Yes, if this work differs from those of some other Economists5, it is in this, that the latter appear to say, “We have but little faith in Providence8, for we see that the natural laws lead to an abyss. And yet we say laissez faire! merely because we have still less faith in ourselves, and because we see clearly that all human efforts designed to arrest the action of these natural laws tend only to hasten the catastrophe10.”
Again, if this work differs from the writings of the Socialists11, it is in this, that the latter say, “We pretend to believe in God, but in reality we believe only in ourselves; seeing that we have no faith in the maxim13, laissez faire, and that we all give forth14 our social nostrums15 as infinitely16 superior to the plans of Providence.”
For my part, I say, laissez faire; in other words, respect liberty, and the human initiative,105 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Responsibility, solidarity17; mysterious laws, of [p466] which, apart from Revelation, it is impossible to appreciate the cause, but the effects and infallible action of which, on the progress of society, it is given us to appreciate—laws which, for the very reason that man is sociable18, are linked together and act together, although they appear sometimes to run counter to each other; and which would require to be viewed in their ensemble19, and in their common action, if science, with its feeble optics and uncertain steps, were not reduced to method—that melancholy20 crutch21 which constitutes its strength whilst it reveals its weakness.
Nosce te ipsum—know thyself: this, according to the oracle22, is [p467] the beginning, the middle, and the end of the moral and political sciences.
As we have elsewhere remarked, in what concerns man or human society, Harmony can never mean Perfection, but only Improvement. Now improvement or perfectibility implies always, to a certain extent, imperfection in the future as well as in the past. If man could ever find his way into the promised land of absolute Good, he would no longer have occasion to use his understanding and his senses—he would be no longer man.
Evil exists. It is inherent in human infirmity. It manifests itself in the moral as in the material world; in the masses, as in the individual; in the whole as in the part. But because the eye may suffer and be lost, does the physiologist23 overlook the harmonious24 mechanism25 of that admirable organ? Does he deny the ingenious structure of the human body, because that body is subject to pain, to disease, and to death—to such extremity26 of suffering as caused Job, in the depth of his despair, “to say to corruption27, Thou art my father; and to the worm, Thou art my mother and my sister”? In the same way, because the social order will never bring mankind to the fancied haven28 of absolute good, is the economist6 to refuse to recognise all that is marvellous in the organization of the social order—an organization prepared with a view to the constantly-increasing diffusion29 of knowledge, of morality, and of happiness?
Strange! that we should deny to economic science the same right to admire the natural order of things which we concede to physiology30. For, after all, what difference is there between the individual and the collective being, as regards the harmony displayed by final causes? The individual, no doubt, comes into existence, grows and is developed, educates and improves himself as life advances, until the time comes when his light and life are to be communicated to others. At that moment everything about him is clothed in the hues31 of beauty; all breathes grace and joy; all is expansion, affection, benevolence32, love, and harmony. For a while, his intelligence continues to be enlarged and confirmed, as if to qualify him to be the guide of those whom he has just called to tread the crooked33 paths of human existence. But soon his beauty fades, his grace disappears, his senses are blunted, his body becomes feeble, his memory clouded, his thoughts less bright; his affections even (except in the case of some choice spirits) get clogged34 with egotism, and lose that charm, that freshness, that sincerity35 and simplicity36, that depth and disinterestedness37, which distinguished38 his [p468] earlier days;—the poetry of life has fled. In spite of all the ingenious precautions which nature has taken to retard39 his dissolution—precautions which physiology sums up in the phrase vis medicatrix—he treads back the path of improvement, and loses, one after another, all his acquisitions by the way; he goes on from privation to privation, until he reaches that which is the greatest of all, because it includes all. The genius of optimism itself can discover nothing consolatory40, nothing harmonious in this slow but unavoidable decadence41—in seeing that being once so proud and so beautiful descending42 sadly into the tomb. . . . . . The tomb! . . . . . But is not that the door of another habitation? . . . . . It is thus, when science stops short, that religion106 renews, even for the individual, in another region, the concordant harmonies which have been interrupted here.107
Despite this fatal déno?ment, does physiology cease to see in the human body the most perfect masterpiece which ever proceeded from its Creator’s hands?
But if the social body is liable to suffering, if it may suffer even to death, it is not for that reason finally condemned43. Let men say what they will, it has not, in perspective, after having been elevated to its apogee44, an inevitable45 decline. The crash of empires even is not the retrogradation of humanity, and the ancient models of civilisation46 have only been dissolved in order to make room for a civilisation still more advanced. Dynasties may be extinguished; the forms of government may be changed; yet the progress of the human race may not the less be continued. The fall of States is like the fall of leaves in autumn. It fertilizes47 the soil; contributes to the return of spring; and promises to future generations a richer vegetation, and more abundant harvests. Nay48, even in a purely49 national point of view, this theory of necessary decadence is as false as it is antiquated50. In the life of no people can we possibly perceive any cause of inevitable decline. The analogy which has so frequently given rise to a comparison between a nation and an individual, and led men to attribute to the one as to the other an infancy51 and an old age, is nothing better than a false metaphor52. A community is being incessantly54 renewed. Let its institutions be elastic55 and flexible, so that in place of coming in collision with [p469] those new powers to which the human mind gives birth, they shall be so organized as to admit of this expansion of intellectual energy and accommodate themselves to it; and we see no reason why such institutions should not flourish in eternal youth. But whatever may be thought of the fragility and fall of empires, it must never be forgotten that society, which in its aggregate56 represents the human race, is constituted upon more solid bases. The more we study it, the more we shall be convinced that it too, like the human body, is provided with a curative force, a vis medicatrix, which delivers it from the evils which afflict57 it; and that it carries in its bosom58, moreover, a progressive force; and is by the latter urged on to improvements to which we can assign no limits.
If individual evil, then, does not weaken or invalidate physiological59 harmony, still less does collective evil weaken or invalidate social harmony.
But how are we to reconcile the existence of evil with the infinite goodness of God? I cannot explain what I do not understand.
All I shall say is, that this solution can no more be exacted from Political Economy than from Anatomy60. These sciences, which are alike sciences of observation, study man as he is, without asking the Creator to reveal His impenetrable secrets.
Thus, I again repeat, harmony does not correspond with the idea of absolute perfection, but with that of indefinite improvement. It has pleased God to attach suffering to our nature, seeing that He has designed that in us feebleness should be anterior61 to force, ignorance to science, want to satisfaction, effort to result, acquisition to possession, destitution62 to wealth, error to truth, experience to foresight63. I submit without murmuring to this ordinance64, being able, moreover, to imagine no other combination. But if, by a mechanism as simple as it is ingenious, He has provided that all men should approximate to a common level, which is continually rising, if He assures them—by the very action of what we denominate evil—both of the duration and the diffusion of progress, then am I not only content to bow myself under His bountiful and almighty65 hand,—I bless that hand, I worship it, I adore it.
