more wealth with less trouble; they have at their disposal a greater amount of gratuitous utility; in their transactions they transfer to one another a greater sum of useful results in proportion to a given amount of labour. Where, then, is the contradiction?
If, indeed, following the example of Adam Smith and his successors, you commit the error of applying the same denomination—value—both to the results obtained and to the exertion made; in that case, an antinomy or contradiction will show itself. But be assured that that contradiction is not at all in the facts, but in your own erroneous explanation of those facts.
M. Proudhon ought, then, to have shaped his proposition thus: [p190] It being granted that man has need of a great variety of products, that he can only obtain them by his labour, and that he has the precious gift of educating and improving himself, nothing in the world is more natural than the sustained increase of results in relation to efforts; and there is nothing at all contradictory in a given value serving as the vehicle of a greater amount of realized utility.
Let me repeat, once more, that for man Utility is the fair side of the medal and Value the reverse. Utility has relation only to our Satisfactions, Value only with our Pains. Utility realizes our enjoyments, and is proportioned to them; Value attests111 our native weakness, springs from obstacles, and is proportioned to those Obstacles.
In virtue112 of the law of human perfectibility, gratuitous utility tends more and more to take the place of onerous utility, expressed by the word value. Such is the phenomenon, and it presents assuredly nothing contradictory.
But the question recurs—Should the word Wealth comprehend these two kinds of utility united, or only the last?
If we could form, once for all, two classes of utilities, putting on the one side all those which are gratuitous, and on the other all those which are onerous, we should form, at the same time, two classes of Wealth, which we should denominate, with M. Say, Natural Wealth and Social Wealth; or else, with M. de Saint-Chamans, the Wealth of Enjoyment and the Wealth of Value; after which, as these authors propose, we should have nothing mere113 to do with the first of these classes.
“Things which are accessible to all,” says M. Say, “and which everyone may enjoy at pleasure, without being forced to acquire them, and without the fear of exhausting them, such as air, water, the light of the sun, etc., are the gratuitous gifts of nature, and may be denominated Natural Wealth. As these can be neither produced nor distributed, nor consumed by us, they come not within the domain114 of Political Economy.
“The things which this science has to do with are things which we possess, and which have a recognised value. These we denominate Social Wealth, because they exist only among men united in society.”
“It is the Wealth of Value,” says M. de Saint-Chamans, “which forms the special subject of Political Economy, and whenever in this work I mention Wealth without being more specific, I mean that description of it.”
Nearly all Economists have taken the same view. [p191]
“The most striking distinction,” says Storch, “which presents itself in the outset, is, that there are certain kinds of value which are capable of appropriation115, and other kinds which are not so.49 The first alone are the subject of Political Economy, for the analysis of the others would furnish no result worthy116 of the attention of the statesman.”
For my own part, I think that that portion of utility which, in the progress of society, ceases to be onerous and to possess value, but which does not on that account cease to be utility, and is about to fall into the domain of the common and gratuitous, is precisely that which should constantly attract the attention of the statesman and of the Economist. If it do not, in place of penetrating117 and comprehending the great results which affect and elevate the human race, the science will be left to deal with what is quite contingent118 and flexible—with what has a tendency to diminish, if not to disappear—with a relation merely; in a word, with Value. Without being aware of it, Economists are thus led to consider only labour, obstacles, and the interest of the producer; and, what is worse, they are led to confound the interest of the producer with the interest of the public,—that is to say, to mistake evil for good, and, under the guidance of the Sismondis and Saint-Chamans, to land at length in the Utopia of the socialists, or the Système des Contradictions of Proudhon.
