The court of Ava had, on its part, also sent urgent messages to the King of Siam--when misfortunes had, to some extent, lowered its pride--calling upon him to make common cause with Burma, and to join it in repelling2 an enemy who would doubtless be as dangerous to him as to Burma.
Siam, however, determined4 to steer5 a middle course. An army was assembled, in readiness for any contingency7; but Siam believed as little as Burma, itself, that the British could possibly be victorious8 over that power; and feared its vengeance9, if she were to ally herself with us while, upon the other hand, Siam had a long sea coast, and feared the injury our fleet might inflict10 upon it, were it to join Burma. The king, therefore, gave both powers an assurance of his friendship; and marched his army down to the frontier of the province of Martaban, which bordered on the great Salween river on the Tenasserim coast, and lay some two hundred miles from Rangoon, across the gulf11 of Martaban.
The intentions of the king being so doubtful, the advance of the Siamese army in this direction could not be regarded with indifference12 by the British. The town of Martaban was the centre of the Burmese military power in Tenasserim, and the advance towards it of the Siamese army would place it in direct communication with that of Burma. On the 13th of October, therefore, a force, consisting of a wing of the 41st Regiment13 and the 3rd Madras Infantry14, sailed from Rangoon against the town. The expedition was delayed by light winds and, when it arrived at the mouth of the river, found that every preparation had been made for an obstinate15 defence. They learned, from a peasant, that strong works had been erected17 on every eminence18 round the town; and that the road from the coast had been cut, and stockaded.
Approach by this route was impossible, for there were twenty miles of country to be traversed; and much of this was under water from the inundations. It was, therefore, determined to go up the river, although this was so shallow and full of shoals that the navigation was extremely difficult. At last, after great labour--incurred by the ships constantly getting ashore--they succeeded in making their way up to Martaban, and anchored off the town.
A heavy cannonade was carried on, for some time, between the ships and the enemy's works. Then the troops were embarked21 in boats, which rowed for the shore under a very heavy fire from the enemy. As soon as they landed, and advanced to attack the stockades22, the Burmese lost heart and hastily retreated; while the inhabitants received the troops as they entered with the warmest welcome--for they were, for the most part, natives of Pegu, and still entertained a deep hatred23 for the Burmese, because of the long oppression that they had suffered at their hands.
Throughout the rest of Tenasserim, however; and indeed, throughout the whole country traversed by the troops later on, the inhabitants appeared to have entirely24 forgotten their ancient nationality, and the conquest of their country by the Burmans; and to have become completely absorbed by them. Throughout the whole time that we occupied Martaban, the people gave no trouble whatever and, indeed, offered to raise a force for service with us, if we wished it.
At the end of October the rain ceased--to the intense delight of the troops--and the cold season set in. November was, however, an exceptionally deadly month--the occasional days of fine weather drawing up the exhalations from the swamps--and the number of deaths was greater than they had been at any previous time. There was, too, no prospect25 of a forward movement, at present. The expedition had come unprovided with boats or other means of transport, making sure that an abundant supply would be obtained, in a country where the whole trade was carried on by the rivers. The promptness with which the native authorities had, on the first appearance of the fleet, sent every boat away, had disappointed this anticipation26 and, although the opening of some of the other rivers had enabled the local fishermen to bring their boats to Rangoon, where fish were eagerly purchased, the British troops were still, up to the end of November, without the means of sending a hundred men up the river, save in the boats of the fleet.
The Indian authorities--believing that, when the Burmese found themselves impotent to turn us out of Rangoon, the court of Ava would be glad to negotiate--had not, until the autumn was drawing to a close, thought of making any preparations to supply the army with water carriage. They now, however, began to bestir themselves. Five hundred boatmen were sent from Chittagong, bringing many boats down with them, and building others at Rangoon. Transports with draft cattle sailed from Bengal, and a considerable reinforcement of troops was on its way to join, at the end of December--for all the natives agreed that no movement could be made, by land, until the end of January.