We have seen certain schools arise which have taken advantage of the insolubility (humanly speaking) of this question to embroil66 all others, as if it were given to our finite intelligence to [p470] comprehend and reconcile things which are infinite. Placing over the portal of social science this sentence, God cannot desire evil, they arrive at the following series of conclusions: “Evil exists in society; then society is not organized according to the designs of God. Let us change, and change again, and change continually this organization. Let us try about, and make experiments, until we have effaced67 all trace of suffering from the world. By that sign we shall know that the kingdom of God has come.”
Nor is this all. These schools have been led to exclude from their social plans liberty as well as suffering, for liberty implies the possibility of error, and consequently the possibility of evil. Addressing their fellow-men, they say, “Allow us to organize you—don’t you interfere—cease to compare, to judge, to decide anything by yourselves and for yourselves. We abhor68 the laissez faire; but we ask you to let things alone, and to let us alone. If we succeed in conducting you to perfect happiness, the infinite goodness of God will be vindicated69.”
Contradiction, inconsistency, presumption,—we ask which is most apparent in such language?
One sect70 among others, not very philosophical71, but very noisy, promises to mankind unmixed felicity. Only deliver over to that sect the government of the human race, and in virtue72 of certain formulas, it makes bold to rid men of every painful sensation.
But if you do not accord a blind faith to the promises of that sect, then, bringing forward that formidable and insoluble problem which has vexed73 philosophy since the beginning of the world, they summon you to reconcile the existence of evil with the infinite goodness of God. Do you hesitate? they accuse you of impiety74.
Fourier rings the changes on this theme till he exhausts all its combinations.
“Either God has not been able to give us a social code of attraction, of justice, of truth, and of unity53; in which case He has been unjust in giving us wants without the means of satisfying them.”
“Or He has not desired to give it us; and in that case He has deliberately75 persecuted76 us by creating designedly wants which it is impossible to satisfy:”
“Or He is able, and has not desired; in which case the principle of good would rival the principle of evil, having the power to establish good, and preferring to establish evil:” [p471]
“Or He has desired and has not been able; in which case He is incapable78 of governing us, acknowledging and desiring good, but not having the power to establish it:”
“Or He has been neither able nor willing; in which case the principle of good is below the principle of evil, etc.:”
“Or He has been both able and willing; in which case the code exists, and it is for us to promulgate79 it, etc.”
And Fourier is the prophet of this new revelation. Let us deliver ourselves up to him and to his disciples80: Providence will then be justified81, sensibility will change its nature, and suffering will disappear from the earth.
But how, I would ask, do these apostles of absolute good, these hardy82 logicians, who exclaim continually that “God being perfect, His work must be perfect also;” and who accuse us of impiety because we resign ourselves to human imperfection,—how, I say, do these men not perceive that, on the most favourable83 hypothesis, they are as impious as we are? I should like, indeed, that, under the reign84 of Messieurs Considérant, Hennequin, etc., no one in the world should ever lose his mother, or suffer from the toothache,—in which case he also might chant the litany, Either God has not been able or has not been willing; I should like much that evil were to take flight to the infernal regions, retreating before the broad daylight of the Socialist12 revelation—that one of their plans, phalanstère, crédit gratuit, anarchie, triade, atelier social,108 and so forth, had the power to rid us of all future evils. But would it annihilate85 suffering in the past? The infinite, observe, has no limits; and if there has existed on the earth since the beginning of the world a single sufferer, that is enough to render the problem of the infinite goodness of God insoluble in their point of view.
Let us beware, then, of linking the science of the finite to the mysteries of the infinite. Let us apply to the one reason and observation, and leave the other in the domain86 of revelation and of faith.
In all respects, and in every aspect, man is imperfect. In this world, at least, he encounters limits in all directions, and touches the finite at every point. His force, his intelligence, his affections, his life, have in them nothing absolute, and belong to a material mechanism which is subject to fatigue87, to decay, and to death.
Not only is this so, but our imperfection is so great that we cannot even imagine perfection as existing either in ourselves or in the external world. Our minds are so much out of proportion to this idea of perfection that all our efforts to seize it are vain. The oftener we try to grasp it, the oftener it escapes us, and is lost in [p472] inextricable contradictions. Show me a perfect man, and you will show me a man who is exempt88 from suffering, and who has consequently neither wants, nor desires, nor sensations, nor sensibility, nor nerves, nor muscles; who can be ignorant of nothing, and consequently has neither the faculty89 of attention, nor judgment90, nor reasoning, nor memory, nor imagination, nor brains; in short, you will show me a being who does not exist.
Thus, in whatever aspect we regard man, we must regard him as being subject to suffering. We must admit that evil has entered as one spring of action into the providential plan; and in place of seeking by chimerical91 means to annihilate it, our business is to study the part which it has to play, and the mission on which it is sent.
When it pleased God to create a being made up of wants, and of faculties92 to supply these wants, it was at the same time decreed that this being should be subject to suffering; for, apart from suffering, we could form no idea of wants, and, apart from wants, we could form no idea of utility, or of the use and object of any of our faculties. All that constitutes our greatness has its root in what constitutes our weakness.
Urged on by innumerable impulses, and indued with an intelligence which enlightens our exertions93, and enables us to appreciate their results, we have free will to guide and direct us.
But free will implies error as possible, and error in its turn implies suffering as its inevitable effect. I defy any one to tell me what it is to choose freely, if it be not to run the risk of making a bad choice, and what it is to make a bad choice if it be not to prepare the way for suffering.
And this is, no doubt, the reason why those schools who are content with nothing less than absolute good are all materialist94 and fatalist. They are unable to admit free will. They see that liberty of acting95 proceeds from liberty of choosing; that liberty of choosing supposes the possibility of error; and that the possibility of error is the possibility of evil. Now, in an artificial society, such as our organisateurs invent, evil cannot make its appearance. For that reason, men must be exempted96 from the possibility of error; and the surest means to accomplish that is to deprive them of the faculty of acting and choosing—in other words, of free will. It has been truly said that Socialism is despotism incarnate97.
In presence of these fooleries, it may be asked, By what right does the organizer of artificial systems venture to think, act, and choose, not only for himself, but for every one else? for, after all [p473] he belongs to the human race, and in that respect is fallible; and he is so much the more fallible in proportion as he pretends to extend the range of his science and his will.