And, then, is not this line of demarcation, which you attempt to draw between the two descriptions of utility, chimerical119, arbitrary, and impossible? How can you thus disjoin the co-operation of nature and that of man when they combine and get mixed up everywhere, much more when the one tends constantly to replace the other, which is precisely what constitutes progress? If economical science, so dry in some respects, in other aspects elevates and fascinates the mind, it is just because it describes the laws of this association between man and nature,—it is because it shows gratuitous utility substituting itself more and more for onerous utility, enjoyments bearing a greater and greater proportion to labour and fatigue120, obstacles constantly lessening121, and, along with them, value; the perpetual mistakes and miscalculations of producers more than compensated122 by the increasing prosperity of consumers; natural wealth, gratuitous and common, coming more and more to take the place of wealth which is personal and appropriated. What! are we to exclude from Political Economy what constitutes its religious Harmony? [p192]
Air, light, water, are gratuitous, you say. True, and if we enjoyed them under their primitive123 form, without making them co-operate in any of our works, we might exclude them from Political Economy just as we exclude from it the possible and probable utility of comets. But observe the progress of man. At first he is able to make air, light, water, and other natural agents co-operate very imperfectly. His satisfactions were purchased by laborious124 personal efforts, they exacted a large amount of labour, and they were transferred to others as important services; in a word, they were possessed of great value. By degrees, this water, this air, this light, gravitation, elasticity125, calorie, electricity, vegetable life, have abandoned this state of relative inactivity. They mingle126 more and more with our industry. They are substituted for human labour. They do for us gratuitously127 what labour does only for an onerous consideration. They annihilate15 value without diminishing our enjoyments. To speak in common language, what cost us a hundred francs, costs us only ten—what required ten days’ labour now demands only one. The whole value thus annihilated has passed from the domain of Property to that of Community. A considerable proportion of human efforts has been set free, and placed at our disposal for other enterprises; so that with equal labour, equal services, equal value, mankind have enlarged prodigiously128 the circle of their enjoyments; and yet you tell me that I must eliminate and banish129 from the science this utility, which is gratuitous and common, which alone explains progress, as well upward as forward, if I may so speak, as well in wealth and prosperity as in freedom and equality!
We may, then, legitimately130 attach to the word Wealth two meanings.
Effective Wealth, real, and realizing satisfactions, or the aggregate of utilities which human labour, aided by the co-operation of natural agents, places within the reach of Society.
Relative Wealth,—that is to say, the proportional share of each in the general Riches, a share which is determined131 by Value.
This Economic Harmony, then, may be thus stated:
By labour the action of man is combined with the action of nature.
Utility results from that co-operation.
Each man receives a share of the general utility proportioned to the value he has created,—that is to say, to the services he has rendered; in other words, to the utility he has himself produced.50 [p193]
Morality of Wealth.—We have just been engaged in studying wealth in an economical point of view; it may not perhaps be useless to say something here of its Moral effects.
In all ages, wealth, in a moral point of view, has been the subject of controversy. Certain philosophers and certain religionists have commanded us to despise it; others have greatly prided themselves on the golden mean, aurea mediocritas. Few, if any, have admitted as moral an ardent132 longing133 after the goods of fortune.
Which are right? Which are wrong? It does not belong to Political Economy to treat of individual morality. I shall make only one remark: I am always inclined to think that in matters which lie within the domain of everyday practice, theorists, savants, philosophers, are much less likely to be right than this universal practice itself, when we include in the meaning of the word practice, not only the actions of the generality of men, but their sentiments and ideas.
Now, what does universal practice demonstrate in this case? It shows us all men endeavouring to emerge from their original state of poverty,—all preferring the sensation of satisfaction to the sensation of want, riches to poverty; all, I should say, or almost all, without excepting even those who declaim against wealth.
The desire for wealth is ardent, incessant26, universal, irrepressible. In almost every part of the globe it has triumphed over our natural aversion to toil. Whatever may be said to the contrary, it displays a character of avidity still baser among savage134 than among civilized135 nations. All our navigators who left Europe in the eighteenth century, imbued136 with the fashionable ideas of Rousseau, and expecting to find the men of nature at the antipodes disinterested137, generous, hospitable138, were struck with the devouring139 rapacity140 of these primitive barbarians141. Our military men can tell us, in our own day, what we are to think of the boasted disinterestedness142 of the Arab tribes.
On the other hand, the opinions of all men, even of those who do not act up to their opinions, concur143 in honouring disinterestedness, generosity144, self-control, and in branding that ill-regulated, inordinate145 love of wealth which causes men not to shrink from any means of obtaining it. The same public opinion surrounds with esteem146 the man who, in whatever rank of life, devotes his honest and persevering147 labour to ameliorating the lot and elevating the condition of his family. It is from this combination of facts, ideas, and sentiments, it would seem to me, that we must form our judgment148 on wealth in connexion with individual morality. [p194]
First of all, we must acknowledge that the motive149 which urges us to the acquisition of riches is of providential creation,—natural, and consequently moral. It has its source in that original and general destitution150 which would be our lot in everything, if it did not create in us the desire to free ourselves from it. We must acknowledge, in the second place, that the efforts which men make to emerge from their primitive destitution, provided they keep within the limits of justice, are estimable and respectable, seeing that they are universally esteemed151 and respected. No one, moreover, will deny that labour is in itself of a moral nature. This is expressed in the common proverb which we find in all countries,—Idleness is the parent of vice. And we should fall into a glaring contradiction were we to say, on the one hand, that labour is indispensable to the morality of men, and, on the other, that men are immoral152 when they seek to realize wealth by their labour.