In November, even Bandoola's army was obliged to make its approach by water. Early in that month it was learned that the Burmese general had given orders for the advance, and preparations were at once begun to meet what none doubted would be a very serious attack. The reinforcements had not yet arrived, and the greatly diminished force was far too small for the length of the line that had to be defended. Redoubts were therefore thrown up, pagodas27 and other buildings were fortified29; and two complete lines of works constructed, from the great pagoda28 to the city, one facing east and the other west.
The post at Kemmendine was strengthened, and was supported by H. M. sloop30 Sophie, a company's cruiser, and a strong division of gunboats. The retention31 of this post was of great importance, as it barred the river approach to Rangoon, and prevented the enemy sending down a huge fleet of war galleys32 and fire rafts to attack the town, and set fire to the merchant shipping33 lying off it.
In the last week of November, smoke was seen to rise from many points in the forest. Many fugitives34 came in from their villages, and reported that Bandoola's army were all on their way down the river; and by the end of the month some sixty thousand men, with a large train of artillery35 and a body of cavalry36, were assembled round our position. Of this force, thirty thousand were armed with muskets37. They had with them, too, a great number of jingals. These little guns carried ball of from six to twelve ounces, and were mounted on a light carriage, which two men could wheel with ease. The cannon20 were carried to the scene of action on elephants. The cavalry were seven hundred strong, drawn39 from the borders of Manipur.
The rest of the army were armed with swords and spears, and carried implements40 for stockading and entrenching42. The force was accompanied by a number of astrologers; and by the Invulnerables--who had, doubtless, satisfactorily explained their failure to capture the pagoda.
A great semicircle of light smoke, rising from the trees, showed that the position taken up by Bandoola extended from the river above Kemmendine to the neighbourhood of Rangoon. On the night of the 31st, the troops at the pagoda heard a loud and continuous stir in the forest. It gradually approached and, by morning, great masses of troops had gathered at the edge of the jungle, within musket38 shot of the post. The garrison44 there were drawn up in readiness to repel3 a sudden rush but, just as the sun rose, a din6 made by thousands of men engaged in cutting down the trees began, and it was evident that the Burmese were going to adopt their usual plan of entrenching themselves behind stockades.
During the time that had elapsed between the repulse45 of the Invulnerables and the arrival of Bandoola's army, Stanley's work was light, and the life dull and monotonous46. An hour was spent, every morning, in examining the fugitives who had, by the retreat of the Burmese, been enabled to make their way back to the town; and of women who had escaped from the vigilance of the Burmese police, and had come in from the villages where they had been held as hostages for their husbands. Once or twice a week, he went off with the general to the hospital ship, to inquire into the state of the sick and to pay a visit to the long line of cots along the main and lower deck. Almost every day he rode, in spite of the weather, to one or other of the regimental camps; and soon came to know most of the officers of the force. His previous experience on the rivers had done much to acclimatise him, and his health continued good.
On the evening of the 30th he had, at the general's order, ridden up to the pagoda. It was considered likely that the attack would be delivered there in the first place and, at three o'clock in the morning, when it became evident that a large body of men were approaching through the forest, he galloped47 back to Rangoon with the news and, at five, rode out again with Sir A. Campbell.
Among the garrison there was much disappointment when the sound of wood chopping announced that the Burmese did not intend to attack; but the general, who had been watching the edge of the jungle through his glasses, lowered them and put them into their case with an expression of satisfaction.
"I don't want them to attack, Colonel," he said. "If they do, and we beat them off, we are no nearer the end than before. That sort of thing might be carried on for months; as long, in fact, as there remains48 a man to bring up. What we want is to inflict such a heavy blow upon them, that even the court at Ava may become convinced that they cannot hope to drive us out of Rangoon; in which case they may consent to negotiate, and we may bring the war to an end.
"Heaven knows that we have suffered enough loss, at present; and I don't want to have to undertake such a difficult operation as an advance against Ava. I am glad to see that they have begun to construct stockades. I do not intend to interfere49 until they have completely finished their work, and gained sufficient confidence to make a general attack on us. Then we shall be able to give them a heavy lesson.