No doubt the organisateur finds this objection radically98 unfounded, inasmuch as it confounds him with the rest of mankind. But he who professes99 to discover the defects of the Divine workmanship, and has undertaken to recast it, is more than a man; he is an oracle, and more than an oracle. . . . .
But when free will, which is the foundation of the whole argument, is denied, is not this the proper place to demonstrate its existence? I shall take good care not to enter upon any such demonstration101. Every one feels that his will is free, and that is enough. I feel this, not vaguely102, but a hundred times more intensely than if it had been demonstrated to me by Aristotle or by Euclid. I feel it with conscious joy when I have made a choice which does me honour; with remorse103, when I have made a choice which degrades me. I find, moreover, that all men by their conduct affirm their belief in free will, although some deny it in their writings.109 All men compare motives104, deliberate, determine, retract105, try to foresee; all give advice, are indignant at injustice107, admire acts of devotion. Then all acknowledge in themselves and in others the existence of free will, without which, choice, advice, foresight, morality, virtue, are impossible. Let us take care how we seek to demonstrate what is admitted by universal practice. Absolute fatalists are no more to be found, even at Constantinople, than absolute sceptics are to be met with at Alexandria. Those who proclaim themselves such may be fools enough to try to persuade others, but they are powerless to convince themselves. They prove with much subtlety108 that they have no will of their own; but when we see that they act as if they had it, we need not dispute with them.
Here, then, we are placed in the midst of nature and of our fellow-men—urged on by impulses, wants, appetites, desires—provided with various faculties enabling us to operate on man and on [p474] things—determined to action by our free will—indued with intelligence, which is perfectible and therefore imperfect, and which, if it enlightens us, may also deceive us with reference to the consequences of our actions.
Every human action—giving rise to a series of good or bad consequences, of which some fall back on the agent, and others affect his family, his neighbours, his fellow-citizens, and sometimes mankind at large—every such action causes the vibration109 of two chords, the sounds of which are oracular utterances—Responsibility and Solidarity.
As regards the man who acts, Responsibility is the natural link which exists between the act and its consequences. It is a complete system of inevitable Rewards and Punishments which no man has invented, which acts with all the regularity110 of the great natural laws, and which may, consequently, be regarded as of Divine institution. The evident object of Responsibility is to restrain the number of hurtful actions, and increase the number of such as are useful.
This mechanism, which is at once corrective and progressive, remunerative111 and retributive, is so simple, so near us, so identified with our whole being, so perpetually in action, that not only can we not ignore it, but we see that, like Evil, it is one of those phenomena112 without which our whole life would be to us unintelligible113.
The book of Genesis tells us that, the first man having been driven from the terrestrial paradise, because he had learned to distinguish between good and evil, sciens bonum et malum, God pronounced this sentence on him: In laboribus comedes ex terra cunctis diebus vit? tu?. Spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi. In sudore vult?s tui vesceris pane114, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es: quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris.110
Here, then, we have good and evil—or human nature. Here we have acts and habits producing good or bad consequences—or human nature. Here we have labour, sweat, thorns, tribulation115, and death—or human nature.
Human nature, I say; for to choose, to be mistaken, to suffer, to rectify116 our errors—in a word, all the elements which make up the idea of Responsibility—are so inherent in our sensitive, rational, and free nature, they are so much of the essence of that nature [p475] itself, that I defy the most fertile imagination to conceive for man another mode of existence.
That man might have lived in an Eden, in paradiso voluptatis, ignorant of good and evil, we can indeed believe, but we cannot comprehend it, so profoundly has our nature been transformed.
We find it impossible to separate the idea of life from that of sensibility; that of sensibility from that of pleasure and pain; that of pleasure and pain from that of reward and punishment; that of intelligence from that of liberty and choice, and all these ideas from the idea of Responsibility; for it is the aggregate of all these ideas which gives us the idea of Being or Existence, so that when we think upon God, our reason, which tells us that He is incapable of suffering, remains117 confounded—so inseparable are our notions of sensibility and existence.
It is this undoubtedly118 which renders Faith the necessary complement119 of our destinies. It is the only bond which is possible between the creature and the Creator, seeing that God is, and always will be, to our reason, incomprehensible, Deus absconditus.
In order to be convinced how hard Responsibility presses us, and shuts us in on every side, we have only to attend to the most simple facts.
Fire burns us; the collision of bodies bruises120 us. If we were not indued with sensibility, or if our sensibility were not painfully affected121 by the approach of fire, and by rude contact with other bodies, we should be exposed to death every moment.
From earliest infancy to extreme old age, our life is only a long apprenticeship122. By frequently falling, we learn to walk. By rude and reiterated123 experiments, we are taught to avoid heat, cold, hunger, thirst, excess. Do not let us complain of the roughness of this experience. If it were not so, it would teach us nothing.
The same thing holds in the social order. From the unhappy consequences of cruelty, of injustice, of fear, of violence, of deceit, of idleness, we learn to be gentle, just, brave, moderate, truthful124, and industrious125. Experience is protracted126; it will never come to an end; but it will never cease to be efficacious.
Man being so constituted, it is impossible that we should not recognise in responsibility the mainspring to which social progress is specially127 confided128. It is the crucible129 in which experience is elaborated. They, then, who believe in the superiority of times past, like those who despair of the future, fall into the most manifest contradiction. Without being aware of it, they extol130 error, and calumniate131 knowledge. It is as if they said, “The more I have learnt, the less I know. The more clearly I discern what is [p476] hurtful, the more I shall be exposed to it.” Were humanity constituted on such a basis as this, it would in a short time cease to exist.
Man’s starting-point is ignorance and inexperience. The farther we trace back the chain of time, the more destitute132 we find men of that knowledge which is fitted to direct their choice,—of knowledge which can be acquired only in one of two ways: by reflection or by experience.
Now it so happens that man’s every action includes, not one consequence only, but a series of consequences. Sometimes the first is good, and the others bad; sometimes the first is bad, and the others good. From one of our determinations there may proceed good and bad consequences, combined in variable proportions. We may venture to term vicious those actions which produce more bad than good effects, and virtuous133 those which produce a greater amount of good than of evil.
When one of our actions produces a first consequence which we approve, followed by many other consequences which are hurtful, so that the aggregate of bad predominates over the aggregate of good, such an action tends to limit and restrain itself, and to be abandoned in proportion as we acquire more foresight.