We must acknowledge, in the third place, that the desire of wealth becomes immoral when it goes the length of inducing us to depart from the rules of justice, and that avarice153 becomes more unpopular in proportion to the wealth of those who addict154 themselves to that passion.
Such is the judgment pronounced, not by certain philosophers or sects155, but by the generality of men; and I adopt it.
I must guard myself, however, by adding that this judgment may be different at the present day from what it was in ancient times, without involving a contradiction.
The Essenians and Stoics156 lived in a state of society where wealth was always the reward of oppression, of pillage157, and of violence. Not only was it deemed immoral in itself, but, in consequence of the immoral means employed in its acquisition, it revealed the immorality158 of those who possessed it. A reaction, even an exaggerated reaction, against riches and rich men was to be expected. Modern philosophers who declaim against wealth, without taking into account this difference in the means of acquiring wealth, believe themselves Senecas, while they are only parrots, repeating what they do not understand.
But the question which Political Economy proposes is this: Is wealth for mankind a moral good or a moral evil? Does the progressive development of wealth imply, in a moral point of view, improvement or decadence159?
The reader anticipates my answer, and will understand that I must say a few words on the subject of individual morality, in order to get quit of the contradiction, or rather of the impossibility, [p195] which would be implied in asserting that what is individual immorality is general morality.
Without having recourse to statistics, or the records of our prisons, we must handle a problem which may be enunciated160 in these terms:—
Is man degraded by exercising more power over nature—by constraining162 nature to serve him—by obtaining additional leisure—by freeing himself from the more imperious and pressing wants of his organization—by being enabled to rouse from sleep and inactivity his intellectual and moral faculties,—faculties which assuredly have not been given him to remain in eternal lethargy?
Is man degraded by being removed from a state the most inorganic163, so to speak, and raised to a state of the highest spiritualism which it is possible for him to reach?
I willingly grant, that when wealth is acquired by means which are immoral, it has an immoral influence, as among the Romans.
I also allow that when it is developed in a very unequal manner, creating a great gulf164 between classes, it has an immoral influence, and gives rise to revolutionary passions.
But does the same thing hold when wealth is the fruit of honest industry and free transactions, and is uniformly distributed over all classes? That would be a doctrine165 which it is impossible to maintain.
I really cannot comprehend how these schools, so opposite in other respects, but so unanimous in this, should not perceive the contradiction into which they fall.
On the one hand, wealth, according to the leaders of these schools, has a deleterious and demoralizing action, which debases the soul, hardens the heart, and leaves behind only a taste for depraved enjoyments. The rich have all manner of vices8. The poor have all manner of virtues—they are just, sensible, disinterested, generous,—such is the favourite theme of these authors.
On the other hand, all the efforts of the Socialists’ imagination, all the systems they invent, all the laws they wish to impose upon us, tend, if we are to believe them, to convert poverty into riches. . . . . . .
点击收听单词发音
1 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
2 gratuitous | |
adj.无偿的,免费的;无缘无故的,不必要的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
3 onerous | |
adj.繁重的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
4 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
5 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
6 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
7 enjoyments | |
愉快( enjoyment的名词复数 ); 令人愉快的事物; 享有; 享受 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
8 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
9 inventory | |
n.详细目录,存货清单 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
10 deference | |
n.尊重,顺从;敬意 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
11 procured | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 );拉皮条 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
12 participation | |
n.参与,参加,分享 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
13 aggregate | |
adj.总计的,集合的;n.总数;v.合计;集合 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
14 annihilated | |
v.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
15 annihilate | |
v.使无效;毁灭;取消 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
16 subsists | |
v.(靠很少的钱或食物)维持生活,生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
17 economists | |
n.经济学家,经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
18 economist | |
n.经济学家,经济专家,节俭的人 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
19 socialist | |
n.社会主义者;adj.社会主义的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
20 socialists | |
社会主义者( socialist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
21 concealing | |
v.隐藏,隐瞒,遮住( conceal的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
22 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
23 patrimony | |
n.世袭财产,继承物 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
24 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
25 impedes | |
阻碍,妨碍,阻止( impede的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
26 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
27 incessantly | |
ad.不停地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
28 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
29 omnipotence | |
n.全能,万能,无限威力 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
