The town and cantonment of Nowshera was the base from which all the operations of the Malakand Field Force were conducted. It is situated2 on the India side of the Cabul River and is six hours by rail from Rawal Pindi. In times of peace its garrison3 consists of one native cavalry4 regiment5, one British, and one native infantry6 battalion7. During the war these troops were employed at the front. The barracks became great hospitals. The whole place was crowded with transport and military stores; and only a slender force remained under the orders of Colonel Schalch, the Base Commandant.
The road from Nowshera to the Malakand Pass and camps is forty-seven miles long, and divided into four stages. Usually there is an excellent tonga service, and the distance is covered in about six hours; but while the Field Force was mobilised so much traffic and so many officers passed up and down the line, that the tonga ponies8 were soon reduced to a terrible condition of sores and emaciation9, and could hardly drag the journey out in nine, ten, or even twelve hours. After leaving Nowshera, and crossing the Cabul River, a stage of fifteen miles brings the traveller to Mardan. This place—pronounced "Merdane"—is the permanent station of the Corps10 of Guides. It is shady and agreeable, though terribly hot in the summer months. It boasts an excellent polo ground and a comfortable rest-house. The passer-by should pause to see the Guides' cemetery11, perhaps the only regimental cemetery in the world. To this last resting-place under the palm trees, close to the fields where they have played, and the barracks in which they lived, have been borne the bodies of successive generations of these wardens12 of the marches, killed in action across the frontier line. It is a green and pleasant spot. Nor is there any place in the world where a soldier might lie in braver company.
After Mardan the road becomes more dusty, and the surrounding country barren and arid13. [This description applies to the autumn season. In the winter and spring the country for a time is green and the air cold.] The mountains are approached, and as the tonga advances their shapes and colours are more distinctly seen. A few knolls14 and ridges15 rising from the level plain, mark the outposts of that great array of hills. Crossing a shallow stream—a tributary17 of the Cabul River, Jalala, the second stage is reached. In peace time a small mud fort is the only indication, but this is expanded by the proximity18 of war to a considerable camp, with an entrenchment19 around it. Stopping only to change ponies, for it is a forsaken20 spot, the journey is resumed. The avenue of trees on either side has ceased. The road is seen simply as a white streak21 stretching towards the mountains. It is traversed in a sweltering heat and choking dust. All around the country is red, sterile22 and burnt up. In front the great wall of hills rises dark and ominous23. At length Dargai at the foot of the pass is reached. It is another mud fort, swelled24 during the operations into an entrenched25 camp, and surrounded by a network of barbed wire entanglement26. The Malakand Pass can now be seen—a great cleft27 in the line of mountains—and far up the gorge28, the outline of the fort that guards it, is distinguishable.
The graded road winds up, with many a turn, the long ascent29 from Dargai to the top of the pass. The driver flogs the wretched, sore-backed ponies tirelessly. At length the summit is neared. The view is one worth stopping to look at. Behind and below, under the haze30 of the heat, is the wide expanse of open country—smooth, level, stretching away to the dim horizon. The tonga turns the corner and enters a new world. A cooler breeze is blowing. A single step has led from peace to war; from civilisation31 to savagery32; from India to the mountains. On all sides the landscape is wild and rugged33. Ridge16 succeeds ridge. Valley opens into valley. As far as the eye can reach in every direction are ragged34 peaks and spurs. The country of the plains is left, and we have entered a strange land, as tangled35 as the maze36 at Hampton Court, with mountains instead of hedges. So broken and so confused is the ground, that I despair of conveying a clear impression of it.
The Malakand is like a great cup, of which the rim37 is broken into numerous clefts38 and jagged points. At the bottom of this cup is the "crater39" camp. The deepest cleft is the Malakand Pass. The highest of the jagged points is Guides Hill, on a spur of which the fort stands. It needs no technical knowledge to see, that to defend such a place, the rim of the cup must be held. But in the Malakand, the bottom of the cup is too small to contain the necessary garrison. The whole position is therefore, from the military point of view, bad and indefensible. In the revised and improved scheme of defence, arrangements have been made, to command the available approaches, and to block such as cannot be commanded with barbed wire entanglements40 and other obstructions41; and by a judicious42 system of works much of the rim is now held. But even now I am told by competent judges that the place is a bad one for defence; that the pass could be held by the fort alone, and that the brigade stationed there would be safer and equally useful, if withdrawn43 to Dargai. At the time this story opens the Malakand South Camp was an impossible place to put troops in. It was easy of access. It was cramped44 and commanded by neighbouring heights. [Under the arrangements which have been made since the war, the Malakand position and the works at Chakdara and Dargai will be held by two battalions45 and some details. These will be supported by a flying column, the exact location and composition of which are as yet undetermined.]