Men naturally perceive the immediate134 consequences of their actions before they perceive those consequences which are more remote. Whence it follows that what we have denominated vicious acts are more multiplied in times of ignorance. Now the repetition of the same acts constitutes habit. Ages of ignorance, then, are ages of bad habits.
Consequently, they are ages of bad laws, for acts which are repeated, habits which are general, constitute manners, upon which laws are modelled, and of which, so to speak, they are the official expression.
How is this ignorance to be put an end to? How can men be taught to know the second, the third, and all the subsequent consequences of their acts and their habits?
The first means is the exercise of that faculty of discerning and reasoning which Providence has vouchsafed135 them.
But there is another still more sure and efficacious,—experience. When the act is once done, the consequences follow inevitably136. The first effect is good; for it is precisely137 to obtain that result that the act is done. But the second may inflict138 suffering, the third still greater suffering, and so on.
Then men’s eyes are opened, and light begins to appear. That action is not repeated; we sacrifice the good produced by the first [p477] and immediate consequence, for fear of the still greater evil which the subsequent consequences entail139. If the act has become a habit, and if we have not power to give it up, we at least give way to it with hesitation140 and repugnance141, and after an inward conflict. We do not recommend it; on the contrary, we blame it, and persuade our children against it; and we are certainly on the road of progress.
If, on the other hand, the act is one which is useful, but from which we refrain, because its first, and only known, consequence is painful, and we are ignorant of the favourable ulterior consequences, experience teaches us the effects of abstaining142 from it. A savage143, for instance, has had enough to eat. He does not foresee that he will be hungry to-morrow. Why should he labour to-day? To work is present pain—no need of foresight to know that. He therefore continues idle. But the day passes, another succeeds, and as it brings hunger, he must then work under the spur of necessity. This is a lesson which, frequently repeated, cannot fail to develop foresight. By degrees idleness is regarded in its true light. We brand it; we warn the young against it. Public opinion is now on the side of industry.
But in order that experience should afford us this lesson, in order that it should fulfil its mission, develop foresight, explain the series of consequences which flow from our actions, pave the way to good habits, and restrain bad ones—in a word, in order that experience should become an effective instrument of progress and moral improvement—the law of Responsibility must come into operation. The bad consequences must make themselves felt, and evil must for the moment chastise144 us.
Undoubtedly it would be better that evil had no existence; and it might perhaps be so if man was constituted differently from what he is. But taking man as he is, with his wants, his desires, his sensibility, his free will, his power of choosing and erring77, his faculty of bringing into play a cause which necessarily entails145 consequences which it is not in our power to elude146 as long as the cause exists; in such circumstances, the only way of removing the cause is to enlighten the will, rectify the choice, abandon the vicious act or the vicious habit; and nothing can effect this but the law of Responsibility.
We may affirm, then, that man being constituted as he is, evil is not only necessary but useful. It has a mission, and enters into the universal harmony. Its mission is to destroy its own cause, to limit its own operation, to concur147 in the realization148 of good, and to stimulate149 progress. [p478]
We may elucidate150 this by some examples which the subject which now engages us—Political Economy—presents.
Monopolies.
Population.111 . . . .
Responsibility guards itself by three sanctions:—
1st, The natural sanction; which is that of which I have just been speaking—the necessary suffering or recompense which certain acts and habits entail.
2d, The religious sanction; or the punishments and rewards of another life, which are annexed153 to acts and habits, according as they are vicious or virtuous.
3d, The legal sanction; or the punishments and rewards decreed beforehand by society.
Of these three sanctions, I confess that the one which appears to me fundamental is the first. In saying this I cannot fail to run counter to sentiments which I respect; but I must be permitted to declare my opinion.
Is an act vicious because a revelation from above has declared it to be so? Or has revelation declared it vicious because it produces consequences which are bad? These questions will probably always form a subject of controversy154 between the philosophical and the religious mind.
I believe that Christianity can range itself on the side of those who answer the last of these two questions in the affirmative. Christianity itself tells us that it has not come to oppose the natural law, but to confirm it.112 We can scarcely admit that God, who is the supreme155 principle of order, should have made an arbitrary classification of human actions, that He should have denounced punishment on some, and promised reward to others, and this without any regard to the effects of these actions, that is to say, to their discordance156, or concordance, in the universal harmony. [p479]
When He said, “Thou shalt not kill—thou shalt not steal,” no doubt He had in view to prohibit certain acts because they were hurtful to man and to society, which are His work.
Regard to consequences is so powerful a consideration with man that if he belonged to a religion that forbade acts which universal experience proved to be useful, or that sanctioned the observance of habits palpably hurtful, I believe that such a religion could not be maintained, but that it would at length give way before the progress of knowledge. Men could not long suppose that the deliberate design of God was to cause evil and to interdict157 good.
The question which I broach158 here has perhaps no very important bearing on Christianity, since it ordains159 only what is good in itself, and forbids only what is bad.
But the question I am now examining is this, whether in principle the religious sanction goes to confirm the natural sanction, or whether the natural sanction goes for nothing in presence of the religious sanction, and should give way to the latter when they come into collision.
Now, if I am not mistaken, the tendency of ministers of religion is to pay little attention to the natural sanction. For this they have an unanswerable reason: “God has ordained160 this; God has forbidden that.” There is no longer any room left for reasoning, for God is infallible and omnipotent161. Although the act should lead to the destruction of the world, we must march on like blind men, just as we would do if God addressed us personally, and showed us heaven and hell.
It may happen, even in the true religion, that actions in themselves innocent are forbidden by Divine authority. To exact interest for money, for example, has been pronounced sinful. Had mankind given obedience162 to that prohibition163, the race would long since have disappeared from the face of the earth. For without interest the accumulation of capital is impossible; without capital there can be no co-operation of anterior and present labour; without this co-operation there can be no society; and without society man cannot exist.
On the other hand, on examining the subject of interest more nearly, we are convinced that not only is it useful in its general effects, but that there is in it nothing contrary to charity and truth—certainly not more than there is in the stipend164 of a minister of religion, and less than in certain perquisites165 belonging to his office.
Thus, all the power of the Church has not been able for an [p480] instant to supersede166, in this respect, the nature of things. The most which has been accomplished167 is to cause to be disguised one of the forms, and that the least usual form, of exacting168 interest, in a number of very trifling169 transactions.
In the same way, as regards precepts171; when the Gospel says, “Unto him who smiteth thee on the one cheek, offer also the other,” it gives a precept170 which, if taken literally172, would destroy the right of legitimate173 defence in the individual, and consequently in society. Now, without this right, the existence of the human race is impossible.