30 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
31 vanquish | |
v.征服,战胜;克服;抑制 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
32 toil | |
vi.辛劳工作,艰难地行动;n.苦工,难事 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
33 surmount | |
vt.克服;置于…顶上 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
34 surmounted | |
战胜( surmount的过去式和过去分词 ); 克服(困难); 居于…之上; 在…顶上 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
35 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
36 attainment | |
n.达到,到达;[常pl.]成就,造诣 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
37 authorized | |
a.委任的,许可的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
38 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
39 stationary | |
adj.固定的,静止不动的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
40 dilemma | |
n.困境,进退两难的局面 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
41 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
42 exertion | |
n.尽力,努力 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
43 exertions | |
n.努力( exertion的名词复数 );费力;(能力、权力等的)运用;行使 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
44 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
45 diminution | |
n.减少;变小 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
46 glorification | |
n.赞颂 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
47 syllogism | |
n.演绎法,三段论法 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
48 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
49 disappearance | |
n.消失,消散,失踪 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
50 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
51 dispelling | |
v.驱散,赶跑( dispel的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
52 saturated | |
a.饱和的,充满的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
53 exult | |
v.狂喜,欢腾;欢欣鼓舞 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
54 snare | |
n.陷阱,诱惑,圈套;(去除息肉或者肿瘤的)勒除器;响弦,小军鼓;vt.以陷阱捕获,诱惑 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
55 lessened | |
减少的,减弱的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
56 staple | |
n.主要产物,常用品,主要要素,原料,订书钉,钩环;adj.主要的,重要的;vt.分类 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
57 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
58 candid | |
adj.公正的,正直的;坦率的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
59 procures | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的第三人称单数 );拉皮条 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
60 contrive | |
vt.谋划,策划;设法做到;设计,想出 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
61 flinch | |
v.畏缩,退缩 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
62 counteract | |
vt.对…起反作用,对抗,抵消 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
63 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
64 augments | |
增加,提高,扩大( augment的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
65 scarcity | |
n.缺乏,不足,萧条 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
66 multiplication | |
n.增加,增多,倍增;增殖,繁殖;乘法 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
67 avow | |
v.承认,公开宣称 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
68 taxation | |
n.征税,税收,税金 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
69 plentiful | |
adj.富裕的,丰富的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
70 prodigality | |
n.浪费,挥霍 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
71 rendering | |
n.表现,描写 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
72 sweeping | |
adj.范围广大的,一扫无遗的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
73 expenditure | |
n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出;使用,消耗 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
74 prodigals | |
n.浪费的( prodigal的名词复数 );铺张的;挥霍的;慷慨的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
75 expedient | |
adj.有用的,有利的;n.紧急的办法,权宜之计 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
76 conflagration | |
n.建筑物或森林大火 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
77 proprietors | |
n.所有人,业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
78 divers | |
adj.不同的;种种的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
79 sterling | |
adj.英币的(纯粹的,货真价实的);n.英国货币(英镑) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
80 pecuniary | |
adj.金钱的;金钱上的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
81 detrimental | |
adj.损害的,造成伤害的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
82 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
83 recede | |
vi.退(去),渐渐远去;向后倾斜,缩进 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
84 panegyric | |
n.颂词,颂扬 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
85 succumbed | |
不再抵抗(诱惑、疾病、攻击等)( succumb的过去式和过去分词 ); 屈从; 被压垮; 死 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
86 datum | |
n.资料;数据;已知数 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
87 exalts | |
赞扬( exalt的第三人称单数 ); 歌颂; 提升; 提拔 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
88 proscribes | |
v.正式宣布(某事物)有危险或被禁止( proscribe的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
89 extols | |
v.赞颂,赞扬,赞美( extol的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
90 lurking | |
潜在 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
91 depreciates | |
v.贬值,跌价,减价( depreciate的第三人称单数 );贬低,蔑视,轻视 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
92 insinuates | |
n.暗示( insinuate的名词复数 );巧妙或迂回地潜入;(使)缓慢进入;慢慢伸入v.暗示( insinuate的第三人称单数 );巧妙或迂回地潜入;(使)缓慢进入;慢慢伸入 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
93 retracts | |
v.撤回或撤消( retract的第三人称单数 );拒绝执行或遵守;缩回;拉回 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
94 paradox | |
n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法;自相矛盾的人(物) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
95 inverse | |
adj.相反的,倒转的,反转的;n.相反之物;v.倒转 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
96 antagonism | |
n.对抗,敌对,对立 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
97 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
98 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