"Ah, there they are, at work!"
As he spoke50, a roar of musketry and artillery broke out suddenly from Kemmendine, and all eyes were turned in that direction. The spot was two miles distant, but the forest shut out, alike, the view of the river and of the works held by us. The exact position, however, was indicated by the masts of the two war vessels51, rising above the trees.
Soon great wreaths of heavy white smoke rose above the forest, in and around Kemmendine, shutting out all view. The fire continued without abatement52, and it was evident that the attack was a hot and determined one. Confident as all felt that the little fort would be able to defend itself successfully, the great smoke clouds were watched with some feeling of anxiety; for the garrison was, after all, but a handful. In momentary53 intervals54 of the firing, the yells and shouts of the natives could be distinctly heard and, once or twice, after a heavy broadside from the ships of war, the cheers of the British sailors could be plainly recognized.
After two hours' fighting the din gradually ceased. The clouds of smoke rolled away, and the masts of the ships became visible, and the garrison of the pagoda raised three hearty55 cheers, to tell the defenders56 that their successful defence had been watched and welcomed.
Presently some heavy columns of the enemy issued from the forest, on the other side of the river; and marched across the plain to Dalla, which faced Rangoon. They moved with great regularity57 and order, led by their chiefs on horseback, their gilded58 umbrellas glittering in the rays of the sun. On reaching the bank of the river opposite Rangoon, they began entrenching themselves and throwing up stockades and batteries; with the evident intention of opening fire on the shipping. Soon afterwards large bodies of men issued from the forest facing the pagoda and, marching along a slight ridge59, that extended from that point to the creek60 below Rangoon, took up their position there, and began entrenching themselves all along the line. Thus the British position was now completely surrounded; there was, however, no doubt that the main body of the enemy was still facing the pagoda.
"We must see what they are doing," the general said. "This is too important a point for us to allow them to erect16 a strongly fortified position, close at hand."
Accordingly, Tollemache was sent down with an order to the 18th Madras Infantry--supported by a detachment of the 13th Regiment, under Major Sale--to advance against the enemy in the jungle. The movements of this force were eagerly watched from the terrace of the pagoda. At a rapid pace they crossed the intervening ground, and a rattle61 of musketry broke out from the jungle as they approached. The British made no response; but charged, with a cheer, and were soon lost to sight in the trees. Their regular volleys could be heard, at short intervals, above the scattered62 rattle of the Burmese musketeers; and their cheers frequently rose, loud and triumphant63. In half an hour the red line emerged again from the jungle, having destroyed the stockades the Burmese had erected; captured several guns, a quantity of muskets, and entrenching tools thrown away by the Burmese; and killed a large number of the enemy.
During the day the enemy made repeated efforts to send fire rafts down the river from above Kemmendine. These rafts were constructed of bamboos, upon which were placed great numbers of earthenware64 pots, filled with petroleum65. These rafts were skilfully66 constructed, and made in sections so that, when they drifted against an anchor chain, they would divide--those on each side swinging round, so as to envelop67 the ship on both sides with fire.
The sailors from the sloops68 and gunboats rowed up to meet the rafts and, although a heavy fire was kept up by the enemy, from the jungles lining69 the banks, they succeeded in towing most of them safely to shore; while the rest grounded on a projecting spit, off Kemmendine.
So diligently70 did the Burmese work at all points throughout the day that, by the afternoon, their whole line of circumvallation was covered with earthworks; behind which they lay, entirely hidden from sight.
"If they could fight as well as they dig, and build stockades," Sir A. Campbell remarked, "they would be one of the most formidable enemies in the world. No European army ever accomplished71 the work of entrenching themselves so speedily as they have done. Their arrangements have been admirable. Everything has been done without confusion, and each body has taken up the position allotted72 to it; as is evident by the fact that there is no gap in their lines.