And what has happened? For eighteen hundred years this saying has been repeated as a mere9 conventionalism.
But there is a still graver consideration. There are false religions in the world. These necessarily admit precepts and prohibitions174 which are in antagonism175 with the natural sanctions attached to certain acts. Now, of all the means which have been given us to distinguish, in a matter so important, the true from the false, that which emanates176 from God from that which proceeds from imposture177, none is more certain, more decisive, than an examination of the good or bad consequences which a doctrine178 is calculated to have on the advancement179 and progress of mankind—a fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos.
Legal sanction.—Nature having prepared a system of punishments and rewards, in the shape of the effects which necessarily proceed from each act and from each habit, what is the province of human law? There are only three courses it can take—to allow Responsibility to act, to chime in with it, or to oppose it.
It seems to me beyond doubt that when a legal sanction is brought into play, it ought only to be to give more force, regularity, certainty, and efficacy to the natural sanction. These two powers should co-operate, and not run counter to each other.
For example, if fraud is in the first instance profitable to him who has recourse to it, in the long-run it is more frequently fatal to him; for it injures his credit, his honour, and his reputation. It creates around him distrust and suspicion. It is, besides, always hurtful to the man who is the victim of it. Finally, it alarms society, and obliges it to employ part of its force in expensive precautions. The sum of evil, then, far exceeds the sum of good. This is what constitutes natural Responsibility, which acts constantly as a preventive and repressive check. We can understand, however, that the community does not choose to depend altogether on the slow action of necessary responsibility, and judges it fit to add a legal sanction to the natural sanction. In [p481] that case, we may say that the legal sanction is only the natural sanction organized and reduced to rule. It renders punishment more immediate and more certain; it gives more publicity180 and authenticity181 to facts; it surrounds the suspected party with guarantees, and affords him a regular opportunity to exculpate182 himself if there be room for it; it rectifies183 the errors of public opinion, and calms down individual vengeance184 by substituting for it public retribution. In fine—and this perhaps is the essential thing—it does not destroy the lessons of experience.
We cannot, then, say that the legal sanction is illogical in principle, when it advances alongside the natural sanction and concurs185 in the same result. It does not follow, however, that the legal sanction ought in every case to be substituted for the natural sanction, and that human law is justified by the consideration alone that it acts in the sense of Responsibility.
The artificial distribution of punishments and rewards includes in itself, and at the expense of the community, an amount of inconvenience which it is necessary to take into account. The machinery186 of the legal sanction comes from men, is worked by men, and is costly187.
Before submitting an action or a habit to organized repression188, there is always this question to be asked:—
Does the excess of good which is obtained by the addition of legal repression to natural repression compensate189 the evil which is inherent in the repressive machinery?
In the case of theft, of murder, of the greater part of crimes and delicts, the question admits of no doubt. Every nation of the earth represses these crimes by public force.
But when we have to do with a habit which it is difficult to account for, and which may spring from moral causes of delicate appreciation191, the question is different, and it may very well be that, although this habit is universally esteemed192 hurtful and vicious, the law should remain neuter, and hand it over to natural responsibility.
In the first place, this is the course which the law ought to take in the case of an action or a habit which is doubtful, which one part of the population thinks good and another part bad. You think me wrong in following the Catholic ritual; I think you wrong in adopting the Lutheran faith. Let God judge of that. Why should I aim a blow at you, or why should you aim a blow [p482] at me? If it is not right that we should strike at each other, how can it be right that we should delegate a third party, the depositary of the public force, to chastise one of us for the satisfaction of the other?
You allege193 that I am wrong in teaching my child the moral and natural sciences; I believe that you are wrong in teaching your child Greek and Latin exclusively. Let us act on both sides according to our feeling of what is right. Let our families be acted on by the law of Responsibility. That law will punish the one who is wrong. Do not invoke194 human law, which may punish the one who is right.
You assert that I would do better to pursue such or such a career, to work according to your process, to employ an iron in place of a wooden plough, to sow thin in place of sowing thick, to purchase in the East rather than in the West. I maintain just the contrary. I have made all my calculations; and surely I am more interested than you in not falling into any mistake in matters upon the right ordering of which my welfare, my existence, and the happiness of my family depend, while in your case they interest only your amour-propre and the credit of your systems. Give me as much advice as you please, but constrain195 me to nothing. I decide upon my own proper risk and peril196, and surely that is enough without the tyrannical intervention197 of law.
We see that, in almost all the important actions of life, it is necessary to respect free will, to rely on the individual judgment of men, on that inward light which God has given them for their guidance, and after that to leave Responsibility to do its own work.
The intervention of law in analogous198 cases, over and above the very great inconvenience of opening the way equally to error and to truth, has the still greater inconvenience of paralyzing intelligence itself, of extinguishing that light which is the inheritance of humanity and the pledge of progress.
But even when an action, a habit, a practice is acknowledged by public good sense to be bad, vicious, and immoral199, when it is so beyond doubt; when those who give themselves up to it are the first to blame themselves,—that is not enough to justify200 the intervention of law. As I have already said, it is necessary also to know if, in adding to the bad consequences of this vice106 the bad consequences inherent in all legal repression, we do not produce, in the long-run, a sum of evil which exceeds the good which the legal sanction adds to the natural sanction.
We might examine, for instance, the evils which would result [p483] from the application of the legal sanction to the repression of idleness, prodigality, avarice201, egotism, cupidity202, ambition.
Let us take the case of idleness.
This is a very natural inclination203, and there are not wanting men who join the chorus of the Italians when they celebrate the dolce far niente, and of Rousseau, when he says, Je suis paresscux avec délices. We cannot doubt, then, that idleness is attended with a certain amount of enjoyment204. Were it not so, in fact, there would be no idleness in the world.
And yet there flows from this inclination a host of evils, so much so that the wisdom of nations has embodied itself in the proverb that Idleness is the parent of every vice.
The evils of idleness infinitely surpass the good; and it is necessary that the law of Responsibility should act in this matter with some energy, either as a lesson or as a spur, seeing that it is in fact by labour that the world has reached the state of civilisation which it has now attained205.
Now, considered either as a lesson or as a spur to action, what would a legal sanction add to the providential sanction? Suppose we had a law to punish idleness. In what precise degree would such a law quicken the national activity?
If we could find this out, we should have an exact measure of the benefit resulting from the law. I confess I can form no idea of this part of the problem. But we must ask, at what price would this benefit, whatever it were, be purchased; and surely little reflection is needed in order to see that the certain inconveniences of legal repression would far exceed its problematical advantages.