99 lurks | |
n.潜在,潜伏;(lurk的复数形式)vi.潜伏,埋伏(lurk的第三人称单数形式) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
100 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
101 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
102 incurable | |
adj.不能医治的,不能矫正的,无救的;n.不治的病人,无救的人 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
103 gainsay | |
v.否认,反驳 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
104 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
105 paradoxes | |
n.似非而是的隽语,看似矛盾而实际却可能正确的说法( paradox的名词复数 );用于语言文学中的上述隽语;有矛盾特点的人[事物,情况] | |
参考例句: |
|
|
106 obviate | |
v.除去,排除,避免,预防 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
107 tautology | |
n.无谓的重复;恒真命题 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
108 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
109 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
110 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
111 attests | |
v.证明( attest的第三人称单数 );证实;声称…属实;使宣誓 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
112 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
113 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
114 domain | |
n.(活动等)领域,范围;领地,势力范围 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
115 appropriation | |
n.拨款,批准支出 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
116 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
117 penetrating | |
adj.(声音)响亮的,尖锐的adj.(气味)刺激的adj.(思想)敏锐的,有洞察力的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
118 contingent | |
adj.视条件而定的;n.一组,代表团,分遣队 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
119 chimerical | |
adj.荒诞不经的,梦幻的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
120 fatigue | |
n.疲劳,劳累 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
121 lessening | |
减轻,减少,变小 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
122 compensated | |
补偿,报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 ); 给(某人)赔偿(或赔款) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
123 primitive | |
adj.原始的;简单的;n.原(始)人,原始事物 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
124 laborious | |
adj.吃力的,努力的,不流畅 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
125 elasticity | |
n.弹性,伸缩力 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
126 mingle | |
vt.使混合,使相混;vi.混合起来;相交往 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
127 gratuitously | |
平白 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
128 prodigiously | |
adv.异常地,惊人地,巨大地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
129 banish | |
vt.放逐,驱逐;消除,排除 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
130 legitimately | |
ad.合法地;正当地,合理地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
131 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
132 ardent | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,强烈的,烈性的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
133 longing | |
n.(for)渴望 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
134 savage | |
adj.野蛮的;凶恶的,残暴的;n.未开化的人 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
135 civilized | |
a.有教养的,文雅的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
136 imbued | |
v.使(某人/某事)充满或激起(感情等)( imbue的过去式和过去分词 );使充满;灌输;激发(强烈感情或品质等) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
137 disinterested | |
adj.不关心的,不感兴趣的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
138 hospitable | |
adj.好客的;宽容的;有利的,适宜的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
139 devouring | |
吞没( devour的现在分词 ); 耗尽; 津津有味地看; 狼吞虎咽地吃光 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
140 rapacity | |
n.贪婪,贪心,劫掠的欲望 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
141 barbarians | |
n.野蛮人( barbarian的名词复数 );外国人;粗野的人;无教养的人 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
142 disinterestedness | |
参考例句: |
|
|
143 concur | |
v.同意,意见一致,互助,同时发生 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
144 generosity | |
n.大度,慷慨,慷慨的行为 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
145 inordinate | |
adj.无节制的;过度的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
146 esteem | |
n.尊敬,尊重;vt.尊重,敬重;把…看作 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
147 persevering | |
a.坚忍不拔的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
148 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
149 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
150 destitution | |
n.穷困,缺乏,贫穷 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
151 esteemed | |
adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 );敬重;认为;以为 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
152 immoral | |
adj.不道德的,淫荡的,荒淫的,有伤风化的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
153 avarice | |
n.贪婪;贪心 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
154 addict | |
v.使沉溺;使上瘾;n.沉溺于不良嗜好的人 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
155 sects | |
n.宗派,教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
156 stoics | |
禁欲主义者,恬淡寡欲的人,不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
157 pillage | |
v.抢劫;掠夺;n.抢劫,掠夺;掠夺物 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
158 immorality | |
n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
159 decadence | |
n.衰落,颓废 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
160 enunciated | |
v.(清晰地)发音( enunciate的过去式和过去分词 );确切地说明 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
161 enunciate | |
v.发音;(清楚地)表达 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
162 constraining | |
强迫( constrain的现在分词 ); 强使; 限制; 约束 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
163 inorganic | |
adj.无生物的;无机的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
164 gulf | |
n.海湾;深渊,鸿沟;分歧,隔阂 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
165 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
166 crammed | |
adj.塞满的,挤满的;大口地吃;快速贪婪地吃v.把…塞满;填入;临时抱佛脚( cram的过去式) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
167 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
欢迎访问英文小说网 |