"As to Bandoola's tactics, I cannot say so much for them. In the first place, he has divided his force into two parts, separated by a river, and incapable73 of helping74 each other. In the next place, great as are his numbers, his lines are far too extended.
"Well, we will let them go on for a time; and then show them the mistake that they have committed."
Major Sale's reports of the entrenchments were that they consisted of a long line of holes, each capable of containing two men. The earth was dug out on one side so as to form a sort of cave. In this was a bed of straw or brushwood, on which one man could sleep, while the other watched. Each hole contained a sufficient supply of rice, water, and even fuel for its inmates76. One line of these holes had been completed, and another was being dug a short distance in advance.
The Burmese do not relieve their men in the trenches77. Those who occupy the line first made remain there. Fresh men dig and occupy the next line, and so the advance is continued, until close to the work to be attacked. The system has the great advantage that a shell falling into one of these holes only kills its two occupants; instead of destroying many, as it might do if it fell in a continuous trench43.
In the afternoon the general returned to Rangoon, leaving Stanley at the pagoda, with orders to ride down should there be any change of importance. In the evening a considerable force of Burmese issued from the jungle, and prepared to entrench41 themselves near the northeast angle of the pagoda hill. Major Piper therefore took two companies of the 38th and, descending78 the hill, drove the Burmese, in confusion, back to the jungle.
In the morning it was found that the enemy had entrenched79 themselves upon some high and open ground, within musket shot of the north gate of the pagoda. It was separated from the gate by a large tank; but as their jingals and musketry were able, from the point they occupied, to sweep the plateau and the huts occupied by the troops, a party of the 38th and the 28th Madras Infantry went out, and drove them off. As soon, however, as our troops fell back the Burmese reoccupied the position and, for the next few days, a constant skirmishing went on at this point; while an artillery fire was maintained, by the assailants and defenders, along the whole line down to Rangoon, and the enemy's batteries at Dalla kept up an incessant80 fire on the shipping. Kemmendine was attacked time after time, and many attempts made to launch fire rafts down the river.
The work was very harassing81 for the troops. Night and day they were expecting an attack in force; and there was a general feeling of delight when, on the evening of the 4th, orders were issued for a general movement against the enemy.
The latter had, by this time, brought the greater portion of their guns up from the jungle, and placed them in their entrenchments; and it was therefore in the power of the British to strike a heavy blow. A division of the flotilla of gunboats was ordered up the creek by the town. These opened a heavy fire upon the enemy's flank, thus attracting their attention to that point and, after the cannonade had continued for some little time, the two columns of attack--the one eight hundred strong, under Major Sale; the other five hundred, under Major Walker of the Madras army--issued out. The latter was to attack the enemy facing the town, the former to force his way through the centre of their position. He had with him a troop of horse, that had landed only the previous day.
Major Walker's force was the first to encounter the enemy. Their resistance was, for a time, obstinate. Major Walker and several other officers fell, in the attack on the first line of entrenchments; but the soldiers carried it at the point of the bayonet and, as the enemy broke and retreated, followed them so hotly that the works in the rear fell into their hands with but slight opposition82.
Major Sale's column now began its attack on the enemy's centre. Here the resistance was more feeble and, bursting through the enemy's lines, the British drove them before them in headlong flight. Then, turning, they swept along the line of entrenchments; carrying all before them until they effected a junction83 with the other column, which was advancing to meet them. They then drove the Burmese from every part of their works into the jungle, leaving the ground behind them covered with dead and wounded.
Except at the point first attacked by Major Walker, the resistance of the Burmese was very feeble, and the British loss inconsiderable; and a large number of guns, entrenching tools, and muskets fell into the hands of the victors. The next day Bandoola rallied the troops that had been driven from the plain, and gathered the greatest part of his force in the forest round the pagoda, where they continued to push forward their works with unabated energy.
The British had a day of rest given them and, on the 7th, prepared to attack the enemy at this point. Four columns of attack were formed, composed of detachments drawn from all the corps84 of the army. In the morning a heavy cannonade was opened upon the jungle; the artillery being assisted by several heavy guns which had, with great labour, been brought up by the sailors from the ships to the pagoda. The enemy returned it with a steady fire of light artillery, jingals, and musketry.