In the first place, there are in France thirty-six millions of inhabitants. It would be necessary to exercise over them all a rigorous surveillance, to follow them into their fields, their workshops, to their domestic circles. Think of the number of functionaries206, the increase of taxes, etc., which would be the result.
Then, those who are now industrious—and the number, thank God, is great—would be, no less than the idle, subjected to this intolerable inquisition. It is surely an immense inconvenience to subject a hundred innocent people to degrading measures, in order to punish one guilty person whom nature has herself taken it in hand to chastise.
And then, when does idleness begin? In the case of each man brought to justice, the most minute and delicate inquiries207 would be necessary. Was the accused really idle, or did he merely take [p484] necessary repose208? Was he sick, or was he meditating209, or was he saying his prayers, etc.? How could we appreciate all those shades of difference? Did he work harder and longer in the morning in order to have a little more time at his disposal in the evening? How many witnesses, judges, juries, policemen, would be needed, how much resistance, espionage210, and hatred211 would be engendered212! . . . . .
Next we should have the chapter of judicial213 blunders. How great an amount of idleness would escape! and, in return, how many industrious people would go to redeem214 in prison the inactivity of a day by the inactivity of a month!
With these consequences and many others before our eyes, we say, Let natural Responsibility do its own work. And we do well in saying so.
The Socialists, who never decline to have recourse to despotism in order to accomplish their ends—for the end is everything with them—have branded Responsibility under the name of individualism,—and have then tried to annihilate it, and absorb it in the sphere of action of a solidarity extended beyond all natural bounds.
The consequences of this perversion215 of the two great springs of human perfectibility are fatal. There is no longer any dignity, any liberty, for man. For, from the moment that the man who acts is not personally answerable for the good or bad consequences of his actions, his right to act singly and individually no longer exists. If each movement of the individual is to reflect back the series of its effects on society at large, the initiative of each such movement can no longer be left to the individual—it belongs to society. The community alone must decide all, and regulate all,—education, food, wages, amusements, locomotion216, affections, families, etc. Now, the law is the voice of Society; the law is the legislator. Here, then, we have a flock and a shepherd,—less than that even, inert217 matter, and a workman. We see, then, to what point the suppression of Responsibility and of individualism would lead us.
To conceal218 this frightful219 design from the eyes of the vulgar, it was necessary to flatter their selfish passions by declaiming against egotism. To the suffering classes Socialism says, “Do not trouble yourselves to examine whether your sufferings are to be ascribed to the law of Responsibility. There are fortunate people in the world, and in virtue of the law of Solidarity they ought to share their prosperity with you.” And for the purpose of paving the way to the degrading level of a factitious, official, legal, con7 [p485] strained, and unnatural220 Solidarity, they erect221 spoliation into a system, they twist all our notions of justice, and they exalt222 that individualist sentiment, which they were thought to have proscribed223, up to the highest point of power and perversity224. Their whole system is thus of a piece,—negation of the harmonies which spring from liberty in the principle,—despotism and slavery in the result,—immorality225 in the means.
Every effort to divert the natural course of responsibility is a blow aimed at justice, at liberty, at order, at civilisation, and at progress.
At justice. An act or a habit being assumed to exist, its good or bad consequences must follow necessarily. Were it possible, indeed, to suppress these consequences, there would doubtless be some advantage in suspending the action of the natural law of responsibility. But the only result to which a written law could lead would be that the good effects of a bad action would be reaped by the author of that action, and that its bad effects would fall back on a third party, or upon the community; which has certainly the special aspect of injustice.
Thus, modern societies are constituted on the principle that the father of a family should rear and educate his children. And it is this principle which restrains within just limits the increase and distribution of population; each man acting under a sense of responsibility. Men are not all indued with the same amount of foresight; and113 in large towns improvidence226 is allied227 with immorality. We have nowadays a regular budget, and an administration, for the purpose of collecting children abandoned by their parents; no inquiry228 discourages this shameful229 desertion, and a constantly increasing number of destitute children inundates230 our poorer districts.
Here, then, we have a peasant who marries late in life, in order not to be overburdened with a family, obliged to bring up the children of others. He will not inculcate foresight on his son. Another lives in continence, and we see him taxed to bring up a set of bastards231. In a religious point of view, his conscience is tranquil232, but in a human point of view he must call himself a fool. . . . . .
We do not pretend here to enter on the grave question of public [p486] charity, we wish only to make this essential observation, that the more a State is centralized, the more that it turns natural responsibility into factitious solidarity, the more it takes away from consequences (which thenceforth affect those who have no connexion with their cause) their providential character of justice, chastisement233, and preventive restraint.
When Government cannot avoid charging itself with a service which ought to remain within the domain of private activity, it ought at least to allow the responsibility to rest as nearly as possible where it would naturally fall. Thus, in the question of foundling hospitals, the principle being that the father and mother should bring up the child, the law should exhaust every means of endeavouring to enforce this. Failing the parents, this burden should fall on the commune; and failing the commune, on the department. Do you desire to multiply foundlings ad infinitum? Declare that the State will take charge of them. It would be still worse if France should undertake to maintain the children of the Chinese, and vice versa. . . . . .
It is, in truth, a singular thing that we should be always endeavouring to make laws to check the evils of responsibility! Will it never be understood that we do not annihilate these evils—we only turn them into a new channel? The result is one injustice the more, and one lesson the less. . . . . .
How is the world to be improved if it be not by every man learning to discharge his duty better? And will each man not discharge his duties better in proportion as he has more to suffer by neglecting or violating them? If social action is to be mixed up in the work of responsibility, it ought to be in order to second it, not to thwart234 it, to concentrate its effects, not to abandon them to chance.
It has been said that opinion is the mistress of the world. Assuredly, in order that opinion should have its proper sway it is necessary that it should be enlightened; and opinion is so much more enlightened in proportion as each man who contributes to form it perceives more clearly the connexion of causes and effects. Now nothing leads us to perceive this connexion better than experience, and experience, as we know, is personal, and the fruit of responsibility.
In the natural play, then, of this great law of responsibility we have a system of valuable teaching with which it is very imprudent to tamper235.
If, by ill-considered combinations, you relieve men from responsibility for their actions, they may still be taught by theory—but [p487] no longer by experience. And I doubt if instruction which has never been sanctioned and confirmed by experience is not more dangerous than ignorance itself. . . . . .