The small area of the camp on the Kotal necessitated47 the formation of a second encampment in the plain of Khar. This was close under the north outer edge of the cup. It was called for political reasons North Malakand. As a military position it, also, was radically48 bad. It was everywhere commanded, and surrounded by ravines and nullahs, which made it easy for an enemy to get in, and difficult for troops to get out. It was, of course, of no strategic value, and was merely used as a habitation for the troops intended to hold Malakand, for whom there was no room in the crater and fort. The north camp has now been definitely abandoned.
Nobody, however—least of all those who selected the site—would seem to have contemplated49 the possibility of an attack. Indeed the whole situation was regarded as purely50 temporary. The vacillation51, caused by the change of parties and policies in England, led to the Malakand garrison remaining for two years in a position which could not be well defended either on paper or in reality. At first, after the Chitral campaign of 1895, it was thought that the retention52 of the brigade in this advanced post, was only a matter of a few weeks. But as the months passed by the camp began, in spite of the uncertainty53, to assume an appearance of permanency. The officers built themselves huts and mess rooms. A good polo ground was discovered near Khar, and under careful management rapidly improved. A race-course was projected. Many officers who were married brought their wives and families to the camp among the mountains, and the whole place was rapidly becoming a regular cantonment. No cases of Ghazi outrage54 broke the tranquillity55. The revolvers, which all persons leaving camp were by regulations obliged to take, were either unloaded or carried by a native groom56. Shooting parties were organised to the hills. A well-contested polo tournament was held in Christmas week. Distinguished57 travellers—even a member of Parliament—visited this outpost of empire, and observed with interest the swiftness and ease with which the Anglo-Saxon adapts every situation to his sports and habits.
At the same time the station of the Malakand Brigade was far from being a comfortable one. For two years they lived under canvas or in rude huts. They were exposed to extremes of climate. They were without punkahs or ice in the hot weather. They were nearly fifty miles from the railway, and in respect of companionship and amusements were thrown entirely58 on their own resources. When the British cavalry officer succeeds, in spite of official opposition59, expense and discouragement, in getting on service across the frontier, he is apt to look with envious60 eyes at the officers of the Frontier Force, who are taken as a matter of course and compelled to do by command, what he would solicit61 as a favour. But he must remember that this is their compensation for long months of discomfort62 and monotony in lonely and out-of-the-way stations, and for undergoing hardships which, though honourable63 and welcome in the face of the enemy, become obnoxious64 in times of peace.
After crossing the Malakand Pass the first turning to the right leads to the Swat Valley. The traveller is now within the mountains. In every direction the view is restricted or terminated by walls of rock. The valley itself is broad, level and fertile. The river flows swiftly through the middle. On either side of it, is a broad strip of rice fields. Other crops occupy the drier ground. Numerous villages, some of which contain large populations, are scattered65 about. It is a beautiful scene. The cool breezes of the mountains temper the heat of the sun. The abundant rains preserve the verdure of the earth.
In ancient times this region was the seat of a Buddhistic66 kingdom, and was known as Woo-Chang or "Udyana," which means "the Park," and proclaims the appreciation67 which its former possessors had of their pleasant valley. "The people," says the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hien, who visited the country in the fifth century, "all use the language of Central India, 'Central India' being what we should call the 'Middle Kingdom.' The food and clothes of the common people are the same as in that Central Kingdom. The law of Buddha68 is very flourishing in Woo-Chang." "The Park," which includes all the country on both banks of the Swat River—then called the Subhavastu—but which perhaps applies more particularly to the upper end of the valley, was famous for its forests, flowers and fruit. But though the valley retains much of its beauty, its forests have been destroyed by the improvidence69, and its flowers and fruit have declined through the ignorance, of the fierce conquerors70 into whose hands it fell.