While the firing was still going on, the four columns were already in motion. One had entered the jungle on the enemy's left, and another on the right. One of the central columns advanced from the foot of the pagoda hill, while the 38th Regiment descended85 the stairs from the north gate and advanced, one wing on each side of the tank, against the enemy's entrenchments on the high ground. As the four columns approached the enemy, our artillery fire ceased.
The Burmese appeared, for a moment, bewildered at the sight of their foes86 advancing against them from so many directions, but they soon opened a very heavy fire upon the assailants; and kept it up with undiminished steadiness until our troops, advancing at the charge, dashed into their entrenchments and drove them headlong before them into the thick forest behind--where pursuit, which would at any time have been difficult, was now impossible; the troops, exhausted87 by their seven days' and nights' watching, being wholly incapable of following their active and lightly-armed enemies.
There now remained but the force at Dalla to cope with and, in the evening, a force composed of the 89th and 43rd Madras Infantry, under Colonel Parlby, embarked in boats. The night was dark, and the troops crossed unobserved. The alarm was not given until the British actually entered the entrenchments, and opened fire upon the enemy; who were sitting, unsuspicious of danger, round their fires. Scarcely any opposition was encountered, and the whole of the works, with the guns and the stores, were soon in our hands; while the enemy were flying towards the forest.
In the actions during these three days, the Burmese lost some 5000 men, 240 pieces of artillery of every kind, and a great number of muskets and vast supplies of ammunition88; while the British had but 50 killed and 300 wounded. Great numbers of Bandoola's men never rejoined the army, and the whole force was dispersed89 through the country.
Bandoola himself was retiring towards Donabew, with but a remnant of his army, when he met considerable reinforcements on their way to join him. During his operations he had left a reserve corps at the village of Kokein, four miles from the pagoda; and these had been busily entrenching the position, which commanded the road leading from Rangoon to Donabew. The ground was elevated and, on his arrival there, Bandoola set his troops--now some 25,000 in number--to aid in the work. In a marvellously short time the heights were completely stockaded with trunks of trees; and with a broad, deep ditch in front. Beyond this were lines of felled trees, their heads pointing outwards90 and each branch sharpened--forming a very formidable abattis--and, believing this to be impregnable, Bandoola awaited the attack of the British.
As soon as his army had been dispersed, great numbers of deserters, and of the inhabitants of the villages, poured into Rangoon. With the deserters were mingled91 a good many of the troops sent in by Bandoola, himself, with instructions to fire the town. In order to lull92 the suspicions of the British, he caused a report to be spread that an imperial commissioner93 from the court of Ava would arrive, in the course of a few days, to treat for terms of peace.
The general, however, determined to attack Bandoola before the commissioner could arrive; as it was evident that better terms could be obtained, after the total dispersion of the Burmese, than if their famous general remained, with 25,000 men, in a formidable position close at hand. He was uneasy at the presence of so large a number of natives in the town, and the precautions that had been taken against fire, some time before, were now redoubled. Were one to break out, not only might the whole of the stores collected for the advance of the army be destroyed but, if Bandoola had his force gathered in readiness at the edge of the jungle, he might take advantage of the confusion that would be caused by the fire, and rush forward to the attack of the town.
Numbers of troops, and of sailors from the fleet, patrolled the streets in every direction at night but, in spite of their efforts, a week after the retreat of Bandoola the dreaded94 cry of fire was raised. At a dozen points, on the windward side of the town, fires had been lighted by incendiaries and, as there was a brisk wind blowing, the danger was extreme. The drums beat to arms along the whole of the British lines. Orders had already been issued as to what was to be done in such an emergency and, while a portion of the troops lined the trenches, the rest were marched at once to the town, and formed up between it and the jungle, to repel any attack that might be made there; leaving the troops quartered in the town, and the sailors of the fleet to battle with the flames.