This is one of the most beautiful moral phenomena. There is nothing which we admire more in a man, in a class, in a nation, than the feeling of responsibility. It indicates superior moral culture, and an exquisite237 sensibility to the awards of public opinion. It may be, however, that the sense of responsibility is highly developed in one thing and very little in another. In France, among the educated classes, one would die of shame to be caught cheating at play or addicting238 oneself to solitary239 drinking. These things are laughed at among the peasants. But to traffic in political rights, to make merchandise of his vote, to be guilty of inconsistency, to cry out by turns Vive le Roi! Vive la Ligue! as the interest of the moment may prompt, these are things which our manners do not brand with shame.
The development of the sense of responsibility may be much aided by female intervention. . . . . .
Females are themselves extremely sensible of the feeling of responsibility. . . . . . It rests with them to create this force moralisatrice among the other sex; for it is their province to distribute praise and blame effectively. Why, then, do they not do so? because they are not sufficiently240 acquainted with the connexion between causes and effects in the moral world. . . . . .
The science of morals is the science of all, but especially of the female sex, for they form the manners of a nation. . .
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
pervades
|
|
| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
animates
|
|
| v.使有生气( animate的第三人称单数 )；驱动；使栩栩如生地动作；赋予…以生命 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
embodied
|
|
| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
Christian
|
|
| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
economists
|
|
| n.经济学家，经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
economist
|
|
| n.经济学家，经济专家，节俭的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
con
|
|
| n.反对的观点，反对者，反对票，肺病；vt.精读，学习，默记；adv.反对地，从反面；adj.欺诈的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
providence
|
|
| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
catastrophe
|
|
| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
socialists
|
|
| 社会主义者( socialist的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
socialist
|
|
| n.社会主义者；adj.社会主义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
maxim
|
|
| n.格言，箴言 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
forth
|
|
| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
nostrums
|
|
| n.骗人的疗法，有专利权的药品( nostrum的名词复数 )；妙策 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
infinitely
|
|
| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
solidarity
|
|
| n.团结；休戚相关 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
sociable
|
|
| adj.好交际的，友好的，合群的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
ensemble
|
|
| n.合奏(唱)组；全套服装；整体，总效果 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
melancholy
|
|
| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
crutch
|
|
| n.T字形拐杖；支持，依靠，精神支柱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
oracle
|
|
| n.神谕，神谕处，预言 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
physiologist
|
|
| n.生理学家 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
harmonious
|
|
| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
mechanism
|
|
| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
extremity
|
|
| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
corruption
|
|
| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
haven
|
|
| n.安全的地方，避难所，庇护所 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
diffusion
|
|
| n.流布；普及；散漫 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
physiology
|
|
| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
hues
|
|
| 色彩( hue的名词复数 )； 色调； 信仰； 观点 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
benevolence
|
|
| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
crooked
|
|
| adj.弯曲的；不诚实的，狡猾的，不正当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
clogged
|
|
| （使）阻碍( clog的过去式和过去分词 )； 淤滞 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
sincerity
|
|
| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
simplicity
|
|
| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
disinterestedness
|
|
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
distinguished
|
|
| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
retard
|
|
| n.阻止，延迟；vt.妨碍，延迟，使减速 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
consolatory
|
|
| adj.慰问的，可藉慰的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
decadence
|
|
| n.衰落，颓废 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
descending
|
|
| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
condemned
|
|
| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
apogee
|
|
| n.远地点；极点；顶点 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
civilisation
|
|
| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
fertilizes
|
|
| n.施肥( fertilize的名词复数 )v.施肥( fertilize的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
nay
|
|
| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
antiquated
|
|
| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
infancy
|
|
| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
metaphor
|
|
| n.隐喻，暗喻 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
unity
|
|
| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
incessantly
|
|
| ad.不停地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
elastic
|
|
| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
aggregate
|
|
| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
afflict
|
|
| vt.使身体或精神受痛苦，折磨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
bosom
|
|
| n.胸，胸部；胸怀；内心；adj.亲密的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
physiological
|
|
| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
anatomy
|
|
| n.解剖学，解剖；功能，结构，组织 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
anterior
|
|
| adj.较早的；在前的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
destitution
|
|
| n.穷困，缺乏，贫穷 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
foresight
|
|
| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
ordinance
|
|
| n.法令；条令；条例 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
almighty
|
|
| adj.全能的，万能的；很大的，很强的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
embroil
|
|
| vt.拖累；牵连；使复杂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
effaced
|
|
| v.擦掉( efface的过去式和过去分词 )；抹去；超越；使黯然失色 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
abhor
|
|
| v.憎恶；痛恨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
vindicated
|
|
| v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的过去式和过去分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
sect
|
|
| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
philosophical
|
|
| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
virtue
|
|
| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
vexed
|
|
| adj.争论不休的；（指问题等）棘手的；争论不休的问题；烦恼的v.使烦恼( vex的过去式和过去分词 )；使苦恼；使生气；详细讨论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
impiety
|
|
| n.不敬；不孝 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
deliberately
|
|
| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
persecuted
|
|
| （尤指宗教或政治信仰的）迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的过去式和过去分词 )； 烦扰，困扰或骚扰某人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
erring
|
|
| 做错事的，错误的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
incapable
|
|
| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
promulgate
|
|
| v.宣布；传播；颁布（法令、新法律等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
disciples
|
|
| n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 )；门徒；耶稣的信徒；（尤指）耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
justified
|
|
| a.正当的，有理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
hardy
|
|
| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
favourable
|
|
| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
reign
|
|
| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
annihilate
|
|
| v.使无效；毁灭；取消 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
domain
|
|
| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
fatigue
|
|
| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
exempt
|
|
| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
faculty
|
|
| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
chimerical
|
|
| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
faculties
|
|
| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
exertions
|
|
| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
materialist
|
|
| n. 唯物主义者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
acting
|
|
| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
exempted
|
|
| 使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
incarnate
|
|
| adj.化身的，人体化的，肉色的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
radically
|
|
| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
professes
|
|
| 声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
frenzy
|
|
| n.疯狂，狂热，极度的激动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
demonstration
|
|
| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
vaguely
|
|
| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
remorse
|
|
| n.痛恨，悔恨，自责 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
retract
|
|
| vt.缩回，撤回收回，取消 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
vice
|
|
| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
injustice
|
|
| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
subtlety
|
|
| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
vibration
|
|
| n.颤动，振动；摆动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
regularity
|
|
| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
remunerative
|
|
| adj.有报酬的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
phenomena
|
|
| n.现象 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
unintelligible
|
|
| adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
pane
|
|
| n.窗格玻璃，长方块 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
tribulation
|
|