The reputation which its present inhabitants enjoy is evil. Their treacherous71 character has distinguished them even among peoples notoriously faithless and cruel. Among Pathans it is a common saying: "Swat is heaven, but the Swatis are hell-fiends." For many years they had lain under the stigma72 of cowardice73, and were despised as well as distrusted by the tribes of the border; but their conduct in the recent fighting has cleared them at least from this imputation74.
Several minor75 chieftains now divide authority in the Swat Valley, but till 1870 it was governed by a single ruler. The Ahkund of Swat was by origin a cowherd, an office considered most honourable in India. The cow is a sacred beast. His service is acceptable to the Gods and men. Princes glory in the name—though they do not usually carry their enthusiasm further. "Guicowar" translated literally76 means "cowherd." From such employment the future Ahkund received his inspiration. He sat for many years by the banks of the Indus, and meditated77. Thus he became a saint. The longer his riparian reflections were continued, the greater his sanctity became. The fame of his holiness spread throughout all the region. The Swatis besought78 him to come and live in their valley. After dignified79 and diplomatic reluctance80, he consented to exchange the banks of the Indus for those of the Swat. For some years, he lived in the green valley, and enjoyed the reverence81 of its people. At the time of the great mutiny, Said Akbar, the King of Swat, died, and the saint succeeded to the temporal as well as the spiritual authority. In 1863 he preached the Jehad against the British, and headed the Swatis and Bunerwals in the Ambeyla campaign. The power which the Sirkar so extravagantly82 displayed to bring the war to an end, evidently impressed the old man, for at its close he made friends with the Government and received from them many tokens of respect.
Before he died in 1870, he summoned his people around him and declared to them that one day their valley would be the scene of a struggle between the Russians and the British. When that came to pass he charged them to fight on our side. The saying is firmly fixed83 in the hearts of the tribesmen, and is associated with the memory of their famous priest, known to English minds chiefly through the medium of the "Bab Ballads84."
His two sons are dead, but his two grandsons, [the Mianguls of Swat] both quite young, live on in the valley, and are the owners of the Ahkund's freeholds, which are in every section of the Swat country. They have very little political influence; but their persons and property are respected by the people and by the British for the sake of their grandfather, who sleeps in an odour of sanctity at Saidu, near Mingaora.
From the Malakand the signal tower of Chakdara can be seen eight miles away to the eastward85. Thither86 the broad graded road runs like a ribbon across the plain. Seven miles from the Kotal Camp, it crosses the Amandara Pass, a gap in a considerable underfeature, which juts87 from the southern mountains. After this it turns more to the north and leads to the fortified88 bridge across the river. I invite the reader to remark this road, for it is historic. It is not only the route by which the Malakand Field Force was able to advance, but it is the very reason of their existence. Without this road there would have been no Malakand Camps, no fighting, no Malakand Field Force, no story. It is the road to Chitral.
Here then, at once, the whole vast question of frontier policy is raised. We hold the Malakand Pass to keep the Chitral road open. We keep the Chitral road open because we have retained Chitral. We retain Chitral in accordance with the "Forward Policy." I am thus confronted at the very outset of this book, which was intended to be devoted89 chiefly to the narration90 of military events and small incidents, with that wide political question, on which the keenest intellects in England are in doubt, and the most valuable expert evidence in India is divided. The reader must not think me pusillanimous91 or weak if I postpone92 the discussion of so great and controversial a matter till a later chapter, when I may perhaps enjoy a larger measure of his sympathy and agreement. After the story has been told, it may not be inappropriate to point the moral.
Prudence93 encourages procrastination94. But while the consideration of the advisability of the retention of Chitral may be deferred95, a description of the means is convenient, if not necessary, to the present chapter.
Nowshera is the railway base of the road. Thence we have followed it to Mardan and across the frontier. Here the new and disputed portion begins. Passing at first through the Lower Ranizai country, it climbs the Malakand Pass, descends96 into the valley beyond and runs thence through Upper Ranizai territory and Lower Swat to Chakdara. Here it crosses the Swat River by the fine suspension bridge which the fort guards. The three spans of this bridge are together nearly 1500 feet long. It was constructed in 1895, during the operations, in about six weeks, and is a very remarkable97 piece of military engineering. Beyond the Swat the road runs through the territories of the Khan of Dir, north and east to Sadu, an obscure village thirty-five miles from Malakand. This marks the end of the first section, and further than this wheeled traffic cannot go. The road, now become a camel track, winds along the left bank of the Panjkora River to within five miles of Dir, where it crosses to the right bank by another suspension bridge. Thence it continues to the junction98 of the Dir stream, along which it finds its way to Dir itself, some fifty miles from Sadu. Beyond Dir camels cannot proceed, and here begins the third section—a path practicable only for mules99, and about sixty miles long. From Dir the road is a triumph of engineering. In many places it is carried on wooden galleries perched on the faces of steep and tremendous cliffs, and at others it works round spurs by astounding100 zig-zags, or is scarped from the mountain side. At the end of the road is Fort Chitral with a garrison of two battalions, one company of sappers, and two mountain guns.
The road is maintained and protected by the tribes through whose territories it passes; but the two principal points where it might be closed are held by Imperial garrisons101. The Malakand Fort guards the passage of the mountains. Chakdara holds the bridge across the river. The rest is left to the tribal102 levies103. The Ranizai tribe receive an annual subsidy104 from the Indian Government of 30,000 rupees, out of which they maintain 200 irregulars armed with Sniders, and irreverently called by the British officers, "Catch-'em-alive-Os." These drive away marauders and discourage outrage and murder. The Khan of Dir, through whose territory the road runs for seventy-three miles, also receives a subsidy from Government of 60,000 rupees, in consideration of which he provides 400 irregulars for its service.
Until the great rising these arrangements worked admirably. The tribesmen interested in the maintenance of the route, were most reluctant to engage in hostilities105 against the Government. The Lower Ranizais, south of Malakand, abstained106 altogether. The elders of the tribe collected all the arms of their hot-headed youths, and forbade them to attack the troops. The Upper Ranizais were nearer the scene of the disturbance107, and were induced by superstition108 and fear to join the Mullah; but very half-heartedly. The Swatis were carried away by fanaticism109. The Khan of Dir throughout behaved loyally, as he is entirely dependent on British support, and his people realise the advantages of the subsidy.
If the road is interesting its story is more so, and a summary of the events and causes which have led to its construction, may also throw some light on the political history and methods of the border tribes.
The uncertainty and insecurity of their power, has always led petty chiefs to seek the support of some powerful suzerain. In 1876 the Mehtar of Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk, was encouraged to seek the protection, and become the vassal110 of our vassal, the Maharaja of Cashmere. In accordance with the general scheme of advance, then already adopted by the Indian Government, a British agency was at once established at Gilgit on the Chitral-Cashmere frontier. Aman-ul-Mulk was presented with a certain supply of arms and ammunition111, and an annual subsidy of 6000 rupees, afterwards raised to 12,000 rupees. The British thus obtained an interest in Chitral, and a point of observation on its borders. In 1881 the agency was withdrawn, but the influence remained, and in 1889 it was re-established with a much larger garrison. Meanwhile Aman-ul-Mulk ruled in Chitral, showing great respect to the wishes of the Government, and in the enjoyment112 of his subsidy and comparative peace. But in 1892 he died, leaving many sons, all equally ferocious113, ambitious and unscrupulous. One of these, Afzal by name, though not the eldest114 or acknowledged heir, had the good fortune to be on the spot. He seized the reins115 of power, and having murdered as many if his brothers as he could catch, proclaimed himself Mehtar, and invited the recognition of the Indian Government. He was acknowledged chief, as he seemed to be "a man of courage and determination," and his rule afforded a prospect116 of settled government. Surviving brothers fled to neighbouring states.
Nizam, the eldest, came to Gilgit and appealed to the British. He got no help. The blessing117 had already been bestowed118. But in November, 1892, Sher Afzul, a brother of the late Aman, returned by stealth to Chitral, whence fraternal affection had driven him, and killed the new Mehtar and another brother, both of whom were his nephews. The "wicked uncle" then ascended119 the throne, or its equivalent. He was, however, opposed. The Indian Government refused to recognise him. Nizam, at Gilgit, urged his claims, and was finally allowed to go and try to regain120 his inheritance. The moral support of 250 Cashmere rifles brought him many adherents121. He was joined by the people. It was the landing of William of Orange on a reduced scale, and with Cashmere troops instead of Dutch Guards. Twelve hundred men sent by Sher Afzul to oppose him, deserted122 to his side. The avuncular123 usurper124, realising that it might be dangerous to wait longer, fled to Afghanistan, as James II had fled to France, was received by the ruler with hospitality, and carefully preserved as an element of future disorder125.
Nizam now became Mehtar according to his desire. But he did not greatly enjoy his power, and may have evolved some trite126 reflections on the vanity of earthly ambition. From the first he was poor and unpopular. With the support of the Government of India, however, he managed to maintain a weak, squalid rule for a space. To give him countenance127, and in accordance with the Policy, Captain Younghusband was sent to the country with a hundred bayonets. The Gilgit garrison was increased by a battalion, and several posts were established between that place and Mastuj.
Thus the Imperial forces had entered Chitral. Their position was soon to become one of danger. They were separated from Gilgit by many miles of bad road, and warlike tribesmen. To move troops from Gilgit would always be slow and difficult. Another route was however possible, the route I have described—a route northwards from Peshawar through Dir—shorter and easier, starting from British territory and the railway. Towards this line of communication the Indian Government now looked. If British troops or agents were to be retained in Chitral, if in other words their recognised policy was to be continued, this route must be opened up. They sounded the Home Government. Lord Kimberley replied, deprecating increase of responsibilities, of territory and expenditure128, and declining to pledge himself to support such a scheme. At the same time he sanctioned the temporary retention of the troops, and the agent, in the hopes of strengthening Nizam. [Despatch129 from Secretary of State, No.34, 1st Sept., 1893.]
At this point Umra Khan must enter the story. The Gilgit agency report, dated 28th April, 1890, speaks of this chief, who was the Khan of Jandul, but whose influence pervaded130 the whole of Bajaur as "the most important man between Chitral and Pashawar." To this powerful ruler, another of the sons of Aman, named Amir, had fled from the family massacre131 which followed his father's death. Umra Khan protected him and determined46 to turn him to his own advantage. In May, 1894, this youth—he was about twenty years of age—returned to Chitral, professing132 to have escaped from the hands of Umra Khan. He was kindly133 received by Nizam, who seems to have been much hampered134 throughout his career by his virtue135. On 1st January, 1895, Amir availed himself of his welcome, to murder his brother, and the principal members of the Chitral Cabinet. He proclaimed himself Mentar and asked for recognition. The Imperial officers, though used to frontier politics, refused to commit themselves to any arrangement with such a villain136, until the matter had been considered in India.
Umra Khan now advanced with a large force to the head of the Chitral Valley, nominally137 to assist his dear friend and ally, Amir, to consolidate138 his rule, really in the hopes of extending his own territories. But Amir, knowing Umra well, and having won his kingdom, did not desire to share it. Fighting ensued. The Chitrals were beaten. As he could not make any use of Amir, Umra Khan invited the wicked uncle to return. Sher Afzul accepted. A bargain was struck. Sher Afzul claimed to be made Mehtar, Umra supported his claims. Both threatened force in the event of opposition.
But the Imperial Government rose in wrath139, refused to have anything to do with the new claimant, informed him that his language was impertinent, and warned Umra Khan to leave Chitral territory forthwith or take the consequences. The answer was war. The scanty141 garrisons and scattered parties of British troops were attacked. A company of the 14th Sikhs was cut to pieces. Lieutenants142 Fowler and Edwards were taken prisoners. Fort Chitral, into which the rest of the Chitral mission and their escort had thrown themselves, was closely and fiercely besieged143. To rescue them was imperative144. The 1st Division of the Field Army was mobilised. A force of nearly 16,000 men crossed the frontier on the 1st April, from Mardan, to advance to the relief by the shortest route—the route through Swat and Dir—the line of the present Chitral road. The command of the expedition was confided145 to Sir Robert Low. Sir Bindon Blood was Chief of the Staff.
So far the tale has been of the steady increase of British influence, in accordance with an avowed146 and consistent policy—primarily in Chitral, and ultimately throughout the border tribes. One movement has been followed by another. All have been aimed at a common end. Now suddenly we are confronted with an act by which the Government of India with open eyes placed an obstacle in the path, which they had so long pursued, to follow which they had made so many efforts themselves and demanded so many sacrifices from their subjects. Perhaps from compunction, but probably to soothe147 the Liberal Government, by appearing to localise the disturbances148, and disclaiming149 any further acquisition of territory, they issued a proclamation to "all the people of Swat and the people of Bajaur, who do not side with Umra Khan," in which they declared that they had "no intention of permanently150 occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct" might "force them to pass, or of interfering151 with the independence of the tribes." [Proclamation, 14th March, 1895.]
If this proclamation was intended for political purposes in England, it, from one point of view, succeeded most admirably, for there has been nearly as much written about it as about all the soldiers who have been killed and wounded in the war. It had, however, no effect upon the tribesmen, who were infuriated by the sight if the troops and paid no attention to the protestations of the Government. Had they watched with care the long, steady, deliberate advance, which I have so briefly152 summarised; had they read the avowed and recorded determination of the Indian Administration "to extend and, by degrees, to consolidate their influence" [Letter from Government of India, No.407, 28th February, 1879.] in the whole drainage system of the Indus, they might have even doubted their sincerity153. Instead, and being unable to make fine distinctions, they saw only invasion in the military movements.
They gathered accordingly, to oppose the advance of the troops. To the number of 12,000 they occupied the Malakand Pass—a tremendous position. From this they were driven with great slaughter154 on the 3rd of April, by the two leading brigades of Sir Robert Low's force. Further operations resulted in the passage of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers being effected. The road to Chitral was open. The besiegers of the fort fled, and a small relieving force was able to push through from Gilgit under Colonel Kelly. Umra Khan fled to Afghanistan, and the question of future policy came before the Government of India.
Two alternatives presented themselves: either they must "abandon the attempt to keep up any effective control" over Chitral, or they must put a sufficient garrison there. In pursuance of their recognised policy, the Council decided155 unanimously that to maintain British influence in Chitral was "a matter of first importance." In a despatch [Despatch of Government of India, No.240, 8th May, 1895.] to the Home Government they set forth140 all their reasons, and at the same time declared that it was impossible to garrison Chitral without keeping up the road from Peshawar, by which the Relief force had advanced.
On the 13th of June Lord Rosebery's Cabinet replied decisively, with courage if not with wisdom, that "no military force or European agent should be kept at Chitral, that Chitral should not be fortified, and that no road should be made between Peshawar and Chitral." By this they definitely and finally repudiated156 the policy which had been consistently followed since 1876. They left Chitral to stew157 in its own juice. They over-ruled the Government of India. It was a bold and desperate attempt to return to the old frontier line. The Indian Government replied: "We deeply regret but loyally accept decision," and began to gather up the severed158 strings159 of their policy and weave another web.
But in the nick of time the Liberal Administration fell, and Lord Salisbury's Cabinet reversed their decision. It is interesting, in reading the Blue Books on Indian questions, to watch the emotions of party principles, stirring beneath the uniform mask of official responsibility—which the most reckless of men are compelled to wear as soon as they become ministers. The language, the style, the tone of the correspondence is the same. It is always a great people addressing and instructing their pro-consuls and administrators160. But the influence inclines backwards161 and forwards as the pendulum162 of politics swings. And as the swing in 1895 was a very great one, a proportionate impulse was given to the policy of advance. "It seemed" to the new ministry163 "that the policy... continuously pursued by successive Governments ought not to be lightly abandoned unless its maintenance had become clearly impossible." [Despatch, Secretary of State, No.30, 16th Aug., 1895.] Thus the retention of Chitral was sanctioned, and the road which that retention necessitated was completed.
I approach with nervousness so great a matter as the "Breach164 of Faith" question. In a book devoted chiefly to the deeds of soldiers it seems almost presumptuous165 to discuss an affair which involves the political honour of statesmen. In their unnecessary and gratuitous166 proclamation the Government of India declared, that they had no intention of interfering with the tribes, or of permanently occupying any territory, the troops might march through; whereas now they do interfere167 with the tribesmen, and have established garrisons at Dargai, Malakand and Chakdara, all of which are in the territory through which the troops passed. But it takes two to make a bargain or a breach of faith. The tribes took no notice of the proclamation. They did not understand it. They did not believe it. Where there is no faith there can be no breach of faith. The border peoples resisted the advance. That position annulled168 the proclamation, and proved that it was not credited by the tribesmen. They do not think they have been tricked. They do not regard the road as a "breach of faith." What they do regard it as, is a menace to their independence, and a prelude169 to annexation170. Nor are they wrong. Looking at the road, as I have seen it, and have tried to describe it, running broad and white across the valley; at the soldiers moving along it; at the political officers extending their influence in all directions; at the bridge and fort of Chakdara; and at the growing cantonment on the Malakand Pass, it needs no education to appreciate its significance. Nor can any sophistry171 obscure it.
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forte
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| n.长处，擅长；adj.(音乐)强音的 | |
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situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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ponies
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| 矮种马，小型马( pony的名词复数 )； ￡25 25 英镑 | |
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emaciation
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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cemetery
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wardens
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| n.看守人( warden的名词复数 )；管理员；监察员；监察官 | |
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arid
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| adj.干旱的；(土地)贫瘠的 | |
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knolls
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| n.小圆丘，小土墩( knoll的名词复数 ) | |
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ridges
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| n.脊( ridge的名词复数 )；山脊；脊状突起；大气层的)高压脊 | |
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16
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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17
tributary
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| n.支流；纳贡国；adj.附庸的；辅助的；支流的 | |
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18
proximity
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| n.接近，邻近 | |
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19
entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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20
Forsaken
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| adj. 被遗忘的, 被抛弃的 动词forsake的过去分词 | |
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21
streak
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| n.条理，斑纹，倾向，少许，痕迹；v.加条纹，变成条纹，奔驰，快速移动 | |
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22
sterile
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| adj.不毛的，不孕的，无菌的，枯燥的，贫瘠的 | |
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23
ominous
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| adj.不祥的，不吉的，预兆的，预示的 | |
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24
swelled
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| 增强( swell的过去式和过去分词 )； 肿胀； （使）凸出； 充满（激情） | |
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25
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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26
entanglement
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| n.纠缠，牵累 | |
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27
cleft
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| n.裂缝；adj.裂开的 | |
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28
gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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29
ascent
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| n.(声望或地位)提高；上升，升高；登高 | |
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30
haze
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| n.霾，烟雾；懵懂，迷糊；vi.(over)变模糊 | |
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31
civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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32
savagery
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| n.野性 | |
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33
rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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34
ragged
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| adj.衣衫褴褛的，粗糙的，刺耳的 | |
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35
tangled
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| adj. 纠缠的，紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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36
maze
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| n.迷宫，八阵图，混乱，迷惑 | |
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37
rim
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| n.(圆物的)边，轮缘；边界 | |
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38
clefts
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| n.裂缝( cleft的名词复数 )；裂口；cleave的过去式和过去分词；进退维谷 | |
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39
crater
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| n.火山口，弹坑 | |
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40
entanglements
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| n.瓜葛( entanglement的名词复数 )；牵连；纠缠；缠住 | |
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41
obstructions
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| n.障碍物( obstruction的名词复数 )；阻碍物；阻碍；阻挠 | |
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42
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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43
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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44
cramped
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| a.狭窄的 | |
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45
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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46
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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47
necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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48
radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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49
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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50
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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51
vacillation
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| n.动摇；忧柔寡断 | |
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52
retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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53
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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54
outrage
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| n.暴行，侮辱，愤怒；vt.凌辱，激怒 | |
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55
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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56
groom
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| vt.给（马、狗等）梳毛，照料，使...整洁 | |
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57
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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58
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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59
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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60
envious
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| adj.嫉妒的，羡慕的 | |
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61
solicit
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| vi.勾引；乞求；vt.请求，乞求；招揽(生意) | |
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62
discomfort
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| n.不舒服，不安，难过，困难，不方便 | |
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63
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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64
obnoxious
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| adj.极恼人的，讨人厌的，可憎的 | |
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65
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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66
Buddhistic
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| adj.佛陀的，佛教的 | |
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67
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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68
Buddha
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| n.佛；佛像；佛陀 | |
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69
improvidence
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| n.目光短浅 | |
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70
conquerors
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| 征服者，占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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71
treacherous
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|
| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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72
stigma
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| n.耻辱，污名；(花的)柱头 | |
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73
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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74
imputation
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| n.归罪，责难 | |
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75
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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76
literally
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|
| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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77
meditated
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| 深思，沉思，冥想( meditate的过去式和过去分词 )； 内心策划，考虑 | |
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78
besought
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|
| v.恳求，乞求（某事物）( beseech的过去式和过去分词 )；(beseech的过去式与过去分词) | |
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79
dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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80
reluctance
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|
| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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81
reverence
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|
| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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82
extravagantly
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|
| adv.挥霍无度地 | |
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83
fixed
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|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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84
ballads
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| 民歌，民谣，特别指叙述故事的歌( ballad的名词复数 )； 讴 | |
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85
eastward
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|
| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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86
thither
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|
| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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87
juts
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| v.（使）突出( jut的第三人称单数 )；伸出；（从…）突出；高出 | |
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88
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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89
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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90
narration
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| n.讲述，叙述；故事；记叙体 | |
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91
pusillanimous
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| adj.懦弱的，胆怯的 | |
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92
postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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93
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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94
procrastination
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| n.拖延，耽搁 | |
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95
deferred
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|
| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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96
descends
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| v.下来( descend的第三人称单数 )；下去；下降；下斜 | |
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97
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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98
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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99
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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100
astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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101
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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102
tribal
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| adj.部族的，种族的 | |
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103
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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104
subsidy
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| n.补助金，津贴 | |
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105
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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106
abstained
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| v.戒（尤指酒），戒除( abstain的过去式和过去分词 )；弃权（不投票） | |
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107
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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108
superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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109
fanaticism
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| n.狂热，盲信 | |
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110
vassal
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| n.附庸的；属下；adj.奴仆的 | |
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111
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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112
enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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113
ferocious
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| adj.凶猛的，残暴的，极度的，十分强烈的 | |
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114
eldest
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| adj.最年长的，最年老的 | |
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115
reins
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| 感情，激情； 缰( rein的名词复数 )； 控制手段； 掌管； （成人带着幼儿走路以防其走失时用的）保护带 | |
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116
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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117
blessing
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| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
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118
bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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119
ascended
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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120
regain
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| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
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121
adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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122
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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123
avuncular
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| adj.叔伯般的，慈祥的 | |
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124
usurper
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| n. 篡夺者, 僭取者 | |
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125
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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126
trite
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| adj.陈腐的 | |
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127
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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128
expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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129
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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130
pervaded
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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131
massacre
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| n.残杀，大屠杀；v.残杀，集体屠杀 | |
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132
professing
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| 声称( profess的现在分词 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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133
kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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134
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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135
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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136
villain
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| n.反派演员，反面人物；恶棍；问题的起因 | |
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137
nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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138
consolidate
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| v.使加固，使加强；(把...)联为一体，合并 | |
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139
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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140
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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141
scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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142
lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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143
besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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144
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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145
confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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146
avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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147
soothe
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| v.安慰；使平静；使减轻；缓和；奉承 | |
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148
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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149
disclaiming
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| v.否认( disclaim的现在分词 ) | |
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150
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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151
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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152
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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153
sincerity
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| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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154
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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155
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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156
repudiated
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| v.（正式地）否认( repudiate的过去式和过去分词 )；拒绝接受；拒绝与…往来；拒不履行（法律义务） | |
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157
stew
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| n.炖汤，焖，烦恼；v.炖汤，焖，忧虑 | |
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158
severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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159
strings
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| n.弦 | |
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160
administrators
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| n.管理者( administrator的名词复数 )；有管理（或行政）才能的人；（由遗嘱检验法庭指定的）遗产管理人；奉派暂管主教教区的牧师 | |
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161
backwards
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| adv.往回地，向原处，倒，相反，前后倒置地 | |
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162
pendulum
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| n.摆，钟摆 | |
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163
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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164
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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165
presumptuous
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| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
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166
gratuitous
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| adj.无偿的，免费的；无缘无故的，不必要的 | |
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167
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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168
annulled
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| v.宣告无效( annul的过去式和过去分词 )；取消；使消失；抹去 | |
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169
prelude
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| n.序言，前兆，序曲 | |
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170
annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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171
sophistry
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| n.诡辩 | |
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