For a time it seemed as if the whole place would be swept away but, by levelling lines of huts, and beating out the flames at the barrier so formed, their progress was at length checked; but not until more than half the town had been destroyed. Fortunately this was the half farthest from the river and--with the exception of the commissariat stores for the supply of the troops of the Madras Presidency--the buildings containing the food, ammunition, and necessaries for the army escaped unharmed.
What had happened once might, however, happen again, in spite of all precautions. The general therefore determined to attack Bandoola at once as, were his force once scattered, the motive95 for these incendiary fires would cease to operate.
The difficulties were formidable. One or two light field pieces could, at the most, be taken with the column. They would have to march by a narrow and winding96 footpath97, through a thick forest, exposed at any moment to a desperate attack by the enemy. Moreover, it would be necessary to leave a strong force for the defence of Rangoon, as Bandoola would be sure to learn, from his spies, of the intended movement and, having with him men intimately acquainted with every forest track, could make a rush down upon the town during the absence of so many of its defenders.
The general felt it imperative98, however, to attack without delay and, early on the morning of the 15th, he moved out with a force of 1500 men against Kokein. They marched without molestation99 through the forest and, on reaching its confines, could see the truly formidable nature of the works that they were to attack. The moment they issued from the forest, a dropping fire was opened upon them by parties of the enemy, in flank and rear; and no time was lost in preparing for the assault.
The 13th Light Infantry and the 18th Madras, with 60 cavalry, under Brigadier General Cotton, were ordered to move round the stockade19 and assault it on the left rear; while the rest of the troops, some 800 strong, with 100 cavalry under the general himself, were to attack in front. The enemy's works consisted of a central entrenchment75, connected with two large entrenched stockades on its flank, but somewhat advanced in front of it.
As soon as the force under General Cotton had gained its position in the rear of the enemy, a gun was fired, and the whole force moved forward to the assault.. The Burmans regarded the attack by so insignificant100 a force upon their works with such contempt that they did not, for some time, fire a shot; but continued chanting a war song, swaying themselves to its cadence101, stamping and beating time with their hands on their breasts.
This delay proved fatal to them. When they opened fire, their assailants were already close to the ditch and, leaping down into this, were sheltered from the fire of the defenders. Scaling ladders were speedily placed and the troops, running up them, leaped down into the entrenchment. Astounded102 at this sudden entry into the works they had deemed impregnable, the Burmese hesitated; and the assailants, being joined by their comrades from behind, rushed impetuously upon the enemy.
The column in the rear had greater difficulty--for they had several strong stockades to carry before they reached the central work--and lost four officers and eight men killed, and forty-nine officers and men wounded, in the 13th Regiment alone. Fifteen minutes after the first shot was fired, the whole of the works were in our possession and the Burmese, who gathered in a confused mass, had been decimated by our volleys. They were now in full flight, many being cut down by the cavalry before they reached the shelter of the woods. The British troops marched back to Rangoon; while the Burmese retreated to Donabew, leaving strong posts on the two rivers leading in that direction.
Their retirement103 left it free to the country people to return to Rangoon, and very large numbers came in, including very many of the villagers who had been forced to fight against us. All had alike suffered from famine and hardship. Even the women had been compelled to labour in the work of stockading, and the sufferings of all had been terrible. The work of rebuilding the town began at once, and the wooden huts sprang up with great rapidity; markets were opened and, in a short time, supplies of fish, fruit, game, and vegetables poured in; sufficient not only for the native population, but to effect a most welcome change in the diet of the troops.
As most of the natives were accustomed to the construction and management of boats, the work of preparing the flotilla by which the troops were to proceed up the rivers went on rapidly; and numbers of men were hired as servants and drivers for the commissariat--with which the force was very insufficiently104 supplied, as the natives of India of that class for the most part refused, on account of their caste prejudices, to engage themselves for service across the sea. Reinforcements arrived; and Rangoon, which but six weeks before presented a miserable105 and deserted106 appearance was, towards the beginning of January, a cheerful and bustling107 town.
Preparations were being made in other quarters to assume the offensive. Some 3000 men were driving the Burmese out of Assam; and a force 7000 strong was marching from Sylhet, to expel them from Cachar and capture Manipur; while 11,000 men were assembled at Chittagong, and were advancing into Aracan with the intention of driving the Burmese from that province--and they meant, if possible, to cross the mountains and effect a junction with Sir Archibald Campbell's force. The first part of the operations were conducted with complete success, and Aracan wrested108 from Burma; but it was found impossible to perform the terrible journey across mountain and swamp, or to afford any aid to the main expedition.
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1
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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repelling
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| v.击退( repel的现在分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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steer
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| vt.驾驶，为…操舵；引导；vi.驾驶 | |
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din
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| n.喧闹声，嘈杂声 | |
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7
contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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17
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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18
eminence
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| n.卓越，显赫；高地，高处；名家 | |
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stockade
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| n.栅栏，围栏；v.用栅栏防护 | |
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cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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22
stockades
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| n.（防御用的）栅栏，围桩( stockade的名词复数 ) | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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24
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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26
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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27
pagodas
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| 塔，宝塔( pagoda的名词复数 ) | |
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pagoda
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| n.宝塔（尤指印度和远东的多层宝塔），（印度教或佛教的）塔式庙宇 | |
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29
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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30
sloop
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| n.单桅帆船 | |
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31
retention
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| n.保留，保持，保持力，记忆力 | |
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32
galleys
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| n.平底大船，战舰( galley的名词复数 )；（船上或航空器上的）厨房 | |
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33
shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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34
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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35
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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36
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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37
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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38
musket
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| n.滑膛枪 | |
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39
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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implements
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| n.工具( implement的名词复数 )；家具；手段；[法律]履行（契约等）v.实现( implement的第三人称单数 )；执行；贯彻；使生效 | |
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41
entrench
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| v.使根深蒂固；n.壕沟；防御设施 | |
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42
entrenching
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| v.用壕沟围绕或保护…( entrench的现在分词 )；牢固地确立… | |
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43
trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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45
repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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monotonous
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| adj.单调的，一成不变的，使人厌倦的 | |
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galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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49
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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51
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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52
abatement
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| n.减(免)税，打折扣，冲销 | |
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momentary
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| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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regularity
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| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
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gilded
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| a.镀金的，富有的 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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creek
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| n.小溪，小河，小湾 | |
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61
rattle
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| v.飞奔，碰响；激怒；n.碰撞声；拨浪鼓 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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earthenware
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| n.土器，陶器 | |
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petroleum
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| n.原油，石油 | |
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skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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envelop
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| vt.包，封，遮盖；包围 | |
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68
sloops
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| n.单桅纵帆船( sloop的名词复数 ) | |
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lining
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| n.衬里，衬料 | |
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diligently
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| ad.industriously;carefully | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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72
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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73
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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74
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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75
entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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76
inmates
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| n.囚犯( inmate的名词复数 ) | |
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77
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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79
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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80
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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81
harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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82
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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83
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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84
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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85
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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86
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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87
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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88
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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89
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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outwards
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| adj.外面的，公开的，向外的；adv.向外；n.外形 | |
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91
mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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92
lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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95
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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96
winding
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| n.绕，缠，绕组，线圈 | |
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97
footpath
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| n.小路，人行道 | |
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98
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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99
molestation
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| n.骚扰，干扰，调戏；折磨 | |
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100
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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101
cadence
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| n.（说话声调的）抑扬顿挫 | |
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102
astounded
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| v.使震惊(astound的过去式和过去分词)；愕然；愕；惊讶 | |
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103
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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104
insufficiently
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| adv.不够地，不能胜任地 | |
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105
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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106
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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107
bustling
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| adj.喧闹的 | |
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108
wrested
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| （用力）拧( wrest的过去式和过去分词 )； 费力取得； （从…）攫取； （ 从… ） 强行取去… | |
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