| n.苦难，灾难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
rectify
|
|
| v.订正，矫正，改正 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
117
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
undoubtedly
|
|
| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
complement
|
|
| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
bruises
|
|
| n.瘀伤，伤痕，擦伤( bruise的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
affected
|
|
| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
apprenticeship
|
|
| n.学徒身份；学徒期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
123
reiterated
|
|
| 反复地说，重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
truthful
|
|
| adj.真实的，说实话的，诚实的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
industrious
|
|
| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
protracted
|
|
| adj.拖延的；延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
specially
|
|
| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
confided
|
|
| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
crucible
|
|
| n.坩锅，严酷的考验 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
extol
|
|
| v.赞美，颂扬 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
calumniate
|
|
| v.诬蔑，中伤 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
destitute
|
|
| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
virtuous
|
|
| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
vouchsafed
|
|
| v.给予，赐予( vouchsafe的过去式和过去分词 )；允诺 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
inevitably
|
|
| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
precisely
|
|
| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
inflict
|
|
| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
entail
|
|
| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
hesitation
|
|
| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
repugnance
|
|
| n.嫌恶 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
abstaining
|
|
| 戒（尤指酒），戒除( abstain的现在分词 )； 弃权（不投票） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
savage
|
|
| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
chastise
|
|
| vt.责骂，严惩 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
entails
|
|
| 使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
elude
|
|
| v.躲避，困惑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
concur
|
|
| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
realization
|
|
| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
stimulate
|
|
| vt.刺激，使兴奋；激励，使…振奋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
elucidate
|
|
| v.阐明，说明 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
frugality
|
|
| n.节约，节俭 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
prodigality
|
|
| n.浪费，挥霍 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
153
annexed
|
|
| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
154
controversy
|
|
| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
155
supreme
|
|
| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
156
discordance
|
|
| n.不调和，不和，不一致性；不整合；假整合 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
157
interdict
|
|
| v.限制；禁止；n.正式禁止；禁令 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
158
broach
|
|
| v.开瓶，提出(题目) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
159
ordains
|
|
| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的第三人称单数 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
160
ordained
|
|
| v.任命（某人）为牧师( ordain的过去式和过去分词 )；授予（某人）圣职；（上帝、法律等）命令；判定 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
161
omnipotent
|
|
| adj.全能的，万能的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
162
obedience
|
|
| n.服从，顺从 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
163
prohibition
|
|
| n.禁止；禁令，禁律 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
164
stipend
|
|
| n.薪贴；奖学金；养老金 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
165
perquisites
|
|
| n.（工资以外的）财务补贴( perquisite的名词复数 )；额外收入；（随职位而得到的）好处；利益 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
166
supersede
|
|
| v.替代；充任 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
167
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
168
exacting
|
|
| adj.苛求的，要求严格的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
169
trifling
|
|
| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
170
precept
|
|
| n.戒律；格言 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
171
precepts
|
|
| n.规诫，戒律，箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
172
literally
|
|
| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
173
legitimate
|
|
| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
174
prohibitions
|
|
| 禁令，禁律( prohibition的名词复数 )； 禁酒； 禁例 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
175
antagonism
|
|
| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
176
emanates
|
|
| v.从…处传出，传出( emanate的第三人称单数 )；产生，表现，显示 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
177
imposture
|
|
| n.冒名顶替，欺骗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
178
doctrine
|
|
| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
179
advancement
|
|
| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
180
publicity
|
|
| n.众所周知，闻名；宣传，广告 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
181
authenticity
|
|
| n.真实性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
182
exculpate
|
|
| v.开脱，使无罪 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
183
rectifies
|
|
| 改正，矫正( rectify的第三人称单数 )； 精馏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
184
vengeance
|
|
| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
185
concurs
|
|
| 同意（concur的第三人称单数形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
186
machinery
|
|
| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
187
costly
|
|
| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
188
repression
|
|
| n.镇压，抑制，抑压 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
189
compensate
|
|
| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
190
impunity
|
|
| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
191
appreciation
|
|
| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
192
esteemed
|
|
| adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 )；敬重；认为；以为 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
193
allege
|
|
| vt.宣称，申述，主张，断言 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
194
invoke
|
|
| v.求助于(神、法律)；恳求，乞求 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
195
constrain
|
|
| vt.限制，约束；克制，抑制 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
196
peril
|
|
| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
197
intervention
|
|
| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
198
analogous
|
|
| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
199
immoral
|
|
| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
200
justify
|
|
| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
201
avarice
|
|
| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
202
cupidity
|
|
| n.贪心，贪财 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
203
inclination
|
|
| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
204
enjoyment
|
|
| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
205
attained
|
|
| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
206
functionaries
|
|
| n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
207
inquiries
|
|
| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
208
repose
|
|
| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
209
meditating
|
|
| a.沉思的，冥想的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
210
espionage
|
|
| n.间谍行为，谍报活动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
211
hatred
|
|
| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
212
engendered
|
|
| v.产生（某形势或状况），造成，引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
213
judicial
|
|
| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
214
redeem
|
|
| v.买回，赎回，挽回，恢复，履行（诺言等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
215
perversion
|
|
| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
216
locomotion
|
|
| n.运动，移动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
217
inert
|
|
| adj.无活动能力的，惰性的；迟钝的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
218
conceal
|
|
| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
219
frightful
|
|
| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
220
unnatural
|
|
| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
221
erect
|
|
| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
222
exalt
|
|
| v.赞扬，歌颂，晋升，提升 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
223
proscribed
|
|
| v.正式宣布（某事物）有危险或被禁止( proscribe的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
224
perversity
|
|
| n.任性；刚愎自用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
225
immorality
|
|
| n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
226
improvidence
|
|
| n.目光短浅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
227
allied
|
|
| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
228
inquiry
|
|
| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
229
shameful
|
|
| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
230
inundates
|
|
| v.淹没( inundate的第三人称单数 )；（洪水般地）涌来；充满；给予或交予（太多事物）使难以应付 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
231
bastards
|
|
| 私生子( bastard的名词复数 )； 坏蛋； 讨厌的事物； 麻烦事 （认为别人走运或不幸时说）家伙 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
232
tranquil
|
|
| adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
233
chastisement
|
|
| n.惩罚 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
234
thwart
|
|
| v.阻挠，妨碍，反对；adj.横(断的) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
235
tamper
|
|
| v.干预，玩弄，贿赂，窜改，削弱，损害 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
236
eminently
|
|
| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
237
exquisite
|
|
| adj.精美的；敏锐的；剧烈的，感觉强烈的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
238
addicting
|
|
| 使沉溺（addict的现在分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
239
solitary
|
|
| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
240
sufficiently
|
|
| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |